existentialism in literature essay

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Existentialist Movement in Literature

By NASRULLAH MAMBROL on March 29, 2016 • ( 8 )

Existentialist themes are displayed in the Theatre of the Absurd , notably in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, in which two men divert themselves while they wait expectantly for someone (or something) named Godot who never arrives. They claim Godot to be an acquaintance but in fact hardly know him, admitting they would not recognize him if they saw him. To occupy themselves they eat, sleep, talk, argue, sing, play games, exercise swap hats, and contemplate suicide—anything “to hold the terrible silence at bay.” The play “exploits several archetypal forms and situations, all of which lend themselves to both comedy and pathos.” The play also illustrates an attitude toward man’s experience on earth: the poignancy, oppression, camaraderie, hope, corruption, and bewilderment of human experience that can only be reconciled in mind and art of the absurdist. The play examines questions such as death, the meaning of human existence and the place of God in human existence.

Franz Kafka ‘s works, in which themes of alienation and persecution are repeatedly emphasized, permeate the apparent hopelessness•and absurdity that are considered emblematic of existentialism. The Metamorphosis resonates the alienation and revulsion of Gregor Samsa , who gets transformed into a monstrous insect and is hopelessly abandoned and hated by his family. The Trial, in which Josef K. is unexpectedly arrested by two unidentified agents for an unspecified crime. The agents do not name the authority for which they are acting. He is not taken away, however, but left at home to await instructions from the Committee of Affairs. On the last day of K.’s thirtieth year, two men arrive to execute him. He offers little resistance, suggesting that he has realised this as being inevitable for some time. They lead him to a quarry where he is expected to kill himself, but he cannot: The two men then execute him. His last words describe his own death: “Like a doggy” The Castle — in which the protagonist, K., struggles to gain access to the mysterious authorities of a castle who govern the village for unknown reasons. The novel is about alienation bureaucracy, the seemingly endless frustrations of man’s attempts to stand against the system, and the futile and hopeless pursuit of an unobtainable goal.

Albert Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus (which introduces his theory of the absurd) presents Sisyphus’s ceaseless and pointless toil as a metaphor for modern lives spent working at futile jobs in factories and offices. Sisyphus represents an absurd hero who lives life to the fullest, hates death and is condemned to a meaningless task. Camus saw absurdity as the result of our desire for clarity and meaning within a world and condition that offers neither, which he expressed in works like The Stranger and The Plague, which often pointedly resonate as stark allegory of phenomenal consciousness and the human condition. Camus emphasizes the ideas that we ultimately have no control, irrationality of life is inevitable, and he further illustrates the human reaction towards the “absurd.” He questions the meaning of the moral concepts justifying humanity and human suffering. The plague, which befalls Oran, ultimately, enables people to understand that their individual suffering is meaningless. As the epidemic “evolves” within the seasons, so do the citizens of Oran, who instead of willfully giving up to a disease they have no control over, decide to fight against their impending death, thus unwillingly creating optimism in the midst of hopelessness.

Tom Stoppard ‘s Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead is an absurdist tragicomedy and palimpsest, which expands upon the exploits of two minor characters from Shakespeare ‘s Hamlet . Comparisons have also been drawn to Samuel Beckett’s Waiting For Godot, for the presence or two central characters who almost appear to be two halves of a single character. Many plot features are similar as well: the characters pass time by playing questions, impersonating other characters, and interrupting each other or remaining silent for long periods of time. The two characters are portrayed as two clowns or fools in a world that is beyond their understanding. They stumble through philosophical arguments while not realizing the , implications, and muse on the irrationality and randomness of the world.

Jean Anouilh ‘s Antigone also presents arguments founded on existentialist ideas. It is a tragedy inspired by Greek mythology and the play of the same name ( Antigone, by Sophocles ) from the 5th century BC. Produced under Nazi censorship, the play is purposefully ambiguous with regards to the rejection of authority (represented by Antigone) and the acceptance of it (represented by Creon ), Antigone rejects life as desperately meaningless but without affirmatively choosing a noble death. The play discusses the nature of power, fate and choice, the “promise of a humdrum of happiness” and of a mediocre existence.

Critic Martin Esslin in the book Theatre of the Absurd pointed out how many contemporary playwrights such as Samuel Beckett, Eugene lonesco , Jean Genet , and Arthur Adamov wove into their plays the existentialist belief that we are absurd beings lost in a universe empty of real meaning. Esslin noted that many of these playwrights demonstrated the philosophy better than did the plays by Sartre and Camus . Though most of such playwrights, subsequently labeled “Absurdist” (based on Esslin’s book), denied affiliations with existentialism and were often staunchly anti-philosophical (for example, lonesco often claimed he identified more with “ Pataphysics ” or with Surrealism than with Existentialism ), the playwrights are often linked to Existentialism based on Esslin’s observation.

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Categories: Literature , Philosophy

Tags: Literary Criticism , Literary Theory , Modernism , Poetry

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Existentialism as literature.

To what extent does existentialism constitute itself as a literary rather than a primarily philosophical phenomenon? Or, to put a slightly different but related question: what form does existentialism take when it is viewed as literature rather than as philosophy? Such questions arise as a fairly direct consequence of the fact that a number of key existentialist works (or works that have generally been regarded as such) have indeed been works of literature - JeanPaul Sartre's Nausea (La Nausee, 1938) and Albert Camus's The Outsider (L'Etranger, 1939) being two excellent examples - while some of the key figures within or close to the existentialist tradition have been literary rather than philosophical - arguably this is true of Camus, and certainly of Beckett. Rather than simply provide an exploration of existentialism in literature, or a survey of those literary works that figure within existentialism, this essay will also examine the idea of existentialism as literature, sketching a picture of existentialism as it emerges in literary rather than solely philosophical terms.

Although it is sometimes argued that existentialism stands in a special relationship to literature - that it is an especially "literary" mode of philosophizing- David E. Cooper argues that over-reliance on existentialist fiction has actually been a source of misconceptions about existentialism. Refusing to include Camus among the existentialists, or to allow that he might be a philosopher, Cooper claims that "existentialism ... is not a mood or a vocabulary, but a relatively systematic philosophy." I am less persuaded than Cooper by the idea of existentialism as a "systematic philosophy" (if there is anything that is systematic in existentialism, then it is, it seems to me, just phenomenology), and much more inclined to view existentialist literature as providing an important means of access to existentialist thinking or, at least, to what has to be viewed as a form of such thinking. While one approach to existentialism is through the philosophical works that make it up, another approach is surely through the literary works that represent a parallel, and sometimes alternative, mode of articulation and expression.

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5 Existentialism as Literature: The Twentieth Century

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In the wake of scientific and industrial advances in the nineteenth century and the unprecedented destruction of two world wars in the twentieth, existentialist literature emerges as both a crisis of meaning and an ambivalent sense of possibility. This chapter shows how existentialism’s approaches to human existence naturally align with creative forms of expression, particularly those of literary modernism. This chapter examines the literary works by existentialist philosophers including Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus, while demonstrating how other modernist writers—including Rainer Maria Rilke, Kafka, Richard Wright, and Ralph Ellison—extend the reach of existentialist thought. Absurdity, mortality, freedom, alienation, and the pressure on human consciousness of oppression are among the many themes explored in existentialist literature.

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Literary Existentialism

Existentialist Thought in Literature and Art

• Belief Systems
• Key Figures in Atheism
• M.A., Princeton University
• B.A., University of Pennsylvania

Because existentialism is treated as a “lived” philosophy that is understood and explored through how one lives one’s life rather than a “system” that must be studied from books, it is not unexpected that much existentialist thought can be found in literary form (novels, plays) and not just in the traditional philosophical treatises. Indeed, some of the most important examples of existentialist writing are literary rather than purely philosophical.

Some of the most significant examples of literary existentialism can be found in the works of Fyodor Dostoyevsky, a 19th-century Russian novelist who wasn’t even technically an existentialist because he wrote so long before anything like a self-aware existentialism existed. Dostoyevsky was, however, very much a part of the 19th century protests against the common philosophical argument that the universe should be treated as a total, rational, comprehensible system of matter and ideas — exactly the attitude that existentialist philosophers have generally criticized.

According to Dostoyevsky and those like him, the universe is much more random and irrational than we want to believe. There is no rational pattern, there is no overarching theme, and there is no way to fit everything in neat little categories. We might think that we experience order, but in reality the universe is quite unpredictable. As a consequence, attempts to construct a rational humanism that orders our values and commitments is simply a waste of time because the rationalized generalizations we create will only let us down if we rely on them too much.

The idea that there are no rational patterns in life that we can rely upon is a prominent theme in Dostoyevsky’s Notes from the Underground (1864), where an alienated antihero struggles against optimistic assumptions of the rationalist humanism around him. Ultimately, Dostoyevsky seems to argue, we can only find our way by turning to Christian love — something that must be lived, not understood philosophically.

Another author commonly associated with existentialism even though he himself never adopted the label would be the Austrian Jewish writer Franz Kafka. His books and stories frequently deal with an isolated individual coping with malevolent bureaucracies — systems that appeared to act rationally, but which upon closer inspection were revealed to be quite irrational and unpredictable. Other prominent themes of Kafka, like anxiety and and guilt, play important roles in the writings of many existentialists.

Two of the most important literary existentialists were French: Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus . Unlike so many other philosophers, Sartre didn’t simply write technical works for the consumption of trained philosophers. He was unusual in that he wrote philosophy both for philosophers and for lay people: works aimed at the former were typically heavy and complex philosophical books while works aimed at the latter were plays or novels.

A principle theme in the novels of Albert Camus, a French-Algerian journalist, is the idea that human life is, objectively speaking, meaningless. This results in absurdity which can only be overcome by a commitment to moral integrity and social solidarity. According to Camus the absurd is produced via conflict — a conflict between our expectation of a rational, just universe and the actual universe that it is quite indifferent to all of our expectations.

• Albert Camus: Existentialism and Absurdism
• Existentialist Absurdity
• Christian Existentialism
• What is Existentialism? History of Existentialism, Existentialist Philosophy
• Dread and Angst: Themes and Ideas in Existentialist Thought
• What Is Existentialism?
• Atheism and Existentialism
• Atheism and Skepticism in Ancient Greece
• Exploring Sartre's Existentialist Themes on Bad Faith and Fallenness
• Existence Precedes Essence: Existentialist Thought
• The Relationship Between Technology and Religion
• The Similarities Between Religion and Philosophy
• Ethical Individualism
• A Biographical Profile of Philosopher Rene Descartes
• Religion as Opium of the People
• History of American Religion:1600 to 2017

Introduction: Existentialism, Religious and Non-Religious

• First Online: 02 October 2021

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The introductory chapter considers different approaches to twentieth-century existentialism and the various figures associated with it. It makes clear the author’s own view, suggests a revised chronology of existentialism, and explains the choice of the three thinkers—Unamuno, Berdyaev, Marcel—chosen for detailed comparative study. It ends by surveying critically the main contributions to religious existentialism.

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In the 2016 edition of the hitherto unpublished Filosofía lógica , the editors justify the publication of a manuscript whose merit Unamuno himself must have doubted, since he left it forgotten in a drawer all his life, by claiming that it is an early example of Unamuno’s mature philosophy and vital attitudes. Far from anticipating his later philosophy, the only aspect worthy of note that I can detect in this youthful work is Unamuno’s recognition of the importance that language plays in all philosophical speculation, something he learned from Wilhelm von Humboldt whilst researching in his early twenties for his doctorate on the Basque language. For the rest, Filosofía lógica is typical of the kind of manual much used in Spanish oposiciones or competitive examinations for state jobs, based on second-hand information and written in the cold, impersonal, logical style of pretentious philosophizing which Unamuno was later to deplore.

A few years after Berdyaev, Marcel said much the same thing, namely that with Heidegger we are ‘in the presence of a secularized form of certain traditional theological themes’ (PRM: 114).

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Langmead Casserly, J. V. (1956). ‘Gabriel Marcel’, in Michalson, Carl (1956). 76–96.

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Macquarrie, John (1966). Studies in Christian Existentialism (London: SCM Press). [1965].

Pattison, George (1999). Anxious Angels. A Retrospective View of Religious Existentialism (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Pattison, George (2012). ‘ Fear and Trembling and the Paradox of Christian Existentialism’, in in Judaken and Bernasconi (2012). 211–236.

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Schilpp, Paul Arthur and Hahn, Lewis Edwin (1984). (Editors). The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (The Library of Living Philosophers). (La Salle IL: Open Court).

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Webber, Jonathan (2018). Rethinking Existentialism (New York: Oxford University Press).

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Longhurst, C.A. (2021). Introduction: Existentialism, Religious and Non-Religious. In: Unamuno, Berdyaev, Marcel. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81999-6_1

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Existentialism

Definition of existentialism.

Existentialism is a philosophy that focuses on the existence of mankind.  It deals with their efforts of finding a way in this hostile universe. The writers apply existentialist philosophy in their texts to underpin the efforts of dejected, tormented and alienated humans, how they find themselves facing certain choices in the world. It is based on the concept that humans should choose their paths of life independently, and, try to make rational decisions in the irrational universe. In this sense, it liberates them from the clutches of moral values, social norms, and religious beliefs. Several literary pieces of the modern age demonstrate this philosophy in one or the other way. Etymologically, the word existence is derived from the Latin word “existere” which means “to stand out.”

Existentialism Examples from Literature

Why you? Why us for that matter? Why anything? Because this moment simply is. Have you ever seen bugs trapped in amber? Well, here we are, Mr. Pilgrim, trapped in the amber of this moment. There is no why.”

( Slaughterhouse-Five by Kurt Vonnegut , Chapter 4)

This quote is taken from chapter four of Slaughterhouse-Five by Kurt Vonnegut. Billy is trapped by the strange creatures, Tralfamadorians and, is kept in a zoo at their planet, Tralfamadore. When Billy asks them why did they choose him, he does not get a satisfactory answer. As a Tralfamadorian state, there is no reason why Billy is chosen. There is no meaning and philosophy behind it. It is his fate that has dragged him into this situation. Billy’s curiosity shows that humans beings, as a whole, tend to find greater meaning if anything happens. However, most of the times things happen in life without any reason. This quote proves existentialism as Billy is trying to figure out the purpose of his existence in an unknown planet.

“Vladimir: Let’s wait and see what he says. Estragon: Who? Vladimir: Godot. Estragon: Good idea. Vladimir: Let’s wait till we know exactly how we stand. Estragon: On the other hand, it might be bettering to strike the iron before it freezes.”

( Waiting for Godot by Samuel Becket, Act I)

These lines occur in a play , Waiting for Godot written by Samuel Becket. Two Characters, Estragon and Vladimir, are waiting for Godot. Here Vladimir seems to be spiritual and religious about the arrival of Godot to come and direct them. However, Estragon suggests that they should not wait and move on. The writer uses the metaphor of “freezing,” implying human beings do not have time to wait for their spiritual guidance to come and enlighten their souls. Instead, they should avail the chance in hand and make decisions without depending upon someone. Thus, the philosophy of existentialism shines in the suggestion of Estragon who is of the view that they should take their own path before it is too late.

  She said, “If you go slowly, you risk getting sunstroke. But if you go too fast, you work up a sweat and then catch a chill inside the church.” She was right. There was no way out.”

