military analysis of ukraine invasion

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International Edition

Military experts react to Ukraine invasion, assess potential for widespread aggression and risks to US

Professor of Political Science, Kansas State University

Founding Director, Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy West Point

Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Mississippi

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The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolds, scholars across the U.S. – and the world – are looking at the ramifications for regular people and for the international community.

The Conversation asked three scholars to briefly explain what this attack means for the people of Ukraine and the world.

Carla Martinez Machain, Professor of Political Science, Kansas State University, and Susan H. Allen, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Mississippi

Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine very early in the morning on Feb. 24, 2022, by launching missiles at military targets, including airfields and military command centers in major Ukrainian cities .

As researchers who study how bombing is used to obtain concessions from other countries, we think Russia’s strategy of attacking strategic Ukrainian military targets will likely be an effective way of using force to make Ukraine meet Russia’s demands, such as giving up territory.

Russia is not engaging only in a campaign of air power, which would have signaled a lack of willingness for it to incur monetary and human costs . Using only drones or cyberattacks would also carry a low risk for Russian casualties.

Russia has instead launched a multipronged invasion that includes ground forces entering Ukraine from Russia, Belarus and Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula Russia annexed in 2014.

This varied approach decreases the likelihood of Russia’s making a quick, low-casualty victory, but it also signals Russia’s resolve for war. Such a combined-forces attack compels Ukraine to react simultaneously to multiple forms of aggression.

Even when civilians are not targeted, the use of airstrikes increases civilian casualties .

The number of people hurt and killed in Ukraine because of this invasion is likely to be high.

Liam Collins, Founding Director, Modern War Institute, United States Military Academy West Point

The Russian invasion of Ukraine could be an extremely costly fight for both nations. Regardless of the outcome, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision is already a historic act of aggression, one that has not been witnessed on the European continent since World War II .

Of course, one significant difference now is that Russia has nuclear weapons. Putin appears to have threatened their use when he stated that the “consequences” of an attempt to strike back at his invasion would provoke a response “never seen in history.”

One of Putin’s potential goals is to increase the territory of the self-proclaimed, Russia-aligned Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic which he recognized as independent on Feb. 21, 2022 .

Putin’s decrees also present the Russian invasion as simply coming to the defense of a sovereign territory, even if every other nation, as well as the Minsk agreement that Russia signed, recognizes the territories as being part of Ukraine.

[ Get The Conversation’s most important politics headlines, in our Politics Weekly newsletter . ]

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Interactive map: How the Ukraine war is developing, day by day

The Russian army has invaded Ukraine. Fighting continues in the southeast. Click through the map to see the current course and the main events of the war at a glance.

What we are showing on our Ukraine map and why it looks different from other media outlets’ projects

This war is different. Although men and machines are also clashing in this one, the global public can this time follow the developments in nearly real time, unlike in past conflicts. At the NZZ, too, we are using the flood of information reaching us from Ukraine to give you the most up-to-date picture of the situation possible. Our interactive map above depicts recent events, territorial gains and losses, satellite imagery, and the position of Russian troops. It is an attempt to map the reality of war.

However, reality is always more complex than what can be represented on a map. Maps always show only a certain point of view, and can only approximate reality. Therefore, we want to be clear here about how our map has been created, so readers can understand what it says and what it does not.

Table of contents

What events do we show on the map, which events do we deliberately not show, how do we make sure that the events are as described, how up-to-date is the map, how do we show which areas are under whose control, our map depicts russian troop movements. how do we know where which unit is located, we show russian troops in btg units. what does that mean, are we developing the map further.

The short answer: anything relevant to understanding the war that we have been able to verify. The detailed answer, on the other hand, is more complex and – because war is constantly changing – in a constant state of flux.

«Relevant» to us means, for example, the locations in which combat operations are taking place; or strategically important targets that have been attacked or captured such as airports, power plants, transmission towers or bridges. We do not report the destruction of individual buildings unless the attack has symbolic value or has claimed an exceptionally large number of victims. For example: In the embattled city of Mariupol, a theater with hundreds of civilians sheltering in its basements was destroyed .

We do not show deaths, events that serve (Russian or Ukrainian) propaganda, or those that violate international law. For example, we do not show pictures in which captured soldiers are recognizable.

» Read more about when and why we publish images of dead people here .

We record on the map only those attacks that we have been able to substantiate through multiple independent sources. Our sources include Twitter, Facebook, Telegram and news agencies. We also include communications from local authorities in our research, but we treat this information with caution.

We check every picture and video to see if it was taken at the specified location and if the specified time is plausible. For verification purposes we refer to satellite images or Google Street View images, but we also rely on other reliable research networks ( such as Bellingcat ) or private persons (so-called Osint specialists, more about this here ).

» Read more about how Osint experts verify events . » Read more about how you can recognize fake news on social media yourself .

We collect current news on a daily basis, even on weekends. In some cases, we are aware of events shortly after they occur, but are unable to verify them until the following day, using further material.

There is no official information from the Ukrainian or Russian side regarding which areas are under whose control. And if such information was provided, it would not be reliable. Maps have always been misused for political purposes (China, for example, depicts maritime areas as belonging to China in order to strengthen its claim to them).

At the same time, the nature of warfare has also changed. Attackers do not drive across forests and meadows with a broad front, seeking to annex square meter after square meter, as they did in World War II, for example. Instead, combat operations focus on strategically important roads, cities and facilities. Maps showing large areas held by Russian troops therefore often do not represent the actual influence of a warring party.

This is illustrated by the following example. The first map is from the Ukrainian organization Liveuamap (more on that later). Instead of entire areas, the creators often mark only individual streets as being held by Russian troops. Information provided by the American Institute for the Study of War appears to show far greater Russian successes for the same day. On the latest map published by Russian newspaper Readovka , areas marked in color as the «war zone» give the impression that large parts of eastern Ukraine are under Russian control.

Same day, different maps

For our map we use data from Liveuamap. This organization emerged in 2014 in Ukraine during the annexation of Crimea. Since then, the staff has dealt with various conflicts both in and outside Europe. The NZZ has also relied on its data for other conflicts.

We rely on information from Henry Schlottman , a former U.S. Army analyst. Using known troop positions before the war began, pictures of (destroyed) Russian war equipment, information from prisoners and other public data, he is able to record the approximate position of each unit. Despite all this information, the data remain approximations.

The Russian army relies on so-called battalion tactical groups (BTGs). A BTG consists of various individual units and is capable of performing tasks without additional support. It is a central organizational unit in the Russian army and typically consists of infantry, tank companies, artillery, air defense, logistics and other support units, for example.

Yes, the map is constantly being adapted and expanded to meet changing needs. We will also update this article on an ongoing basis.

Do you have any further questions about our map? Write to us at [email protected].

Interactive Map: Simon Huwiler, Michel Grautstück, Kaspar Manz, Adina Renner and Roland Shaw. Data collection and verification: Julia Monn, Simon Huwiler, Manuela Paganini, Nikolai Thelitz, Eike Hoppmann, Florian Seliger, Forrest Rogers and Simon Haas.

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• Lessons from Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Top experts, writing from a range of perspectives, share their insights in an effort to inform and improve US policy. MIT Security Studies Program Professors Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera are highlighted below. Read the full article and analysis from other experts  here .

Barry Posen: "When we take actions that seem highly inimical to the security positions of rival nation states, we should also be alert to the possibility that we may product the opposite of desired outcomes"

Preventive war is an enduring feature of international politics but is ill understood. States sometimes initiate wars because they perceive a potential opponent is on track to achieve a significant military advantage in the future, and they attack to forestall it. Discussions of Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine regularly feature the observation that Russia faced no threat of attack. This is true. Had it faced a threat of imminent attack, it would, in international law , have been licensed to wage a preemptive attack on Ukraine. That may not have been wise, but it would have been legal.

The focus on the absence of conditions that would justify preemption excludes an equally pernicious, and highly plausible, cause of this war from consideration—preventive motives that fed a decision for preventive war. Theorists of the realist school of international relations observe that when states perceive that their competitors are racing ahead of them in material power, they become concerned about future clashes of interest. In such a clash, the rising power will be able to use its advantage to either coerce a better bargain or win a contest of arms. Depending on the concerned state’s own assessment of the adversary’s intentions and the pace of change, war to “prevent” the power shift may become attractive.

Sometimes such wars literally aim to “prevent” a very specific power shift—they are about the control of material or geographical resources that would produce an advantage for the opponent. Sometimes they are simply about the rising power itself; war now with that power is necessary to forestall its progress. Notable preventive wars since World War II include the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950 to prevent the United States from unifying the Koreas and settling its own forces on the Chinese border, Israel’s attack on Egypt in 1956 to forestall its absorption of a huge new supply of tanks and fighter aircraft from the Eastern Bloc, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 to forestall Iraq’s possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

It will be many years, if ever, before we have sufficient evidence about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision-making to know what his true motives were for launching this war and the relative importance they enjoyed. It is comfortable for Ukraine and its Western allies to settle entirely on inside-out explanations for President Putin’s aggression. These stress his nostalgia for the Soviet or Russian empires, nationalism, and contempt for Ukrainian culture and history. But there is at least as much evidence for the proposition that President Putin invaded Ukraine out of fear that it was on track to become a member of NATO, bringing the most powerful military alliance in history led by the United States—the most potent global military power in history—to his front, side, and back yards. It is rare for any great power to view such an event without concern.

To suggest that President Putin’s motive was preventive is not to shift all the ”blame” for the war from Russia to Ukraine or to the West. Preventive wars are indeed illegal in international law, and astute practitioners of realpolitik often counsel against them. Otto von Bismarck called preventive war, “suicide for fear of death.” Exchanging the pleasures and predictability of peace for the costs and uncertainty of war is almost always a big gamble. Powers in decline have many ways to alter a perceived poor trajectory. They can invest more in defense, find allies, and the rising power may yet encounter hiccups. But the wisdom of “restraint” is nevertheless often overlooked by the states on the losing end of a power shift.

Those who pushed hard for NATO enlargement may not wish to think about their possible share of the political responsibility for President Putin’s decision to go to war. To do so inherently undercuts some of the righteousness of the West’s passionate and principled mobilization of support for Ukraine. But we should try to learn something from this tragic war that might be of use later. When we take actions that seem highly inimical to the power and security positions of rival nation states, however attractive those actions may be on ideological, ethical, or even strategic grounds, we should also be alert to the possibility that we are pushing too hard and may produce the opposite of the desired outcomes.

Stephen Van Evera: "The United States and Ukraine should avoid making large sacrifices for aims that are secondary or unattainable and move to negotiate an imperfect peace that consolidates Ukraine's post-invasion success"

Ukraine has already achieved its most important objectives in its war with Russia. Continuing to fight will provide Ukraine with only minor additional gains, if any, while imposing high costs on Ukraine and the United States. More fighting will also raise the risk of nuclear escalation. Instead, it is time for Ukraine to consolidate its successes and resolve the war on imperfect terms.

Ukraine faced a battle for national survival when Russia invaded on February 24, 2022, but this is no longer the case. The danger that Ukraine might be conquered, vassalized, or landlocked by losing its Black Sea port at Odessa has been averted. Ukraine’s military is far stronger than it was on February 24, thanks to great efforts by Ukraine and generous military aid and training from NATO states. Ukraine’s military buildup and successes on the battlefield have secured the prime Ukrainian national interests at stake in the war: that Ukraine be a free society, secure from conquest, with a viable economic base. It seems very unlikely that Russia will regain its lost momentum and threaten these core Ukrainian interests again. And if Russia somehow regains its momentum, the United States could halt a renewed Russian advance by increasing military aid to Ukraine.

Yet Ukraine’s prospects for making further military gains are also dim. Ukraine has now recovered nearly half the land it lost after Russia’s invasion. However, regaining the rest will be far harder for two reasons. First, both sides have had time to entrench and fortify their forces. This bolsters both sides’ defensive power. Therefore, expelling Russian forces from the territory they still control will be costly and could prove impossible.

Second, Russian President Vladimir Putin may escalate to nuclear use if it appears that Russian forces will be completely expelled from Ukraine, absent compensating NATO concessions. Complete and uncompensated expulsion from Ukraine would be universally seen as a major defeat for Russia. President Putin knows that things often go badly for dictators who suffer major defeats; his power and perhaps even his life would be in danger. President Putin also has a record of doubling down when faced with a setback. If cornered, he may do so again.

To move toward a settlement, the United States and Ukraine should signal to Russia that they are willing to offer concessions on four issues they refused to negotiate on before the war: a promise that Ukraine will not join NATO, a mutual pullback of NATO and Russian forces from NATO’s eastern boundaries, mutual implementation of the 2015 Minsk II accords, and U.S. and Ukrainian acceptance of Russian control over Crimea. NATO and Ukraine blundered before the war by not offering to make concessions on these issues in return for Russian guarantees of Ukrainian independence and security. It is possible that Russia would agree to a tolerable settlement of some kind, including ceding occupied Ukrainian territory, if offered these concessions now.

In a just world, Russia would gain nothing from its war against Ukraine. Instead, Russian troops would be forced from Ukraine, and Russian leaders would be tried and punished for their aggression and barbaric war crimes against the Ukrainian people. Unfortunately, Russia has the power to veto such an outcome. At the same time, Ukraine has already secured its most important war aims. The United States and Ukraine should avoid making large sacrifices for aims that are secondary or unattainable and move to negotiate an imperfect peace that consolidates Ukraine’s post-invasion success.

Read the full article here .

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On the defensive: Why Ukraine is 'in a bind' as war with Russia grinds on

Ukraine says it is short on air defence systems, ammunition and soldiers.

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In the early days of January, at a U.S. military base in Germany, Ukrainian military planners huddled with their counterparts from the United States and Europe for a week-long war game session focused on how to defend against the Russian military as its full-scale invasion of Ukraine is set to enter its third year. 

And 2024 could see Ukraine on the defence for most of it. 

Last year, Ukraine's counteroffensive yielded few battlefield gains. Defence experts say as Ukraine grapples with a shortage of ammunition and troops, it is in need of a reset and rebuild.

But that comes as support from one of its biggest backers — the United States — wavers and other countries face criticism for not doing more or acting urgently enough to help Ukraine defeat Russia. 

"It leaves Ukraine having to fight a defensive action … with insufficient resources," said Tim Willasey-Wilsey, a visiting professor in the war studies department at King's College London. 

"I think most people estimate that Ukraine could hold out in 2024. But that leaves a big question about 2025."

Why Ukraine’s counteroffensive has stalled

In recent months, while Ukraine tried to push Russia back in the south and in the east, it also built fortifications along the sprawling front line in an effort to impede a Russian army that has been able to replenish its weaponry by ramping up domestic production and leaning on the likes of Iran and North Kore a to help supplement it stocks. 

Russia, with a population of more than 140 million, has been able to boost its military ranks, but experts say it still struggles on the battlefield because of a deficient command and control structure.

Five months after Ukraine launched its counteroffensive, the country's top general described the situation as a stalemate to the publication The Economist, but backtracked on that when speaking to a Ukrainian publication a month later. 

Ukraine and Russia are digging in for the next phase of this protracted war. 

While there could be few changes to the front line in 2024, the international political landscape could vary greatly if Donald Trump or another Republican is elected president of the United States in November. A $60-billion aid package is stalled in the U.S. Congress as Republicans refuse to pass the funding unless Democrats agree to tighten security at the border and crack down on illegal crossings. 

Looking for air defence

As Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met with the leader of Lithuania in Vilnius on Wednesday, he vowed that this year will be decisive for Ukraine and its partners, adding that one of the largest issues was the country's lack of modern air defence systems. 

Last January,  Canada promised to supply Ukraine with a $400-million surface-to-air-missile system. It has been paid for, but not yet delivered. 

The system, which is known by the acronym NASAMS, is jointly manufactured by U.S. and Norwegian companies and it is not clear  when it will be ready to be deployed to Ukraine. 

Why Ukraine can't beat Russia’s 'elastic defence' | About That

In December, a senior Ukrainian army general told Reuters that a  shortage of ammunition, particularly artillery shells, was forcing the army to scale back military operations. 

"They're not able to fire as many shells … it's dropped from maybe 7,000 a day to about 1,000 to 2,000 across the entire front," Patrick Bury, a former British army captain and former NATO analyst, said in a Zoom interview with CBC News. 

