the doll's house essay by katherine mansfield

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Analysis of Katherine Mansfield’s The Doll’s House

By NASRULLAH MAMBROL on July 10, 2022

Published in The Dove’s Nest , Katherine Mansfield’s last collection of short stories, “The Doll’s House” belongs with “Prelude” (1920) and “At the Bay” (1922) among the Burnell stories, a trilogy based on the re-creation of a New Zealand childhood that threads family life with social satire while exploring issues of identity and belonging. The story, divided into three sections, uses the central metaphor of the doll’s house, which also provides the linear and dramatic framework of the narrative. It begins with the arrival of a completely furnished doll’s house sent to the Burnell children by “dear old Mrs. Hay,” a friend of the family. When Pat, a servant, opens the house, Isabel, Kezia, and Lottie cannot believe their eyes: “It was too marvellous; it was too much for them.” But while her sisters admire this imitation of gaudy bourgeois comfort, Kezia, Mansfield’s recurring figure of the open-minded girl, is drawn by the perfection of an “exquisite little amber lamp” that looks “real” to her.

the doll's house essay by katherine mansfield

In the second and third sections of the story, the doll’s house becomes a source of social and psychological conflict as it is turned into an instrument of power by Isabel, the eldest Burnell sister, and the other schoolchildren invited to share her euphoric pride. Cruelly excluding the Kelvey girls from their companionship and from the pleasure of seeing the doll’s house because they are the daughters “of a washerwoman and a gaolbird,” Isabel and her friends reproduce their parents’ prejudiced views and social sense of self-gratification without questioning them. The narrative works up to an epiphanic climax when Kezia, “the potentially free subject,” to use Kate Fullbrook’s terms (113), breaks with social and family conventions by opening “the big white gates” of her home and her heart to allow Lil and Else Kelvey a hurried glimpse at the doll’s house. Over a short moment of symbolical intensity, the three children are drawn together in a shared experience of vision and beauty: “[Else] put out a finger and stroked her sister’s quill; she smiled her rare smile. ‘I seen the little lamp,’ she said.”

As are most of Katherine Mansfield’s stories, “The Doll’s House” is poised dialectically between the external world of social reality and an internalized world of subjective perceptions. Its Modernism lies in its refusal to rely on narratorial intrusions (the text is full of ironic insights but is never judgmental) and in its use of point of view and indirect free form to convey inner feelings, of symbol and metaphor as structural elements, and of epiphany as the ephemeral moment when the focal character and the reader might gain access to truths hidden to ordinary perceptions: Not only do Kezia and the Kelvey sisters know that the doll’s house is a social symbol of status and discrimination, they also see in its little lamp the metaphorical values of shared knowledge and emotion, while the whole story suggests that artistic creation may be a redeeming act of inclusion and fulfillment.

“The Doll’s House” is also typically Mansfieldian in the way the narration oscillates between ironic distance and emotional empathy, using “impersonation” as a form of speech representation that captures the subtle nuances of a character’s tone of voice and makes for immediacy but also ambiguity and ironic contrasts. However, the epiphanic accomplishment characterizing this story makes it different from most of the other short fiction by Mansfield: Far from being an experience of self-deception or self-betrayal, the expected revelation is here a “blazing” if evanescent moment of discovery and happiness.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Fullbrook, Kate. Katherine Mansfi eld. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. Kobler, J. F. Katherine Mansfi eld: A Study of the Short Fiction. Boston: Twayne, 1990. Mansfi eld, Katherine. The Dove’s Nest and Other Stories. London: Constable, 1923

The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield | Summary and Analysis

Analysis of the doll's house by katherine mansfield.

The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield, published in 1922, is a short story written in third-person, through an omniscient narrator. It discusses societal class and ostracization through the lens of two sets of school-going sisters from different family backgrounds.

The Doll’s House | Summary

The story starts with Mrs. Hay- a previous guest at the Burnell’s residence- sending a lovely, large dollhouse as a gift to the family’s three daughters- Isabel, Lottie, and Kezia. It smelled of paint, but the decorations and detail were perfect, and the girls were thrilled. The youngest sister, Kezia, especially loved the little amber lamp with its white globe, standing in the middle of the dining table. She thought the dolls looked too large and unnatural for the dollhouse- meanwhile, it was the tiny lamp that seemed to fit perfectly, as though it was meant to live there.

The Burnell sisters were already popular at school, being from a family that was relatively well-off for their location. In fact, their mother disapproved of the school, for the girls had to mix with the children of grocers and milkmen. However, she allowed the sisters to bring their friends home two by two to see the dollhouse. When Isabel explained the dollhouse to their friends, Kezia felt she was not giving nearly enough importance to the little lamp- but it did not matter, as Isabel was the one choosing the first two visitors. The only girls who did not participate in this excitement were Lil and Else Kelvey- they sat outside the circle and listened in without saying a word. Those two sisters were social outcasts- their mother was a washerwoman and their father was allegedly in prison. Else never said a word, quietly following Lil’s lead. Many parents, including the Burnell sisters, forbid their children from mingling with them.

As days passed, the Burnell’s dollhouse became the talk of the school. Everyone had visited and admired it and discussed it eagerly in class the next day. As usual, the Kelveys sat on the outside looking in. Kezia asked her mother one day if she may invite the Kelveys, but she was firmly turned down, with her mother saying, “You know why not.” In the end, the Kelveys were the only ones who hadn’t been invited to see the dollhouse, and it turned the school’s attention onto them. One day, the schoolgirls were being especially rude to the two sisters, a girl named Lena even asking Lil if she would be a servant when she grew up. Lil did not pay heed, which infuriated Lena into making a comment about the Kelveys’ apparent criminal father. The other girls shrieked with shock and excitement and went to play jump rope with a renewed vigor.

A few days later, when the Burnell girls were getting ready for a visitor, Kezia saw the Kelvey sisters walking near her house’s gate. She quietly opened it and beckoned them in, asking if they wanted to see the dollhouse. They refused, as their mothers said the Burnell’s weren’t allowed to speak to them. But at Kezia’s firm insistence, they stepped foot into the courtyard. Lil and Else were able to get a view of the dollhouse, and even briefly saw its interior before Kezia’s Aunt Beryl appeared and furiously shooed them away. Aunt Beryl was already in a bad mood because she received a letter from William Brent demanding he meet her at midnight, otherwise he would turn up at her door. The pressure of the letter vanished after she frightened the Kelveys and scolded Kezia.

Meanwhile, the two Kelvey sisters were out of sight from the Burnell’s house. They sat on a drainpipe and gazed into the distance in silence, almost dreamily. They had already forgotten the scolding of Aunt Beryl- their mind was fixed on the dollhouse they finally managed to see. It was Else who spoke, for the first time in the story, saying that she had seen the little lamp. The two continued to sit in silence.

The Doll’s House | Analysis

Katherine Mansfield , born and raised in New Zealand, was one of the most famous writers of her time. She often wrote in third-person and portrayed elements of her personal experiences. The theme of her work usually matched the situation she was undergoing in her own life. The Doll’s House is written in third-person using an omniscient narrator, and it translates the nuances of very deep elements in an insightful yet simple way . The main themes are class prejudice, social hierarchy and ostracization, and innocence. Because the main characters are young schoolgirls, these topics are put forth in a rather straightforward manner- after all, young children have far less direct awareness or conscience, and their way of thinking is often precise. However, we also see the cruelty of this forthrightness in the way the children do not hesitate to bully and mock their classmates of a lower social sphere. This shows the normalization of treatment based on hierarchy , as well as the influence of society on children’s mindsets . Similes, metaphors and imagery are employed throughout this piece.

Mansfield also uses object symbolism to portray key aspects of the story. Starting from the very beginning, when the Burnell girls are gifted a dollhouse , Mansfield establishes the concept of social class . The dollhouse is a direct representation of the Burnell’s own house – it is large, the girls are thrilled by it, and it seems furnished to the detail. However, its description is not entirely flattering- “a dark, oily, spinach green, picked out with bright yellow” and “ the smell of paint coming from that doll’s house was quite enough to make anyone seriously ill.” Further, it is important to note “ When dear old Mrs. Hay went back to town after staying with the Burnells, she sent the children a doll’s house. ” This implies that the Burnells themselves do not live in the central part of town , but in the outskirts. Hence, the dollhouse symbolizes that though the Burnells may not be extremely rich on a large scale, they are well-to-do and of a higher social class within their area of residence.

The fact that when the sisters went to school and Isabel talked about the dollhouse is also a portrayal of the automatic respect and flattery given to those with more money or at a higher rank :

“The girls of her class nearly fought to put their arms round her, to walk away with her, to beam flatteringly, to be her special friend.”

This emphasizes the superficiality of these advances- none of the girls wanted to spend time with Isabel because they liked her as a person. They did not want to be her ‘ special friend’ because they enjoyed her company. It was simply out of the eagerness to see the magnificent dollhouse. At this time, the Kelvey sisters being left out represents the lower rung of the social hierarchy. The fact that it is the other children’s parents who forbid them from mingling with Else and Lil showcases how society and adults can impact a child’s behavior . For example, “ For the fact was, the school the Burnell children went to was not at all the kind of place their parents would have chosen if there had been any choice.” – this automatically instills in the Burnell children a superiority complex.

Else never spoke and stuck close to her sister Lil- “Where Lil went, our Else followed.”- which shows the demure nature. It also emphasizes a level of acceptance from both of them- they never tried to fight back or defend themselves as they knew nothing would come of it, but simply ignored the mocking and jeers and moved on. They seem to have realized that things will not change, and they are stuck in the social class they were born into. The fact that these girls have understood this and cope with it at such a young age makes the reader realize how normalized it is, which is quite unfortunate. The description of Lil and Else sitting outside the circle of schoolgirls and constantly having to listen in is a direct depiction of being socially ostracized – closed off, on the outside looking in.

Kezia, the youngest Burnell sister, is the only one of the family- of the whole school, maybe- who questions the social ostracization of the Kelveys . She wants to invite the sisters home to show them the dollhouse, as well- her youth and innocence put everyone on a level playing field . While the rest of her family sees things from the perspective of social status and financial importance, she simply sees everyone as people . She views the world in a more wholesome manner. When she sees the Kelvey sisters near her house, she is swinging on the white gate of her house. This white gate is what separates the Burnells from the outside world, trapping them in their bubble of greater wealth and societal class . As a material divide between the Burnells and the rest of the area, the gate represents t he separation of the social spheres . Kezia swings on it back and forth, teetering on the edge of this imposed border, which symbolizes her different outlook . Unlike her family, she does not understand why the Kelveys are kept at a distance.

