an essay about the problem of evil

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The Problem of Evil

Other essays.

“The problem of evil” is one of the most discussed objections to the existence of God and is a top reason many unbelievers give for their unbelief. These objectors argue that since there are so many cases of significant pain and suffering in the world that God could easily prevent, the fact that all this evil was not prevented means it is very unlikely (if not impossible) that God exists.

“The problem of evil” appeals to the phenomenon of evil (significant cases of pain and suffering) as evidence against the existence of God. For many, this evidence appears decisive, because if God existed, he would be powerful enough to prevent such evil, and good enough to want to prevent such evil. Since there is evil, no such powerful and good being exists. For the past two millennia Christians have typically urged two points in reply: theodicy and inscrutability. First, God may very well have a good reason for allowing the evil he does allow – a reason compatible with his holy and good character – and the way of theodicy goes on to list a number of these reasons. Second, the fact that unbelievers may not be able to discern or correctly guess at God’s justifying reason for allowing evil is no good reason to think he doesn’t have a reason. Given the infinity of God’s omniscience, the complexity of his providence, the depth of the goods he aims at, and our own substantial cognitive limitations, we shouldn’t expect to guess God’s reasons.

What Is the Problem of Evil?

The so-called “problem of evil” is an argument against the existence of God that reasons along these lines:

A perfectly powerful being can prevent any evil.
A perfectly good being will prevent evil as far as he can.
God is perfectly powerful and good.
So, if a perfectly powerful and good God exists, there will be no evil.
There is evil.
Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

“Evil,” here is understood as any significant case of pain and suffering in the world, whether “moral” (evil willfully caused by human beings such as murder, adultery, theft, rape, etc.) or “natural” evil (harm caused by impersonal forces of nature such as earthquakes, tornadoes, plague, etc.).

Responding to the Problem of Evil

Nonstarters.

A Christian must be truthful and face the question honestly. It will not do to deny that evil exists (#5 above), for evil is the very presumption of the gospel. Nor can we deny that God could prevent evil (#1 above) or that he is perfect in power and goodness (#3). However, we can (and should) question the second premise above – that a perfectly good God must prevent all evil – for it doesn’t necessarily follow from God’s perfect goodness that he will prevent every evil he can prevent. Perhaps God has a good reason for permitting evil rather than preventing it; if so, then his permission of evil is justified and doesn’t militate against his goodness.

The Ways of Theodicy and Inscrutability

Our response the problem of evil, then, may take either of two approaches. We may argue that the second premise above is false and seek to demonstrate that it is false by showing God’s reasons for permitting evil – the way of “theodicy.” Or we could argue that the second premise is unproven because unbelievers can’t rule out God’s having a good reason for permitting evil – the way of “inscrutability.”

The way of theodicy (from the Greek theos , “God,” and dikaios , “just”; hence, a justification of the ways of God in his dealings with men) seeks to demonstrate God’s reasons for permitting evil. The idea is that by allowing evil God attains greater good than possible apart from evil. The way of theodicy shows that premise (2) is false, arguing that God wouldn’t prevent every evil he could prevent.

The way of inscrutability argues, more modestly, that no one knows that premise (2) is true because no one can know enough to conclude that God doesn’t have good reason for permitting evil. We just cannot grasp God’s knowledge, the complexity of his plans, or the deep nature of the good he aims at in providence. And there is no proof that God does not have good reasons for allowing evil, but because he is good we can only assume that he does. Here we don’t have to come up with ‘theodicies’ to defend God against the problem of evil. Rather, the way of inscrutability shows that it is entirely to be expected that creatures like us can’t come up with God’s reasons, given who God is and who we are.

The Way of Theodicy

Two popular theodicies that have no biblical basis ..

Some theodicies that have been offered lack solid biblical grounding. The free will theodicy , for example, argues that moral evil is due to human abuse of free will. The value of free will is a great good: the possibility of morally good choice and of human beings imaging God by way of these choices. But free will has the unfortunate consequence of allowing for the possibility of moral evil. In response to this we might ask, if free will of this sort is so valuable then why doesn’t God have it, and why won’t we have it in heaven?

The natural law theodicy argues that natural evil is due to the laws of nature. The value of laws of nature is a great good: a stable environment needed for making rational choices of any sort. But laws of nature have the unfortunate consequence of allowing for the possibility of natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.). In response to this we might ask, if a stable environment requires the possibility of natural evil by requiring laws of nature then why isn’t there any natural evil in the pre-fall Garden of Eden or in the new heavens and the new earth?

Four popular theodicies have some biblical basis

By contrast, at least four theodicies have been offered that have some biblical basis. The punishment theodicy argues that suffering is a result of God’s just punishment of evildoers (Gen 3:14-19; Rom 1:24-32, 5:12, 6:23, 8:20-21; Isa 29:5-6; Ezek 38:19; Rev 6:12; 11:13; 16:18). In punishment God aims at the good of displaying his judgment against sin. The soul-building theodicy argues that suffering leads us from self-centeredness to other-centeredness (Heb 12:5-11; Rom 5:3-5; 2Cor 4:17; Jas 1:2-4; 1Pet 1:6-7; cf. Prov 10:13, 13:24; 22:15; 23:13-24, 29:15). In painful providences God aims at the good of displaying his goodness in shaping our character for good. The pain as God’s megaphone theodicy argues that pain is God’s way of getting the attention of unbelievers in a noncoercive way so that they might forget the vanities of earth, consider spiritual things instead, and perhaps even repent of sin (Luke 13:1-5). In pain God aims at the good of displaying his mercy that through such warnings we might be delivered from the wrath to come. The higher-order goods theodicy says that some goods can’t exist apart from the evils to which they are a response. There is no courage without danger, no sympathy without suffering, no forgiveness without sin, no atonement without suffering, no compassion without need, no patience without adversity. God must often allow lots of evils to make these goods a part of his world, given how these goods are defined (Eph 1:3-10; 1Pet 1:18-20).

These theodicies fall under the umbrella of the “greater good theodicy.”

A “greater good theodicy” (GGT) argues that the pain and suﬀering in God’s world play a necessary role in bringing about greater goods that could not be brought about otherwise. The question that remains, then, is just this: does the Bible really teach that God aims at great goods by way of various evils?

Constructing the “Greater Good Theodicy”: a Three-Fold Argument for Three Biblical Themes

Our argument here is that Scripture combines the ways of theodicy and inscrutability . The biblical accounts of Job, Joseph, and Jesus reveal the goodness of God in the midst of evil, weaving together these three themes:

God aims at great goods (either for mankind, or for himself, or both).
God often intends these great goods to come about by way of various evils .
God leaves created persons in the dark (in the dark about which goods are indeed his reasons for the evils, or about how the goods depend on the evils).

Thus, the Bible seems to strongly suggest that the GGT (God’s aiming at great goods by way of various evils) is in fact his modus operandi in providence, his “way of working.” But this GGT is tempered by a good dose of divine inscrutability.

The Case of Job

In the case of Job God aims at a great good: his own vindication – in particular, the vindication of his worthiness to be served for who he is rather than for the earthly goods he supplies (Job 1:11; 2:5). God intends the great good of the vindication of his own name to come to pass by way of various evils . These are a combination of moral evil and natural evil (Job 1:15, 16, 17, 19, 21-22; 2:7, 10; 42:11). God also leaves Job in the dark about what God is doing , for Job has no access to the story’s prologue in chapter 1. And when God speaks to him “out of the whirlwind” he never reveals to Job why he suffered. Instead, Job’s ignorance of the whole spectrum of created reality is exposed (Job 38:4-39:30; 40:6-41:34), and Job confesses his ignorance of both creation and providence (Job 40:3-5; 42:1-6).

The Case of Joseph

In the case of Joseph we find the same. God aims at great goods: saving the broader Mediterranean world from a famine, preserving his people amid such danger, and (ultimately) bringing a Redeemer into the world descended from such Israelites (Matt 1:1-17; Luke 3:23-38). God intends the great good of the preservation of his people from famine to come to pass by way of various evils (Gen 45:5, 7; Psa 105:16-17), including Joseph’s betrayal, being sold into slavery, and suffering unjust accusation and imprisonment (Gen 37, 39). Joseph sees these evils as the means of God’s sovereign providence (Gen 50:20). But God leaves Joseph’s brothers, the Midianite traders, Potiphar’s wife, and the cupbearer in the dark . None of these people knew the role their blameworthy actions would play in preserving God’s people in a time of danger. They had no clue which goods depended on which evils, or that the evils would even work toward any goods at all.

The Case of Jesus

And in the case of Jesus we see the same again. God aims at great goods: the redemption of his people by the atonement of Christ and the glorification of God in the display of his justice, love, grace, mercy, wisdom, and power. God intends the great good of atonement to come to pass by way of various evils : Jewish plots (Matt 26:3-4, 14-15), Satan’s promptings (John 13:21-30), Judas’s betrayal (Matt 26:47-56; 27:3-10; Luke 22:22), Roman injustice (Matt 26:57-68), Pilate’s cowardice (Matt 27:15–26), and the soldiers’ brutality (Matt 27:27-44). But God leaves various created agents (human and demonic) in the dark , for it is clear that the Jewish leaders, Satan, Judas, Pilate, and the soldiers are all ignorant of the role they play in fulfilling the divinely prophesied redemptive purpose by the cross of Christ (Acts 2:23, 3:18, 4:25-29; John 13:18, 17:12, 19:23-24).

Licensing and Limiting the GGT

In each narrative, the first two themes highlight the way of theodicy (God aiming at great goods by way of evils), while the third theme highlights the way of inscrutability (left to ourselves, we cannot discern what God’s reasons are for any case of evil). By way of the first two themes Scripture repeatedly encourages the view that God has a justifying reason for permitting the evils of the world. That is what’s right with the way of theodicy. But Scripture, by way of the third theme, repeatedly discourages the view that we can ever know what that reason is in any particular case of evil. That is what’s right with the way of inscrutability. In contemporary philosophy, these are usually presented as two different ways to solve the problem of evil (theodicy and inscrutability). However, the Bible seems to combine these two ways when it speaks of God’s relation to the evils in the world. That is, it licenses the greater good theodicy as an overall perspective on evil, but wisely limits that perspective in a way that is instructive for both Christians and non-Christians.

Licensing the GGT: God’s Sovereignty over All Evil

God’s sovereignty over natural evil.

It is one thing to acknowledge God’s sovereign and purposeful providence over the moral and natural evils mentioned in the Job, Joseph, and Jesus narratives. It is quite another to claim that God is sovereign over all moral and natural evils. But this is what the Bible repeatedly teaches. This takes us a considerable way towards licensing the GGT as a general approach to the problem of evil. The Bible presents multitudes of examples of God intentionally bringing about natural evils – famine, drought, rampaging wild animals, disease, birth defects such as blindness and deafness, and even death itself – rather than being someone who merely permits nature to ‘do its thing’ on its own. Here are some samples:

Famine (Deut 32:23-24; 2Kgs 8:1; Psa 105:16; Isa 3:1; Ezek 4:16, 5:16-17, 14:13, 14:21; Hos 2:9; Amos 4:6, 9; Hag 2:17)
Drought (Deut 28:22; 1Kgs 8:35; Isa 3:1; Hos 2:3; Amos 4:6-8; Hag 1:11)
Rampaging wild animals (Lev 26:22; Num 21:6; Deut 32:23-24; 2Kgs 17:25; Jer 8:17; Ezek 5:17, 14:15, 14:21, 33:27)
Disease (Lev 26:16, 25; Num 14:12; Deut 28:21-22, 28:27; 2Kgs 15:5; 2Chron 21:14, 26:19-20)
Birth defects such as blindness and deafness (Exod 4:11; John 9:1-3)
Death itself (Deut 32:39; 1Sam 2:6-7)
Ten Egyptian plagues (Exod 7:14-24, 8:1-15, 8:16-19, 8:20-32, 9:1-7, 9:8-12, 9:13-35, 10:1-20, 10:21-29, 11:4-10, 12:12-13, 12:27-30)
‘Impersonal’ forces and objects (Psa 65:9-11, 77:18, 83:13-15, 97:4, 104:4, 104:10-24, 107:25, 29, 135:6-7, 147:8, 147:16-18, 148:7-8, Jonah 1:4, Nah 1:3-4, Zech 7:14, Matt 5:45, Acts 14:17)

God’s Sovereignty over Moral Evil

In addition, and perhaps surprisingly, the Bible presents God as having such meticulous control over the course of human history that a wide range of moral evils – murder, adultery, disobedience to parents, rejecting wise counsel, even human hatred – can be regarded as “of the Lord.” Without erasing or suppressing the intentionality of creatures – and this includes their deliberations, their reasoning, their choosing between alternatives they consider and reflect upon – God’s own intentionality stands above and behind the responsible choices of his creatures. Again, some samples:

Eli’s sons’ disobedience (1Sam 2:23-25)
Samson’s desire for a foreign wife (Jdg 14:1-4)
Absalom, Rehoboam, and Amaziah rejecting wise counsel (2Sam 17:14; 1Kgs 12:15; 2Chron 25:20)
Assassination (2Chron 22:7, 9, 32:21-22)
Adultery (2Sam 12:11-12, 16:22)
Human hatred (Psa 105:23-25; Exod 4:21; Deut 2:30, 32; Josh 11:20; 1Kgs 11:23, 25; 2Chron 21:16-17)

God’s Sovereignty over All Evil

So the Job, Joseph, and Jesus passages are not anomalies, but part and parcel of a more general view the Bible takes on the subject, with respect to both natural and moral evil. Indeed, in addition to this large swath of ‘particular’ texts about individual cases of evil, there are quite a few “universal” texts which seem to trace all calamities, all human decision-making, all events whatsoever, back to the will of God.

God’s sovereignty over all calamity (Ecc 7:13-14; Isa 45:7; Lam 3:37-38; Amos 3:6)
God’s sovereignty over all human decision-making (Prov 16:9, 19:21, 20:24, 21:1; Jer 10:23)
God’s sovereignty over all events whatsoever (Psa 115:3; Prov 16:33; Isa 46:9-10; Rom 8:28, 11:36; Eph 1:11)

Limiting the GGT: The Inscrutability of God’s Purposes

Establishing the burden of proof.

Of course, each specific theodicy mentioned earlier has significant limitations. For instance, the Bible frequently discourages the idea that the punishment theodicy can explain all evils in the world (Job 1:1, 1:8, 2:3, 42:7-8; John 9:1-3; Acts 28:1-6). More generally, Christians can never know enough about a person’s situation, or about God’s purposes, to rule in a specific theodicy as being God’s reason for permitting evil in a particular case. In fact, it would be entirely presumptuous to do so. But if he who affirms must prove, then the question in the problem of evil is not whether Christians know enough to “rule in” the applicability of a theodicy on any particular occasion, but whether critics know enough to “rule out” the applicability of any theodicy. But how could a critic reasonably claim to know that there is no reason that would justify God in permitting suffering? How could he know that premise (2) of the original argument is true? For why think that God’s reasons for permitting particular cases of evil are the kinds of things that we would discern by our cognitive capacities, if such reasons were there?

Analogies for our Cognitive Limitations

It is widely recognized that we have cognitive limitations with respect to discerning goods and connections, at least in territories where we lack the relevant expertise, experience, or vantage point. Some examples:

It doesn’t seem to me that there is a perfectly spherical rock on the dark side of the moon right now, but that’s no reason to conclude that such a rock isn’t there.
It didn’t seem to any medievals that the theories of special relativity or quantum mechanics were true, but that was no reason to think they weren’t true.
It didn’t seem to humans in earlier eras that fundamental human rights of one sort or another were in fact fundamental human rights, but that was no reason to think there weren’t any such rights.
It wouldn’t seem to a non-Greek-speaker that spoken Greek sentences have any meaning, but that is no reason to think they don’t have a meaning.
It wouldn’t seem to the musically uninitiated that Beethoven projected the ‘sonata form’ onto the symphony as a whole, giving the entire musical work a fundamental unity it would not otherwise have had. But it wouldn’t follow from their ignorance that Beethoven didn’t have such a purpose, much less that he was unsuccessful in executing it.
It might not seem to my one-month-old son that I have a good reason for him to receive a painful series of shots at the doctor’s office. But it wouldn’t follow from his ignorance that there isn’t a good reason.

God is omniscient, which means he not only knows everything that we are likely to guess at, but every truth whatsoever. This means that God knows things that we cannot even fathom. As the above analogies suggest, this is easily demonstrated for a huge range of cases. If the complexities of an infinite God’s divine plan for the unfolding of the universe does involve God’s recognizing either deep goods, or necessary connections between various evils and the realization of those goods, or both of these things, would our inability to discern these goods or connections give us a reason for thinking they aren’t there? What would be the basis of such confidence? But without such confidence, we have little reason to accept premise (2) of the problem of evil. So we have little reason to accept its conclusion.

Biblical Argument for Divine Inscrutability

The theme of divine inscrutability is not only exceedingly defensible common sense. It also looms large in the Bible, having both pastoral and apologetic implications. It closes the mouths of Christians who would insensitively offer “God’s reasons” to those who suffer (when they don’t know such reasons). And it closes the mouths of critics who would irrationally preclude divine reasons for the suffering. Imagine we were on the scene in the cases of Job (as his friend), Joseph (as his brother), and Jesus (as his tormentor). Would we have been able to guess at God’s purpose for the suffering? Would we not instead have been wholly unaware of any such purpose? Does not a large part of the literary power of the Bible’s narrative, and the spiritual encouragement it offers, rest upon this interplay between the ignorance of the human actors and the wisdom of divine providence?

One of the most extended reflections in the New Testament on the problem of evil – in this case, the evil of Jewish apostasy – is Romans 9-11. Paul’s concluding doxology blends together these twin themes of divine sovereignty over evil and divine inscrutability in the midst of evil:

Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! ‘For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?’ ‘Or who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid?’ For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen (Rom 11:33–36).

To the extent that God has not spoken about a particular event in history, his judgments are unsearchable, and his paths are beyond tracing out. But that does not mean there is not a greater good which justifies God’s purposing of that event.

The Problem of Evil, Essay Example

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Introduction

The presence of evil has always been a fascination and a challenge to humanity. This is itself interesting; good is usually accepted as natural and right, but good is only a moral quality, and just as subject to investigation as evil. Nonetheless, it is evil that is often focused upon, and because it is inexplicable to many, whereas goodness is felt to be the normal and natural force. As God created the world and reality, and God is perceived as acting on behalf of mankind, evil then stands apart. It does not, or should not, belong in God’s world. This is an issue I have struggled with, as have many others. Why, in plain terms, would God permit evil to exist, since He orders all things and evil cannot exist unless He wills it? Philosophers and ordinary people alike have tried to answer this question, and their conclusions vary. My own view is that evil exists because it is a necessary element of life, just as darkness is necessary in order to know and value light. Moreover, I believe that God allows evil because only He is able to comprehend that it belongs to all existence, and creates means of developing goodness and character. In the following, I examine and support that evil is a natural force enabled by God, one that actually creates opportunities for good, and one that is necessary for humans and animals to exercise their own instincts and wills as God wishes them to.

To understand that there is a reason for evil, it is first necessary to know the identity of God, or come as close to this as is possible for human beings. Without question, this has engaged great minds since the beginning of human life and the belief in a single God. He is made in the image of man, in the minds of many, and because this is the only way we can begin to understand a being beyond our scope. Then, we turn to Scripture for a clear idea of who and what He is, but there remains the issue of Scripture as composed – and interpreted – by humans. In plain terms, God tends to exist as individuals perceive Him, and this ranges from ideas of the all-powerful and vengeful God to the loving, caring deity. All of this suggests a critical point, and one going to the meaning of evil; namely, that the mystery of God’s being is actually central to belief. The less human beings can accurately know about God, in other words, the more there is a turning to genuine faith, or trust in God’s existence. Many theists in fact argue that “hiding the Godself” is an act of God’s will (Keller 40). It is not for human beings to “know” God beyond their faith in Him, and this is supported by the fact that God does not reveal Himself to people in ways going to a defined being. This is in keeping with Hegel, who argues that there is a harmonious whole to reality in which all things have meaning and purpose, and a whole that human beings cannot comprehend (Rachels, Rachels 66). It must be enough that He is known to be God and that He orders the reality of all things.

As there is then no direct explanation for evil from God, it follows that human beings must consider the forms evil takes, which may offer evidence of its purpose. Setting aside evil in human terms, the suffering of animals raises important questions. Animals are creatures that act out of instinct, and have no agendas beyond satisfying their needs and/or pleasing the humans who sometimes care for them. They are truly “innocent” in the sense that they are not motivated by the forces and desires driving human behavior. If they attack, it is because they feel threatened. If they eat other animals, it is because this is how they must live and they are acting out of natural impulses. This being the reality, it must be wondered why animals should suffer needlessly. They face evils both natural and gratuitous; they are often starved to death in the wild, and abused by cruel human beings who, behaving in an evil way, enjoy inflicting pain on them. Human beings have wills and can create their realities, in terms of choices in behaviors. Most animals have no such consciousness or choice, so their suffering seems pointless and like an act of cruelty on the part of God.

When this issue is examined more closely, however, the evils faced by animals take on a different meaning. To begin with, most nonhuman animals have no continuing sense of self. Their consciousness is restricted to the moment and they have no real memories of past pains or ideas of death, so their suffering is not the same as human suffering. In fact, it is arguable that we attach human views of pain to animals when they do not apply. Then, it is also argued that the evils faced by animals serve an important purpose. The pain experienced by an animal in the wild, for example, will drive to animal to do what is necessary to end it and survive. The animal having trouble in locating food suffers hunger, but is then more driven to locate food. The creature who is pursued by other animals develops the skills to escape (Keller 26). These realities explain a purpose to natural evils, and because those evils are parts of existence in the wild. This is the world as ordered by God, in that animals must engage in competition to survive, and is then not a true evil as such.

When the issue goes to gratuitous evil, however, more is required. Animals suffer at the hands of humans – and occasionally other animals, as in killer whales – who inflict pain because they desire to do so, or are unconcerned with creating suffering. This in turn connects to how human beings do the same to one another, as individuals or in group actions going to evil. If we define evil as the intent and effort to cause pain and/or harm to others, it becomes clear that this has always been an enormous element in human history. There is no need to list the many and vile forms such evil takes, from the atrocities of the Holocaust and Bataan Death March to how individuals torture and kill innocent children. All that is important is recognizing that evil is a consistent and powerful force in human affairs. This then demands an explanation, as God creates reality and consequently permits such evils. What we are dealing with our two realities, God and evil, and they must be reconciled.