Bury, who is a senior lecturer in security at the University of Bath in western England, says Russia now has superiority over Ukraine when it comes to the number of artillery shells that can be fired over the front line. 

"This is mainly because the European production, the U.S. production, although ramping up significantly, hasn't got to where it needs to be. "

Calls for more support, faster 

Earlier this week, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz  criticized members of the European Union for not doing enough to deliver sufficient weapons to Ukraine, a point that was made throughout  a report published by Estonia's Ministry of Defence late last year. 

It stated that the EU has delivered 300,000 out of one million artillery rounds already agreed to and would have to significantly increase the pace of production to meet Ukraine's minimum need over the next two years. 

With collective support, the report predicts that Ukraine will win the war by 2026 at the latest. 

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Russia has been able to increase its production of military vehicles and artillery by putting its economy on a war footing, with some factories running 24/7, said Konrad Muzkya, a defence analyst and director of Gdansk-based Rochon Consulting.

Muzyka told CBC News that there isn't accurate data about Russian levels of production, but independent Ukrainian analysts believe that Russia is able to produce, modernize and repair 1,000 tanks a year. 

"We would assume that the current rate of production is sustainable over the next couple of years," he said. 

Zelenskyy doesn't think Ukraine is starting to lose the war

Muzyka said in October, Russia was able to launch a combined arms assault involving 10,000 to 20,000 men to try to gain control of the decimated  community of Avdiivka , which lies about 20 kilometres north of Donestk in Eastern Ukraine. Muzyka described it as Russia's first large-scale co-ordinated assault since the beginning of the war. 

Its military failed to capture Avdiivka, and Ukraine's president said thousands of Russian soldiers were killed during the assault. 

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Muzyka said it is an example of Russia's problematic command and control structure that sees troops sent directly into the firing line with little regard for their lives. 

U.S. officials estimate that more than 300,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured since it launched its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022. 

Through mobilization and recruitment, Russia has been able to bolster its military, but Russian economists have warned of a mounting labour shortage that has also been made worse by the millions who left Russia in the early days after the invasion began and after Russia announced partial mobilization in the fall of 2022.  

Ukrainian mobilization 

Millions have also left Ukraine, according to the United Nations refugee agency . 

It is estimated that 30 million people live in the areas currently under Ukrainian control. 

The country's parliament is reviewing a bill that would lower the age of mobilization from 27 to 25, while the military has asked for an additional 500,000 troops.

But getting the boots on the ground is only the first step, as experts say Ukraine's training system needs to be revamped to better prepare troops and the officers commanding them on the front line. 

Putin answers hand-picked questions at 4-hour news conference

"You can imagine taking some volunteers off the street and giving them five weeks of training time to go attack Russian lines," said Bury, who noted that as a former infantry officer in the U.K., he was given a year and a half of training before joining a platoon. 

He says Ukraine has had a lot of success using missiles and drones to target Russian military infrastructure, including the country's Black Sea Fleet , and believes that will be a key part of its strategy over the next few months. 

That and continuing to press its partners to deliver the weaponry its military needs. 

"Ukraine is in a bind," Bury said, because it wants to show its Western partners that it can win on the battlefield.

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But Bury believes the decisions Ukraine makes this year should be more strategic. 

"2024 is about resourcing this problem and getting the building blocks really properly in order to win what is a big, long war."

Russia escalating air attacks as Ukraine faces roadblocks in military aid in 2024

About the author.

Foreign correspondent

Briar Stewart is CBC's Russia correspondent, currently based in London. During her nearly two decades with CBC, she has reported across Canada and internationally. She can be reached at [email protected] or on X @briarstewart

With files from Corinne Seminoff and Reuters

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Assessing the War in Ukraine

Photo: GENYA SAVILOV/AFP via Getty Images

Transcript — February 14, 2024

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• Download the Transcript 293kb

This transcript is from a CSIS press briefing  hosted on February 14, 2024.

Alex Kisling: Thanks, Brad. Really appreciate it. And good morning, everybody, and welcome to today’s CSIS press briefing. We have a terrific lineup of experts from across CSIS’s research programs joining us today to offer their latest insights on several critical areas surrounding the war in Ukraine ahead of the two-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion, which we’ll mark just a week or so from now.

Just a couple housekeeping notes before we get started. Each CSIS expert will offer a few minutes of introductory remarks, after which we’ll turn to any questions from those of you joining us today. We’ll also have a transcript of today’s call available by later this afternoon, which will be shared directly with all participants and posted to CSIS.org.

So, with that, why don’t we go ahead and get started? I will turn first to my colleague Seth Jones, CSIS senior vice president, Harold Brown chair, and director of our International Security Program. Seth, over to you.

Seth G. Jones: Thanks, Alex. Really appreciate it. Great to be on this panel.

I’ve got four comments. My remarks are going to primarily focus on the military campaign and a little bit of the Russian military.

As we move into the third year of the war, I would say from a military perspective that Ukraine, which had the initiative last year during its offensive campaign, has lost it. That doesn’t necessarily mean the Russians have it, but I do think it’s fair to say that the – that the Ukrainians have lost the military initiative, at least for the moment. They did not succeed in regaining much territory – a little, but not – certainly not as much as some and even they had hoped. I suspect what we’ll see – we already see a little bit of this in the Luhansk area – is the Russians attempting to seize the military initiative this spring – this year more broadly – and to go on the offense. As I see it, the Russian main effort in terms of the military campaign is likely to center around areas like Luhansk Oblast to capture the remainder of Luhansk, push westward into eastern Kharkiv, and also parts of northern Donetsk. It doesn’t mean it’s unlikely that the Russians will go south and try to retake Kherson. I just don’t see that as being their primary military objective.

Some of the areas that I am definitely watching on an hourly, day-by-day basis are Russian pushes into areas like Avdiivka. There has been a lot of positional fighting near the city over the last few days. Some Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces crossed the rail line in Avdiivka and entrenched themselves in the dacha area west of the railway. But there have been some milbloggers, among others – including Russian ones – that have claimed that these reports so far are unconfirmed. So there’s a little bit of content contestation, but I do think it’s fair to say that we haven’t seen a big change of territorial control.

On the – just briefly, on the – well, actually, I’ll let Eliot talk a little bit more about the Ukrainian military. Let me actually share – to my second major point, which is on kind of the Russian reconstitution. As I look at Russian efforts over the past several months, there is a significant effort to reinvigorate the defense industrial base for a protracted war. And I think it’s reasonable now to expect that Russians now have stockpiles that they would be able to plight for at least another year or two. What’s been interesting, I think – and this – I won’t really talk aid packages because I think a few others are going to talk aid packages – but I think what’s interesting is how much we’re seeing crossing major regional lines, so U.S. intelligence assessments that they have declassified have indicated that the Chinese have ramped up military aid to the Russian – both the military and Russian intelligence services. Examples include navigation equipment for M-17 military helicopters, jamming technology for military vehicles, parts for fighter jets, components for defense systems like the S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile System, semiconductor chips for weapon systems, drones for battlefield use. We’ve also seen some help clearly from the Iranians with the Shahed 136s and the Mojaher 6 drones, including building a drone factory near the Russian town of Yelabuga, and North Korean assistance in providing advanced technology to the Russians, as well – primarily artillery shells and munitions for Moscow’s war in Ukraine. So I certainly think along those line the Russians have the ability to continue to fight for quite some time.

Let me just conclude with a third point on some of the more sort of defeatist comments that I’ve heard, including coming from some senators, about the likelihood of a Russian victory. I think it is way too early to assess the likelihood of victory by either side. I would just point to the repeated examples of small powers wearing down and defeating much larger ones: the Soviets losing in Afghanistan, the French and the U.S. in Vietnam, the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan, the French in Algeria – plenty of examples where there was, to paraphrase Pakistan’s ISI during the 1980s war in Afghanistan against the Soviets, death by a thousand cuts. And I think in that sense what we see is – what we’ve seen historically is protracted wars where there is significant attrition can change the political calculations and the cost-benefit analysis. So I think if Ukrainians are able to continue to get foreign assistance – the European Taurus would be a good example of what the Ukrainians have been pushing for. If Ukrainians are able to adopt a successful strategy, including heavy focus on drones and air, then I think, you know, there’s a – there’s a reasonable chance that they will make it very painful for the Russians to advance. And we have seen, as I turn to Maria, the Russians not that successful on offense over the course of this war, except for the very early stages.

So, with that, I will hand it over to Maria.

Mr. Kisling: Thanks, Seth. Really appreciate it.

Maria Snegovaya:

 Thank you very much.

Mr. Kisling: Yeah, Maria, I’ll just queue you up here. Maria is our senior fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. So, Maria, over to you.

Dr. Snegovaya: Hello, everyone. Honored to be here. With apologies, I will have to jump off. I will not be able to stay for Q & A since I’m in the Congress briefing our congressmen on the importance of containing Russia.

So I will cover two topics today, following up on Seth’s excellent comments. First of all, Russia’s ability to circumvent the sanctions; and also Russia’s ability to continue supplying manpower.

So on the sanctions front, unfortunately, news that came out from the last year are awfully negative. As a matter of fact, like, I will cover the oil price cap and export controls as the two main areas on which Western sanctions have focused.

Unfortunately, while the oil price cap did seem to have had an impact on declining Russian revenues in early 2023, by the late 2023 Russia, by investing heavily into refocusing on suppling its maritime oil shipments through shady fleet, almost have been able to, to a large extent, substitute for the oil price cap. By different estimates, it’s about 45 percent of its maritime oil is now covered by shady fleet. With also Russian own fleet, that covers about 70 percent of all Russian maritime oil.

As a result, we’ve seen continuously growing revenues of the Russian budget coming from the oil, that was combined with a relatively favorable oil dynamic. And by now, Russia’s monthly revenues – one year into the oil price cap – actually exceed what Russia used to get before its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Accordingly, Russians used this money to double down on defense spending. In 2024, its investments in defense have increased by almost 70 percent as compared to 2023.

Now, when it comes to export controls, the effort to limit the influx of sensitive technologies into Russia, again, we have seen a fairly similar dynamic where, while at first it took Russia some time to readjust, perhaps, to find new suppliers, it’s huge land border with many countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus, as well as, of course, China, more or less fully substitute for the important Western-produced goods. China’s the biggest factor, especially when it comes to semiconductors. Western-made microchips are the items most often discovered in pretty much every type of Russian military equipment which was investigated by Ukrainian authorities. As a matter of fact, the situation with export control is so dire that, for example, you know – (inaudible) – essentially just points out that export controls are now circumvented left and right, and we really cannot talk any more of them working.

As I mentioned before, China’s role here is particularly prominent. China is very actively substituting for a variety of goods that Russia has lost as a result of the Western-imposed sanctions, from the car industry all the way to consumer goods. But when it comes to technology, China’s role is particularly important. We have seen that Russia’s trade with China in 2023 has reached a record, growing by about 26 percent from 2022.

Now, besides China, Seth has pointed out the important role of North Korea and Iran when it comes to the military. But most importantly, Russia is feeling quite comfortable within the economic dynamics. As we have seen, there’s a lot of Keynesian type of economy, essentially investing into the growth through the investment – through its own state-based investment. And, accordingly, we have seen that Russia also boosting its domestic production and the military industrial complex. Unfortunately, there isn’t a lot of independent data on this matter, so we have to rely on the Russian state-reported data, which is arguably inflated but is not in complete contradiction to what we are seeing on the ground in Ukraine. They are ramping up domestic production of weapons, including tanks, rocket launchers, artillery, and missiles, by more than twofold, and in some instances by more than tenfold. Therefore, it can – one can hardly describe the sanctions as success.

Having said that, we did see Russia’s rainy-day fund grow – steadily erode. There are budget issues, where they are actually struggling to come up with new sources of revenues and likely will be increasing taxes. We have seen inflation rising. Partly that’s the contribution of the sanctions and the fact that Russia now has to resort to the so-called regressive – (inaudible). And in general, there is a general feeling of uncertainty about where things are headed. But it would be – one would be really hard-pressed to describe the sanctions situation as a success, and unfortunately, we will have to do better going forward.

Now, when it comes to the manpower situation, again, Russia displayed a lot of resilience, more than one had expected, given completely unprecedented losses. UK MoD has reported – has estimated that Russia, since the start of the war, has lost about 315,000 troops killed or injured. And with this dynamic, by the end of 2024 it will lose approximately half-a-million people.

So it seems that that huge losses would have had impact on the society, on the morale of the soldiers. However, so far, because it’s the, obviously, among other things, because of the repressions, control of the media, as well as huge influx of the money that Russia is getting for oil revenues and distributing to the families of the injured or killed, and to people – or to so-called volunteers who go to fight in Ukraine, so far, that has actually created a new status quo in Russia which helps it sustain a more or less durable status quo. According to RUSI, for example – (inaudible) – estimated Russian state can sustain the war at least for the next three years. We have seen that the Russian MoD fairly – is fairly consistent in its military tactics, relying on mass infantry attacks, and sends large waves of soldiers against Ukraine in an effort to wear down the Ukraine defense, especially given the shortages in manpower that increasingly happens on the Ukrainian side.

Now, having said that, we do see some early indications of the spreading of fatigue, war fatigue, in the Russian society. For example, we have seen by the end of 2023 some growing – growth in the number of people, of Russian people, in response to the surveys who do support the war – or, sorry, the war negotiations, the war settlement, the peace talks. We have seen them, for example, very supported by – (inaudible) – by the Russians killed; having said that, only under the conditions of Russia holding onto the territories that it’s already occupied in Ukraine. So the numbers right now are about over 50 percent, actually, supporting – defending on the poll you’re looking at. There was this new campaign by Boris Nadezhdin, a politician who wanted to run against Putin, campaigning for end of the war. He also has been able to collect more than 20,000 signatures in order to run in the election, but he wasn’t allowed to run. So there are some spreading signs of the fatigue.

Having said that, so far Russia has been able to fairly successfully maintain an influx of so-called volunteers, promising them high social payments and salaries. Putin in this fall reported that about 300,000 new so-called volunteers volunteered to participate in Ukraine’s war. And RUSI reports that recruiters are achieving about 85 percent of their assigned target for contracting troops for Ukraine war. Therefore, with the current dynamic, unfortunately, it seems that Russia’s not facing serious social resistance to continuing this war, at least for the next year – couple of next years.

And I’ll stop here. Thank you.

Mr. Kisling: Maria, thanks so much. Really appreciate it.

Let’s turn next to Max Bergmann, director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and Stuart Center. Max, over to you.

Max Bergmann: Great. Thanks, Alex. And thanks, Maria and Seth and Eliot.

Maybe I’ll just say a little bit about Europe’s response, and then maybe a quick thought on kind of where Ukraine sees itself and the current aid dynamic in Congress.

So I think one of the big surprises over the last two years has actually been the response of the Europeans. Now, two things can be true at the same time, where I think Europe’s response has genuinely surprised, I think, Washington, many in the administration, and I think many in Europe themselves about what they have done and what they – what they are doing; and yet, it’s also at times, you know, not sufficient to actually meet the needs for Ukraine.

I think the one thing when we think about the European response is it’s been far stronger than what we saw after 2014, the EU coming together on sanctions and actually pushing at times the administration to go harder and stronger. We’ve seen major European countries provide major military support for the first time – Germany being, I think, the lead there, where they have not only provided a lot of advanced weaponry but done so at a scale that I think is – has been sort of quite surprising to many, and especially at the beginning of the war given Germany’s history and policy of not providing lethal assistance to a country in conflict. And European will, which, you know, we were all nervous that it was going to crack over the winter of 2022/2023 when energy prices skyrocketed and actual inflation was really tied, I think, to the war in Ukraine and in the explosions of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines and the cutting off of Russian gas, Europe has adapted and public support has remained really strong despite the economic challenges.

And we’ve seen that recently with the EU coming together and basically getting over the hump with the Hungarian potential veto of 50 billion euros for Ukraine. What’s important to note is that it’s economic aid, not military aid. So the EU is stepping up on the economic side. And I think what we may be seeing in Brussels over the next few weeks, particularly as aid may be stuck in our Congress, is additional assistance packages from the EU. They have something called the European Peace Facility, which in typical EU parlance is actually an EU security assistance fund. That is now out of money, and the question is how much money will be put back into that and whether it’s sort of reformed to now fit the current challenges of the current conflict.