When the family receive the dollhouse, Kezia alone fixates on the tiny lamp –

“The father and mother dolls, who sprawled very stiff as though they had fainted in the drawing-room, and their two little children asleep upstairs, were really too big for the doll’s house. They didn’t look as though they belonged. But the lamp was perfect. It seemed to smile at Kezia, to say, “I live here.” The lamp was real.”

This lamp is symbolic of innocence and hope . It does not stand out extraordinarily, which is why none of the older sisters or adults find it interesting. Yet its gentle, modest appearance is what draws Kezia to it- this highlights a younger child’s perspective. The lamp is a form of hope for Kezia and the Kelvey sisters- for after being chased away by Aunt Beryl, Else smiles for the first time and says, “I seen the little lamp.” It is an unspoken bond between Else and Kezia- that they are able to see beyond the discrimination of the adults in the society. They notice and appreciate the same things- a small detail like a lamp, rather than the grandeur of the rest of the dollhouse. Their youth stops them from fully comprehending the reason for this class divide, but their innocent and open-minded attitude forms a ray of hope that even when they are older, they will be able to see everyone as human rather than by social status.

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The Doll's House

28 pages • 56 minutes read

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Authorial Context: Katherine Mansfield

Katherine Mansfield (1888-1923) is remembered as a key figure of the Modernist movement. She is known for her essays, short stories, and articles.

Mansfield was born into an upper-class family in Wellington, New Zealand. While attending the Wellington Girls’ High School, she explored a passionate relationship with Maata Mahupuku, who is believed to be Mansfield’s first female lover and had a tremendous influence on Mansfield’s writing about sexuality and nationality. Mahupuku was the granddaughter of a Māori chief, perhaps influencing one of Mansfield’s trademark themes: feeling disillusioned as a New Zealander because of the institutionalized maltreatment of the M ā ori people.

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The Doll's House

by Katherine Mansfield

The doll's house themes, class prejudice (classism).

Class prejudice (classism) is the principal theme in " The Doll's House ." Through the story, Mansfield depicts a society in which people are invisibly divided into a hierarchy of social classes based on economic prosperity or lack thereof. The narrator begins by showing the perspective of the Burnell children, who live in a large house and whose family employs a servant who, despite him being an adult, the children know simply by his first name, Pat . Mansfield contrasts the Burnells' casual opulence with the desperately impoverished Kelvey sisters, who wear clothes made of cast-off fabrics from families like the Burnells. While the Burnells' mother disapproves of her children mixing with the children of people whose parents have middle-class jobs, she "draws the line" at the Kelveys and absolutely forbids her children from speaking to them. The Kelveys are scrutinized to the point where they face humiliation in school not only from other children but from their teacher, who sneers at the "common" flowers Lil generously brings to her desk. With the mass rejection of the Kelveys, Mansfield shows how the hierarchical attitude of class prejudice creates an invisible wall that dooms the Kelvey children to the same fate as their parents; the Kelveys have little hope of being seen as any other than members of society's lowest rung.

Expressed primarily through the characters Kezia and Else, innocence is another of the story's major themes. In contrast to the prejudiced attitudes the older characters in the story unreflectingly adopt, Kezia Burnell challenges her mother's rule that the Kelveys not be allowed to view the doll's house. Kezia's mother responds that Kezia knows "quite well" why the Kelveys aren't allowed to see the doll's house, but the truth is that Kezia is too innocent in her youth to comprehend the class division that predetermines the Kelveys' exclusion. While her older sister Isabel follows their mother's order not to associate with the Kelveys, and her schoolmates mimic this cruelty, Kezia takes it upon herself to invite the Kelveys into the courtyard. Lil, having taken on the idea of her own inferiority, knows she is not supposed to talk to Kezia or see the doll's house. But Lil's younger sister Else—similar to Kezia—is innocent enough not to understand the invisible class division that has determined her and her sister's social ostracism. Even after Aunt Beryl shames the girls for thinking they could get away with talking to Kezia and entering the courtyard, Else thinks of Aunt Beryl as merely "the angry lady," not understanding why she and her sister were told to go away. In her naivety, Else quickly forgets about the angry lady but remembers how she saw the little lamp—a symbol of innocence that unites her and Kezia.

Social Ostracism

As a result of the class prejudice in the microcosm of New Zealand society Mansfield depicts, people of lower social standing are made victims of persistent ostracism. This exclusion from the larger group is best illustrated in the Kelveys' staying forever banished to the edge of the circle of girls who flock around Isabel Burnell at lunch and playtime. Rather than the Kelveys occupying a completely separate area of the playground, the invisible forces of class prejudice and social ostracism keep them near enough for the popular girls to feel superior over them and ridicule them whenever the whim to exercise power strikes. By keeping the Kelveys close but unequal, the girls at the mixed-income school emulate the greater society's de facto rules of ostracism that ensure the Kelveys' parents are kept subservient and in the underclass.

The principle weapon the privileged people wield against the Kelveys is shame. To ensure the Kelveys understand their lower social standing, the popular girls differentiate themselves from the Kelveys by shaming them for their poverty, homemade recycled clothing, mother's profession, and father's presumed status as a prisoner. Mansfield illustrates how the shaming impulse operates when Lena Logan shows off the other girls by walking over to Lil and Else Kelvey to ask if Lil is going to grow up to be a servant. When Lil smiles in return, not reacting to the insult, Lena grows indignant at her inability to shame Lil. To save face, Lena shouts at Lil that her father is in prison, a statement considered by the other girls so "marvelous" in shaming potential that they become giddy with delight. Mansfield does not show Lil's reaction to the statement. Instead, Mansfield waits until the end of the story to show Lil being overcome with shame when Aunt Beryl shoos her and Else out of the Burnells' courtyard. Mansfield writes: "Burning with shame, shrinking together, Lil huddling along like her mother, our Else dazed, somehow they crossed the big courtyard and squeezed through the white gate." In this passage, Mansfield shows how the emotion of shame has a physical effect on Lil's body, contorting her into her mother's huddled position. Ultimately, the line suggests that the piling on of class-based shame Lil experiences will guarantee she grows up with the same lack of respect and opportunity as her mother.

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The Doll’s House Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for The Doll’s House is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

Describe Kezia's act of kindness.

While swinging in her yard, Kezia sees the Kelveys walking down the road. As the Kelveys come nearer; their shadows stretch long, reaching across the road so that the shadows of their heads are in the buttercups. Kezia clambers back up the gate,...

Pat pried it open with his penknife, and the whole house front swung back, and—there you were, gazing at one and the same moment into the drawing-room and dining-room, the kitchen and two bedrooms.

Meaning, Pat used his penknife to open the side...

Who is described using animal images?

The Kelveys are described with animal images. The images serve as a symbol of their alienation from society.

Else: “a little white owl”.

The girls move “like two little stray cats”.

Beryl shoos the girls away “as if they were chickens."

Study Guide for The Doll’s House

The Doll's House study guide contains a biography of Katherine Mansfield, literature essays, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

About The Doll's House
The Doll's House Summary
Character List

The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield

WHEN dear old Mrs. Hay went back to town after staying with the Burnells she sent the children a doll’s house. It was so big that the carter and Pat carried it into the courtyard, and there it stayed, propped up on two wooden boxes beside the feed-room door. No harm could come to it; it was summer. And perhaps the smell of paint would have gone off by the time it had to be taken in. For, really, the smell of paint coming from that doll’s house (‘ Sweet of old Mrs. Hay, of course ; most sweet and generous ! ‘)—but the smell of paint was quite enough to make anyone seriously ill, in Aunt Beryl’s opinion. Even before the sacking was taken off. And when it was…

There stood the Doll’s house, a dark, oily, spinach green, picked out with bright yellow. Its two solid little chimneys, glued on to the roof, were painted red and white, and the door, gleaming with yellow varnish, was like a little slab of toffee. Four windows, real windows, were divided into panes by a broad streak of green. There was actually a tiny porch, too, painted yellow, with big lumps of congealed paint hanging along the edge.

But perfect, perfect little house! Who could possibly mind the smell. It was part of the joy, part of the newness.

” Open it quickly, someone ! ”

The hook at the side was stuck fast. Pat prized it open with his penknife, and the whole house front swung back, and—there you were, gazing at one and the same moment into the drawing-room and dining-room, the kitchen and two bedrooms. That is the way for a house to open ! Why don’t all houses open like that ? How much more exciting than peering through the slit of a door into a mean little hall with a hatstand and two umbrellas! That is—isn’t it ?—what you long to know about a house when you put your hand on the knocker. Perhaps it is the way God opens houses at the dead of night when He is taking a quiet turn with an angel…

” O-oh! ” The Burnell children sounded as though they were in despair. It was too marvellous ; it was too much for them. They had never seen anything like it in their lives. All the rooms were papered. There were pictures on the walls, painted on the paper, with gold frames complete. Red carpet covered all the floors except the kitchen ; red plush chairs in the drawing-room, green in the dining-room; tables, beds with real bedclothes, a cradle, a stove, a dresser with tiny plates and one big jug. But what Kezia liked more than anything, what she liked frightfully”, was the lamp. It stood in the middle of the dining-room table, an exquisite little amber lamp with a white globe. It was even filled all ready for lighting, though, of course, you couldn’t light it. But there was something inside that looked like oil and moved when you shook it.

The father and mother dolls, who sprawled very stiff as though they had fainted in the drawing-room, and their two little children asleep upstairs, were really too big for the doll’s house. They didn’t look as though they belonged. But the lamp was perfect. It seemed to smile at Kezia, to say, ” I live here.” The lamp was real.

The Burnell children could hardly walk to school fast enough the next morning. They burned to tell everybody, to describe, to—well —to boast about their doll’s house before the school-bell rang.

” I’m to tell,” said Isabel, ” because I’m the eldest. And you two can join in after. But I’m to tell first.”

There was nothing to answer. Isabel was bossy, but she was always right, and Lottie and Kezia knew too well the powers that went with being eldest. They brushed through the thick buttercups at the road edge and said nothing.

” And I’m to choose who’s to come and see it first. Mother said I might.”

For it had been arranged that while the doll’s house stood in the courtyard they might ask the girls at school, two at a time, to come and look. Not to stay to tea, of course, or to come traipsing through the house. But just to stand quietly in the courtyard while Isabel pointed out the beauties, and Lottie and Kezia looked pleased…

But hurry as they might, by the time they had reached the tarred palings of the boys’ playground the bell had begun to jangle. They only just had time to whip off their hats and fall into line before the roll was called. Never mind. Isabel tried to make up for it by looking very important and mysterious and by whispering behind her hand to the girls near her, ” Got something to tell you at playtime.”