( Albert Camus , The Stranger )

A character , the nurse, speaks these words when addressing Meursault during the funeral procession. The nurse puts Meursault in a serious dilemma . Meursault’s words that there is really no way out points to the frustration he is going through. He realizes that he is forced or condemned to choose one or the other options and that there is no escape. This is entirely an absurd situation that points to the existential situation.

“As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams he found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect.”

( Franz Kafka , The Metamorphosis )

These are the opening lines of The Metamorphosis by Franz Kafka. The protagonist , Gregor wakes up in the morning and finds himself transformed into a gigantic bug. The quote suggests that the transformation of Gregor was just an ordinary event, implying that the world around Gregor was inheritably purposeless, rather than rational so these type of incidents are considered normal. These lines exemplify the idea of existentialism that Gregor is living in an irrational, chaotic and meaningless world, where his miserable plight drags him into an existentialist crisis.

Existentialism Meaning and Functions

Existentialist philosophy serves as a pause for the audience . It gives them a chance to think and ponder upon the nature of their existence. It also gives them a chance to see things from a different perspective . Although it seems illogical to the people belonging to different schools of thoughts, it offers them a new dimension to magnify their existence to see its significance. However, by liberating humans from the chains of religion and moral belief system, it empowers them to make their own choices. Also, it proves a moment of action for the characters.

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Albert Camus and Existentialism 📝

Despite being remembered as one of the most important existentialist philosophers of the 20th century, Camus vehemently denied being one.

Quick Facts

Written by Emma Baldwin

B.A. in English, B.F.A. in Fine Art, and B.A. in Art Histories from East Carolina University.

He didn’t just brush off the label in passing, he stated outright that he is “not an existentialist” in November of 1945 while giving an interview to Les Nouvelles Littérires.

He protested the use of the term in regard to his own work and did not compare himself to Jean-Paul Sartre as many others did. He describes in the same interview his continual surprise (and Sartre’s surprise) at seeing their names “linked”. He goes on to say: 

We have even thought of publishing a short statement in which the undersigned declare that they have nothing in common with each other and refuse to be held responsible for the debts they might respectively incur.

Albert Camus stated that when he and Sartre really got to know one another, it was only their differences that increased not their similarities. 

What is Existentialism? 

Before digging too deeply into why Camus didn’t label himself as an existentialist, it is important to fully investigate what existentialism is and who its major thinkers were (and are). In its simplest form, existentialism is the exploration of the nature of existence with emphasis on the experiences of humanity. The “living human individual” is at the heart of this experience, not just the “thinking subject”. 

The philosophical line of thought is usually associated with thinkers from 19th and 20th century Europe such as Søren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre. They might have had differences, but they all believed in the importance of the human subject, and many considered transitional philosophies too abstract to truly speak on the nature of existence. Kierkegaard is usually named the first existentialist philosopher. He is remembered for proposing that individuals are responsible for giving meaning to life, not religion or society. Humans must, in his view, live life “authentically” and passionately. 

Existentialism was popularized in the post-WWII years mostly due to Sartre whose writings were incredibly influential. Importantly for Camus, Sartre believed that “existence preceded essence”. This means that the individual should be concerned with their own individuality rather than with labels or roles they’re supposed to play. These categories are the “essence” part of the equation.  It is the life one leads that’s important and their “true essence” not the arbitrary essence that society gives to them. 

Existentialism and the Absurd 

The absurd is where Camus comes into the equation. He is often cited as the most important of the absurdist writers and thinkers. The notion of the absurd refers to the idea that there is no meaning to life even though humans continue to strive for it. Camus believed that neither the world nor the human being was absurd. It only comes out in the clash between the need for meaning and the lack of it. One of Camus’ most famous quotes comes from his essay “The Myth of Sisyphus”. In it he writes: 

[…] there is only one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.

Camus did not see suicide as a way of escaping the absurd but as a way to make one’s extinct even more absurd. Only the truly courageous can live on in spite of the absurd, it is a heroic thing to do. 

Why Camus was not an Existentialist? 

As stated in the previous section, Jean-Paul Sartre believed that “existence preceded essence”. Camus saw things the other way around. He believed that essence precedes existence meaning the roles or labels that we are born into are at the center of our lives rather than any individual desire. Despite the fact that Camus shares a starting point with many existentialist thinkers, “The Myth of Sisyphus” is written against existentialist arguments in general. He wrote in the book-length essay the following lines in regard to Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and others: 

They deify what crushes them and find reason to hope in what impoverishes them. That forced hope is religious in all of them (The Myth of Sisyphus).

Camus saw absurdity as essential to the human relationship with the world, in contrast to Sartre and other existentialists who saw it as property but not a fundamental one. Camus built his entire philosophical worldview with absurdity at the center. To him, it is something inescapable, something human beings are constantly coming up against. He believed one could not make sense of the world through reason and that existentialist writers were betraying their initial thoughts by “turning to the transcendent” and looking for something beyond the human condition ( Stanford ).  

About Emma Baldwin

Emma Baldwin, a graduate of East Carolina University, has a deep-rooted passion for literature. She serves as a key contributor to the Book Analysis team with years of experience.

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Existentialism

As an intellectual movement that exploded on the scene in mid-twentieth-century France, “existentialism” is often viewed as a historically situated event that emerged against the backdrop of the Second World War, the Nazi death camps, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all of which created the circumstances for what has been called “the existentialist moment” (Baert 2015), where an entire generation was forced to confront the human condition and the anxiety-provoking givens of death, freedom, and meaninglessness. Although the most popular voices of this movement were French, most notably Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, as well as compatriots such as Albert Camus, Gabriel Marcel, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the conceptual groundwork of the movement was laid much earlier in the nineteenth century by pioneers like Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche and twentieth-century German philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers as well as prominent Spanish intellectuals José Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno. The core ideas have also been illuminated in key literary works. Beyond the plays, short stories, and novels by French luminaries like Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus, there were Parisian writers such as Jean Genet and André Gide, the Russian novelists Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoevsky, the work of Norwegian authors such as Henrik Ibsen and Knut Hamsun, and the German-language iconoclasts Franz Kafka and Rainer Maria Rilke. The movement even found expression across the pond in the work of the “lost generation” of American writers like F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway, mid-century “beat” authors like Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsburg, and William S. Burroughs, and the self-proclaimed “American existentialist,” Norman Mailer (Cotkin 2003, 185).

What distinguishes existentialism from other movements in the intellectual history of the West is how it stretched far beyond the literary and academic worlds. Its ideas are captured in films by Ingmar Bergman, Michelangelo Antonioni, Jean-Luc Goddard, Akira Kurosawa, and Terrence Malick. Its moods are expressed in the paintings of Edvard Munch, Marcel Duchamp, Pablo Picasso, Paul Cézanne, and Edward Hopper and in the vitiated forms of the sculptor Alberto Giocometti. Its emphasis on freedom and the struggle for self-creation informed the radical and emancipatory politics of Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X as well as the writings of Black intellectuals such as Ralph Ellison, Richard Wright, and W.E.B. Du Bois. Its engagement with the relationship between faith and freedom and the incomprehensibility of God shaped theological debates through the lectures and writings of Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and Martin Buber, among others. And, with its penetrating analyses of anxiety and the importance of self-realization, the movement has had a profound impact in the development of humanistic and existential approaches to psychotherapy in the work of a wide range of theorists, including R.D. Laing, Rollo May, Viktor Frankl, and Irvin Yalom.

With this broad and diverse range of incarnations, it is difficult to explain what the term “existentialism” refers to. The word, first introduced by Marcel in 1943, is certainly not a reference to a coherent system or philosophical school. [ 1 ] Indeed, the major contributors are anything but systematic and have widely divergent views, and of these, only Sartre and Beauvoir explicitly self-identified as “existentialists.” In surveying its representative thinkers, one finds secular and religious existentialists, philosophers who embrace a conception of radical freedom and others who reject it. And there are those who regard our relations with others as largely mired in conflict and self-deception and others who recognize a deep capacity for self-less love and interdependence. Given these disparate threads and the fact that there is no unifying doctrine, one can nonetheless distill a set of overlapping ideas that bind the movement together.

• Nihilism : The emergence of existentialism as an intellectual movement was influenced by the rise of nihilism in late nineteenth century Europe as the pre-modern religious worldview was replaced with one that was increasingly secular and scientific. This historical transition resulted in the loss of a transcendent moral framework and contributed to the rise of modernity’s signature experiences: anxiety, alienation, boredom, and meaninglessness.
• Engagement vs. Detachment : Against a philosophical tradition that privileges the standpoint of theoretical detachment and objectivity, existentialism generally begins in medias res , amidst our own situated, first-person experience. The human condition is revealed through an examination of the ways we concretely engage with the world in our everyday lives and struggle to make sense of and give meaning to our existence.
• Existence Precedes Essence : Existentialists forward a novel conception of the self not as a substance or thing with some pre-given nature (or “essence”) but as a situated activity or way of being whereby we are always in the process of making or creating who we are as our life unfolds. This means our essence is not given in advance; we are contingently thrown into existence and are burdened with the task of creating ourselves through our choices and actions.
• Freedom : Existentialists agree that what distinguishes our existence from that of other beings is that we are self-conscious and exist for ourselves, which means we are free and responsible for who we are and what we do. This does not mean we are wholly undetermined but, rather, that we are always beyond or more than ourselves because of our capacity to interpret and give meaning to whatever limits or determines us.
• Authenticity : Existentialists are critical of our ingrained tendency to conform to the norms and expectations of the public world because it prevents us from being authentic or true to ourselves. An authentic life is one that is willing to break with tradition and social convention and courageously affirm the freedom and contingency of our condition. It is generally understood to refer to a life lived with a sense of urgency and commitment based on the meaning-giving projects that matter to each of us as individuals.
• Ethics : Although they reject the idea of moral absolutes and universalizing judgments about right conduct, existentialism should not be dismissed for promoting moral nihilism. For the existentialist, a moral or praiseworthy life is possible. It is one where we acknowledge and own up to our freedom, take full responsibility for our choices, and act in such a way as to help others realize their freedom.

These ideas serve to structure the entry.

1. Nihilism and the Crisis of Modernity

2.1 subjective truth, 2.2 perspectivism, 2.3 being-in-the-world, 2.4 embodiment, 3. existence precedes essence, 4.1 the anxiety of choice, 4.2 mediated freedom, 5.1 the power of moods, 5.2 kierkegaard’s knight of faith, 5.3 nietzsche’s overman, 5.4 heidegger’s resolute dasein, 5.5 self-recovery in sartre and beauvoir, 6.1 authentic being-for-others, 6.2 the ethics of recognition, 6.3 the ethics of engagement, 7.1 post-structuralism, 7.2 narrative and hermeneutic philosophy, 7.3 philosophy of mind and cognitive science, 7.4 critical phenomenology, 7.5 comparative and environmental philosophy, 7.6 philosophy of health and illness, 7.7 a new generation, other internet resources, related entries.

We can find early glimpses of what might be called the “existential attitude” (Solomon 2005) in the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies of antiquity, in the struggle with sin and desire in St. Augustine’s Confessions , in the intimate reflections on death and the meaning of life in Michel de Montaigne’s Essays , and in the confrontation with the “dreadful silence” of the cosmos in Blaise Pascal’s Pensées . But it was not until the nineteenth century that the ideas began to coalesce into a bona fide intellectual movement. By this time, an increasingly secular and scientific worldview was emerging and the traditional religious framework that gave pre-modern life a sense of moral orientation and cohesion was beginning to collapse. Without a north star of moral absolutes to guide us, the modern subject was left abandoned and lost, “wandering,” as Nietzsche writes, “as if through an endless nothing” (1887 [1974], §125). But it wasn’t just the rise of modern science and its cold mechanistic view of the world as a value-less aggregate of objects in causal interaction that contributed to the anxiety and forlornness of the modern age. The rise of Protestantism also played a role. With its rejection of hierarchical Church authority, this new form of Christianity emphasized subjective inwardness and created a unique social configuration grounded in principles of individualism, freedom, and self-reliance. The result was the loss of a sense of community and belongingness rooted in the close-knit social bonds of traditional society. And the Protestant shift intensified the Christian attitude of contemptus mundi (“contempt for the world”), contributing to feelings of loneliness and creating a perception of public life as a domain that was fundamentally inauthentic and corrupt (Aho 2020; Guignon 2004; Taylor 1989).

Along with these historical developments, social transformations associated with the Industrial Revolution and the formation of the modern state were emerging. With newly mechanized working conditions and bureaucratic forms of administration, an increasingly impersonal and alienating social order was established. When Ortega y Gasset introduces his notion of “the mass man,” he captures the automation and lifeless conformism of the machine age, where everybody “feels just like everybody else and is nevertheless not concerned about it” (1930 [1993, 15]). In their conceptions of “the public” (Kierkegaard), “the herd” (Nietzsche), and “the They” (Heidegger), existentialists offer powerful critiques of the leveled down and routinized ways of being that characterize mass society. And the novels and short stories of Dostoevsky, Camus, and Kafka capture the bourgeois emptiness and boredom of the managerial class and the paranoia and distrust that emerges when life is regulated and controlled by faceless bureaucrats.

These social transformations created the conditions for nihilism, where modern humanity suddenly found itself adrift and confused, unsure of which path to take or where to look for a stable and enduring sense of truth and meaning. The condition of nihilism involves the shocking recognition that there is no overarching reason, order, or purpose to our existence, that it is all fundamentally meaningless and absurd. Of all the existentialists, Nietzsche was the most influential and prophetic in diagnosing and conceptualizing the crisis. With the death of God and the loss of moral absolutes, we are exposed to existence “in its most terrible form … without meaning or aim” (Nietzsche 1887 [1974], §55). And it is against this anomic background that the question of existence, of what it means to be, becomes so urgent. But it is a question that requires taking a radically different standpoint than the one privileged by the philosophical tradition.

2. Engagement vs. Detachment

From Plato onward, Western philosophy has generally prioritized a methodology grounded in a perspective of rational detachment and objectivity to arrive at truths that are immutable and timeless. By practicing what Merleau-Ponty disparagingly calls, “high-altitude thinking” (1964 [1968], 73), the philosopher adopts a perspective that is detached and impersonal, a “God’s eye view” or “view from nowhere” uncorrupted by the contingencies of our emotions, our embodiment, or the prejudices of our time and place. In this way the philosopher can grasp the “reality” behind the flux of “appearances,” the essential and timeless nature of things “under the perspective of eternity” ( sub specie aeternitatis ). Existentialism offers a thoroughgoing rejection of this view, arguing that we cannot look down on the human condition from a detached, third-person perspective because we are already thrown into the self-interpreting event or activity of existing, an activity that is always embodied, felt, and historically situated. Existence, then, is generally grasped not just through dispassionate theorizing but through a careful analysis of first-person experience, of the concrete, flesh and blood particulars of everyday life and the feelings, relationships, and commitments that make us who we are. It is a philosophy that begins from the standpoint of the engagé , of the individual who is engaged in life and who confronts the givens of existence.