And from a European perspective, the way they support Ukraine military I think, basically, has to – has to evolve and change. I think I sort of identify three phases.

Phase one was the Eastern Europeans giving away all their old Soviet equipment from when they were part of the Warsaw Pact country. Now, those were integrated and used by the Ukrainians at great speed.

Phase two was many Western European countries providing a lot of their old major platforms, Leopard tanks and other things like that.

But now we’re in phase three, where the Europeans are kind of out of stock of a lot of older equipment in their warehouse and it’s now a lot more expensive for them to provide aid to Ukraine in the sense that they would have to provide newer equipment or they have to go and buy that from industries. And the problem in Europe is that they haven’t put things under contract fast enough. They have similar defense industrial issues that we have here and sort of ramping up on that scale. But theirs are – their problems are even more severe because it’s a completely fragmented defense industrial complex and it’s been underinvested in for decades.

The good news there – there’s good news and bad news. The good news is that Europe is ramping up its defense industrial production. European factories are expanding and increasing ammunition production. The EU has provided funding to help finance the expansion of the capacity of defense industries. The challenge is that orders haven’t really come in at the scale that is needed. And part of the issue is that there’s a – there’s kind of a tension between European countries modernizing their own militaries – so investing in NATO capabilities and supporting Ukraine.

For example, Germany announced the Zeitenwende fund, investing a hundred billion. A lot of that money’s going to F-35s, going to advanced helicopters, great equipment that will really improve the German military. That is important for NATO. On the other hand, what Ukraine needs is ammunition and other things that that fund isn’t going to. And so European defense ministries are sort of struggling with they’ve got an increase in funding and how much of – how much of that increase in funding do you use to provide for Ukraine or to now finally modernize your forces. So that’s one of the tensions. And I think, hopefully, there will be some breakthroughs at the EU level.

Just quickly on the state of the war to pick up something I think Seth mentioned earlier about, you know, the – a number of – we’ve seen smaller countries frequently, you know, defeat larger countries in battle, with Vietnam and others being key examples. And I think that’s exactly the right way to view this war. I think Putin – the problem for Russia and the problem for Putin is he has wanted this war in many ways to be treated by the Russian public as a civil war, where this is a war – not a war of choice but an existential conflict for Russia – think our Civil War between North and South, and that once the North sort of fully puts its weight into it with its industrial might and its population advantage, well, the South is – was going to crumble, and that Ukraine will crumble and sort of be reincorporated to Russia. The problem is that he has not won that narrative battle inside of Russia. Calling this a “special military operation” and being concerned about how this is viewed inside of Russia, and by coming up with all sorts of, you know, evolving narratives about this war has meant this is very much a war of conquest by Russia. And that is, obviously, how it’s seen in Ukraine, and I think around much of the world. But I think for most Ukrainians, this is – or, most Russians this is seen somewhat as a war of choice. And while there’s a lot of popular choice for war of choices – we have seen that in the United States – that can really wane, and I think that leads to some constraints on the Kremlin in how they’re going to wage this war.

And so what I’d say is that Ukraine, I think, is at a bit of a pivot point. I think they are at a point where a long war, to me, actually favors them as long as we – that they are continually supported by Europe and the United States in particular. And that is critical, because, while this is utterly sustainable for us economically, maintaining this war economy may not really be sustainable for Russia over the long term and may have – lead to increasing internal challenges.

And so that gets to the assistance funding, where if that funding is passed I have no doubt that Ukraine will be able to completely absorb the Russian offensive that is going on in 2024. In fact, I would be quite optimistic about Ukraine’s potential in 2025 with Russia sort of, in its hubris, launching constant offensives, losing lots of people, and they’re kind of running out of prisoners to throw into the meat grinder so they’re starting to throw people that have more importance or significance from a societal standpoint into the frontlines, that that will really pay a toll on the Russian military, on the Russian war effort, and that in 2025 we’ll have a point where European production will have really ramped up as well. So if U.S. aid continues and European production ramps up, Ukraine will be in a very strong point to, I think, continue this war into 2025.

And this leads to, I think, maybe my final – well, maybe one final thought: Therefore, Congress getting this over the line, the aid funding, is really existential for Ukraine, because if they don’t provide the funding then the war of attrition, the kind of balance goes back to Russia. And I agree with Seth; Russia doesn’t have much offensive combat capacity. But right now, Ukraine is running out of ammunition on the frontlines. They’re having to use more manpower to plug the holes on the frontline. And so the war of attrition really advantages the Russians, and you don’t know when those frontlines may break. We saw in World War I, you know, the Germans in the spring of 1918 were on the outskirts of Paris, and then they lost the war six months later, where their lines just suddenly broke. In a war of attrition, lines can break if the attritted side is depleted enough. So I think that passing the assistance is really critical.

And just one final thought is that right now I’ve seen this narrative on the Hill about, well, maybe it’s time for negotiation. Well, to have negotiations you need both sides. And right now in the Kremlin they think they’re going to win. And if they think they’re going to win, they’re not going to negotiate and they see a real advantage. Negotiations tend to happen when there is a sense of stalemate and that neither side thinks they’re going to be able to win. And we are, I think, a very long way from that happening, and the Russians have to be convinced that they’re not going to win. And to do that essentially requires us to provide assistance and support, and to make clear that that’s not going to stop, then the Russians may view their situation as completely untenable over the longer term and may seek a way out. They’re not going to do that in the near term. And the same applies for Ukraine, in the sense that Ukraine needs to know that they can basically – that they can fight the Russians to the point where the Russia wants the war to end.

So I think that’s where we are. It’s a real pivot point, I think, right now in history about what Congress does. So maybe I’ll leave it at that.

Mr. Kisling: Thanks, Max.

We have a couple of speakers left. Just for those of you who want to ask a question, to add your name to the queue please press one and zero. And then we’ll turn to questions after our speakers wrap here.

Let me turn next to Dr. Eliot Cohen, CSIS Arleigh Burke chair in strategy. Eliott, over to you, please.

Eliot A. Cohen: Great, thank you. So a number of observations. Some pretty much, I would say, supplementing or complementing things that colleagues have pointed out, but some are a little bit different. Let me begin with the first one.

I think it’s easy to fixate on the fact that the lines on land look fairly static. You know, we get a lot of reporting about the battle front, Avdiivka, and so on. And it looks kind of like our mental image of World War One, with a very static trench line. The fact is that there are multiple campaigns going on. And I think it’s important to recognize that fact.

So in fact, just the other day, yesterday, the Ukrainians were able to hit with some of their naval drones a yet another Russian landing ship. This is a pretty substantial ship. I think it’s about 269 feet long. It’s the fifth of nine landing ships that the Russians had in the Black Sea Fleet. So they’ve now sunk more than half of those. Those are actually quite important, because that’s how the Russians – one of the main ways in which the Russians are getting ammunition to the frontlines in southern Ukraine. So there’s a maritime campaign where the Ukrainians have been remarkably successful. They continue to be able to export wheat. It’s not easy, but they’re exporting quite a bit. They’ve pushed a large chunk of Black Sea Fleet off the Crimean Peninsula, as they gradually erode the ability of the Russians to resupply by sea. The Russians are very dependent on the Kerch Bridge. And if they ever get the means to take that out, that’ll be gone.

There’s a deep strike campaign where the Russians have the advantage, but where, frankly, Ukrainian society has, to some extent, I think, become somewhat inured to this. But the Ukrainians are also striking deep in a variety of ways into Russia, with drones, with missiles, but also with a very active sabotage campaign. This has some military consequences, but also has a lot of psychological consequences. And there’s a – there’s an information campaign, on both sides. Which it feels to me a bit more like a draw. You know, the Ukrainians I think clearly had the edge at the beginning, the Russians are, I think, very actively trying to create a narrative of inevitable Ukrainian defeat. Unfortunately, they have some people in Congress are all too willing to believe in that.

Even on land, I think it’s – we got to be careful about how we assess this. My assessment of what the Ukrainians are doing is, in battles like Avdiivka, as with Bakhmut, I think they’ve made a conscious decision to fight for some of these places as way of attritting the Russians. Now, it’s true that, on the one hand, Russians, by a variety of means, are kind of replenishing their manpower. But the point that has to be borne in mind is, you know, this is not a well-trained force. And there’s some elements of it which still are, most of it, though, is very poorly trained. And it’s pretty demoralized. And therefore, not really capable, I think, of large-scale land maneuver. And I do think this is part of the Ukrainian concept.

The other thing I would say is that this is not a static battlefield in another way. Both sides are pouring a lot of effort into the use of advanced technologies. And Seth referenced this earlier. The Russians obviously, in a variety of ways that people have spoken that, are doing this, including with a very active drone program but also with acquisition of technology from Iran and North Korea. But the Ukrainians are very far from sitting still. And in fact, they do have their own industrial strategy in all of this. And they are – they have shown themselves, I think, particularly – I’ll go back to the naval realm – capable of being very ingenious and effective. And really, that was that way throughout the war.

There’ll be new elements entering the battlefield. The Ukrainians are going to get F-16s. They’re not going to be a wonder weapon, but they’re both – they are going to change a little bit, I think, the ability of the Russian Air Force to operate. With luck, they’re going to get some of the weapons systems that would really be helpful to them, particularly the German Taurus and, of course, American ATACMS. So the war is evolving technologically as well, and we shouldn’t – we shouldn’t miss that fact.

The critical question, as a number of my colleagues have pointed out, is, of course, U.S. support, particularly this vote that’ll be coming up in the House. And that’s important, both on very concrete grounds – the Ukrainians are suffering from real shortage, particularly of 155-millimeter artillery ammunition, as well as other things. And this would go a long way to helping them. It’s also psychological. I think it is very important that people don’t think that the United States has lost faith in Ukraine. Although, one has to say that one of the consequences of this debate in the United States has been to spur, I think, increasing European efforts.

The problem, as Max and others have pointed out, is that the Europeans are still behind the power curve in terms of actual military industrial production. The Ukrainian – issues that the Ukrainians face are really three, I think. One is this question simply of resupply there, and shortage of hardware. They have a second big question. That’s a mobilization question. This has been posed sometimes as conscription. That’s not the issue. They have conscription. So the question is, are they going to make more extensive efforts to mobilize the manpower they have, to share the burden more equally, to make sure that units get rotated and so forth? President Zelensky has talked about that. And he particularly talked about that in the context of the change in the command team that he’s put through. And I think that’s a critical domestic, social, and political issue.

And that does bring up the third issue, which is this rather major overhaul of Ukrainian military leadership. The replacement of General Zaluzhny with General Syrskyi. But there is a whole tier of other general officers who’ve been replaced. That tier is actually the more interesting one, in some ways. It is a younger, combat-experienced team. Most of them have worked with Syrskyi himself. He’s actually quite a talented general. There’s a lot of misleading commentary, I think, about the changeover.

You know, generals are heroes in wartime. So everybody loves Zaluzhny. People will love Syrskyi, I’m sure, almost as much. He’s a less charismatic figure in some ways, but he’s certainly highly competent. This is a normal kind of thing that have happen in war. What was interesting to me about that, though, was the instructions that Zelensky gave as he got in this new command team. And I think I think all of us augured pretty well, but he be sure that units get rotated, make sure that the Ukrainians up the level of training, and so forth. So I think that is actually, in many ways, a good sign.

And I just want to address the question of, how could the war end? So my first thought on that one is, if you look at military history most wars, particularly of this magnitude, have to end with the change of leadership on one side or the other. I don’t think either the Ukrainian government or the Russian government, as currently constituted, would be willing to throw in the towel. And so it’ll be the moment when either Zelensky is not in power or Putin is not in power. I think the latter’s a bit more likely than the former. I don’t see the Ukrainians giving up, because this is an existential war for them. It is not an existential war for Russia.

It’s also the case that wars like this often end with a sudden collapse. We need to – in this respect, I think the World War One analogy can be fruitful. Nobody expected the war to end in November 1918. You know, in September, even into early October, people are planning for the campaigns of 1919. And there was not just one collapse, but a set of collapses. I think something similar might happen in this case.

But, you know, my baseline prediction would be this war is going to go on for quite some time. That 2024 is going to be a year when both sides are remodeling their militaries. Hopefully, the Ukrainians are resupplied on the large scale. And I think, unfortunately, there’s going to be quite a bit more fighting to be done before this war ends up resolving itself.

Mr. Kisling: Eliot, thanks so much. Really appreciate it.

Again, if you have a question that you’d like to ask, please press one and then zero. We’ll get to those in just a moment.

But let me turn next to our final speaker, Romina Bandura, who is our senior fellow with the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development. Romina, over to you.

Romina Bandura: Thank you, Alex. And thank you for – to my CSIS colleagues. I’m going to take another angle in the discussion and address an important aspect of the war, which is the Ukrainian economy. And I’ll make four points. First, Ukraine’s future depends on the outcomes on the battlefield as much as on the economic front. You know, Ukraine is fighting as much a military war against Russia as an economic war. The enemy is trying not only to occupy land, wipe out physical infrastructure, and inflict mass civilian casualties, but also wants to cripple the Ukrainian economy, targeting critical industries.

In this regard, as Max mentioned, the international community needs to continue helping Ukraine keep the lights on. So, you know, this is essential to pay pensioners, teachers, police, which in turn fuels consumption in Ukraine so that, you know, the economy and society did not completely collapse. A staggering indicator is that now more than 24 percent of Ukrainians are now poor and need support. We need a functioning state and a functioning economy in Ukraine. The Ukrainian economy grew by 4.5 percent in last year, in part due to the international support but also thanks to a resilient information technology sector, consumer spending, and Ukraine’s ability to reroute its exports through the Danube and Western borders.

My second point is that budgetary aid for the government of Ukraine is super important to keep the economy running, but the private sector in Ukraine also needs support. A strong business sector is the key to Ukraine’s future. I would say, yes, it’s true that many companies have had to shut down or had their operations halted or interrupted. But many others have proven to be resilient and have adapted to war times. We have to remember that businesses employ people and pay taxes to the government. And a large portion of Ukraine, which is close to 85 percent of the territory, is unoccupied. And this is where businesses can operate and potentially grow.

But companies are having problems finding labor, especially highly skilled labor. Remember that between six and eight million Ukrainians have fled. And companies are reporting that between 10 to 20 percent of their staff has mobilized for the war. Companies are also finding it hard to access affordable credit, fresh capital, and war insurance schemes. Regarding new investments into Ukraine, foreign direct investment, unfortunately, it has collapsed since the war started. Ukraine was able to attract about 500 million (dollars) in new investments, according to the data provided by Ukraine Invest, which is the country’s investment promotion agency. And these investments are taking place in regions that are not under active combat, such as the western and central parts of the country.

I would say that, on the other hand, like, large reconstruction projects that the international community is talking about, mainly in the east and southeast of Ukraine – you know – as you know, these are the regions that have been heavily destroyed or are under active combat. These reconstruction projects will probably have to wait until the war is over.

Third, what can donors do to support, you know, the private sector? Donors through their development finance institutions – what is known as DFIs – could do more to support companies. Only a small portion of the economic aid is being directed to the private sector. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD, is one of the main institutions that is helping the private sector in Ukraine with commitments of around two billion (dollars). And what we’re hearing is that companies need from these institutions more innovative schemes such as setting up investment funds where donors would provide a first loss tranche to attract other investors; more insurance schemes, maybe for the less-risky areas in Ukraine; more coordination and consolidation of the scattered initiatives that currently these institutions have; and more access to reasonable credit.

My fourth and final point is that Ukraine is also undertaking a lot of governance reforms and combatting corruption, even amid the war. You know, governance and anti-corruption are fundamental steps to attract foreign direct investment and join the EU family in the future.