Playtime came and Isabel was surrounded. The girls of her class nearly fought to put their arms round her, to walk away with her, to beam flatteringly, to be her special friend. She held quite a court under the huge pine trees at the side of the playground. Nudging, giggling together, the little girls pressed up close. And the only two who stayed outside the ring were the two who were always outside, the little Kelveys. They knew better than to come anywhere near the Burnells.

For the fact was, the school the Burnell children went to was not at all the kind of place their parents would have chosen if there had been any choice. But there was none. It was the only school for miles. And the consequence was all the children of the neighbourhood, the Judge’s little girls, the doctor’s daughters, the store-keeper’s children, the milkman’s, were forced to mix together. Not to speak of there being an equal number of rude, rough little boys as well. But the line had to be drawn somewhere. It was drawn at the Kelveys. Many of the children, including the Burnells, were not allowed even to speak to them. They walked past the Kelveys with their heads in the air, and as they set the fashion in all matters of behaviour, the Kelveys were shunned by everybody. Even the teacher had a special voice for them, and a special smile for the other children when Lil Kelvey came up to her desk with a bunch of dreadfully common-looking flowers.

They were the daughters of a spry, hardworking little washerwoman, who went about from house to house by the day. This was awful enough. But where was Mr. Kelvey ? Nobody knew for certain. But everybody said he was in prison. So they were the daughters of a washerwoman and a gaolbird. Very nice company for other people’s children! And they looked it. Why Mrs. Kelvey made them so conspicuous was hard to understand. The truth was they were dressed in ” bits ” given to her by the people for whom she worked. Lil, for instance, who was a stout, plain child, with big freckles, came to school in a dress made from a green art-serge table-cloth of the Burnells’, with red plush sleeves from the Logans’ curtains. Her hat, perched on top of her high forehead, was a grown-up woman’s hat, once the property of Miss Lecky, the postmistress. It was turned up at the back and trimmed with a large scarlet quill. What a little guy she looked ! It was impossible not to laugh. And her little sister, our Else, wore a long white dress, rather like a nightgown, and a pair of little boy’s boots. But whatever our Else wore she would have looked strange. She was a tiny wishbone of a child, with cropped hair and enormous solemn eyes—a little white owl. Nobody had ever seen her smile ; she scarcely ever spoke. She went through life holding on to Lil, with a piece of Lil’s skirt screwed up in her hand. Where Lil went, our Else followed. In the playground, on the road going to and from school, there was Lil marching in front and our Else holding on behind. Only when she wanted anything, or when she was out of breath, our Else gave Lil a tug, a twitch, and Lil stopped and turned round. The Kelveys never failed to understand each other.

Now they hovered at the edge ; you couldn’t stop them listening. When the little girls turned round and sneered, Lil, as usual, gave her silly, shamefaced smile, but our Else only looked.

And Isabel’s voice, so very proud, went on telling. The carpet made a great sensation, but so did the beds with real bedclothes, and the stove with an oven door.

When she finished Kezia broke in. ” You’ve forgotten the lamp, Isabel.”

” Oh, yes,” said Isabel, ” and there’s a teeny little lamp, all made of yellow glass, with a white globe that stands on the dining-room table. You couldn’t tell it from a real one.”

” The lamp’s best of all,” cried Kezia. She thought Isabel wasn’t making half enough of the little lamp. But nobody paid any attention. Isabel was choosing the two who were to come back with them that afternoon and see it. She chose Emmie Cole and Lena Logan. But when the others knew they were all to have a chance, they couldn’t be nice enough to Isabel. One by one they put their arms round Isabel’s waist and walked her off. They had something to whisper to her, a secret. ” Isabel’s my friend.”

Only the little Kelveys moved away forgotten ; there was nothing more for them to hear.

Days passed, and as more children saw the doll’s house, the fame of it spread. It became the one subject, the rage. The one question was, ” Have you seen Burnells’ doll’s house ? Oh, ain’t it lovely ! ” ” Haven’t you seen it ? Oh, I say ! ”

Even the dinner hour was given up to talking about it. The little girls sat under the pines eating their thick mutton sandwiches and big slabs of johnny cake spread with butter. While always, as near as they could get, sat the Kelveys, our Else holding on to Lil, listening too, while they chewed their jam sandwiches out of a newspaper soaked with large red blobs. ” Mother,” said Kezia, ” can’t I ask the Kelveys just once ? ”

” Certainly not, Kezia.”

” But why not ? ”

” Run away, Kezia ; you know quite well why not.”

At last everybody had seen it except them. On that day the subject rather flagged. It was the dinner hour. The children stood together under the pine trees, and suddenly, as they looked at the Kelveys eating out of their paper, always by themselves, always listening, they wanted to be horrid to them. Emmie Cole started the whisper.

” Lil Kelvey’s going to be a servant when she grows up.”

” O-oh, how awful! ” said Isabel Burnell, and she made eyes at Emmie.

Emmie swallowed in a very meaning way and nodded to Isabel as she’d seen her mother do on those occasions.

” It’s true—it’s true—it’s true,” she said.

Then Lena Logan’s little eyes snapped. ” Shall I ask her ? ” she whispered.

” Bet you don’t,” said Jessie May.

” Pooh, I’m not frightened,” said Lena. Suddenly she gave a little squeal and danced in front of the other girls. ” Watch! Watch me ! Watch me now! ” said Lena. And sliding, gliding, dragging one foot, giggling behind her hand, Lena went over to the Kelveys.

Lil looked up from her dinner. She wrapped the rest quickly away. Our Else stopped chewing. What was coming now ?

” Is it true you’re going to be a servant when you grow up, Lil Kelvey ? ” shrilled Lena.

Dead silence. But instead of answering, Lil only gave her silly, shamefaced smile. She didn’t seem to mind the question at all. What a sell for Lena ! The girls began to titter.

Lena couldn’t stand that. She put her hands on her hips; she shot forward. ” Yah, yer father’s in prison ! ” she hissed, spitefully.

This was such a marvellous thing to have said that the little girls rushed away in a body, deeply, deeply excited, wild with joy. Someone found a long rope, and they began skipping. And never did they skip so high, run in and out so fast, or do such daring things as on that morning.

In the afternoon Pat called for the Burnell children with the buggy and they drove home. There were visitors. Isabel and Lottie, who liked visitors, went upstairs to change their pinafores. But Kezia thieved out at the back. Nobody was about; she began to swing on the big white gates of the courtyard. Presently, looking along the road, she saw two little dots. They grew bigger, they were coming towards her. Now she could see that one was in front and one close behind. Now she could see that they were the Kelveys. Kezia stopped swinging. She slipped off the gate as if she was going to run away. Then she hesitated. The Kelveys came nearer, and beside them walked their shadows, very long, stretching right across the road with their heads in the buttercups. Kezia clambered back on the gate ; she had made up her mind ; she swung out.

” Hullo,” she said to the passing Kelveys.

They were so astounded that they stopped. Lil gave her silly smile. Our Else stared.

” You can come and see our doll’s house if you want to,” said Kezia, and she dragged one toe on the ground. But at that Lil turned red and shook her head quickly.

” Why not ? ” asked Kezia.

Lil gasped, then she said, ” Your ma told our ma you wasn’t to speak to us.”

” Oh, well,” said Kezia. She didn’t know what to reply. ” It doesn’t matter. You can come and see our doll’s house all the same. Come on. Nobody’s looking.”

But Lil shook her head still harder.

” Don’t you want to ? ” asked Kezia.

Suddenly there was a twitch, a tug at Lil’s skirt. She turned round. Our Else was looking at her with big, imploring eyes ; she was frowning ; she wanted to go. For a moment Lil looked at our Else very doubtfully. But then our Else twitched her skirt again. She started forward. Kezia led the way. Like two little stray cats they followed across the courtyard to where the doll’s house stood.

” There it is,” said Kezia.

There was a pause. Lil breathed loudly, almost snorted ; our Else was still as stone.

” I’ll open it for you,” said Kezia kindly. She undid the hook and they looked inside.

” There’s the drawing-room and the dining-room, and that’s the——”

” Kezia ! ”

Oh, what a start they gave !

“Kezia!”

It was Aunt Beryl’s voice. They turned round. At the back door stood Aunt Beryl, staring as if she couldn’t believe what she saw.

” How dare you ask the little Kelveys into the courtyard ? ” said her cold, furious voice. ” You know as well as I do, you’re not allowed to talk to them. Run away, children, run away at once. And don’t come back again,” said Aunt Beryl. And she stepped into the yard and shooed them out as if they were chickens.

” Off you go immediately! ” she called, cold and proud.

They did not need telling twice. Burning with shame, shrinking together, Lil huddling along like her mother, our Else dazed, somehow they crossed the big courtyard and squeezed through the white gate.

” Wicked, disobedient little girl! ” said Aunt Beryl bitterly to Kezia, and she slammed the doll’s house to.

The afternoon had been awful. A letter had come from Willie Brent, a terrifying, threatening letter, saying if she did not meet him that evening in Pulman’s Bush, he’d come to the front door and ask the reason why! But now that she had frightened those little rats of Kelveys and given Kezia a good scolding, her heart felt lighter. That ghastly pressure was gone. She went back to the house humming.

When the Kelveys were well out of sight of Burnells’, they sat down to rest on a big red drainpipe by the side of the road. Lil’s cheeks were still burning ; she took off the hat with the quill and held it on her knee. Dreamily they looked over the hay paddocks, past the creek, to the group of wattles where Logan’s cows stood waiting to be milked. What were their thoughts? Presently our Else nudged up close to her sister. But now she had forgotten the cross lady. She put out a finger and stroked her sister’s quill; she smiled her rare smile.

” I seen the little lamp,” she said, softly.

Then both were silent once more.

The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield – Summary

‘‘The Doll’s House’’ begins when an elaborate doll’s house is delivered to the home of the Burnell family. It is a gift from Mrs. Hay, who has been staying with them for a while in their house out in the suburbs but has recently returned to the city. The doll’s house is massive, so big that the delivery man needs the help of the Burnells’ handyman to carry it into the yard. It is left in the yard because it is newly painted, and Aunt Beryl, who lives in the house, finds the smell of its paint offensive. She hopes that the odor will dissipate by the end of the summer.

The doll’s house is amazing to all who see it because it accurately reproduces a real house in miniature, including such fine details as chimneys, window panes, wallpaper, umbrellas, and plates on the table. Kezia, one of the Burnell daughters, finds the lamp on the dining room table to be the most interesting aspect. The dolls that are included with the house seem too big to live in a house like this, but Kezia and the other children are enchanted with the details of the doll’s house.