For evil to be explained, then, several approaches are necessary. To begin with, an important question must be addressed: are good and evil only concerns of mankind? (Rachels, Rachels 72). Animals suffer pain, but it is unreasonable to assume that they perceive this as evil in any sense, and because the moral attachment is a strictly human device. It may be argued that this is not true. In Scripture, it is consistently clear that evil is the domain of Satan, and exists as opposed to the goodness of God. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that humanity’s knowledge of God derives only from human accounts. Considering the Bible further only adds to complicating the issue and reinforcing evil as a human concept alone. In the old Testament, certainly, God demands actions from his children that may be seen as evil. When defied or doubted, He exacts severe punishments. It was God’s will, for example, that Sodom and Gomorrah be destroyed and the people die, because their sinfulness was an outrage to him. Even the testing of Job may be viewed as a divine and evil act, as Job was devout and God allowed him to suffer greatly, to prove his faith. In plain terms, God acts in cruel ways very often, so the idea of evil itself more belongs to mankind. This is not to say that God actually endorses evil; instead, the point is that God’s actions are removed from evil because, as God, He deems them necessary in ways human beings cannot understand. This being the case, good and evil are moral concepts based solely on human thinking and belief.

This then changes the idea of how evil itself can exist in a world ordered by God. In a sense, it exists in a way completely removed by God because it is a concept of humanity alone. We decide what is evil, and this is often a subject of debate. For example, there are people who torture and kill others, and who are identified as having extreme brain disorders. The actions certainly conform to the most horrific ideas of evil, but it is questionable whether this applies, and because these people are under biological influences dictating the behavior. Even so, many still insist that evil is present in such cases, the causes notwithstanding. There can be no real justification for the suffering of such victims, but there is as well a purpose to be seen. In plain terms, evil tends to create the need in others to address it and generate some form of good. People will care for victims of evil as much as they can, and this brings out the better nature of human beings. Then, the structures of cultures and societies very much go to laws and norms that express good and defy, and prevent, evil. People universally come together to address evil behaviors and make efforts to limit any opportunity for evil to exist, from laws exacting punishment for crimes to support organizations for many kinds of victims of injustice or cruelty. Goodness is more than a concept; it is in fact a reaction very often, and a practical effort to redress evil. None of this would be in place without the driving force of evil, so it is arguable that evil is a “necessary evil.” It is impossible to determine, but it must be wondered how good most people would be if there were not the threat of evil generating the reaction of good. As noted, light can only be known because of darkness, and the same may be said of evil. This view in place, there is no issue with reconciling a benevolent God with it. It is, as the phrase goes, part of the larger reality understood fully only by God.

There is also another consideration regarding the permitting of evil by an otherwise caring God. This goes to the inability of human beings to actually understand the nature of God, and their usual way of attaching expectations to God that do not apply. People historically and today ask the same question: why does God let evil happen, when He is all-powerful and can remove all evil forever? One answer lies in the discussion above, in terms of evil as necessary to create goodness. The other, however, is that God is not a divine power who directly intervenes in human affairs and behavior. It seems that many perceive God as a kind of employer, and one who should involve himself in the concerns and matters of all human beings. The reality of the world, nonetheless, offers no evidence of any such involvement, and simply because what humanity does occurs apart from God and divine influence. Then, and importantly, it is an enormous element of Scripture that God does not directly act in human affairs, and the key to this is the affirming of human beings as exercising their own will. Proverbs expresses this in the Bible: “That thou mayst be delivered from the evil way, and from the man that speaketh perverse things.” The central point, reiterated through the Bible, is that mankind “mayest.” God has invested people with will and choice, and this is supported by the need for people to choose to have faith. In plain terms, the fate of humanity is not on God’s agenda; He has made it clear that, given great powers of thought and feeling, people must make their own courses. God does not permit evil, then. Rather, he permits mankind to do what it will, and suffer the consequences when it acts in evil ways.

Evil is a source of misery to many, as has been true since the earliest days of humanity. As there is widespread belief in God, there then arises the long ongoing question of how evil can be in a world ordered by a benevolent God. There is no one answer, but there are explanations. With animals, the evil of pain prompts behaviors that go to survival. Regarding gratuitous evil to animals and to people, more is necessary, and it is seen that good exists only because evil must be addressed. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, God and evil are reconciled because evil itself is both a human concept and the force created by humans, acting with the wills given to them by God. He permits evil, then, as He permits the universe itself to exist. Ultimately, and in my estimation, evil is only a natural force among others enabled by God. It is a force that actually creates opportunities for good, and a behavior that is necessary for humans and animals to exercise their own instincts and wills as God wishes them to.

Works Cited

Keller, James A. Problems of Evil and the Power of God . Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2013. Print.

Rachels, James, & Rachels, Stuart. Problems from Philosophy, 3 rd Ed . New York: McGraw-Hill Humanities, 2011. Print.

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Introduction, free will and responsibility, the importance of the body and the soul, the possibility of certitude.

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

The Problem of Evil

Author: Thomas Metcalf Category: Philosophy of Religion Word Count: 1000

Many people believe in God and understand God to be an omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), and morally perfect being. [1]

But the world contains quite a lot of evil or badness: intense suffering, premature death, and moral wickedness.

This inspires some questions: Why would God permit such evil? Is there a good reason why? Or does it occur in part because there is no God to prevent it?

Asking these questions involves engaging with the Problem of Evil . [2]

The concern is whether evil provides a reason to disbelieve in God. There are four things one might say about evil, ranging from that it proves that God does not exist to that it provides no evidence at all against God’s existence.

1. The Incompatibility Problem of Evil

The ‘Incompatibility’ or ‘Logical’ versions of the Problem of Evil claim that evil’s existence is logically incompatible with God’s existence: believing in God and evil is like believing in a five-sided square, a contradiction. [3]

Most philosophers today reject this argument. [4] They think that God could have some sufficient reason to permit some evil: e.g., personal growth requires confronting challenges that inherently involve some evil or bad things. These defenses [5] seem to show that it is not contradictory to believe in God and the existence of evil.

2. The Evidential Problem of Evil

Other philosophers argue that the mere existence of evil does not prove that God does not exist, but that the facts about evil provide good evidence against God’s existence. [6]

There are probably billions of evils such that we do not know why God, if there is a God, would permit them. Many argue that if even one of these instances is gratuitous —i.e., God could have prevented it without thereby sacrificing an equal or greater good and without thereby permitting an equal or worse evil—then God does not exist. [7]

Theists have reason to find an explanation or set of explanations that could plausibly justify all evils. This involves trying to find plausible theodicies or explanations of why God would permit that evil or why that evil is not as evidentially weighty as it might seem. Here’s a summary of two of the best theodicies.

2.1. Free Will

Many theists hold that humans’ having significant free will is a very great good, one that is worth the evil that sometimes arises from it. [8]

This being a plausible explanation of evil depends on justifying these claims:

(a) we have libertarian free will [9] (a belief that is mostly rejected by philosophers [10] );

(b) (e.g.) Stalin’s free will was more valuable than the lives of the millions he killed (against, presumably, their freely-willed choices to remain alive);

(d) even apparently natural disasters and disease, including those that harm nonhuman animals [12] , are all the result (e.g.) of free-willed evil-spirits’ choices. [13]

2.2. “Soul-Making”

Perhaps encountering evil and freely responding to it develops various virtues, such as compassion, generosity, and courage. [14]

For this to explain evil, the theist may need to argue that:

(a) God could not have developed those virtues in us any other equally valuable but less harmful ways (e.g,. by creating humans who are more morally sensitive in the first place and reducing evil accordingly);

(b) all evil can reasonably be expected to contribute to soul-making; and

(c) the compassion Smith develops when she sees Jones suffering justifies God using Jones (or allowing Jones to be used) as a means to the end of producing that compassion. [15]

Given these and other theodicies, we must ask how much evidence evil provides, and weigh that against any evidence for God’s existence. This will obviously be very complicated.

3. Outweighing Evidence?

Theists might argue that there is so much evidence for God’s existence that we are justified in being confident that God has a purpose for all evil. [16]

We cannot consider those arguments here, but we should recall how many billions of instances of severe, inscrutable evils there are in the world. Therefore, for this defense to work, perhaps there must be very strong evidence for God’s existence. Also, a substantial majority of philosophers reject theism, [17] and so seem to believe that there is little good evidence for God’s existence. Therefore, this strategy may depend on appealing to a set of generally-rejected arguments to try to explain evil.

4. Evil Is No Evidence?

Some defenses amount to the response that evil is no evidence against God’s existence at all.

Some argue that we should not expect to understand why God would permit evil, and so we should not be confident in our ability to assess whether some evil is gratuitous. [18] If there is a God, God might have a purpose for all the evil in the world, a purpose that we do not or cannot understand, and so we should not trust our doubt that some evil in the world is justified. [19]

Typically, this inspires the question of whether a similar argument can be made about other beliefs we have, thereby threatening to produce a deep, general skepticism about science, morality, and even arguments for God’s existence. [20] If God works in mysterious ways, how do I assess the likelihood that God has some inscrutable reason for tricking me into (wrongly) thinking that other minds exist, that the past exists, that an external world exists, and that I ought to save a child drowning in a shallow pond? This is perhaps the primary focus of the debate about the Problem of Evil in recent years.

Finally, some philosophers argue that God’s existence is actually compatible with gratuitous evil after all, [21] although most philosophers disagree. [22]

5. Conclusion

If each particular evil is even a little bit of evidence against God’s existence, the billions and billions of them in history might really pile up. For many people, the problem of evil is not merely an abstract puzzle, for it challenges their most profound beliefs about what God is like and whether God even exists.

[1] Anselm 1965 [1077-78]: ch. 2.

[2] The Problem of Evil involves engaging arguments from the existence of evil, or types of evils, to the conclusion that God does not exist. So the Problem of Evil is also called The Argument from Evil.

[3] Mackie 1955. “Evidential” versions of the argument, discussed in the next section, typically focus on the totality of evil and can be seen as “Incompatibility” arguments also: the claim is that God’s existence entails that there are no gratuitous or pointless evils—evils God could have prevented it without thereby sacrificing an equal or greater good and without thereby permitting an equal or worse evil—but that there are such gratuitous or pointless evils, which is a logical contradiction.

[4] Rowe 1979: 335.

[5] A “defense” is an attempt to explain why God and evil are not incompatible. Defenses are closely related to theodicies (two of which are presented below) which attempt to explain why God permits evil. Defenses and theodicies are different: defenses hold that there is some possible explanation, even if we’re not sure what it is, while theodicies attempt to supply that actual explanation.

[6] Rowe 1979; Draper 1989; Tooley 2014: § 3.2.1.

[7] Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder 1999.

[8] Plantinga 1977: 29-59.

[9] For an explanation of what libertarian free will is, see Jonah Nagashima’s Free Will and Free Choice . Libertarians about free will (a view of which has no relation to the political position of the same name) believe that free choices are choices that are not causally determined by the past and the laws of nature (or anything else), and so they believe that determinism is false, yet that such choices are not ultimately random because we are the ultimate source of our choices.

The other broad definition of free will is that of compatibilist free will. On this theory of free will, we can be determined to do what we do, yet our actions can still be done from free will if, e.g., we are doing what we want to do and acting on our own desires. This view of free will seems to allow that God could cause us to not act in horribly evil ways, and that we freely choose to never engage in these evils, and so the free will defense is not available to compatibilists.

[10] Bourget and Chalmers 2014.

[11] So, e.g., Stalin might freely make the choice to kill someone, but whether the effect of that choice—that is, whether someone is actually killed—seems to be another matter. So, a question is whether, if there is a God, God could allow us to freely make decisions (which is assumed to be a great good), but prevent the very bad effects that result from some of them, and God be justified preventing those very bad effects.

[12] Rowe 1979: 337.

[13] Plantinga 1977: 58.

[14] Hick 2007: 253-61.

[15] cf. Kant 1987 [1785]: 4:429; Trakakis 2008.

[16] cf. Rowe 1979: 338.

[17] Bourget and Chalmers 2014.

[18] Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder 1999: 115.

[19] Wykstra 1998.

[20] Draper 1998: 188; Russell 1998: 196-98. The general response to the Problem of Evil that we are not likely to know whether any evil is gratuitous or pointless is known as “Skeptical Theism,” since skeptics deny that we have a type of knowledge. A concern about skeptical theism is whether the motivations for it lead to or justify other types of skepticism.

[21] van Inwagen 2000; Kraay 2010. van Inwagen’s argument is complex and depends on the (controversial) claim that it can be permissible to allow some unjustified evils, e.g., that it could be permissible to allow someone to remain imprisoned for at least slightly longer than any just imprisonment because sometimes arbitrary lines must be drawn. From there, he appeals to something like a “little by little” argument (based on concerns about vagueness: see Darren Hibb’s Vagueness ). that if a little unjustified evil can be permissibly allowed, then a tiny bit more can be permissibly allowed, so then a little more can be allowed, leading to the conclusion that any unjustified evils can be allowed.

[22] Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder 1999; Trakakis 2003.

Anselm. (1965 [1077-78]). St. Anselm’s Proslogion . Tr. M. J. Charlesworth. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Bourget, David and David J. Chalmers. (2014). “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical Studies , forthcoming.

Draper, Paul. (1989). “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists.” Noûs 23: 331-50.

———. (1998). “The Skeptical Theist.” In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil . Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 175-92.

Hick, John. (2007). Evil and the God of Love . New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder. (1999). “Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?” American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2): 115-30.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals . In Kant, Immanuel. Practical Philosophy . Ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1999.

Kraay, Klaas J. “Theism, Possible Worlds, and the Multiverse.” Philosophical Studies 147 (2010), pp. 255-68.

Mackie, J. L. (1955). “Evil and Omnipotence.” Mind 64 (254): 200-12.

Plantinga, Alvin. (1977). God, Freedom, and Evil . Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.

Rowe, William. (1979). “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 16(4): 335-41.

Russell, Bruce. (1998). “Defenseless.” In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil . Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press: 193-205.

Tooley, Michael. (2014). “The Problem of Evil.” In Edward N. Zalta (ed .), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 edition), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/evil/>.

Trakakis, Nick. (2008). “Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?” Sophia 47: 161-91.

———. (2003). “God, Gratuitous Evil, and van Inwagen’s Attempt to Reconcile the Two.” Ars Disputandi 3 (1): 1-10.

van Inwagen, Peter. (2000). “The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils.” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 74: 65–80.

Wykstra, Stephen John. (1998). “Rowe’s Noseeum Argument from Evil.” In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument from Evil . Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press: 126-50.

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Revision History

This essay, posted 8/16/2020, is a revised version of an essay originally posted 4/7/2014.

About the Author

Tom Metcalf is an associate professor at Spring Hill College in Mobile, AL. He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder. He specializes in ethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Tom has two cats whose names are Hesperus and Phosphorus. http://shc.academia.edu/ThomasMetcalf

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In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section The Problem of Evil

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Traditional Problems of Evil
Commonsense Problem of Evil
Nonskeptical Responses: Defenses and Theodicies
Skeptical Theism

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The Problem of Evil by Trent Dougherty , Scott Cleveland LAST REVIEWED: 08 October 2015 LAST MODIFIED: 30 July 2014 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0211

“The problem of evil” is a multifaceted problem. But the problem for theistic philosophers is that there are plausible arguments starting from plausible claims about evil to the conclusion that there is no God. These arguments have taken many forms, as have the replies to them. This bibliography covers primarily the most important contemporary treatments.

Peterson 1998 and Dougherty and Walls 2013 provide accessible introductions to the topic. McBrayer and Howard-Snyder 2013 give an opinionated introduction to the major response of the major figures in the field. Dougherty 2011 offers an in-depth survey of recent literature. O’Connor 1998 surveys challenges and responses with the purpose of defending that theism or atheism may be justified depending on a person’s epistemic position. Howard-Snyder 1996 is a highly influential anthology containing seminal works on all sides of the issue. While sometimes highly technical, Plantinga and Tooley 2008 is a lively debate between two leading figures.

Dougherty, Trent. “Recent Work on the Problem of Evil.” Analysis 71.3 (July 2011): 560–573.

DOI: 10.1093/analys/anr059

This article states and evaluates the major lines of the debate concerning the problem of evil in the ten years leading up to its publication.

Dougherty, Trent, and Jerry L. Walls. “Arguments from Evil.” In The Routledge Companion to Theism . Edited by Charles Taliaferro, Victoria S. Harrison, and Stewart Goetz, 369–382. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Offers an accessible introduction to a variety of arguments from evil, both for and against the existence of God. Includes an argument for God’s existence from the pattern of suffering in the world.

Howard-Snyder, Daniel. The Evidential Argument from Evil . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.

An anthology of highly influential essays, the title of which came to name the family of arguments from evil focused on arguing from the probable existence of gratuitous or unjustified particular evils to God’s nonexistence. Contains both seminal early works promoting and responding to this family of argument as well as pieces written specifically for it.

McBrayer, Justin, and Daniel Howard-Snyder, eds. Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil . Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

Contains chapters giving opinionated treatments of most major issues relating to the problem of evil by major scholars.

O’Connor, David. God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism . Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

Surveys a number of challenges and responses. Offers a defense of the view that theism or atheism could be justified for a person given that person’s epistemic position. Argues that the skeptical theist response undermines natural theology.

Peterson, Michael L. God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues . Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998.

A somewhat dated but excellent and very accessible orientation to the main issues pertaining to the problem of evil.

Plantinga, Alvin, and Michael Tooley. Knowledge of God . Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.

DOI: 10.1002/9781444301304

A lively, if sometimes highly technical, debate-style exchange between two leading figures in the field.

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59 The Problem of Evil Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

🏆 best the problem of evil topic ideas & essay examples, 📌 good essay topics on the problem of evil, 🔎 most interesting the problem of evil topics to write about.

St. Augustine. Solution to the Problem of Evil Augustine claims that the solution of evil is to do the right thing and to abstain from wrongdoing. He claims that evil results from a man trying to equal himself to God.
John Hick’s “Soul-Making” Theodicy and the Problem of Evil Many Christians find it hard to explain the problem of evil as it does not seem to correspond to the will of God. We will write a custom essay specifically for you by our professional experts 808 writers online Learn More
Problem of Evil: John Hick “Philosophy of Religion” The third one is the idea that God is not that powerful and therefore he has no ability to deal with the problem of evil and suffering.
John Mackie and Alvin Plantinga Arguments on the Problem of Evil This paper will discuss the problem of evil, state the main claims that have been argued by John Mackie and Alvin Plantinga, and show some of the arguments that other scholars have raised with regard […]
Problem of Evil and Varieties of Atheism The article “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” gives a powerful argument to support the ideas of atheism based on the existence of evil.
The Problem of Evil: Personal Viewpoint Now with my new system of theological thinking, I acknowledge that God’s ability accurately defines His authority over the whole world, and therefore Evil, as well as Good, is His will.
Theodicy and the Problem of Evil However, what perhaps relates to the issue at hand is when, in the Book of Genesis, God created enmity between the woman’s offspring and that of the serpent.
The Problem of the Evil and Philosophy of Religion John Hick, the author of Evil and the God of Love, insists on the idea that theodicy is “unavoidable…in the virtue of the nature that the world and of the essential character of the Christian […]
Problem of Evil and Illegitimate Theodicy Discussing the first claim, it should be noted that the evil never preceded the good; therefore it should not be taken as if the evil were the first to occur and then as a result […]
The Problem of Evil in Religion and Theology In the viewpoint of religion and theology, the issue of evil is the trouble of reconciliation the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of a god.
The Problem of Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation A philosophical theory of evil can be expected to address many questions of meaning and value that pertain us to think in multiple dimensions at a time like thinking of “evil” a concept worth preserving […]
Examining the Problem of Evil in Theism The idea of immortality is one of the key themes that are discussed in theism in terms of the problem of evil.
God and Problem of Evil in Johnson’s Philosophy As for the moral features of God, it is possible to assume that he is evil since he causes many evil events.
The Problem of Evil: Modern vs Traditional The aspects of evil and the reality of the devil are deeply explored in different verses in the Bible, both Old Testament and New Testament.
Marilyn McCord Adams’ Views on the Problem of Evil Since overcoming the adverse effects of such a phenomenon is beyond the capacity of human beings, the presence of horrendous evil signifies the inconsistency of optimism as a viable, sustainable posture in life and demands […]
Hamartiology as a Problem of Evil Moral evil, which is ultimately the cause of natural evil, can be traced to the beginning of creation when Adam and Eve defied God’s explicit directive not to eat fruits from the tree at the […]
The Problem of Evil: Rational, Reasonable, and Scientific Explains God is omnipotent and it is impossible to reject it under the statements of evil’s presence. God is unable to create a world where everything is good, as it contradicts the idea of personal choice […]
The Problem of Evil: Religious and Apologetic Way The problem of evil is simply the disagreement of how such a great God can exist and evil still dominates a greater part of the world he created.
The Logical Problem of Evil and the Freewill Defense The free-will defense as a response to the logical problem of evil will also be covered in the essay as well as how the free-will response demonstrates the existence of evil to be logically inconsistent […]
The Problem of Evil During the Jewish Holocaust
The Problem of Evil: An Issue in Religious Philosophy and the Logic
How the Problem of Evil Aims to Disprove the Existence of God
Boethius’ Account of and Solution to the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil in Shakespeare’s Play “Richard Iii”
The Christian Philosophy’s Stance on the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil in “Rebellion” by Fyodor Dostoevsky
A Christian Solution to the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil in “The Harry Potter” Series
The Problem of Evil in the World and the Goal of a Christian Life
Continuing Controversy for Theological Philosophers: The Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil in the Philosophic Community
What the Problem of Evil Is Under a General Scope
What Theists Understand as the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil: Definition, Responses, & Facts
The Logical Problem of Evil: Views Mackie and Plantinga
Satan and the Problem of Evil: From the Bible to the Early Church Fathers
The Theory of Middle Knowledge as Solution to Soteriological the Problem of Evil
John Mackie’s Views on the Problem of Evil
Logical the Problem of Evil and the Limited God Defense
The Problem of Evil in Richard Swinburne’s Natural Evil
The Basic Argument for the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil and the Free Will Defense
Axiological Versus Deontological Formulations of the Problem of Evil
Incompatibility Formulations Versus Inductive Formulations of the Problem of Evil
Surin’s Theodicy as the Problem of Evil
What Is the Biblical Solution to the Problem of Evil
How Scripture Frames the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil in the Field of Social Work
How Does Address the Problem of Evil Plantinga’s Free Will Defense
How Should Christians Approach the Problem of Evil
Differences Between the Intellectual and Emotional the Problem of Evil
Critically Assessing Thomas Aquinas’ Approach to the Problem of Evil
Merciful God and the Problem of Evil in the Philosophy
The Problem of Evil as Treated by St. Augustine
Comparing Moral Error Theory and the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs
The Argument of Logical the Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil in Experimental Philosophy of Religion
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Explaining Evil: Four Views

W. Paul Franks (ed.), Explaining Evil: Four Views , Bloomsbury, 2019, 180pp., $27.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781501331121.