There was a recent survey that highlights that Ukrainian society considers corruption as the number two problem in the country after the war, but Ukraine has made strong inroads in this regard, including ramping up criminal proceedings against suspected perpetrators, and we’ve seen high-profile cases in the last year. It’s taken judiciary reforms. Ukraine set up a competitive selection process for the heads of the main anti-corruption agencies, and has done improvements in public procurement and others. And due to these changes, the good news is that Ukraine has improved its corruption score. It’s now scoring 36 points out of a hundred in the latest edition of Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. I know this is still very low; it’s half the score of France and 18 points below Poland, but let me point out that it’s very similar to countries like Colombia, which scores 39 out of a hundred, and Mexico scores lower than Ukraine at 31 out of a hundred, and both of these countries – Colombia and Mexico – are part of – are members of the OECD. So combatting corruption is an area where the international community can play a critical role by providing advice and accompanying Ukraine in these reforms. And Ukrainian civil society and independent journalists are important allies in this fight.

So just to conclude on the economy – keeping the economy running is key to Ukraine’s survival. The international community can support this effort through budgetary aid and innovative schemes to help companies continue their operations. I would say that as long as there’s – you know, the security arrangement for Ukraine remains unclear in the – you know, after the war, I would say large-scale investments in Ukraine will probably not materialize any time soon. And I know we’re talking about two years of the full-scale invasion, but I want to remind everybody that it’s actually ten years since Russia occupied Crimea, and so with that I will turn – I’ll thank you, everybody, and I now turn it back to Alex.

Mr. Kisling: Thanks so much, Romina – really appreciate it. And thanks to all of our speakers for their insights this morning.

We have a number of questions in the queue here. Just a reminder: If you want to add your name to the queue, please press one.

But let’s get to some of the questions here. And we’ll start with George Condon from National Journal. George, good morning.

Q: (Off mic) – stepping up.

How has the war affected views of American leadership of the alliance? And is Biden viewed as a leader able to deliver on his promises? And has the current impasse raised European fears of a return of Trump, and all that means for American global leadership?

Mr. Kisling: Thanks, George.

Max, do you want to take a pass at that one?

Mr. Bergmann: Sure.

I think what I would say is that the potential return of Trump is all the Europeans can talk about right now. I think they have viewed the Biden administration essentially as returning America kind of back to kind of its traditional role, as being engaged in leading NATO. I think there’s been some critiques of kind of the slowness of U.S. aid at times.

But I think what has happened over the last year is that Europeans have sort of never – have struggled to doubt that we would provide aid to Ukraine, that they had always believed that we would come through. And in fact, part of the Biden administration’s messaging to Europe over the – since January of last year has been, you know our Congress is divided, but America will be there. We’re unwavering. Secretary of Defense Austin was in Ukraine, you know, late fall, early winter, and said as much, that, you know, we will come through. And Europeans have really grabbed onto that.

And I mean, it’s now dawning on Europe that that may not be the case, and it is causing a real degree of panic. Because I think one of the geniuses of American global leadership has been that we have always – you know, and the administration has sort of always – almost always been in sync with Congress, so that Congress provided the funding for America to do things globally. And you know, it broke down a couple times, Vietnam, but generally, that has been the case. Iraq and Afghanistan, wars were always funded.

And now, we’re in a situation where here’s a war that Europe and the United States are fully invested in, and there’s concern that – whether the U.S. will be there. And it’s coming – I think we haven’t – my concern is that Europe has not been either alive to the fact, or we have been maybe overly reassuring them that we will be able to come through, and hence Europe hasn’t been really geared itself up to take the kind of necessary steps to attempt to fill the gap left by the United States.

So – and I – Trump’s comments over the weekend, President Trump’s comments, were, you know, THE discussion point in Europe. And I think there’s tremendous concern about what this means because, let’s be clear, Europe is dependent on the United States for its security. And as much as we complain about that, and want the Europeans to spend more, that is how NATO is structured. NATO is structured that Europe goes to the United States, and the U.S. military will lead the effort to defend Europe. That is how we have wanted it. That is what we have told the Europeans, that’s how they structured their militaries, around us, around NATO. And even if they all spend 2 percent, that will – they will still be dependent on us. And that is the freakout concern, is that somehow if we pull back there – you know, there’s no real ability for the Europeans to coordinate their military efforts without us. And that’s how we have wanted it, and now there’s concern that we are going to be pulling back.

And I actually have a related question here from Aamer Madhani from Associated Press, who unfortunately had to drop. But he posed this, and so maybe, Max, you can address, and, Seth/Eliot/Romina, feel free to jump in.

But essentially the question is, you know, if an aid package is passed here in 2024, will that really essentially be it? But how can the U.S. possibly keep up aid for Ukraine in the current political environment for a war that, you know, many on this call have even suggested that, you know, shows no end in sight? So, Max, I don’t know if you want to address that. And Seth and Eliot, Romina, please feel free to weigh in if you have any thoughts on that as well.

Mr. Bergmann: Yeah. I guess my quick thought is I’ve heard that and I don’t think that’s necessarily true. I think that I – who knows, well, if – I think it’s hard to see a second Trump administration pushing forward for more aid. That said, I think a second Biden administration would. And after an election in which President Biden would be successfully elected, I don’t know where the Republican Party will be. And I think what’s pretty clear is that I think still the majority of Republicans – maybe they’re not going to vote this way – support Ukraine. So I don’t think that this would be the end of the road for Ukraine assistance. I don’t think this has to be the end of the road. So I could be optimistic about continued U.S. support.

The thing I would say is that European production, hopefully, is a ramped up in 2025. As Seth said, if we aren’t able to provide aid, at least the aid that we provide now would be the bridge to transition this to more of a European effort.

Dr. Cohen: I mean, I think I would just add to that that, you know, we have lived through so many circumstances where people have said this can’t go on or, you know, they’re absolutely certain that things will turn out in a particular way.

This is just an incredibly fluid environment. You know, it’s not even inconceivable to me that if Trump were elected, you know, if he’s flattered the right way we could easily end up sending arms to Ukraine.

But I think on balance, you know, the – objectively the American security interest in a free Ukraine is enormous. It has tremendous repercussions for how we are viewed in Asia and, indeed, around the world. It is, from the point of view of our defense budget, a trivial amount of money for a very important outcome, which is the destruction of the Russian military.

So the basic arguments are going to remain intact. As for where the Republican Party goes, you know, I think God only knows and I wouldn’t – I really wouldn’t try to predict. But I do think that we have to accept the fact that there’s a reemergence of isolationist sentiments in the United States on a scale which we really haven’t seen since the ’30s and early ’40s and that’s – it’s very concerning.

But I don’t think it’s in any way a given that those instincts and inclinations will triumph.

Dr. Jones: Let me just add briefly – this is Seth – a couple of additions, and I strongly agree with the way Eliot just characterized the importance of this.

But I think it’s certainly possible that the U.S. does pass the aid package. I think there’s no question it’s become more difficult politically to do that, at least in this environment. But, you know, Germany is considering long-range Taurus missiles. I think there is a lot of concern about the future of Russian activity. We could certainly see countries on NATO’s eastern flank like Poland, for example, continue to provide assistance to Ukraine and use their territory to do that.

I’ve been pleasantly surprised to see South Koreans and the Japanese stepping up and providing either directly or indirectly weapon systems including indirectly South Korean tanks to Poland, which has allowed Poland to provide some assistance.

The U.S. could also provide assistance to Ukraine in other indirect ways, selling various weapon systems to European countries that allow them to then take older models and give them to the Ukrainians. There are questions about using frozen Russian assets which, you know, there’s some debate about.

And then it’s just worth noting that the U.S. support to the Afghan mujaheddin in the 1980s was not a Title 10 operation for the most part. It was (entitled ?) 51; it was done as a covert action program.

There would be options that the U.S. could provide covert assistance that would not necessarily require the same type of assistance that the U.S. has provided today – you know, large chunks of money that Congress has to approve but done through Title 50 needs. Thanks.

Mr. Kisling: Seth, thanks. And thanks, Eliot and Max.

We’re about to hit the hour here, but we do have a couple of final questions in the queue. So maybe we can quickly go through those.

Howard from Christian Science Monitor, why don’t you go ahead? Good morning.

Q: Good morning. Thank you all for doing this.

I wanted to ask – there was some discussion of Russia’s efforts to build up its defense production, its military industrial production, and – but I’m wondering if you can talk a little bit about Ukraine and how successful Ukraine is at that, kind of where that stands. And in particular, what I think I remember seeing was something about Ukraine shifting its space industry, which has been, you know, kind of a stellar international space program, but sort of transitioning that into defense production.

And then, secondly, there was also discussion of the Black Sea. I was glad; that was going to be my other question. But in particular on that, you know, over the past couple of years, always as we get around to summer there’s a focus on food and wheat exports. And I’m wondering if there’s any sense of prospects of this year for the food and in particular wheat exports. Thanks.

Dr. Cohen: Eliot here. Let me jump in on those.

I think one thing to remember about Ukraine is that when it was part of the Soviet Union it was really a piece of the advanced industrial infrastructure of the country, including in aerospace. They also have a – have had historically a very strong software and information technology industry. Now, that – all that doesn’t translate into the ability to, you know, manufacture large numbers of modern tanks or things like that, but they have been able to do a pretty remarkable job of producing some quite sophisticated long-range cruise missiles like the one that destroyed the cruiser Moskva, these underwater drones, the way they have been able to develop their own drone industry and to operate it in quite sophisticated ways with homegrown software. And so they’re clearly putting a lot of effort into this.

It remains somewhat opaque, and I think that’s entirely by intention and it’s entirely appropriate. I mean, the one problem that you have is the country is fundamentally within range of Russian missile attacks. And so there have – there has been talk of having some of the – some Ukrainian facilities outside the country, and I think you’ll see more of that. But it’s quite clear that the – you know, the Ukrainians do have a very energetic leader in their – I think it’s the Ministry for Strategic Industries, Mr. Kamyshin, who was the guy who I believe had been running their railroad system very, very effectively as well. So there’s a lot of energy and dynamism in that. It’s going to pay off in a variety of ways.

But at the end of the day, they still absolutely need particularly heavy military equipment and very sophisticated long-range ballistic missiles and things like that. They’re going to be dependent on external supply.

I think, you know, the basic news on the Black Sea is they have been continuing to export grain and they will continue to do so. It is quite remarkable how the Black Sea Fleet has been driven back. And if you go – if you think back to where we were two years ago, where there was an expectation that you were going to have Russian marines landing and seizing Odesa, we’re a very, very far cry from that. Now, the Russians are going to continue to attack ports with cruise and ballistic missiles. They will continue to deploy mines, although that – you know, there are some issues associated with that in terms of how other Black Sea powers, particularly Turkey, feel about that; the same thing with submarine warfare. But on the whole, this is something that the Ukrainians have been able to sustain, and that’s – it’s quite a remarkable achievement. And people – we tend to be very land-focused. It’s important to think about the war at sea as well, because it’s really – it is very important in a number of ways for Ukraine.

Dr. Jones: Just to add briefly onto Eliot’s comments, particularly on – and, Howard, great to hear from you. This is Seth.

The key parts of the industrial base – despite recent meetings in Washington with the U.S. Department of Defense, Commerce, State, and Ukraine’s industrial base, key parts of that are going to just take a long time. I mean, it’s long enough if the U.S. – you know, for the U.S. to jumpstart its medium- and long-range munitions. You know, all of our sophisticated systems there are at least a two-year production phase. So to start not entirely from scratch, but to really build some of those domestic capabilities is – it’s a long process. I think, as Eliott notes, there are some areas where, you know, this sort of MacGyver-like – to highlight the former TV character – entrepreneurship of Ukrainians, where they’ve really been able to advance, and I think where they do have some domestic capabilities, is on uncrewed or unmanned systems.

And a lot of the technology – the Palantirs and Andurils that have provided assistance to the Ukrainians on the technology side, including software, the Ukrainians are pretty good now at key parts of what in the defense world we call the kill chain. And that’s the sensor nodes, the movement of intelligence quickly. That could be from a forward-deployed drone back to artillery. They’re pretty good at that. So there are key parts of that what I’ll call kill chain that Ukrainians are domestically, I think, able to do. Some of the bigger and longer-range ammunition, or missiles, or air defense system, that’s just – that’s just a long – that’s a long time horizon. That’s long for the U.S. to do it in its own industry.

Mr. Kisling: Seth, thanks.

I know we’re over time here, but we have one final question. Jordan Davis from Swiss Broadcasting. Jordan’s been waiting patiently. So, Jordan, why don’t we go to your question? We’ll address it, and then we’ll wrap the call.

Jordan, please.

Q: Hi. Thanks for taking my question.

You touched on it just a few minutes ago, about sort of what the other possible options were for the United States if there’s no congressional authorization for Ukraine weapons and, you know, one of them the exporting to other allies who would then in turn send weapons to Ukraine. And I was wondering how – what the potential for that is? And, yeah, how if that – I mean, obviously, I don’t think that could replace the congressional authorization. But what is the potential for that to help Ukraine?

Mr. Bergmann: Yes. This is Max. I think there is – there is real potential. The broader issue is Europeans have run out – they don’t have the stockpiles that we have. And then there are certain countries, like France for instance, that have a serious military and they’re not going to be willing to go below certain thresholds, just like the Pentagon’s not going to be willing to go below a certain threshold. I could see a situation in an emergency where perhaps they go lower, but only if there’s adequate funding that then is allocated to ramp up production, and they have a degree of certainty.

So there is a sort of tension between the broader readiness of certain European forces and their ability in the immediate term to backfill. Over, I think, the longer term, in terms of providing weapons and selling weapons to Ukraine, I think there’s a lot more potential there. Now, obviously, they’re still not going to have the same industrial capacity that we have. But, you know, Europe is 450 million people. It has lots of resources. And they have a very diverse defense industrial base. So I think there is real potential there.

I’m a little bit more skeptical when I hear about U.S. defense companies going into, like, Eastern Europe to then build equipment for Ukraine. I think there’s potential there, but we have, in general, a challenge of allocating funding to – you know, in Congress – that would go – that wouldn’t be spent for jobs in America. So I think that’s our fundamental challenge. I think there’s this big question for the Eastern European defense industrial base that a lot of it has been geared to sort of focus on old Soviet equipment and repairing sort of Soviet tanks and things like that, and keeping those in service. And they have a lot of spare defense industrial capacity now because all that equipment is gone.

So they have to retool. And there’s a challenge, just like anything with European defenses, that none of these countries or companies are really working together. And I think there’s a lot of uncertainty about where this defense industrial capacity would go. Some of – the EU is sort of trying to address that. That’s part of been the 155 ASAP initiative by the EU, linking some of the Western European companies with Eastern European companies. So there’s a lot happening in this space, I think, in Europe. But it is one that they – what’s certainly needed is funding, I think, to supercharge it all.

Dr. Jones: This this is Seth. Let me just add two kinds of examples. And, you know, this is – these are really meant to be examples rather than comprehensive. But the U.S. continues to export some of its more advanced fighter aircraft to a range of European states, like its F-35s. And that certainly could continue to allow some of those European states to export F-16s to Ukraine. And that’s already started, from Denmark and Netherlands. So, you know, one area to look at is the export of fixed-wing aircraft or even helicopters.

Second is tanks. General Dynamics has been pretty active in working with countries like Poland, discussions with Finland, about exporting Abrams to Europe, particularly to some of the frontline eastern flank states. So that leaves open the possibility of additional Abram supplies that provide a little bit of opportunity for, whether it’s the Poles or others, to export some land-based systems into Ukraine. So those are active discussions. And I think, you know, F-35s is obviously Lockheed, Abrams is General Dynamics, but these are the European – U.S.-European – exports to Europe that might provide some opportunities. And again, we’ve already seen that with that F-16s.

Mr. Kisling: All right, Seth, thank you very much. And to Max, thank you. And thanks to Eliot and Romina and Maria for all of their comments today. And thanks to all of our participants for a great discussion.

So we’ll leave it there. As I noted at the top of the call, we will have a transcript available of this call in a few hours, which we’ll share with everybody and post to CSIS.org. But, of course, we’re always happy to be a resource for your coverage. Don’t hesitate to reach out to the CSIS Press Office as you continue your coverage in leading up to the anniversary here. So with that, thank you all for joining us and enjoy the rest of your day.

Programs & Projects

• Two Years Later: Russia’s War in Ukraine

Russia-Ukraine War Analysts Reveal Plan to Defeat Putin

W estern countries backing Ukraine need to urgently increase their defense production, dedicating more military equipment to Kyiv while battling Moscow's wielding of information, to prevent the Kremlin from triumphing in Ukraine, according to a new analysis.