The three Burnell girls—Isabel, Lottie, and Kezia—are excited about their new doll’s house, and they want to bring friends from school home to see it. Their mother, however, is concerned that having too many girls come through the house might create too much trouble, so she puts limitations on the visitors; only two guests can come over at a time, and they are not allowed into the house. Isabel, as the oldest Burnell, is allowed first choice of which friends to invite. The girls are anxious, but they arrive at school just in time for classes. Later, at recess, Isabel is able to gather the girls around her and describe the house to them. All of the girls gather and are impressed. They are so enthusiastic about taking their turns to go to the Burnell house that they compete to show each other who is a better friend to Isabel. Outside of the group, off to the side, stand the Kelvey sisters.

Lil and Else Kelvey come from a poor family. In general, the families where they live are wealthy, but the school district serves a wide geographical area, and families from the poor areas on the outskirts of town send their children there as well. The Kelveys’ mother does laundry for some of the families of Lil and Else’s schoolmates, and no one even knows where their father is, although rumors abound that he is in jail. The girls dress in hand-me-down clothes and in strange garments sewn together from things the rich households gave to their mother. Most of the poor children at the school are accepted by the students and their families, but the Kelveys are not. As the Burnell girls stand at the center of attention, choosing which girls to invite to their home to see the doll’s house, the Kelvey sisters are not even considered.

Over the course of weeks, all of the girls from school except the Kelvey girls go to view the doll’s house. Kezia asks her mother if she may invite the Kelveys to see it, but her mother adamantly refuses. She will not say why she will not let them come to the house, but she assumes that Kezia understands the social rules that prohibit such a visit. At school, the other children become aware of the Kelveys’ social situation when they see them excluded from viewing the doll’s house. At first, they talk rudely about the Kelvey sisters among themselves, but in time they are emboldened to risk offending them. To show off to the other girls, Lena Logan walks over to Lil Kelvey and asks if she plans to be a servant when she grows up, which makes the other girls laugh maliciously. Their laughing makes Lena turn even meaner, and she shouts out pointedly that the Kelveys’ father is in prison. The other girls are delighted to see the Kelveys humiliated.

That afternoon, Pat, the handyman, picks up the girls in the buggy, and when they arrive home, they find that there are visitors. The older two girls run upstairs to change into their good clothes, but Kezia goes out into the yard by herself, feeling estranged from her family. When she sees the Kelvey sisters walking along the road, she climbs up on the gate and calls out to them, inviting them into the yard to take a look at the doll’s house. Lil Kelvey knows that Kezia’s mother has forbidden them from entering the yard, and so she is hesitant to enter, but Kezia tells her that no one will see them. Else tugs on Lil’s skirt to show that she would like to see it very much.

The three girls stand before the doll’s house. Kezia opens it and just as she starts to show the Kelveys the inside, her Aunt Beryl notices them from inside the house and calls out angrily, telling the Kelvey girls to leave their yard and never come back, chasing them away ‘‘as if they were chickens.’’ She yells at Kezia and slams the doll’s house shut. Scolding Kezia and shouting at the lower-class Kelvey girls makes her feel good.

The Kelvey sisters walk away from the Burnell house. Lil is humiliated by the things that Aunt Beryl has called her. After the two girls sit quietly for a brief while, Else, who has not spoken up to this point in the story, tells her sister, smiling with pride, that she did, in fact manage to catch a view of the little lamp that was the object of Kezia’s attention.

Sara Constantakis – Short Stories for Students – Presenting Analysis, Context & Criticism on Commonly Studied Short Stories, vol. 29, Katherine Mansfield, Published by Gale Group, 2001.

The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield - Themes
The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield - Characters
The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield - Literary Devices - Symbolism
The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield - Analysis
The Doll’s House by Katherine Mansfield - Setting
That in Aleppo Once by Vladimir Nabokov: Literary Devices

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Katherine Mansfield: Spaces, Places, Traces - Extended Deadline

Katherine Mansfield: Spaces, Places, Traces

IADT Dún Laoghaire, Dublin

June 14th–16th 2024

An international conference organised by the Katherine Mansfield Society

Hosted by the Institute of Art, Design and Technology, Dún Laoghaire

Katherine Mansfield once wrote ‘How hard it is to escape from places […] — you leave little bits of yourself fluttering on the fences — little rags and shreds of your very life’. Her journeys ‘From the other side of the world / From a little island cradled in the giant sea bosom’ indelibly shaped the form and content of her writing, and the places that she visited and in which she settled throughout Europe exerted a lasting influence on her.

The Annual Katherine Mansfield Society Conference 2024 will take place in the Institute of Art, Design & Technology (IADT) Dún Laoghaire, Dublin and will focus on the themes of Spaces, Places, Traces in relation to Mansfield’s writing. The coastal suburb of Dún Laoghaire has a long history as a point of departure and arrival for travellers to and from Dublin (including James Joyce). It bears traces of Ireland’s complex colonial history, and offers a unique setting in which to reconsider the spaces and places that Mansfield navigated and the routes that she traced throughout her writing life. The final day of the conference will include some Bloomsday events.

Suggested topics might include (but are not limited to):

KM and colonial, postcolonial, and transnational spaces
KM and island-nations
KM, coasts, and the sea-side
KM, the city, the countryside, and the suburbs
KM, borders, and boundary-crossing
KM and domestic spaces
KM and impermanent/temporary residences (hotels, guest-houses, etc.)
KM and public space (commemoration; publishing; etc.)
KM, nature, and non-human worlds
KM and new materialisms
KM and mobility studies
KM’s association with specific places (Wellington, Fontainebleau, Menton; etc.)

Abstracts of 200 words for 20-minute papers, together with a 50-word bio-sketch, should be sent to the conference organisers at: [email protected]

Conference organisers: Dr Jenny McDonnell (IADT); Dr Janka Kaščáková, Dr Erika Baldt, Dr Anna Kwiatkowska (Katherine Mansfield Society)

Extended deadline: April 30th 2024

Read the Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Abortion Ban

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The Florida Supreme Court overturned decades of legal precedent in ruling that the State Constitution’s privacy protections do not extend to abortion, effectively allowing Florida to ban the procedure after six weeks of pregnancy.

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Supreme Court of Florida No. SC2022-1050 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL FLORIDA, et al., Petitioners, VS. STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., Respondents. No. SC2022-1127 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHWEST AND CENTRAL FLORIDA, et al., Petitioners, VS. STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., Respondents. April 1, 2024 GROSSHANS, J. The Florida Constitution guarantees "the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into . . . private life.” Art. I,

§ 23, Fla. Const. In this case, we are asked to determine if there is a conflict between the rights secured by this provision and a recently amended statute that shortens the window of time in which a physician may perform an abortion. See ch. 2022-69, § 4, Laws of Fla. (codified at section 390.0111(1), Florida Statutes (2022)). The parties have presented thoughtful arguments as to the scope of this provision, which has traditionally been referred to as the “Privacy Clause." Those legal arguments on the Privacy Clause's meaning are, in our view, distinct from the serious moral, ethical, and policy issues that are implicated in the subject matter of this case. Our analysis focuses on the Privacy Clause’s text, its context, and the historical evidence surrounding its adoption. After considering each of these sources and consistent with longstanding principles of judicial deference to legislative enactments, we conclude there is no basis under the Privacy Clause to invalidate the statute. In doing so, we recede from our prior decisions in which-relying on reasoning the U.S. Supreme Court has rejectedwe held that the Privacy Clause guaranteed the right to receive an abortion through the end of the second trimester. See generally In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); N. Fla. Women's Health & - 2

Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003); Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017). For this reason, petitioners are not entitled to the temporary injunction granted by the trial court, and we approve the outcome reached by the First District Court of Appeal below.1 I This case involves a constitutional challenge to an amended Florida statute prohibiting abortions “if the physician determines the gestational age of the fetus is more than 15 weeks." § 390.0111(1), Fla. Stat. (2022); ch. 2022-69, § 8, Laws of Fla. (providing effective date of July 1, 2022). This prohibition does not apply if any of the following occurs: (a) Two physicians certify in writing that, in reasonable medical judgment, the termination of the pregnancy is necessary to save the pregnant woman's life or avert a serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman other than a psychological condition. (b) The physician certifies in writing that, in reasonable medical judgment, there is a medical necessity for legitimate emergency medical procedures for termination of the pregnancy to save the pregnant woman's life or avert a serious risk of imminent substantial and 1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (express-and-direct conflict). - 3

irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman other than a psychological condition, and another physician is not available for consultation. (c) The fetus has not achieved viability under s. 390.01112 and two physicians certify in writing that, in reasonable medical judgment, the fetus has a fatal fetal abnormality. § 390.0111(1)(a)-(c). Prior to this change, the statute had restricted only late-term abortions. ² After this new law took effect, seven abortion clinics and one medical doctor (collectively Planned Parenthood)³ sued the State and others. Planned Parenthood alleged that the statute violated the Privacy Clause, which was added to the Florida Constitution in 1980. Located within the Declaration of Rights, the clause provides in full: 2. Specifically, the statute said, "No termination of pregnancy shall be performed on any human being in the third trimester of pregnancy unless one of [two] conditions is met." § 390.0111(1), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added). 3. The eight plaintiffs are Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida; Planned Parenthood of South, East, and North Florida; Gainesville Woman Care, LLC; A Woman's Choice of Jacksonville, Inc.; Indian Rocks Woman's Center, Inc.; St. Petersburg Woman's Health Center, Inc.; Tampa Woman's Health Center, Inc.; and Dr. Shelly Hsiao-Ying Tien. - 4

SECTION 23. Right of privacy.-Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law. With the complaint, Planned Parenthood filed a motion for temporary injunction, asking the trial court to block enforcement of the statute until it could rule on the merits of the constitutional challenge. In part, Planned Parenthood claimed that it was substantially likely to prevail in the lawsuit because it could demonstrate that the statute violates the Privacy Clause. In addition, Planned Parenthood argued that pregnant Floridians would be irreparably harmed absent a temporary injunction because the statute "would prohibit [them] from obtaining essential medical care and force them to remain pregnant and continue enduring the risks of pregnancy against their will." The statute, Planned Parenthood said, would also cause irreparable harm to itself and its staff by subjecting them to potential punitive consequences and interfering with the doctor-patient relationship. The State opposed Planned Parenthood's request for a temporary injunction. It argued that Planned Parenthood lacked - 5

standing to assert the privacy rights of its patients and, on the merits, could not establish any of the four requirements for a temporary injunction, let alone all four.4 After the State submitted its response, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision on abortion in a case involving a Mississippi statute. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022). In that decision, the Court ruled that the federal constitution does not guarantee a right to abortion. Id. at 231, 235-63, 292, 295. Based on this holding, the Court overturned Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)—cases which had recognized a broad right to abortion under federal law. Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 292, 302 (expressly overruling Roe and Casey). In overruling those decisions, Dobbs "returned to the people and their elected representatives" "the authority to regulate abortion." Id. at 292. 4. Under Florida law, a party seeking a temporary injunction must prove four things: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, (3) irreparable harm absent entry of an injunction, and (4) that the injunction would serve the public interest." Fla. Dep't of Health v. Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d 1101, 1110 (Fla. 2021). - 6