Reviewed by Matthew K. Douglass, Ouachita Baptist University

When confronted with the reality of widespread and terrible suffering, we naturally seek an explanation for why such things happen. In their attempts to make sense of suffering, philosophers have settled on a handful of ways to discuss the problem, dividing it up into smaller, more manageable pieces. It is common, for instance, to distinguish suffering caused by human cruelty from suffering that follows from indifferent laws of nature. Some philosophers address specific instances of suffering that are so horrific or seemingly pointless that they defy explanation, while others focus on why there is so much suffering in the world and why it is unfairly distributed. However, the problem of evil is parsed, it is typically stated as a problem for theism. If God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect, he must have the inclination and ability to eliminate evil. Why, then, does evil exist?

As valuable as such discussions are, framing the issue as a problem for theism can hide the fact that evil is a problem for everyone, theist and atheist alike. As W. Paul Franks notes in the introductory chapter, "the task of explaining evil is not something that falls to theists alone . . . Non-theists are just as prone to seek out explanations" (2). And because the problem of evil is often stated as an argument against theism, discussions can focus too narrowly on whether this theodicy or that objection to theism is successful. However, Franks continues, "while this is a worthwhile activity, taken alone it doesn't actually give us what we were initially looking for -- an explanation for evil" (2).

The central purpose of the book, therefore, is to keep the bigger question in mind and to find a satisfactory explanation for evil. Toward that end, the book presents four competing explanations for evil. Each chapter begins with a leading essay that presents and defends an account for why evil exists, followed by responses from the other three contributors, and finishing with a reply from the original author. The first two chapters deal with theistic accounts from Richard Brian Davis and Paul Helm, while the final two chapters present the views of atheists Michael Ruse and Erik J. Wielenberg.

It is worth commenting on the scope of the book before I summarize each chapter. In order to explain evil, it is first necessary to at least roughly define what evil is. All four authors, it turns out, conceive of evil in moral terms, and thus "natural evils" like earthquakes, disease, and famine are mostly left out of the discussion. In the introduction, Franks says that separating the problem of moral evil from nature-based suffering helps us see that a solution to one problem may not have anything to do with the other. Moreover, he claims, separating the problems encourages non-theists, who may not think that nature-based suffering poses any philosophical problem, to nevertheless engage with the problem of evil (6). To be sure, there are benefits to focusing on moral evils alone. However, an overwhelming amount of suffering results from the indifferent forces of nature, and even if it poses no special problem for an atheist, it is an acute problem for theists. Thus, even if nature-based suffering does not properly count as evil , it still would have been good for the theists (at least) to discuss the problem more. Having said that, let me turn to the substance of each chapter.

In Chapter 1, Davis explains evil from the perspective of "agent-causal theism." According to this view, evil exists because humans were endowed by God with the power of self-motion, "of initiating volitions to act . . . in light of the reasons [they] have for acting" (14). After briefly giving reasons to think that humans have agent-causal powers, Davis devotes most of his essay to the claim that only agent-causal theism can successfully explain the reality of evil. As Davis describes it, evil essentially involves immoral thoughts, actions, and decisions freely chosen by a conscious moral agent. But free will, he argues, is an illusion if every choice has been predetermined by a series of prior external causes. Consequently, deterministic worldviews -- in particular Darwinian Naturalism and Calvinistic Theism -- will be unable to account for the sort of freedom that makes evil possible. Moreover, he argues, Darwinian Naturalism cannot explain the existence of conscious beings, since there is no way for purely physical causes to produce consciousness. Ultimately, Davis concludes, evil is possible only if theism is true. Thus, ironically, the reality of evil is proof of God's existence.

In Chapter 2, Helm defends Theistic Compatibilism; however, he is careful to note, his compatibilism is not essential to his explanation of evil. Instead, Helm focuses on two distinct questions. First, what is God's purpose for ordaining/permitting evil? Second, granted that God ordains evil, how does it occur? Helm answers the first question by considering God's purpose in creating the world. According to Helm, God creates in order to express his glory, power, goodness, and perfection. Following Alvin Plantinga's felix culpa theodicy, Helm suggests that a world in which God becomes incarnate, atones for sin, and defeats evil is incommensurably better than a world without evil. To explain how evil comes about, Helm interprets "the Fall" story in Genesis as an historical account. On this reading, humanity was originally given a good, but mutable character. Unfortunately -- for reasons that we can never fully understand -- the original humans rebelled against God and now all humanity is bound to sin. Evil, therefore, is the product of this sinful nature, though importantly, God will eventually restore and glorify the original creation. Helm's approach in this chapter follows the scholastic tradition of "faith seeking understanding." For him, philosophy is useful in this search for understanding, but ultimately it is limited; since we are inquiring into the inscrutable will of God, questions will inevitably arise that human reason cannot answer. Similarly, while Helm values the natural sciences, he argues that when science conflicts with faith, faith should take priority: "The important thing is that science is provisional, revelation is not" (61).

Next, the book switches to two atheistic accounts of evil. In Chapter 3, Ruse defends his opening claim that "I believe in the existence of evil" (83), while at the same time rejecting objective morality. An evil action, on his view, is one that goes against the general moral sentiments ingrained in us through evolution. In complex organisms, especially those who live in large social groups, genetically-determined patterns of behavior arise in order to promote the long-term survival of a species. In humans, the sense of right and wrong arose as both a shortcut mechanism for making complex decisions in a social context, as well as a motivator to cooperate despite the inclination to cheat and steal whenever possible. Importantly, on Ruse's account morality depends on human nature and is thus universal, not relative among people or cultures. Thus, evil exists because it is a violation of the natural. "I think Himmler was evil," he writes, "because he consciously of choice went against what it is to be a human being" (101). At the same time, however, morality is contingent since humanity could have evolved differently and some other rules of behavior might have been necessary for long-term survival. Ultimately, then, Ruse affirms the existence and substance of morality, and, in turn, the reality of evil; he simply denies that morality is objective or based on anything non-physical, like Platonic Forms or the divine will.

In the final chapter, Wielenberg explains evil from the perspective of "robust normative realism." On this view, being evil is a non-natural property that cannot be reduced to a natural property (like being painful ) or a supernatural property (like being forbidden by God ). In addition, Wielenberg affirms the existence of basic ethical facts -- substantive, metaphysically necessary moral truths that are true without explanation or external justification. These facts form the basis of morality and are not based on anything else. One such ethical fact is that it is evil to cause pain just for fun. But what, precisely, is the relationship between the property being an instance of causing pain for fun and the property being evil? According to Wielenberg, there is a robust causal relationship between the two; the first simply and directly causes the next, without any intermediate law of nature. So, on his view, evil exists in our world because certain non-moral properties, like pain and cruelty, exist. As for the prevalence of evil, Wielenberg turns to the specific evil of dehumanization, in which the perpetrator denies the human personhood of his victim. After describing some examples and common features of dehumanization, Wielenberg concludes that "evolutionary forces have shaped our minds so that dehumanization comes easily to us, though the specific nature of dehumanization varies across cultures" (137).

Overall, the book is a welcome addition to the literature on the problem of evil. It approaches the problem in a way that is refreshingly different from the norm. The position-and-response format allows the reader to grasp the key elements of each view, briefly stated and in conversation with each other. Because the position, objections, and replies are collected together, by the end of each chapter it is clear what the lead position is, as well as its strengths and weaknesses.

Unfortunately, to allow for such back-and-forth within a short volume, each essay is condensed and several key assertions are left unsupported. Similarly, the brevity of the volume restricts the interaction among the authors. Each leading essay is subjected to three sets of objections, some of which are significant and would require a full essay to address adequately. This is not to say that the arguments are weak or half-baked; the authors frequently refer to previous works where their views are discussed in more depth, and a helpful list of recommended reading is included as an appendix. And for the most part, the authors do a good job of sketching plausible responses to the various objections, though in some instances, serious objections are dispatched with just a few sentences.

Despite these limitations, the book is engaging and accessible for interested readers. The essays are short and clear, giving enough detail to explain each position without overwhelming the reader. In addition, the book touches on a wide variety of philosophical topics -- the nature of free will, normative ethics and metaethics, possible worlds, epistemology, and philosophy of language. For undergraduate classes, the book would be a good introduction to some of these topics and a useful way to show how they are interrelated.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The problem of evil.

This article is divided into four sections. The first is concerned with some preliminary distinctions; the second, with alternative formulations of the argument from evil; the third, with different versions of the inductive argument from evil; the fourth, with important responses to the argument from evil.

1. Some Important Distinctions

2. the choice between incompatibility formulations and evidential formulations.

3. Evidential Formulations of the Argument from Evil

4. Responses to the Argument from Evil: Refutations, Defenses, and Theodicies

Bibliography, other internet resources, related entries, 1.1 relevant concepts of god.

On the other hand, there are interpretations that connect up in a clear and relatively straightforward way with religious attitudes, such as those of worship, and with very important human desires, such as the desire that, at least in the end, good will triumph, and justice be done, and the desire that the world not be one where death marks the end of the individual's existence, and where, ultimately, all conscious existence has ceased to be.

What properties must something have if it is to be an appropriate object of worship, and if it is to provide reason for thinking that there is a reasonable chance that the fundamental human hopes just mentioned will be fulfilled? A natural answer is that God must be a person, and who, at the very least, is very powerful, very knowledgeable, and morally very good. But if such a being exists, then it seems initially puzzling why various evils exist. For many of the very undesirable states of affairs that the world contains are such as could be eliminated, or prevented, by a being who was only moderately powerful, while, given that humans are aware of such evils, a being only as knowledgeable as humans would be aware of their existence. Finally, even a moderately good human being, given the power to do so, would eliminate those evils. Why, then, do such undesirable states of affairs exist, if there is a being who is very powerful, very knowledgeable, and very good?

What one has here, however, is not just a puzzle, since the question can, of course, be recast as an argument for the non-existence of God. Thus if, for simplicity, we focus on a conception of God as all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good, one very concise way of formulating such an argument is as follows:

If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
Evil exists.
If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn't know when evil exists, or doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil.
Therefore, God doesn't exist.

That this argument is valid is perhaps most easily seen by a reductio argument, in which one assumes that the conclusion -- (7) -- is false, and then shows that the denial of (7), along with premises (1) through (6), leads to a contradiction. Thus if, contrary to (7), God exists, it follows from (1) that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. This, together with (2), (3), and (4) then entails that God has the power to eliminate all evil, that God knows when evil exists, and that God has the desire to eliminate all evil. But when (5) is conjoined with the reductio assumption that God exists, it then follows via modus ponens from (6) that either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn't know when evil exists, or doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil. Thus we have a contradiction, and so premises (1) through (6) do validly imply (7).

Whether the argument is sound is, of course, a further question, for it may be that one of more of the premises is false. The point here, however, is simply that when one conceives of God as unlimited with respect to power, knowledge, and moral goodness, the existence of evil quickly gives rise to potentially serious arguments against the existence of God.

Is the situation different if one shifts to a deity who is not omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect? The answer depends on the details. Thus, if one considers a deity who is omniscient and morally perfect, but not omnipotent, then evil presumably would not pose a problem if such a deity were conceived of as too remote from Earth to prevent the evils we find here. But given a deity who falls considerably short of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection, but who could intervene in our world to prevent many evils, and who knows of those evils, it would seem that an argument rather similar to the above could be formulated by focusing not on the mere existence of evil, but upon the existence of evils that such a deity could have prevented.

But what if God, rather than being characterized in terms of knowledge, power, and goodness, is defined in some more metaphysical way - for example, as the ground of being, or as being itself? The answer will depend on whether, having defined God in such purely metaphysical terms, one can go on to argue that such a entity will also possess at least very great power, knowledge, and moral goodness. If so, evil is once again a problem.

By contrast, if God is conceived of in a purely metaphysical way, and if no connection can be forged between the relevant metaphysical properties and the possession of significant power, knowledge, and goodness, then the problem of evil is irrelevant. But when that is the case, it would seem that God thereby ceases to be a being who is either an appropriate object of religious attitudes, or a ground for believing that fundamental human hopes are not in vain.

1.2 Incompatibility Formulations versus Inductive Formulations

Alternatively, rather than being formulated as a deductive argument for the very strong claim that it is logically impossible for both God and evil to exist, (or for God and certain types, or instances, or a certain amount of evil to exist), the argument from evil can instead be formulated as an evidential (or inductive/probabilistic) argument for the more modest claim that there are evils that actually exist in the world that make it unlikely - or perhaps very unlikely - that God exists.

The choice between incompatibility formulations and evidential formulations is discussed below, in section 2.

1.3 Abstract Versus Concrete Formulations

To formulate the argument from evil in terms of the mere existence of any evil at all is to abstract to the greatest extent possible from detailed information about the evils that are found in the world, and so one is assuming, in effect, that such information cannot be crucial for the argument. But is it clear that this is right? For might not one feel that while the world would be better off without the vast majority of evils, this is not so for absolutely all evils? Thus, some would argue, for example, that the frustration that one experiences in trying to solve a difficult problem is outweighed by the satisfaction of arriving at a solution, and therefore that the world is a better place because it contains such evils. Alternatively, it has been argued that the world is a better place if people develop desirable traits of character - such as patience, and courage - by struggling against obstacles, including suffering. But if either of these things is the case, then the prevention of all evil might well make the world a worse place.

It seems possible, then, that there might be evils that are logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, and this possibility provides a reason, accordingly, for questioning one of the premises in the argument set out earlier - namely, premise (4), where it is claimed that if God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.

But there is also another reason why that claim is problematic, which arises out of a particular conception of free will - namely, a libertarian conception. According to this view of free will, and in contrast with what are known as compatibilist approaches, free will is incompatible with determinism, and so it is impossible even for an omnipotent being to make it the case that someone freely chooses to do what is right.

Many people claim, however, that the world is a better place if it contains individuals who possess libertarian free will, rather than individuals who are free only in a sense that is compatible with one's actions being completely determined. If this claim can be made plausible, one can argue, first, that God would have a good reason for creating a world with individuals who possessed libertarian free will, but secondly, that if he did choose to create such a world, even he could not ensure that no one would ever choose to do something morally wrong. The good of libertarian free will requires, in short, the possibility of moral evil.

The upshot is that the idea that either the actuality of certain undesirable states of affairs, or at least the possibility, may be logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, is not without some initial plausibility, and if some such claim can be sustained, it will follow immediately that the mere existence of evil cannot be incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

How does this bear upon evidential formulations of the argument from evil? The answer would seem to be that if there can be evils that are logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, then it is hard to see how the mere existence of evil - in the absence of further information - can provide much in the way of evidence against the existence of God.

Details concerning such things as how suffering and other evils are distributed over individuals, and the nature of those who undergo the evils, are, then, of crucial importance. Thus it is relevant, for example, that many innocent children suffer agonizing deaths. It is relevant that animals suffer, and that they did so before there were any persons to observe their suffering, and to feel sympathy for them. It is relevant that, on the one hand, the suffering that people undergo apparently bears no relation to the moral quality of their lives, and, on the other, that it bears a very clear relation to the wealth and medical knowledge of the societies in which they live.

The prospects for a successful abstract version of the argument from evil would seem, therefore, rather problematic. It is conceivable, of course, that the correct moral principles entail that there cannot be any evils whose actuality or possibility makes for a better world. But to attempt to set out a version of the argument from evil that requires a defense of that thesis is certainly to swim upstream. A much more promising approach, surely, is to focus, instead, simply upon those evils that are thought, by the vast majority of people, to pose at least a prima facie problem for the rationality of belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person.

Given that the preceding observations are rather obvious ones, one might have expected that discussions of the argument from evil would have centered mainly upon concrete formulations of the argument. Rather surprisingly, that has not been so. Indeed, some authors seem to focus almost exclusively upon very abstract versions of the argument.

One of the more striking illustrations of this phenomenon is provided by Alvin Plantinga's discussions of the problem of evil. In God and Other Minds , in The Nature of Necessity , and in God, Freedom, and Evil , for example, Plantinga, starting out from an examination of John L. Mackie's essay “Evil and Omnipotence”, in which Mackie had defended an incompatibility version of the argument from evil, focuses mainly on the question of whether the existence of God is compatible with the existence of evil, although there are also short discussions of whether the existence of God is compatible with the existence of a given quantity of evil, and of whether the existence of a certain amount of evil renders the existence of God unlikely. (The latter topic is then the total focus of attention in his long article, “The Probabilistic Argument from Evil”.)

This view is very implausible. For not only can the argument from evil be formulated in terms of specific evils, but that is the natural way to do so, given that it is only certain types of evils that are generally viewed as raising a serious problem with respect to the rationality of belief in God. To concentrate exclusively on abstract versions of the argument from evil is therefore to ignore the most plausible and challenging versions of the argument.

1.4 Axiological Versus Deontological Formulations

There exist states of affairs in which animals die agonizing deaths in forest fires, or where children undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, and that (a) are intrinsically bad or undesirable, and (b) are such that any omnipotent person has the power to prevent them without thereby either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good.
For any state of affairs (that is actual), the existence of that state of affairs is not prevented by anyone.
There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person.
God does not exist.

As it stands, this argument is deductively valid. [ 2 ] (Here is a proof .) However it is likely to be challenged in various ways. In particular, one vulnerable point is the claim, made in the last part of statement (1), that an omnipotent and omniscient person could have prevented those states of affairs without thereby either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good, and when this is challenged, an inductive step will presumably be introduced, one that moves from what we know about the undesirable states of affairs in question to a conclusion about the overall value of those states of affairs, all things considered -- including things that may well lie outside our ken.

But the above argument is subject to a very different sort of criticism, one that is connected with a feature of the above argument which seems to me important, but which is not often commented upon -- the fact, namely, that the above argument is formulated in terms of axiological concepts, that is, in terms of the goodness or badness, the desirability or undesirability, of states of affairs. The criticism that arises from this feature centers on statement (3), which asserts that an omniscient and morally perfect being would prevent the existence of any states of affairs that are intrinsically bad or undesirable, and whose prevention he could achieve without either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good. For one can ask how this claim is to be justified. One answer that might be offered would be that some form of consequentialism is true -- such as, for example, the view that an action that fails to maximize the balance of good states of affairs over bad states of affairs is morally wrong. But the difficulty then is that any such assumption is likely to be a deeply controversial assumption that many theists would certainly reject.

The problem, in short, is that any axiological formulation of the argument from evil, as it stands, is incomplete in a crucial respect, since it fails to make explicit how a failure to bring about good states of affairs, or a failure to prevent bad states of affairs, entails that one is acting in a morally wrong way. Moreover, the natural way of removing this incompleteness is by appealing to what are in fact controversial ethical claims, such as the claim that the right action is the one that maximizes expected value. The result, in turn, is that discussions may very well become sidetracked on issues that are, in fact, not really crucial -- such as, for example, the question of whether God would be morally blameworthy if he failed to create the best world that he could.

The alternative to an axiological formulation is a deontological formulation. Here the idea is that rather than employing concepts that focus upon the value or disvalue of states of affairs, one instead uses concepts that focus upon the rightness and wrongness of actions, and upon the properties -- rightmaking properties and wrongmaking properties -- that determine whether an action is one that ought to be performed, or ought not to be performed, other things being equal. When the argument is thus formulated, there is no problematic bridge that needs to be introduced connecting the goodness and badness of states ofaffairs with the rightness and wrongness of actions.

The problem with that premise, as we saw, is that it can be argued that some evils are such that their actuality, or at least the possibility, is logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, in which case it is not true that a perfectly good being would want to eliminate such evils.

In section 1.4, a much more concrete version of an incompatibility argument was set out, which, rather than appealing to the mere existence of some evil or other, appealed to specific types of evil - in particular, situations where animals die agonizing deaths in forest fires, or where children undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer. The thrust of the argument was then that, first of all, an omniscient and omnipotent person could have prevented the existence of such evils without thereby either allowing equal or greater evils, or preventing equal or greater goods, and, secondly, that any omniscient and morally perfect person will prevent the existence of such evils if that can be done without either allowing equal or greater evils, or preventing equal or greater goods.

The second of these claims avoids the objections that can be directed against the stronger claim that was involved in the argument set out in section 1.1 - that is, the claim that if God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil. But the shift to the more modest claim requires that one move from the very modest claim that evil exists to the stronger claim that there are certain evils that an omniscient and omnipotent person could have prevented the existence of such evils without thereby either allowing equal or greater evils, or preventing equal or greater goods, and the question arises as to how that claim can be supported. In particular, can it be established by means of a purely deductive argument?

Consider, in particular, the relevant premise in the more concrete version of the argument from evil set out in section 1.4, namely:

How would one go about establishing, via a purely deductive argument that a deer's suffering a slow and painful death because of a forest fire, or a child's undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, is not logically necessary either to achieve a greater good or to avoid a greater evil? If one had knowledge of the totality of morally relevant properties, then it might well be possible to show both that there are no greater evils that can be avoided only at the cost of the evil in question, and that there are no greater goods that are possible only given that evil. Do we have such knowledge? Some moral theorists would claim that we do, and that it is possible to set out a complete an corect moral theory. But this is certainly a highly controversial metaethical claim, and, as a consequence, the prospects for establishing a premise such as (1) via a deductive argument do not appear promising, given the present state of moral theory.

