religion discrimination essay

Essay on Religious Discrimination

Students are often asked to write an essay on Religious Discrimination in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

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100 Words Essay on Religious Discrimination

Understanding religious discrimination.

Religious discrimination is when someone is treated poorly because of their religion. It can happen anywhere, like schools, offices, or public places. This unfair treatment can make people feel sad, angry, or scared. It’s important to understand that everyone should be treated equally, no matter what their religion is.

Types of Religious Discrimination

There are different ways people can face religious discrimination. This can include being made fun of, being denied opportunities, or even being hurt physically. It can also include being treated unfairly because of religious clothes, symbols, or holidays.

Effects of Religious Discrimination

Religious discrimination can harm people in many ways. It can hurt their feelings, make them feel alone, or even make them scared to practice their religion. It can also cause problems in communities, making people feel divided and causing conflicts.

Fighting Against Religious Discrimination

Fighting against religious discrimination is everyone’s job. We must learn to respect all religions and treat everyone fairly. Schools, offices, and governments can help by making rules against discrimination. We can also help by standing up for people who are being treated unfairly because of their religion.

Religious discrimination is a serious problem that we must fight against. By respecting all religions and treating everyone fairly, we can make our world a better place. It’s important to remember that everyone has the right to practice their religion without fear of discrimination.

250 Words Essay on Religious Discrimination

What is religious discrimination.

Religious discrimination is when people are treated badly because of their religious beliefs. This could be at school, at work, or in the community. It’s like treating someone unfairly just because they follow a different religion. It’s not right and it’s against the law in many places.

Examples of Religious Discrimination

Imagine a person not getting a job or promotion because they wear a religious symbol, like a cross or a hijab. Or a student being teased at school for their religious beliefs. These are examples of religious discrimination.

Religious discrimination can hurt people’s feelings and make them feel left out. It can also cause stress and fear. People might even stop practicing their religion because of it.

Preventing Religious Discrimination

To stop religious discrimination, we should respect all religions. We should also learn about different religions to understand them better. Schools and workplaces should have rules against religious discrimination.

Religious discrimination is wrong. Everyone has the right to follow their own religion without being treated badly. By understanding and respecting each other’s religions, we can help to stop religious discrimination.

500 Words Essay on Religious Discrimination

Religious discrimination means treating someone unfairly because of their religious beliefs. It is a problem that happens when people are not treated equally because they follow a certain religion, or because they have different religious views. This kind of unfair treatment can happen in many places, like schools, workplaces, or even in public places.

Forms of Religious Discrimination

Religious discrimination can take many forms. One common form is when people are treated badly or unfairly because of their religious beliefs. This can include being made fun of, being left out, or even being hurt physically because of one’s religion. Another form is when people are not given the same opportunities as others because of their religion. For example, someone might not get a job or a promotion at work because of their religious beliefs.

Religious discrimination can have serious effects on people. It can make people feel sad, angry, or scared. It can also make people feel like they do not belong or are not accepted by others. This can lead to feelings of loneliness and isolation. In some cases, religious discrimination can even lead to violence or conflict between different religious groups.

Combating Religious Discrimination

There are many ways to fight against religious discrimination. One way is through education. By learning about different religions and their beliefs, people can gain a better understanding and respect for each other’s differences. This can help to reduce misunderstandings and prejudice.

Another way is through laws and policies that protect people from religious discrimination. Many countries have laws that make it illegal to discriminate against someone because of their religion. These laws can help to ensure that everyone is treated equally, regardless of their religious beliefs.

Religious discrimination is a problem that affects many people around the world. It can cause harm and create division among people. But by understanding what it is, recognizing its forms, and taking steps to combat it, we can work towards a world where everyone is treated with respect and fairness, no matter what their religious beliefs may be. It is important for all of us to stand up against religious discrimination and promote understanding and respect for all religions.

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Home — Essay Samples — Religion — Religious Tolerance — Religious Discrimination: A Challenge to Freedom and Equality

Religious Discrimination: a Challenge to Freedom and Equality

Categories: Religious Liberty Religious Tolerance

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Words: 676 |

Published: Sep 16, 2023

Words: 676 | Page: 1 | 4 min read

Understanding religious discrimination, the global scope of religious discrimination, the consequences of religious discrimination, combating religious discrimination.

Harassment: Verbal, physical, or psychological abuse targeted at individuals based on their religious beliefs.
Exclusion: Denying individuals access to education, employment, public services, or social activities due to their religious affiliation.
Stereotyping: Perpetuating negative stereotypes or misconceptions about particular religious groups, leading to bias and discrimination.
Hate Crimes: Committing acts of violence or vandalism against religious institutions, individuals, or communities because of their faith.
Religious Persecution: Religious minorities, such as the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar or the Uighur Muslims in China, face severe persecution and human rights abuses.
Religious Hate Crimes: Hate crimes against religious groups, like the attack on a synagogue in Pittsburgh, USA, or the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand, highlight the global reach of religious discrimination.
Legal Discrimination: Laws that discriminate against specific religious groups or restrict religious freedom are still in place in some countries, limiting the rights and opportunities of religious minorities.
Human Rights Violations: Discrimination infringes upon the basic human rights and dignity of individuals, leading to a cycle of inequality and injustice.
Social Tensions: Discrimination fosters social tensions, divisions, and conflicts between religious communities, hindering peaceful coexistence.
Economic Disparities: Exclusion from employment and educational opportunities can result in economic disparities for religious minorities, perpetuating cycles of poverty.
Radicalization: In some cases, discrimination can lead to radicalization and extremism, as individuals feel marginalized and turn to extremist ideologies.
Legal Protections: Enacting and enforcing laws that prohibit religious discrimination and hate crimes, while also promoting religious freedom.
Educational Initiatives: Implementing educational programs that promote tolerance, diversity, and interfaith dialogue from an early age.
Community Engagement: Encouraging religious leaders and communities to engage in dialogue, build understanding, and foster cooperation between religious groups.
International Cooperation: Promoting international collaboration to address religious discrimination on a global scale and provide support to affected communities.

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Article Contents

1. introduction, 2. two distinct religious interests, from the committed and non-committal perspectives, 3. a conceptual distinction between the two interests, 4. the right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination: functional and normative distinctions, 5. conclusion.

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The right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination: Theoretical distinctions

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Tarunabh Khaitan, Jane Calderwood Norton, The right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination: Theoretical distinctions, International Journal of Constitutional Law , Volume 17, Issue 4, October 2019, Pages 1125–1145, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz087

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This article argues that while they are often conflated, the right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination are in fact distinct human rights. Religious freedom is best understood as protecting our interest in religious adherence (and non-adherence), understood from the committed perspective of the (non)adherent. This internal, committed perspective generates a capacious and realistic conception of religious adherence, which reflects the staggering plurality of forms of religiosity (or lack thereof) as extant in contemporary societies. The right against religious discrimination is best understood as protecting our non-committal interest in the unsaddled membership of our religious group. Thus understood, the two rights have distinct normative rationales. Religious freedom is justified by the need to respect our decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence. The prohibition on religious discrimination is justified by the need to reduce any significant (political, sociocultural, or material) advantage gaps between different religious groups. These differences reveal a complex map of two overlapping, but conceptually distinct, human rights which are not necessarily breached simultaneously.

We live in a post-secular world where religion has made a surprising comeback, falsifying Weberian predictions of ever-continuing secularization. 1 Almost every large society—some for the first time in recent history—is grappling with religious pluralism. At the same time, however, religious conflicts and religious terrorism occupy newspaper headlines, Islamophobia has become rampant, 2 anti-Semitism has increased, and lower-scale religious hostility is rife. Even majority religions now view themselves as victims of secularization, multiculturalism, and the feminist and gay rights “agendas.” The re-emergence of religion has resulted in at least some of these issues being debated in courts, using the legally prescribed discourse of human rights. Here, we most commonly see this debate take place in terms of the right to religious freedom or the right against religious discrimination.

This article is an intervention in an ongoing debate around the legal protection for religion. Some argue that the prohibition on religious discrimination has become a tool to protect prejudice and intolerance (usually against women, gays, bisexuals, lesbians, and transpersons), and therefore religion should lose its status as a protected characteristic altogether. 3 By contrast, others argue that discrimination law is not taking conscience-based claims of religious adherents seriously enough and, in its zeal to protect gay people from discrimination, is itself discriminating against religious people, alongside violating their religious freedom. 4 Therefore, this argument claims, human rights protection of religion is becoming increasingly toothless. It seems that neither side is happy with how the law deals with religion.

This article approaches the debate around law and religion from a different angle by arguing that, while they are often conflated, the right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination are in fact distinct human rights. As such, they protect distinct human interests and distinct (although often overlapping) aspects of religion. Religious freedom is best understood as protecting our interest in religious (non)adherence. The right against religious discrimination is best understood as protecting our interest in the unsaddled membership of our religious group. 5 One right is interested in protecting certain beliefs and practices, the other in protecting our tribe. The distinction is well-captured in the old joke about a Belfast rabbi being asked if he was “a Protestant Jew or a Catholic Jew.” Or, as Ashis Nandy claimed in the Indian context, “Hindutva will be the end of Hinduism.” 6 In these examples, Protestantism/Catholicism/Hindutva identify sociopolitical group identities, whereas Judaism and Hinduism concern religious adherence. And yet, legal scholarship has paid little attention to this distinction or to its implications, 7 and the courts have moved between the two rights with little explanation. 8 In commenting on controversial issues involving religion, politicians and the media have also perpetuated this lack of clarity. 9 This article attempts to remedy this oversight by setting out the distinction between the two sets of interests and their corresponding rights in conceptually clear terms. A subsequent article will canvass some of the key implications of these theoretical distinctions for legal doctrine and offer a normative restatement of the same.

Section 2 identifies and explains these two distinct religious interests. These interests may be distinguished by adopting different perspectives: religion as viewed from the committed perspective of the (non)adherent on the one hand and, on the other hand, the privileges and disadvantages that accompany the membership of a religious group as assessed from the non-committal (public) point of view. This distinction is important for two reasons. First, unpacking the differing facets of religious interests provides theoretical clarification— what is the law protecting when it protects religion? Second, the distinction has practical implications for how religious interests are protected (to be explored in a companion article). Section 3 identifies a key conceptual distinction between the two religious interests distinguished in the preceding section: religious adherence tracks the freedom to pursue the good, whereas unsaddled membership of a religious group directly tracks the good. Finally, in Section 4, we argue that, functionally, the right to religious freedom is best understood as protecting our interest in religious (non)adherence, whereas the right against religious discrimination is best understood as protecting religious group membership. We further argue—at a normative level—that the value of respecting decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence underpins religious freedom, whereas the need to reduce the sociocultural and material advantage gaps between different religious groups is the key aim of the right against religious discrimination.

This distinction between religious adherence and religious group membership can help explain why it is not inconsistent for a person to disapprove of a religious group being made a target of prejudice, stereotypes, and social disadvantage, while at the same time rejecting or even condemning, some of the substantive religious beliefs of some such groups. It also explains why an uncommitted/non-adherent person can and should still receive antidiscrimination law’s protection. The conceptual distinction we are proposing may not always be observed in the practice of a given jurisdiction. Lawyers have strategic reasons to throw whatever argument might stick, and conceptual tidiness is often a casualty. It would be naive to expect theory and practice to mirror each other. Nonetheless, the conceptual (and normative) claims in this paper should be a useful guide to understanding the two rights that concern religion.

In this section, we identify two distinct interests we have with respect to religion: an interest in religious (non)adherence and an interest in our ability to enjoy unsaddled membership of a religious group. To explore this distinction further, we distinguish the committed perspective of the religious (non)adherent from the noncommittal (public) identification of the privileges and disadvantages—social, economic, cultural, and political—that accompany the membership of (different) religious groups. The distinction grounds subsequent discussion about the nature of the two human rights concerning religion. While it is possible that some of our arguments could apply to non-religious interests also—such as adherence to a set of non-religious beliefs —this article’s focus is on the legal protection of religion.