The existentialist critique of theoretical detachment was pioneered by Kierkegaard whose scorn was directed primarily at G.W. F. Hegel, a philosopher who adopted the “perspective of eternity” to build a metaphysical system that would provide complete knowledge of reality. By taking a disengaged and panoptic view, Kierkegaard argues Hegel’s system invariably covers over the deeply personal project of being human and the specific needs and concerns of the existing individual. In his words, “it makes the subject accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing” (1846 [1941, 173]). In response, Kierkegaard reverses the traditional orientation that privileges objectivity by claiming that, when it comes to the question of existence, one’s own subjective truth is “ the highest truth attainable ” (1846 [1941, 182]). This means the abstract truths of philosophical detachment are always subordinate to the concrete truths of the existing individual. “The real subject,” writes Kierkegaard, “is not the cognitive subject … the real subject is the ethically existing subject” (1846 [1941, 281]). And subjective truth cannot be reasoned about or explained logically; it emerges out of the situated commitments, affects, and needs of the individual. For this reason, it does not disclose timeless and objective truths; it discloses “a truth which is true for me” (1835 [1959, 44]). For Kierkegaard, to live this truth invariably results in feelings of anxiety and confusion because it is objectively uncertain; it has no rational justification, and no one else can understand or relate to it. It is an ineffable truth that is felt rather than known. In this sense, the existing individual “discovers something that thought cannot think” (Kierkegaard 1844 [1936, 29]). But prioritizing the contingent and unrationalizable truths of existence does not mean Kierkegaard is forwarding a position of “irrationalism.” He is claiming, rather, that the standpoint of rational detachment cannot help us access the self-defining commitments and projects that matter to the existing individual. Truths of flesh and blood cannot be reduced to systematic explanation because such truths do not provide us with objective knowledge. Rather, they lay bare the passionate and urgent sense of how we should live our lives. They tell the individual: “what I am to do , not what I am to know” (Kierkegaard, 1835 [1959, 44]).

Nietzsche echoes Kierkegaard’s misgivings about methodological detachment and philosophical systems but he does so by forwarding a pragmatic and perspectival account of truth. He argues that philosophers don’t discover objective truths by means of detached reasoning because truth claims are always shaped by and embedded in specific sociohistorical contexts. Truths, for Nietzsche, are best understood as social constructs; they are created or invented by a historical people, and they endure only so long as they are socially useful. On Nietzsche’s account, truths are passed down historically for generations to the point where they are uncritically accepted as “facts.” But from the standpoint of perspectivism, “facts are precisely what there is not, [there are] only interpretations. [The world] has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings” (Nietzsche 1901 [1968], §481). Nietzsche’s genealogy is one that shows how the history of Western philosophy is largely a history of forgetting how truths are invented. “It is only by means of forgetfulness,” he writes, “that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a ‘truth’” (Nietzsche 1889a [1990a], §93). This means human beings are already bound up in socially constructed perspectives that they cannot disengage or detach from. To exist, then, is to live in one’s “own perspectival forms, and only in them. We cannot see around our own corner” (Nietzsche 1887 [1974], §374). There is no aperspectival “reality.” The epistemological distinction between “appearance” and “reality” is a pseudo-problem that is always parasitic on the perspectival forms that we inhabit.

Nietzsche goes on to suggest there is a psychological motivation in our shared belief in objective truth. It shelters us from the terrifying contingency and mutability of existence. Nietzsche understands that human beings are vulnerable and frightened creatures, and the belief in truth—even though it is an illusion—has social and pragmatic utility by providing a measure of coherence and reliability. We need these truths for psychological protection, to help us cope with an otherwise chaotic and precarious existence. “Truth,” therefore, “is that sort of error without which a certain species of life could not live” (Nietzsche 1901 [1968], §493).

In Being and Time , Heidegger will expand on this critique of detachment and objectivity by developing his own phenomenological analysis of existence or “being-in-the-world” ( In-der-Welt-sein ). Following the core maxim of phenomenology introduced by his teacher Husserl, Heidegger’s philosophy attempts to return “to the things themselves,” to not explain but describe how things are given, reveal themselves, and make sense to us in our average everyday lives. Employing the word “Dasein,” a colloquial German term that refers to the kind of “existence” or “being” unique to humans, Heidegger makes it clear he is not interested in a systematic explanation of what we are , as if existence referred to the objective presence of a substance—e.g., a rational animal, an ego cogito , or an ensouled body. As a phenomenologist, he is concerned with how we are . In his version of phenomenology, Dasein is viewed not as a substance with what-like characteristics but as a self-interpreting, meaning-giving activity. Dasein refers to “the subject’s way of being ” (Heidegger 1927 [1982, 123]), someone who is always already involved and engaged with the equipment, institutions, and practices of a shared world and that embodies a tacit understanding of how to be in that world.

Heidegger’s conception of being-in-the-world articulates three related ideas that will become central to twentieth-century existentialism and phenomenology. First, it offers a thoroughgoing rejection of the Cartesian view of the self or “I” as a discrete mental container of “inner” thoughts and beliefs that is somehow separate and distinct from “outer” objects in the world. There is no inner-outer dualism because the self is not a disembodied mind or consciousness. It is the activity of existing, a relational activity that is structurally bound up in the world. Thus, “self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein” (Heidegger 1927 [1982, 297]). Second, Heidegger compels us to rethink what we mean by “world.” From a phenomenological perspective, the world is not a geometrical space nor is it the sum of objects. It is the relational setting of our lives, the shared context of meaning that we are already involved in. And our involvement in the world allows objects to count and matter to us in particular ways. Third, Heidegger suggests that being-in-the-world is a meaning-giving activity. When we engage with and handle objects in the world, we give them meaning; we encounter them as meaningful . What appears to us in the immediacy of lived experience is always shaped by the public meanings we grow into. The fact that our existence is “fraught with meaning” suggests that experience has an intentional structure; it is always directed towards objects; it is about or of something (Heidegger 1919 [2002, 60]). The experience of hearing, for example, is not a representation of bare sense data because sounds are invariably colored by the context of meaning we are thrown into. We hear some- thing : we hear “the thunder of the heavens, the rustling of the woods, the rumbling of the motors, the noises of the city” (Heidegger 1950 [1971, 65], emphasis added). Meaning, on this view, is not generated by detached cognitive associations. It emerges against the background of our functional involvement in the world, in the way we are situated and engaged in a shared network of equipment, roles, institutions, and projects. And this engagement reveals a kind of pre-reflective competence or practical “know how” ( können ) that can never be made theoretically explicit.

We see, then, that in their critique of third-person detachment existentialists forward the idea that we are already “caught up in the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1945 [1962, 5]). And an essential aspect of being caught up in this way is the experience of one’s own embodiment and the crucial role that bodily orientation, affectivity, perception, and motility play in our everyday being-in-the-world. In this way, philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Beauvoir, and Marcel challenge the traditional interpretation of the body. Against the standard “Cartesian account,” the body is not regarded as a discrete, causally determined object, extended in space, and set apart from the disinterested gaze of the cognizing mind. The body is not something I have. It is a site of affectivity and meaning. It is who I am . And I cannot obtain objective knowledge of my body because I am already living through it; it is the experiential medium of my existence. “The body,” as Sartre puts it, “is lived and not known .” (1943 [1956, 427]) [ 2 ]

By building on the analysis of the lived body ( corps propre , corps vécu , corps vivant , Leib ), existentialists reveal how our moods, perceptions, and experiences are already bound up in worldly meanings, how we internalize these meanings, and how this act of internalization shapes the way we live, how we handle the tools of daily life, maneuver through lived space, relate to others, and interpret and perform our identities. In her pathbreaking work The Second Sex , Beauvoir illuminates this point by showing how a woman tends to internalize the dominant androcentric worldview, resulting in a representation of herself as subordinate, weak, and inferior. She is the “second sex” not because she is born with a particular biological body, but because she inhabits, enacts, and embodies the oppressive meanings and practices unique to her patriarchal situation. As Beauvoir famously puts it, the woman “is not born , but rather becomes a woman.” This is because “the body is not a thing; it is a situation… subject to taboos [and] laws… It is a reference to certain values from which [she] evaluates [herself]” (1949 [1952, 34, 36]).

The existentialist’s distinction between the object-body and the lived-body has made it possible for contemporary philosophers and social theorists to engage the lived experience of those who have been historically marginalized by the western tradition. By rejecting the standpoint of theoretical detachment and focusing on the structures of embodiment and being-in-the-world, influential thinkers such as Franz Fanon (1952 [1967]), Iris Marion Young (1984 [2000]), and Judith Butler (1990), among others, have explored different ways in which we enact and embody forms of oppression and how this can shape our self-image and inhibit the experience of movement, spatial orientation, and other forms of bodily comportment. These investigations help to broaden and pluralize our understanding of the human condition by shedding light on a diverse range of embodied perspectives, from ethnicity and race, sex and gender, and age and physical ability. And insofar as these analyses help capture what is distinct about the meaning-giving activity of humans, they illuminate what is arguably the unifying principle of existentialism: “existence precedes essence.”

This principle was initially introduced early on in Heidegger’s Being and Time when he writes, “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence” (1927 [1962, 42]). [ 3 ] Sartre will later repackage this line with the pithy adage, “existence precedes essence” (1946 [2001, 292]). What this statement suggests is that there is no pre-given or essential nature that determines us, which means that we are always other than ourselves, that we don’t fully coincide with who we are. We exist for ourselves as self-making or self-defining beings, and we are always in the process of making or defining ourselves through the situated choices we make as our lives unfold. This is, according to Sartre, “the first principle of existentialism,” and it “means, first, that man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself” (1946 [2001, 292–3]). The point here is that there can be no complete or definitive account of being human because there is nothing that grounds or secures our existence. Existence is fundamentally unsettled and incomplete because we are always projecting forward into possibilities, “hurling ourselves toward a future” as we imagine and re-imagine who we will be. Existence, then, is not a static thing; it is a dynamic process of self-making.

Acknowledging existence as a self-making process does not mean the existentialist is denying that there are determinate aspects or “facts” about our situation that limit and constrain us. This is our givenness (or “facticity”), and it includes aspects of our being such as our embodiment and spatiality, our creaturely appetites and desires, and the socio-historical context we find ourselves in. But what distinguishes us as humans is that we have the capacity to rise above or “transcend” these facts in the way we relate to, interpret, and make sense of them. If I am compelled by a strong desire for sex, alcohol, or cigarettes, for instance, I do not out of necessity have to act on these desires. I have the freedom to question them and give them meaning, and the meanings I attribute to them shape my choices and the direction my life will take going forward.

This means, unlike other organisms, we are self-conscious beings who can surpass our facticity by calling it into question, interpreting it in different ways, and making decisions about how to deal with it in the future. This is what Kierkegaard means when he describes existence as “a relation that relates to itself” (1849 [1989, 43]). Existence is a reflexive or relational tension between “facticity” and “transcendence,” where we are constrained by our facticity but simultaneously endowed with the freedom to exceed or transcend it. The human being is, as Ortega y Gasset writes, “a kind of ontological centaur, half immersed in nature, half transcending it” (1941, 111). We are not wholly determined by our nature because our nature is always a question or an issue for us. We have the capacity to reflect on and care about it. And the way we care about our nature informs how we create ourselves. Sartre will go so far as to say that human existence is fundamentally “indefinable” and that “there is no human nature” because there is no aspect of our facticity that can fully describe us. Our facticity reveals itself to us only through the self-defining meanings and values that we give to it. “If man […] is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing . Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be” (1946 [2001, 293]). This idea that facticity can always be nullified or negated by our choices reveals the key to understanding the existentialist conception of freedom.

Recognizing that there is no pre-given essence that determines existence, the existentialist makes it clear that it is up to the individual to make his, her, or their own identity through choices and actions. Sartre explains that the coward, for instance, is not the way he is because of an unstable childhood or a particular genetic makeup. The coward “makes himself a coward” by means of his decisions (1946 [2001, 301]). In this way, the existentialist generally affirms the view that the human being has free will, is able to make decisions, and can be held responsible for their actions. [ 4 ] But, as we will see, this does not mean that we can do whatever we want. It means, rather, that existence is structured by our capacity to give meaning to our situation based on the actions and choices we make as our lives unfold. Insofar as we exist, we are envisioning a certain kind of life, assigning a value to our identity, and making ourselves into the kind of person we are.

When we become aware of our freedom as an inescapable given of the human condition, the awareness is often accompanied by anxiety because we realize that we alone are responsible for our choices and the projects we undertake. There is no moral absolute, divine will, or natural law that can provide guidance or justify our actions. We are, in this sense, condemned to be free because “there are no excuses behind us nor justifications before us” (Sartre 1946 [2001, 296]).

In the canon of existentialist literature, no writer captures this idea better than Dostoevsky in his Notes from the Underground . The nameless “underground man” rebels against an increasingly scientized, rational, and mechanistic picture of human behavior promoted by Russian social reformers in the 1860s, where everything a person does was thought to be determined by causal laws. For the underground man, this view reduces the human being to a mechanical cog or “a piano key” (1864 [2009, 18]), and it undermines the one value that gives existence its meaning and dignity, that is, the capacity to choose and create our own lives. [ 5 ] To affirm his freedom, the underground man responds to this situation through self-immolating acts of revolt, doing the opposite of whatever the determinations of rationality, social convention, or the laws of nature demand. When he has a toothache, he refuses to see the doctor; when he is at a party with former school mates, he behaves in outrageous and humiliating ways; when the prostitute Liza reaches out to him in tenderness, he lashes out at her in rage. In this sense, the underground man is an anti-hero. He recognizes that freedom is the highest value, the “most advantageous advantage” (1864 [2009, 17]) for human beings, but at the same time he realizes there is no way of knowing what might come of our choices; they may, as they do for the underground man, result in our own self-destruction. As Dostoevsky writes: “What man wants is simply independent choice, whatever that independence may cost and wherever it may lead. And the choice, of course, the devil only knows what choice” (1864 [2009, 20]).

This account of freedom suggests that my being (or identity) is always penetrated by the possibility of its own negation because I can always question myself and assign new meanings to and interpretations of who I am in the future. My self-interpretation is always insecure or unstable. I may interpret myself as a philosophy professor today, but I am also not a professor insofar as I can freely choose to reject this identity and resign from my job tomorrow. In this sense, I am no-thing, a “being-possible.” As Sartre puts it: “human existence is constituted as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is ” (1943 [1956, 107]). For the existentialist, anxiety discloses this predicament to me, revealing that I’ve been abandoned to a realm of possibilities, where I face a dizzying array of options, and I alone am answerable to whatever options I choose. Understood this way, anxiety is not directed at some external object or event in the world. If I am an incarnation of freedom, it is directed at me ; I am the source of it.

In Being and Nothingness , Sartre forwards an account of “radical” or “absolute” freedom, an unconditioned “freedom-in-consciousness” where we make or create ourselves ex nihilo , through the sheer “upsurge” of choice alone. But in the wake of Marxist criticism in the 1940s and 1950s, his views changed; he realized that this early account was far too abstract, interiorized, and influenced by Cartesian assumptions. [ 6 ] It failed to engage the social, historical, and material conditions that invariably limit and constrain our freedom. He came to recognize that our choices and actions are always mediated by the world, by the sociohistorical situation we’ve been thrown into. He sees that the idea of radical, unconditioned freedom “is nonsense. The truth is that existence ‘is-in-society’ as it ‘is-in-the-world’” (Sartre 1952 [1963, 590]). Freedom must be understood as “freedom-in-situation.” It is true that we are free to create ourselves, but it is also true that we are already created by our situation. “Man,” is best understood as “a totally conditioned social being who does not render back completely what his conditioning has given him” (Sartre 1972 [2008, 35]).