If a premise such as (1) cannot, at least at present, be established deductively, then the only possibility, it would seem, is to offer some sort of inductive argument in support of the relevant premise. But if this is right, then it is surely best to get that crucial inductive step out into the open, and thus to formulate the argument from evil not as a deductive argument for the very strong claim that it is logically impossible for both God and evil to exist, (or for God and certain types, or instances, of evil to exist), but as an evidential (inductive/probabilistic) argument for the more modest claim that there are evils that actually exist in the world that make it unlikely that God exists.

3. Inductive Versions of the Argument from Evil

3.1 arguments.

The first and the third approaches are found, for example, in articles by William Rowe, while the second approach has been set out and defended by Paul Draper. These three approaches will be considered in the sections that follow.

3.2 Direct Inductive Versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil

3.2.1 a concrete, deontological, and direct inductive formulation.

Both the property of intentionally allowing an animal to die an agonizing death in a forest fire, and the property of allowing a child to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, are wrongmaking characteristics of an action, and very serious ones.
Our world contains animals that die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children who undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer.
An omnipotent being could prevent such events, if he knew that those events were about to occur.
An omniscient being would know that such events were about to occur.
If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are cases where he intentionally allows animals to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer.
If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then there are specific cases of such a being's intentionally allowing animals to die agonizing deaths in forest fires, and children to undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, that have wrongmaking properties such that there are no rightmaking characteristics -- including ones that we are not aware of -- that both apply to the cases in question, and that are also sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking characteristics.
If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then that being both intentionally refrains from performing certain actions in situations where it is morally wrong to do so, all things considered, and knows that he is doing so.
There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being.

When the argument from evil is formulated in this way, it involves nine premises, set out at steps (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7), (10), (13), and (16). Statement (1) makes a moral claim, but one that, setting aside the question of the existence of objective values, is surely very plausible. Statement (2) makes an empirical claim, and one that is surely true. Statements (3) and (4) are true by virtue of the concepts of omnipotence and omniscience, together with the nature of the events in question, while statement (5) is true by virtue of the concept of intentional action.. Statement (7) follows from the relevant facts about the world, together with facts about the moral knowledge that we possess. Statement (10) obtains by virtue of the concepts of rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics, together with the concept of an action's being wrong, all things considered. Statement (13) follows from the concept of moral perfection, while statement (16) simply states what is involved in the concept of God that is relevant here. So all of the premises seem fine.

As regards the logic of the argument, all of the steps are deductive except for one -- namely, the non-deductive move from (8) to (9). The deductive inferences, however, are all valid. The argument stands or falls, accordingly, with the inference from (8) to (9). The crucial questions, accordingly, are, first, exactly what the form of that inductive inference is, and, secondly, whether it is sound.

3.2.2 A Natural Account of the Logic of the Inductive Step

One philosopher who has suggested that this is the case is William Rowe, in his 1991 article, “Ruminations about Evil”. Let us consider, then, whether that view can be sustained.

( P ) No good state of affairs that we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being's obtaining it would morally justify that being's permitting E 1 or E 2 .

The good states of affairs I know of, when I reflect on them, meet one or both of the following conditions: either an omnipotent being could obtain them without having to permit either E 1 or E 2 , or obtaining them wouldn't morally justify that being in permitting E 1 or E 2 . (1991, 72)

( Q ) No good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being's obtaining it would morally justify that being's permitting E 1 or E 2 .” (1991, 72)

( P ) No good that we know of has J . Therefore, probably: ( Q ) No good has J .

we are justified in inferring Q (No good has J ) from P (No good we know of has J ) only if we have a good reason to think that if there were a good that has J it would be a good that we are acquainted with and could see to have J . For the question can be raised: How can we have confidence in this inference unless we have a good reason to think that were a good to have J it would likely be a good within our ken? (1991, 73)

My answer is that we are justified in making this inference in the same way we are justified in making the many inferences we constantly make from the known to the unknown. All of us are constantly inferring from the A s we know of to the A s we don't know of. If we observe many A s and note that all of them are B s we are justified in believing that the A s we haven't observed are also B s. Of course, these inferences may be defeated. We may find some independent reason to think that if an A were a B it would likely not be among the A s we have observed. But to claim that we cannot be justified in making such inferences unless we already know, or have good reason to believe, that were an A not to be a B it would likely be among the A s we've observed is simply to encourage radical skepticism concerning inductive reasoning in general. (1991, 73)

One is entitled to infer Q from P only if she has a good reason to think that if some good had J it would be a good that she knows of.
One is entitled to infer Q from P only if she has no reason to think that if some good had J it would likely not be a good that she knows of.

In view of the last point, Rowe concludes that “one important route for the theist to explore is whether there is some reason to think that were a good to have J it either would not be a good within our ken or would be such that although we apprehend this good we are incapable of determining that it has J .” (1991, 74)

3.2.3 An Evaluation of this Account of the Inductive Step

We are justified in believing that all the A s that we haven't observed are also B s
We are justified in believing of each of the A s that we haven't observed that that A is also a B .

Let us consider, then, the relevance of this distinction. On the one hand, Rowe is certainly right that any criticism that claims that one is not justified in inferring (2) unless one has additional information to the effect that unobserved A s are not likely to differ from observed A s with respect to the possession of property B entails inductive skepticism. But, by contrast, it is not true that this is so if one rejects, instead, the inference to (1).

This is important, moreover, because it is (1) that Rowe needs, since the conclusion that he is drawing does not concern simply the next morally relevant property that someone might consider: conclusion Q asserts, rather, that all further morally relevant properties will lack property J . Such a conclusion about all further cases is much stronger than a conclusion about the next case, and one might well think that in some circumstances a conclusion of the latter sort is justified, but that a conclusion of the former sort is not.

One way of supporting the latter claim is by arguing (Tooley, 1977, 690-3, and 1987, 129-37) that when one is dealing with an accidental generalization , the probability that the regularity in question will obtain gets closer and closer to zero, without limit, as the number of potential instances gets larger and larger, and that this is so regardless of how large one's evidence base is. Is it impossible, then, to justify universal generalizations? The answer is that if laws are more than mere regularities -- and, in particular, if they are second-order relations between universals -- then the obtaining of a law, and thus of the corresponding regularity, may have a very high probability upon even quite a small body of evidence. So universal generalizations can be justified, if they obtain in virtue of underlying laws.

The question then becomes whether Q expresses a law -- or a consequence of a law. If -- as seems plausible -- it does not, then, although it is true that one in justified in holding, of any given, not yet observed morally relevant property, that it is unlikely to have property J , it may not be the case that it is probable that no goodmaking (or rightmaking) property has property J . It may , on the contrary, be probable that there is some morally relevant property that does have property J .

3.3 Indirect Inductive Versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil

There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness, that they are endowed with perfect malice, that they are opposite and have both goodness and malice, that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former unmixed principles. And the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seems to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems be far the most probable. (1779, Part XI, 212)

Hume advanced, then, an evidential argument from evil that has a distinctly different logical form than that involved in direct inductive arguments, for the idea is to point to some proposition that is logically incompatible with theism, and then to argue that that, given facts about undesirable states of affairs to be found in the world, that hypothesis is more probable than theism, and, therefore, that theism is more likely to be false than to be true.

( HI ) neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons.

(1) Pr ( O / HI ) > Pr ( O / T ) (Substantive premise) (2) Pr ( O / HI ) = Pr ( O & HI )/ Pr ( HI ) (Definition of conditional probability) Therefore (3) Pr ( O & HI )/ Pr ( HI ) > Pr ( O / T ) (From (1) and (2).) (4) Pr ( O / T ) = Pr ( O & T )/ Pr ( T ) (Definition of conditional probability) Therefore (5) Pr ( O & HI )/ Pr ( HI ) > Pr ( O & T )/ Pr ( T ) (From (3) and (4).) (6) Pr ( O & HI ) = Pr ( HI / O ) × Pr ( O ) (From the definition of conditional probability) Therefore (7) Pr ( O & HI ) /Pr ( HI ) = Pr ( HI / O ) × Pr ( O )/ Pr ( HI ) (From (6).) Therefore (8) Pr ( HI / O ) × Pr ( O )/ Pr ( HI ) > Pr ( O & T )/ Pr ( T ) (From (5) and (7).) (9) Pr ( O & T ) = Pr ( T / O ) × Pr ( O ) (From the definition of conditional probability) Therefore (10) Pr ( O & T )/ Pr ( T ) = Pr ( T / O ) × Pr ( O )/ Pr ( T ) (From (9).) Therefore (11) Pr ( HI / O ) × Pr ( O )/ Pr ( HI ) > Pr ( T / O ) × Pr ( O )/ Pr ( T ) (From (8) and (10).) (12) Pr ( O / T ) 0 (Axiom of probability theory) Therefore (13) Pr ( O / HI ) > 0 (From (1) and (12).)

(14) Pr ( HI ) > 0, (Substantive premise) (15) Pr ( OI / HI ) × Pr ( HI ) = Pr ( O & HI ) = Pr ( HI / O ) × Pr ( O ) (From the definition of conditional probability) Therefore (16) Pr ( O ) > 0, (From (13), (14) and (15).)

(17) Pr ( HI / O ) > Pr ( T / O ) × Pr ( HI )/ Pr ( T ) (18) HI entails ~ T (Substantive premise) Therefore (19) Pr (~ T / O ) Pr ( HI / O ) (From (18).) Therefore (20) Pr (~ T / O ) > Pr ( T / O ) × Pr ( HI )/ Pr ( T ) (From (17) and (19).) (21) Pr ( HI ) Pr ( T ) (Substantive premise) Therefore (22) Pr (~ T / O ) > Pr ( T / O ) (From (20) and (21).) (23) O entails [( T & O ) or (~ T & O )] and [( T & O ) or (~ T & O )] entails O (Logical truth) Therefore (24) Pr ( T & O ) + Pr (~ T & O ) = Pr ( O ) (From (23).)

(25) Pr ( T & O )/ Pr ( O ) + Pr (~ T & O )/ Pr ( O ) = Pr ( O )/ Pr ( O ) = 1 Therefore (26) Pr ( T / O ) + Pr (~ T / O ) = 1 (From (25).) Therefore (27) Pr ( T ) < 0.5 (From (22) and (26).)

There are various points at which this argument might be criticized. First, it might be argued that the substantive premise introduced at (18) is not obviously true. For might it not be logically possible that there was an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being who created a neutral environment in which evolution could take place in a chancy way, and who afterwards did not intervene in any way? But, if so, then while T would be true, HI might also be true -- as it would be if there were no other nonhuman persons. So, at the very least, it is not clear that HI entails ~ T .

Secondly, the substantive premise introduced at (21) also seems problematic. Draper supports it be arguing that whereas the hypothesis of theism involves some ontological commitment, the Hypothesis of Indifference does not. But, on the other hand, the latter involves a completely universal generalization about the absence of any action upon the earth by any nonhuman persons, of either a benevolent or malevolent sort, and it is far from clear why the prior probability of this being so should be greater than the prior probability of theism.

There exists an omnipotent and omniscient person who created the Universe and who has no intrinsic concern about the pain or pleasure of other beings. (1989, 26)

Thirdly, it can be objected that the argument does not really move far beyond two of its three crucial assumptions - the assumptions set out, namely, at steps (18) and (21), to the effect that HI I entails ~ T , and Pr ( HI ) * Pr ( T ). For given those assumptions, it follows immediately that Pr ( T ) * 0.5, and so the rest of the argument merely moves from that conclusion to the conclusion that Pr ( T ) < 0.5.

(1 + ) Pr ( O / HI ) = Pr ( O / T ) + k [ 5 ] .

(*) Pr ( T ) < 0.5 - k × Pr ( HI )/2 × Pr ( O )

(Here is the derivation .) Then, provided that one can estimate k, Pr ( HIO , and Pr ( O ), one will be able to determine a lower bound for the amount that Pr ( T ) is less than 0.5.

Fourthly, objections can be directed at the arguments that Draper offers in support of a third substantive premise -- namely, that introduced at (1). Some of the objections directed against this premise are less than impressive -- and some seem quite desperate, as in the case, for example, of Peter van Inwagen, who has to appeal to quite an extraordinary claim about the conditions that one must satisfy in order to claim that a world is logically possible:

One should start by describing in some detail the laws of nature that govern that world. (Physicists' actual formulations of quantum field theories and the general theory of relativity provide the standard of required “detail.”) One should then go on to describe the boundary conditions under which those laws operate; the topology of the world's space-time, its relativistic mass, the number of particle families, and so on. Then one should tell in convincing detail the story of cosmic evolution in that world: the story of the development of large objects like galaxies and of stars and of small objects like carbon atoms. Finally, one should tell the story of the evolution of life. (1991, 146)

Such objections tend to suggest that any flaws in Draper's argument in support of the crucial premise are less than obvious. Nevertheless, given that the argument that Draper offers in support of the premise at (1) involves a number of detailed considerations, very careful scrutiny of those arguments would be needed before one could conclude that he premise is justified.

(1 & ) Pr ( O & O* / HI ) > Pr ( O & O* / T ) ?

At the very least, it would seem that (1 & ) is much more problematic than (1). But if that is right, then the above, Draper-style argument, even if all of its premises are true, is not as significant as it may initially appear, since if (1 & ) is not true, the conclusion that theism is more likely to be false than to be true can be undercut by introducing additional evidence of a pro-theist sort.

3.4 Bayesian-Style Probabilistic Versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil

3.4.1 a summary of rowe's bayesian argument.

( P ) No good that we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting E 1 and E 2 ; ( G ) There is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being.

(C1) Pr ( G / P & k ) < Pr ( G / k ) (C2) Pr ( G / P & k ) < 0.5.

The first conclusion, then, is that the probability that God exists is lower given the combination of P together with our background knowledge than it is given our background knowledge alone. Thus P disconfirms G in the sense of lowering the probability of G . The second conclusion is that P disconfirms G in a different sense -- namely, it, together with our background knowledge, makes it more likely than not that G is false.

(1) Pr ( P /~ G & k ) = 1 (2) Pr (~ G / k ) > 0 (3) Pr ( P / G & k ) < 1

Fourthly, all three assumptions are surely eminently reasonable. As regards (1), it follows from the fact that for any two propositions q and r , if q entails r then Pr ( r / q ) = 1, together with the fact that Rowe interprets P in such a way that ~ G entails P , since he interprets P as saying that it is not the case that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being together with some known good that justifies that being in allowing E 1 and E 2 . As regards (2) and (3), it certainly seems plausible that there is at least some non-zero probability that God does not exist, given our background knowledge -- here one is assuming that the existence of God is not logically necessary -- and also some non-zero probability that no good that we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting E 1 and E 2 . Moreover, if the existence of God is neither a logically necessary truth nor entailed by our background knowledge, and if the existence of God together with our background knowledge does not logically entail that no good that we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting E 1 and E 2 , then one can support (2) and (3) by appealing to the very plausible principle that the probability of r given q is equal to one if and only if q entails r .

(4) Pr ( G / k ) 0.5

3.4.2 The Flaw in the Argument

In fact, however, Rowe's argument is unsound. The reason is connected with the point that while inductive arguments can fail, just as deductive arguments can, either because their logic is faulty, or their premises false, inductive arguments can also fail in a way that deductive arguments cannot, in that they may violate a principle -- namely, the Total Evidence Requirement -- which I shall be setting out below, and Rowe's argument is defective in precisely that way.

Pr ( G / P & k ) < 0.5.

(1) Pr ( P /~ G & k ) = 1 (2) Pr (~ G / k ) > 0 (3) Pr ( P / G & k ) < 1 (4) Pr ( G / k ) 0.5

Either God does not exist, or there is a pen in my pocket.

Statements (1) and (3) will both be true given that replacement, while statements (2) and (4) are unaffected, and one will be able to derive the same conclusions as in Rowe's Bayesian argument. But if this is so, then the theist can surely claim, it would seem, that the fact that Rowe's ‘P’ refers to evil in the world turns out to play no crucial role in Rowe's new argument!

This objection, however, is open to the following reply. The reason that I am justified in believing the proposition that either God does not exist or there is a pen in my pocket is that I am justified in believing that there is a pen in my pocket. The proposition that either God does not exist or there is a pen in my pocket therefore does not represent the total evidence that I have. But the argument cannot be set out in terms of the proposition that does represent one's total evidence -- namely, the proposition that there is a pen in my pocket -- since that proposition is not entailed by ~ G .

The Total Evidence Requirement : For any proposition that is not non-inferentially justified, the probability that one should assign to that proposition's being true is the probability that the proposition has relative to one's total evidence.

Pr ( G / P & k ) < 0.5

No good we know of justifies an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being in permitting E 1 and E 2

No good we know of would justify God, ( if he exists ) in permitting E 1 and E 2 (1996, 283)

(1*) Pr ( P */~ G & k ) = 1

3.4.3 Can Rowe's Argument Be Revised?

(5) Pr ( P */~ G & k ) > Pr ( P */ G & k ).

1. Pr ( P */~ G & k ) = Pr ( P * & ~ G / k )/ Pr (~ G & k ) 2. Pr ( P */ G & k ) = Pr ( P * & G / k )/ Pr ( G & k ) 3. Pr ( P */~ G & k ) > Pr ( P */ G & k ) [Assumption (5)] 4. Pr ( P * & ~ G / k )/ Pr (~ G & k ) > Pr ( P * & G / k )/ Pr ( G & k ) [From 1, 2, and 3] 5. Pr (~ G / P * & k ) = Pr (~ G & P */ k )/ Pr ( P * & k ) 6. Pr ( G / P * & k ) = Pr ( G & P */ k )/ Pr ( P * & k ) 7. Pr (~ G / P * & k )/ Pr (~ G & k ) > Pr ( G / P * & k )/ Pr ( G & k ) [From 4, 5, 6, and 7] 8. Pr ( G / k ) 0.5 [Assumption (4)] 9. Pr (~ G / k ) > Pr ( G / k ) [From 8] 10. Pr (~ G / P * & k ) > Pr ( G / P * & k ) [From 7 and 9]

But now the problem is that assumption (5), in contrast to assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4), is a deeply controversial claim. For while it is true that if God does not exist, then evils such as E 1 and E 2 , which are not justified by any good that we know of, will in all probability arise by the operation of morally blind laws of nature, it might be argued that, even if God does exist, evils such as E 1 and E 2 may very well arise, either because it is good if events happen in a generally regular way, or even because God will sometimes facilitate the occurrence of events such as E 1 and E 2 , for the sake of some greater good that we have no knowledge of. So it is not at all easy to see why assumption (5) is justified,

(5*) Pr ( P */ Q & k ) > Pr ( P */~ Q & k ).

(4*) Pr (~ Q / k ) 0.5.

Pr ( Q / P * & k ) > Pr (~ Q / P * & k )

The latter, however, would serve to justify the inductive step from P to Q in the argument from evil. So given the apparent plausibility of (4*), any grounds that one has for questioning the inductive step in the earlier, non-Bayesian versions of the argument are likely to translate into grounds for questioning, first of all, proposition (5*), and secondly, the closely connected proposition (5).

The upshot is that if one tries to avoid the objection that Rowe's original Bayesian argument violates the total evidence requirement by shifting to a modified argument that involves assumption (5), one is faced both with the problem of showing why (5) is plausible, and, even more seriously, with the objection that assumption (5) is tantamount to the assumption that the inductive step involved in direct inductive formulations of the argument is sound. The revised argument therefore begs, in effect, the crucial question.

4.1 Refutations, Defenses, and Theodicies

If the latter thesis is correct, the argument from evil does not even get started. Such responses to the argument from evil are naturally classified, therefore, as attempted, total refutations of the argument.

The proposition that relevant facts about evil do not make it even prima facie unreasonable to believe in the existence of God probably strikes most philosophers, of course, as rather implausible. We shall see, nevertheless, that a number of philosophical theists have attempted to defend this type of response to the argument from evil.

The alternative course is to grant that there are facts about intrinsically undesirable states of the world that make it prima facie unreasonable to believe that God exists, but then to argue that belief in the existence of God is not unreasonable, all things considered. This response may take, however, two slightly different forms. One possibility is the offering of a complete theodicy . As I shall use that term, this involves, first of all, describing, for every actual evil found in the world, some state of affairs that it is reasonable to believe exists, and which is such that, if it exists, will provide an omnipotent and omniscient being with a morally sufficient reason for allowing the evil in question; and secondly, establishing that it is reasonable to believe that all evils, taken collectively, are thus justified.

It should be noted here that the term “theodicy” is sometimes used in a stronger sense, according to which one who offers a theodicy is attempting to show not only that such morally sufficient reasons exist, but that the reasons cited are in fact God's reasons. Alvin Plantinga (1974a, 10; 1985a, 35) and Robert Adams (1985, 242) use the term in that way, but, as has been pointed out by a number of writers, including Richard Swinburne (1988, 298), and William Hasker (1988, 5), that is to saddle the theodicist with an unnecessarily ambitious program.

The other possibilility is that of offering a defense . But what is a defense? In the context of abstract, incompatibility versions of the argument from evil, this term is generally used to refer to attempts to show that there is no logical incompatibility between the existence of evil and the existence of God. But as soon as one focuses upon evidential formulations of the argument from evil, a different interpretation is needed if the term is to remain a useful one. So I shall understand a defense to be any attempt to show only that it is likely that there are reasons which would justify an omnipotent and omniscient being in not preventing the evils that we find in the world, even if we do not know what they are. A defense differs from a theodicy, then, in that it attempts to show only that some God-justifying reasons probably exist; it does not attempt to specify what they are.

4.2 Attempted Total Refutations

4.2.1 human epistemological limitations.

The appeal to human cognitive limitations does raise a very important issue, and we have seen that one very natural account of the logical form of the inductive step in the case of a direct inductive argument is not satisfactory. But there may very well be some other account that is satisfactory. In addition, the appeal to human cognitive limitations does not show that there is anything wrong either with the reasoning that Draper offers in support of the crucial premise in his indirect inductive version of the argument from evil, or with the inference to the best explanation type of reasoning employed in the updated version of Hume's indirect inductive formulation of the argument from evil.