A word first about what is meant by religion. Religion is a complex and multifaceted intersubjective phenomenon, in the sense that its existence depends on its shared acceptance in the consciousness of several persons. Not all details of its contents need to be shared, but as a “social form” 10 it cannot exist outside some shared consciousness within a social group. Other similar intersubjective phenomena include marriage (it would be meaningless to “marry” someone in a society where it did not exist as a social form), money (few would trade valuable goods for pieces of paper without an intersubjective acceptance of the value of these pieces of paper), and nations (imagined communities they might be, 11 but a nation cannot be constituted in the imagination of one person—or even ten, for that matter). This intersubjectivity requirement qualifies the committed perspective we are about to explore—it places constraints on what can count as religion, and more importantly what cannot (for example, my personal cult of bunny worship is not likely to satisfy the intersubjectivity requirement). 12 Intersubjectivity, of course, admits to degrees—perhaps the traditional distinction between a religion and a cult ( sans its more recent negative connotations) was based on the notion that cults are putative religions that do not (yet) satisfy the intersubjectivity threshold.

Beyond this, it is “notoriously difficult,” and potentially problematic, to define religion. 13 We will not attempt to do what our betters have been unable to do. Instead, we will satisfy ourselves with identifying the two distinct interests that people have in matters concerning religion: an interest in religious (non)adherence and an interest in the unsaddled membership of a religious group.

2.1. The committed interest in religious (non)adherence

The committed or internal point of view is the point of view of the religious adherent. An adherent strives to believe in (what she thinks are) the tenets of her religion, and tries to practice (what in her view) it demands of her. From the committed perspective, in other words, religious adherence involves a commitment to some combination of a set of beliefs and practices . Our interest here is to describe briefly the phenomenon of religious adherence (and non-adherence) as it actually exists in most democracies. This must be the starting point of any account that seeks to understand the nature of our interest in religious (non)adherence. As such, we deliberately privilege this descriptive account of the committed adherent’s perspective over any official doctrinal perspective of an authoritative religious body. In religions that have authoritative bodies—such as hierarchical churches—the official perspective of these bodies may well be reflected in that of many of its adherents. But adopting the official doctrinal perspective would be contrary to our goal of drawing up a realistic picture of religious (non)adherence that reflects the diversity between, and within, religions. 14

Before we proceed, two points on the prefix “ non” before “ adherents ” may be noted. First, non-adhering belief and practice are important not only to atheists and agnostics but to all religious adherents. This is because adherents of a given religious tradition usually do so exclusively. In other words, their adherence to religion X often entails a rejection of all other religions, including (say) Y. Non-adherence is not restricted to matters of belief. Sometimes it demands performative non-participation in rituals or worship of other religions. Therefore, to take the committed perspective seriously we must recognize that for an adherent of X, it may be important (for her adherence to X) not to believe in, or perform acts that are based on, the tenets of religion Y. For example, it may be important for an atheist or Jewish witness not to swear on the Christian Bible. Even in cases where the demands of another’s religion entail an omission rather than an action—for example, non-Hindus required to refrain from eating beef—an interest in religious non-adherence is engaged if the prohibition on beef-eating was premised on the Hindu injunction to treat the cow as sacred. In other words, all of us have an interest in religious non-adherence, whether we choose to assert it or not. More importantly, perhaps, non-adherence can, and usually does, arise out of religious commitment to the extent that adherence (to religion X) usually entails non-adherence (to religion Y).

The second point regarding non-adherence is that the line between the religious and the atheist is often drawn too sharply. In reality, not only are some religions atheistic (e.g. Jainism) or agnostic (e.g. some versions of Buddhism), others include the acceptance as well as the rejection of the divine within their ambit (e.g. Hinduism). 15 Given the numerous ways in which religiosity manifests itself (consider, for example, those atheists who describe themselves as “spiritual”), sharp divisions between atheism and religiosity may capture the reality for some people but are unlikely to do so for everyone. 16 For these reasons, our interest in religious adherence must be understood to include an interest in non-adherence (jointly referred to as (non)adherence).

We can now turn to the first dimension of religious (non)adherence. The dimension of belief —or as the European Court of Human Rights prefers to call it, the forum internum —entails (not) subscribing to certain fundamental beliefs (usually, but not necessarily) concerning the nature, origin, and character of life, especially focusing on the human condition and usually entailing views about improving it. This can include metaphysical views on life, pre-life, afterlife, and future lives, and the nature and existence of superhuman or non-human beings or powers as well as human ancestors. This is broadly consistent with what the UK Supreme Court referred to as “mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with the infinite . . . [which] may or may not involve belief in a supreme being.” 17 Characterizing this dimension of religion broadly in terms of “belief,” rather than narrowly as “faith,” allows religious traditions that invite belief without demanding faith to be included in the concept. It also encompasses those beliefs concerning god(s) and religion that are indifferent to, or even reject, faith or god (including versions of Buddhism, Jainism, atheism, and agnosticism).

Given this characterization of belief, one objection to our account of the committed perspective on religion might be that it is unrealistic, or, at least, not true for many adherents. The term “belief” can be read to overplay the thoughtfulness, consideration, and intensity that go into religious adherence. Many people simply (and, one may say, unthinkingly) follow the (non)religion of their parents. 18 Many others have a relaxed rather than intense, and flexible rather than dogmatic, approach to religious (non)adherence. Given our commitment to imbuing our conception of religious (non)adherence with the capaciousness that exists in practice, it would be odd if it included only the intense, inflexible, thoughtful, or single-minded (non)adherent. 19 While our characterization of belief may not hold true for everyone, we take the seriousness and thoughtfulness that go into religious belief as a potentiality—realized to different degrees by different (non)adherents.

This potential for seriousness and thoughtfulness exists in those who reject religious adherence as much as in those who accept it. Some Christians rarely think about their Christianity; others arrive at it through deep contemplation, after rejecting the alternatives. Similarly, for some atheists, their atheism is merely a default (absence of) belief. For others, on the other hand, rejection of all (or some) religions is a deeply considered, strongly held, metaphysical and ethical belief fundamental to their individuality—some atheists are quite devout in their unbelief. The point is this: in the dimension of belief, religions make claims which have truth value (i.e. they are the sort of claims that may be true or false, or be true to some extent). This is why adherents are able to accept these claims as true. 20 Accepting or rejecting these claims can both be thoughtful or thoughtless, salient or unimportant, intense or relaxed. With these caveats, we defend this capacious conception of religious belief, which adopts the committed (but not necessarily dogmatic) perspective of the adherent, because it most closely reflects the diversity of religious belief that exists in most contemporary societies.

The second dimension of religion, from the adherent’s viewpoint, is its practical or performative side—its forum externum . This usually entails rules of behavior and performative practices such as worship, prayer, sacrifice, rituals, and meditation. The scope and demandingness of religious practice varies from religion to religion. Some religions also require that at least some of these practices and rituals must be undertaken in community with other adherents. Indeed, some practices and rituals can only take place where there is a religious community. 21 Thus, the committed viewpoint often has a communal dimension. Some practical dimensions of religion follow from beliefs, often called manifestations of beliefs in European law, and provide reasons for action. But not all religious practice and performance can be characterized as manifestations of beliefs. Some religions (like Protestantism) emphasize beliefs, others (such as Buddhism and Orthodox Judaism) focus on practice, most on some combination of the two. 22

We have seen how religious commitment is diverse. When we take the diversity of religious commitment seriously, we notice that most adherents subscribe to a web of multiple, but usually interrelated, beliefs and practices. Viewed from this committed perspective, the level of religious diversity one finds around the world is astonishing. Some religions seek coherence in their package of beliefs and practices. Others, like Hinduism, are happier to embrace mutually contradictory beliefs and practices. Even when not directly contradictory, there is significant interpretative latitude around religious demands on adherents. 23 Even in religions with internal structures that make authoritative rulings on doctrinal disagreements, adherents often pick and choose from the packages on offer—the diversity of beliefs among Catholics on the legitimacy of same-sex marriages and abortion is a case in point. 24 Indeed, a recent sociological study of “Catholics” in the UK shows that “if we measure Catholics by their conformity to some of the key beliefs and behaviors laid down by the Catholic magisterium . . . only 5% of Catholics qualify as ‘faithful’ or orthodox.” 25 Further still, adherents are often capable of giving varying weights and emphases to different religious demands, making the actual practice of religion staggeringly pluralistic. As the history of religious conflicts has shown, these differences could be over relatively small, and—for non-adherents and even some adherents of the same religion—inconsequential matters.

The committed interest in religious (non)adherence is expansive. It presents a picture of religious (non)adherence that is diverse and pluralistic (both within and between religions). This diversity exists in the dimensions of belief and practice. Religious commitment demands adherence as well as non-adherence from us. These expansive takes on our interest in (non)adherence are tempered, however, by the requirement of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity filters out highly eccentric and frivolous beliefs or practices. As such, the committed perspective avoids three potential pitfalls when defining the scope of the interest in religious (non)adherence: (i) overinclusion that leads to the protection of just about any ideology, belief, or practice; (ii) underinclusion of dissenting, minority, and heterodox religions; and (iii) exclusion of atheism and agnosticism. 26 These findings are central to how we understand the right to freedom of religion, and the values that underpin it.

2.2. The non-committal interest in unsaddled membership of a religious group

Having considered religion from the committed perspective of the adherent, we now consider the phenomenon from a different angle by adopting an external or public perspective. This can be termed the non-committal perspective. From the non-committal, or public, perspective, we focus not on adherents of certain religions but on members of certain religious groups .

Group membership can affect how power and advantage are distributed in society. In most human societies, power and advantage—material, sociocultural, political—are distributed in ways that are sensitive to certain personal characteristics (such as race, educational attainment, or gender) but insensitive to other personal characteristics (such as zodiac signs, the number of letters in one’s name, or one’s favorite color). 27 Individual exceptions no doubt abound, but on a macro level, these claims are generally accepted as true of many contemporary societies. Religious group membership, in most societies, tends to fall in the former category, inasmuch as it tends to affect the success of our lives (at least in the secular sense). Here, it does not matter whether a person actually adheres to the beliefs or practices of any particular religion. She is more likely than not to have powers and advantages (or lack thereof) in keeping with others who are, or are perceived to be, the members of the same religious group. She may belong to (or be perceived to belong to) a religious group, even without being an adherent. This (assumption of) membership may be because of the religious group membership of her parents, or because religious practice has become a familiar part of her cultural habits, or because she carries proxy characteristics (such as belonging to certain racial or ethnic groups) that signify (to others) adherence to a particular religion. She may even take pride in her membership of her religious group and find community and solace in fellow members despite not being an adherent, or she may dislike it, or be indifferent to it. Just like her membership of her caste or racial group, how she feels about it makes little difference to her actual or perceived religious group membership, just as her adherence or lack thereof makes no difference either. Like it or not, she is likely to be saddled with (or enjoy the privileges of) the (dis)advantages that accompany her membership of her religious group.

In most cases adherents are likely to be members of a religious group. However, the two categories do not entirely map onto each other. For example, recent converts may have cultural and ethnic traits that differ from most adherents. There are people who identify as “cultural Christians” or “atheistic Jews” having given up on adherence but not on the associated cultural traits. Heterodox and dissenting interpreters of a tradition—such as Reform Jews and Ahmadis—may be saddled with the cultural identification of majority adherents by the outside world but seen as non-members, or even heretics, by their “co-religionists.” It is not uncommon for Sikhs in North America and elsewhere to be taken to be Muslims because of racial and cultural similarities. These examples illustrate that (non)membership of a religious group is not always within the control of the individual.

The non-committal perspective takes seriously the fact that religious group membership often gets mixed up with culture, ethnicity, race, language, and nationality. Not only is the (non)membership of her religious group not fully within the control of the individual adherent, she usually has even less control over the sociopolitical and material disabilities (or privileges) that accompany such membership. What is more, even for a typical religious adherent who fully embraces her actual and perceived religious group membership, her interest in being able to adhere truly to her religion is related to, but surely distinct from, her interest in her religious group not being subject to social, cultural, material, or political disabilities.