Several days after Dobbs issued, the trial court in this case held an evidentiary hearing on Planned Parenthood's motion for temporary injunction. Planned Parenthood called one witness and offered several exhibits. The State also presented witness testimony and documentary evidence. Deeming Planned Parenthood's evidence persuasive, the trial court entered a temporary injunction. It found that Planned Parenthood had third-party standing and satisfied all four temporary-injunction elements. In finding a likelihood of success on the merits, the court relied on our abortion jurisprudence. See generally T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191-94 (Privacy Clause encompasses abortion); N. Fla. Women's Health, 866 So. 2d at 639 (reaffirming T.W.); Gainesville Woman Care, 210 So. 3d at 1246, 1253-55 (relying on T.W.). The court concluded that the statute was subject to strict scrutiny under that case law and determined that it either did not serve compelling interests or, in the alternative, was not the least restrictive means of achieving those interests. For the harm factor, the court ruled that both Planned Parenthood and its patients would suffer sufficient harm to support the requested relief. Rounding out its analysis, the court found no -7

adequate remedy at law and that an injunction would serve the public interests. The State appealed to the First District, triggering an automatic stay of the temporary injunction.5 Planned Parenthood asked the trial court and later the district court to vacate the automatic stay. Both courts, however, denied relief. State v. Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla., 342 So. 3d 863, 865-66 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). As relevant here, in denying Planned Parenthood's motion to vacate, a divided panel of the First District held that Planned Parenthood could not establish irreparable harm as a result of the stay. Id. at 868-69. A few weeks later, the district court relied on essentially that same reasoning in reversing the temporary injunction—again, one judge dissented. State v. Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla., 344 So. 3d 637, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ("[T]he non-final order granting the temporary injunction is reversed as [Planned Parenthood] could not assert irreparable harm on behalf of persons not appearing below."); id. (Kelsey, J., dissenting). 5. Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(2) (automatic-stay provision triggered by filing of timely notice of appeal in certain situations). -8

Following these adverse rulings, Planned Parenthood asked us to review the First District's decisions, arguing that they conflict with our precedent. Accepting this jurisdictional argument, we granted review. II Planned Parenthood asks that we quash the district court's decisions and reinstate the temporary injunction. Relying on our precedent, it argues that the right to an abortion is secured by our constitution’s Privacy Clause. The State disputes Planned Parenthood's interpretation of the provision's text and asks us to reconsider our Privacy Clause jurisprudence or, at the very least, the abortion-related decisions. It argues that T.W.—our first case recognizing a right to abortion under the Privacy Clause-is flawed 6. In its brief, the State argues that Planned Parenthood lacks standing to challenge the new law. However, at oral argument, the Solicitor General urged us to decide this case on the merits. Oral Arg. at 50:52-51:06 (“We do think that the Court can assume for the sake of argument that the Plaintiffs have standing here and instead reach the merits. . . . That, I think, is what the Court should do.”). We view these statements as an abandonment of the State's standing argument. Thus, we proceed directly to the merits without passing upon any theory of standing articulated by the parties. - 9

in numerous respects, including that it failed to meaningfully consider the actual text of the provision at issue, failed to consider the history of the provision, and failed to give deference to the statute challenged in that case. Mindful of these fundamental concerns, we agree that our holding in T. W. should be reexamined.7 In T. W., this Court assessed a Privacy Clause challenge to a law that required unmarried minors to obtain parental consent or a substitute for consent to have an abortion. We held the challenged law to be incompatible with the protections afforded by the Privacy Clause, concluding that the right to abortion was embodied within the provision. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1188, 1192-96; id. at 1197, 1201 7. As our discussion will show, we also emphasize the uniqueness of the competing interests implicated in abortion and the fact that the Supreme Court repudiated Roe and its underlying understanding of privacy. Because these factors relate to T. W. in a particularized way, we do not take up the State's invitation now to revisit the question of whether the Privacy Clause protects only "informational privacy" interests. Our jurisprudence before and after T. W. has understood the Privacy Clause to encompass certain decisional or autonomy rights, and today we do not revisit our precedents outside the abortion context. - 10

(Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).8 In the majority opinion, we discussed Roe v. Wade at length and ultimately adopted its definition of privacy along with its trimester and viability rules. See id. at 1190-94. Integral to the majority's analysis, T. W. emphasized recent Florida cases (primarily from the district courts) equating privacy with the right of personal decision-making in the specific context of refusing unwanted medical treatment. Id. at 1192. We also relied on Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985)-a case involving privacy in financial institution records—to conclude that the provision “embraces more privacy interests" and "extends more protection to the individual in those interests, than does the federal Constitution." T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192. Building on that, this Court made the following broad pronouncement: 8. Three justices, however, concluded that the challenged statute could be given a constitutional construction, though they accepted or assumed that the Privacy Clause conferred a right to abortion. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1201-02 (Overton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1202-04 (Grimes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1204-05 (McDonald, J., dissenting). - 11 -

Florida's privacy provision is clearly implicated in a woman's decision of whether or not to continue her pregnancy. We can conceive of few more personal or private decisions concerning one's body that one can make in the course of a lifetime, except perhaps the decision of the terminally ill in their choice of whether to discontinue necessary medical treatment. Of all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the most profound and intimate relate to two sets of ultimate questions: first, whether, when, and how one's body is to become the vehicle for another human being's creation; second, when and how-this time there is no question of "whether"-one's body is to terminate its organic life. [Laurence H.] Tribe, American Constitutional Law 133738 (2d ed. 1988). The decision whether to obtain an abortion is fraught with specific physical, psychological, and economic implications of a uniquely personal nature for each woman. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Florida Constitution embodies the principle that “[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision . . . whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental.” T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192-93 (second alteration in original) (some citations omitted). This pronouncement was flawed in several respects. T. W. associated the language of the Privacy Clause with Roe's understanding of privacy; but it did not justify how that concept of privacy aligned with our constitution's text—i.e., “the right to be let alone and free from government intrusion into private life." T. W. - 12 -

also did not ask how Florida voters would have understood the text of the provision and how that understanding would be informed by Florida's long history of proscribing abortion. As a result of its analytical path, T. W. did not look to dictionaries, contextual clues, or historical sources bearing on the text's meaning. Instead, overlooking all these probative sources, it adopted Roe's notions of privacy and its trimester framework as matters of Florida constitutional law.9 Compounding these errors, the T.W. majority failed to apply longstanding principles of judicial deference to legislative enactments and failed to analyze whether the statute should be given the benefit of a presumption of constitutionality. Since Roe featured prominently in T. W., we think it fair to also point out that the T. W. majority did not examine or offer a reasoned response to the existing criticism of that decision or consider 9. In his dissent, Justice Labarga emphasizes "that T. W. was decided on state law grounds." Dissenting op. at 90. We agree that T.W. was not applying federal law to the challenged statute. However, T.W. relied heavily on Roe in interpreting the meaning of our constitution's Privacy Clause. Indeed, T. W. cited Roe over twenty times, it accepted Roe's concept of privacy without analysis, and it enacted a viability-trimester system that closely paralleled Roe's, without citing to any Florida precedent supporting that framework. - 13 -

whether it was doctrinally coherent. This was a significant misstep because Roe did not provide a settled definition of privacy rights. Controversial from the moment it was released, “Roe's constitutional analysis was far outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretation of the various constitutional provisions to which it vaguely pointed." Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 268. What's more, Roe "failed to ground its decision in text, history, or precedent.” Id. at 270. This left even progressive legal scholars baffled at how such a right could be gleaned from the constitution's text. Akhil R. Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 778 (1999) ("As a precedent-follower, Roe simply stringcites a series of privacy cases involving marriage, procreation, contraception, bedroom reading, education, and other assorted topics, and then abruptly announces with no doctrinal analysis that this privacy right is broad enough to encompass' abortion. . . . But as the Court itself admits a few pages later [in the opinion], the existence of the living fetus makes the case at hand ‘inherently different’ . . . from every single one of these earlier-invoked cases. And as a precedent-setter, the Court creates an elaborate trimester framework that has struck many critics as visibly (indeed, nakedly) . . . more legislative than - 14 -

judicial." (footnotes omitted)); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1973) (noting that "[o]ne reads the Court's explanation [of the viability line] several times before becoming convinced that nothing has inadvertently been omitted”). Indeed, just three years after T.W. (and well before Dobbs), the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned Roe's position that the right to abortion was grounded in any sort of privacy right. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (joint opinion) (“Constitutional protection of the woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); cf. Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 279 ("The Court [in Casey] abandoned any reliance on a privacy right and instead grounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."). This demonstrates the tenuous connection between “privacy” and abortion an issue that, unlike other privacy matters, directly implicates the interests of both developing human life and the pregnant woman. In light of T. W.'s analytical deficiencies and subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions rejecting the Roe framework on which - 15 -

T.W.'s reasoning depended, our assessment of the challenged statute requires us to examine the Privacy Clause and, for the first time in the abortion context, consider the original public meaning of the text as it was understood by Florida voters in 1980.10 III A We begin by recognizing the standard that governs our review. Because this case requires us to review both “the constitutionality of a statute and the interpretation of a provision of the Florida Constitution," our review is de novo. Lewis v. Leon Cnty., 73 So. 3d 151, 153 (Fla. 2011) (citing Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws., Inc., 978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008)); see also Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d at 1110. We have long recognized that “statutes come clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and must be construed whenever possible to effect a constitutional outcome." Lewis, 73 So. 3d at 10. We decided two other significant cases involving abortion after T. W., but in those cases, we did not provide additional doctrinal justifications for T.W.'s adoption of Roe's privacy framework. - 16