4.2.2 The ‘No Best of All Possible Worlds' Response

This response to the argument from evil has been around for awhile. In recent years, however, it has been strongly advocated by George Schlesinger (1964, 1977), and, more recently, by Peter Forrest (1981) -- though Forrest, curiously, describes the defense as one that has been “neglected”, and refers neither to Schlesinger's well-known discussions, nor to the very strong objections that have been directed against this response to the argument from evil.

The natural response to this attempt to refute the argument from evil was set out very clearly some years ago by Nicholas La Para (1965) and Haig Khatchadourian (1966) among others, and it has been developed in an especially forceful and detailed way in an article by Keith Chrzan (1987). The basic thrust of this response is that the argument from evil, when properly formulated in a deontological fashion, does not turn upon the claim that this world could be improved upon, or upon the claim that it is not the best of all possible worlds: it turns instead upon the claim that there are good reasons for holding that the world contains evils, including instances of suffering, that it would be morally wrong, all things considered, for an omnipotent and omniscient being to allow. As a consequence, the proposition that there might be better and better worlds without limit is simply irrelevant to the argument from evil.

If one accepts a deontological approach to ethics, this response seems decisive. Many contemporary philosophers, however, are consequentialists, and so one needs to consider how the ‘no best of all possible worlds' response looks if one adopts a consequentialist approach.

(1) An action is, by definition, morally right if and only if it is, among the actions that one could have performed, the one that produces the greatest value; (2) An action is morally wrong if and only if it is not morally right; (3) If one is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then for any action whatever, there is always some other action that produces greater value.

Then it surely follows that it is impossible for an omnipotent and omniscient being to perform a morally wrong action, and therefore that the failure of such a being to prevent various evils in this world cannot be morally wrong.

Consider an omnipotent and omniscient being that creates a world with zillions of innocent persons, all of whom endure extraordinarily intense suffering for ever. If (1), (2), and (3) are right, then such a being does not do anything morally wrong. But this conclusion, surely, is unacceptable, and so if a given version of consequentialism entails this conclusion, then that form of consequentialism must be rejected.

Can consequentialism avoid this conclusion? Can it be formulated in such a way that it captures the view that allowing very great, undeserved suffering is morally very different, and much more serious, than merely refraining from creating as many happy individuals as possible, or merely refraining from creating individuals who are not as ecstatically happy as they might be. If it cannot, then it would seem that the correct conclusion is that consequentialism is unsound. On the other hand, if consequentialism can be so formulated that this distinction is captured, then an appeal to consequentialism, thus formulated, will not enable one to avoid the crucial objection to the ‘no best of all possible worlds’ response to the argument from evil.

4.2.3 The Appeal to the Ontological Argument

If the ontological argument were sound, it would provide a rather decisive refutation of the argument from evil. For in showing not merely that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being, but that it is necessary that such a being exists, it would entail that the proposition that God does not exist must have probability zero on any body of evidence whatever.

A more satisfying response to the ontological argument would, of course, show not merely that the ontological argument is unsound, but precisely why it is unsound. Such a response, however, requires a satisfactory account of the truth conditions of modal statements -- something that lies outside the scope of this article

4.3 Attempted Defenses

4.3.1 the appeal to positive evidence for the existence of god.

Starting out from this line of thought, a number of philosophers have gone on to claim that in order to be justified in asserting that there are evils in the world that establish that it is unlikely that God exists, one would first have to examine all of the traditional arguments for the existence of God, and show that none of them is sound. Alvin Plantinga, for example, says that in order for the atheologian to show that the existence of God is improbable relative to one's total evidence, “he would be obliged to consider all the sorts of reasons natural theologians have invoked in favor of theistic belief -- the traditional cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments, for example.” (1979, 3) And in a similar vein, Bruce Reichenbach remarks:

With respect to the atheologian's inductive argument from evil, the theist might reasonably contend that the atheologian's exclusion of the theistic arguments or proofs for God's existence advanced by the natural theologian has skewed the results. (1980, 224)

But this view seems mistaken. Consider the cosmological argument. In some versions, the conclusion is that there is an unmoved mover. In others, that there is a first cause. In others, that there is a necessary being, having its necessity of itself. None of these conclusions involve any claims about the moral character of the object in question, let alone the claim that it is a morally perfect person. But in the absence of such a claim, how could such arguments, even if they turned out to be sound, serve to undercut the argument from evil?

The situation is not essentially different in the case of the argument from order. For while that argument, if it were sound, would provide grounds for drawing some tentative conclusion concerning the moral character of the designer or creator of the universe, the conclusion in question would not be one that could be used to overthrow the argument from evil. For given the mixture of good and evil that one finds in the world, the argument from order can hardly provide support even for the existence of a designer or creator who is very good, let alone one who is morally perfect. So it is very hard to see how the teleological argument, any more than the cosmological, can overturn the argument from evil.

A similar conclusion can be defended with respect to other arguments, such as those that appeal to purported miracles, or religious experiences. For while in the case of religious experiences it might be argued that personal contact with a being may provide additional evidence concerning the person's character, it is clear that the primary evidence concerning a person's character must consist of information concerning what the person does and does not do. So, contrary to the claim advanced by Robert Adams (1985, 245), even if there were veridical religious experiences, they would not provide one with a satisfactory defense against the argument from evil.

A good way of underlining the basic point here is by setting out an alternative formulation of the argument from evil in which it is granted, for the sake of argument, that there is an omnipotent and omniscient person. The result of doing this is that the conclusion at which one arrives is not that there is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person, but, rather, that, although there is an omnipotent and omniscient person, that person is not morally perfect.

When the argument from evil is reformulated in that way, it becomes clear that the vast majority of considerations that have been offered as reasons for believing in God can be of little assistance to the person who is trying to resist the argument from evil. For most of them provide, at best, very tenuous grounds for any conclusion concerning the moral character of any omnipotent and omniscient being who may happen to exist, and almost none of them provides any support for the hypothesis that there is an omnipotent and omniscient being who is also morally perfect.

4.3.2 Belief in the Existence of God as Non-Inferentially Justified

The reason emerges if one considers the epistemology of perception. Some philosophers hold that some beliefs about physical objects are non-inferentially justified, while others hold that this is never so, and that justified beliefs about physical states of affairs are always justified via an inference to the best explanation that starts out from beliefs about one's experiences. But direct realists as much as indirect realists admit that there can be cases where a person would be justified in believing that a certain physical state of affairs obtained were it not for the fact that he has good evidence that he is hallucinating, or else subject to perceptual illusion. Moreover, given evidence of the relevant sort, it makes no difference whether direct realism is true, or indirect realism: the belief in question is undermined to precisely the same extent in either case.

4.3.3 Induction Based on Partial Success

What Swinburne says here is surely very reasonable, and I can see no objection in principle to a defense of this sort. The problem with it is that no theodicy that has ever been proposed has been successful in the relevant way -- that is, there is no impressive range of undesirable states of affairs where people initially believe that the wrongmaking properties of allowing such states of affairs to exist greatly outweigh any rightmaking properties associated with doing so, but where, confronted with some proposed theodicy, people come to believe that it would be morally permissible to allow such states of affairs to exist. Indeed, it is hard to find any such cases, let alone an impressive range.

4.4. Theodicies

… we cannot see why our world, with all its ills, would be better than others we think we can imagine, or what , in any detail, is God's reason for permitting a given specific and appalling evil. Not only can we not see this, we can't think of any very good possibilities. And here I must say that most attempts to explain why God permits evil -- theodicies , as we may call them -- strike me as tepid, shallow and ultimately frivolous. (1985a, 35)

4.4.1 A Soul-Making Theodicy

The value-judgement that is implicitly being invoked here is that one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptation, and thus by rightly making responsibly choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either of innocence or of virtue. In the former case, which is that of the actual moral achievements of mankind, the individual's goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a stability based upon an accumulation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort. (1977, 255-6)

Is this theodicy satisfactory? There are a number of reasons for holding that it is not. First, what about the horrendous suffering that people undergo, either at the hands of others -- as in the Holocaust -- or because of terminal illnesses such as cancer? One writer -- Eleonore Stump -- has suggested that the terrible suffering that many people undergo at the end of their lives, in cases where it cannot be alleviated, is to be viewed as suffering that has been ordained by God for the spiritual health of the individual in question. (1993b, 349). But, given that it does not seem to be true that terrible terminal illnesses more commonly fall upon those in bad spiritual health than upon those of good character, let alone that they fall only upon the former, this ‘spiritual chemotherapy’ view seems quite hopeless. More generally, there seems to be no reason at all why a world must contain horrendous suffering if it is to provide a good environment for the development of character in response to challenges and temptations.

Secondly, and is illustrated by the weakness of Hick's own discussion (1977, 309-17), a soul-making theodicy provides no justification for the existence of any animal pain, let alone for a world where predation is not only present but a major feature of non-human animal life. The world could perfectly well have contained only human persons, or only human person plus herbivores.

Thirdly, the soul-making theodicy provides no account either of the suffering that young, innocent children endure, either because of terrible diseases, or at the hands of adults. For here, as in the case of animals, there is no soul-making purpose that is served.

4.4.2 Free Will

One problem with an appeal to libertarian free will is that no satisfactory account of the concept of libertarian free will is yet available. Thus, while the requirement that, in order to be free in the libertarian sense, an action not have any cause that lies outside the agent is unproblematic, this is obviously not a sufficient condition, since this condition would be satisfied if the behavior in question was caused by random events within the agent. So one needs to add that the agent is, in some sense, the cause of the action. But how is the causation in question to be understood? Present accounts of the metaphysics of causation typically treat causes as states of affairs. If, however, one adopts such an approach, then it seems that all that one has when an action is freely done, in the libertarian sense, is that there is some uncaused mental state of the agent that causally gives rise to the relevant behavior, and why freedom, thus understood, should be thought valuable, is far from clear.

The alternative is to shift from event-causation to what is referred to as ‘agent-causation’. But then the problem is that there is no satisfactory account of agent-causation.

But even if the difficulty concerning the nature of libertarian free will is set aside, there are still very strong objections to the free-will approach. First, and most important, the fact that libertarian free will is valuable does not entail that one should never intervene in the exercise of libertarian free will. Indeed, very few people think that one should not intervene to prevent someone from committing rape or murder. On the contrary, almost everyone would hold that a failure to prevent heinously evil actions when one can do so would be seriously wrong.

Secondly, the proposition that libertarian free will is valuable does not entail that it is a good thing for people to have the power to inflict great harm upon others. So individuals could, for example, have libertarian free will, but not have the power to torture and murder others.

Thirdly, many evils are caused by natural processes, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and other weather conditions, and by a wide variety of diseases. Such evils certainly do not appear to result from morally wrong actions. If that is right, then an appeal to free will provides no answer to an argument from evil that focuses upon such evils.

Some writers, such as C. S. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga, have suggested that such evils may ultimately be due to the immoral actions of supernatural beings (Lewis, 1957, 122-3; Plantinga, 1974a, 58). If that were so, then the first two objections mentioned above would apply: one would have many more cases where individuals were being given the power to inflict great harm on others, and then were being allowed by God to perform horrendously evil actions leading to enormous suffering and many deaths. In addition, however, it can plausibly be argued that, though it is possible that earthquakes, hurricanes, cancer, and the predation of animals are all caused by malevolent supernatural beings, the probability that this is so is extremely low.

4.4.3 The Freedom to Do Great Evil

This variant on the appeal to libertarian free will is also open to a number of objections. First, as with free will theodicies in general, this line of thought provides no justification for the existence of what appear to be natural evils.

Secondly, if what matters is simply the existence of alternative actions that differ greatly morally, this can be the case even in a world where one lacks the power to inflict great harm on others, since there can be actions that would benefit others enormously, and which one may either perform or refrain from performing.

4.4.4 The Need for Natural Laws

This type of theodicy is also exposed to serious objections. First, what natural evils a world contains depends not just on the laws, but on the initial, or boundary conditions. Thus, for example, an omnipotent being could create ex nihilo a world which had the same laws of nature as our world, and which contained human beings, but which was devoid of non-human carnivores. Or the world could be such that there was unlimited room for populations to expand, and ample natural resources to support such populations.

Secondly, many evils depend upon precisely what laws the world contains. An omnipotent being could, for example, easily create a world with the same laws of physics as our world, but with slightly different laws linking neurophysiological states with qualities of experiences, so that extremely intense pains either did not arise, or could be turned off when they served no purpose. Or additional physical laws of a rather specialized sort could be introduced that would cause very harmful viruses to self-destruct.

Thirdly, this final theodicy provides no account of moral evil. If other theodicies could provide a justification for God's allowing moral evil, that would not be a problem. But, as we have seen, no satisfactory justification appears to be available.

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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion

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8 The Problem of Evil

Peter Van Inwagen is the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He has delivered the Maurice Lectures at King's College, London, the Wilde Lectures at Oxford University, the Stewart Lectures at Princeton University, and the Gifford Lectures at St Andrews University. His books include: An Essay on Free Will (OUP, 1983), Material Beings, Metaphysics (2002 [2nd ed.]), God, Knowledge, and Mystery, Ontology, Identity, and Modality, and The Problem of Evil (2006). He is at work on a book called Being: A Study in Ontology. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2005, and was president of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, 2008–2009.

Published: 02 September 2009
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There are many ways to understand the phrase “the problem of evil.” This article conceives this phrase as a label for a certain purely intellectual problem—as opposed to an emotional, spiritual, pastoral, or theological problem (and as opposed to a good many other possible categories of problem as well). The fact that there is much evil in the world (that is to say, the fact that many bad things happen) can be the basis for an argument for the nonexistence of God (that is, of an omnipotent and morally perfect God). But this article takes these qualifications to be redundant: It takes the phrases “a less than omnipotent God” and “a God who sometimes does wrong” to be self-contradictory, like “a round square” or “a perfectly transparent object that casts a shadow.”) Here is a simple formulation of this argument: If God existed, he would be all-powerful and morally perfect. An all-powerful and morally perfect being would not allow evil to exist.

1. Introductory Remarks: The Problem of Evil and the Argument from Evil

There are many ways to understand the phrase “the problem of evil.” In this chapter, I understand this phrase as a label for a certain purely intellectual problem—as opposed to an emotional, spiritual, pastoral, or theological problem (and as opposed to a good many other possible categories of problem as well). The fact that there is much evil in the world (that is to say, the fact that many bad things happen) can be the basis for an argument for the nonexistence of God (that is, of an omnipotent and morally perfect God. But I take these qualifications to be redundant: I take the phrases “a less than omnipotent God” and “a God who sometimes does wrong” to be self-contradictory, like “a round square” or “a perfectly transparent object that casts a shadow.”) Here is a simple formulation of this argument:

If God existed, he would be all-powerful and morally perfect. An all-powerful and morally perfect being would not allow evil to exist. But we observe evil. Hence, God does not exist.

Let us call this argument “the argument from evil”—glossing over the fact that there are many arguments for the nonexistence of God that could be described as arguments from evil. The intellectual problem I call the problem of evil can be framed as a series of closely related questions addressed to theists: How would you respond to the argument from evil? Why hasn't it converted you to atheism (for surely you've long known about it)? Is your only response the response of faith—something like, “Evil is a mystery. We must simply trust God and believe that there is some good reason for the evils of the world”? Or can you reply to the argument? Can you explain how, in your view, the argument can be anything less than an unanswerable demonstration of the truth of atheism?

These questions present theists with a purely intellectual challenge. I believe this intellectual challenge can be met. I believe it can be met by critical examination of the argument. I believe critical examination of the argument shows that it is indeed something less than an unanswerable demonstration of the truth of atheism. I attempt just such a critical examination in this chapter. In this chapter, we shall examine this argument, hold it up to critical scrutiny.

2. The “Moral Insensitivity” Charge

Before we examine the argument from evil, however, we must consider the charge that to examine it, to treat it as if it was, as it were, just another philosophical argument whose virtues and defects could be weighed by impartial reason, is a sign of moral insensitivity—or downright wickedness. One might suppose that no argument was exempt from critical examination. But it is frequently asserted, and with considerable vehemence, that it is extremely wicked to examine the argument from evil with a critical eye. Here, for example, is a famous passage from John Stuart Mill's Three Essays on Religion :

We now pass to the moral attributes of the DeityThis question bears a very different aspect to us from what it bears to those teachers of Natural Theology who are encumbered with the necessity of admitting the omnipotence of the Creator. We have not to attempt the impossible problem of reconciling infinite benevolence and justice with infinite power in the Creator of a world such as this. The attempt to do so not only involves absolute contradiction in an intellectual point of view but exhibits to excess the revolting spectacle of a jesuitical defense of moral enormities. (1875, 183)

I cannot resist quoting, in connection with this passage from Mill, a poem that occurs in Kingsley Amis's ( 1966 ) novel The Anti-death League (it is the work of one of the characters). 1 This poem puts a little flesh on the bones of Mill's abstract Victorian prose. It contains several specific allusions to just those arguments Mill describes as jesuitical defenses of moral enormities. Its literary effect depends essentially on putting these arguments, or allusions to them, into the mouth of God.

To a Baby Born without Limbs This is just to show you who's boss around here. It'll keep you on your toes, so to speak. Make you put your best foot forward, so to speak, And give you something to turn your hand to, so to speak. You can face up to it like a man, Or snivel and blubber like a baby. That's up to you. Nothing to do with Me. If you take it in the right spirit, You can have a bloody marvelous life, With the great rewards courage brings, And the beauty of accepting your lot . And think how much good it'll do your Mum and Dad, And your Grans and Gramps and the rest of the shower, To be stopped being complacent. Make sure they baptize you, though, In case some murdering bastard Decides to put you away quick, Which would send you straight to limb-o , ha ha ha. But just a word in your ear, if you've got one. Mind you, do take this in the right spirit, And keep a civil tongue in your head about Me. Because if you don't , I've got plenty of other stuff up My sleeve, Such as leukemia and polio (Which, incidentally, you're welcome to any time, Whatever spirit you take this in). I've given you one love-pat, right? You don't want another. So watch it, Jack.

I am afraid I must accuse Mill (and the many other authors who have expressed similar sentiments) of intellectual dishonesty.

Philosophy is hard . Thinking clearly for an extended period is hard. It is easier to pour scorn on those who disagree with you than actually to address their arguments. And of all the kinds of scorn that can be poured on someone's views, moral scorn is the safest and most pleasant (most pleasant to the one doing the pouring). It is the safest kind because, if you want to pour moral scorn on someone's views, you can pretty much take it for granted that most people will regard what you have said as unanswerable; you can take it as certain that everyone who is predisposed to agree with you will believe you have made an unanswerable point. You can pretty much take it for granted that your audience will dismiss any attempt your opponent in debate makes at an answer as a “rationalization”—that great contribution of modern depth psychology to intellectual complacency and laziness. Moral scorn is the most pleasant kind of scorn to deploy against those who disagree with you because a display of self-righteousness—moral posturing—is a pleasant action whatever the circumstances, and it's nice to have an excuse for it. No one can tell me Mill wasn't enjoying himself when he wrote the words “exhibits to excess the revolting spectacle of a jesuitical defense of moral enormities.” (Perhaps he was enjoying himself so much that his attention was diverted from the question, What would it be to exhibit a revolting spectacle in moderation?)

To people who employ the argument from evil and attempt to deflect critical examination of this argument by that sort of moral posturing, I can only say, Come off it. These people are, in point of principle, in exactly the same position as those defenders of law and order who, if you express a suspicion that a man accused of abducting and molesting a child has been framed by the police, tell you with evident disgust that molesting a child is a monstrous crime and that you're defending a child molester.

3. God's Omnipotence, His Moral Perfection, and His Knowledge of Evil

Having defended the moral propriety of critically examining the argument from evil, I will now do just that. The argument presupposes, and rightly, that two features God is supposed to have are “nonnegotiable”: that he is omnipotent and morally perfect. That he is omnipotent means that he can do anything —provided his doing it doesn't involve an intrinsic impossibility. (Thus, even an omnipotent being can't draw a round square. And God, although he is omnipotent, is unable to lie, for his lying is as much an intrinsic impossibility as a round square.) To say that God is morally perfect is to say that he never does anything morally wrong—that he could not possibly do anything morally wrong. If omnipotence and moral perfection are nonnegotiable components of the idea of God, this fact has the following two logical consequences. (1) If the universe was made by an intelligent being, and if that being is less than omnipotent (and if there's no other being who is omnipotent), the atheists are right: God does not exist. (2) If the universe was made by an omnipotent being, and if that being has done even one morally wrong thing (and if there isn't another omnipotent being, one who never does anything morally wrong), the atheists are right: God does not exist. If, therefore, the Creator of the universe lacked either omnipotence or moral perfection, and if he claimed to be God, he would be either an impostor (if he claimed to be omnipotent and morally perfect) or confused (if he admitted that he was less than omnipotent or less than morally perfect and still claimed to be God).

One premise of the simple version of the argument set out above—that an all-powerful and morally perfect being would not allow evil to exist—might well be false if the all-powerful and wholly good being were ignorant, and not culpably ignorant, of the existence of evil. But this is not a difficulty for the proponent of the simple argument, for God, if he exists, is omniscient. The proponent of the simple argument could, in fact, defend his premise by an appeal to far weaker theses about the extent of God's knowledge than “God is omniscient.” If the simple argument presents an effective prima facie case for the conclusion that there is no omnipotent and morally perfect being who is omnisicent, it presents an equally effective prima facie case for the conclusion that there is no omnipotent and morally perfect being who has even as much knowledge of what goes on in the world as we human beings have. The full panoply of omniscience, so to speak, does not really enter into the initial stages of a presentation and discussion of an argument from evil. Omniscience, omniscience in the full sense of the word, will become important only when we come to examine responses to the argument from evil that involve free will (see Section 9).

How shall we organize our critical examination of the argument from evil? I propose that we imagine in some detail a debate about the existence of God, and that we try to determine how effective a debating point the reality of evil would be for the party to the debate who was trying to show that there was no God.