Implicit in the preceding paragraphs is a very specific conception of a “group.” The term is not necessarily used to refer to a cohesive collectivity with a shared culture/language/history/religion/identity, and so on. 28 We have used the term “group” more loosely. It includes people who perceive themselves to be members of the group even when the group does not and those who are taken to be the members of the group when they do not see themselves as such. There need not be any cohesiveness to this group. On our understanding, “people with disabilities,” heterosexuals, and yes, even atheists, qualify as a group. Having said that, given the non-committal perspective we have assumed, there needs to be some external, sociological reality to the group, outside the internal point of view of its members. 29

We have identified two interests pertaining to religion: the committed interest in religious (non)adherence and the non-committal interest in unsaddled membership of a religious group. These interests, we argue, are distinct. By way of illustration, a “Muslim” woman, living in a deprived, predominantly Muslim, neighborhood in Birmingham (or Delhi, for that matter) suffers because of such deprivation, whether or not she in fact adheres to any version of Islam. On the other hand, being forbidden from wearing a crucifix at work might engage a devout Christian’s interest in religious adherence, but does not—in itself—affect her membership in her religious group (understood in the loose sense as explained above). We now turn to a key conceptual difference between these two interests.

We have identified two distinct interests a person might have with respect to religion: (i) an interest in her ability to (intersubjectively) determine and to pursue her religious commitments as a (non)adherent, and (ii) an interest in being unsaddled by the disabilities that accompany her religious group membership. Religion is not unique in possessing these two dimensions. Pregnancy, for example, has an internal dimension concerning a person’s decision (as well as her ability to decide whether) to become (or not become) pregnant. From the non-committal perspective, on the other hand, pregnancy (and the ability or potential to become pregnant) brings with it certain social and economic costs, such as reduced attractiveness in the employment market, the stigma attached to pregnancy outside marriage, the medical and care costs associated with pregnancy, and so on. Sexual orientation has a similar quality. From the internal point of view, what matters is a person’s orientation with respect to the sex and gender of the person they are sexually or romantically attracted to, and their decision (as well as their ability to decide whether) to associate sexually and/or romantically with a person of the same sex as their own. Societally, this could have been completely irrelevant to the distribution of social, cultural, political, and material power between gay people and heterosexuals; unfortunately, as we know, this is not the case.

Defenders of pregnancy and sexual orientation rights have debated whether privacy or antidiscrimination is a better approach to defend these rights. 30 These debates have taken place precisely because both approaches have something to offer to the protection of the interests involved. In this section, we draw upon these continuities to clarify a key conceptual distinction between the two categories of religious interests identified in the previous section. Unlike the debates that have taken place in the context of pregnancy and sexual orientation, however, we will show that these are not alternative ways of framing the same human interest; rather that they are two distinct interests that we ought to treat separately.

We draw a conceptual distinction between two sets of human interests: our interests in the good, and our interests in our freedom to pursue the good. In the first set, we have interests whose satisfaction is, at least prima facie, necessarily a good thing (from a public, objective perspective). It may not be possible to always protect such interests all things considered, and some such compromises may be entirely legitimate. But on their own, the satisfaction of these interests is always a good thing. Such interests include our interest in adequate nutrition, good education, fair trial, protective shelter, and so on. In all these cases, the good is tracked directly by the satisfaction of the interest concerned.

On the other hand, we have interests not only in realizing the good but also (or, even especially) in pursuing the good on our own. In these cases, it is in our interest to freely define the good and to pursue it, even when we might sometimes make mistakes. 31 Examples include our interest in freely choosing who to become friends with, whether and who to marry, what and how to say something, what career to pursue, whether and what films to watch or books to read, and so on. While, generally speaking, being free to pursue the good in such cases is a good thing, there is the possibility of making mistakes. Making friends with bullies, saying hurtful things simply to hurt others, or joining a racist organization do not become good simply because these acts were freely done. For this reason, the distinction between interests that directly track the good and those that track my interest in the freedom to define and to pursue the good makes sense. 32 We do not, lest we are misunderstood, wish to suggest that our interests in the good are necessarily superior to our interests in our freedom to pursue the good. They are, nonetheless, conceptually different, and this difference could be normatively salient.

Now we can map this distinction onto the two interests we have identified. It is always a good thing that one’s religious group is not saddled with relative social, political, and material disabilities. This is just a roundabout way of saying that social disabilities should not, in an ideal world, accompany religious group membership. On the other hand, our interest in religious adherence tracks our freedom to pursue the good in matters religious. The intersubjectively determined committed viewpoint is not, after all, subject to any public standard of reasonableness or morality, and may therefore make demands that are unreasonable or immoral. This key conceptual distinction underpins some of the normative judgments that need to be made in relation to the protection of these interests, especially in relation to their operation in horizontal relations between non-state actors.

Our starting point is that if most human rights documents recognize two distinct human rights pertaining to religion—the right to freedom of religion and the right against religious non-discrimination—they are best understood as protecting distinct religious interests. The claim is conceptual and normative, rather than historical. Even if their distinct articulation is a historical accident, or even technical oversight on the part of the drafters, the conceptual claim would still be plausible in light of the distinctiveness of the two religious interests we identified in Section 2. Having identified these distinct interests, we will now argue that our interest in religious (non)adherence is best protected under the right to freedom of religion, and we are most likely to enjoy unsaddled religious group membership under a robust right against religious discrimination.

The main reason for this claim is that there are structural similarities between the interests identified in Section 2 and the jurisprudence concerning the two rights (at least in Europe). While there are other ways of reading legal doctrine concerning these rights, we select those strands in the jurisprudence that do the best job of protecting the two religious interests at stake. Thus, the interest and the right mutually define each other. We will argue that freedom of religion is valuable because it protects our decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence. Freedom from discrimination based on certain protected characteristics matters morally because the possession of these characteristics tends to affect our access to those basic goods necessary for living a good life.

4.1. The right to freedom of religion

Freedom of religion is valuable because it protects our decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence. Many other foundational values are also plausible, including the value of social goods such as religious tolerance, religious pluralism, and social harmony, and the value in respecting an individual’s conscience or integrity. We do not deny that these values may also be good reasons to support some version of religious freedom. However, the only value that can fully support the capacious and realistic version of our interest in religious (non)adherence (as understood in Section 2) is the need to respect our decisional autonomy in matters pertaining to religious adherence.

Religious pluralism, harmony, and tolerance are no doubt valuable social goods, but they fail to directly underpin an individual’s interest in religious (non)adherence (even though they may indirectly facilitate its protection in most circumstances). The historical origins of the protection of religious freedom may well lie in these social goods. 33 Since its transformation into a contemporary human right, however, its underlying rationale must, at least primarily, be found in a fundamental human interest rather than in the common good. 34

The need to respect an individual’s conscience is a more promising candidate. In fact, some scholars believe that religion is merely a placeholder for the protection of “conscience” in human rights law. 35 While there might be very good reasons to protect conscience for its own sake, our account of religious adherence from the committed viewpoint shows that religion is both broader and narrower than conscience. Not all religious beliefs implicate one’s conscience, which is typically other-regarding rather than self-regarding. For example, most people would accept that the religious obligations of Muslims to pray five times a day or make a pilgrimage are not matters of conscience. A belief that does not engage one’s conscience may nonetheless be fundamentally important to the believer because it is demanded by his or her religion. On the other hand, not all conscientious beliefs are “religious.” While many systemic and comprehensive world views, such as pacifism and environmentalism, could be sufficiently religion-like for certain purposes (and should perhaps be treated as such by human rights law), one’s conscience can also make stand-alone demands against military service or eating animal products that do not flow from an existing commitment to any broader world view or involve intersubjectivity. For these reasons, the value of respecting an individual’s conscience cannot ground the right to religious freedom.

Personal integrity is also insufficient to ground the right to religious freedom. This value takes an individual’s relationship to herself seriously, and facilitates a harmonious and complete conception of one’s self. It is related to conscience, but can encompass not only ethical but also performative and ritualistic (e.g. prayer and pilgrimage) dimensions of religious adherence. Like conscience, its scope is broader than religious adherence. However, over-inclusion is less of a problem as long as we can carve out a clear subset of the value that concerns religion. We reject integrity as the foundational value of religious freedom not because it is overinclusive, but because it is also underinclusive —it does not include our capacious conception of a person’s possible interests in religious adherence. Integrity tends to overvalue adherence that is intense, thought-through, and deeply held, and may fail to adequately protect religiosity that is relaxed, flexible, or habitual. Like conscience, it also has the tendency to cast religion in a particularly Protestant image (“Here I stand, I can do no other”), and may underserve other strands of religious (non)adherence. 36

The value of respecting every person’s decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence is the most viable norm to underpin religious freedom. An autonomy-based rationale demands respect for a committed point of view in a way that other rationales may not. For example, a social harmony-based protection for religious freedom might be content to protect only the essential practices of major religions, interference in which might cause conflict. 37 The autonomy rationale, on the other hand, is acutely sensitive to the religious pluralism and diversity we see in religious practice, including sensitivity to internal diversity within religions. It extends its protection to heterodox and dissenting views and to non-religious persons. One of us has argued elsewhere in some detail why the value of preserving our decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence is also normatively attractive for other reasons. 38 The underlying premises are that personal autonomy is of immense value to individuals, that in order to be autonomous individuals must have access to a range of valuable opportunities, and that the freedom to make decisions in relation to (non)adherence to religions is one such valuable opportunity. 39

An autonomy-based rationale has the additional advantage of protecting our capacious interest in religious adherence: it is not underinclusive or unfair to non-believers. It also has significant support in case law 40 and academic literature. 41 It is, of course, overinclusive, inasmuch as decisional autonomy in matters of religious adherence is a subset of our decisional autonomy generally. Even so, decisional autonomy in matters pertaining to religious (non)adherence is a clearly identifiable subset that protects a fundamental and valuable interest.

We do not claim that religion is the only, or the most valuable, subset of decisional autonomy. Other facets of decisional autonomy (e.g. in matters of sexual relationships) also need robust protection—as such, we sidestep the debate over whether religion is special except to express skepticism about the possibility. 42 Our skepticism is conceptual—attempts to define religion generally have failed because it is hard (if not impossible) to pin down a set of characteristics that pertain to all phenomena we agree to characterize as religions. Any effort to suggest that religion is special will necessarily need to highlight some common feature in all religions that makes religion special. The best that can be done is to imagine religion in a particular image—privileging a certain religious tradition and identifying its core features to claim special status. But that would be an argument for why Catholicism or Buddhism is special, not why religion is special. 43

Two common criticisms of the decisional autonomy rationale must be responded to. The first is that religion is often not a matter of choice for its adherents. The second it that the rationale is too individualistic. With regard to the first criticism, autonomy is too easily confused with a simplistic understanding of “choice.” 44 When we speak of “decisional autonomy” we do not intend to suggest that everyone necessarily has a free choice in matters of religious adherence. In fact, many adherents may not feel that they have (or, indeed, that they should have) any choice in subscribing to (what they view as) the truth. 45 This truth may make many imperative demands on them that leave little room for choice. 46 Others may have followed the religion of their parents with little thought and without ever consciously exercising any choice. Later in life, it may be psychologically very difficult for them to choose not to follow that religion. 47

While we accept that an adherent may not feel she has a choice in religious matters, we are employing a capacious conception of autonomy. This conception seeks to protect the agent’s moral capacity to make her own decisions on matters concerning religious (non)adherence, whether or not she feels she has (or in fact has) any “choice” in the matter and whether or not this moral capacity is ever acted upon. It protects the religious freedom of converts who actively change their religious status, of those who zealously reaffirm it, as well as those who never care to think much about it. This broad notion of decisional autonomy does not seek to relegate religious adherence to the private sphere either—it accepts that religious performance can and does have a public dimension. Nor does it reject communal dimensions of religious adherence—if communal performance matters to the adherent, it forms part of her decisional autonomy in religious matters.