Sartre’s Marxist inspired conception of situated or mediated freedom is one that had already been forwarded and developed by Beauvoir in her major treatises The Second Sex and The Coming of Age and in her novels such as The Blood of Others (1945 [1970]) and The Mandarins (1954 [1991]). The view is also developed by her compatriot Merleau-Ponty. In Phenomenology of Perception , for example, Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that the options we choose to act on do not emerge out of nothing. They are already embedded in a sociohistorical situation “before any personal decision has been made.” (1945 [1962, 449]) The ways in which we create or make ourselves, then, are always circumscribed by the meanings of our situation. We are simultaneously self-making and already made. “We exist in both ways at once,” writes Merleau-Ponty. “We choose the world, and the world chooses us.” (1945 [1962, 453–454]). As we will see in section 6.3, the recognition of the extent to which freedom is mediated by the material conditions of our situation opened existentialism to a broader engagement with the social sphere and the structures of oppression and violence that shape our experience and self-understanding.

5. Authenticity

Existentialism is well known for its critique of mass society and our tendency to conform to the levelled-down norms and expectations of the public. Rather than living our own lives, we tend to get pulled along by the crowd, doing what “they” do. As Heidegger writes, “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure. We read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge … we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The ‘they’… prescribes the kind of being of everydayness” (1927 [1962, 126–7]). Living this way can be comforting, creating the illusion that we are living well because we are doing what everyone else does. But for the existentialist, this conformist way of being is a manifestation of inauthenticity or self-deception because it shows how we are unwilling or unable to face up to the freedom and contingency of our condition; it reveals the extent to which we are afraid of being an individual, of being true to ourselves, and of making our own life-defining choices.

In The Sickness unto Death , Kierkegaard describes inauthenticity in terms of fleeing from ourselves, of “not wanting to be oneself, [of] wanting to be rid of oneself” (1849 [1989, 43]). Insofar as we let others decide our lives for us, we live a life that is bereft of passion, a life of “bloodless indolence,” where we are unwilling or unable to “make a real commitment.” (Kierkegaard 1846 [1946, 266–67]). Similarly, Heidegger will refer to this condition as a form of estrangement that “alienates Dasein from itself,” where we exist as a “they-self” ( Man-selbst ) that drifts along in lockstep with others. (1927 [1962, 254–55]) And this self-estrangement is numbing or “tranquilizing” ( beruhigend ) because it covers over the anxiety of own freedom and finitude.

Sartre and Beauvoir refer to inauthenticity in terms of “bad faith” ( mauvaise foi ), where we either deny or over-identify with one of the two aspects of human existence, either facticity or transcendence. I am in bad faith, for example, when I over-identify with my factical situation and deny my freedom to act on and transform this situation. I am also in bad faith when I over-identify with freedom and deny my past conduct and the fact that my choices are limited and constrained by my situation. Sartre and Beauvoir recognize that the self is never wholly free or wholly determined; it is structurally unstable, it is a “double- property … that is at once a facticity and a transcendence” (Sartre 1943 [1956, 98]). When we cling to one or the other of these poles, we are denying this “double-property,” and this is a denial of the fundamental ambiguity and instability at the core of the human condition.

For the existentialists, the possibility of breaking free from engrained patterns of self-deception is generally not something that is accomplished by means of detached reflection. It emerges in the wake of powerful emotional experiences or moods. When the existentialist refers to feelings of “nausea” (Sartre), “absurdity” (Camus), “anxiety” (Kierkegaard), “guilt” (Heidegger), or “mystery” (Marcel) they are describing uncanny affects that have the power to shake us out of our complacency, where the secure and familiar world breaks apart and collapses, and we are forced to confront the question of existence. Jaspers refers to these moments as “limit” or “boundary situations” ( Grenzsituationen )—situations “when everything that is said to be valuable and true collapses before our eyes” (1932 [1956, 117]).

Although terrifying, the existentialist makes it clear that we should not close our eyes or flee from these experiences because they are structural to the human condition. They are, as Jaspers puts it, “impassable, unchangeable situations that belong to human existence as such” (1913 [1997, 330]). Instead of turning away from this basic anxiety, the existentialist asks us to turn toward and face it, because it is amidst a collapsing world that the ultimate questions emerge: Who am I? and What now? In this way, the existentialist sees the experience of anxiety and its related moods as an opportunity for personal growth and transformation. World-shattering moods open me up to the possibility of being authentic, of accepting and affirming the unsettling givens of my condition, of being released from distractions and trivialities, and of recognizing the self-defining projects that matter to me as an individual.

For Kierkegaard, the authentic individual is someone that is “willing to be one’s own self.” (1843 [1989, 43]) He, she, or they recognize(s) that there is more to life than following the crowd or chasing surface pleasures. Such a life is invariably scattered and disjointed, pulled apart by temporal desires and the fleeting fads and fashions of the public. Authenticity requires a passionate, “personality defining” ( personligheds definerende ) decision or commitment that binds together and unifies the fragmented and disjointed moments of our life into a focused and coherent whole. The “unifying power” of commitment is embodied in, what Kierkegaard calls, an attitude of “earnestness” ( alvor ), a sober recognition that existence is a serious affair, not a pleasure-seeking masquerade. But authenticity cannot be achieved simply by means of renouncing temporal pleasures and doing one’s duty according to some universal moral principle—such as the Ten Commandments or Kant’s Categorical Imperative. This is because, for Kierkegaard, the subjective truth of the individual is higher than the universal truths of morality. And this means there may be times in our lives where we must suspend our obligation to the ethical sphere and accept the terrible fact that it may be more important to be authentic (to be true to oneself) than it is to be moral (to do what is right.)

In Fear and Trembling , Kierkegaard draws on the biblical figure of Abraham to make this point. As a father, Abraham has a moral duty to love and protect his son, but when God demands that he break this commandment and kill Isaac, he is confronted with a personal truth that is higher than the universal. In committing himself to this truth, Abraham becomes a “knight of faith” by “leaping” ( springer ) into a paradox, one where the truth of “the singular individual is higher than the universal” (1843 [1985, 84]). As a religious existentialist, Kierkegaard contends that this is what is required to enter the sphere of faith and become a Christian. It has nothing to do with membership in a congregation or obedience to doctrinal statements. It is, rather, a willingness to commit to a truth that is fundamentally irrational and absurd. How, for example, can one make rational sense of God’s command to Abraham to kill his own son? “The problem,” writes Kierkegaard, “is not to understand Christianity, but to understand that it cannot be understood” (1835–1854 [1959, 146]). [ 7 ] An authentic or religious life, then, is always accompanied by anxiety and loneliness because the leap individualizes us; it cuts us off from the comforting truths of the public and its blanket conceptions of right and wrong. It compels us to follow a path that no one else may understand. Abraham’s decision is, for this reason, fraught with despair. In his willingness to suspend his moral duty, he appears “insane” because he “cannot make himself understood to anyone.” (1985 (1843], 103)

But with the despair of faith comes feelings of intensity, even joy, as we recognize the absurdity of religious existence, that the eternal or divine is not found in some otherworldly realm, it is bound up in the temporal; that it is this life , the finite, that has infinite significance. Freed from the temptations of the crowd and of blind obedience to moral principles, the knight of faith “takes delight in everything he sees” because he is now fully aware of the majesty and richness of finitude. For him, “finitude tastes just as good as to one who has never known anything higher” (1843 [1985, 69–70]).

Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is critical of our tendency to follow the herd and cling to universal moral principles. He forwards a conception of authenticity that accepts our nihilistic predicament and rises above Christian values of good and evil. He sees these values as representative of a tame and submissive way of being, a “slave morality” ( Sklavenmoral ) that is subservient to authority and bereft of any originality or style. Nietzsche contrasts this with a “master morality” ( Herrenmoral ) embodied in those who have the courage to face, even affirm, the cruel and tragic aspects of life and the self-directed power to create their own meanings and values against the backdrop of God’s death. Nietzsche refers to the individual who can overcome the meek and slavish values of tradition for the sake of self-creation as an “Overman” ( Übermensch ), an aristocratic figure who embodies the freedom, courage, and strength to be original, that is, to “give style” to life. “Such spirits,” writes Nietzsche, “are always out of fashion or explain themselves and their surroundings as free nature—wild, arbitrary, fantastic, and surprising” (1887 [1974], §290).

The key to living with style is, for Nietzsche, a radical acceptance of one’s existence and the world as it is , embracing all our strengths and weaknesses and all the blessed and cursed events that have been and will be. The Overman is a “yes-sayer” who affirms every aspect of his life, “every truth, even the simple, bitter, ugly, unchristian, immoral truths” (1887 [1996], §1). In The Gay Science , Nietzsche captures this attitude with a famous thought experiment called the “doctrine of eternal recurrence.” Here, he asks if we have the audacity to live the same life we are living now over and over for eternity. “And there will be nothing new about it,” he explains, “but every pain and every pleasure, and every thought and sigh, and everything unspeakably small and great in your life must come back to you and all in the same series and sequence.” On Nietzsche’s view, most of us would recoil in horror at the prospect of eternally suffering through the same boredom, failures, and disappointments. But overflowing with amor fati (love of one’s fate), the Overman welcomes this possibility, proclaiming, “I have never heard anything more godlike” (1887 [1974], §341). Camus describes this attitude as a form of rebellion against servile and conformist ways of being. Like the Overman, “the rebel” is someone “born of abundance and fullness of spirit,” and he embodies “the unreserved affirmation of human imperfection and suffering, of evil and murder, of all that is problematic and strange in our existence. It is born of an arrested wish to be what one is in a world that is what it is” (1951 [1956, 72]).

But not everyone has the inborn power to rebel against tradition and creatively express their unique style of living. For Nietzsche, only “the highest types” can manifest this kind of freedom and capacity for self-overcoming. To this end, his account of authenticity is unapologetically elitist and anti-democratic. Most of us are too mired in self-deception, too frightened and weak to break with the herd and become who we are. “Only a very few people can be free,” writes Nietzsche, “It is a prerogative of the strong” (1886 [1998], §29).

Heidegger devotes much of the second half of Being and Time to an analysis of authenticity, employing the German term Eigentlichkeit —formed from the stem of the adjective eigen (“own” or “property”)—that literally means “being own’s own” or “ownnness.” But he sets up his analysis of authenticity by first claiming that self-deception or “inauthenticity” is unavoidable; it is a structure of the human condition, one that he refers to as “falling” ( Verfallen ). What this means is that in our everyday lives we invariably conform (or “fall prey”) to the norms and values of the public world. This results in a kind of complacency and indifference about the question of existence, where we are not our own selves, where “everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (1927 [1962, 128]). Falling creates the illusion that our existence (or being-in-the-world) is secure and thing-like because we are doing what everyone else does. But, for Heidegger, there is nothing that fundamentally secures our existence. As a self-making activity, I am not a stable thing. I am nothing, a “not yet” ( noch nicht ) that is always unsettled, always in the process of making myself. The awareness of our own unsettledness emerges in moments of anxiety when the familiar and routinized world “collapses into itself” (1927 [1962, 186]), and I “die” ( sterben ) because I am no longer able-to-be, that is, to understand or make sense of who I am. [ 8 ]

Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger interprets anxiety as an individualizing mood, one that momentarily “snatches one back” from the tranquilizing routines of “the They,” leaving us vulnerable and exposed to confront our lives (1927 [1962, 384]). And this is potentially liberating because it can temporarily free us from patterns of self-deception, providing insight, a “moment of vision” ( Augenblick ) that can give our lives a renewed sense of urgency and focus. But this experience of individuation does not detach me from the world, turning me into a radical subject or “free floating ‘I’” (1927 [1962, 298]). Heidegger claims that our self-defining choices are always guided in advance by our historical embeddedness, what he calls “historicity” ( Geschichtlichkeit ). The meanings we choose to give to our lives, then, are not created out of thin air; they have already been interpreted and made intelligible by a historical community or “people” ( Volk ). [ 9 ] The moment of vision shakes me out of my fallen, everyday existence and allows me to come back to my historical world with fresh eyes, to seize hold of the publicly interpreted meanings that matter to me and make them “mine” ( Jemeinig ).

Heidegger refers to this authentic attitude in terms of “resoluteness” ( Entschlossenheit ), where I “pull [myself] together,” giving life a sense of cohesion and focus that was missing when I was lost and scattered in “the They.” But being resolute does not mean that I stubbornly cling to whatever possibilities I happen to choose. For Heidegger, authenticity demands an openness and flexibility with how I interpret myself. [ 10 ] Understanding that existence is a situated process of self-making, whatever values or meanings I commit myself to, I must also be willing to let go or give up on them depending on the circumstances of my life, that is, to “hold [myself] free for the possibility of taking it back ” (1927 [1962, 308]). Resoluteness, on this view, does not mean “becoming rigid” and holding fast to a chosen identity because my self-understanding is always insecure; it can die at any time. For this reason, authenticity requires “readiness” or “anticipation” ( Vorgriff ), where we passionately hold ourselves open and free for the inescapable breakdowns and emergencies of life. It is, in Heidegger’s words, “an impassioned freedom towards death—a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the ‘They’” (1927 [1962, 266]).

Sartre and Beauvoir follow Heidegger in viewing self-deception as structural to the human condition. It is, as Sartre writes, “an immediate, permanent threat to every project of the human being” (1943 [1956, 116]). Although I can certainly deceive myself by over-identifying with freedom and denying the extent to which my possibilities are constrained by facticity, the most common and familiar form of bad faith is when I over-identify with my facticity, as if I were a fully realized object or thing, a being “in-itself” ( en-soi ). This form of self-deception is understandable as it creates the consoling impression that there is something secure and thing-like about my identity, that “I am what I am,” and there is nothing that can change me. But to live this way is to deny my freedom and transcendence, that I am self-making, that I live for myself —or, in the vernacular of Sartre and Beauvoir, “for-itself” ( pour-soi ). Human beings are, on their view, always in the process of making or constituting themselves, modifying and negating their being through moment-to-moment choices and actions. This means my identity is never fixed or stable because I can always choose to take a new path or interpret myself in other ways. Regardless of how I see myself at a given time—as a professor, a father, or a political activist—I am also “not” that person, because my identity is never realized and complete; I am always free to negate a given identity and define myself differently in the future. This means I am “what I am not ” (1943 [1956, 103]). And this situation appears to undermine the prospect of authenticity altogether. If the self is always unstable, always in question, how can I ever be genuine or true to myself?

In Being and Nothingness , Sartre provides an answer, referring to authenticity in terms of a “recovery” ( récupération ) of a self or way of being “that was previously corrupted” (1943 [1956, 116]). [ 11 ] But this act of “self-recovery” has nothing to do with creating or holding on to a particular identity. It involves, rather, a clear-eyed awareness and acceptance of the instability and ambiguity of the human condition. And, along with this acceptance, a willingness to act in the face of this ambiguity and to take responsibility, however horrible, for wherever these actions might lead. As Sartre writes, “authenticity consists in a lucid consciousness of the situation, in assuming the responsibilities and risks it involves, in accepting it […] sometimes with horror and hate” (1946 [1948, 90]). But just because existence is fundamentally ambiguous does not mean that our chosen projects are meaningless or absurd. My projects have meaning and value because I chose these projects, but the meaning is contingent; it is never enduring or stable. In The Ethics of Ambiguity , Beauvoir explains: “The notion of ambiguity must not be confused with that of absurdity. To declare that existence is absurd is to deny that it can ever be given a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never fixed” (1947 [1948, 129]). The point of authenticity, then, is not to be concerned with who I am —because, at bottom, I am nothing. It is to be concerned with what I do . As Sartre writes, “Authenticity reveals that the only meaningful project is that of doing (not that of being)” (1948 [1992, 475]). For Sartre and Beauvoir, to be authentic is to recover and accept the ambiguous tension of the self, that: we are who we are not —and— we are not who are . And by means of this recovery, recognize that the task of existence involves acting and doing, that is, realizing our freedom through projects in the world but also, as we will see, taking responsibility for how these projects might enhance or diminish freedom for others.