4. A Description of an Ideal Debate about the Existence of God

Let us imagine that we are about to watch part of a debate between an atheist (“Atheist”) and a theist (“Theist”) about whether there is a God. This debate is being carried on before an audience of agnostics. As we enter the debating hall (the debate has evidently been going on for some time), Atheist has the floor. She is trying to convince the agnostics to abandon their agnosticism and become atheists like herself. Theist is not, not in this part of the debate anyway, trying to convert the agnostics to theism. At present, he is trying to convince the agnostics of only one thing: that Atheist's arguments should not convert them to atheism. (By an odd coincidence, we have arrived just at the moment at which Atheist is beginning to set out the argument from evil.) I mean these fictional characters to be ideal types, ideal representatives of the categories “atheist,” “theist,” and “agnostic”: they are all highly intelligent, rational, and factually well informed; they are indefatigable speakers and listeners, and their attention never wanders from the point at issue. The agnostics, in particular, are moved by a passionate desire for truth. They want to get the question of the existence of God settled , and they don't at all care which way it gets settled. Their only desire is—if this should be possible—to leave the hall with a correct belief about the existence of God, a belief they have good reason to regard as correct. (They recognize, however, that this may very well not be possible, in which case they intend to remain agnostics.) Our two debaters, be it noted, are not interested in changing each other's beliefs. Each is interested in the effects his or her arguments will have on the beliefs of the agnostics and not at all in the effects those arguments will have on the beliefs of the other debater. One important consequence of this is that neither debater will bother to consider the question, Will my opponent accept this premise? Each will consider only the question, Will the agnostics accept this premise?

Can Atheist use the argument from evil to convert these ideal “theologically neutral” agnostics to atheism—in the face of Theist's best efforts to block her attempt to convince them of the truth of atheism? Our examination of the argument from evil will be presented as an attempt to answer this question.

5. Atheist's Initial Statement of the Argument from Evil; Theist Begins His Reply by Making a Point about Reasons

Atheist, as I have said, is beginning to present the argument from evil to the audience of agnostics. Here is her initial formulation of the argument:

Since God is morally perfect, he must desire that no evil exist—the nonexistence of evil must be what he wants . And an omnipotent being can achieve or bring about whatever he wants—or at least whatever he wants that is intrinsically possible, and the nonexistence of evil is obviously intrinsically possible. So if there were an omnipotent, morally perfect being who knew about these evils—well, they wouldn't have arisen in the first place, for he'd have prevented their occurrence. Or if, for some reason, he didn't do that, he'd certainly remove them the instant they began to exist. But we observe evils, and very long-lasting ones. So we must conclude that God does not exist.

What shall Theist say in reply? I think he should begin with an obvious point about the relations between what one wants, what one can do, and what one will, in the event, do:

I grant that, in some sense of the word, the nonexistence of evil must be what a perfectly good being wants . But we often don't bring about states of affairs we can bring about and want to bring about. Suppose, for example, that Alice's mother is dying in great pain and that Alice yearns desperately for her mother to die—today and not next week or next month. And suppose it would be easy for Alice to arrange this—she is perhaps a doctor or a nurse and has easy access to pharmacological resources that would enable her to achieve this end. Does it follow that she will act on this ability she has? It does not, for Alice might have reasons for not doing what she can do. (She might, for example, think it would be morally wrong to poison her mother; or she might fear being prosecuted for murder.) The conclusion that evil does not exist does not, therefore, follow logically from the premises that the nonexistence of evil is what God wants and that he is able to bring about the object of his desire—since, for all logic can tell us, God might have reasons for allowing evil to exist that, in his mind, outweigh the desirability of the nonexistence of evil.

But Theist must say a great deal more than this, for, if we gave her her head, Atheist could make a pretty good prima facie case for two conclusions: that a morally perfect creator would take pains to prevent the suffering of his creatures, and that the suffering of creatures could not be a necessary means to any end for an omnipotent being. Theist must, therefore, say something about God's reasons for allowing evil, something to make it plausible to believe there might be such reasons. Before I allow him to do this, however, I will introduce some terminology that will help us to understand the general strategy I am going to have him follow in his discussion of God's reasons for allowing evil to exist.

6. A Distinction: “Theodicy” and “Defense”

Suppose that I believe in God and that I think I know what God's reasons for allowing evil to exist are and that I tell them to you. Then I have presented you with what is called a theodicy, from the Greek words for “God” and “justice.” Thus, Milton, in Paradise Lost , tells us that the purpose of the poem is to “justify the ways of God to men”—“justify” meaning “exhibit as just.” (Here I use “theodicy” in Alvin Plantinga's sense. Other writers have used the word in other senses.) If I could present a theodicy, and if the audience to whom I presented it found it convincing, I'd have an effective reply to the argument from evil, at least as regards that particular audience. But suppose that, although I believe in God, I don't claim to know what God's reasons for allowing evil are. Is there any way for someone in my position to reply to the argument from evil? There is. Consider this analogy.

Your friend Clarissa, a single mother, left her two very young children alone in her flat for several hours very late last night. Your Aunt Harriet, a maiden lady of strong moral principles, learns of this and declares that Clarissa is unfit to raise children. You spring to your friend's defense: “Now, Aunt Harriet, don't go jumping to conclusions. There's probably a perfectly good explanation. Maybe Billy or Annie took ill, and she decided to go over to St Luke's for help. You know she hasn't got a phone or a car and no one in that neighborhood of hers would come to the door at two o'clock in the morning.” If you tell your Aunt Harriet a story like this, you don't claim to know what Clarissa's reasons for leaving her children alone really were. And you're not claiming to have said anything that shows that Clarissa really is a good mother. You're claiming only to show that the fact Aunt Harriet has adduced doesn't prove Clarissa isn't a good mother; what you're trying to establish is that for all you or Aunt Harriet know, she had some good reason for what she did. And you're not trying to establish only that there is some remote possibility that she had a good reason. No lawyer would try to raise doubts in the minds of the members of a jury by pointing out to them that for all they knew his client had an identical twin, of whom all record had been lost, and who was the person who had actually committed the crime his client was charged with. That may be a possibility—I suppose it is a possibility—but it is too remote a possibility to raise real doubts in anyone's mind. What you're trying to convince Aunt Harriet of is that there is, as we say, a very real possibility that Clarissa had a good reason for leaving her children alone, and your attempt to convince her of this consists in your presenting her with an example of what such a reason might be.

Critical responses to the argument from evil—at least responses by philoso phers—usually take just this form. A philosopher who responds to the argument from evil typically does so by telling a story, a story in which God allows evil to exist. This story will, of course, represent God as having reasons for allowing the existence of evil, reasons that, if the rest of the story were true, would be good ones. Such a story philosophers call a defense . A defense and a theodicy will not necessarily differ in content. A's defense may, indeed, be verbally identical with B's theodicy. The difference between a theodicy and a defense is simply that a theodicy is put forward as true, while nothing more is claimed for a defense than that it represents a real possibility—or a real possibility given that God exists. If I offer a story about God and evil as a defense, I hope for the following reaction from my audience: “Given that God exists, the rest of the story might well be true. I can't see any reason to rule it out.” The logical point of this should be clear. If the audience of agnostics reacts to a story about God and evil in this way, then, assuming Atheist's argument is valid, they must reach the conclusion Theist wants them to reach: that, for all they know, one of Atheist's premises is false. And if they reach that conclusion, they will, for the moment, remain agnostics.

Some people, if they are familiar with the usual conduct of debates about the argument from evil, may be puzzled by my bringing the notion “a very real possibility” into my fictional debate at this early point. It has become something of a custom for critics of the argument from evil first to discuss the so-called logical problem of evil, the problem of finding a defense that contains no internal logical contradiction; when the critics have dealt with this problem to their own satisfaction, as they always do, they go on to discuss the so-called evidential (or probabilistic) problem of evil, the problem of finding a defense that (among certain other desirable features) represents, in my phrase, a real possibility. A counsel for the defense who followed a parallel strategy in a court of law would first try to convince the jury that his client's innocence was logically consistent with the evidence by telling a story involving twins separated at birth, operatic coincidences, and mental telepathy; only after he had convinced the jury by this method that his client's innocence was logically consistent with the evidence would he go on to try to raise real doubts in the jurors' minds about his client's guilt.

I find this division of the problem artificial and unhelpful and will not allow it to dictate the form of my discussion of the argument from evil. I am, as it were, jumping right into the evidential problem (so-called; I won't use the term) without any consideration of the logical problem. Or none as such, none under the rubric “the logical problem of evil.” Those who know the history of the discussions of the argument from evil in the 1950s and 1960s will see that many of the points I make, or have my creatures Atheist and Theist make, were first made in discussions of the logical problem.

All right. Theist's response will take the form of an attempt to present one or more defenses, and his hope will be that the response of the audience of agnostics to this defense, or these defenses, will be, “Given that God exists, the rest of the story might well be true. I can't see any reason to rule it out.” What form could a plausible defense take?

One point is clear: a defense cannot simply take the form of a story about how God brings some great good out of the evils of the world, a good that outweighs those evils. At the very least, a defense will have to include the proposition that God was unable to bring about the greater good without allowing the evils we observe (or some other evils as bad or worse). And to find a story that can plausibly be said to have this feature is no trivial undertaking. The reason for this lies in God's omnipotence. A human being can often be excused for allowing, or even causing, a certain evil if that evil was a necessary means, or an unavoidable consequence thereof, to some good that outweighed it—or if it was a necessary means to the prevention of some greater evil. The eighteenth-century surgeon who operated without anesthetic caused unimaginable pain to his patients, but we do not condemn him because (at least if he knew what he was about) the pain was an unavoidable consequence of the means necessary to a good that outweighed it: saving the patient's life, for example. But we should condemn a present-day surgeon who had anesthetics available and who nevertheless operated without using them—even if his operation saved the patient's life and thus resulted in a good that outweighed the horrible pain the patient suffered.

7. Theist's Reply Continues; The Initial Statement of the Free-will Defense

There seems to me to be only one defense that has any hope of succeeding, and that is the so-called free-will defense. 2 I am going to imagine Theist putting forward a very simple form of this defense; I will go on to ask what Atheist might say in response:

God made the world and it was very good. An indispensable part of its goodness was the existence of rational beings: self-aware beings capable of abstract thought and love and having the power of free choice between contemplated alternative courses of action. This last feature of rational beings, free choice or free will, is a good. But even an omnipotent being is unable to control the exercise of free choice, for a choice that was controlled would ipso facto not be free. In other words, if I have a free choice between x and y , even God cannot ensure that I choose x . To ask God to give me a free choice between x and y and to see to it that I choose x instead of y is to ask God to bring about the intrinsically impossible; it is like asking him to create a round square or a material body with no shape. Having this power of free choice, some or all human beings misused it and produced a certain amount of evil. But free will is a sufficiently great good that its existence outweighs the evils that have resulted and will result from its abuse; and God foresaw this.

Theist's presentation of the free-will defense immediately suggests several objections. Here are two that would immediately occur to most people:

How could anyone possibly believe that the evils of this world are outweighed by the good inherent in our having free will? Perhaps free will is a good and would outweigh, in Theist's words, “a certain amount of evil,” but it seems impossible to believe that it can outweigh the amount of physical suffering (to say nothing of other sorts of evil) that actually exists. Not all evils are the result of human free will. Consider, for example, the Lisbon earthquake or the almost inconceivable misery and loss of life produced by the hurricane that ravaged Honduras in 1997. Such events are not the result of any act of human will, free or unfree.

In my view, the simple form of the free-will defense I have put into Theist's mouth is unable to deal with either of these objections. The simple form of the free-will defense can deal with at best the existence of some evil—as opposed to the vast amount of evil we actually observe—and the evil with which it can deal is only the evil that results from the acts of human beings. I believe, however, that more sophisticated forms of the free-will defense do have interesting things to say about the vast amount of evil in the world and about the suffering caused by earthquakes and hurricanes and other natural phenomena. Before I discuss these “more sophisticated” forms of the free-will defense, however, I want to examine two objections that have been brought against the free-will defense that are so fundamental that, if they were valid, they would refute any elaboration of the defense, however sophisticated. These objections have to do with free will. I am not going to include them in my dialogue between Atheist and Theist, for the simple reason that, in my view, anyway, they have not got very much force, and I do not want to be accused of fictional character assassination; my Atheist has more interesting arguments at her disposal. But I cannot ignore these arguments: the first has been historically important and the second turns on a point that is likely to occur to most readers.

8. An Objection to the Free-will Defense: God Can Control the Exercise of Free Choice

The first of the two arguments is essentially this: the free-will defense fails because free will and determinism are compatible; God could, therefore, create a world whose inhabitants are free to do evil but do only good.

This might seem a surprising argument. Why should anyone believe that free will and determinism were compatible?

Well, many very able philosophers have believed this, and for reasons unrelated to theological questions. Philosophers of the stature of Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill have held that free will and determinism are perfectly compatible: that there could be a world in which the past determined a unique future and whose inhabitants were nonetheless free agents. Philosophers who accept this thesis are called “compatibilists.” It is not hard to see that if the compatibilists are right about the nature of free will, the free-will defense fails. If free will and determinism are compatible, an omnipotent being can , contrary to a central thesis of the free-will defense, create a person who has a free choice between x and y and ensure that that person choose x rather than y .

Those philosophers who accept the compatibility of free will and determinism defend their thesis as follows: being free is being free to do what one wants to do. Prisoners in a jail, for example, are unfree because they want to leave and can't. The man who desperately wants to stop smoking but can't is unfree for the same reason—even though the barrier that stands between him and a life without nicotine is psychological, and not a physical thing like a wall or a door. The very words “free will” testify to the rightness of this analysis, for one's will is simply what one wants, and a free will is just exactly an unimpeded will. Given this account of free will, a Creator who wants to give me a free choice between x and y has only to arrange matters in such a way that the following two “if” statements are both true: if I were to want x , I'd be able to achieve that desire, and if I were to want y , I'd be able to achieve that desire. And a Creator who wants to ensure that I choose x rather than y has only to implant in me a fairly robust desire for x and see to it that I have no desire at all for y . And these two things are obviously compatible. Suppose, for example, that there was a Creator who had placed a woman in a garden and had commanded her not to eat of the fruit of a certain tree. Could he so arrange matters that she have a free choice between eating of the fruit of that tree and not eating of it—and also ensure that she not eat of it? Certainly. To provide her with a free choice between the two alternatives, he need only see to it that two things are true: first, that if she wanted to eat of the fruit of that tree, no barrier (such as an unclimbable fence or paralysis of the limbs or a neurotic fear of trees) would stand in the way of her acting on that desire, and, second, that if she wanted not to eat of the fruit, nothing would force her to act contrary to that desire. And to ensure that she not eat of the fruit, he need only see to it that not eating of the fruit be what she desires (and that she have no other desire in conflict with this desire). An omnipotent and omniscient being could therefore bring it about that every creature with free will always freely did what was right.

Having thus shown a proposition central to the free-will defense to be false, the critic can make the consequences of its falsity explicit in a few words. If a morally perfect being could bring it about that every creature with free will always freely did what was right, there would of necessity be no creaturely abuse of free will, and evil could not possibly have entered the world through the creaturely abuse of free will. The so-called free-will defense is thus not a defense at all, for it is an impossible story.

We have before us, then, an argument for the conclusion that the story called the free-will defense is an impossible story. But how plausible is the account of free will on which the argument rests? Not very, I think. It certainly yields some odd conclusions. Consider the lower social orders in Brave New World , the “deltas” and “epsilons.” These unfortunate people have their deepest desires chosen for them by others, by the “alphas” who make up the highest social stratum. What the deltas and epsilons primarily desire is to do what the alphas tell them. This is their primary desire because it has been implanted in them by prenatal and postnatal conditioning. (If Huxley were writing today, he might have added genetic engineering to the alphas' list of resources for determining the desires of their slaves.) It would be hard to think of beings who better fitted the description “lacks free will” than the deltas and epsilons of Brave New World . And yet, if the compatibilists' account of free will is right, the deltas and epsilons are exemplars of beings with free will. Each of them is always doing exactly what he wants, after all, and who among us is in that fortunate position? What he wants is to do as he is told by those appointed over him, of course, but the compatibilists' account of free will says nothing about the content of a free agent's desires: it requires only that there be no barrier to acting on them. The compatibilists' account of free will is, therefore, if not evidently false, at least highly implausible—for it has the highly implausible consequence that the deltas and epsilons are free agents. And an opponent of the free-will defense cannot show that that story fails to represent a “real possibility” by deducing its falsity from a highly implausible theory.

9. A Second Objection to the Free-will Defense: Free Will Is Incompatible with God's Omniscience

I turn now to the second argument for the conclusion that any form of the free-will defense must fail: the free-will defense, of course, entails that human beings have free will; but the existence of a being who knows the future is incompatible with free will, and an omnisicent being knows the future, and omniscience belongs to the concept of God; hence, the so-called free-will defense is not a possible story—and is therefore not a defense at all.

Most theists, I think, would reply to this argument by trying to show that divine omniscience and human free will were compatible, for that is what most theists believe. But I find the arguments, which I will not discuss, for the incompatibility of omniscience and freedom, if not indisputably correct, at least pretty convincing, and I will therefore not reply in that way. (And I think that the attempt of Augustine and Boethius and Aquinas to solve the problem by contending that God is outside time—that he is not merely everlasting but altogether nontemporal—is a failure. I don't mean to say that I reject the proposition that God is outside time; I mean that I think his being outside time doesn't solve the problem.) I will instead reply to the argument by engaging in some permissible tinkering with the concept of omniscience. At any rate, I believe it to be permissible for reasons I shall try to make clear.

In what follows, I am going to suppose that God is everlasting but temporal, that he is not “outside time.” I make this assumption because I do not know how to write coherently and in detail about a nontemporal being's knowledge of (what is to us) the future. Now consider these two propositions:

X will freely do A at t . Y, a being whose beliefs cannot be mistaken, believes now that X will do A at t .

These two propositions are consistent with each other or they are not. If they are consistent, there is no problem of omniscience and freedom. Suppose, then, that they are inconsistent, and suppose free will is possible. (If free will isn't possible, the free-will defense is self-contradictory for that reason alone.) Then it is impossible for a being whose beliefs cannot be mistaken to have beliefs about what anyone will freely do in the future. Hence, if free will exists it is impossible for any being to be omniscient. Now, if the existence of free will implies that there cannot be an omniscient being, it might seem, by that very fact, to imply that there cannot be an omnipotent being. For if it is intrinsically impossible for any being now to know what someone will freely do tomorrow or next year, it is intrinsically impossible for any being now to find out what someone will freely do tomorrow or next year; and a being who can do anything can find out anything. But this inference is invalid, for an omnipotent being is, as it were, excused from the requirement that it be able to do the intrinsically impossible. This suggests a solution to the problem of free will and divine omniscience: why should we not qualify the concept of omniscience in a way similar to the way the concept of omnipotence is qualified? Why not say that even an omniscient being is unable to know certain things—those such that its knowing them would be an intrinsically impossible state of affairs. Or we might say this: an omnipotent being is also omnisicent if it knows everything it is able to know. If we say, first, that the omnipotent God is omniscient in the sense that he knows everything that, in his omnipotence, he is able to know, and, second, that he does not know what the future free acts of any agent will be, we do not contradict ourselves—owing to the fact that (now) finding out what the future free acts of an agent will be is an intrinsically impossible action.

I must admit that this solution to the problem of free will and divine foreknowledge raises a further problem for theists: Are not most theists committed (for example, in virtue of the stories told about God's actions in the Bible) to the proposition that God at least sometimes foreknows the free actions of creatures? This is a very important question. In my view, the answer is no, at least as regards the Bible. But a discussion of this important question is not possible within the scope of this chapter.

10. Atheist Contends That the Free-will Defense Cannot Account for the Amount and the Kinds of Evil We Observe

I conclude that neither an appeal to the supposed compatibility of free will and determinism nor an appeal to the supposed incompatibility of free will and omniscience can undermine the free-will defense.

Let us return to Atheist, who, as I said, has better arguments at her disposal than those considered in sections 8 and 9. What shall she say in response to the free-will defense? What she should do, I think, is to concede a certain limited power to the free-will defense and to go on to maintain that this power is essen tially limited. Her best course is to concede that the free-will defense shows there might be, for all anyone can say, a certain amount of evil, a certain amount of pain and suffering, in a world created by an all-powerful and morally perfect being, and to conduct her argument in terms of the amounts and the kinds of evil that we actually observe. Her best course is to argue for the conclusion that neither the simple version of the free-will defense I have had Theist present nor any elaboration of it can constitute a plausible account of the evil, the bad things, that actually exist. I have mentioned two points about the evil we observe in the world that would probably occur to most people immediately upon hearing Theist's initial statement of the free-will defense: that the amount of suffering (and other evils) is enormous and must outweigh whatever goodness is inherent in the reality of free will; that some evils are not caused by human beings and cannot therefore be ascribed to the creaturely abuse of free will. I will now ascribe to Atheist a rather lengthy speech that takes up these two points—and a third, perhaps less obvious.