Furthermore, the term “autonomy” is used here to mean an aspirational value that ought to be sought and realized, rather than entailing any descriptive claim about people actually possessing sufficient autonomy. 48 Of course some of us, in the descriptive sense, have more autonomy than others, and many don’t have adequate autonomy. In the case of religion, it is no coincidence that most people adhere to the religion of their parents. Even so, there are good reasons for the state to take an adherent’s self-proclaimed religious affiliation at face value in the absence of any proof of direct coercion, even if such adherence is deluded, irrational, unfairly influenced, and so on. 49 The autonomy loss resulting from the non-recognition or mis-recognition of one’s self-proclaimed religion is unlikely to be offset by any autonomy gains accruing from efforts by the state to help them “see light.” The state telling me my religion might have got it wrong is usually better than it telling me I have got my religion wrong. An autonomy-based rationale dictates that we take the committed point of view of the adherent seriously. Individual decisional autonomy in religious matters would be left with little content if any external body or person could determine whether an individual has freely chosen to adhere to a religion, what that religion is, what adherence to that religion entails, or who (if anyone) is an authority on what an adherence to that religion requires.

While the autonomy rationale takes the committed perspective of the adherent seriously, the rationale itself need not be endorsed as adequate justification for religious freedom from the committed point of view. It is not even clear, from the internal point of view of every religion, that the protection of (everyone’s) religious freedom is valuable. It is only the content of the claim that the adherent seeks protection for that is discerned from the committed point of view; the reasons for protecting such claims (whether autonomy, toleration, or something else) need not be endorsed by the adherent’s committed viewpoint. Nor is our argument that the law itself should adopt a committed viewpoint in matters of religion. It is usually a good thing when the state’s reasons for acting in a particular way track public reasons, 50 even as public reasons sometimes require the state to tolerate, respect, or protect actions grounded in sectarian reasons. Our argument here is simply that there may be good (public) reasons for the state to protect an adherent’s committed internal perspective in matters of religion.

The second objection to the decisional autonomy rationale might be that it is too individualistic. We acknowledged, however, the importance of communal dimensions of religious practice in certain religions in the preceding section. While the rationale values the autonomy of individuals, it is compatible with—and even requires—the protection of any communal dimension of religious adherence. 51 This will be the case as long as the collective or communal dimension is (intersubjectively as well as from the committed individual’s perspective) part of the religion. In other words, if communal worship is important to the individual’s adherence to her religion, an autonomy-based rationale will protect it. Participation in the life of a religious community, or the acceptance of the religious authority of one’s church, can therefore be aspects of religious adherence. 52 Furthermore, the essence of religious practice itself often depends on social forms—i.e. forms of behavior which are widely practiced within that group. 53 While it is individual believers who constitute a religious community, the group itself may have “a strong role to play in constructing individual religious affiliation.” 54 None of this needs to be denied by anyone who subscribes to the autonomy rationale for religious freedom. Any adherent who disagrees with such collectivity requirements is simply a dissenter within that group (whose right to dissent is equally protected). 55 In other words, there surely are collective dimensions to freedom of religion, but these are derivative of the individual’s right to that freedom. 56

4.2. The right against religious discrimination

Unlike the right to freedom of religion, the right against religious discrimination is not a stand-alone guarantee. It is a species of the more general freedom from discrimination based on certain protected characteristics which, apart from religion, tend to be race, gender, disability, sexual orientation, language, ethnicity, and so on. As such, unless we have very good reasons to think otherwise, the rationale for prohibiting religious discrimination must be found in the rationale for prohibiting discrimination more generally. 57

The main function of the prohibition of discrimination, as one of us has argued before, is to prevent, reduce, or eliminate any substantial, abiding, and pervasive advantage gaps between certain cognate groups (i.e. groups defined by the same personal characteristic, such as men and women, or Christians and Sikhs). 58 These advantage gaps could be political, material, or sociocultural, but they usually tend to manifest in all these dimensions simultaneously and reinforce each other. The underpinning normative argument is that we should care about such advantage gaps between groups because they reduce the ability of members of the (relatively) disadvantaged groups to access certain basic goods—negative freedom, an adequate range of valuable opportunities, and self-respect—whose secure enjoyment is essential to our ability to live a free and flourishing life. 59 Thus, even though the object of discrimination law’s immediate attention is groups, in keeping with the contemporary human rights tradition, the ultimate commitment is to the freedom and well-being of (all) individuals. 60

One need not accept the details of this rationale for discrimination law. But almost all credible accounts of this area of law—at least accounts that take the Anglo-American law concerning the regulation of discrimination seriously—accept that the current or historical disadvantage faced by social groups lies at the heart of discrimination law. This is true of egalitarian accounts, 61 freedom-based accounts, 62 as well as expressive accounts 63 that seek to explain discrimination law. Given this consensus—at least at a broad level—it would be very surprising if the main purpose of the law regulating religious discrimination was to protect individual religious (non)adherence (rather than to secure an unsaddled membership of one’s religious group). This theoretical consensus over the group focus in discrimination law may seem surprising to some practitioners, especially if they notice that typically, the claimants in discrimination law are individuals, and that the protection is offered symmetrically to both the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups. To answer this objection, we need to distinguish this systemic-functional claim about the overall purpose of discrimination law from specific design issues. Drawing upon Rawls and Hart, one of us has argued elsewhere that full transparency between the functional goal of discrimination law and the design of particular rules that regulate discrimination may actually be counterproductive. 64 To put the point differently, the goal of reducing relative group disadvantage may be ill-served if courts start asking in each case what outcome will best reduce such disadvantage. Additional considerations of fairness, pragmatism, clarity, certainty, and a normative commitment to liberalism also inform the design of antidiscrimination rules. Considerations such as these, for example, dictate that (in general) discrimination law should protect not only the relatively disadvantaged group but also its cognate advantaged groups. 65

On the reading we have outlined, non-committal religious group membership , rather than committed religious adherence, lies at the heart of discrimination law. 66 Because religion is one of the characteristics that creates substantial, abiding, and pervasive advantage gaps between cognate groups, it is a protected characteristic in discrimination law, alongside race, sex, sexual orientation, disability, pregnancy, ethnicity, and other such characteristics. It follows that the big-picture concern of discrimination law is to prevent or mitigate a caste-like organization of society on religious lines where certain religious groups end up with a lower class status. Burdening adherence to a particular religion may well increase the (political, material, social) advantage gap between religious groups, but there are other ways this can happen too. It may be, for example, that most members of a minority religion are poor, or that they are recent immigrants, or that they are subject to widespread hostility and ostracism by the majority religious group because of their racial difference, and therefore suffer relative group disadvantage. Discrimination law is indifferent to the cause of such disadvantage. Rather, it is the fact or likelihood of relative group disadvantage that this area of law seeks to counter.

As we move from the systemic concern that discrimination law has with group disadvantage to specific design issues, we notice—at least outside the context of religious discrimination—a rather tightly regulated scope of what counts as discrimination. In the limited contexts that discrimination law regulates, a claimant must establish a prima facie case of direct or indirect discrimination against her. The determination is objective, and requires the claimant to show either that she suffered some non-remote adverse effect:

(a) because of the defendant’s intentional reliance on a protected characteristic, 67 or

either exclusively on members of her group, 68 or

on those who disproportionately belong to her group. 69

British law treats (a) and (b)(i) as instances of direct discrimination, and (b)(ii) as a case of indirect discrimination. Cases in (a) that involve the intentional targeting of a religious group, or even the intentional use of religion in a decision, tend to be rare and, when they come up, tend to be easier to decide. It is the set of cases in (b) that are the most controversial and shall be our focus in the discussion that follows. These cases involve the impact of a facially neutral policy on the claimant’s group. In such group impact cases, discrimination must be established by showing comparative adverse effect on the claimant’s group, in relation to a cognate group. So, in the case of religion, a claimant must show that the policy in question not only affected her but also that it (exclusively or disproportionately) affected other members of her religious group when compared with some other cognate group. For example, a Muslim claimant will need to show that an employer who requires a university degree for a manual job in an area where Muslims are disproportionately less likely to have university degrees affected not just her (as a potential applicant who did not meet the criterion) but also disproportionately affected (or would disproportionately affect) Muslims (in that area) generally.

Whether a protected group suffered adverse impact is determined objectively, rather than subjectively. This objective standard sets a relatively high bar for making a prima facie case of discrimination. This high bar is unavoidable, to some extent, given that discrimination law’s primary concern is with group disadvantage. While the entry threshold is relatively high, however, the possibility of justifying a successful prima facie case is relatively slim. Direct discrimination admits to very few and very high-threshold exceptions. Moreover, even though indirect discrimination can be justified, certain types of justifications—such as the business profitability, consumer preference, or competitive disadvantage—are typically barred. Although the claimant has a demanding threshold to cross in order to make a prima facie case of discrimination, once she has met this threshold the possibility that the discrimination she faces might be justified is slim and usually assessed strictly by courts.

Religious group membership (chosen or otherwise) saddles us with privileges and disabilities. Given this, something would be lost (and very little gained) if the right against religious discrimination was reduced to just another means of protecting our interest in religious adherence. While there may be good strategic reasons for practicing lawyers to try to achieve these outcomes, the erasure of the distinction we are hoping to highlight will not only create conceptual confusion but will ultimately be a bad thing for the protection of our religious interests.

We should emphasize that the sharp distinction we are drawing between the two rationales for human rights protection of religious interests—religion as adherence and religion as group membership—is a conceptual one. The two religious interests can, after all, overlap. It is evidently true that often protection of religious freedom is likely to reduce not just the religious but also social, material, and political disadvantages faced by its adherents. And sometimes discrimination against members of a group will also impinge upon religious adherence. In fact, if we map all cases of breaches of the right to religious freedom and all cases of breaches of the right against religious discrimination, the overlap might indeed be significant. This does nothing, however, to minimize the existence or significance of the conceptual and normative distinctions we are trying to draw out. Our argument is that it is not the purpose of discrimination law to secure religious freedom, nor is it the purpose of the right to religious freedom to reduce religious group disadvantage.

This article makes a contribution to ongoing theoretical debates around the legal protection of religion. In these debates, the right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination are often conflated and little attention has been paid to their conceptual and normative differences. We have argued that they are in fact distinct human rights. As such, they protect distinct human interests and distinct aspects of religion. Religious freedom is concerned with protecting an interest in our ability to (not) adhere to our religious commitments. The right against religious discrimination is concerned with a separate interest in ensuring that our religious group does not suffer relative sociocultural, political, or material disabilities in comparison with other religious groups. This article brings conceptual clarity to this area and helps explain what the law is protecting when it protects religion. Key doctrinal implications follow for the respective scope of the two rights, whether they may be claimed against non-state actors, and their divergent assessment of religious establishment. In a follow-up article to be published in the next issue of this journal, we will offer a normative restatement of the legal doctrine relating to these rights. In particular, we will map these implications in relation to their scope, horizontal application, and religious establishment, and also outline the resulting areas of overlap and differences between the two legal rights.

For helpful comments, we thank several colleagues who, on editorial instructions, are too numerous to be named here. Special thanks to Sati Nagra for research support. Tarun Khaitan is grateful to New York University Law School, where he had the opportunity to work on the article as a Global Visiting Fellow. Usual disclaimers apply.

Peter Berger, The Many Altars of Modernity: Towards a Paradigm for Religion in a Pluralist Age (2014); Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld , Constitutional Secularism in an Age of Religious Revival xv–xvi (Mancini & Rosenfeld eds., 2014) (referring to the “repoliticization of religion”). For an analysis as to the different strands of secularism, see Cécile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion (2017).

We find “Islamophobia” an inadequate term for capturing prejudice against Muslims, but we are sticking to it because it has acquired a certain currency.

Aileen McColgan, Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace , 38 Indus. L.J. 1 (2009).

Christopher McCrudden, Marriage Registrars, Same-Sex Relationships, and Religious Discrimination in the European Court of Human Rights in The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the Balance Between Religion, Identity, and Equality (Suzanne Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018).

By “unsaddled” membership we mean membership that does not incur external social, economic, cultural, or political costs. Religious adherence often demands compliance with the internal rules of the religion. That group members who are also adherents of that religion will be “saddled” with these internal rules is not of concern here.