153 (citing Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005)). Indeed, nearly a century ago, we said: (1) On its face every act of the Legislature is presumed to be constitutional; (2) every doubt as to its constitutionality must be resolved in its favor; [and] (3) if the act admits of two interpretations, one of which would lead to its constitutionality and the other to its unconstitutionality, the former rather than the latter must be adopted . . . Gray v. Cent. Fla. Lumber Co., 140 So. 320, 323 (Fla. 1932); see also Savage v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for Hillsborough Cnty., 133 So. 341, 344 (Fla. 1931); Chatlos v. Overstreet, 124 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1960); In re Caldwell's Estate, 247 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1971); Franklin v. State, 887 So. 2d 1063, 1073 (Fla. 2004); Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d at 1111; Statler v. State, 349 So. 3d 873, 884 (Fla. 2022). And to overcome the presumption of constitutionality, “the invalidity must appear beyond reasonable doubt." Franklin, 887 So. 2d at 1073 (quoting State ex rel. Flink v. Canova, 94 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 1957)); see also Waybright v. Duval Cnty., 196 So. 430, 432 (Fla. 1940) ("[W]e will . . . determine if, beyond a reasonable doubt, violence was done [to] any provisions of the organic law in the passage of the challenged act, and in doing so will not deal with the - 17 -

merits of the measure, that being the exclusive concern of the Legislature."). B Our approach to interpreting the constitution reflects a commitment to the supremacy-of-text principle, “recognizing that '[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means. Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 365 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678, 681 (Fla. 2021)) (interpreting statutory text); see also Advisory Op. to Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend. (Amendment 4), 288 So. 3d 1070, 1081 (Fla. 2020) (interpreting constitutional text). The goal of this approach is to ascertain the original, public meaning of a constitutional provision-in other words, the meaning as understood by its ratifiers at the time of its adoption. See City of Tallahassee v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 375 So. 3d 178, 183 (Fla. 2023) ("[W]e give the words of the constitution their plain, usual, ordinary, and commonly accepted meanings at the time they were written.”). In construing the meaning of a constitutional provision, we do not - 18 - 999

seek the original intent of the voters or the framers. Instead, we ask how the public would have understood the meaning of the text in its full context when the voters ratified it. See Amendment 4, 288 So. 3d at 1081-82. To answer this question of public meaning, we consider the text, see Alachua Cnty. v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169-70 (Fla. 2022), contextual clues, see id., dictionaries, see Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887, 891 (Fla. 2022), canons of construction, see Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598-99 (Fla. 2022), and historical sources, including evidence related to public discussion, see Tomlinson v. State, 369 So. 3d 1142, 1147-51 (Fla. 2023); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614 (2008). IV With these background principles fixed, we now focus our attention on the Privacy Clause itself. Article I, section 23 is entitled: "Right of privacy." Our constitution, though, tells us that in construing the meaning of constitutional text, we are not to use titles and subtitles. See art. X, § 12(h), Fla. Const. Accordingly, we look at the operative text, which guarantees the right “to be let - 19 -

alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life." Art. I, § 23. As is apparent at first glance, the provision does not explicitly reference abortion at all. Thus, if Planned Parenthood is to prevail, we must find that the public would have understood the principle embodied in the operative text to encompass abortion, even though the clause itself says nothing about it. To this end, the parties have marshaled era-appropriate dictionary definitions of key terms in the Privacy Clause. Based on the dictionaries we consulted, we know that in 1980 the right to be "let alone" could be defined as the right to be left "in solitude," free from outside "interfer[ence]” or “attention." See Let Alone, Oxford English Dictionary 213 (1st ed. 1933) (reprinted in 1978). And the latter phrase "free from governmental intrusion” into “private life”—can convey a similar meaning. “Intrusion” meant “[i]llegal entry upon or appropriation." Intrusion, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 688 (1st ed. 1969); see also Intrusion, American Heritage Dictionary 674 (2d Coll. ed. 1982) (same); Intrude, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 687 (1st ed. 1969) ("To interpose (oneself or something) - 20 -

without invitation, fitness, or leave."); Intrude, American Heritage Dictionary 674 (2d Coll. ed. 1982) (similar). And the word "private" carried the idea of being "[s]ecluded from the sight, presence, or intrusion of others," the chief example being “a private bathroom." Private, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1042 (1st ed. 1969); Private, American Heritage Dictionary 986 (2d Coll. ed. 1982) (same). These accepted definitions do not seem to us to be natural ways of describing the abortion procedures of 1980. The decision to have an abortion may have been made in solitude, but the procedure itself included medical intervention and required both the presence and intrusion of others. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“A transaction resulting in an operation such as [abortion] is not 'private' in the ordinary usage of that word."); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that even the Roe majority recognized a "pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy” because “the termination of a - 21

pregnancy typically involves the destruction of another entity: the fetus" (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 159)).11 Next, we see if contextual clues could offer guidance. Looking at the complete text of the provision allows us to consider the physical and logical relation of its parts, as they might have been viewed by a voter. See Lab'y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022). 11. The dissent cites Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating on privacy grounds a state law criminalizing the use of contraception in the marital context), to support the assertion that the involvement of others does not prevent an activity or procedure from being a private matter. Dissenting op. at 67-68 (stressing that the law at issue in Griswold “operate[d] directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation" (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482)). But the Court in Griswold "only invalidated the section of the state law which prohibited the use of contraception, rather than outlawing the manufacture, distribution, or sale of contraceptives." Alyson M. Cox & O. Carter Snead, “Grievously and Egregiously Wrong": American Abortion Jurisprudence, 26 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 1, 16-17 (2022). Indeed, as we noted above, Roe itself acknowledged that abortion was "inherently different" from the situations involved in cases like Griswold. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. Thus, we do not share the dissent's concern "that parties will rely on the majority's reasoning that the involvement of 'others' in an abortion procedure defeats privacy—in attempts to undermine the broad privacy protections that are extended in the medical context.” Dissenting op. at 68. - 22

The first sentence sets forth the protected right, i.e., "to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into . . . private life." The second sentence then provides that “[t]his section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." Art. I, § 23. By its terms, this latter sentence covers “public records and meetings.” That phrase which relates only to accessing public informationdoes not implicate or apply to the subject of abortion. We do not give great weight to this observation, but we note it here to emphasize that contextual clues do not lend support to a claim that voters clearly understood abortion to be part and parcel of the rights recognized in the Privacy Clause. V Dictionary definitions and immediate context, although informative, do not provide a full picture of the text's meaning. We also consider the historical background of the phrases contained within the operative text. See Tomlinson, 369 So. 3d at 1146 ("[W]hen (as often happens) a word had more than one accepted meaning at that time, we decide which one is the law by looking to the context in which it appears, and what history tells us about - 23 -

how it got there."); Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012) ("[C]ontext embraces not just textual purpose but also . . . a word's historical associations acquired from recurrent patterns of past usage . ."); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 605 (noting the critical importance in constitutional interpretation of examining “a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification"); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 424 (2021) (relying on historical sources in determining constitutional text's meaning); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2022) (historical sources integral to Court's holding). A Before examining the Privacy Clause's specific history and public debate, we explore the settled use of the "right to be let alone" in the context of Florida law, cognizant that technical meanings might bear upon the public understanding of the constitutional text. 12 12. In construing constitutional provisions that have an acquired meaning, “[w]e cannot understand these provisions unless - 24

The phrase "to be let alone" carries with it a rich legal tradition. In Cason v. Baskin, we discussed the common-law right to privacy and explained that in substance it was "the right to be let alone, the right to live in a community without being held up to the public gaze if you don't want to be held up to the public gaze." 20 So. 2d 243, 248 (Fla. 1944) (quoting Laurence H. Eldredge, Modern Tort Problems 77 (1941)).¹3 This right “to be let alone,” which was we understand their history; and when we find them expressed in technical words, and words of art, we must suppose these words to be employed in their technical sense." Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 93-94 (7th ed. 1903). Indeed, “[t]he technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights." Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 13. We recognize that this phrase “the right to be let alone” is likely sourced from the seminal 1890 law-review article, The Right to Privacy. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); cf. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 265 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting) (recognizing significance of this article). The authors of that article elaborated on the "right to be let alone" and free from “intrusion upon the domestic circle." Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 195-96 (borrowing label for this right from a tort treatise by Judge Thomas Cooley). The right, however, “had little to do with the autonomy of an individual to make decisions . . . free from government control." Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 Rutgers L.J. 971, 990 (2006). It described a "different sort of privacy"-one - 25 -

often used interchangeably with the "right to privacy," was a prominent feature in Florida tort law. See, e.g., Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195, 197 (Fla. 1964) (“An unauthorized use of a person's name in this respect is recognized as a violation of his right of privacy."); Jacova v. S. Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1955) (reiterating that Florida recognized a common-law claim for invasion of privacy and noting that "[when] one, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or general interest,” “he emerges from his seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right of privacy' to publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence" (quoting Metter v. L.A. Exam'r, 95 P.2d 491, 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939))); Harms v. Mia. Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961) (noting in the tort context that "[t]he "directed to keeping personal information from being exposed to the public, rather than to keeping decision-making within the control of an individual." Id. To Warren and Brandeis, the “right to be let alone" and free from “intrusion" safe-guarded against the publication of private facts. Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 195-96, 207-12. - 26

right of privacy is defined as the right of an individual to be let alone and to live a life free from unwarranted publicity"). 14 Significantly, throughout the decades in which the "right to be let alone" was developed and applied in Florida, two distinct propositions were true in the law and harmonious: first, the right "to be let alone” existed and had a discernable and enforceable meaning; and second, the Legislature had the authority to comprehensively regulate abortion before and after viability. Indeed, from at least 1868 to 1972, abortion was for the most part prohibited in our state. 15 And although litigants, prior to the 14. Florida law in this respect appears consistent with that of other jurisdictions. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Right of Privacy, 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950) (noting acts of intrusion into one's private affairs may also constitute violations of the right of privacy, such as eavesdropping, examination of private records or papers, or publications of personal material identified with the complainant as would using the complainant's name or likeness in almost any form of distributive publication). 15. See ch. 1637, subc. 3, § 11, subc. 8, § 9, Laws of Fla. (1868) (outlawing most abortions); Rev. St. 1892, §§ 2387, 2618 (same); §§ 782.10, 797.01, Fla. Stat. (1941) (repealed 1972) (same); §§ 782.10, 797.01, Fla. Stat. (1971) (repealed 1972) (same). In 1972, this Court determined that the abortion statute in effect at that time was unconstitutionally vague. State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1972). Immediately following that decision, the Legislature passed a more specific law, still banning abortion at all times during pregnancy except in certain limited circumstances. - 27 -

adoption of the Privacy Clause, sought to curtail government action by arguing they had the "right to be let alone," we are not aware of litigants invoking that particular right to challenge abortion restrictions in Florida. We also stress that this “right to be let alone” was modified by a limiting principle: the right did not permit an individual to inflict harm on herself or others. See State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1969) (rejecting a challenge to helmet laws based on a right "to be let alone," stressing that "no person is an entirely isolated being" and that “it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them") (cleaned up). Indeed, our Privacy Clause jurisprudence outside the abortion context recognizes that the right does not authorize harm to third parties. See, e.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996) (parents' privacy right to raise their children yields to need to protect children from harm). Because the "right to be let alone" was limited in this way, it is not surprising that when litigants Ch. 72-196, § 2, Laws of Fla. (codified at section 458.22 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1972)) (repealed 1976). - 28