Existentialist ethics generally begins with the idea that there is no external moral order or table of values that exists a priori. “It must be understood,” as Beauvoir writes in The Ethics of Ambiguity , “that the passion in which man has acquiesced finds no external justification. No outside appeal, no objective necessity permits of its being called useful.” But this does not mean that the existentialists are promoting a form of moral nihilism. Beauvoir admits it is true that the human being “has no reason to will itself. But this does not mean that it cannot justify itself, that it cannot give itself reasons for being that it does not have .” It is human existence itself “which makes values spring up in the world on the basis of which it will be able to judge the enterprise in which it will be engaged.” (1947 [1948, 12, 15]). [ 12 ] There is, then, a coherent account of ethical responsibility grounded in freedom, not as a theoretical abstraction but as a concrete expression of transcendence, and the obligation to help others realize their own freedom so that I can realize mine. When I acknowledge that freedom is my essence, I must also acknowledge that it is the essence of others and work, to the best of my ability, to help them realize it. My freedom, then, is not free-floating; it is invariably bound up in the freedom of others. As Sartre puts it: “We want freedom for freedom’s sake and in every particular circumstance. And in wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that freedom of others depends on ours […] I am obliged to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom” (1945 [2001, 306]).

Sartre and Beauvoir argue that we generally exist as “a being-for-others” ( un être-pour-autrui ), which is to say that I understand or see myself in the way that I do through “the look” ( le regard ) of the Other. And the look has the power to strip away my freedom and turn me into an object. Human relations, on this account, are best understood as a form of conflict, a dyadic power struggle where I try to assert my freedom and subjectivity by turning the Other into an object, while the Other tries to do the same to me. “While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other,” writes Sartre, “the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me… Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others” (1943 [1956, 475]). This struggle for self-assertion leads to Sartre’s famous claim in his play Huis Clos (No Exit) that “Hell is— other people ” (1944 [1989, 45]).

But the struggle to objectify and possess the Other by stripping them of their freedom is a manifestation of inauthentic being-for-others. There is an authentic counterpart. Beauvoir, for example, explores what it means to develop and cultivate freedom for others with her account of “authentic love” ( l’amour authentique ), describing it as a relationship where we acknowledge and nurture the other’s freedom and transcendence while at the same time resisting the temptations of bad faith, that is, to see the Other as an object or thing to be manipulated and possessed. As a moral stance, authentic being-for-others is a form of reciprocity that involves “the mutual recognition of two freedoms […] [where] neither would give up transcendence [and] neither would be mutilated” (1949 [1952, 667]). In this way authenticity and morality belong together, whereby we have a shared obligation to liberate or free each other so that we can create ourselves and take responsibility for the life we lead. Therefore, as Beauvoir puts it, “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same decision” (1947 [1948, 24]).

Heidegger develops a similar idea in Being and Time with his account of “liberating concern” ( befreiend Fürsorge ), a form of care where the central aim is to free the Other from patterns of self-deception so that they can anxiously face and create their own existence. It is a relational stance that “helps the Other become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it” (1927 [1962, 122]). When we care in this way, we resist the temptation to “leap-in” ( einspringen ) for the Other, as if the Other were a dependent thing or object that needs to be sheltered from the unsettling question of existence. Heidegger refers to this sheltering tendency in terms of a kind of tacit mastery or “domination” ( Beherrschung ) that strips the Other of the anxious responsibility they have for their own life. Instead of leaping-in for the Other and disburdening them of their responsibility, an authentic relation is one that “leaps-ahead” ( vorausspringt ) of the Other, giving them back their anxiety and the freedom to care for and confront their condition. As Heidegger writes, we leap-ahead of the Other, “not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to them authentically as such for the first time” (1927 [1962, 122]). Here, we see the development of an ethical maxim: to act in such a way as to will the realization of your own freedom and the realization of freedom for others.

There is also heterodox current among some religious existentialists, one that suggests that moral demands are placed on us when we recognize ourselves not as voluntaristic subjects—or, in the words of Iris Murdoch, “brave naked wills” (1983, 46) severed from bonds of community and attachment—but as relational beings who are fundamentally bound together in mutual vulnerability. And this recognition may serve as the foundation for an ethics by pulling us out of our everyday self-absorption and awakening us, not to our freedom, but to our essential dependency.

Speaking through the religious elder Father Zossima in The Brothers Karamazov , Dostoevsky offers a powerful indictment of the “terrible individualism” that he sees as endemic to modernity, where unfettered freedom and self-affirmation have become the highest values. Such a view leads not to self-actualization but to loneliness and despair. The modern man, says Zossima, “is accustomed to rely upon himself alone and to cut himself off from the whole; he has trained himself not to believe in the help of others, in men and in humanity […] but this terrible individualism must inevitably have an end, and all will suddenly understand how unnaturally they are separated from one another” (1879 [1957–80, 279]). Against the vision of the willful subject who makes choices without evaluative limits or constraints, Dostoevsky suggests it is only in recognizing the Other as dependent and vulnerable that we can come to recognize ourselves. True freedom emerges when we release ourselves from the bondage of our own egoistic striving and adopt an attitude of humility and self-sacrifice. The aim is to show that the human being is not an isolated will but a frail and defenseless being that is dependent on the self-less love, compassion, and charity of others. [ 13 ] When we free ourselves from the temptations of individualism in this way, Zossima says a moral demand is placed on us, one where we begin to see that “we are all responsible to all and for all” (1879–80 [1957, 228).

The Jewish existentialist Martin Buber expands on this idea in his masterwork I and Thou . He claims that in our everyday lives we generally relate to others from an instrumental and objectifying standpoint, what he calls the “I-It” ( Ich-Es ) relation, where the other is encountered as a thing (or “it”) to be manipulated and controlled for one’s own use. This relation is comforting because it creates the illusion that we have control of our situation. But there are moments in our lives when this illusion collapses, and we become vulnerable to the other, not as an “it” but as a “you.” In the “I-You” ( Ich-Du ) relation, all the egoistic defenses we rely on to conceal our essential dependency and openness to the Other break down. Buber refers to this as an experience of grace, where the Other is revealed to me as a whole person, defenseless and exposed, and I am revealed in the same way. It is a moment where “two human beings reveal the You to one another” (1923 [1970, 95]). In this way, anxiety isn’t a radically individualizing affair, where the forlorn subject is cut off from the relational world to confront their own freedom. For Buber, exposure to the I-You relation shakes us out of our own egoistic concerns and awakens us to the fact that we are not isolated individuals but beings who are always in living relation with others. With this experience “the barriers of the individual are breached,” and this creates an affective union, a “bridge from self-being to self-being across the abyss of dread” (1938 [1965], 201, 207]).

The Nazi occupation of France, his own experience as a prisoner of war, and the attacks on his philosophy from influential Marxist critics, compelled Sartre to shift his focus from the individual to the social. Following the war, he, along with Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir, launched the influential journal of social criticism Le Temps Modernes (Modern Times), and Sartre made his aims clear in the first issue, writing: “Our intention is to help effect certain changes in the Society that surrounds us… one is responsible for what one is … Totally committed and totally freed. And yet it is the free man who must be delivered , by enlarging his possibilities of choice” (Sartre 1945 [1988, 264–65]). Here we see existentialists making the connection that for the Other to realize their freedom, philosophy must engage the “bases and structures” that limit and constrain them. This is because these structures are not philosophical abstractions; they “are lived as schematic determinates of the individual’s future” (Sartre 1957 [1968, 94]). Society, here, is viewed not as an aggregate of voluntaristic subjects; it is the mediating background of our lives, and if we are going to create a situation of freedom and “enlarge the possibilities of choice,” we must recognize how this background can be violent and oppressive—especially to historically marginalized and undervalued people—and to act in such a way as to transform it.

Of all the major developers of existentialism, it is unquestionably Beauvoir who offered the most sustained and influential analyses of oppression and of possibilities for emancipation, not only in her feminist masterwork The Second Sex , but in her bleak account of the dehumanization of the elderly in The Coming of Age (1970 [1996]) and her reflections on the experience of Black populations in the Jim Crow South in her memoir America Day by Day (1954 [1999]). In these works, Beauvoir illuminates how socioeconomic and political structures can restrict the human capacity for freedom and transcendence, how they have the power to “freeze” the Other, strip away possibilities for agency and self-creation, and trap them in “immanence.” But in these works, Beauvoir makes it clear that this situation is not a destiny. Human beings have no essential nature; no one is born inferior or submissive. We are constituted intersubjectively by growing into, internalizing, and enacting ready-made structures of oppression. But insofar as these structures are constituted and maintained by the choices and actions of individuals, they are not fixed and static. Like human beings, they too are subject to change. Here we see how the recognition that existence precedes essence moves from the ontological realm to the ethical, it becomes a call to action, to engage and transform the material conditions that limit the possibilities of choice for those who are oppressed and marginalized.

In this way, postwar existentialism began to engage the realities of the social sphere and the painful “isms”—classism, racism, colonialism, sexism, anti-Semitism—haunting the western world. It was a philosophy that had come to recognize, in Sartre’s words, that “the individual interiorizes his social determinations; he interiorizes the relations of production, the family of his childhood, the historical past, the contemporary in institutions, and he then re-exteriorizes these acts and options which necessarily refer us back to them” (1972 [2008, 35]). And insofar as these social determinations are not fixed and timeless but contingent human constructs, they can be resisted and transformed to free others.

7. Contemporary Relevance

Existentialism has had a profound impact on how philosophers conceptualize and understand the human condition, with rich accounts of affectivity and embodiment, facticity (or worldliness), and the ways in which we are constituted intersubjectively. It has opened new paths for philosophy to engage with concrete and acute human problems, from sexuality, race, disability, and old age to broader issues of social and political violence and oppressive relations in general. And the movement continues to thrive in the academy today. Not only is the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) flourishing as the second largest philosophical organization in the English-speaking world, with smaller research groups (or “Circles”) devoted to every major figure. There is a cascade of scholarship published every year in leading journals and academic presses that captures the enduring relevance of existentialist thought, including important new work engaging the significance of French existentialism as an ethical theory (Webber 2018), reframing our conceptions of virtue and human flourishing (McMullin 2019), and even addressing current analytic debates in philosophies of life-extension, anti-natalism, and transhumanism (Buben 2022). Indeed, the core ideas and major figures of existentialism are not just alive and well; they are shaping developments in a diverse range of areas across the humanities and social sciences.

The legacy is most clearly present in the European philosophies that proceeded it. Existentialism’s critique of foundationalism and the authority of reason as well as its rejection of universalism, essentialism, and “grand narratives” (or metanarratives) all had a decisive impact on post-structural philosophies in France. Nietzsche and Heidegger in particular served as decisive influences on the project of “de-centering the subject” in Jacques Derrida’s method of deconstruction and in Michel Foucault’s genealogy of power, demonstrating how the subject is not the privileged center or origin of truth and knowledge. The subject is, rather, shaped in advance by sociohistorical structures, an overlapping network of norms and practices, linguistic conventions, and shared meanings, and this shaping takes place in a way that we are never fully conscious of. [ 14 ] The individual, on this view, is more of a placeholder or crossing point in these anonymous structures, where the subject exists as “the inscribed surface of events […] totally imprinted by history” (Foucault 1977, 148). Of course, existentialists reject the idea that this historical imprinting or “decentering” is total or absolute. They are, after all, still committed to the value of freedom and authenticity, but they recognize that freedom is never unconditioned. Beyond the philosophies of Heidegger and Nietzsche, we see this recognition in Merleau-Ponty’s conception of mediated freedom, in Sartre’s postwar account of “freedom-in-situation,” and in what Beauvoir calls “ la force des choses ” (the power of circumstances). The recognition of historicity as an impersonal force that structures our identity had such an impact on Foucault’s work that he once remarked: “My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger” (Foucault 1985, cited in Dreyfus 1995, 9).

In viewing the self not as a substance or thing but as a self-interpreting, meaning-giving activity that is always already bound up in the world, existentialism has also informed key developments in narrative and hermeneutic philosophy. Prominent anglophone philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt (1971), Charles Taylor (1985), and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) have drawn on classical existentialism to illuminate how we exist in the meanings and self-interpretations that we create for ourselves. My sense of who I am is constituted by an ongoing process of choosing, pulling together, and consolidating the roles, projects, and meanings that matter to me and that are made available by the sociohistorical situation I find myself in. On this view, the story I create for myself is held together by the narrative unity and cohesion that I give to it. This is what Taylor means when he says that we can only understand or “grasp our lives in a narrative” (1989, 47). And this conception of narrative identity not only offers a response to overly reductive conceptions of the self that are grounded in the substance ontologies of mind and body; it demonstrates an attentiveness to the ambiguous tension of our condition, that our choices are both self-fashioning and socially embedded, that we simultaneously make ourselves and are already made.

Beginning with Hubert Dreyfus’s (1972) groundbreaking critique of Artificial Intelligence (AI), philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have been drawing on existentialist philosophy—especially Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—to challenge the overly mentalistic picture of selfhood and agency that modern philosophy inherits from Descartes and Kant and to dismantle traditional representational theories of knowledge. Key works by Shaun Gallagher (2005), Thomas Fuchs, (2018), and Dan Zahavi (2005) have replaced the picture of the disembodied mind with the now widely accepted notion of the embedded, enactive, and embodied self. This is a rejection of the long-held assumption that human action must somehow be represented or “mirrored” in the mind. Existentialism illuminates how—as a situated way of being-in-the-world—human beings already embody a tacit understanding of the world in a way that we are not and can never be thematically conscious of. This means we do not understand things as discrete objects. We understand things in terms of how we use and handle them and in terms of the purposive, meaning-giving roles these things play in our everyday lives. The traditional view of the mind as something resembling the rule-governed processes of a computer program have continually failed to capture this ambiguous and embodied sense of being-in-the-world.

The attentiveness to conditions of oppression, subjugation, and violence among postwar existentialists in France has had a decisive impact on recent developments in critical phenomenology by giving voice to those who have been historically marginalized or undervalued in the western tradition. Beauvoir’s pioneering account of the woman’s experience in The Second Sex is well known for laying the conceptual foundations for second wave feminism, and her late career phenomenology of aging broke new ground by shedding light on the existence of older persons and exposing the toxic ageism in contemporary capitalist societies. Together with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, her ideas would inform Franz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952 [1967]), a seminal work that disclosed the dehumanizing experience of colonized Black populations and helped give birth to Africana critical theory or “black existentialism” (Gordon 2000). The focus on the ways in which structures of discrimination along with the limits of our own embodiment can constrain our capacities for freedom and transcendence has, in turn, influenced recent phenomenological accounts of intersectionality and the lived experience of, among others, indigenous peoples, immigrants, and exiles (Coulthard 2014; Ortega 2016), queer and trans identities (Ahmed 2006; Salamon 2010), those who are imprisoned or in solitary confinement (Guenther 2013; Leder 2016), and the elderly, disabled, and chronically ill (Aho 2022; Reynolds 2022; Dickel 2022).