Ashis Nandy, The Twilight of Certitudes: Secularism, Hindu Nationalism and Other Masks of Deculturation , 1 Postcolonial Stud . 283, 294 (1998).

Honorable exceptions include Ronan McRea, Squaring the Circle: Can an Egalitarian and Individualistic Conception of Freedom of Religion or Belief Co-Exist with the Notion of Indirect Discrimination? , in Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law (Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds., 2018); McCrudden, supra note 4. Also see the following article, which was published after this article had been finalised, and therefore our arguments could not benefit from its insights: Ilias Trispiotis, Religious Freedom and Religious Antidiscrimination , 82 Mod. L. Rev. 864 (2019).

In the Eweida litigation (wearing of cross in private workplace), for example, the claim was brought as a religious discrimination case domestically (Eweida v. British Airways [2010] E.W.C.A. 80) and as a religious freedom case at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) level (Eweida v. United Kingdom [2013] E.C.H.R. 37). Despite this change, there was no acknowledgement, let alone explanation, of the distinction by the ECtHR. Moreover, the ECtHR applied religious freedom horizontally to the private employer (British Airways), in a similar manner to how religious discrimination law operates horizontally, with no discussion as to how this new development could be justified.

For example, despite Eweida’s claim in the ECtHR being grounded in religious freedom, David Cameron tweeted shortly after the decision that he was “[d]elighted that principle of wearing religious symbols at work has been upheld—people shouldn’t suffer discrimination due to religious beliefs.” See the reporting in “British woman wins discrimination case,”’ Reuters, Jan. 14, 2013, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-religion-court/british-woman-wins-religious-discrimination-case-idUSL6N0AJF9H20130115 .

Joseph Raz , The Morality of Freedom 308–310 (1986). Raz understands social forms to be “forms of behaviour which are . . . widely practised in society” or “common social forms of action.” Social forms have “internal richness and complexity” and the degree to which a practice has to be shared, and by whom, are open questions. Raz is clear, however, that comprehensive personal goals—such as, on our argument, religious (non)adherence—can only be founded in social forms. We assume, without argument, that atheism is a social form in most contemporary societies, although this is likely to be the case for many societies in the past too.

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983).

Maclure and Taylor, among others, also distinguish between “religious beliefs” and “expensive tastes,” but on criteria other than intersubjectivity; see Jocelyn Maclure & Charles Taylor , Secularism and Freedom of Conscience 76 (2011).

Rex Adhar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State 139 (2015). See also George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 Geo. L.J. 1519 (1983). See also Carolyn Evans , Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights 51 (2001); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law , 72 Calif. L. Rev . 753 (1984); R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 A.C. 246 (HL) ¶¶ 57–58.

See Volkhard Krech et al., Religious Diversity and Religious Vitality: New Measuring Strategies and Empirical Evidence , 9 Interdisc. J. Res. on Religion 2 (2013); Lars Ahlin et al., Religious Diversity and Pluralism: Empirical Data and Theoretical Reflections from the Danish Pluralism Project , 27 J. Contemp. Religion 403 (2012); Detlef Pollack, Religious Pluralism: Undermining or Reinforcing Religiosity? , 53 Soc’y 131 (2016).

See generally Linda Woodhead, Intensified Religious Pluralism and De-differentiation: The British Example , 53 Soc’y 41 (2016). See also Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity 46 (2006) (Sen’s recollection of a conversation with his grandfather, who identified the former’s atheism as falling in the “Lokayata part of the Hindu spectrum”).

See Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God (2013).

R (Hodkin) v. Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] U.K.S.C. 77 ¶ 57, [2014] A.C. 610 ¶ 57.

See Farrah Ahmed, The Autonomy Rationale for Religious Freedom , 80 Mod. L. Rev. 238 (2017).

On a sociological index used to measure intensity of religiosity in persons, see Stefan Huber & Odilo Huber, The Centrality of Religiosity Scale, 3 Religions 710 (2012).

See Paul Horwitz, The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution 153–154 (2011).

See Farrah Ahmed & Jane Calderwood Norton, Religious Tribunals, Religious Freedom, and Concern for Vulnerable Women, 24 Child & Fam. L. Q. 363, 377–378 (2012).

It is for this reason that we use the capacious term “adherent” rather than the narrower term “believer” to describe a person committed to a religion.

This is why talk of Catholicism s , Islam s, and Judaism s makes sense: Peter W. Edge, Determining Religion in English Courts , 1 Oxford J. L. & Religion 402, 402, 406 (2012); Farrah Ahmed , Religious Freedom Under the Personal Law System 19–21 (2016).

Ayelet Shachar discusses this selectivity—or “forum shopping”—between state and religious institutions in the context of family law disputes: see Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights 122–126 (2001). John Bowen observed similar selectivity in relation to shari’a law in England: John Bowden, Private Arrangements “Recognizing Sharia” in England , Boston Rev. (Mar./Apr. 2009), www.http://bostonreview.net/BR34.2/bowen.php .

Woodhead, supra note 15, at 42.

Andrew Koppelman, How Could Religious Liberty Be a Human Right? 16(3) Int’l J. Const. L. 985 (2018).

See Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law , ch. 2–3 (2015).

On this type of religious “group,” see Renate Ysseldyk et al., Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of Religion from a Social Identity Perspective , 14 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 60, 60–71 (2010).

See also infra Section 4.1. (discussion toward the end of the section).

See Yoshino-Gerken debate: Heather Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 843 (2008); Kenji Yoshino, Tribe , 42 Tulsa L. Rev 961 (2008). See also David Richards, Liberal Democracy and the Problems of Patriarchy , 46 Israel L. Rev. 169 (2013).

Analogous to these interests are the rights that include the “right to do wrong”: see Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong , 92 Ethics 21 (1981).

Posner draws a similar distinction between intermediate/instrumental goods on the one hand and final/ultimate goods on the other: see Richard Posner, The Right to Privacy , 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393, 394 (1977).

See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313, 317 (1996).

R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 A.C. 246 (HL) ¶ 22 (freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual).

Michael Sandel, Religious Liberty—Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice? , 3 Utah L. Rev. 597 (1989).

This is not to suggest that there may not be some relationship between personal integrity and decisional autonomy more broadly; for example, it has been argued that autonomy may reflect or promote a person’s integrity: e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Life’s dominion 224 (1993); Ronald Dworkin, Autonomy and the Demented Self , 64 Milbank Q. 1, 4–16. (1986).

The Indian Supreme Court tends to adopt this position.

Jane Calderwood Norton, Freedom of religious organizations (2016).

On personal autonomy generally, see Raz, supra note 10.

E.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 ¶¶ 134–135 (2011); Eweida v. British Airways Plc. [2010] E.W.C.A. Civ. 80 ¶ 40; R (Begum) v. Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] U.K.H.L. 15, [2007] 1 A.C. 100 ¶ 93; R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2003] Q.B. 1300 (CA) (2003); Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.). For US examples, see Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1284–1300 (2000); Kent Greenawalt, Religion and The Constitution, Volume I: Free Exercise and Fairness 3–4 (2006). For a full account see Ahmed, supra note 18.

E.g., Evans, supra note 13; Greenawalt , supra note 40, at 3–4. Sandel also accepts that an autonomy-based conception of religious freedom is the predominant contemporary liberal understanding of religious freedom: Sandel, supra note 35, at 611 (1989). See also Ahmed, supra note 18, at 239.

We take this debate to be concerned with whether religious interests are special—and weightier—than non-religious ones.

See generally , Koppelman, supra note 26; Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment? , U. Ill. L. Rev. 571 (2006); Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is? , 84 Notre Dame L. Rev . 807 (2009); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special? , 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1351 (2012); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (2012); Michael McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom? , 123 Yale L.J. 770 (2013).

The choice-based understanding of religious autonomy is rightly criticized. See Ronan McCrea, Religion and the Public Order of the European Union 111 (2010). Similar criticisms apply to arguments from choice in the context of reproductive rights. See Thérèse Murphy, The Texture of Reproductive Technologies , in New Technologies and Human Rights ( Thérèse Murphy ed., 2009).

See Sandel, supra note 35, at 611; John Garvey, Free Exercise and the Value of Religious Liberty , 18 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 791 (1986).

See Nicholas Aroney, Individual, Community and State: Thoughts on Jane Norton, Freedom of Religious Organizations , 42 Australia J. Legal Phil. 270 (2017).

See Leslie Green, Rights of Exit , 4 Legal Theory 165 (1998); Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit , 112 Ethics 205, 216–222 (2002).

See generally Raz, supra note 10.

R (Begum) v. Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] U.K.H.L. 15, [2007] 1 A.C. 100 ¶¶ 95–96.

Although the role of public reasons in Rawlsian philosophy is more limited than our claim above, on the concept of public reasons generally, see John Rawls , Political Liberalism 212f (1996).

See Calderwood Norton , supra note 38.

Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 ¶ 62 (2002).

See Raz , supra note 10, at 308.

See Calderwood Norton , supra note 38, at 24.

See Green, supra note 47.

See Calderwood Norton , supra note 38. Cf. Julian Rivers, Religious Liberty as a Collective Right, in Law and Religion (Richard O’Dair & Andrew Lewis eds., 2001).

See generally Dworkin on local priority within ‘departments’ of law: Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 250 f (1986); Tarunabh Khaitan & Sandy Steel, Theorising Areas of Law (Oct. 4, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3464432 .

See Khaitan , supra note 27. For comparable accounts see Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause , 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. (1976); Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle , 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994).

On how this happens, see Tarunabh Khaitan, The Point of Discrimination Law in The Empire of Disgust: Prejudice, Discrimination, and Policy in India and the US (Martha Nussbaum et. al. eds., 2018).

See Khaitan , supra note 27, at 38f (on the “eccentric distribution condition” for more clarification on the group orientation of discrimination law).

See, e.g., Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2002); Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: Now More than Ever , 37 Harv. J. L. & Gender 569 (2014).

See, e.g., Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination? , 38 Phil. & Pub. Aff. (2010); Khaitan , supra note 27.

See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (2008).

See Khaitan, supra note 27, at 9f.

See id., ch. 6.

Just as the protected characteristic “sex” is akin to the personal characteristic of sex and gender rather than sexual intercourse. Of course, group membership and behavior are related, but not reducible to each other.

British/European law treats this as direct discrimination: Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA (2017) Case C-188/15 (E.C.J.). Even these cases that track intentional use of a protected characteristic as a basis of classification are ultimately concerned with the adverse effect of such use on the protected group. See Khaitan , supra note 27, ch. 6.

This is also direct discrimination in British/European law. See James v. Eastleigh B.C. [1990] 2 A.C. 751; Bull v. Hall [2013] U.K.S.C. 73.

This alone is indirect discrimination in British/European law. See Essop v. Home Office (UK Border Agency) [2017] U.K.S.C. 27.

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Essay on Religious Discrimination

Our country has made leaps and bounds towards the abolishment of discrimination. Ever since the outlaw of segregation in public educational facilities, thanks to Brown v. Board of Education, America has since made significant efforts to stop discrimination in its tracks. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the final push we had to make in order to desegregate and terminate the majority of discrimination across our country. However, since we have evolved into more modern times, we are being faced with different sectors of discrimination.

It wasn’t until the late 1990’s and early 2000’s that mass amounts of people began to openly express themselves as a member of the LGBTQ community. And as this prideful community grows, society as a whole is beginning to accept the ideals of these genuine people. Nevertheless, with this acceptance comes anger from those who disagree with the open lifestyles of the LGBTQ community. Such people are a handful of conservatives, our very own president, and religious persons. The question now is can one legally discriminate against members of the LGBTQ community due to religious or moral beliefs? This controversial topic is more relevant today than it has ever been, and the fact that we have to even ask this question is beyond belief. Discrimination should never be tolerated, even under religious grounds.