challenged the 1972 abortion statute in this Court, they did not do so based on the "right to be let alone." Instead, they argued a right to privacy grounded in substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Barquet, 262 So. 2d at 434. B We also acknowledge that the public understanding of the term "privacy" was, to some extent, informed by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. Following that decision, the phrase “right to privacy” gained new connotations that, for the first time, included the choice to have an abortion. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 ("We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision .”). In Planned Parenthood's view, this aspect of federal privacy jurisprudence should control our analysis here. Specifically, Planned Parenthood argues that Florida voters would have internalized Roe's definition of privacy when they voted for the privacy amendment. Indeed, Planned Parenthood has repeatedly asserted that the public understanding of this privacy definition was so engrained by 1980 that even without a specific mention of the term abortion, the Privacy Clause unequivocally - 29 -

included such a right by implication. Agreeing with this argument, the dissent cites case law, newspaper articles, a news clip, and more to support the contention that Americans, and Floridians in particular, would have naturally understood privacy to encompass abortion. 16 Though this argument has some force, we cannot agree with Planned Parenthood or the dissent that the backdrop of Roe conclusively establishes how a voter would have understood the provision. In Roe, the Supreme Court did not consider language comparable to the operative text of Florida's Privacy Clause-that is, the “right to be let alone.” That phrase is found only once in Roe, and that single mention is in Justice Stewart's concurrence quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in support of the proposition that there is no federal right to privacy. Roe, 410 U.S. 16. This evidence consists primarily of media coverage surrounding the Roe decision and subsequent evidence that discussed the abortion debate and associated a right of privacy with abortion. We accept that Roe had some bearing on the public's understanding of privacy rights in 1980. But, unlike the dissent, we do not find that it is dispositive. We are unwilling to disregard other probative evidence of public meaning, much of which is focused specifically on the amendment itself. The dissent, in our view, gives little attention to such evidence. - 30

at 167 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). So, while the Roe majority may have deemed abortion to be part of a “right to privacy," it would require an analytical leap to say that the public would have instinctively associated “the right to be let alone and free from governmental interference into one's private life" with abortion. E.g., Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1424 (1974) (decisional autonomy “is not at all what most people mean by privacy,” which instead concerns “my freedom from official intrusion into my home, my person, my papers, my telephone”). This point is reinforced by the fact that the specific phrase used in the Privacy Clause had a consistent meaning in Florida law and had never once been interpreted to cover abortion rights. And as a final point here, we reiterate that Roe did not settle the scope of privacy rights as Planned Parenthood insists. As we discussed earlier, Roe's privacy-based reasoning was questioned soon after the opinion issued and was eventually rejected in a decision that completely detached abortion rights from the concept of privacy. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (joint opinion). Thus, even if it is possible that voters would have understood the Privacy Clause to protect certain individual autonomy interests, it is by no means - 31

clear that those interests would have included the controversial subject of abortion, which uniquely involves the interests of prenatal life. Consequently, while Roe is relevant to our analysis of public meaning, it is not dispositive. Having considered dictionary definitions, context, and technical meanings that could have informed the original public meaning, we now turn to a critical piece of our historical analysis where we answer the following relevant questions: How did this provision make its way to the ballot, what was the focus of the debate surrounding its adoption, and how were the issues framed for the voters? C The origin of our Privacy Clause traces back to the work of a constitution revision commission in the late 1970s. As part of its work, the commission held public meetings throughout Florida and listened to the public's views and concerns. See Daniel R. Gordon, Upside Down Intentions: Weakening the State Constitutional Right to Privacy, a Florida Story of Intrigue and a Lack of Historical Integrity, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 579, 588 (1998); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings at D:003272-73 (Jan. 9, 1978) (discussion of - 32 -

committee's work regarding privacy proposal). Eventually, the commission agreed upon the following language: Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. Patricia A. Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 609, 650 n.248 (1978) (quoting Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 23 (May 11, 1978)). That proposed amendment, along with roughly 80 others, was submitted to the public as a package deal in the 1978 election. Gordon, supra, at 588. This package, in addition to containing the privacy proposal, also included amendments ensuring access to (1) public records, (2) meetings of non-judicial public bodies, (3) judicial hearings and records, and (4) proceedings and records of the judicial nominating commissions. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 671, 675-77 (1978). Of note, proposals specifically addressing state abortion rights were rejected by the commissioners and never made it to the ballot. See Fla. Const. Revision Comm'n, Summary of Proposed Revisions to the Florida Constitution 1-2 (Sept. 27, 1977) (available in the Florida State University College of Law Research - 33 -

Center); cf. Mary Ann Lindley, A New Constitution Takes Shape, Palm Beach Post-Times, Apr. 9, 1978, at D1. For our purposes, though, we focus on statements made by commissioners in describing the reason or need for the proposal.17 On this subject, Justice Overton said: [W]ho, ten years ago, really understood that personal and financial data on a substantial part of our population could be collected by government or business and held for easy distribution by computer operated information systems? There is a public concern about how personal information concerning an individual citizen is used, whether it be collected by government or by business. The subject of individual privacy and privacy law is in a developing stage. . . . It is a new problem that should probably be addressed. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings D:000020-21 (July 6, 1977). 17. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 828-29 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to discern the most likely public understanding of a particular provision at the time it was adopted. Statements by legislators can assist in this process to the extent they demonstrate the manner in which the public used or understood a particular word or phrase. They can further assist to the extent there is evidence that these statements were disseminated to the public. In other words, this evidence is useful not because it demonstrates what the draftsmen of the text may have been thinking, but only insofar as it illuminates what the public understood the words chosen by the draftsmen to mean.”). - 34 -

Justice Overton was not alone in this respect. Commissioner Jon Moyle (sponsor of the privacy proposal) spoke of government surveillance, technological advances, and society's dependence on such technology—characterizing them as threats to an individual's privacy. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings at D:003273, 327678 (Jan. 9, 1978). He also noted that records about private life were becoming more common. Id. at D:003277-81. According to him, states were “very much involved in the business of keeping records about their residents.” Id. at D:003276. But the states, in his view, had not done “their part” in protecting such records. Id. at D:003277. In line with Commissioner Moyle's sentiments, Commissioners Lew Brantley and Dexter Douglass both noted specific government-surveillance efforts as sources of privacy concerns. Id. at D:003325 (remarks of Lew Brantley); id. at D:003336 (remarks of Dexter Douglass). This historical survey is illustrative of the commission's focus in terms of privacy. Various commissioners publicly expressed concern for informational privacy. However, as best as we can tell from their statements, that pressing concern did not extend to abortion. - 35

The proposals failed, and less than two years later, we held that there was no state constitutional right of privacy that would prevent public disclosure of confidential papers prepared by a consultant for an electric authority. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633, 639 (Fla. 1980); cf. Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962, 963 (Fla. 1977) (no constitutional right of privacy to smoke marijuana in confines of home). Months after Shevin was decided, the Legislature revived the idea of a privacy clause and ultimately agreed on a proposal that said: Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into [the person's] private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law. Editorial, Guaranteeing Our Privacy, Boca Raton News, Oct. 29, 1980, at 6A (setting forth language to appear on 1980 ballot); Patrick McMahon, State Constitutional Amendments, St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 30, 1980, at 22 (noting ballot title). In overwhelming numbers, legislators from both political parties voted to approve it for placement on the ballot. Out of the - 36

138 legislators who voted on it, only 6 did not support the proposal. See Lorraine Cichowski, House Votes to Propose Guaranteeing Right to Privacy, Fort Myers News-Press, May 7, 1980, at 8B; Jim Walker, Senators Clash over Privacy Amendment, Tampa Tribune, May 15, 1980, at 6-A. Of additional note, during the floor debate, there was virtually no discussion of abortion. And when abortion was brought up, the Senate sponsor assured other senators that the proposal would have no effect on that subject. Audio Tape: Proceedings of the Fla. S., Tape 2 at 17:40 (May 14, 1980) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series S1238, Box 57). As best as we can tell, no commissioner or legislator ever claimed (at least publicly between 1977-80) that abortion was part of the rights guaranteed by the Privacy Clause.¹8 See, e.g., Gordon, 18. To the extent that Planned Parenthood relies on Representative Jon Mills's later statement in the 1990s that he subjectively hoped that the privacy proposal would cover abortion, such reliance is misplaced. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (proper approach to interpretation does not consider hidden or secret meaning "that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation”). Similarly, Planned Parenthood and one amicus misplace reliance on how voters handled two later proposed amendments—one in 2004 and the other in 2012. The understanding of voters over 20 years after the privacy amendment offers little value in determining what the voters in 1980 would have understood the privacy proposal to mean. Indeed, at oral - 37 -

supra, at 590 n.148 ("Nowhere did revision commissioners in 1978 refer to abortion . ."). Indeed, Planned Parenthood does not claim otherwise. D Like the history of the privacy proposal, the public debate surrounding the amendment also did not focus on abortion. Once the privacy proposal was approved for placement on the ballot in 1980, the public engaged in significant and robust debate over whether that proposal should be approved. Advocates for homosexual rights, proponents of legalized marijuana use, and various editorial boards advocated in favor of the amendment. Mary Hladky, Commissioners Table Vote on State Privacy Amendment, Fort Lauderdale News, Oct. 1, 1980, at 8B; Mary Lavers, Privacy Amendment Advocated by Kunst, Tampa Times, Oct. 23, 1980, at 10-A; Associated Press, Privacy Amendment Caught in Swirl of Controversy, Sentinel Star (Orlando), Oct. 24, 1980, at 2-C; Editorial, Amendment 2-Vote Yes, argument, Planned Parenthood conceded as much. See Oral Arg. at 22:59-23:02 (“2012 isn't evidence of what [the privacy amendment] meant in 1980.”). - 38 -