"The West has the advantage, but it must decide to use it," the Institute for the Study of War ( ISW ), a U.S. think tank, said Wednesday. "All it needs to do is stand up" and mobilize in support of Ukraine's war effort.

"Mobilizing would mean surging its military production, sparing more of its existing military capabilities and economic assets, and accepting a higher threshold for pain and risk now to avoid more cost and pain and risk in the future," the ISW said.

Many Western countries have committed to arming and supporting Ukraine in the more than 25 months Kyiv has spent fighting Russia's full-scale invasion. The U.S. has been the single largest donator of military aid to Kyiv's war effort.

But a new package, worth $60 billion, has languished for months in Congress , jeopardizing Ukraine's supplies of ammunition, rockets, air defense systems and other vital assets. Shortages have already boxed Ukraine into a corner by limiting its operations against Russia, experts say.

Worries over whether Ukraine is adequately equipped will likely worsen in the coming months. Kyiv has warned that Russia is preparing for a renewed offensive around late May and into the summer, and Moscow has been making slow but steady advances in eastern Ukraine.

Western analysts say Russia is hoping to exhaust Ukraine and the support of its Western allies in a grinding war of attrition. Despite sustaining heavy casualties and sky-high equipment losses, Moscow mobilized its industry and put itself on a war footing to plug the gaps in supplies.

Russia is now dedicating around a third of its state spending to defense, rolling out replacement tanks and replenishing its missile stocks.

Western governments, militaries and companies have scaled up defense production, focusing not least on the NATO-standard 155 mm artillery shell that is in high demand in Ukraine. The alliance's stocks have been depleted by sending 155 mm ammunition to the war-torn country.

But throughout the war, Western governments have been hesitant to dedicate resources, citing fears over escalation. The Kremlin's use of "perception manipulation," or making Ukraine's backers see the world and the conflict a certain way, could "allow Russia to win in the real world," the ISW said.

"The Kremlin's principal effort is to force the United States to accept and reason from Russian premises to decisions that advance Russia's interests, not ours," the think tank said.

The U.S. and other countries backing Ukraine need to "take several specific and immediate steps," the ISW said. These nations should give "Ukraine sufficient military aid and other support required for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlefield," as well as ramping up their defense-industrial bases and production within Ukraine, the think tank said.

The West should also help Ukraine exploit vulnerabilities in Russia's military, such as its Black Sea Fleet, the ISW said. Ukraine has estimated that Russia may have lost around a third of its Black Sea Fleet after Kyiv successfully targeted its vessels and bases with missiles and drones during the many months of conflict.

"Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West — and will likely lose — if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin," the ISW said.

Correction 3/31/2024, 10 a.m. ET: This article has been corrected to change a reference to Russia's defense spending.

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Analysis: How Russia, Ukraine’s militaries stack up after two years of war

Ukraine is outgunned by Russia, but plans to increase drone production as the war drags on into a third year.

Ukraine has been fighting Russia for two years to liberate its lands and drive Russia back – but supply, tactics and the flat terrain have meant that the much-vaunted Ukrainian counteroffensive of last year has produced few tangible results.

In the wide-open agricultural land of southern Ukraine, there is not much in the way of cover for an attacking force.

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Russia had months to prepare its defences, and built them in depth.

Row after row of trenches, anti-tank obstacles, ditches and reinforced bunkers have formed a barrier, often kilometres deep, effectively containing Ukrainian forces as they have repeatedly tried to break through into the open country beyond, with little success.

The counteroffensive has bogged down into slow, attritional warfare, as Russia’s strategy of making Ukraine pay for every metre it tries to take is showing signs of succeeding.

The quality of Russia’s soldiers may be questionable, but they are still able to slow down Ukrainian advances, protected in fortified dugouts, along with the help of surveillance drones that stop Ukraine’s military from springing surprise attacks on them.

Even so, a mixture of new and old weaponry has changed the dynamics of the modern battlefield and the war fought in Ukraine.

Some new tactics are being developed and successful weapons systems have been brought into play as old ones, such as the tank, have been kept on.

Yet despite all the 21st-century innovations, the battlefields of southern Ukraine are starting to take on an eerie World War I dynamic. A general from a century ago would have no problem understanding the brutal slog of this conflict.

Drones, drones and more drones

Drones have been integral to both sides of this war.

Russia was very late to adopt their use and paid the price as attempts by its military to surprise Ukraine were dashed, with mass artillery used to destroy Russian armoured and infantry units.

Small Ukrainian drones were used to drop grenades onto Russian positions, demoralising the troops stuck in trenches and foxholes.

Ukrainian artillery used them to spot for batteries that could quickly adjust fire in real time, catching Russian troops and tanks in the open as they tried to advance across flat, featureless fields.

Moscow’s forces have, over time, applied the same lessons and turned the tables. It is now Ukrainian units that get caught advancing only to be destroyed by Russian artillery strikes.

The rivals have both realised the value not just of surveillance drones, but also of longer-range drones that can be used to strike valuable targets deep behind enemy lines.

Russia has used hundreds of Iranian-imported Shahed-136 drones as cheap cruise missiles.

While slow flying, they serve to exhaust Ukrainian air defences, depleting Ukrainian missile inventories as a combination of drone, cruise and ballistic missile attacks steadily erode Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

Ukraine has learned the lesson that plenty of cheap, effective, armed drones are useful in an industrial-level war and a good way to offset a weaker air force.

Ukraine plans mass production of drones that can destroy targets up to 1,000km (620 miles) away, theoretically bringing Moscow and St Petersburg into range. More importantly, marshalling yards, port facilities, train depots and barracks would now all potentially come under fire, further complicating Russian logistical challenges in supplying its forces on the front lines.

To give an idea of the reliance on drones, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, said that in 2023 alone, domestic drone production rose to 300,000 drones, and this didn’t include foreign donations.

The target this year is to make over a million drones, with at least half the components locally made, in an effort to offset waning United States support for Ukraine.

Industry is key

Regardless of who wins the US election , backing for Ukraine has eased as domestic concerns and other wars, such as Israel’s campaign in Gaza, soak up US support and resources.

Ukraine is not getting the military aid it desperately needs as Russia puts its economy on a light war footing, now allocating 6.5 percent of its total budget to replacing its significant losses on the battlefield.

One estimate, published this month by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think-tank, says Russia can now produce 125 tanks per month, more than enough to replace those destroyed in recent fighting.

European members of NATO have been increasingly relied on to make up any potential US shortfall in military aid.

Boosting Ukrainian defence manufacturing in drones and artillery ammunition is now considered a national priority.

The brutal arithmetic shows Ukraine needs an extra 240,000 shells a month to even keep pace with Russia.

As most of the fighting is being conducted at long range, artillery is key to both sides.

Russia’s industry has significantly ramped up production of artillery shells and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), together with large imports of North Korean artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles.

Russia is now able to fire five shells for every Ukrainian one. Desperate Ukrainian defenders in some areas are now down to firing a few rounds a day, just to stave off defeat.

Hard lessons learned

The world’s militaries have been watching the conflict unfold and have had to take several hard lessons onboard.

Prewar estimates for artillery production were woefully small and the Ukrainian conflict shows just how much industrial power one needs when fighting an equivalent army or larger.

Prewar stockpiles of missiles are also extremely low.

Most land-attack missiles were leftovers from the Cold War and would mostly have been nuclear tipped, a few hundred sufficing. It’s now clear that thousands would be needed, which means that low-cost, quickly manufactured missiles are key parts of any arsenal.

So too is a layered air-defence system, again reliant on plentiful amounts of cheap missiles, whose production can be quickly scaled up. The same goes for cruise missiles.

The likes of the Storm Shadow missile – with a range of more than 250km (155 miles) – are extremely effective but are expensive and take a long time to build. Cheap alternatives are needed.

The idea of the tank has made a comeback.

Pre-invasion, many militaries were steadily getting rid of their tank inventories. But experience now shows that the tank, properly protected and part of a combined-arms assault, still has great uses on the battlefield and remains a formidable weapon.

Back to drones, which have infused themselves at every level of the battlefield. Serious force multipliers, they can help any military leverage what equipment and weapons it has. One Ukrainian soldier recently noted, in an interview with Politico, that the accuracy of artillery units increased by 250 percent when paired with drones.

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Russia’s War in Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to Russia’s Military Operations and Systems

• Philip Wasielewski
• June 30, 2023
• Eurasia Program

Key Takeaways

• Some of the critical vulnerabilities to Russia’s military operations and systems—revealed during the war in Ukraine—are due to its military culture and poor strategic choices at the beginning of the war including overly ambitious strategic aims. Deficiencies in Russian military culture include a highly centralized decision-making process, a disregard for the welfare of its soldiers, and flagrant dishonesty.
• Certain aspects of Russia’s military culture, especially the disconnect between front-line soldiers and senior officers, complicate the Russian military’s ability to adapt, develop solutions to obvious deficiencies, and institutionalize lessons learned from the battlefield.
• Other critical Russian military vulnerabilities are not inherent to its military culture but to Russia’s national demographic and industrial capabilities. Limits in these areas make it difficult for Russia to regenerate military power by either increasing the size of its military or increasing the quality of its weapons systems. Even if Russia’s military culture experiences a post-war military renaissance, its ability to regenerate military power lost in Ukraine will be limited by its declining population and industrial bases as well as Western sanctions on high technology.

Russian conscripts called up for military service line up before their departure for garrisons as they gather at a recruitment centre in Simferopol, Crimea, April 25, 2023. REUTERS/Alexey Pavlishak

The Russian Military’s Key Weaknesses

Fifteen months of high-intensity conventional war in Ukraine has exposed a variety of systemic Russian military weaknesses. These include significant equipment deficiencies, such as issues with the quality and quantity of precision-guided munitions, command and control systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), communications systems, reconnaissance and command and control aircraft, and personal equipment. Among other things, the Russian military’s recon-fire complex was ineffective at the beginning of the war with too few UAVs, command and control systems, and precision-guided munitions to employ it successfully, which left Russian ground units vulnerable. However, the primary weakness relates to the Russian military’s doctrine and culture, which explains the Russian military’s poor performance in learning lessons and adapting during the war. This fundamental problem affects how well the Russian military can identify weaknesses, develop solutions, and institutionalize lessons. Of course, this also affects how the Russian military procures new equipment and determines which systems are priorities, so it is fundamental to Russia’s broader defense policy.

One of the difficulties in analyzing the Russian military’s poor performance during the invasion of Ukraine is assessing the extent its performance was due to inherent weaknesses of the Russian military or due to the poor strategy and overly ambitious objectives set by Russia’s political leadership. Indeed, many of the early failures were largely a result of the lack of warning Russian units received and the extreme compartmentalization that characterized the planning of the invasion. The strategy was underpinned by the flawed assumption that there would be minimal resistance. Most Russian soldiers invaded Ukraine with only a few hours of notice and little understanding of the war’s goals, which contributed to confusion and serious morale problems. Units also did not have sufficient time to properly service their vehicles and equipment or acquire enough fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. Ground units received orders to proceed to cities as fast as possible, and they often left behind key support capabilities, which left them unable to fight in a combined arms manner effectively. The Russian military sustained heavy casualties and equipment losses during the first month of the war due to decisions made by Russia’s political leadership. But the Russian military has also been slow to adapt even after it was clear that the assumptions that underpinned the invasion plan were flawed.

One of the key problems demonstrated in this war is that the senior leadership of the Russian military ultimately executed an extremely flawed operation in which Russian forces did not fight according to their doctrine and training. The Russian military emphasizes the role of artillery and fires, but these capabilities were not emphasized in the invasion plan. The operation did not require the Ukrainian military to be defeated because it assumed little resistance. Consequently, the Russian military played mostly a supporting role while the Federal Security Service (FSB) was supposed to effect regime change in Kyiv. Senior Russian officers reportedly questioned the strategy for the war, including the thrust toward Kyiv, but they still executed the plan. [1] The poor results should have been foreseeable, but no senior commanders resigned. Russia’s operation also lacked unity of command, a key principle of war that Russian officers understand. Ultimately, this demonstrated that Russia’s senior military leadership was too compliant and subservient to its political leadership. Coupled with Vladimir Putin’s micromanagement of the war and unrealistic view of what the Russian military could achieve, the senior military leadership’s political compliance meant that Russian strategy was quite poor. Even after repeated failures, senior generals continue to order assaults with little chance of success, likely to please President Putin. This led to minimal gains during the winter offensive but potentially set the stage for Ukraine’s counteroffensive by degrading Russia’s most elite units.

Russia’s Deputy head of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev visits the Prudboi military training ground in Volgograd region, Russia June 1, 2023. Sputnik/Yekaterina Shtukina/Pool via REUTERS

The extreme compartmentalization employed during the invasion is also a sign of the highly centralized decision-making process in the Russian military, which is a critical weakness. Although it has sought to emphasize greater decentralization and innovation in units, the Russian military remains tied to its Soviet past. This is coupled without a strong emphasis on troop welfare, which has been exemplified by senior commanders repeatedly ordering units to conduct assault with little chance for success. In addition, senior Russian officers did not think it was critical to inform their subordinates they were going to war, leaving them unable to prepare properly. This lack of warning and low priority to explain to soldiers why they were fighting in Ukraine contributed to serious morale problems and the significant number of soldiers and officers who refused to continue fighting. In practice, this means that more senior Russian military officers are often out of touch with the realities of junior soldiers and units. When Russia invaded Ukraine, it did so with significantly understrength battalions. Although every Russian brigade and regiment is supposed to be able to form two permanent readiness battalion tactical groups (BTGs) manned exclusively by contract soldiers with 700–900 personnel, Russian battalions were often only at 65–70% strength. Many of these units still depended on conscripts to fill out squads even though conscripts are not supposed to be deployed or assigned to these BTGs. If Russian regiments and brigades had enough time to prepare for the war, they could have fixed some of these issues. Instead, conscripts were deployed by several Russian units at the beginning of the war because they lacked enough contract soldiers. This suggests that senior Russian commanders were unaware of the extent of the personnel issues before Russia invaded. 

Similarly, many Russian units had serious equipment issues, including a lack of UAVs at the outset. Some units had to rely on volunteers with commercial UAVs despite the emphasis that Russian officials had placed on UAV procurement over the past decade, which President Vladimir Putin repeatedly mentioned. This also indicates that more senior officers were unaware of the situation in Russian tactical formations and were not conducting effective regular inspections. This disconnect continued as the war progressed and hindered tactical adaptations. Although Russian soldiers and units adapted, these lessons were not properly institutionalized within the military, limiting their effectiveness. Many Russian Telegram channels mentioned the resistance from more senior officers to procuring commercial UAVs, both used in a reconnaissance role and to drop munitions. This was a natural response to the lack of military UAVs, but senior Russian officers were often hesitant or prohibited their use. In contrast, the Ukrainian military made a much greater effort at procuring UAVs, including the more recent development of First-Person View UAVs as improvised loitering munitions. Ukrainian forces, often supplied by non-governmental groups through crowdfunding on social media, began using these UAVs effectively to target Russian forces over the winter, but Russia was much slower to adopt them. Soldiers and junior officers had a greater appreciation for the need for commercial UAVs and loitering munitions, but senior officers did not. Throughout the war, the Russian military has been slower to innovate than the Ukrainian military. The overly top-down method of leadership is a significant factor in the Russian military’s poor performance in the war and as a learning organization. 

The Russian military is also overly bureaucratic, which often prevents soldiers and officers from exercising initiative and solving problems at their level. A common complaint among Russian Telegram channels was that units of mobilized soldiers trained to serve as artillerymen or in other specialties were used as infantry in Ukraine. In other cases, former Spetsnaz servicemen were sent to serve in tank units where their skills and experiences were not maximized. Additionally, assignments to assault or storm units, which are designed to conduct assaults, have often become a punishment even though they should only be manned by the most motivated and capable soldiers, according to Russian combat manuals.  Numerous anecdotes indicate Russian officers followed regulations that did not apply to the circumstances of the war and focused on garrison disciplinary measures. This included banning MultiCam uniforms by certain senior officers, conducting garrison-style unit inspections, and diverting soldiers from training and combat-related tasks in Ukraine. There is a widespread perception among Russian military bloggers that many senior Russian military officers cannot identify the most important issues facing Russian troops, including equipment problems, and instead focus on peacetime methods of leadership. 