In 2012, Jack Phillips and his masterpiece cakeshop refused to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple on the basis of his religious beliefs. The couple, David Mullins and Charlie Craig felt no need to stay quiet. When the news hit media, the Colorado cake shop became a “symbol of discrimination for many in the LGBTQ community…” (Calfas, 2018, para. 3). The situation was recognized by many and eventually escalated to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The case was significantly controversial. Phillips and his team argued that making a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would technically involve him in the event which was “religiously” immoral to him. They asked, If vegan bakeries do not have to sell non-vegan products based on their religious beliefs, why should he have to sell a cake to a gay couple if his religion goes against it? Philips and his team made use of the First Amendment. Not only does he have freedom of religion but the First Amendment also grants him the freedom of self-expression, and to Phillips, that means expressing himself through the art of his cakes.

To be realistic, a vegan bakery does not offer non-vegans products, however, Phillips cakeshop does offer wedding cakes, just not to homosexuals. Craig said, “If Phillips didn’t want to sell wedding cakes to gay couples, he shouldn’t sell wedding cakes at all.” (Calfas, 2018, para. 9). Phillips claim of “self-expression” should and does not “exempt business owners from public accommodation laws, which requires them to serve equally.” (Corvino, 2017) Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court Justices ruled 7-2 in favor of Phillips. This was a huge lose for the LGBTQ community and those who are fighting with them. What many people don’t realize is that this court ruling has started a wave of discrimination across our country based on religious grounds, and it is frightening.

Due to this Supreme Court ruling, religious persons are now more confident than ever. They see this as their chance to ask, “Well if they don’t have to provide service to gays, why should we?” And adoption agencies are being the first ones to ask. The House Appropriations Committee passed an amendment that, if implemented, would allow adoption agencies and child welfare services to refuse gay couples based on their religious or moral beliefs despite the needs of the child (Diaz, 2018, para. 1). This implementation would be called Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act.

The Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act would cause a great deal of damage if implemented. Not only would the needs of children be overlooked, but our tax dollars would be used for discriminatory purposes. “The act would require the U.S. Department of Health and Human services to withhold 15% of the federal funds a state receives to administer child welfare programs if it fails to comply the provisions of the Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act” (Human Rights Campaign, 2017, para 2). More importantly, by taking adoption rights away from the LGBTQ community, we are denying a child’s right to be a part of a happy, safe, loving family and home. As of today, there are hundreds of thousands eligible children waiting to be fostered or adopted. Same-sex couples are six times more likely to foster and four times more likely to adopt than a heterosexual couple (Diaz, 2018, para. 6). With that being said, it’s easy to imagine the significant amount of kids that will lose their opportunity if this act was implemented.

The discrimiation doesn’t stop at the LGBTQ community. Women have become a target of this discriminatory behavior as well. President Donald Trump, and his administration, have drafted a rule that could allow religious employers to deny covering their employees birth control in their health insurance plans (Cooney, 2017, para. 1). This rule specifically targets a mandate in the Affordable Care Act which requires employers to provide cost free birth control to their employees. So far this mandate has benefitted over 50 million women across the United States. If we were put under new regulations, hundreds of thousands of women could lose their benefits of no cost contraceptives (Pear, 2017, para. 8). This would indefinitely strip away our rights as women to provide ourselves with the contraceptives needed not only for safe sex, but also for medical conditions such as irregular periods, acne, endometriosis, etc.

In the end religious freedom is a fundamental right. However, to say it is an absolute right is incorrect. “It cannot be used as a shield to permit discrimination against LGBTQ Americans” (Pear, 2017, para. 18). This being the same shield employers and businesses tried to use a half century ago to discriminate against African-Americans based on their religious or moral beliefs, in which this case the Federal Courts denied (Pear, 2017, para. 18). If it was denied then, it can and must be denied now. Our citizens have basic rights that are now being infringed upon because we are permitting the excuse of “religious freedom” and “self expression.” As a country we are taking a giant step back by allowing such behavior to continue.

So when does the excuse of “religious freedom” end? Are we just going to allow bakeries and/or all businesses for that matter deny service to our LGBTQ community? How long is our country willing to let a child’s needs go unattended? And how soon will our rights as women be striped from us at the hands of our own government? I wish I could tell you.

Racism and Discrimination in Religion Context Research Paper

Racism and discrimination, what does the church teach regarding this issue, putting catholic social teachings into practice, working to end or speak out against it, works cited.

Racism and discrimination are a form of social and personal disorder that adheres to the assumption that one race or social group is inherently superior to the other. This outlook is not based on any inherent biological superiority; rather, it originates from socio-cultural ideas regarding the superiority of a particular individual by the race, religion, ethnicity or social class that they originate from. One of the best historical examples of racial discrimination in action can be seen before the mid-1900s African American Civil Rights Movement when black Americans were considered second class citizens due to the color of their skin and were given fewer opportunities and rights despite the fact that they were also American citizens.

The stance of the church in this matter is reflected in the 1989 Papal Encyclical by the late Pope John Paul II, which correlated racist and discriminatory thoughts and attitudes as a sin. From the perspective of the church, all individuals are equal in the eyes of God and should be treated as such. While attitudes related to overt racism and discrimination are no longer as prevalent as they used to be, subversive elements still do exist, this is apparent in the various discriminatory practices that continue to plague society today (Beyer 7). This can be seen in the discrimination against American Muslims, Latin Americans, and even African Americans. With racism and discrimination still prevalent in America today, one must wonder what the church is doing to counteract the ill-effects of such practices?

Scriptural Basis for the Church’s Teachings

In Galatians 3:28, it is stated that “there is neither Jew or Greek or even slave or free man, male or female; rather, we are all one under Jesus Christ.” This verse implies that all of us, regardless of who were are or where we come from, are considered the same and equal under Christ (Regan 1027). This is a statement that is supported by Genesis 1:26-27, Acts 10:34 as well as Galatians 3:28, which all emphasize our equality under God.

This is a sentiment that can be summed up in a single phrase “God does not play favorites”. In other words, there is no such thing as one race being superior to the other or one group being inherently better; we are all a single people with differences that make us special and unique, yet in the end we are all the same (Valadez and Mirci 162). It is based on these passages, as well as numerous others, that the stance of the church has been one of tolerance of differences, the celebration of the unique and the acceptance that we are all brothers and sisters under God.

Summary of Teachings from one Papal Encyclical

One of the best Papal Encyclicals that relate to racism and discrimination was the encyclical of Pope John the XXIII, which was published on April 11, 1963. In it, the Pope explains that though all beings are reflections of the infinite wisdom of God, there is disunity among us, brought about by considerations related to differences in economic classes, cultural clashes, discrimination against what is different and rampant racism (Tablan 291). The encyclical states that these are artificial creations brought about by man’s hubris in his desire to control, categorize and to place order in his life. A significant emphasis is placed on maintaining such order based on the influences of individual cultures and, in so doing, creates conflict when two or more cultures or people come into contact with one another.

What must be understood though is that, as reflections of God’s divine wisdom, we are all the same and bear a small aspect of our creator. We are all human and have inalienable rights and freedoms. In essence, it is the artificial constructs of society as we have come to know them today that have caused people to lean towards discrimination and racism. Society has begun to take on a different meaning wherein it is praised on the same pedestal as the Lord Almighty where groups of people emphasize they are better than others by belonging to a particular society (Finn 136).

This is the origin of racism and discrimination since several groups have created an artificial belief in superiority based on a false idol (i.e. social groups). All of us need to understand that it is not a society that defines us, that controls who we are, or influences our freedoms. We are one body under God and is through his love and divine providence that we exist and thrive in this world. The closer we are to understanding that we are all one and the same under God, the more likely we are to turn away from discrimination and racism and focus on improving who we are as individuals for the glory of our creator.

Pastoral Letter From US Catholic Bishops or Regional Bishops

The 1979 Pastoral Letter on Racism from the U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference delves into the concept of the current subversive nature of racism. In the past, racism was more obvious based on biased practices, laws and attitudes that were clearly evident. These days, such practices are no longer as prevalent as they once were; however, this does not mean that they have completely disappeared from the landscape of society.

While it is currently illegal to discriminate against someone based on their race when it comes to jobs or various opportunities, discrimination still exists resulting, in particular, different ethnicities such as Latin Americans being denied potential job opportunities (Caccamo 301). This is due to the idea that Latin Americans are perceived as a source of crime within the community; however, what people fail to realize is that by denying people legitimate opportunities, they are making sure that such individuals have no choice but to turn to crime.

From the point of view of the Catholic Church, the problem lies in the way in which people learn to discriminate or be racist. Such attitudes are not inherent, instead, they come about through social influences which cause a person to think in a particular manner. The U.S. Catholic Bishops Conference states that the only way in which racism and discrimination can truly be removed is if we address how social concepts and behaviors are transmitted from one generation to the next.

Two interesting examples of the Catholic church putting its social teachings into practice can be seen in the support of the Australian Catholic University for the anti-racism campaign by the Australian Human Rights Commission as well as the activities of the Catholics in Alliance Organization. In the first example, the support of ACU is done not only through tacit approval of what the commission is doing but also in how it promotes the ideals of human rights, non-discrimination and equality among its students. In the case of the Catholics in Alliance organization, it promotes the creation of various public policies and programs that emphasize on bringing to light the inherent dignity found in all people with racism and discrimination being at the forefront of the issues it tackles.

Work towards removing the “language of racism” from the general public consciousness

Over the past few years, there have been numerous instances where celebrities and politicians have been called out for their use of what can be defined as “racist language”. Examples of this come in the form of the term “nigger or negro” for African Americans and “beaner” for Latin Americans. The fact that prominent individuals were criticized for their use of these terms is a good sign since it showcases the growing social awareness regarding the negative impact that racism has.

However, the fact remains that the use of such terms continues to be prevalent despite the fact the American Civil Rights Movement, as well as numerous instances of equal rights protests that have occurred since the 1950s. If people are aware that the use of such racist and discriminatory terms is wrong, and it is accepted that such terms should never be utilized, why is it that they continue to exist and are used extensively today despite 70 years of advocacy against their usage?

The problem lies with the public continuing to place some level of importance behind racist or discriminatory language. Words like “negro” and “beaner” are now placed under the same category as swear words and are often utilized in the same situations (Santos and Laczniak 29). Unfortunately, this ensures their continued existence since the public, in effect, maintains them through informal usage. What is needed is for the “language of racism” to be given less importance, this is not done by banning their use since this is likely to encourage it; rather, it is better to start by educating children that these words are not appropriate to be utilized under any context.

People do not start out as racists or inherently discriminate against others; they learn these behaviors over time as a direct result of the influence of their environment. By removing racist and discriminatory elements from a child’s upbringing (i.e. racist language), this ensures that they are less likely to utilize such terms or engage in such practices (Groody 17). This can only be done by convincing parents of the need to properly raise their children in an environment that encourages love for one’s fellow man. Some of the possible ways this can be accomplished is through church sermons as well as public information campaigns that specifically target new parents.

Enhance cultural sharing

Cultural sharing involves understanding differences instead of considering them something to be avoided. The Catholic Church could attempt the same strategy that various embassies are using with their Spanish or French weeks wherein the embassies sponsor films, fairs and other activities involving their culture. Instead of sponsoring Catholicism, the church could sponsor Latin American or Muslim fairs to occur in front of or beside the church. This would allow greater interaction between people from different background resulting in a greater level of shared understanding.

Enhance sharing of religious traditions and ways of thinking

One potential strategy is to promote and share religious traditions and ways of thinking across multiple social groups. People often fear and mistrust that which they do not understand, and this often leads to discriminatory actions. By letting people understand more about different religions, it is likely that the fear will disappear, and people would become more understanding.

Promote the idea that all Christians are obligated in reforming societal awareness regarding the proper attitude towards racism and discrimination

The problem with reforming society is that people often think that it is not their problem or that it is the responsibility of someone else. All Christians need to realize that we are mandated to share the word of God with all our brothers and sisters and one aspect of it is the knowledge that we are all equal under God. We should not expect someone else to take care of society’s issues for us; instead, we need to take a stand and show what it means to be true Catholics through words, deeds, and examples. Yes, this may seem hard to do but it is possible so long as we trust in God and follow the teachings he imparted to us through Jesus Christ.