Interpreting existence in terms of the situated activity of being-in-the-world not only serves as a rejection of substance ontology and the metaphysical dualisms (subject-object; mind-body; inner-outer) that we inherit from Cartesian and empiricist epistemologies; it also reveals deep affinities with the nonduality of Buddhism and other incarnations of Eastern thought. (Loy 2018; Kalmanson 2020) And the recognition of our enmeshment in the world has informed a range of important advances in the philosophy of place, deep ecology, and eco-phenomenology (Brown & Toadvine 2003; Malpas 2017; Morton 2016; Rentmeester 2016). These endeavors have exposed the limitations of the scientific worldview and our uncritical dependence on technological innovation to address the current ecological crisis. Modern science generally assumes a binary paradigm of the subject as separate and distinct from a value-less domain of objects (or nature), a domain that can, in turn, be mastered and controlled by technoscience. In this way, it betrays our ordinary experience, that in our day-to-day lives we are not atomistic, self-certain subjects but beings that are fundamentally entwined with the world and the meaning and value that this intertwining brings to our experience. For the existentialist, then, extricating ourselves from environmental doom requires not a technoscientific fix but an ontological transformation in our own self-understanding, an awaking to the reality of our interdependence with nature, that the earth is not apart from us but rather part of us.

Outside of the humanities and social sciences, existentialism has also had a deep and lasting impact on the allied health professions. The role it has played in the development of existential and humanistic approaches to psychotherapy (Cooper 2003; Spinneli 2007; van Deurzen 2015) and to phenomenological psychopathology (Parnas & Gallagher 2015; Ratcliffe 2015; Stanghellini et al. 2019) is well-known, but in recent years we have seen its influence emerge in a range of different areas, from narrative medicine to nursing, and from gerontology to palliative care. To this end, existentialism has informed a move away from the reductive and objectifying tendencies of modern biomedicine to recover the first-person experience of health and illness, viewing the body not so much as a biophysical machine that needs to be adjusted and maintained but as the experiential and interpretative medium of our existence. This shift has not only allowed clinicians to challenge the emergent tendency to medicalize ever-expanding swaths of the human condition; it makes it possible for the clinician to better understand the patient’s experience by getting a sense of “what it means” and “what it feels like” to suffer when the body breaks down (Aho 2018; Slatman 2014; Svenaeus 2022; Zeiler & Käll 2014).

Beyond its ascendency in the healing arts, its myriad cultural influences, and its wide-ranging impact on the humanities and social sciences, the enduring legacy of existentialism is perhaps most visible in the classroom. Existentialist-themed courses are often among the most popular in the philosophy curriculum as young students confront, for the first time, the unsettling questions of freedom and the meaning of their own existence. And these questions have never been more pressing as they develop against the backdrop of anthropogenic climate change, species extinction, global pandemics, and the reemergence of authoritarian and fascist politics. Amidst these planetary emergencies, a new generation is facing the predicament of nihilism and the death of God and owning up to the uncanny truth of the human condition: that existence precedes essence.

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• –––, 1889b [1990b] Twilight of the idols , R. J. Hollingdale (trans.), New York: Penguin Books.
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• –––, 1930 [1993] The revolt of the masses , (anonymous trans.), New York: W.W. Norton.
• Ortega, M., 2016. In-between: Latina feminist phenomenology, multiplicity, and the self , Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
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• Young, I. M., 1984 [2000]. On the female body experience: “Throwing like a girl” and others essays , New York: Oxford University Press.
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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Crowell, Steven, “Existentialism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/existentialism/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]
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• Existentialism , entry at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Norther American Sartre Society
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• Simone de Beauvoir , entry at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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• The International Merleau-Ponty Circle
• The North American Nietzsche Society
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Beauvoir, Simone de | Buber, Martin | Heidegger, Martin | hermeneutics | Husserl, Edmund | Jaspers, Karl | Kierkegaard, Søren | Marcel, Gabriel (-Honoré) | Merleau-Ponty, Maurice | Nietzsche, Friedrich | Ortega y Gasset, José | phenomenology | Sartre, Jean-Paul

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PHIL304: Existentialism

Course introduction.

• Time: 32 hours
• Free Certificate

Unlike rationalist thinkers such as René Descartes and G.W.F. Hegel, existentialists reject the idea that humans are fundamentally rational creatures living in an orderly, well-designed universe. They also do not believe that thoughtful consideration and reasoned deliberation can solve life's issues. Instead, existentialists view human beings as creatures whose reason is secondary to human passions and anxieties and who exist in an irrational, absurd, and insignificant universe. Existentialists claim that in such a cosmos, one strives to be the greatest person one can be given one's religious, historical, cultural, economic, and personal circumstances.

Existentialists emphasize the human being's place in a complicated set of circumstances to highlight the uniqueness and individuality that each of us possesses. They emphasize the importance of the human body in all of our actions and judgments, saying that the mind cannot exist apart from the body (in contrast to the majority of rationalists, who assert that the mind is separate from the body).

In addition, existentialists consider whether absolute individual freedom is attainable; and, if so, what this means for our sense of personal, social, and divine responsibility. They also consider the consequences of the existence or nonexistence of God and what each option entails for our sense of freedom and responsibility. More than anything, existentialists ponder the implications of accepting death's inevitability in our lives.

This course examines the major figures and works of the existentialist movement from a historical perspective. Søren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Albert Camus are among the authors you will examine. You will be able to identify, analyze, and differentiate among important themes and figures in existentialism history. Most importantly, you will comprehend the contributions existentialist thinkers have made to our present view of human existence and our role in the universe.

Course Syllabus

First, read the course syllabus. Then, enroll in the course by clicking "Enroll me". Click Unit 1 to read its introduction and learning outcomes. You will then see the learning materials and instructions on how to use them.

Unit 1: What Is Existentialism?

Existentialists are concerned with existence, the human condition, human existence, and their own existence in particular. Existence is the starting point for philosophical reflection. Rather than "What is the fundamental substance of the universe?", an existentialist asks, "What does it mean to be?". An existentialist is interested in authentic existence. They are concerned with how to answer this question in the context of a universe that is not orderly, such as rationalists like Plato (428–348 BC), René Descartes (1596–1650), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) would have it.

Existentialism refers to the philosophical and literary movement that Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) and Albert Camus (1913–1960) first popularized in post-war France. While the term emerged with these and other 20th-century philosophers such as Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), W.E.B. Du Bois (1868–1963), and Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986), we can trace its roots to Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). While these "proto-existentialists" did not use the term, their philosophical concerns were direct precursors to the existentialist movement that took shape after World War II.

Completing this unit should take you approximately 1 hour.

Unit 2: Søren Kierkegaard

Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813–1855) was a Danish Christian philosopher, theologian, and social critic, widely considered a founding existentialist figure. Convinced that the Christian faith had gone astray, Kierkegaard was a fierce critic of religious dogma. In Kierkegaard's view, you must earn your relationship with God through dedication and suffering.

According to Kierkegaard, a person becomes a committed, responsible human being by making difficult decisions and sacrifices. The force of Kierkegaard's philosophy rests in the notion that human life is paradoxical and absurd and that confronting this absurdity makes us fully human (a theme revisited by Albert Camus, as we will discuss in Unit 8).

This unit introduces you to Kierkegaard's life and religious philosophy, along with an overview of themes that later philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir will call "existentialism". These key existentialist themes include the notions of commitment and responsibility, absurdity, anxiety, and authenticity.

This unit will also note the work of Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) as a fellow theistic existentialist to Kierkegaard. Many philosophers believe Pascal was a precursor to the existentialist movement due to his concerns about the constraints of human existence or "finitude", perpetual change, uncertainty, suffering in human life, and the irrationality of human behavior.

Completing this unit should take you approximately 4 hours.

Unit 3: Fyodor Dostoevsky

Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky (1821–1881) was a Russian novelist, journalist, and essayist whose literary works are among the most important texts in the history of existentialism. Despite never self-identifying as an existentialist, Walter Kaufmann, a German-American philosopher and author, declares, "It is as if Kierkegaard had stepped right out of Dostoevsky's pen", adding that "part one of Notes from Underground is the best overture for existentialism ever written".

Dostoevsky's (also written Dostoyevsky) literature investigates the loneliness, alienation, and despair humans experience living in conditions populated with ominous protagonists and gloomy situations. The hardships he encountered early in life influenced his preoccupations with the oppressed, suffering, and tormented. He viewed the human condition as constrained by social, political, and economic institutions and limited by God, whose existence constrains human existence. One of his most meaningful themes is that life is about being true to oneself. This unit will guide you through Dostoevsky's key existential themes, focusing on human freedom and moral responsibility in Notes from the Underground (1864) and The Grand Inquisitor (1880).

Unit 4: Friedrich Nietzsche

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), an unapologetic critic of culture, society, religion, and philosophical dogma (views his predecessors and contemporaries accepted without question), is widely regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of the past two centuries. Nietzsche, like all existentialists, condemned the universalistic tendencies that have characterized Western philosophy throughout its history; that is, the tendency of philosophers to assert they could determine what is true for everyone and for all time.

According to Nietzsche, there is no universal truth – in his pursuit of truth, he values suspicion and skepticism over rationalism. He focuses on subjective individuality and the dangers of being absorbed into the herd, losing "freedom", and rejecting all of the usual crutches people lean on to escape responsibility. Personal experience and acting on one's convictions lead to truth. Individuals must be strong enough to create meaning for themselves, unlike the common herd whose sense of purpose and meaning lies entirely in conformity to rules; the great people are those who "re-evaluate all values".

Completing this unit should take you approximately 9 hours.

Unit 5: W.E.B. Du Bois

William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868–1963), the American author, professor, and activist known as W.E.B. Du Bois, was among the most influential Black leaders of the 20th century. While many do not think of him as an existential philosopher, he wrote during a time when people of color struggled throughout the world to achieve liberation. Authors such as Richard Wright, James Baldwin, and W.E.B. Du Bois explored themes related to freedom, existence, and hardship attributable to living in America as a person of color. In 1996, Lewis Gordon, an American philosopher who teaches at the University of Connecticut, wrote:

At least four Africana theorists, W.E.B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, Ralph Ellison, and Frantz Fanon, have theorized dimensions of anti-Black racism in a way that is so clearly indicative of an existential phenomenological turn…[w]hat these figures have in common are a passion to understand human beings and passion to articulate a liberation project that does not lead to the estrangement of humanity from itself.

Philosophers of the Black experience engaged in philosophical reflection about the lived experience of racism and its intersections with other oppressions, including sexism and classism.

Completing this unit should take you approximately 3 hours.

Unit 6: Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger's (1889–1976) extensive and illuminating meditations on what he described as the ontological "question of being" established his reputation as one of the most original and important philosophers of the 20th century.

Like other philosophers we call existentialists, Heidegger refused to associate his own thinking with the term. However, his focus on human existence, anxiety, death, and authenticity – themes his predecessors (Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche) and contemporaries (Sartre and Camus) shared – place him at the center of this movement. In this unit, we explore Heidegger's thought, especially the philosophy of existence he introduced in his most famous work, Being and Time (1927).

Completing this unit should take you approximately 5 hours.

Unit 7: Jean-Paul Sartre

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) is the public face of existentialism. His fictional and philosophical works affirm the existentialist priority of concrete, situated, and historical human existence. He stresses the value of choice, responsibility, and authenticity in human self-fashioning. Sartre was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1964 – an honor he refused because he maintained it conflicted with his professional, personal, and political commitments.

In this unit, we examine Sartre's contributions to existentialist philosophy and highlight his place in the movement's history. In particular, we explore how Sartre expanded on the existentialist themes his predecessors dealt with, such as the notions of authenticity, anxiety, and freedom.

Unit 8: Simone de Beauvoir

A novelist, social critic, and philosopher, Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) was trained in philosophy and wrote her graduate thesis on the German logician and philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). Her influential feminist work, The Second Sex (1949), is of particular note. She extended previous existential theory into the social and political realms. She developed a philosophy based on existentialist ethics and feminist theory that would have a lasting influence on the feminist political movement of the 1960s and 1970s.

Like previous existentialists, de Beauvoir emphasized the importance of individual freedom to human existence. However, unlike the existentialists before her, she argued that individual freedom was only possible if others were also free. In other words, de Beauvoir believed that equitable social relations are required for meaningful freedom. In this unit, we discuss de Beauvoir's existentialist ethics and feminism.

Completing this unit should take you approximately 2 hours.

Unit 9: Albert Camus

Albert Camus (1913–1960) was an Algerian writer and intellectual. He refused to be labeled a philosopher because he did not believe human reason could systematize human experience in all its complexities. A friend and subsequently a critic of Sartre, his writings reflect comparable themes to Sartre's. In 1957, Camus was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature.

In this unit, we explore Camus' existentialism by examining his book The Stranger and his essay "The Myth of Sisyphus" (both published in 1942), which highlight the absurdities of human existence and the absurdity of existentialism itself when the philosophy is taken to an extreme. He was internationally well-known and famous for his concepts of the Absurd.

Study Guide

This study guide will help you get ready for the final exam. It discusses the key topics in each unit, walks through the learning outcomes, and lists important vocabulary terms. It is not meant to replace the course materials!

Course Feedback Survey

Please take a few minutes to give us feedback about this course. We appreciate your feedback, whether you completed the whole course or even just a few resources. Your feedback will help us make our courses better, and we use your feedback each time we make updates to our courses.

If you come across any urgent problems, email [email protected].

Certificate Final Exam

Take this exam if you want to earn a free Course Completion Certificate.

To receive a free Course Completion Certificate, you will need to earn a grade of 70% or higher on this final exam. Your grade for the exam will be calculated as soon as you complete it. If you do not pass the exam on your first try, you can take it again as many times as you want, with a 7-day waiting period between each attempt.

Once you pass this final exam, you will be awarded a free Course Completion Certificate .

Existentialism in Literature | Meaning and Characteristics

Introduction.

Existentialism is a movement of 20th-century literature that focuses on the individual and his or her relationship with the universe or God.

This existentialist tag has been applied to writers, philosophers, visual artist and film-makers; the movement flourished in Europe.

Existentialism Examples

The main idea of Existentialism is to do whatever you want to do. Means there is a difference between ‘ My World’ [Emotional] and ‘Your World’ [Logical]. Generally, our approach towards society remains like this that ‘My World is better than Your World’.

There are two ways of looking at society:

One is a Secular way of looking and another is a religious way of looking. If I start with the self then when somebody asks us who are you? Then our answers must be like this that I am John or David or any other name. But who said this that my name is so and so?

Then our next answer must be like this that my parents or relatives. Apart from this, we don’t know much about ourselves. Our names are related to our physical appearance only.

But this is the not appropriate answers for who am I? When we think about all these questions then we find that everything is meaningless.

Why? The answer is because our ultimate destiny is death. GWF Hegel, Soren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, Edmund Husserl, Kafka, Sartre, Beckett, Beauvoir, Camus these are the well-known names in the field of existentialism. Basically the existentialism questions about our existence in this universe.

Why are we here? Who am I?

The basic consult is a search for the self. That is why the existentialist critics often say that our birth is out of our power so at least our death must be in our hand.

It means the way I want to die I must be free to do so. And that is why other critics say that Existentialism is negative criticism. That is why many critics would say that Existentialism is Nihilism.

There is a minor difference between existentialism and nihilism. It is true that Existentialism talks about the death idea but here death in the sense of the philosophical death.

Every day we wake up in the morning, do our routine work and the end of the day goes to our bed. Apart from this we never tried to think about existence that why I am here? What is my purpose in this human world? Who am I?