There was also a clear disconnect between soldiers on the front line and senior commanders before Ukraine’s successful offensive in Kharkiv. Soldiers and commanders on the front line had seen a buildup by Ukrainian forces and Russian Telegram channels warned about a potential breakthrough. Russia’s defenses in Kharkiv were weak and many units were significantly understrength. Despite this perilous position, senior leaders failed to make any serious effort to fix the situation or prepare for Ukraine’s offensive. It is unclear if senior Russian generals alerted President Putin to the situation, but they could have taken greater efforts to improve their defenses in the area. Ultimately, the Russian chain of command has repeatedly failed to address problems recognized by units on the front line.

This was one of the many foreseeable mistakes the Russian military committed during this war. Another likely contributing factor to Russia’s failure in Kharkiv is the wide-scale practice of lying and filing false reports to senior officers. Another common complaint among Russian military bloggers is that equipment or personnel shortages are not addressed because officers will simply lie to their superiors to say they are at their authorized strength. Of course, this is also related to the issue of troop welfare since junior soldiers are placed in a worse position when their units are understrength, but they are still ordered to perform missions as if they are at full strength. This also contributes to the poor situational awareness of senior Russian officers. Lying and falsifying reports are culturally entrenched practices that will likely be difficult to fix quickly through reforms. 

These issues with centralized decision-making, lying, troop welfare, and a disconnect between senior officers and junior soldiers, which often reinforce one another, are significant weaknesses. Taken together, they hinder the identification and institutionalization of lessons learned. The Russian military reacts far too slowly to problems or does not address them until they become a serious issue. As for the problems in the Russian reconnaissance-fire complex, senior officers were unaware that many units lacked the right equipment to effectively employ the complex, units were not empowered to operate in a decentralized manner to locate targets, there was often minimal coordination between ground and air units, and units had little time to prepare for the war. Senior officers were likely not aware of how bad the problem was and may have expected it could still be employed at the outset of the war. Even after early deficiencies were identified, Russian units were still slow to adopt commercial UAVs, which could perform the reconnaissance role. 

Looking to the future, these issues are significant because they affect how the Russian military operates, learns, and procures equipment, and they are very difficult to ameliorate because they are so ingrained in Russian military culture. The Russian military requires substantial reforms, but it is unclear if it will have the political will to implement them. This also affects the type of weapons Russia is procuring and the long-term structure of the military. There is less oversight of the Russian military and there is a perception among military bloggers that the Russian military does not promote the best officers to senior positions. Without much room for bottom-up refinement, the senior Russian military officers who make these decisions may not have the best understating of the needs of their units, and they have not demonstrated the willingness to push back against political leaders. In addition, there is a perception among Russian military bloggers that, unlike the Russian-proxy LDNR units, Russian military commanders often receive promotions with less merit, and their promotions are often due to their performance in garrison. Regardless of the truth of the matter, that perception among Russian servicemen is a critical problem. Long-term, Russian conscripts will be less likely to volunteer to serve as contract soldiers because they will not trust the military’s leadership. These systemic cultural and doctrinal issues will be difficult to fix, and they will affect the quality of Russian servicemen and officers who will serve in the Russian military in the future. Indeed, despite fighting in several wars, senior Russian commanders have not demonstrated keen strategic insight or an understanding of how to fix the Russian military.

These considerations lead to the second half of this study on critical Russian military vulnerabilities exposed by the war in Ukraine. This portion will concentrate not on cultural but on capacity issues and their possible effects on Russian military capacity in the future.

A UAV is pictured during a drill of the aerial reconnaissance unit of one of the Territorial Defence brigades, Zaporizhzhia Region, southeastern Ukraine, March 7, 2023. Photo by Dmytro Smolienko/Ukrinform/ABACAPRESS.COM

Weaknesses not in Culture but in Capacity

One critical vulnerability to Russia’s military operations and systems revealed during the war with Ukraine is Russia’s difficulty regenerating military capacity after high casualties, equipment losses, and munitions expenditures. While Russia’s partial mobilization in October 2022 temporarily met manpower needs in Ukraine, the challenges to rebuilding its military are daunting. Regenerating Russian military capability presents challenges in terms of both personnel and major combat systems for Russia’s ground and air forces. This study concludes with a brief analysis of what this means for Russia’s military capabilities later in the decade, whether the war in Ukraine has concluded or turned into a “frozen conflict.”

If demography is destiny, Russia’s destiny as this decade continues will be one of slow decline, which will be reflected in its ability to man the military, paramilitary, and police forces the Kremlin thinks necessary to maintain sovereignty and keep order in the world’s largest country by land mass.

According to Russian government statistics, its population at the beginning of 2023 was 146.4 million, a decline of 600,000 people from just the year before. [2] However, there is doubt that this figure is accurate. Some sources, based on projections of the United Nation’s data, estimate Russia’s population today at 144.5 million. The Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook estimates Russia’s population at 141.7 million. [3] President Putin himself raised doubts about Russia’s true population when he possibly misspoke, or spoke the truth, on March 14, 2023, in Buryatia, stating that only 12 million Russians live east of the Ural Mountains. Official statistics put this number at 27 million. [4] If true, Russia’s publicly released population statistics could be ten or twenty million people too high; its real population figure could be 130 million or less.

Whatever Russia’s actual population, it is undeniable that it continues to decline due to decreased fertility and increased emigration and death rates. If Russian deaths continue to outnumber births in this decade by almost 800,000, then its total population by 2030 would certainly be under 140 million. [5] Considering this was the approximate size of the United States during World War II, Russia should still be able to field a considerable military force from this population base. A Russian population in 2030 of approximately 141 million people would include 7.9 million males between the ages of 20–29 and 11.5 million males between the ages of 20–35. [6]

Thus, Russia’s current and near-term manpower base could support a war in Ukraine and increase the size of its military to 1.5 million men, including 695,000 contract service personnel, as announced by Minister of Defense Shoigu in December 2022. [7] However, there will be difficulties maintaining a military of this size including economic costs and political risks.

The first of these challenges is the increasing unwillingness of young Russian men to serve in the military. The actual manpower cost of the October 2022 mobilization of 300,000 men to Russia’s workforce was at least 600,000 men if one includes the more than 300,000 draft-aged males (many educated in high-technology professions) who fled Russia to avoid the draft. [8] One estimate is that Russia could lose 10% of its 20–29-year-old male cohort due to battlefield casualties and emigration. [9] This is consistent with Moscow’s own public figures that show approximately one million Russian males have left the country to either fight in Ukraine or have emigrated. [10]

The reluctance of Russians to fight in Ukraine is clear. However, even if the war ended today, this would not alter the propensity of most Russian men to avoid military service. Draft evasion among Russia’s youth has become almost a national sport with the majority of those drafted unable to use bribes or influence to avoid conscription. Recognizing this, Russian military reforms purposely decreased the size of its military and tried to attract more contract volunteers. This worked to a degree. When the war in Ukraine began, 70% of Russia’s enlisted men were contract volunteers. However, the remaining manpower requirements of even a much smaller military (900,000 in 2022, vice 1.7 million in 1998) still required two semiannual call-ups of conscripts each year totaling approximately 260,000 men for one year of service. Since most contract soldiers seldom reenlisted due to poor living and working conditions, it is hard to imagine how—after the war—enough young men would volunteer to meet Shoigu’s goal of 695,000 contract soldiers.

Besides its military, Russia has other national security forces to man, mostly with military-age males. The three largest organizations are the 900,000-man Ministry of Internal Affairs, the 340,000-man paramilitary Rosgvardia, and the 170,000-man Federal Border Guard Service, part of the Federal Security Service. When one considers the size of the various internal security organizations, approximately 1.5 million, in comparison with the size of Russia’s military, 900,000, it is clear from where Russia’s leadership really believes its greatest threats come.

Between its intended increased military and its current police and paramilitary forces, the Kremlin plans to put approximately three million men under arms. This is its actual staffing requirement to protect Russia. Due to cultural norms, women will only make up a small percentage of this need. As of 2020, only 5% of Russia’s military cadres were women. [11] The use of prisoners in penal battalions to make up for military shortfalls in combat cannot be replicated in police and security units. It is doubtful that using prisoners will work again for the military due to the high casualty rates suffered by these prisoners, and the reluctance of many others to volunteer.

When one considers the desire to increase the military to 1.5 million people and maintain internal security forces at that same level, the total of three million men under arms will require a considerable part of the 20–29-year-old cohort of 7.9 million men. This is especially so considering, based on years of poverty and poor health care, a substantial percentage of that cohort may not meet even Russian military health and fitness standards. Given these challenges, how will Russia keep three million men in arms? Is this even possible?

Russian conscripts called up for military service take part in a ceremony marking their departure for garrisons as they gather at the Trinity Cathedral in Saint Petersburg, Russia May 23, 2023. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov

Volunteers will gravitate toward the paramilitary, police, and security services because of greater security and the chance of personal gain through corruption. The proclivity of some people to embrace military service based on family traditions, a sense of adventure, patriotism, etc., will attract some contract soldiers or officer candidates. Economic conditions will bring in more. However, based on past contract reenlistment rates and the recent experience of the war in Ukraine, it is unlikely that Russia can solve its manpower requirements as before with a 70/30 ratio of contract soldiers to conscripts. It must either lower its manpower requirements or increase conscription to meet those requirements. For an authoritarian regime obsessed with maintaining power, the latter option is more likely. There are several consequences to this: military, economic, and political.

The primary military consequence will be to return to the Soviet tradition of an army made up of one- or two-year conscripts, a small number of senior noncommissioned officers and warrant officers, and an oversized officer corps. In the Soviet era, the training of short-service conscripts emphasized rote learning of basic combat skills, with no room for initiative or innovation. As in Soviet days, a challenge will be retaining highly skilled personnel to operate, maintain, and fix high-technology weapons and equipment.

The primary economic consequence of this will be the number of people removed from Russia’s workforce and its effect on productivity. Given the birth slump of the past two decades, Russia’s native-born labor force, which is already shrinking, is bound to be yet smaller in 2030 and 2040 than it is today. The number of working-age Russians (ages 25–64) peaked in 2011 and is on a path of steady shrinkage through at least 2040, while the prime-age group (25–54) actually peaked two decades ago. [12] Increasing Russia’s military from its 2022 size of 900,000 to 1.5 million will decrease Russia’s available labor force. These numbers do not reflect the losses the labor force has already sustained due to the war and resulting emigration. Since the size of a country’s labor force is a factor in its gross domestic product (GDP), maintaining a larger military and security force will affect GDP and the standard of living at a time when both are already stressed by sanctions. Declining GDP decreases the government’s ability to meet both military and social spending needs. The former will influence the ability to regenerate military capacity, the latter will impact political stability.

The primary political consequence of maintaining a large military and security establishment at the expense of other social requirements will be the risk of public unrest. Many observers believe the fear of public unrest is what kept President Putin from announcing a mobilization earlier than October 2022, and may yet keep him from announcing a second mobilization to make up for battlefield losses since then.

Therefore, while Russia probably could meet its desired military and security force manpower requirements, it will come at costs that will continue to weaken it economically, as well as risk undermining political and social cohesion. Meeting manpower requirements will only be the first step in regenerating military capacity, especially for the ground and air forces. Russia’s major combat systems have suffered significantly in the war to date, and this analysis considers what the Russian military-industrial complex is capable of replacing.

Ground Forces

According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), in February 2022, Russia’s ground forces consisted of an army of approximately 280,000 men—airborne forces and special forces with 45,000 and 1,000 men respectively—and a naval infantry force of approximately 35,000 men. Since the war began, Russia has conducted two semiannual conscript drafts totaling approximately 260,000 men for its entire military (not just ground forces) and mobilized an additional 300,000 (mostly for its ground forces fighting in Ukraine). [13] IISS also estimated that Russian ground forces at the beginning of the war in Ukraine had 2,927 main battle tanks (MBT), 5,180 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), 1,968 self-propelled (SP) and 150 towed artillery pieces, and 1,056 multiple rocket launchers (MRL), with an additional 10,200 tanks, 8,500 IFVs, 4,260 SP artillery pieces, 12,415 towed artillery pieces, and 3,220 MRLs in storage (mostly older Soviet models). [14]

Since the war began, there is evidence that in some cases official Russian troop strengths and equipment combat readiness had been exaggerated not only to foreign observers but also to its own chain of command. The war has produced high personnel and equipment losses. While the extent of loss is difficult to determine accurately with open sources, the following represent estimates based on available data.

In a December 2022 Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) analysis, Russian military personnel losses by the end of November 2022 exceeded 100,000. [15] On April 30, 2023, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby provided a US assessment that Russian casualties since December were approximately 100,000, with 20,000 dead and 80,000 wounded. [16] Considering Russia’s inadequate medical services, nearly nonexistent rapid medical evacuation capabilities, and the fact that many of these casualties were former convicts serving in Wagner and therefore considered expendable, this 1:4 killed-to-wounded ratio was probably too optimistic. Based on a 1:2.3 killed-to-wounded ratio consistent with Russian casualty rates during World War II, there were likely 30,000 killed and 70,000 wounded in action from December to May 2023. Adding these two estimates plus casualties since May 1, 2023, Russian ground forces have arguably suffered at least 200,000 casualties, and probably more due to the intense combat around Bakhmut in recent weeks.

Equipment losses are somewhat easier to estimate thanks to the work of open-source organizations such as Oryx, whose database of equipment losses requires photographic evidence for verification. According to Oryx’s data, as of May 31, 2023, Russia had lost a minimum of 2,001 MBTs, 2,366 IFVs, 405 SP artillery pieces, 187 towed artillery pieces, and 202 MRLs. One hundred and thirty of the 2,001 MBTs counted by Oryx as destroyed, damaged, or captured were T-62 and T-64 type tanks not counted in IISS data as front-line equipment and most likely reserve stocks brought out of storage. The same applies to the figure for towed artillery pieces. Oryx data counts 187 of these destroyed or captured while IISS data showed only 150 in front-line status, another indicator of equipment used from storage to compensate for combat losses. [17]

By comparing IISS data on front-line Russian equipment in 2022 with current Oryx data on losses in Ukraine, at a minimum Russia has lost approximately 64% of its prewar front-line MBT strength (T-72, T-80, and T-90 models of all types). This includes 35 T-90A and 20 T-90M tanks destroyed or captured out of an estimated total of 350 T-90A (10% loss rate) and 67 T-90M (30% loss rate) tanks, the most modern tanks in the Russian army’s inventory. [18]

Losses for other major classes of ground combat equipment are equally devastating. As of May 31, 2023, at least 2,366 out of 5,180 IFVs have been destroyed, damaged, or captured (46%); as well as 405 SP artillery pieces out of 1,968 (21%) and 202 MRLs out of 1,056 (19%). [19] This is before whatever losses will be suffered in the summer and fall fighting season of 2023.

As IISS data indicates, the Russian military has immense reserves of equipment and has sent many replacement tanks, artillery pieces, and other combat vehicles to the front. However, these provide only a temporary fix and cannot regenerate prewar military capacity because of the age of the equipment (and therefore lower combat capability) and the limited number that can be refurbished for active service. Press reporting indicates that only one in ten Russian combat vehicles in storage may be usable, due to the theft of vital electronics, optics, range-finding equipment, and, in some cases, even entire engines. [20]

Russia’s military-industrial complex can only replace a small percentage of these losses. Russia’s primary tank production plant, UralVagonZavod, built in the 1930s, can reportedly produce only 20 tanks and refurbish another eight each month. Three other armored vehicle repair plants can each refurbish approximately 18 tanks a month. This means an output of possibly 90 new and refurbished tanks a month while Russia’s army loses on average 150 per month in Ukraine. [21] An April 2023 FPRI report indicates that it is unlikely that tank production can be increased due to a shortage of skilled workers and engineers and because Russia’s only tank engine plant is completely dependent on imported industrial equipment. [22] Furthermore, due to sanctions, the question remains whether these newly produced and refurbished armor vehicles have the modern range finders, electronics, main tank gun stabilizers, and other advanced equipment that provide a modern MBT with a battlefield advantage over its predecessors.