You also need to ask yourself the following question: “Was Jesus ever racist? Did he truly show preference for one social class over another?” The answer is no, his ministry included people from all walks of life, all races and backgrounds and it is this attitude that we should take when it comes to spreading the word of God. Despite differences in wealth and social standing, we are all the same, we are all God’s creations and, as such, we should not discriminate nor racially profile one another since this would be the same as doing it to ourselves.

If there is one aspect that can be taken from this paper, it should be the realization that it is useless to hate someone based on their race, religion, ethnicity, etc. All of us, no matter the country of origin, are part of the human race that has been created in the image of God. We all have similar physical characteristics with minor variances to indicate our individuality. To hate based on minor differences in skin, belief or origin is the height of folly since we are, in effect, discriminating against ourselves. God even stated in James 2:4 that we should “love our neighbors as we love ourselves”, yet people seem to discriminate more than love.

The problem, as this paper has shown, originates from the desire to showcase superiority, the desire to place ourselves above others and to show that we belong to a particular group. One of the clearest examples of this can be seen in social attitude of either being a “winner” or “loser”. We as a society have created these negative classifications to showcase our superiority over one another. In fact, some individuals derive a certain level of “happiness” from being considered “better” than others by belonging to a group and not through their accomplishments. It is attitudes like this that are at the heart of racism and discrimination in the world today.

Contributing to this problem is the way in which our current capitalist society is oriented wherein the accumulation of wealth is upheld as the primary goal that all members of society should pursue. This has resulted in additional methods of discrimination (i.e. the distinction between the rich and the poor) and has contributed towards dividing society rather than bringing it closer together. Eradicating racism and discrimination in society would necessitate more than sermons and letters indicating that discriminating against others is wrong; rather, it would be necessary to change the socio-cultural attitudes that cause people to act in a discriminatory manner in the first place.

The pursuit of wealth as the main goal of life, the desire to be superior and the belief that superiority can be attained simply by belonging to a particular group are all attitudes that need to be removed from our societal consciousness so that racism and discrimination will no longer be an issue. The problem is that priests, bishops and even the Pope himself are limited in their capacity to enact social change in the scale that is necessary to remove racism and discrimination. As seen in the various excerpts of information from the church that have been detailed thus far, numerous letters, encyclicals, and Pastoral letters have been published over the past 100 years indicating that the Church is firmly against racism and discrimination; however, the aforementioned factors continue to thrive in the present.

This is due to the innate resistance to change that all individuals and societal groups have as well as their learned behavior. No one is born a racist; they become one as a direct result of the behaviors and points of view that they internalize throughout their lives. Fortunately, learned behaviors can also be unlearned, but how is the church supposed to cause an entire society to unlearn a specific behavior. The solution is to utilize church scripture and how it explains the duty of Christians as ministers of the Word of God. The word of God not only advocates his love for all humanity but how we should all love each other as brothers and sisters under God.

Individual Christians can help society unlearn specific behaviors by showing the right behaviors to utilize. Refusing to use racist terminology, celebrating differences and protecting those that have been discriminated against are only a few of the attitudes that Christians can espouse to show to others the “proper way” in which we can treat each other. Applying this strategy is easier said than done since many Christians believe that combating racism and discrimination is someone else’s problem. Bishops and priests should explain to their respective congregations that the continued existence of racism and discrimination is a problem that affects us all which we all have a shared responsibility to remove from our society.

Racism and discrimination cannot be combated by priests and bishops alone, since they lack the reach necessary, nor can it be handled by individual Christians since a single voice among many is not effective. What is needed is a concerted effort by all members of the Church, to advocate for change in society and bring it about through the guidances of the priests and bishops and the efforts of the entire congregation.

Beyer, Gerald J. “The Meaning Of Solidarity In Catholic Social Teaching.” Political Theology 15.1 (2014): 7-25. Print.

Caccamo, James. “The Ethics Of Branding In The Age Of Ubiquitous Media: Insights From Catholic Social Teaching.” Journal Of Business Ethics 90.(2009): 301. Print.

Finn, Daniel K. “What Is A Sinful Social Structure?.” Theological Studies 77.1 (2016): 136. Print.

Groody, Daniel G. “A God Of Life, A Civilization Of Love: Justice, Mission, And Catholic Social Teaching.” International Review Of Mission 102.1 (2013): 17. Print.

Regan, Ethna. “Barely Visible: The Child In Catholic Social Teaching.” Heythrop Journal 55.6 (2014): 1021-1032. Print.

Santos, Nicholas, and Gene Laczniak. ““Just” Markets From The Perspective Of Catholic Social Teaching.” Journal Of Business Ethics 89.(2009): 29. Print.

Tablan, Ferdinand. “Catholic Social Teachings: Toward A Meaningful Work.” Journal Of Business Ethics 128.2 (2015): 291. Print.

Valadez, James R., and Philip S. Mirci. “Educating For Social Justice: Drawing From Catholic Social Teaching.” Journal Of Catholic Education 19.1 (2015): 154-177. Print.

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Bibliography

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Regions & Countries

1. views on discrimination in our society.

Large shares of Americans say there is at least some discrimination against several religious, racial and ethnic groups in our society. About eight-in-ten see discrimination against Muslims and Jews, as well as against Arab, Black and Hispanic people.

Chart shows Large majorities see at least some discrimination against many groups in our society today

Three-quarters also see at least some discrimination against Asian people.

Half or fewer see at least some discrimination against evangelical Christians and White people.

The shares of Americans who say there is a lot of discrimination against each group vary considerably. Muslims are most widely perceived to face a high degree of discrimination: 44% of U.S. adults say there is a lot of discrimination against Muslims, which is slightly more than the shares saying this about Black people (40%), Jews (40%) and Arab people (39%). Somewhat fewer think there is a lot of discrimination against Hispanic people (28%) and Asian people (24%). Americans are least likely to say there is a lot of discrimination against evangelical Christians (14%) and White people (13%).

Across all age groups, solid majorities see at least some discrimination against Muslim, Jewish, Arab, Black, Hispanic and Asian people.

Young adults (ages 18 to 29) stand out for being more likely than older adults to perceive a lot of discrimination against certain groups. This is particularly the case when it comes to Black people: 51% of adults under 30 say there is a lot of discrimination against Black people in our society, while about a third of those ages 65 and older say the same (34%). This pattern holds for perceptions of discrimination against Muslims, Arab, Hispanic and Asian people.

But younger adults are much less likely than older people to perceive a lot of discrimination against Jews. Of all the age groups analyzed, adults 65 and older are the most heavily inclined to say there is a lot of discrimination against Jews in our society today (50%), while adults under 30 are the least likely to say this (31%). Younger adults are also less likely than older people to say there is a lot of discrimination against evangelical Christians and White people.

Chart shows Younger Americans less likely than older adults to see a lot of discrimination against Jews, and more likely to see a lot of discrimination against Muslims

Partisanship

Two-thirds or more of Republicans and Democrats see at least some discrimination against Jewish, Muslim, Black, Hispanic, Asian and Arab people.

Chart shows Partisans generally agree that U.S. Jews face discrimination, but differ on other groups

Still, the party coalitions diverge when it comes to which of those groups experience a lot of discrimination. For example, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are 45 percentage points more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to say there is a lot of discrimination against Black people.

Democrats are also more likely than Republicans to say there is a lot of discrimination against Muslim, Arab, Hispanic and Asian people.

On the other hand, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to see discrimination against evangelical Christians and White people.

Only in the case of Jews do partisans on both sides largely agree: Four-in-ten Republicans and Democrats alike say Jews face a lot of discrimination in our society today.

Overall, Democrats are generally much more likely than Republicans to perceive a lot of discrimination against various groups. Aside from Jews (40%), no group is seen as facing a lot of discrimination by more than 27% of Republicans, whereas more than 40% of Democrats see a lot of discrimination against five of the listed groups.

Race and ethnicity

Among adults in each of four large racial and ethnic categories – White, Black, Hispanic and Asian Americans – about three-quarters or more say that Black, Hispanic and Asian people face at least some discrimination in our society today. Black Americans themselves are particularly likely to feel that Black people face a lot of discrimination (73% say this).

Roughly eight-in-ten or more Americans across all four racial or ethnic groups also feel that Muslims and Arab people face at least some discrimination.

White Americans are the most likely to say that Jews face at least some discrimination (85%). Slightly fewer Black (78%), Hispanic (75%) and Asian (71%) Americans express the same view.

Like the overall public, fewer people in most of these racial or ethnic groups think there is discrimination against evangelical Christians, though about half of White (52%), Black (51%) and Hispanic (46%) adults say there is at least some discrimination against evangelical Christians.

White adults are far more likely than any of the other racial or ethnic groups to feel there is at least some discrimination against White people (52%).

Chart shows 94% of Black adults say there is at least some discrimination against Black people

Religious groups differ significantly in their assessments of discrimination in our society. To begin with, each religious group tends to be especially likely to perceive discrimination against itself .

Take, for example, views of discrimination against Jews: 72% of Jewish Americans say there is a lot of discrimination against Jews in our society today, but fewer than half of adults in any other religious group in the survey say the same. Muslim Americans stand out for a particularly small share saying Jews face a lot of discrimination (17%).

Chart shows U.S. religious groups are especially likely to perceive a lot of discrimination against themselves

Similarly, Muslim Americans are significantly more likely than most other religious groups to say that Muslims face a lot of discrimination (67%). Still, around half or more of Jewish Americans (57%), religiously unaffiliated Americans (52%) and Black Protestants (51%) also perceive a lot of discrimination against Muslims. White evangelical Protestants (27%) are among the least likely to say Muslims face a lot of discrimination.

Indeed, White evangelical Protestants are as likely to say that evangelical Christians face a lot of discrimination (30%) as they are to say that Muslims face a lot (27%). But more White evangelical Protestants feel there is a lot of discrimination against Jews (46%) than feel there is a lot against evangelical Christians. 2

How views of discrimination have changed over time

Against muslims.

The percentage of U.S. adults who say Muslims face a lot of discrimination in our society has ticked up 5 percentage points since 2021.

Chart shows Share of Americans who say there is a lot of discrimination against Jews has doubled since 2021

Still, it was markedly higher in 2017 than it is today. At that time – shortly after the election of former President Donald Trump and amid court battles over his effort to “ban” travel to the United States from several Muslim-majority countries – 87% said there was at least some discrimination against Muslims, including 56% who said there was a lot.

Our directly comparable trends only go back to 2017. Prior to that, Pew Research Center asked about discrimination in a slightly different way: We asked Americans on the telephone whether there was a lot of discrimination against each group in a list, using a “yes/no” format.

Using the old question, the perceived level of discrimination against Muslims was higher in 2017 than it had been in prior years (2009, 2013 and 2014). And using the new question, it has been lower in subsequent years (2019, 2021 and 2024) than it was in 2017. This does not mean, however, that 2017 was necessarily an all-time peak; to make that judgment, one would need comparable survey data going back much farther, including data from before and after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

Pew Research Center has conducted three major, national surveys focusing specifically on Muslim Americans. These surveys – in 2007 , 2011 and 2017 – found that the share of Muslims who said they personally had experienced discriminatory treatment in the past year grew from 40% in 2007 to 48% in 2017 .

Against Jews

While the share of Americans who believe Muslims face a lot of discrimination has been relatively high for more than a decade, the share of Americans who say Jews face a lot of discrimination in our society has risen sharply in recent years.

Chart shows The sense that Jews face a lot of discrimination has risen more among older Americans than younger ones

Today, 40% of U.S. adults say Jews face a lot of discrimination – twice the share who said this in 2021 (20%). While most demographic groups analyzed now say Jews face more discrimination than three years ago, opinions have shifted more markedly among some groups than others.

Most notably, among Americans ages 65 and older, the sense that Jews face a lot of discrimination has risen 29 percentage points since 2021, from 21% to 50%. Among adults ages 18 to 29, the share increased 11 points over the same period. This has opened a sizable age gap in views of discrimination against Jews, which was not present in 2021.

With the doubling in recent years, the share of the overall U.S. public saying Jews face a lot of discrimination is now identical to the share saying the same about Black people (40%) and close to the figure for Muslims (44%). By comparison, in most of our past surveys, Americans were much less likely to say there was a lot of discrimination against Jews than to say the same about other groups, including Muslims and Black people .