Among the most famous and influential existentialism propositions is Sartre’s dictum. “Existence precedes and rules essence” , which is generally taken to mean that ‘there is no pre-defined essence to humanity except that which we make for ourselves.’

For Sartre humans are fundamentally different from the things like a car, fan etc. before making a car we can say that what will be the work of the car but about human, we can’t say, and still we try to bind ourselves in different identities. i.e. religious identity, family identity, community identity etc. and then we see the clash between all these identities.

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existentialism in literature essay

Existentialism in literature is actually a movement or perhaps tendency that emphasizes person existence, flexibility, and decision. While Existentialism was hardly ever an structured literary activity, the tenets of this beliefs have affected many different writers all over the world and visitors can identify existential components in their hype. Americans copy writers like Bill Faulkner, Ernest Hemingway and John Steinbeck reveal existential elements within their writing. Probably the most prominent motif in existentialist writing is regarding choice.

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Humanity’s primary distinction, in the watch of most existentialists, is the independence to choose.

Because we are free to choose our very own paths, existentialists have contended, we must acknowledge the risk and responsibility of following each of our commitments wherever they business lead. American freelance writers Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson often wrote regarding these concepts. Existentialism is not dark. It is far from depressing. Existentialism is about life. Existentialists trust in living”and in fighting for lifetime.

The politics of existentialist writers around the world varies extensively, but every single seeks the most individual flexibility for people in a society.

Despite encompassing this a comprehensive portfolio of philosophical, faith based, and politics ideologies, the underlying ideas of existentialism are constant:? Mankind offers free will certainly? Life is a number of choices? Few decisions will be without any unfavorable consequences? A lot of events and occurrences will be irrational or perhaps absurd, with no explanation.? In the event that one makes a decision, she must follow through.

Thus existentialism, extensively defined, is actually a set of philosophical systems worried about free will certainly, choice, and personal responsibility. Since we make choices depending on our experience, beliefs, and biases, those choices are unique to us”and manufactured without an goal form of truth. There are simply no “universal guidelines for most decisions, existentialists believe. Even having faith in science is often a “leap of faith.  The existentialists determine that human choice is subjective, because persons finally need to make their own choices without support from these kinds of external standards as laws and regulations, ethical guidelines, or customs.

Because people make their own choices, they can be free; nevertheless because they will freely select, they are totally responsible for their very own choices. The existentialists emphasize that independence is always accompanied by responsibility. Furthermore, since individuals are required to choose for themselves, they have all their freedom”and therefore their responsibility”thrust upon them. They are “condemned to be cost-free.  Various existentialist authors stress the value of passionate individual actions in deciding questions of both personal morality and truth.

Personal experience and acting on your own croyance are essential in arriving at the truth. 17th-century France philosopher and existentialist Blaise Pascal observed human living in terms of paradoxes. He presumed that “We know real truth, not only by simply reason, yet also by heart.  And as many existentialists, he acknowledges that “It may be the fight only that pleases us, not really the success.  The ultra-modern adage that the journey is somewhat more important compared to the final destination applies to this idea.

Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, who was the first article writer to call himself existential, reacted against traditional thoughts by requiring that the maximum good for the is to locate his or her own unique incorporation. As he composed in his log, “I need to find a real truth that is authentic for me… the idea for which I can live or perhaps die.  Existentialists possess argued that no goal, rational basis can be found to get moral decisions. The 19th-century German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche contended the fact that individual applying free will certainly must choose situations are to count since moral scenarios.

He thought that “There are no information, only understanding. … and he is famous for this well-known adage: “That which will not kill myself, makes me stronger.  The 19th-century Russian author Fyodor Dostoyevsky is probably the most well-known existentialist fictional figure. In his book Remarks from the Subterranean the alone anti-hero queries experiences in life that are unforeseen and sometimes self-destructive.

French article writer, Jean Paul Sartre had written that man can can nothing unless he offers first understood that he or she must count on no one but him self; that he can alone, abandoned on earth accompanied by his infinite responsibilities, with no help, with no other purpose than the one he models himself, without having other destiny than the a single he aciérie for himself on this globe.

There is no best meaning or perhaps purpose natural in individual life; with this sense life is absurd. We could forlorn, abandoned in the world to maintain ourselves entirely. The only base for principles is human being freedom, and that there can be zero external or perhaps objective justification for the values any person chooses to adopt.

 When the Swedish Academy granted the Nobel Reward in Literary works to Sartre for his work which in turn, they acknowledged as “rich in ideas and filled with the spirit of freedom and the quest for real truth, [that] offers exerted a far-reaching effect on the age,  Sartre managed to get known that he would not wish to recognize the reward. In a open public announcement, in1964, Sartre portrayed his repent that his refusal with the prize experienced given rise to a scandal, and he wanted it to become known that his refusal was not designed to slight the Swedish School but was rather based on personal and goal reasons.

Sartre pointed out that as a result of his pregnancy of the writer’s task he previously always decreased official respects so this work was not unmatched. He had likewise refused other awards agreed to him. This individual stated a writer’s acceptance of this honor is always to associate his personal commitments with all the awarding establishment, and that, especially, a writer should never allow him self to be turned into an institution.

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Existentialism as a Theoretical Perspective

Existentialism, as a theoretical term, is a philosophical and literary movement that emphasizes the significance of individual existence and freedom.

Etymology of Existentialism

Table of Contents

The term “existentialism” is derived from the Latin word “existere,” which means “to exist.” It became popular in the mid-20th century to describe a philosophical movement that focuses on the individual’s existence and the associated themes of freedom, choice, and responsibility.

Meanings of Existentialism

Definition of existentialism as a theoretical term.

Existentialism, as a theoretical term , is a philosophical and literary movement that emphasizes the significance of individual existence and freedom. It contends that human beings are responsible for creating their own meaning in a seemingly indifferent or absurd universe, often by making choices that define their identity and values.

Existentialism rejects absolute or predetermined truths, highlighting the subjective and often anguished nature of human experience.

Existentialism: Theorists, Works, and Arguments

Existentialism is a philosophical and literary movement associated with several notable theorists, works, and key arguments:

• Jean-Paul Sartre: A prominent existentialist philosopher, Sartre’s major works include Being and Nothingness. He argued that existence precedes essence, emphasizing human freedom and the concept of “bad faith.”
• Albert Camus: Known for works like The Stranger and The Myth of Sisyphus Camus explored the absurdity of life and the search for meaning in an indifferent world.
• Søren Kierkegaard: Often considered a precursor to existentialism, Kierkegaard focused on the individual’s subjective experience and the leap of faith in his works, such as Fear and Trembling .
• Friedrich Nietzsche: His philosophical ideas on the will to power, the eternal recurrence, and the Übermensch (Overman) have had a significant influence on existentialist thought.
• Being and Nothingness by Jean-Paul Sartre: This foundational work explores existentialism’s core ideas, including the concepts of consciousness, freedom, and existential angst.
• The Myth of Sisyphus by Albert Camus: Camus’s essay presents the idea of the absurd and how individuals can find meaning in a world devoid of inherent purpose.
• Fear and Trembling by Søren Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard’s exploration of faith, ethics, and the individual’s relationship with the divine contributes to existentialist themes.

Key Arguments:

• Existence Precedes Essence: Existentialism asserts that individuals exist before they define their essence. This means that people are responsible for creating their own values and meaning in life.
• Freedom and Responsibility: Existentialists stress human freedom and the responsibility that comes with it. Choices are seen as crucial in shaping one’s identity and determining the course of one’s life.
• The Absurd: Existentialism often grapples with the idea that life lacks inherent meaning or purpose, leading to a sense of absurdity. The search for meaning in a seemingly indifferent world is a central theme.
• Authenticity: Authenticity involves living in accordance with one’s own values and choices, rather than conforming to societal expectations or “bad faith,” which is a form of self-deception.
• Angst (Existential Anxiety): The existentialist concept of “angst” or existential anxiety reflects the inherent anxiety and dread individuals face when confronted with their freedom and the responsibility to make choices in the absence of absolute values or guidelines.

Principals of Existentialism

Major works in existentialism and arguments.

• Being and Nothingness by Jean-Paul Sartre: Sartre’s work presents the concept that “ existence precedes essence ,” emphasizing that individuals exist before they define their essence. He argues that humans are condemned to be free, meaning they bear the burden of absolute freedom and responsibility for their choices.
• The Myth of Sisyphus by Albert Camus: Camus explores the idea of the absurd , suggesting that life lacks inherent meaning or purpose. He argues that despite the inherent absurdity of existence, individuals should embrace their freedom and find their own meaning, symbolized by the myth of Sisyphus.
• Fear and Trembling by Søren Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard delves into the notion of faith, ethics, and the individual’s relationship with the divine. He presents the concept of the “knight of faith” who makes a leap of faith beyond reason, transcending the ethical and the universal.
• Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Friedrich Nietzsche: Nietzsche introduces the concept of the Übermensch (Overman or Superman), an individual who creates their own values and transcends conventional morality. He critiques traditional values and morality, advocating for a reevaluation of moral concepts.
• Nausea by Jean-Paul Sartre: Sartre’s novel embodies the sense of existential nausea , portraying the protagonist’s experience of the absurdity and contingency of existence. It illustrates the existentialist idea that life’s inherent lack of meaning can induce a feeling of nausea or revulsion.
• Existentialism is a Humanism by Jean-Paul Sartre: In this essay, Sartre defends existentialism as a human-centered philosophy. He argues that existentialism is a philosophy of freedom and choice, emphasizing that individuals must take responsibility for their actions and decisions.
• The Rebel by Albert Camus: Camus delves into the concept of rebellion against oppressive systems and the moral ambiguity of revolutionary actions. He argues for a “metaphysical rebellion” that opposes both the absurdity of existence and unjust authority.

These major works and associated arguments represent the core ideas of existentialism, including the themes of existence, freedom, responsibility, the absurd, and the search for meaning in an often indifferent or irrational world.

Suggested Readings

• Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus . Vintage, 1991.
• De Beauvoir, Simone. The Ethics of Ambiguity . Citadel Press, 1998.
• Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling . Penguin Classics, 1986.
• Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra . Penguin Classics, 1969.
• Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness . Washington Square Press, 1993.
• Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism is a Humanism . Yale University Press, 2007.
• Sartre, Jean-Paul. Nausea . New Directions, 2007.
• Camus, Albert. The Rebel . Vintage, 1991.

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• African American Theory
• Archetypal Literary Theory / Criticism
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‘A completely different game’: Faculty, students harness AI in the classroom

Grace Honeyman ’26 describes her final project, made with AI, for Juan Hinestroza’s class “Textiles, Apparel and Innovation Design” in fall 2023.

By Susan Kelley, Cornell Chronicle

For 15 years, Professor Juan Hinestroza had been teaching his course on innovative textiles essentially the same way. But last fall, he changed it up, requiring his students to use generative AI.

In the past, the final project took a five-student team two months to finish. Last semester, each student working alone with AI did it in two weeks – with superior results.

Documenting their progress with blog posts, the students used AI tools to summarize research papers, then used that information to update an existing design that applies innovative textiles to a garment or object to solve a real-world problem. Some improved gloves that ease arthritis. Others updated shoes that convert the wearer’s movement to energy that warms the feet of people with diabetes. They also used the tools to create images of their designs. For the final research posters, they used only AI for imagery, text and references.

Juan Hinestroza, the Rebecca Q. Morgan ’60 Professor of Fiber Science and Apparel Design in the College of Human Ecology, has embraced the use of AI in his courses.

“AI really liberated them to dig deeper. It’s like a calculator: You can spend your time doing your calculations by hand. But if you have a calculator, then you can spend more time doing something else,” said Hinestroza, the Rebecca Q. Morgan ’60 Professor of Fiber Science and Apparel Design in the College of Human Ecology (CHE).

He is one of many faculty members across Cornell’s colleges and disciplines who are embracing AI’s capabilities and limitations in their classrooms.

To be sure, some faculty members do not allow the use of AI in their courses; a university committee initiated by Provost Michael I. Kotlikoff offered faculty guidance on the use of AI in the classroom in fall 2023.

“I tell my colleagues, especially those who are opposed to these tools, that you cannot teach the same way you were taught. Because it’s a completely different game,” Hinestroza said. “The reality is that these tools are being used by companies. They’re being used by other universities. So you have to train the students for the real world. The world that we as faculty members think exists – it doesn’t exist anymore.”

Hinestroza is one of five winners of the 2024 Teaching Innovation Awards (see sidebar). They will discuss their approaches at the Provost’s Teaching Innovation Showcase: Creative Responses to Generative AI, on April 11.

“The award winners, and other applicants as well, represent a wide and impressive range of responses to the new challenges and opportunities associated with generative AI in the classroom,” said Steven Jackson, vice provost for academic innovation. “They provide more great evidence of the skill and imagination of Cornell teachers in responding to ongoing changes in the teaching environment.”

‘We’re going to experiment’

Grace Honeyman ’26 had minimal experience with AI prior to taking Hinestroza’s course, “Textiles, Apparel and Innovation Design.” She had never even opened a ChatGPT account on her computer.

Grace Honeyman ’26 gave the AI platform Midjourney the prompt “create a schematic image of an elderly man wearing a piezoelectric nanogenerator embedded textile for medical monitoring” to create this image.

The course introduced her and other students to AI tools that can create images and interpret scientific literature, including ChatGPT, Midjourney, BingChat, Claude.ai, DALL-E, Jasper.ai and Adobe’s Firefly and Sensei. “I told them, ‘I’m learning as you are. And we’re going to experiment,’” Hinestroza said. “The students were incredibly patient and played along as we made mistakes and found ways to optimize the use of tools.”

For her final project, Honeyman redesigned a medical undershirt, which reads the vital signs of people with congestive heart failure, to include a piezoelectric nanogenerator that converts the kinetic energy of the wearer’s movement into electrical energy within the textile, eliminating the need for a bulky battery pack.

Nancy Wang ’24 used the AI DALL-E3 and the prompt “create a schematic of one layer of flexible battery, one layer of woven conductive thread, and one layer of textile” to create this image.

She fed a series of prompts into Midjourney and Bing.AI, which eventually created images that matched what she had in mind. “I don’t have time to do a five-hour Photoshop tutorial and put together a schematic of what my textile looks like,” she said. “Doing that on DALL-E or Midjourney take five or 10 minutes, depending on how long it takes you to type in your prompt.”

That gave her more time to research how to update the technology, textile applications and intended use. “A lot of what people are missing is that students start with an image in our minds,” she said. “It’s not really all being done by AI – we still have to use our creativity.”

And they had to watch out for the tools’ mistakes. Sometimes AI creates images of a hand, for example, that has only three fingers, or “hallucinates” research papers that don’t exist.

“Honestly, being very, very critical of all this technology is one of the most important skills to learn and one of the most important things I did learn from this class,” Honeyman said.

‘The genie is out of the bottle’

A few major AI image-generating tools were released about a month before Jennifer Birkeland , assistant professor of landscape architecture in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, started teaching her course on graphic communication.

And she had heard many professionals in landscape architecture were using them already, so she started playing around with the tools herself. “I was like, ‘Oh, this is really weird and interesting. This is a really critical tool. I need to incorporate this somehow into my class,’” she said.

Matthew Sprague, MLA ’26, used Midjourney AI to create this digital landscape for a class on graphic communication in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences.