I will concede that the free-will defense shows that the mere existence of some evil or other cannot be used to prove the nonexistence of God. If we lived in a world in which everyone, or most people, suffered in certain relatively minor ways, and if each instance of suffering could be traced to the wrong or foolish acts of human beings, you would be making a good point when you tell these estimable agnostics that, for all they know, these wrong or foolish acts are free acts, that even an omnipotent being cannot determine the outcome of a free choice, and that the existence of free choice is a good thing, sufficiently good to outweigh the bad consequences of its occasional abuse. But the evil we actually observe in the world is not at all like that. First, the sheer amount of evil in the world is overwhelming. The existence of free will may be worth some evil, but it certainly isn't worth the amount we actually observe. Second, there are lots of evils that can't be traced to the human will, free or unfree. Earthquakes and tornados and genetic defects andwell, one hardly knows where to stop. These two points are familiar ones in discussions of the argument from evil. I want also to make a third point, which, although fairly well-known, is not quite so familiar as these. Let us consider certain particular very bad events—“horrors” I will call them. Here are some examples of what I call horrors: a school bus full of children is crushed by a landslide; a good woman's life is gradually destroyed by the progress of Huntington's Chorea; a baby is born without limbs. Some horrors are consequences of human choices and some are not (consider, for example, William Rowe's [ 1979 ] case of a fawn that dies in agony in a forest fire before there were any human beings). But whether a particular horror is connected with human choices or not, it is evident that God could have prevented the horror without sacrificing any great good or allowing some even greater horror. Now a moment ago I mentioned the enormous amount of evil in the world, and it is certainly true that there is in some sense an enormous amount of evil in the world. But the word “amount” at least suggests that evil is quantifiable, like distance or weight. That may be false or unintelligible, but if it is true, even in a rough-and-ready sort of way, it shows that horrors raise a problem for the theist that is distinct from the problem raised by the enormous amount of evil. If evil can be, even roughly, quantified, as talk about amounts seems to imply, it might be that there was more evil in a world in which there were thousands of millions of relatively minor episodes of suffering (broken ribs, for example) than in a world in which there were a few horrors. But an omnipotent and omniscient creator could be called to moral account for creating a world in which there was even one horror. And the reason is obvious: that horror could have been “left out” of creation without the sacrifice of any great good or the permission of some even greater horror. And leaving it out is exactly what a morally perfect being would do; such good things as might depend causally on the horror could, given the being's omnipotence and omniscience, be secured by (if the word is not morally offensive in this context) more “economical” means. Thus, the sheer amount of evil (which might be distributed in a fairly uniform way) is not the only fact about evil Theist needs to take into account. He must also take into account what we might call (again with some risk of using morally offensive language) high local concentrations of evil—that is, horrors. And it is hard to see how the free-will defense, however elaborated, could provide any resources for dealing with horrors. I will, finally, call your attention to the fact that the case of “Rowe's fawn,” which I briefly described a moment ago, is a particularly difficult case for Theist. True, however sentimental we may be about animals, we must admit that the death of a fawn in a forest fire is not much of a horror compared with, say, a living child's being thrown into a furnace as a sacrifice to Baal. The degree of horror involved in the event is not what creates the special difficulty for theists in this case. What creates the difficulty is rather the complete causal isolation of the fawn's sufferings from the existence and activities of human beings. No appeal to considerations in any way involving human free will can possibly be relevant to the problem with which this case confronts Theist, the difficulty of explaining why an omnipotent and morally perfect being would allow such a thing to happen.

11. Theist Elaborates the Free-will Defense: Evil Results from a Primordial Estrangement of Humanity from God

This is Atheist's response to the free-will defense. How is Theist to reply? If I were he (and in some sense I am), I would reply as follows.

The free-will defense, in the simple form in which I've stated it, suggests—though it does not entail—that God created human beings with free will, and then just left them to their own devices. It suggests that the evils of the world are the more or less unrelated consequences of uncounted millions of largely unrelated abuses of free will by human beings. Let me propose a sort of plot to be added to the bare and abstract story called the free-will defense. Consider the story of creation and rebellion and the expulsion from paradise we find in the first three chapters of Genesis. Could this story be true—I mean literally true, true in every detail? Well, no. It contradicts what science has discovered about human evolution and the history of the physical universe. And that is hardly surprising, for it long antedates these discoveries. The story is a reworking—with much original material—by a Hebrew author or authors of elements found in many ancient Middle Eastern mythologies. Like Virgil's Aeneid , it is a literary refashioning of materials that were originally mythical and legendary, and it retains a strong flavor of myth. It is possible, nevertheless, that the first three chapters of Genesis are a mythicoliterary representation of actual events of human prehistory. The following is consistent with what we know of human prehistory. Our current knowledge of human evolution, in fact, presents us with no particular reason to believe this story is false: For millions of years, perhaps for thousands of millions of years, God guided the course of evolution so as eventually to produce certain very clever primates, the immediate predecessors of Homo sapiens . At some time in the past few hundred thousand years, the whole population of our prehuman ancestors formed a small breeding community—a few thousand or a few hundred or even a few score. That is to say, there was a time when every ancestor of modern human beings who was then alive was a member of this tiny, geographically tightly knit group of primates. In the fullness of time, God took the members of this breeding group and miraculously raised them to rationality. That is, he gave them the gifts of language, abstract thought, and disinterested love—and, of course, the gift of free will. Perhaps we cannot understand all his reasons for giving human beings free will, but here is one very important one we can understand: He gave them the gift of free will because free will is necessary for love. Love, and not only erotic love, implies free will. The essential connection between love and free will is beautifully illustrated in Ruth's declaration to her mother-in-law, Naomi: And Ruth said, Entreat me not to leave thee, or to return from following after thee: for whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge: thy people shall be my people and thy God my God: where thou diest, will I die, and there will I be buried; the Lord do so to me, and more also, if aught but death part thee and me. (Ruth 1: 16, 17)

It is also illustrated by the vow Mr. van Inwagen, the author of my fictional being, made when he was married:

I, Peter, take thee, Elisabeth, to my wedded wife, to have and to hold from this day forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish, till death us do part, according to God's holy ordinance; and thereto I plight thee my troth.

God not only raised these primates to rationality—not only made of them what we call human beings—but also took them into a kind of mystical union with himself, the sort of union Christians hope for in Heaven and call the Beatific Vision. Being in union with God, these new human beings, these primates who had become human beings at a certain point in their lives, lived together in the harmony of perfect love and also possessed what theologians used to call preternatural powers—something like what people who believe in them today call paranormal abilities. Because they lived in the harmony of perfect love, none of them did any harm to the others. Because of their preternatural powers, they were able somehow to protect themselves from wild beasts (which they were able to tame with a look), from disease (which they were able to cure with a touch), and from random, destructive natural events (like earthquakes), which they knew about in advance and were able to avoid. There was thus no evil in their world. And it was God's intention that they should never become decrepit with age or die, as their primate forbears had. But, somehow, in some way that must be mysterious to us, they were not content with this paradisal state. They abused the gift of free will and separated themselves from their union with God.

The result was horrific: not only did they no longer enjoy the Beatific Vision, but they now faced destruction by the random forces of nature, and became subject once more to old age and natural death. Nevertheless, they were too proud to end their rebellion. As the generations passed, they drifted further and further from God—into the worship of invented gods (a worship that sometimes involved human sacrifice), inter-tribal warfare (complete with the gleeful torture of prisoners of war), private murder, slavery, and rape. On one level, they realized, or some of them realized, that something was horribly wrong, but they were unable to do anything about it. After they had separated themselves from God, they were, as an engineer might say, “not operating under design conditions.” A certain frame of mind became dominant among them, a frame of mind latent in the genes they had inherited from a million or more generations of ancestors. I mean the frame of mind that places one's own desires and perceived welfare above everything else, and that accords to the welfare of one's relatives and the other members of one's tribe a subordinate privileged status, and assigns no status at all to the welfare of anyone else. And this frame of mind was now married to rationality, to the power of abstract thought; the progeny of this marriage were continuing resentment against those whose actions interfere with the fulfillment of one's desires, hatreds cherished in the heart, and the desire for revenge. The inherited genes that produced these baleful effects had been harmless as long as human beings had still had constantly before their minds a representation of perfect love in the Beatific Vision. In the state of separation from God, and conjoined with rationality, they formed the genetic substrate of what is called original or birth sin: an inborn ten dency to do evil against which all human efforts are vain. We, or most of us, have some sort of perception of the distinction between good and evil, but, however we struggle, in the end we give in and do evil. In all cultures there are moral codes (more similar than some would have us believe), and the members of every tribe and nation stand condemned not only by alien moral codes but by their own. The only human beings who consistently do right in their own eyes, whose consciences are always clear, are those who, like the Nazis, have given themselves over entirely to evil, those who say, in some twisted and self-deceptive way what Milton has his Satan say explicitly and clearly: “Evil, be thou my Good.”

When human beings had become like this, God looked out over a ruined world. It would have been just for him to leave human beings in the ruin they had made of themselves and their world. But God is more than a God of justice. He is, indeed, more than a God of mercy—a God who was merely merciful might simply have brought the story of humanity to an end at that point, like a man who shoots a horse with a broken leg. But God, as I have said, is more than a God of mercy: he is a God of love. He therefore neither left humanity to its own devices nor mercifully destroyed it. Rather, he set in motion a rescue operation. He put into operation a plan designed to restore separated humanity to union with himself. This defense will not specify the nature of this plan of atonement. The three Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, tell three different stories about the nature of this plan, and I do not propose to favor one of them over another in telling a story that, after all, I do not maintain is true. This much must be said, however: the plan has the following feature, and any plan with the object of restoring separated humanity to union with God would have to have this feature: its object is to bring it about that human beings once more love God. And, since love essentially involves free will, love is not something that can be imposed from the outside, by an act of sheer power. Human beings must choose freely to be reunited with God and to love him, and this is something they are unable to do of their own efforts. They must therefore cooperate with God. As is the case with many rescue operations, the rescuer and those whom he is rescuing must cooperate. For human beings to cooperate with God in this rescue operation, they must know that they need to be rescued. They must know what it means to be separated from him. And what it means to be separated from God is to live in a world of horrors. If God simply “canceled” all the horrors of this world by an endless series of miracles, he would thereby frustrate his own plan of reconciliation. If he did that, we should be content with our lot and should see no reason to cooperate with him. Here is an analogy. Suppose Dorothy suffers from angina, and that what she needs to do is to stop smoking and lose weight. Suppose her doctor knows of a drug that will stop the pain but will do nothing to cure the condition. Should the doctor prescribe the drug for her, in the full knowledge that if the pain is alleviated, there is no chance she will stop smoking and lose weight? Well, perhaps the answer is yes, if that's what Dorothy insists on. The doctor is Dorothy's fellow adult and fellow citizen, after all. Perhaps it would be insufferably paternalistic to refuse to alleviate Dorothy's pain in order to provide her with a motivation to do what is to her own advantage. If one were of an especially libertarian cast of mind, one might even say that someone who did that was “playing God.” It is far from clear, however, whether there is anything wrong with God's behaving as if he were God. It is at least very plausible to suppose that it is morally permissible for God to allow human beings to suffer if the result of suppressing the suffering would be to deprive them of a very great good, one that far outweighed the suffering. But God does shield us from much evil, from a great proportion of the sufferings that would have resulted from our rebellion if he did nothing. If he did not shield us from much evil, all human history would be at least this bad: every human society would be on the moral level of Nazi Germany—or worse, if there is a “worse.” But, however much evil God shields us from, he must leave a vast amount of evil “in place” if he is not to deceive us about what separation from him means—and, in so deceiving us, to remove our only motivation for cooperating with him in the working out of his plan for divine-human reconciliation. The amount he has left us with is so vast and so horrible that we cannot really comprehend it, especially if we are middle-class Europeans or Americans. Nevertheless, it could have been much worse. The inhabitants of a world in which human beings had separated themselves from God and he had then simply left them to their own devices would regard our world as a comparative paradise. All this evil, however, will come to an end. There will come a time after which, for all eternity, there will be no more unmerited suffering. Every evil done by the wicked to the innocent will have been avenged, and every tear will have been wiped away. If there is still suffering, it will be merited: the suffering of those who refuse to cooperate with God in his great rescue operation and are allowed by him to exist forever in a state of elected ruin—those who, in a word, are in Hell.

One aspect of this story needs to be brought out more clearly than it has been. If the story is true, much of the evil in the world is due to chance. There is generally no explanation of why this evil happened to that person. What there is is an explanation of why evils happen to people without any reason. And the explanation is: that is part of what our being separated from God means: it means our being the playthings of chance. It means not only living in a world in which innocent children die horribly, it means living in a world in which each innocent child who dies horribly dies horribly for no reason at all. It means living in a world in which the wicked, through sheer luck, often prosper. Anyone who does not want to live in such a world, a world in which we are the playthings of chance, had better accept God's offer of a way out of that world.

I will call this story the expanded free-will defense. I mean it to include the “simple” free-will defense as a part. Thus, it is a feature of the expanded free-will defense that even an omnipotent being, having raised our remote ancestors to rationality and having given them the gift of free will, which included a free choice between remaining united with him in bonds of love and turning away from him to follow the devices and desires of their own hearts, was not able to ensure that they have done the former—although we may be confident he did everything omnipotence could do to raise the probability of their doing the former. But, before there were human beings, God knew that, however much evil might result from the elected separation from himself, and consequent self-ruin, of his human creatures—if it should occur—the gift of free will would be, so to speak, worth it. For the existence of an eternity of love depends on this gift, and that eternity outweighs the horrors of the very long but, in the most literal sense, temporary period of divine-human estrangement.

Here, then, is a defense, the expanded free-will defense. I contend that the expanded free-will defense is a possible story (internally consistent, at least as far as we can see); that, given that there is a God, the rest of the story might well be true; that it includes evil in the amount and of the kinds we find in the actual world, including what is sometimes called natural evil, such as the suffering caused by the Lisbon earthquake. (Natural evil, according to the expanded free-will defense, is a special case of the evil that results from the abuse of free will; the fact that human beings are subject to destruction by earthquakes is a consequence of a primordial abuse of free will.) I concede that it does not help us with cases like “Rowe's fawn”—cases of suffering that occurred before there were human beings or that are for some other reason causally unconnected with human choice. But I claim to have presented a defense that accounts for all actual human suffering.

That was a long speech on the part of Theist. I now return to speaking in propria persona. I have had Theist tell a story, a story he calls the expanded free-will defense. You may want to ask whether I believe this story I have put into the mouth of my creature. Well, I believe parts of it and I don't disbelieve any of it. (Even those parts I believe do not, for the most part, belong to my faith; they are merely some of my religious opinions.) I am not at all sure about “preternatural powers,” for example, or about the proposition that God shields us from much of the evil that would have been a “natural” consequence of our estrangement from him. But what I believe and don't believe is not really much to the point. The story I have told is, I remind you, only supposed to be a defense. Theist does not put forward the expanded free-will defense as a theodicy, as a statement of the real truth of the matter concerning the coexistence of God and evil. Nor would I, if I told it in circumstances like Theist's. Theist contends only, I contend only, that the story is—given that God exists—true for all anyone knows. And I certainly don't see any very compelling reason to reject any of it. In particular, I don't see any reason to reject the thesis that God raised a small population of our ancestors to rationality by a specific action on, say, June 13, 116,027 bc , or on some such particular date. It is not a discovery of evolutionary biology that there are no miraculous events in our evolutionary history. It could not be, any more than it could be a discovery of meteorology that the weather at Dunkirk during those fateful days in 1940 was not due to a specific and local divine action. It could , of course, be a discovery of evolutionary biology that the genesis of rationality was not a sudden, local event. But no such discovery has been made. If someone, for some reason, put forward the theory that extraterrestrial beings visited the earth, and by some prodigy of genetic engineering, raised some population of our primate ancestors to rationality in a single generation (something like this happened in the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey ), this theory could not be refuted by any facts known to physical anthropology.

12. Atheist Turns to the Consideration of a Particular Horrible Evil

How might Atheist respond to the expanded free-will defense, given that this defense is, as I argued, consistent with what science has discovered about human prehistory? If I were in her position, I would respond to Theist in some such words as these:

You, Theist, may have told a story that accounts for the enormous amount of evil in the world, and for the fact that much evil is not caused by human beings. But I don't think you appreciate the force of the argument from horrors (so to call it), and I think I can make the agnostics, at any rate, see this. Let me state the argument from horrors a little more systematically; let me lay out its premises explicitly, and you can tell me which of its premises you deny. There are many horrors, vastly many, from which no discernible good results—and certainly no good, discernible or not, that an omnipotent being couldn't have got without the horror; in fact, without any suffering at all. Here is a true story. A man came upon a young woman in an isolated place. He overpowered her, chopped off her arms at the elbows with an axe, raped her, and left her to die. Somehow she managed to drag herself on the stumps of her arms to the side of a road, where she was discovered. She lived, but she experienced indescribable suffering, and although she is alive, she must live the rest of her life without arms and with the memory of what she had been forced to endure. No discernible good came of this, and it is wholly unreasonable to believe that any good could have come of it that an omnipotent being couldn't have achieved without employing the raped and mutilated woman's horrible suffering as a means to it. And even if this is wrong and some good came into being with which the woman's suffering was so intimately connected that even an omnipotent being couldn't have got the good without the suffering, it wouldn't follow that that good outweighed the suffering. (It would certainly have to be a very great good to do that.) I will now draw on these reflections to construct a version of the argument from evil, a version that, unlike the version I presented earlier, refers not to all the evils of the world, but just to this one event. (The argument is modeled on the central argument of William Rowe's “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” [ 1979 ].) I will refer to the events in the story I have told collectively as “the Mutilation.” I argue: (1) If the Mutilation had not occurred, if it had been, so to speak, simply left out of the world, the world would be no worse than it is. (It would seem, in fact, that the world would be significantly better if the Mutilation had been left out of it, but my argument doesn't require that premise.) (2) The Mutilation in fact occurred and was a horror. (3) If a morally perfect creator could have left a certain horror out of the world he created, and if the world he created would have been no worse if that horror had been left out of it than it would have been if it had included that horror, then the morally perfect creator would have left the horror out of the world he created—or at any rate, he would have left it out if he had been able to. (4) If an omnipotent being created the world, he was able to leave the Mutilation out of the world (and was able to do so in a way that would have left the world otherwise much as it is). There is, therefore, no omnipotent and morally perfect creator.

You, Theist, must deny at least one of the four premises of this argument; or at any rate, you must show that serious doubts can be raised about at least one of them. But which?

So speaks Atheist. How might Theist reply? Atheist has said that her argument was modeled on an argument of William Rowe's. If Theist models his reply on the replies made by most of the theists who have written on Rowe's argument, he will attack the first premise (see, for example, Wykstra 1996 ). He will try to show that, for all anyone knows, the world (considered under the aspect of eternity) is a better place for containing the Mutilation. He will try to show that for all anyone knows, God has brought, or will at some future time bring, some great good out of the Mutilation, a good that outweighs it, or else has employed the Mutilation as a means to preventing some even greater evil; and he will argue that, for all anyone knows, the great good achieved or the great evil prevented could not have been, respectively, achieved or prevented, even by an omnipotent being, otherwise than by some means that essentially involved the Mutilation (or something else as bad or worse).

13. Theist Discusses the Relation of the Expanded Free-will Defense to the Question Whether an Omnipotent and Morally Perfect Being Would Eliminate Every Particular Horror from the World

I am not going to have Theist reply to Atheist's argument in this way. I find (1) fairly plausible, even if I am not as sure as Atheist is (or as sure as most atheists who have discussed the issue seem to be) that (1) is true. I am going to represent Theist as employing another line of attack on Atheist's response to his expanded free-will defense. I am going to represent him as denying premise (3), or, more precisely, as trying to show that the expanded free-will defense casts considerable doubt on premise (3). And here is his reply:

Why should we accept premise (3) of Atheist's argument? I have had a look at Rowe's defense of the corresponding premise of his argument, the entirety of which I will quote: “[This premise] seems to express a belief that accords with our basic moral principles, principles shared both by theists and non-theists.” ( 1979 , 337) But what are these “basic moral principles, shared both by theists and non-theists”? Rowe does not say, but I believe there is really just one moral principle it would be plausible to appeal to in defense of premise (3). It might be stated like this. If one is in a position to prevent some evil, one should not allow that evil to occur—not unless allowing it to occur would result in some good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in some other evil at least as bad.

Is this principle true?

I think not. (I can, in fact, think of several obvious objections to it. But most of these objections would apply only to the case of human agents, and I shall therefore not mention them.) Consider this example. Suppose you are an official who has the power to release anyone from prison at any time. Blodgett has been sentenced to ten years in prison for felonious assault. His sentence is nearing its end, and he petitions you to release him from prison a day early. Should you? Well, the principle says so. A day spent in prison is an evil—if you don't think so, I invite you to spend a day in prison. Let's suppose that the only good that results from putting criminals in prison is the deterrence of crime. (This assumption is made to simplify the argument. That it is false introduces no real defect into the argument.) Obviously, nine years, 364 days spent in prison is not going to have a significantly different power to deter felonious assault from ten years spent in prison. So: no good will be secured by visiting on Blodgett that last day in prison, and that last day spent in prison is an evil. The principle tells you, the official, to let him out a day early. This much, I think, is enough to show that the principle is wrong, for you have no such obligation. But the principle is in more trouble than this simple criticism suggests.

It would seem that if a threatened punishment of n days in prison has a certain power to deter felonious assault, a threatened punishment of n − 1 days spent in prison will have a power to deter felonious assault that is not significantly less. Consider the power to deter felonious assault that belongs to a threatened punishment of 1,023 days in prison. Consider the power to deter felonious assault that belongs to a threatened punishment of 1,022 days in prison. There is, surely, no significant difference. Consider the power to deter felonious assault that belongs to a threatened punishment of 98 days in prison. Consider the power to deter felonious assault that belongs to a threatened punishment of 97 days in prison. There is, surely, no significant difference. Consider the power to deter felonious assault that belongs to a threatened punishment of one day in prison. Consider the power to deter felonious assault that belongs to a threatened punishment of no time in prison at all. There is, surely, no significant difference. (In this last case, of course, this is because the threat of one day in prison would have essentially no power to deter felonious assault.)

A moment's reflection shows that if this is true, as it seems to be, then the moral principle entails that Blodgett ought to spend no time in prison at all. For suppose Blodgett had lodged his appeal to have his sentence reduced by a day not shortly before he was to be released but before he had entered prison at all. He lodges this appeal with you, the official who accepts the moral principle. For the reason I have set out, you must grant his appeal. Now suppose that when it has been granted, clever Blodgett lodges a second appeal: that his sentence be reduced to ten years minus two days. This second appeal you will also be obliged to grant, for there is no difference between ten years less a day and ten years less two days as regards the power to deter felonious assault. I am sure you can see where this is going. Provided only that Blodgett has the time and the energy to lodge 3,648 successive appeals for a one-day reduction of his sentence, he will escape prison altogether.

This result is, I take it, a reductio ad absurdum of the moral principle. As the practical wisdom has it (and this is no compromise between practical considerations and strict morality; it is strict morality), You have to draw a line somewhere. And this means an arbitrary line. The principle fails precisely because it forbids the drawing of morally arbitrary lines. There is nothing wrong, or nothing that can be determined a priori to be wrong, with a legislature's setting ten years in prison as the minimum punishment for felonious assault—and this despite the fact that ten years in prison, considered as a precise span of days , is an arbitrary punishment.

The moral principle is therefore false—or possesses whatever defect is the analogue in the realm of moral principles of falsity in the realm of factual statements. What are the consequences of its falsity, of its failure to be an ac ceptable moral principle, for the “argument from horrors”? Let us return to the expanded free-will defense. This story accounts for the existence of horrors—that is, that there are horrors is a part of the story. The story explains why there are such things as horrors (at least, it explains why there are postlapsarian horrors) although it says nothing about any particular horror. And to explain why there are horrors is not to meet the argument from horrors.