Pew Research Center has conducted two major, national surveys focusing specifically on Jewish Americans. Both of those surveys – in 2013 and 2020 – posed questions about discrimination against Jews and other groups. They found that while many Jews perceived anti-Jewish discrimination in the U.S., larger shares of Jews perceived a lot of discrimination against other groups . 3 In 2020, for example, 48% of U.S. Jewish adults surveyed said Jews face a lot of discrimination in our society – but 60% said the same about Muslims and 54% said this about Black people. 4 Today, the pattern is different: Jewish Americans are now more likely to say that Jews face a lot of discrimination in our society (72%) than to say the same about Muslims (57%) or Black people (52%).

Against evangelical Christians, racial and ethnic groups

Perceptions of discrimination against evangelical Christians have been stable across our surveys in recent years – and the share saying this remains relatively low.

There also has not been much change in views of discrimination against Black, Hispanic, Asian and White people in the past few years .

How the American public thinks discrimination has changed since the start of the Israel-Hamas war

In addition to asking survey respondents how much discrimination various groups face in our society, the new survey asked whether discrimination against three groups – Muslims, Jews and Arab people – has increased, decreased or stayed about the same since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.

Chart shows Majority of Americans think discrimination against Jews increased since the start of the Israel-Hamas war; fewer say the same about Muslims and Arabs

A majority of Americans (57%) say that discrimination against Jews has increased since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, while 19% say it has stayed the same and 3% say it has decreased. Around one-in-five are not sure.

Meanwhile, 38% say discrimination against Muslims has increased since the start of the war, while 30% see no change, 5% say it has decreased and around a quarter are not sure.

Views of discrimination against Arabs are roughly similar to views about Muslims: 36% of U.S. adults say discrimination against Arab people has increased since the war began, while 31% say it has stayed the same, 5% say it has decreased and 27% are not sure.

Chart shows Young adults are less likely than older Americans to say discrimination against Jews has increased since the start of the Israel-Hamas war

U.S. adults under 30 are about equally likely to say that discrimination has increased against Muslims, Jews and Arabs since the start of the Israel-Hamas war (47% say this about each).

These young adults are more likely than older Americans to say that discrimination against Muslims and Arabs has increased, and less likely than older Americans to say the same about Jews.

Among adults ages 65 and older, a significantly larger share say discrimination against Jews has increased since the start of the Israel-Hamas war (73%) than say the same about Muslims (41%) or Arabs (38%).

Americans aligned with both parties largely agree that discrimination against Jews has increased: 57% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents express this view, as do 61% of Republicans and Republican leaners.

But there are significant partisan differences when it comes to whether Muslims and Arabs have experienced more discrimination since the start of the war.

Democrats are about twice as likely as Republicans to say that discrimination has risen against Muslims (52% vs. 26%) and Arab people (49% vs. 23%). Among Republicans, a plurality say that discrimination has stayed the same in the case of both Muslims (41%) and Arab people (42%), and only about one-in-ten or fewer say discrimination against either group has decreased.

Chart shows Majorities of U.S. Jews and Muslims see increased discrimination against their respective groups since start of the Israel-Hamas war

Religious groups differ in their perceptions of how discrimination has changed since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.

The vast majority of Jewish Americans (89%) think discrimination against Jews has increased since the start of the war. This is the highest share of any religious group we analyzed – although smaller majorities of White evangelical Protestants (66%), White Catholics (69%), White nonevangelical Protestants (62%) say the same. Fewer Muslim Americans agree (36%).

A large majority of Muslim Americans (70%) say discrimination against Muslims has increased since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. Around half of Jews (49%) share this view, while fewer Christians in any of the broad groups we can analyze – including White Catholics (36%) and Hispanic Catholics (42%) – agree. White evangelical Protestants (25%) are among the least likely of the religious groups studied to say that discrimination against Muslims has increased.

Views of discrimination against Arabs largely mirror views about Muslims.

How perceptions of increased discrimination since the conflict began vary based on people’s experiences with the Israel-Hamas war

As part of this survey, we asked Americans how closely they are following news about the Israel-Hamas war .

Those who say they closely follow news about the war are more likely than those who don’t to perceive a rise in discrimination against all three groups (Muslims, Arabs and Jews) since the start of the war.

Chart shows Views on discrimination are related to how Americans engage with news and social media about the war, and also to their degree of sympathy for each side

The survey also asked whether respondents have ever been personally offended by comments about the war – either because of something they saw on the news or social media, or because of something someone said around them.

People who say they have been offended are more likely than those who haven’t to perceive a rise in discrimination against all three groups.

Some Americans also reported that they have stopped talking to someone, or unfollowed or blocked someone online, because of something that person said about the Israel-Hamas war. (For more about this, read Chapter 2 of this report . )

People who have cut off communication with someone in this way are more likely than those who haven’t to say discrimination against both Muslims and Arabs has increased.

Where people say their sympathies lie in the Israel-Hamas war is also related to their perceptions about discrimination in the U.S.

78% of those who sympathize entirely or mostly with the Israeli people say discrimination against Jews has increased. Fewer say this among those who sympathize entirely or mostly with the Palestinian people (55%) or who sympathize equally with both groups (62%).
By comparison, those who sympathize entirely or mostly with the Palestinian people are more likely to say discrimination against Muslims (66%) and Arabs (64%) has increased. Fewer of those who sympathize predominantly with Israelis (29% and 25%, respectively) or equally with both groups (48% and 45%, respectively) say the same.
We also looked at evangelical Christians as a whole – not just among White Protestants and not including those who only identify as born-again but not evangelical. In that case, 76% of evangelical Christians say there is at least some discrimination against evangelical Christians in our society, including 29% who say there is a lot . ↩
The 2013 survey of Jewish Americans included a similar question about discrimination, but the response options were different. The 2020 survey response options were “A lot,” “Some,” “Not much” or “None at all,” while in the 2013 survey the response options were “Yes, there is a lot of discrimination” and “No, not a lot of discrimination.” Despite this change, both surveys found that more Jews perceived a lot of discrimination against some other minority groups than against Jews. ↩
The latest survey analyzes only those who are Jews by religion – people who answer a question about their present religion by saying they are Jewish. The 2013 and 2020 surveys, which focused specifically on Jews, were designed to enable analysis of additional forms of Jewish identity, including “Jews of no religion” – people who say they have at least one Jewish parent and who consider themselves Jewish in some way (such as by culture, ethnicity or family background) but who describe their current religion as atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular. ↩

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Table of contents, younger americans stand out in their views of the israel-hamas war, how u.s. muslims are experiencing the israel-hamas war, how u.s. jews are experiencing the israel-hamas war, majority in u.s. say israel has valid reasons for fighting; fewer say the same about hamas, how americans view the conflicts between russia and ukraine, israel and hamas, and china and taiwan, most popular.

About Pew Research Center Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts .

Editorials | Editorial: Moody Bible case tests whether…

Editorials | Editorial: Moody Bible case tests whether religious doctrine is a defense against workplace discrimination

Moody Bible Institute's Crowell Hall on LaSalle Street in Chicago on June 3, 2021. (Chris Sweda/Chicago Tribune)

As the Christian faithful gather to celebrate Easter this Sunday, a lawsuit over religious beliefs is getting new life in Chicago’s federal courts.

In a March 18 decision, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals sided with a teacher who claims Moody Bible Institute fired her because of sex discrimination. The private evangelical Christian college had sought to dismiss the complaint, saying in part that it’s forbidden based on the U.S. Constitution’s protection of religious freedom.

At the heart of the dispute is a tough call about whether religious doctrine was merely a cover for illegal discrimination in the workplace. Moody has claimed that it fired Janay Garrick because she challenged the church’s teaching that only men can become clergy. Garrick has said that Moody knew her views on the topic when it hired her and that the school treated her badly because she was an outspoken woman, not because she thinks qualified people should be considered for clergy roles regardless of their gender.

While the appellate dispute turned on a technical matter of the law, the case wound up pitting one Donald Trump-appointed judge who wrote the majority opinion siding with Garrick against another Trump appointee who dissented, saying the lawsuit improperly entangles Moody in litigation over a strictly religious question.

The upshot is that Garrick’s lawsuit is slated to continue in a Chicago federal court, with the potential to eventually reach a U.S. Supreme Court whose conservative majority has repeatedly sided with Christians in major religious cases.

Garrick’s troubles started after Moody hired her in 2014 as a non-tenure instructor on a one-year contract to teach communications classes, according to the 7th Circuit decision. The ruling suggests that Garrick became unpopular with her colleagues after she objected to a hostile atmosphere toward women and LGBTQ+ people at the conservative school.

Male colleagues ignored, avoided and ridiculed her, and an executive in charge of human resources told her to stay in her office to avoid negative interactions, the decision relates. When she co-designed a presentation for making the campus more inclusive, a supervisor criticized her “inflammatory rhetoric” and told her she needed to “learn how to speak around here.” Her male co-presenter wasn’t similarly reprimanded.

The school refused to lighten her teaching load while she finished her terminal academic degree, as it did for male faculty, while requiring her to develop five new courses, a heavier workload than Moody required of her male counterparts. When she applied for a tenure-track job for which she was apparently qualified, the school rejected her application within an hour, despite her strong performance reviews to date.

In 2017, Moody gave her a negative performance review just three months after she had received a positive one. For the first time since her hiring three years previously, Garrick’s superiors said her views about female clergy were problematic.

Shortly afterward, they cited those beliefs in a letter explaining that her annual contract would not be renewed. The letter said she would be paid for the rest of the year, but when she discussed her termination with students and student reporters, Moody fired her and expelled her from campus, according to the 7th Circuit decision.

Garrick’s dismissal coincided with a turbulent time at the Bible college, which was founded in Chicago by businessman and evangelist Dwight L. Moody more than a century ago. The institution receives federal financial assistance, subjecting it to federal rules that prohibit sex-based discrimination.

Beginning in 2017, the same year it fired Garrick, Moody experienced high-profile financial problems, leading it to shutter a campus on the West Coast and cut faculty and staff in Chicago. Both its president and chief operating officer resigned, and the school pursued a plan to sell part of the valuable property making up its campus on the Near North Side of Chicago. In 2022, the Chicago City Council approved the North Union redevelopment project on the former Moody land.

We don’t envy the judges in this case. It appears the school went after Garrick, rebuking her for speaking out, loading her with work and subjecting her to hostility from her peers. But there’s no simple way to separate Moody’s religious motivations from its other motivations in forcing out a teacher it evidently viewed as a troublemaker who didn’t fit in.

The case law cited in the appellate decision is revealing: The majority cites the case of a junior high teacher at a Catholic school who was fired after she underwent in vitro fertilization, which the church said conflicted with its moral doctrines. A judge upheld the teacher’s right to pursue her lawsuit.

The dissent, on the other hand, relies on what’s known as the “fake nun” case, in which an archbishop determined that a woman was not a nun in good standing, as she claimed. She sued for defamation, losing when the court decided the Constitution forbids the government from second-guessing religious judgments.

The Garrick case differs from both of those, of course. The courts that are deciding it will need to determine whether something unlawful occurred without wading into religious doctrine. That will be tricky, and we will be watching closely with the knowledge that additional cases are probably coming that will claim religious justifications for conduct that otherwise would be wrong in the eyes of the law.

Submit a letter, of no more than 400 words, to the editor here or email [email protected] .

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The right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination: Theoretical distinctions

2.1. The committed interest in religious (non)adherence

2.2. The non-committal interest in unsaddled membership of a religious group

4.1. The right to freedom of religion

4.2. The right against religious discrimination

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How views of discrimination have changed over time

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Against evangelical Christians, racial and ethnic groups

How the American public thinks discrimination has changed since the start of the Israel-Hamas war

How perceptions of increased discrimination since the conflict began vary based on people’s experiences with the Israel-Hamas war

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Editorials | Editorial: Moody Bible case tests whether…

Editorials | Editorial: Moody Bible case tests whether religious doctrine is a defense against workplace discrimination

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