Her students wrote a series of prompts to make the tools create an image that they’d work with for the rest of the semester. They used Rhinoceros 3D, a modeling software, to create 3D models and then cross-sections of the object, and further iterations through the traditional design process.

She aimed to teach students to think critically and become AI literate. “It’s two-sided,” Birkeland said. “Yes, AI is cool and smart, but it’s also dumb.”

For example, she asked students to use one prompt with different AI tools and compare the results. The exercise demonstrated that each tool draws from a different library of data to generate images – and often include racial and gender biases. “I asked, ‘Did you get only men in this one? Or did you only get white men, versus another tool that might have had something else?’” Birkeland said.

The tools are helping Matthew Sprague, MLA ’26, learn to recognize good design, he said. The images AI tools create are “pretty peculiar and strange-looking, mostly,” he said. “It makes you think about style and what visually works or doesn’t. And you can identify some of that in your own work. You need to have some design skills to take that and make it look right.”

Matthew Sprague, MLA ’26, used Midjourney AI to create this image of an urban garden for a class on graphic communication in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences.

The tools have other limitations. For example, they wouldn’t be able to do assignments for his main studio class, Sprague said. “If I tried to tell it to make those drawings, it wouldn’t have any clue what I was talking about, especially with architectural drawings that need to be precise. It’s not there yet.”

But the tools do level the playing field for students who don’t have a fine-art background, Birkeland said. “People who don’t draw are now able to generate these images, and then use them as references to show people what they’re envisioning.”

Given the increasing use of AI, instructors have a responsibility to teach students how to use it, Birkeland said. “Whether we like it or not, it’s not going away – not at this point. The genie is out of the bottle.”

Transformative change

In the government class “America Confronts the World,” students treated large language models like ChatGPT as interlocutors that supported, rather than substituted for, original writing.

“After attending Center for Teaching Innovation workshops and consulting instructor reflections, we implemented a two-pronged approach that required responsible yet creative student engagement with AI,” said Peter Katzenstein , the Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. Professor of International Studies in the College of Arts and Sciences. He collaborated with his teaching assistants – doctoral candidates Amelia C. Arsenault, M.A. ’23, and Musckaan Chauhan, M.A. ’23 – to integrate AI into the classwork.

“This is a tool that students are using already, and it’s probably not going away,” said Arsenault, whose research focuses on surveillance technologies, which rely heavily on AI. “We thought this would be an opportunity for us to teach them how to use it in a way that was actually most useful for them.”

2024 Teaching Innovation Award

Five faculty members have been honored with the 2024 Teaching Innovation Award, sponsored by the Vice Provost for Academic Innovation and the Center for Teaching Innovation . This year’s theme, “Creative Responses to Generative Artificial Intelligence,” recognizes creative approaches from the last year developed in response to generative AI.

Award winners will present their experiences at the Provost’s Teaching Innovation Showcase: Creative Responses to Generative AI, on April 11. The winners will collaborate with CTI to share their experiences with colleagues.

The winners:

• Jennifer Birkeland , assistant professor of landscape architecture, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences;
• Tracy Carrick , senior lecturer, John S. Knight Institute for Writing in the Disciplines, College of Arts & Sciences (A&S);
• Juan Hinestroza , the Rebecca Q. Morgan ’60 Professor of Fiber Science and Apparel Design, College of Human Ecology;
• Peter Katzenstein , the Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. Professor of International Studies, Department of Government, A&S; and
• Amie Patchen , lecturer, Department of Public and Ecosystem Health, College of Veterinary Medicine.

The course focuses on the wide range of views at play in American politics and foreign policy. Four written assignments integrated AI, while four had non-AI prompts.

In one assignment, students wrote an essay based on class readings and then brainstormed an objecting argument; in another, they fed their essay into an AI tool and asked it to come up with an objecting argument that they then counterargued to strengthen their thesis. Throughout the course, the students did reflections on their experiences with AI.

“The students appreciated that we were willing to deal with it in some way, shape or form,” Arsenault said.

Esteban Lau ’25, a government major in A&S, was surprised to find that when he prompted the AI tool to counter his essay, it argued for his point instead. Like other students, he found he had to try several different prompts to get the result he wanted. “I guess that comes down to what people call ‘prompt engineering.’ I’m actually getting better at using the AI tool,” he said.

“But at the same time, I think there’s a lot of value in not using them and developing your own analytical thought,” he said. “And it’s a difficult balance to strike because, you know, some students do use AI writing as a crutch, and they rely on it too heavily. And I think that impacts their education.”

Increasingly there are tools that purport to identify when a student has cheated and used an AI tool to write their essay, but they are highly unreliable, Arsenault said. “Rather than getting yourself in that position where you have to make very difficult, probably impossible decisions about what is and what is not generated by ChatGPT, we can put up parameters about how we would like to see it used in the class. The goal is, the students will learn real skills, and hopefully take those forward with them as they enter the workplace.”

Katzenstein thinks of AI as transformative rather than marginal change, he said. “Students will have to find their way in this world while writing, as a basic cultural technology, will fundamentally change.”

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Members-Only Mania: Why Are More Private Clubs Popping Up in New York?

Some people belong to multiple private clubs that have emerged to fill physical and emotional voids. Others belong only to Sam’s Club.

Credit... Clark Hodgin for The New York Times

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By Anna Kodé

Anna Kodé visited seven private clubs while reporting this story.

• March 29, 2024

In a 115-year-old ferry terminal in New York’s financial district, an abundance of excess now exists. Walls lined with Loro Piana cashmere, Brooklyn Bridge views, a wellness center, a jazz bar — all of it can be yours for $3,900 annually (or just $2,500, if you’re under 30). Since it opened in 2021, Casa Cipriani has become one of the city’s buzziest private clubs.

If you can get in, there are many rules on how to behave. No photos are allowed in the “living room” — last year, some members were reportedly ousted after guests snapped pictures of Taylor Swift with Matty Healy. And there’s a dress code — jeans are allowed, so long as they have “no rips.”

Private clubs have long shaped the fabric of New York social life. Many of them formed during the Gilded Age, meticulously designed to be showstoppers before Manhattan’s skyscrapers surrounded them. Some of the original clubs still exist, sitting on prime real estate near Central Park and now officially designated as city landmarks.

But in recent years, a new wave of clubs, including Casa Cipriani, has proliferated, varying in price point, exclusivity and amenities. These clubs have risen by filling two voids left by the pandemic: the loss of “third places,” or locations distinct from work and home that can foster a sense of community, and the abundance of empty office space amid a new work-from-home culture.

Last month, over 98 million square feet of office space was available in Manhattan, nearly double the amount in March 2020, according to the real estate firm Colliers.

Commercial landlords are not in a position to be picky about their tenants, said Ruth Colp-Haber, chief executive of the real estate brokerage Wharton Property Advisors. “There are many New York City landlords that have a lot of empty space, and they need to figure out how they’re going to fill it,” said Ms. Colp-Haber. “They’re very welcome to new tenants, new types of uses.”

In a survey conducted by GGA Partners, a consulting firm for private clubs, over 60 percent of clubs reported an increase in membership for 2022. “The remote work environment fueled by Covid has created these executives who are working from home but still craving that social interaction,” said Zack Bates, the founder of Private Club Marketing.

The historical function of members’ clubs — to stratify the city by gender, race or class — persists today.

Aman New York , which opened in 2022, has offered a membership with an initiation fee of $200,000, plus annual dues. Exclusive access to Casa Cruz , which opened the same year, came at a price of $250,000 to $500,000. ZZ’s Club, from Major Food Group, has comparatively modest fees of $20,000 at initiation and $10,000 per year — the cost of getting into “the world’s first and only private location of Carbone,” the company’s restaurant beloved by celebrities .

On the other end of the spectrum, a membership at Verci — which has more of a D.I.Y., college campus feel — ranges from $200 to $300 a month, with no initiation fee. “We’ve been using this as our third space, our shared living room, a place for about 120 people that are all young and creative and artistic,” said Anant Vasudevan, a co-founder of Verci, which opened its first location in a former office space in Lower Manhattan last year.

The speedy growth has come with some sputtering. Soho House, one of the best-known clubs, announced late last year that it would stop admitting new members at its Los Angeles, New York and London spaces after complaints of overcrowding. The company, which has over 180,000 members and more than 40 locations worldwide, was founded in 1995 and helped pave the way for today’s clubs. In 2021, Soho House made an initial public offering during an aggressive expansion effort , but recently it has considered going private again .

Will the current flurry of hip, trendy clubs stand the test of time?

‘Staying Power’

The affordability of commercial real estate played a role in Verci’s ability to secure a physical space in downtown Manhattan, according to Mr. Vasudevan. “Being able to have a little bit of leverage on that side has been really helpful for us, especially as we start this out,” he said, adding that his company “retrofitted” the space to “feel more like a cozy environment rather than like a corporate environment.”

While many of the older institutions own their clubhouses, the newer ones tend to rent them: Verci, Remedy Place and Maxwell are on leases. “I wish we had the capabilities to buy the buildings,” said Jonathan Leary, the founder of Remedy Place, a “social wellness club.” “Maybe one day.”

Renting might limit the “staying power” of the newer clubs, said Diana Kendall, a professor of sociology at Baylor University and the author of “Members Only: Elite Clubs and the Process of Exclusion.” Dr. Kendall pointed out that some of the new crop “have already come and gone,” including the much-publicized women-only social club the Wing, which shuttered in 2022 .

Some new clubs lack “the prestige and resources of the old, established clubs,” Dr. Kendall said, and are thus “more vulnerable to shifts in the economy and fluctuations in the employment sector even at the top levels.”

‘Who You Were and Who You Knew’

The city’s oldest clubs — places for wealthy New Yorkers (mainly white men, at the time of their founding) to socialize among other people of the same status — were created in a sometimes messy fashion, the stuff of gossip.

The Union Club, widely considered New York’s first men’s social club, formed in 1836 out of “an informal meeting of a number of gentlemen of social distinction,” as Francis Gerry Fairfield put it in his 1873 book, “The Clubs of New York.” According to Mr. Fairfield, the initiation fee was $200, and annual dues were $75. But by 1871, after a gentlemen’s disagreement over who was being let in, some members left and formed the Knickerbocker Club — the Knick, for short.

Many other clubs were springing up around this time, including the Century Association, the Brook and the Metropolitan Club, whose first president was J. Pierpont Morgan.

The club culture “was dependent on who you were and who you knew,” Dr. Kendall said. During the Gilded Age, from the late 1800s to the early 1900s, “people were making lots of money — railroads, banking, all of that — in New York,” Dr. Kendall explained. “And so they really wanted places where they could sit around and have cocktails with each other.”

Many early clubs did not allow women or people of color as members. In response, some elite members of those marginalized groups formed their own associations. The socialite and suffragist Florence Jaffray Harriman founded the Colony Club in 1903, which became the city’s premier women’s social club. And the Harmonie Club was founded by Jewish men who were denied entry to other clubs.

University clubs, such as the Yale, Harvard and Cornell clubs, were also popping up during this era to bring together people who shared academic credentials. Other clubs formed around mutual interests — for instance, the Anglers’ Club for those who loved fishing, the Lotos Club for the literary elite and the National Arts Club, which was founded by The New York Times critic Charles de Kay.

But interest in some clubs slumped in the mid- to late 20th century. As suburban development expanded, wealthy white people left New York City in droves and joined golf or country clubs. With membership down, the Union and Knickerbocker clubs even considered a merger.

What You Get for Getting In

With a plenitude of amenities, many of today’s New York City clubs offer more than the opportunity to hobnob.

At Remedy Place, members can take Zoom calls from hyperbaric oxygen chambers. And at Zero Bond, yuppies can, ironically or unironically, sip on a drink called the Trillionaire.

Other clubs pride themselves on offering little to no services. “We don’t have a fully functioning restaurant here, we’re not open until 6 p.m. during the weekdays — you can’t use this as a co-working space,” boasted David Litwak, a co-founder of Maxwell, which opened in Tribeca last year. “Our members have their own liquor locker. They can pour their own drinks.” Membership at Maxwell costs $3,000 annually, with initiation fees that range from $1,000 to $12,000.

Getting into some clubs may require navigating an opaque system. Cipriani’s website says the club “has the sole discretion to approve or deny any application for membership.” Those interviewing to join Maxwell need to pass “a vibe check,” Mr. Litwak said. “There’s no requirement for a degree of accomplishment. We have people who own hedge funds, or people who are in the lowest rung at hedge funds.”

These hoops can be part of the appeal of joining a private club. The clubs can “give you a feeling of prestige that in contemporary life a lot of people don’t necessarily have,” Dr. Kendall said — the feeling that you’re special enough to skip the line.

Searching for Third Places

Third places, such as libraries, coffee shops, bars and community centers, are locations where people can casually spend time outside of home and work — and research shows they have been under threat in recent years. The pandemic accelerated small-business closures, and in New York last year, Mayor Eric Adams — who is known to spend time at the private club Zero Bond — proposed budgets that would have forced libraries to cut their hours and programming. (After a backlash, the mayor said he would exempt public libraries from the cuts.)

For some people, private clubs have been filling that social void.

Last year, Sarah Mary Cunningham, a 41-year-old who works at Columbia Records, joined Remedy Place, which opened its Flatiron location in 2022 and has memberships ranging from $300 to $2,250 a month. Ms. Cunningham said she once made a friend while waiting for an IV drip at the club. “It was a shared connection,” she said. “There might not have been other ways for us to have met.”

Joining Verci “opened up this whole world for me because I didn’t go to college,” said Khalil DaTerra, a 21-year-old artist. “So having this campus feeling of dropping into a community is so valuable.” Mr. DaTerra is a resident member at Verci, part of a program that allows some members who can’t afford the monthly fees to pay what they can or nothing at all.

But in some crucial ways, private clubs cannot be considered third places. In “The Great Good Place,” Ray Oldenburg, the sociologist who coined the term in the 1980s, detailed several characteristics that ideal third places have — including being inclusive and homely and not setting “formal criteria of membership and exclusion.”

The business interests of private clubs can also sometimes conflict with the desires of their members. While people who join private clubs often seek intimacy, personalized treatment and a feeling of exclusivity, the clubs usually seek profitability and increased membership.

Aaisha Bhuiyan, a 27-year-old who works in tech, joined a private social club at the end of last year. She moved from New York City to New Jersey so that she could afford to live on her own, she said, and having access to a club gave her “a place to host my friends without dragging them to another state.” But she said that being at the club has felt “transactional.”

She declined to specify which club, but the cost, she said, is $250 a month.

Anna Kodé writes about design and culture for the Real Estate section of The Times. More about Anna Kodé

The State of Real Estate

Whether you’re renting, buying or selling, here’s a look at real estate trends..

A lot of change is happening in the housing market. Here’s the outlook .

With a landmark legal settlement  poised to upend a decades-old norm that has dictated who pays real estate agents and how much, economists, agents and lenders are beginning to worry that the burden could now be on first-time home buyers .

American homeowners could see a significant drop  in the cost of selling their homes  after a real estate trade group agreed to a landmark deal  that would eliminate the standard 6% sales commission.

A pricey housing market and higher interest rates have made it harder to afford a house, but so-called closing costs — for items like loan origination fees, discount points, appraisal and credit report fees — are also adding to the challenge .

As the prices for office space in urban centers tumble, cities whose municipal budgets rely on taxes associated with commercial real estate are starting to bear the brunt .

Homeowners are adding hidden doors and rooms to foil burglars, eke out extra storage space and prepare for Armageddon .

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