The Russian military’s shortage of artillery ammunition is part and parcel of this same military-industrial dilemma. In fifteen months, Russia has gone through decades of artillery stockpiles, and its industrial base is not poised to quickly ramp up production. Investment and construction to do so will take years. Russian ammunition usage rates along the front have reportedly fallen from 20,000 rounds per day (600,000 shells a month of all calibers) to 5,000 per day (150,000 shells a month) due to artillery shell shortages. [23] Open-source information on Russia’s ability to replenish artillery ammunition stocks is less illuminating than information on tank production. However, the April 2023 FPRI report that carefully observed Russian munition refurbishment and ammunition factory financial data estimated that iRussia produced 1.7 million artillery shells of all types in 2022. [24]   This would allow its forces in Ukraine to fire 5,000 rounds a day for 340 days, in other words, just enough to maintain a stalemate once all earlier reserve stocks have been used up. It is certainly not enough to allow Russia to ever again reach the estimated millions of stockpiled artillery rounds that were the legacy of its Cold War arms production.

A parallel problem to the artillery shortage is the issue of barrel life for both artillery pieces and tanks. Most artillery pieces need new barrels after firing 5–7,000 rounds, and most tanks need new barrels after firing 1,000 rounds. This is complicated because, to change a barrel on a Russian tank, one must first remove the turret. [25] Therefore, an additional unknown number of Russian tanks and artillery pieces may be ineffective in combat until they receive new barrels. Unfortunately, ineffective tanks cannot be identified from satellite photos.

Russia’s air force (VVS, a branch of the Russian Aerospace Forces, VKS) has not suffered the same level of attrition as its ground forces, but it faces similar issues of limited industrial capacity and access to advanced materials and avionics due to Western sanctions, which impede its capacity to replace losses. The VVS entered the war with 185 fighters, 427 multi-mission aircraft (fighter and attack), and 264 attack aircraft. Russia’s naval aviation branch had 67 fighters, 44 multi-mission aircraft, and 46 attack aircraft. Since the war began, Russian aviation losses have included one fighter to combat and three fighters to noncombat incidents, 37 multi-mission aircraft, and 40 attack aircraft (Su-24 or Su-25) or approximately 8% of its overall combat air strength. Attack helicopter losses have been somewhat greater. Russia entered the war with 399 attack helicopters and as of May 31, 2023, had lost 62 or 15% of its inventory. [26]

Replacing even this limited amount of combat aircraft and attack helicopter losses will strain Russia’s aviation industry. In March 2021, a lack of orders and other financial difficulties caused the famous Russian aviation design firms of MiG and Sukhoi to merge into the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). Additional mergers followed, including the historic Tupolev and Ilyushin design firms along with the Irkut corporation. In 2022, UAC delivered 27 new multipurpose combat aircraft (four Su-30SM2s for the naval aviation branch, and ten Su-34Ms, seven Su-35Ss, and six Su-57s for VVS). [27]

The Su-57, Russia’s attempt at a fifth generation (5G) aircraft, has had a troubled developmental history with one crash out of the eleven aircraft delivered since 2019. In 2019, UAC signed a contract to deliver 76 aircraft by 2027 but serial production has been limited with the six produced in 2022 as the largest delivery batch to date. None of the ten remaining aircraft have yet to be delivered to operational squadrons, and all are currently assigned to a VKS testing and training center although two aircraft served for a short period in Syria. [28]

Russian aircraft and helicopter production has been hampered by US sanctions specifically aimed at its military-industrial complex. US Treasury sanctions imposed in March 2022 targeted Russia’s aviation industry including factories and companies specializing in avionics, radars, missiles, electronics, helicopter production, etc. [29] UAC has a contract to deliver 20 Su-34 aircraft between 2021–2024 in addition to the contract for 76 Su-57s. Its overall contract obligations are to deliver 150 aircraft of all types from 2021–2027 plus 30 Ka-52 attack helicopters between 2022–2023. It is unlikely that these production numbers can be increased, and with sanctions, it will be a challenge to meet current contracts. [30] Therefore, even if all contracts are fulfilled on time, Russia’s aviation industry will replace only 30 of the 62 attack helicopters lost to date in Ukraine, and its 96 contracted Su-34 and Su-57 multipurpose aircraft will increase overall combat aviation strength by 15 planes after replacing the approximately 81 fighter, multipurpose, and attack aircraft lost so far in the war. This of course assumes no additional losses from combat or accidents.

 Furthermore, half of Russia’s aviation losses have been of its Su-24 and Su-25 attack aircraft, both of which are maximized for close air support. Since neither aircraft production lines are open, this means that either more advanced multipurpose aircraft will have to take on the high-risk, close air support missions or the VVS may have to decrease the amount of close air support it provides to the Russian army in Ukraine to avoid risking its remaining fleet of high-value jets. 

People carry a coffin out of a chapel before the funeral of Alexander Skobelev, junior sergeant of the Russian armed forces killed in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict, in the town of Shlisselburg in the Leningrad region, Russia, June 8, 2023. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov

Regenerating Russia’s Lost Military Capacity: Implications

Russian manpower requirements for a 1.5-million-man military and a 1.5-million-man military/police/security complex can theoretically be met with enough incentives and coercion—though the latter has risks  including societal unrest and impact on GDP. Those in the military become unavailable for the general workforce which impedes the regenerative capacity of Russia’s military-industrial complex by increasing its labor shortage. Currently, a lack of skilled workers and engineers hinder tank production. These and other plants use convict labor—never a source of high-quality outputs—to make up for this shortage. This situation is prevalent in other parts of Russia’s military-industrial complex and has the same hindering effect on regenerating military capacity.     

Due to the heavy losses of trained cadres and armored vehicles and the inability of the Russian military to train quickly newly mobilized forces in technical military specialties, the Russian army in Ukraine has transformed into primarily a foot infantry force. Armor and artillery capabilities remain, but many modern systems have been lost and are replaced by obsolete Soviet-era designs, lowering combat capability. Revolutionary designs touted before the war such as the Armata MBT and the Boomerang IFV have been failures and have not even shown up on the battlefield. Russian ground forces face the prospect of continued heavy losses of men and material in the second half of 2023. Replacing those losses will be inadequate due to manpower and industrial base constraints.

The Russian air force today will be the same in size and capability for the rest of the decade, and possibly beyond, due to the limited capacity of the aviation industry. As with the ground forces, Russian military aviation faces further attrition during 2023. With limited replacements to make up for these losses and replace older models, aircraft will continue to age and consist of 4G and 4.5G combat aircraft while competitors are equipped with 5G aircraft and introduce 6G models. Russia’s aviation industry produced 27 aircraft in 2022, but Lockheed delivered 170 F-35 5G aircraft that year, and China reportedly has produced approximately 200 J-20 5G aircraft since 2017. [31] While others move ahead, Russia’s air combat fleet can only regenerate barely enough capacity to stay in place.

Politico-military

However, despite the deficiencies listed above that will have drastic consequences in any future war against a peer competitor, Russia still has the manpower and military-industrial capacity to keep fighting the war in Ukraine as a stalemate or “frozen conflict” for the foreseeable future unless it suffers a major defeat on the battlefield or experiences major social and political changes at home. It remains a threat to its neighbors due to its imperial intentions, size, huge stockpile of legacy (but still lethal) Soviet-era weapons, and a limited but functioning military-industrial complex to build modern weapons. Russia, with its nebulous population of 130–140 million still dwarfs its neighbors numbering only 1.3 million (Estonia), 1.8 million (Latvia), 2.8 million (Lithuania), 3.7 million (Georgia), 5.5 million (Finland), 9 million (Belarus), 10 million (Azerbaijan), or 19 million (Kazakhstan). Its forces do not have the capacity “to reach the English Channel,” but with time to rebuild, it could reach the Gulf of Riga. Russia’s initial advances into Ukraine in February 2022 penetrated up to 75–125 miles in certain sectors, which, if applied to the topography of NATO’s Baltic members, would bring Russian forces from its borders to the outskirts of Tallinn, Riga, and Lithuania’s Baltic port of Klaipeda. Russian soldiers are capable of incredible sacrifices just as they are capable of incredible brutality. What has hobbled Russia in Ukraine in 2022–2023, besides the fighting spirit of the Ukrainian nation, is its inability to regenerate its combat capacity quickly after absorbing the initial shock of a major industrial-age war, from issues of manpower and industrial capacity. It is a lesson that the United States should heed as it prepares its own national defenses.

Related article(s)

• The Roots of Russian Military Dysfunction
• Russia’s Military Industry Forecast 2023-2025
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The Kremlin says Russia is in a 'state of war' in Ukraine

The Kremlin said Friday that Russia is in a “state of war” in Ukraine , direct language that fueled questions about whether it signaled a change in approach following the landslide election victory claimed by President Vladimir Putin to extend his rule.

“Yes, it began as a special military operation, but as soon as this group was formed there, when the collective West became a participant in this on the side of Ukraine, for us it already became a war,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in comments to the pro-Kremlin Argumenty i Fakty newspaper.

“I am convinced of this. And everyone should understand this for their own internal mobilization,” Peskov added.

The comments quickly drew attention in Russia and abroad, where observers of the war are watching for signs that the Kremlin is readying its public for deeper and prolonged involvement in Ukraine, including a second wave of mobilization to beef up its military ranks as the conflict enters a third year.

The Kremlin has insisted on calling its full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine a “special military operation,” and censorship laws adopted in the early days of the war have allowed authorities to arrest or even jail people who criticize Russia’s actions in Ukraine or simply use the word “war.”

Peskov’s comments would appear to be a departure from that language, which sought to cast the invasion as a limited endeavor and play down its increasingly dominant role in Russian life.

As the remarks drew headlines across the world, analysts were divided over whether they signaled a dramatic shift from the Kremlin.

Peskov’s point that everyone in Russia should understand that the country is in a state of war “for their own internal mobilization” was noted as a particular sign that authorities may soon be asking for more from the Russian public. A new recruitment drive has long been seen as a possibility once Putin secured re-election.

“Now it’s official: the SMO (special military operation) is recognized as a war. Of course, the SMO de facto became a war a long time ago,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the founder and head of the political analysis firm R.Politik.

“But this is a certain psychological boundary, beyond which both the population and the elites will be faced with different demands than during the period of the special military operation,” she wrote on Telegram.

However, others noted that Kremlin officials regularly allude to a wider “war” in their remarks.

“This is not new: The idea that the SMO is just one front, albeit the most bloody, in a wider political-economic-cultural war with the West has long been established, not least by Putin in his state of the federation speech last month, in which he used the w-word,” said Mark Galeotti, head of the consultancy Mayak Intelligence and an honorary professor at University College London.

Peskov’s mention of “internal mobilization” is actually key, Galeotti said. “The Kremlin’s demand that every Russian get into a wartime mindset, and realise there is now no middle ground between being a patriot and a traitor (as Putin defines these),” he wrote on X . “But it’s also important to stop sometimes and not think that there’s going to be a ‘gotcha’ moment when Putin’s mask is ripped off.”

Peskov sought to clarify his comments later Friday.

“This is not related to any legal changes,” Peskov said in his daily briefing with reporters, when asked if they signified a legal change in the status of the “special military operation.”

“This is a special military operation de jure. But de facto, in fact, it has turned into a war for us after the collective West has been directly increasing the level of its involvement in the conflict more and more.”

When pushed on the fact that some in Russia have been put in jail for protesting with the phrase “no to war,” Peskov said it was a “completely inappropriate comparison” because “the context is different.”

Last December, Peskov told NBC News that Russia’s fight remains a “special military operation,” but said the West’s efforts against Russia were indisputably a war, citing what he called “direct” involvement of foreign countries in the conflict and U.S.-led economic sanctions. “If it’s not a war, then how would you like to call it?” Peskov said at the time. “We call it war.”

Putin has framed the war in Ukraine as Russia’s existential fight for survival against the West, which he said seeks its annihilation.

Russian propaganda frequently berates Western governments for supplying Ukraine with weapons, accusing them of effectively fighting Russia on the battlefield, if only by remote control so far.

Tensions around the West’s involvement in Ukraine have grown in recent weeks after French President Emmanuel Macron suggested that he couldn’t rule out sending Western troops on the ground in Ukraine in the future. Putin responded by saying that could precipitate a nuclear war .

Yuliya Talmazan is a reporter for NBC News Digital, based in London.

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Russia-Ukraine war: drones strike Russian factories more than 1,000km from Ukraine – as it happened

Kyiv officials say attack in Tatarstan was on a facility producing long-range drones

• 3h ago Summary of the day
• 3h ago Russia accuses International Olympic Committee President of “conspiracy” with Ukraine
• 3h ago France to propose EU-wide sanctions on Russian companies
• 3h ago UN high commissioner on civilian casualties: 'The conflict is becoming entrenched'
• 4h ago Russia announces wave of military appointments, urges increased security, in wake of March Moscow attack
• 5h ago Blinken: 'absolutely essential' that Ukraine gets more munitions and air defences
• 6h ago ‘We will get those who ordered the attack on Moscow’, Putin says
• 6h ago Damage on Russia's oil refinery not critical, Reuters reports
• 7h ago US intelligence on Moscow attack was too general, Russian media reports
• 7h ago Ukrainian war damage claims system launches at The Hague
• 8h ago Ukrainian Intelligence says attacks will continue, to reduce Russia’s oil revenue
• 8h ago Russian MP says drone attacks will stop ‘when Kyiv is taken’
• 9h ago Ukrainian attack hit Russian facility producing long-range drones, says Kyiv
• 9h ago Belarus holds military drills near Ukraine border
• 10h ago Drones strike Russian factories more than 1,000km from Ukraine

Ukrainian attack hit Russian facility producing long-range drones, says Kyiv

We have more details to bring you on the Ukrainian drone attack which targeted a Russian region more than 1,000 km from Ukraine this morning, Ukraine’s deepest attack yet.

A Kyiv intelligence source said the attack on Tatarstan hit a facility where Russia produces Shahed drones, which are frequently used in assaults on Ukrainian territory. This comes after Ukraine’s military spy agency said “significant damage” had been caused to a military target.

Reuters analysis of photographs posted online suggests that one of the drones also hit a unit at Tatarstan’s Taneco oil refinery which accounts for roughly half of its annual production capacity.

Summary of the day

Here is a wrap-up of the day’s key events:

In their deepest attack into Russia yet, a Ukrainian drone struck the primary unit of the third largest Russian oil refinery in the Tatarstan region, more than 1,100 km (690 miles) from Ukraine . A Kyiv intelligence source said the attack on Tatarstan hit a facility where Russia produces Shahed drones, which are frequently used in assaults on Ukrainian territory. The strike caused a fire at the facility, the source said, adding that such attacks would continue in order to reduce Russia’s oil revenue. Tatarstan officials said earlier on Tuesday that the attack didn’t disrupt industrial production, while Nizhnekamsk’s mayor said the attempt to strike a refinery was thwarted by air defenses.

A senior Russian politician has said drone attacks on Russia will only stop ‘when Kyiv is taken’. A translation of Andrei Kartapolov’s remarks suggests he accused Ukraine of carrying out ‘despicable terrorist’ attacks, calling it a ‘vile enemy’ which is striking Russia ‘on the sly’. In response to the attack, the Kremlin said that it was working to minimise the impact of Ukrainian drone strikes.

The Register of Damages for Ukraine opened formally in The Hague , during a conference bringing together senior ministers and officials from Ukraine, the Netherlands and European institutions. Ukrainians can enter claims for damages to their property as a result of Russia’s invasion via a new mechanism launched on Tuesday, with officials expecting as many as 10 million requests overall. The initial launch focuses on claims of damage or destruction to residential property from the invasion. Between 300,000 and 600,000 claims are expected in this category.

President Vladimir Putin vowed to ‘get those who ordered the attack on Moscow’ and urged Russia’s law enforcement agencies to tighten security at mass gatherings. Putin said it is important to determine ‘not only the perpetrators of this outrage, but all links in the chain and its beneficiaries.’ He added: ‘Those who use this weapon against Russia should realise it’s a double-edged weapon.’ Previously, top Russian officials have accused Ukraine and the West of being involved, even though the attack has been claimed by the Islamic State (IS) group. Russian spy service chief Sergei Narynshkin has also said on Tuesday that while the US did send Moscow intelligence ahead of the attack, it was ‘too general.’