A general account of the existence of horrors does not constitute a reply to the argument from horrors because it does not tell us which premise of the argument to deny. Let us examine this point in detail. According to the expanded free-will defense, God prevents the occurrence of many of the horrors that would naturally have resulted from our separation from him. But he cannot, so to speak, prevent all of them, for that would frustrate his plan for reuniting human beings with himself. And if he prevents only some horrors, how shall he decide which ones to prevent? Where shall he draw the line—the line between threatened horrors that are prevented and threatened horrors that are allowed to occur? I suggest that wherever he draws the line, it will be an arbitrary line. That this must be so is easily seen by thinking about the Mutilation. If God had added that particular horror to his list of horrors to be prevented, and that one alone, the world, considered as a whole, would not have been a significantly less horrible place, and the general realization of human beings that they live in a world of horrors would not have been significantly different from what it is. The existence of that general realization is just the factor in his plan for humanity that (according to the expanded free-will defense) provides his general reason for allowing horrors to occur. Therefore, preventing the Mutilation would in no way have interfered with his plan for the restoration of our species. If the expanded free-will defense is a true story, God has made a choice about where to draw the line, the line between the actual horrors of history, the horrors that are real , and the horrors that are mere averted possibilities, might-have-beens. The Mutilation falls on the “actual horrors of history” side of the line. And this fact shows that the line is an arbitrary one, for if he had drawn it so as to exclude the Mutilation from reality (and left it otherwise the same) he would have lost no good thereby and he would have allowed no greater evil. He had no reason for drawing the line where he did. But then what justifies him in drawing the line where he did? What justifies him in including the Mutilation in reality when he could have excluded it without losing any good thereby? Has the victim of the Mutilation not got a moral case against him? He could have saved her and he did not, and he does not even claim to have achieved some good by not saving her. It would seem that God is in the dock, in C. S. Lewis's words; if he is, then I, Theist, am playing the part of his barrister, and you, the Agnostics, are the jury. I offer the following obvious consideration in defense of my client: there was no nonarbitrary line to be drawn. Wherever God drew the line, there would have been countless horrors left in the world—his plan requires the actual existence of countless horrors—and the victim or victims of any of those horrors could bring the same charge against him that we have imagined the victim of the Mutilation bringing against him.

But I see Atheist stirring in protest; she is planning to tell you that, given the terms of the expanded free-will defense, God should have allowed the minimum number of horrors consistent with his project of reconciliation, and that it is obvious he has not done this. She is going to tell you that there is a nonarbitrary line for God to draw, and that it is the line that has the minimum number of horrors on the “actuality” side. But there is no such line to be drawn. There is no minimum number of horrors consistent with God's plan of reconciliation, for the prevention of any one particular horror could not possibly have any effect on God's plan. For any n , if the existence of n horrors is consistent with God's plan, the existence of n −1 horrors will be equally consistent with God's plan. To ask what the minimum number of horrors consistent with God's plan is is like asking, What is the minimum number of raindrops that could have fallen on England in the nineteenth century that is consistent with England's having been a fertile country in the nineteenth century? Here is a simple analogy of proportion: a given evil is to the openness of human beings to the idea that human life is horrible and that no human efforts will ever alter this fact as a given raindrop is to the fertility of England.

And this is why God did not prevent the Mutilation—insofar as there is a “why.” He had to draw an arbitrary line and he drew it. And that's all there is to be said. This, of course, is cold comfort to the victim. Or, since we are merely telling a story, it would be better to say: if this story were true and known to be true, knowing its truth would be cold comfort to the victim. But the purpose of the story is not to comfort anyone. It is not to give an example of a possible story that would comfort anyone if it were true and that person knew it to be true. If a child dies on the operating table in what was supposed to be a routine operation and a board of medical inquiry finds that the death was due to some factor the surgeon could not have anticipated and that the surgeon was not at fault, that finding will be of no comfort to the child's parents. But it is not the purpose of a board of medical inquiry to comfort anyone; the purpose of a board of medical inquiry is, by examining the facts of the matter, to determine whether anyone was at fault. And it is not my purpose in offering a defense to provide even hypothetical comfort to anyone. It is to determine whether the existence of horrors entails that God is at fault—or, rather, since by definition God is never at fault, to determine whether the existence of horrors entails that an omnipotent creator would be at fault.

It is perhaps important to point out that we might easily find ourselves in a moral situation like God's moral situation according to the expanded free-will defense, a situation in which we must draw an arbitrary line and allow some bad thing to happen when we could have prevented it, and in which, moreover, no good whatever comes of our allowing it to happen. In fact, we do find ourselves in this situation. In a welfare state, for example, we use taxation to divert money from its primary economic role in order to spend it to prevent or alleviate various social evils. And how much money, what proportion of the gross national product, shall we—that is, the state—divert for this purpose? Well, not none of it and not all of it (enforcing a tax rate of 100 percent on all earned income and all profits would be the same as not having a money economy at all). And where we draw the line is an arbitrary matter. However much we spend on social services, we shall always be able to find some person or family who would be saved from misery if the state spent (in the right way) a mere $1,000 more than it in fact plans to spend. And the state can always find another $1,000, and can find it without damaging the economy or doing any other sort of harm.

14. Concluding Remarks: Evaluating Theist's Response to the Argument from Evil

So Theist replies to Atheist's argument from horrors. But we may note that Theist has failed to respond to an important point Atheist has made. As he himself conceded, his reply takes account only of postlapsarian horrors. There is still to be considered the matter of prelapsarian horrors, horrors such as Rowe's poor fawn. There were certainly sentient animals long before there were sapient animals, and the paleontological record shows that for much of the long prehuman past, sentient creatures died agonizing deaths in natural disasters. Obviously, the free-will defense cannot be expanded in such a way as to account for these agonizing deaths, for only sapient creatures have free will, and these deaths cannot therefore have resulted from the abuse of free will—unless, as C. S. Lewis has suggested, prehuman animal suffering is ascribed to a corruption of nature by fallen angels ( 1940 , 122–24). Interesting as this suggestion is, I do not propose to endorse it, even as a defense. I confess myself unable to treat this difficult problem adequately within the scope of this chapter. I should have to devote a whole essay to the problem of prelapsarian horrors to say anything of value about it. I must simply declare this topic outside the scope of this chapter. I refer the reader to my essay “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,” (van Inwagen 1991 ), which contains a defense—not a version of the free-will defense—that purports to account for the sufferings of prehuman animals. I will remark that this defense shares one important feature of the expanded free-will defense. This defense, too, requires God to draw an arbitrary line; it allows God to eliminate much animal suffering that would otherwise have occurred in the course of nature, but it requires him, as it were, to stop eliminating it at some point, even though no good is gained by his stopping at whatever point he does stop at. I would thus say that God could have eliminated the suffering of Rowe's fawn at no cost and did not, and that this fact does not count against his moral perfection—just as the fact that he could have eliminated the Mutilation at no cost and did not does not count against his moral perfection. But the nature of the goods involved in this other defense is a subject I cannot discuss here.

Let me put this question to the readers of this chapter: Has Theist successfully replied to the argument from horrors insofar as those horrors are events that involve human beings ? Well, much depends on what further things Atheist might have to say. Perhaps Atheist has a dialectically effective rejoinder to Theist's reply to the argument from horrors. But one must make an end somewhere. The trouble with real philosophical debates is that they almost never come to a neat and satisfactory conclusion. Philosophy is argument without end. I do think this much: if Atheist has nothing more to say, the Agnostics should render a verdict of “not proven” as regards premise (3) of the argument from horrors and the moral principle on which it is based, namely, that, if it is within one's power to prevent some evil, one should not allow that evil to occur unless allowing it to occur would result in some good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in some other evil at least as bad.

Let me put a similar question before the readers of this chapter as regards the extended free-will defense and the problem of the vast amount of evil (including the vast amounts of natural evil): Does Theist's presentation of the extended free-will defense constitute a successful reply to Atheist's contention that an omnipotent and morally perfect God would not allow the existence of a world that contains evil in the amount and of the kinds we observe in the world around us insofar as this contention involves only evils that befall human beings ? Again, much depends on what further things Atheist might have to say. My own opinion is this: if Atheist has nothing further to say, an audience of agnostics of the sort I have imagined should concede that for all anyone knows , a world created by an omnipotent and morally perfect God might contain human suffering in the amount and of the kinds we observe. 3

In the novel, there are several minor illiteracies in the poem (e.g., “whose” for “who's” in the first stanza). (The fictional author of the poem, a well-educated man, was trying to hide the fact of his authorship.) I have corrected these, despite the judgment of Martin Amis that the illiteracies are an intended part of the literary effect of the poem (intended, that is, by its real author, Kingsley Amis, not by its fictional author).

Almost all theists who reply to the argument from evil employ some form of the free-will defense. The free-will defense I am going to have Theist employ derives, at a great historical remove, from Saint Augustine. A useful selection of Augustine's writings on free will and the origin of evil (from The City of God and the Enchiridion ) can be found in Melden ( 1955 , 164–77).

For a very different approach to the problem of evil (to the purely intellectual problem considered in this chapter and to many other problems connected with trust in God and the very worst evils present in his creation), see Marilyn McCord Adams, Hor rendous Evils and the Goodness of God ( 1999 ). I find this book unpersuasive (as regards its general tendency and main theses; I think Adams is certainly right about many relatively minor but not unimportant points), but endlessly fascinating. I hope that my friend Marilyn, if she reads the sentence to which this note is appended, will take special notice of the words “seems to me,” and will accept my assurance that their presence in that sentence is not a mere literary reflex.

For another important but very different discussion of the problem of evil, see Eleonore Stump's Stob Lectures, Faith and the Problem of Evil ( 1999 ).

Many recent versions of the free-will defense (including the version developed in the seminal work of Alvin Plantinga) can be found in Pike ( 1964 ), Adams and Adams ( 1990 ), and Peterson ( 1992 ), collections that contain excellent and representative selections from the important philosophical work on the argument from evil that had been published as of their copyright dates.

Three important book-length treatments of the problem of evil, all in the Augustinian (or “free will”) tradition, are Lewis ( 1940 ), Geach (1977), and Swinburne ( 1998 ).

For another version of Theist's argument (in which something like the story here called the expanded free will defense is presented not as a defense but as a theodicy—a “theodicy” in a weaker sense than the word is given in this chapter), see van Inwagen ( 1988 ).

A longer version of the debate between Atheist and Theist concerning the “argument from horrors” is contained in van Inwagen ( 2000 ).

Works Cited

Adams, Marilyn McCord . 1999 . Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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Adams, Marilyn McCord , and Robert Merrihew Adams , eds. 1990 . The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Amis, Kingsley . 1966 . The Anti-death League. London: Victor Gollancz.

Geach, P. T. 1997 . Providence and Evil. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Howard-Snyder, Daniel , ed. 1996 . The Evidential Argument from Evil. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lewis, C. S . 1940 . The Problem of Pain. London: Macmillan.

Melden, A. I ., ed. 1955 . Ethical Theories. 2nd edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Mill, John Stuart . 1875 . Three Essays on Religion. London: Longmans, Green.

Peterson, Michael L. , ed. 1992 . The Problem of Evil. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Pike, Nelson , ed. 1964 . God and Evil. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Rowe, William L. 1979 . “ The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. ” American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335–41. Reprinted in Adams and Adams, 1990.

Stump, Eleonore . 1999 . Faith and the Problem of Evil. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Stob Lectures Endowment.

Swinburne, Richard . 1998 . Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0198237987.001.0001

Van Inwagen, Peter . 1988 . “ The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy. ” Philosophical Topics 16: 161–87. Reprinted in van Inwagen 1995; in leonore Stump and Michael Murray , eds., The Big Questions: Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); in Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau , eds., Reason and Responsibility , 11th edition (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth/Thompson, 2002); and in William Lane Craig , ed., Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Reader , forthcoming from Edinburgh University Press.

Van Inwagen, Peter . 1991 . “ The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence. ” Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion : 135–65. Reprinted in Howard-Snyder 1996, and in van Inwagen 1995.

Van Inwagen, Peter . 1995 . God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Van Inwagen, Peter . 2000 . “ The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils. ” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (annual supplement to the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly ) 74: 65–80.

Wykstra, Stephen John . 1996. “Rowe's Noseeum Arguments from Evil.” In Howard-Snyder 1996, 126–50.

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The Problem of Evil: An Akan Perspective Essay Questions

1. How does the Akan perspective on the problem of evil differ from the Western perspective? Explain.

2. According to Akan thought, why would God create human beings with the power to do good and evil? Explain.

3. Explain the problem of evil and the Akan perspective on the problem of evil. Does Akan philosophy have a compelling solution to the problem of evil? Why or why not?

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The Problem of Evil
The so-called "problem of evil" is an argument against the existence of God that reasons along these lines: A perfectly powerful being can prevent any evil. A perfectly good being will prevent evil as far as he can. God is perfectly powerful and good. So, if a perfectly powerful and good God exists, there will be no evil.
The Problem of Evil, Essay Example
The pain experienced by an animal in the wild, for example, will drive to animal to do what is necessary to end it and survive. The animal having trouble in locating food suffers hunger, but is then more driven to locate food. The creature who is pursued by other animals develops the skills to escape (Keller 26).
The Problem of Evil: [Essay Example], 1126 words GradesFixer
Mani taught that the universe was a battlefield of two conflicting forces. On one side is God, who represents light and goodness and who seeks to eliminate suffering. Opposing him is Satan, who represents darkness and evil and is the cause of misery and affliction. Human beings find themselves caught in the middle of these two great forces.
The Problem of Evil
The 'Incompatibility' or 'Logical' versions of the Problem of Evil claim that evil's existence is logically incompatible with God's existence: believing in God and evil is like believing in a five-sided square, a contradiction.[3] Most philosophers today reject this argument.[4] They think that God could have some sufficient reason ...
The Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil. First published Mon Sep 16, 2002; substantive revision Tue Mar 3, 2015. The epistemic question posed by evil is whether the world contains undesirable states of affairs that provide the basis for an argument that makes it unreasonable to believe in the existence of God. This discussion is divided into eight sections.
Problem of evil
problem of evil. theodicy, (from Greek theos, "god"; dikē, "justice"), explanation of why a perfectly good, almighty, and all-knowing God permits evil. The term literally means "justifying God.". Although many forms of theodicy have been proposed, some Christian thinkers have rejected as impious any attempt to fathom God's ...
Logical Problem of Evil
This essay examines one form the argument from evil has taken, which is known as "the logical problem of evil." In the second half of the twentieth century, atheologians (that is, persons who try to prove the non-existence of God) commonly claimed that the problem of evil was a problem of logical inconsistency.
Problem of evil
The problem of evil is the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil and suffering with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God ... Economic theorist Thomas Malthus stated in a 1798 essay on the question of population over-crowding, its impact on food availability, and food's impact on population through famine and death ...
The Problem of Evil
Introduction. "The problem of evil" is a multifaceted problem. But the problem for theistic philosophers is that there are plausible arguments starting from plausible claims about evil to the conclusion that there is no God. These arguments have taken many forms, as have the replies to them. This bibliography covers primarily the most ...
The Problem of Evil
This is known as the Logical problem of evil which claims that it is logically impossible for both God (as defined with omnipotence & omnibenevolence) and evil to both exist. P1. An omnipotent God has the power to eliminate evil. P2. An omnibenevolent God has the motivation to eliminate evil. P3.
The Problem of the Evil
Hick, John. "Evil and the God of Love". Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. ed. Stewart, David. US: Prentice Hall, 2006.192-197. This essay, "The Problem of the Evil and Philosophy of Religion" is published exclusively on IvyPanda's free essay examples database. You can use it for research and reference purposes to write your own paper.
Does 'The Problem of Evil' Contradict God?
The problem of evil is usually seen as the problem of how the existence of God can be reconciled with the existence of evil in the world. The problem simply stems from basic beliefs or assumptions pertaining to the attributes of God: God is perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent. From this, such a God should want to prevent evil, yet much ...
59 The Problem of Evil Essay Topic Ideas & Examples
The Problem of Evil: Rational, Reasonable, and Scientific Explains. God is omnipotent and it is impossible to reject it under the statements of evil's presence. God is unable to create a world where everything is good, as it contradicts the idea of personal choice […] The Problem of Evil: Religious and Apologetic Way.
PDF The Secular Problem of Evil: An Essay in Analytic Existentialism
The Secular Problem of Evil: An Essay in Analytic Existentialism. Abstract: The existence of evil is often held to pose philosophical problems only for theism. I argue that the existence of evil gives rise to a philosophical problem which confronts theist and atheist alike. The problem is constituted by the following claims: (1) psychologically ...
Explaining Evil: Four Views
And because the problem of evil is often stated as an argument against theism, discussions can focus too narrowly on whether this theodicy or that objection to theism is successful. ... Despite these limitations, the book is engaging and accessible for interested readers. The essays are short and clear, giving enough detail to explain each ...
The Problem of Evil Essay
The general interpretation of the problem of evil is as follows: Premise 1) If God exists then God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. Premise 2) if God were omniscient then God would be aware of evil. Premise 3) if God were omnipotent, then God would be able to eliminate the evil that exists in the world.
The Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil ... Plantinga, starting out from an examination of John L. Mackie's essay "Evil and Omnipotence", in which Mackie had defended an incompatibility version of the argument from evil, focuses mainly on the question of whether the existence of God is compatible with the existence of evil, although there are also short ...
8 The Problem of Evil
Oxford Handbooks. Collection: Oxford Handbooks Online, Oxford Scholarship Online. 1. Introductory Remarks: The Problem of Evil and the Argument from Evil. There are many ways to understand the phrase "the problem of evil.". In this chapter, I understand this phrase as a label for a certain purely intellectual problem—as opposed to an ...
The secular problem of evil: an essay in analytic existentialism
I argue that the existence of evil gives rise to a philosophical problem which confronts theist and atheist alike. The problem is constituted by the following claims: (1) Successful human beings (i.e. those meeting their basic prudential interests) are committed to a good-enough world; (2) the actual world is not a good-enough world (i.e ...
Problem of Evil Essay
The Problem of Evil. The problem of evil is the notion that, how can an all-good, all-powerful, all-loving God exists when evil seems to exist also. The problem of evil also gives way to the notion that if hell exists then God must be evil for sending anyone there. I believe both of these ideas that God can exist while there is evil and God is ...
The Problem of Evil and Modern Philosophy
1 'The Problem of Evil and Modern Philosophy -', New Blackfriars, December 1982. 2 2 Swinburne , Richard , The Existence of God ( Oxford , 1979 ), p 97 Google Scholar .
"Black and Deep Desires": An Essay on the Problem of Evil in
This essay explores a remarkable congruence between Macbeth and the teachings of Thomas Aquinas on the nature of virtue, temptation and evil, natural law, and the relationship of the natural to the … Expand
The Problem of Evil: An Akan Perspective Essay Questions
1. How does the Akan perspective on the problem of evil differ from the Western perspective? Explain. 2. According to Akan thought, why would God create human beings with the power to do good and evil? Explain. 3. Explain the problem of evil and the Akan perspective on the problem of evil.
PDF "Black and Deep Desires": An Essay on the Problem of Evil in
incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the. passions" (quoted in Hibbs and Hibbs, pp. 282-3). Indeed, we did observe Macbeth being tempted. by the witches' prophecies, his "black and deep" desires kindled, although he did try to fight against.
Lord Of The Flies Human Nature Essay
Lord Of The Flies Human Nature Essay. Evil in Human Nature. Albert Einstein once said, "The real problem is in the hearts and minds of men. It is easier to denature plutonium than to denature the evil spirit of man.". The idea of humans being naturally evil has been discussed by many people throughout history.

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The Problem of Evil

What Is the Problem of Evil?

Responding to the Problem of Evil

The Ways of Theodicy and Inscrutability

The Way of Theodicy

Four popular theodicies have some biblical basis

These theodicies fall under the umbrella of the “greater good theodicy.”

Constructing the “Greater Good Theodicy”: a Three-Fold Argument for Three Biblical Themes

The Case of Job

The Case of Joseph

The Case of Jesus

Licensing and Limiting the GGT

Licensing the GGT: God’s Sovereignty over All Evil

God’s Sovereignty over Moral Evil

God’s Sovereignty over All Evil

Limiting the GGT: The Inscrutability of God’s Purposes

Analogies for our Cognitive Limitations

Biblical Argument for Divine Inscrutability

Further Reading

The Problem of Evil, Essay Example

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The Problem of Evil

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The Problem of Evil

1. The Incompatibility Problem of Evil

2. The Evidential Problem of Evil

2.1. Free Will

2.2. “Soul-Making”

3. Outweighing Evidence?

4. Evil Is No Evidence?

5. Conclusion

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The Problem of Evil by Trent Dougherty , Scott Cleveland LAST REVIEWED: 08 October 2015 LAST MODIFIED: 30 July 2014 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0211

59 The Problem of Evil Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

Explaining Evil: Four Views

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

1. Some Important Distinctions

4. Responses to the Argument from Evil: Refutations, Defenses, and Theodicies

1.2 Incompatibility Formulations versus Inductive Formulations

1.3 Abstract Versus Concrete Formulations

1.4 Axiological Versus Deontological Formulations

3. Inductive Versions of the Argument from Evil

3.2 Direct Inductive Versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil

3.2.2 A Natural Account of the Logic of the Inductive Step

3.2.3 An Evaluation of this Account of the Inductive Step

3.3 Indirect Inductive Versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil

3.4 Bayesian-Style Probabilistic Versions of the Evidential Argument from Evil

3.4.2 The Flaw in the Argument

3.4.3 Can Rowe's Argument Be Revised?

4.1 Refutations, Defenses, and Theodicies

4.2 Attempted Total Refutations

4.2.2 The ‘No Best of All Possible Worlds' Response

4.2.3 The Appeal to the Ontological Argument

4.3 Attempted Defenses

4.3.2 Belief in the Existence of God as Non-Inferentially Justified

4.3.3 Induction Based on Partial Success

4.4. Theodicies

4.4.1 A Soul-Making Theodicy