Russia has announced new top brass in wake of March Moscow attack. The Russian defence ministry on Tuesday announced that it was appointing several officers to senior military positions. Adm Alexander Moiseev was appointed head of the navy, Vice Adm Konstantin Kabantsov was appointed as commander of the Northern Fleet, and Vice Adm Sergei Pinchuk was named as commander of the Black Sea fleet.

The US secretary of state Antony Blinken has said it is “absolutely essential” that Ukraine gets more munitions and air defences , when speaking to media in France on Tuesday.

France announces plans to propose EU-wide level sanctions on Russain companies spreading ‘disinformation,’.

Pytor Verzilov, the unofficial spokesperson of the feminist opposition group Pussy Riot, has been sentenced in absentia by a Moscow court to eight years and four months for social media posts criticising the war in Ukraine. He left Russia in 2020, and announced last spring that he had joined the Ukrainian army, although it is unclear if he is still there. Reuters reports he could not immediately be contacted for comment.

Russia has accused International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach on Tuesday of taking part in a “conspiracy” with Ukraine to exclude its strongest athletes from this year’s Paris Games. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova posted on Telegram that Bach had ‘entered into a political-administrative and, apparently, criminal conspiracy with one specific party’ – meaning Ukraine – ‘to exclude strong sports competitors from international competitions’.

Russia accuses International Olympic Committee President of “conspiracy” with Ukraine

Russia accused International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach on Tuesday of taking part in a “conspiracy” with Ukraine to exclude its strongest athletes from this year’s Paris Games.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova made the allegation after two Russian pranksters known as Vovan and Lexus published a recording of a conversation with Bach in which he was falsely led to believe he was speaking to an African sports official.

Bach said in the call that the IOC had established a special panel to monitor the media and the internet and ensure that Russian athletes who had made political statements in support of their government could not take part in the Olympics.

“We have also offered to the Ukrainian side – not only offered, but asked them - to provide us with their knowledge of the behaviour of such (Russian) athletes or officials,” Bach could be heard saying in English on the recording. Zakharova posted on Telegram that Bach had ‘entered into a political-administrative and, apparently, criminal conspiracy with one specific party’ – meaning Ukraine – ‘to exclude strong sports competitors from international competitions’.

She added: ‘The relationship of IOC President Bach with the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine and its officials, and the admissions of a “request to monitor Russian athletes” should be the subject of a thorough investigation.’

Relations between Russia and the IOC have worsened sharply in the run-up to the Olympics, at which Russian and Belarusian athletes will compete as neutrals, without their flags and anthems, because of the war in Ukraine. They have also been banned from taking part in the opening parade.

France to propose EU-wide sanctions on Russian companies

France will propose EU-wide level sanctions on Russain companies spreading ‘disinformation,’ said French foreign affairs minister, Stephane Sejourne , announced on Tuesday.

“I will propose putting forward a sanctions regime against those who support a regime of disinformation,” said Sejourne, as he held a news conference in Paris with US secretary of state Antony Blinken .

UN high commissioner on civilian casualties: 'The conflict is becoming entrenched'

Volker Türk , the UN High commissioner for Human Rights, said Tuesday that the war has killed more than 10,500 Ukrainian civilians and injured more than 20,000.

“The conflict increasingly is becoming entrenched and protracted, punctuated by recurring waves of attacks, as seen across the country last week,” he said in a speech.

Several people were injured in Ukraine’s attacks against the drone factory, region head Rustam Minnikhanov said. It was not immediately clear if they were workers involved with drone production.

A video posted online showed a fixed-wing aircraft diving toward the factory grounds in Yelabuga and setting off a large explosion as it slammed into one of the buildings. Onlookers, including police officers, could be seen diving to the ground as debris was thrown in the air.

Drones strike Yelabuga, Tatarstan: hitting the Elaz-Nefteproduct refinery and the Shahed drone factory. Yelabuga sits 1,200 km from Ukraine's border. pic.twitter.com/8AS1dtUCCW — Maria Avdeeva (@maria_avdv) April 2, 2024

Journalists and online researchers have confirmed that the strikes appeared to have hit dormitories that previously housed the students at the factory site. Read more:

Russia announces wave of military appointments, urges increased security, in wake of March Moscow attack

The Russian defence ministry on Tuesday announced that it was appointing several officers to senior military positions. Adm Alexander Moiseev was appointed head of the navy.

During the conference call with the senior staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu also said that Vice Adm Konstantin Kabantsov was appointed as commander of the Northern Fleet, and Vice Adm Sergei Pinchuk was named as commander of the Black Sea fleet.

Earlier on Tuesday, President Vladimir Putin vowed to track down the masterminds of the Moscow concert hall attack and urged the country’s law enforcement agencies to tighten security at mass gatherings.

Putin said it is important to determine “not only the perpetrators of this outrage, but all links in the chain and its beneficiaries.” He added: “Those who use this weapon against Russia should realise it’s a double-edged weapon.”

Putin said that the masterminds of the concert hall raid sought to “sow discord and panic, strife and hatred in our multi-ethnic country in order to break up Russia from within,” adding that “we mustn’t allow them to do that.”

“Some of them are trying to preserve their hegemony in today’s rapidly changing world at the expense of Russia,” he went on. “Some apparently saw our country as a weak link. They are mistaken.”

Blinken: 'absolutely essential' that Ukraine gets more munitions and air defences

Speaking to the media in France, the US secretary of state Antony Blinken has said it is “absolutely essential” that Ukraine gets more munitions and air defences.

Reuters reports he told the media “It is absolutely essential to get Ukrainians what they continue to need to defend themselves, particularly when it comes to munitions and air defences.”

In a dig at Republicans in the US house and senate holding up money for Ukraine, he added “It’s another reason why the supplementary budget request that President Biden has made to Congress must be fulfilled as quickly as possible.”

Blinken and French defence minister Sebastien Lecornu earlier visited a factory where arms producer Nexter says it is aiming to increase production.

Pytor Verzilov, the unofficial spokesperson of the feminist opposition group Pussy Riot, has been sentenced in absentia by a Moscow court to eight years and four months for social media posts criticising the war in Ukraine .

Reuters reports the Ostorozhno Novosti Telegram channel said that Moscow’s Basmanny district court had found Verzilov guilty of spreading “deliberately false” information about the Russian military.

Verzilov has posted frequent criticism on social media of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including videos showing mass graves in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha.

He left Russia in 2020, and announced last spring that he had joined the Ukrainian army, although it is unclear if he is still there. Reuters reports he could not immediately be contacted for comment.

Last week, the same court sentenced another Pussy Riot activist, Lyusya Shtein , to six years also in absentia under wartime censorship laws.

Ukrinform reports that an intelligence source has told it that Ukrainian forces struck a power plant in Sevastopol in Crimea overnight. Russian unilaterally claimed to have annexed the Crimea peninsula in 2014.

‘We will get those who ordered the attack on Moscow’, Putin says

On Tuesday, Vladimir Putin said that ‘We will definitely get to those who ultimately ordered it.’

Putin told a meeting of Interior Ministry officials, ‘We paid a very high price, and the entire analysis of the situation must be extremely objective and professional.’

The 22 March attack on a Moscow concert hall was the worst in Russia for years. More than 130 people were killed as gunmen stormed the complex, days after President Vladimir Putin began his fifth term of office. The Islamic State group (IS) has said four of its members carried out the attack.

Russia’s FSB Security Service said Monday that four people arrested over a foiled “terror” plot had provided money and arms for the deadly attack on a Moscow concert hall last month.

Previously, top Russian officials have accused Ukraine and the West of being involved in the deadly Moscow concert hall attack, after it was claimed by the Islamic State (IS) group.

Damage on Russia's oil refinery not critical, Reuters reports

An industry source has told Reuters that damage to Russia’s Taneco oil refinery, Russia’s third biggest refinery, is not critical and personnel is returning to the site. The drone attack has been Ukraine’s deepest since the war began in February 2022. Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu also said on Tuesday that the army is pushing Ukrainian forces westwards. Shoigu said groups of Russian troops “continue to push back the Ukrainian formations” towards the west.

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Russia Amps Up Online Campaign Against Ukraine Before U.S. Elections

Moscow has found better ways to conceal influence operations that spread arguments for isolationism, officials and experts say.

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By Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger

Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger, who have covered Russian cyber and information operations for years, reported from Washington.

Russia has intensified its online efforts to derail military funding for Ukraine in the United States and Europe, largely by using harder-to-trace technologies to amplify arguments for isolationism ahead of the U.S. elections, according to disinformation experts and intelligence assessments.

In recent days, intelligence agencies have warned that Russia has found better ways to hide its influence operations, and the Treasury Department issued sanctions last week against two Russian companies that it said supported the Kremlin’s campaign.

The stepped-up operations, run by aides to President Vladimir V. Putin and Russian military intelligence agencies, come at a critical moment in the debate in the United States over support for Ukraine in its war against Russia. While opposition to additional aid may have started without Russian influence, the Kremlin now sees an opportunity.

Russian operatives are laying the groundwork for what could be a stronger push to support candidates who oppose aiding Ukraine, or who call for pulling the United States back from NATO and other alliances, U.S. officials and independent researchers say.

Investigators say that firms working in the “Doppelgänger” network — and Russian intelligence agencies duplicating the tactics — are using the techniques to replicate and distort legitimate news sites in order to undermine continued aid to Ukraine.

These techniques are subtle and far more skillful than what Russia attempted in 2016, when it made up Facebook posts or tweets in the names of nonexistent Americans, and used them to fuel protests over immigration or other hot-button issues.

The loosely linked “Doppelgänger” creates fake versions of real news websites in the United States, Israel, Germany and Japan, among other countries. It often promotes websites previously associated with Russia’s military intelligence agency, known as the G.R.U.

The result is that much of the original speech is First Amendment-protected — say a member of Congress declaring that resources being sent to Ukraine should instead be used to patrol the southern border of the United States. But the amplification is engineered in Russia or by Russian influencers.

Mr. Putin has given responsibility for a growing number of influence operations to a key lieutenant, Sergei Kiriyenko, according to American and European officials. The Treasury Department last Wednesday imposed sanctions on people associated with Mr. Kiriyenko’s operations.

Researchers at Alethea, an anti-disinformation company, have identified a group affiliated with the G.R.U. that is using hard-to-detect techniques to spread similar messages on social media. A report by Alethea echoed a recent assessment by American intelligence agencies that said Russia would continue to “better hide their hand” while conducting influence operations.

“The network demonstrates an evolution of Russian objectives with their information operations,” Lisa Kaplan, the firm’s founder and chief executive, said in an interview. “Where the Russians previously sought to sow chaos, now they appear to be singularly focused on influencing democracies to elect candidates that do not support sending aid to Ukraine — which in turn supports isolationist, protectionist candidates and policies.”

“This long-term strategy, if effective, would result in reduced support for Ukraine globally,” she said.

American officials note, however, that these techniques make identifying — and calling out — Russian operations particularly difficult.

In the 2016 election, the Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll farm that waged information warfare against the United States, spewed out thousands of social media posts, pretending they were from Americans. By the 2020 election, the National Security Agency learned how to disrupt the operations inside Russia.

Moscow moved to shut down the Internet Research Agency after its founder, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, staged a short-lived mutiny against the Russian military last year. People affiliated with the group remain active. But U.S. officials and experts say it is no longer the main Russian influence effort.

“The Internet Research Agency in many ways was just a place holder for what became a much more expansive information effort in traditional media and social media,” said Clint Watts, the general manager of Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center.

The latest efforts are more directly controlled by the Kremlin. Before the Treasury sanctions last week, the State Department outlined what it said were efforts by the two Russian companies , the Social Design Agency, a public relations company, and Structura National Technologies, an information technology firm, to create disinformation campaigns.

American intelligence agencies do not believe the Kremlin has begun its full-bore influence effort. Mr. Putin will probably shift at some point from the anti-Ukraine messaging to influence operations that more directly support the candidacy of former President Donald J. Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee.

Mr. Putin is not likely to order a major effort in the presidential election until after the party conventions this summer, officials and experts said.

“What we’ve observed is the Russians, and a number of other adversarial countries, thinking about how and when they might influence the election,” said Jim Himes, Democrat of Connecticut and a senior member of the House Intelligence Committee.

Mr. Putin argues that the United States has sought to influence Russian politics, including the presidential election this month, in which he was, unsurprisingly, re-elected by an overwhelming margin . It is not clear how much Mr. Putin regards U.S. sanctions issued after the death of the opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny as a kind of interference in his politics.

“Putin believes in his heart that we meddle in his elections,” Mr. Himes said. “Things like contact with dissident groups or amplifying Navalny’s message. Putin sees all of that as interference on the part of the U.S. He regards things like senators and congressmen criticizing his election as election interference.”

The Russian activity captivating American attention is not limited to influence operations. Russia’s S.V.R., the intelligence agency that was most active in the 2016 election and that was behind the “SolarWinds” hack that gained entry to scores of government agencies and major American companies, has been in a monthslong attack on Microsoft. The effort appears aimed at gaining access to emails and corporate data.

And U.S. officials say that ransomware attacks continue to surge from Russian territory.

A wave of such attacks prompted President Biden and Mr. Putin’s only leader-to-leader summit, in 2021. An effort to work together on stemming those attacks collapsed as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began the next year. Today, the hacking campaigns reap millions of dollars for criminal groups, while often serving the Kremlin’s agenda of disrupting American health care, government services and utilities.

In their annual threat assessment, the intelligence agencies said that Russia was trying to sow discord among voters in the United States and its allies around the world, and that the war in Ukraine “will continue to feature heavily in its messaging.”

“Moscow views U.S. elections as opportunities and has conducted influence operations for decades,” the intelligence report said. “Russia is contemplating how U.S. electoral outcomes in 2024 could impact Western support to Ukraine and probably will attempt to affect the elections in ways that best support its interests and goals.”

Russia is likely to be the most active foreign power seeking to influence the presidential election, though China and Iran have also stepped up their efforts, Mr. Himes said.

“It’s important to remember that the nature of election meddling is very different when you’re talking about the Russians,” Mr. Himes said. “The Russians are orders of magnitude more intense and more focused on what we’ve seen from the Chinese, Iranians and others.”

After the 2016 vote, Democrats and Republicans fiercely debated whether Mr. Putin simply wanted to create chaos in the American electorate or actively supported Mr. Trump. The intelligence agencies concluded in that election, and in 2020, that Russia sought to bolster Mr. Trump.

Intelligence agencies believe the Russian government again favors Mr. Trump’s election, largely because of his skepticism about aid to Ukraine. But how explicitly Russian influence operations will support Mr. Trump or denigrate Mr. Biden is unknown, according to American officials.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger

Our Coverage of the War in Ukraine

News and Analysis

Kyiv is aiming to build its own weapons to bring the fight to Russia, signaling a potential boom in domestic weapons production . Whether that can be done in time to alter the trajectory of a war that would be more tenuous without U.S. military aid remains to be seen.

Ukraine’s troop-starved brigades have started their own recruitment campaigns  to fill ranks depleted in the war with Russia.

The Czech Republic froze the assets of two men and a news website  it accused of running a “Russian influence operation” in Europe.

Symbolism or Strategy?: Ukrainians say that defending places with little strategic value is worth the cost in casualties and weapons , because the attacking Russians pay an even higher price. American officials aren’t so sure.

Elaborate Tales: As the Ukraine war grinds on, the Kremlin has created increasingly complex fabrications online  to discredit Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, and undermine the country’s support in the West.

Targeting Russia’s Oil Industry: With its army short of ammunition and troops to break the deadlock on the battlefield, Kyiv has increasingly taken the fight beyond the Ukrainian border, attacking oil infrastructure deep in Russian territory .

How We Verify Our Reporting

Our team of visual journalists analyzes satellite images, photographs , videos and radio transmissions  to independently confirm troop movements and other details.

We monitor and authenticate reports on social media, corroborating these with eyewitness accounts and interviews. Read more about our reporting efforts .