Bradenton Herald, Nov. 1, 1980, at A-4; Craig Matsuda, State Questions Are a Mix of Roads, Water, Privacy, Miami Herald, Nov. 2, 1980, at 8E; Amendments, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 1, 1980, at 12B. These groups presented sweeping views of what the amendment would accomplish. Some, for instance, claimed that the amendment would decriminalize marijuana as well as certain intimate sexual conduct occurring inside the confines of a home. Julius Karash, Psychologist Stumps for Amendment, News-Press Local, Oct. 3, 1980, at B1; Steve Piacente, Gay Rights Activist Speaks for Privacy Act, Tampa Tribune, Oct. 24, 1980, at 2-B. Opponents of the measure included some political conservatives, various law enforcement officers, an association of prosecutors, and the then-serving governor. Prosecutors Condemn Privacy Amendment, Florida Today, Oct. 28, 1980, at 4B; Attorneys' Group Fights Privacy Amendment, Palm Beach Post, Oct. 28, 1980, at B26; Amendments under Attack as Vote Nears, Bradenton Herald, Oct. 29, 1980, at B-5; Graham Hit on Privacy, Florida Today, Oct. 29, 1980, at 6B; Amendment Opposition by Graham Criticized, Palm Beach Post, Oct. 29, 1980, at A11; Lawyer Raps Constitution Revision Plan, Fort Lauderdale News, Oct. 29, 1980, at 17A; Michael - 39 -

Harrell, Advertisement, Fort Lauderdale News, Oct. 29, 1980, at 16A; Amendments, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 1, 1980, at 12B. Some opponents expressed concern that the open-ended language would permit courts to expansively interpret the amendment. Sensing that growing concern, House sponsors of the privacy proposal weighed in on the public debate. Taking to the newspapers, they reassured the public that concerns about whether the amendment would accomplish sweeping policy changes were unfounded. For instance, sponsors said that the proposed amendment arose from concerns “about technological advances that could enable the government to compile extensive computer files on citizens." Privacy Amendment Caught in Swirl of Controversy, supra, at 2-C; see also Associated Press, Privacy Measure Stirs Controversy, Pensacola News-Journal, Nov. 2, 1980, at 14C. Indeed, one sponsor said that the proposal was "necessary to ward off a growing government whose curiosity about people's private lives also is increasing." R. Michael Anderson, Amendment Guaranteeing Right to Privacy Debated, Florida Times-Union Jacksonville Journal, Oct. 26, 1980, at B-1. That same sponsor characterized the proposal as "quite conservative," predicting that - 40 -

"Florida judges wouldn't use it to overturn many existing laws." Privacy Amendment Caught in Swirl of Controversy, supra, at 2-C. And the other sponsor called expansive views of the proposed amendment “garbage.” See id. Of note, in looking at the extensive discussion surrounding the privacy amendment, little to nothing was said about abortion in print or in public comment. The debate-as framed to the publicoverwhelmingly associated the Privacy Clause's terms with concerns related to government surveillance and disclosure of private information to the public. Consistent with this observation, prolife and prochoice groups did not join in the fray. These groups are not politically bashfulnot now, and not in 1980. If the public understanding of the privacy proposal was that it included a silent-but almost unfettered-right to abortion, we would expect such groups to have engaged in the robust public debate. But based on all sources brought to our attention, we simply see no evidence of that. See James W. Fox, Jr., A Historical and Originalist Defense of Abortion in Florida, 75 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 393, 443-44 (2023) (acknowledging that these groups were silent on this topic; but - 41 -

discounting significance of such fact); cf. Oral Arg. at 13:02-13:39 (counsel for Planned Parenthood acknowledging that silence in the historical record). The dissent downplays the significance of this scope-of-debate evidence. Dissenting op. at 86. Accepting the logic of a law review article, the dissent claims that “[a]bortion would only have been debated if its coverage within the right to privacy were in dispute or were not yet established in law." Dissenting op. at 86 (quoting Fox, supra, at 442-43). We, however, cannot agree with this speculation. A person's understanding of the amendment's purpose would certainly inform whether he or she supported the adoption of the amendment. And, critically, it would inform how that person would persuade others to adopt their position. The debate over the privacy amendment was vigorous, yet there is virtually no evidence that anyone publicly connected the privacy amendment proposal with abortion rights. And as referenced by the dissent, newspapers during this same period were still discussing the controversy surrounding abortion, so it was far from a settled issue. Dissenting op. at 81-82 (noting that "Florida newspapers" in 1980 "covered statements by pro-choice activists and by pro-life activists" - 42 -

involving the abortion debate). We are unwilling to presume, as the dissent does, that abortion was so intertwined with the term "privacy" and so unquestionably accepted by society that its complete absence from the public debate surrounding this amendment should be expected. In sum, the scope of the privacy-proposal debate, both in terms of topics and participants, underscores that the public would not have understood, or assumed, the language of the Privacy Clause to encompass abortion. E Finally, we consider two additional sources of historical evidence, both of which show a contemporaneous understanding that the Privacy Clause did not enshrine abortion rights in our constitution. The first is concurrent legislative action. There were several Florida statutes passed between 1978 and 1980 regulating or restricting access to abortion in substantial ways. See ch. 78382, §§ 2, 4-10, Laws of Fla. (empowering Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to create rules regulating abortion clinics; setting forth licensing requirement and framework; prohibiting abortion by unlicensed clinics); ch. 79-302, § 1, Laws of - 43 -

Fla. (requiring parental consent for unmarried minors); ch. 80-208, § 1, Laws of Fla. (fetal remains to be disposed of in "sanitary and appropriate manner"; establishing crime for violations of this standard); ch. 80-413, § 1, Laws of Fla. (additional regulations on abortion clinics; imposing standard governing disposal of fetal remains); cf. Amicus Brief of Former State Representative John Grant at 25-28 (noting concurrent legislation on abortionparticularly the abortion law passed during the same session as the privacy proposal). Based on this significant body of abortion regulation—some of which would be struck down as violative of Roe¹⁹ it seems unlikely to us that the Legislature in 1980 would put to the people a proposal crafted to imperil that recent work. The second source of evidence is what legislators of the time expressed with respect to adding a right-to-life amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Fla. S. Comm. on HRS SM 737 (1978) Staff Analysis 1 (Fla. May 9, 1978) (available at Fla. Dep’t of State, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.); Fla. H.R., H.M. 388, 11th Sess. (Fla. 1979) (available at Dep't of State, Fla. State Archives, 19. See, e.g., Fla. Women's Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Smith, 536 F. Supp. 1048, 1059 (S.D. Fla. 1982). - 44 -

Tallahassee, Fla.); Fla. S., S.M. 118, 11th Sess. (Fla. 1979) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). Of significance here, twenty-seven legislators who voted for the privacy proposal had, within the prior two years, openly supported the adoption of a federal amendment to "protect unborn human[s]” in response to Roe v. Wade. Compare H.R. Journal, 12th Sess., at 318 (Fla. 1980), with H.R. Journal, 11th Sess., at 48 (Fla. 1979); compare S. Journal, 11th Sess., at 21 (Fla. 1979), with S. Journal, 12th Sess., at 313 (Fla. 1980). To us, it seems quite unlikely that so many legislators would have tried to remove abortion rights as a matter of federal constitutional law only to restrict legislative power on abortion just two years later by way of a state constitutional amendment. F We pause to summarize the textual, contextual, and historical evidence we have discussed so far. The Privacy Clause of the Florida Constitution does not mention abortion or include a word or phrase that clearly incorporates it. Era-appropriate dictionary definitions and contextual clues suggest that abortion does not naturally fit within the rights at issue. Reliable historical sources, - 45 -

like the technical meaning of the terms contained in the provision, the origin of the amendment, and the framing of the public debate, similarly do not support a conclusion that abortion should be read into the provision's text. Roe is also relevant to our analysis of the public meaning of the Privacy Clause. But speculation as to Roe's effect on voter understanding does not overcome the combined force of the substantial evidence we have examined above. Thus, we cannot conclude that in 1980 a voter would have assumed the text encompassed a polarizing definition of privacy that included broad protections for abortion. VI We have established the background legal principles that govern our review and analyzed the original public meaning of the Privacy Clause as it relates to the subject of abortion. Now, we must address how those considerations apply here-namely, can Planned Parenthood demonstrate conflict between the challenged statute and the constitutional protections secured by the Privacy Clause? The statute we review prohibits abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, subject to certain exceptions. This statute "come[s] - 46 -

clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and must be construed" if possible "to effect a constitutional outcome." Crist, 978 So. 2d at 139. To overcome this presumption, the challenger must establish invalidity (or conflict) "beyond reasonable doubt." Id. Based on our analysis finding no clear right to abortion embodied within the Privacy Clause, Planned Parenthood cannot overcome the presumption of constitutionality and is unable to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the 15-week ban is unconstitutional. 20 This conclusion brings us into tension with our precedent, primarily T. W. in which we derived a right to abortion from the Privacy Clause's text and invalidated a statute on that basis. 551 So. 2d at 1188; see also N. Fla. Women's Health, 866 So. 2d at 639 (reaffirming T.W.); Gainesville Woman Care, 210 So. 3d at 1253-56, 20. Even if we gave significantly greater weight to Roe's effect on the original public meaning of the Privacy Clause (as urged by the dissent) and gave less weight to the other meaningful sources of evidence discussed above, we would still be left without a definition of privacy and considerable ambiguity as to the breadth of the provision. In that instance, we would reach the same conclusion, because a statute is presumed constitutional unless shown to be invalid beyond a reasonable doubt. Franklin, 887 So. 2d at 1073. The dissent fails to address what effect, if any, this longstanding principle of law should have here. - 47 -

1260 (relying on T.W.). In deciding how to resolve that tension, we again emphasize that T. W. failed to acknowledge the longstanding principle that statutes are presumed to be constitutional. This error led the Court to read additional rights into the constitution based on Roe's dubious and immediately contested reasoning, rather than evaluate what the text of the provision actually said or what the people of Florida understood those words to mean. The decision to extend the protections of the Privacy Clause beyond what the text could reasonably bear was not ours to make. As a result, we removed substantial authority from the people's elected representatives to regulate abortion-a profoundly unique and complicated issue that affects society in many significant ways. Accordingly, for the reasons given above, we find T.W. to be clearly erroneous. Based on our established test for assessing stare-decisis issues, we now ask whether there is a valid reason not to recede from T.W. See State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 506-07 (Fla. 2020) (outlining a two-part framework on stare-decisis issues). We have said that reliance is a critical consideration. Id. But as noted by the State, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dobbs shows why reliance does not justify keeping T.W. In conducting a - 48 -

stare-decisis analysis in that case, the Supreme Court stressed that "[t]raditional reliance interests arise where advance planning of great precision is most obviously a necessity.'” Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 287 (first quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (joint opinion); and then citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). The Court went on to state that “those traditional reliance interests [a]re not implicated because getting an abortion is generally ‘unplanned activity,' and ‘reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account of any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions."" Id. at 288 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 856). Finally, the Court rejected application of a more malleable and undefined form of reliance that focused on the relative social and economic effects of abortion. Id. at 288-89. In its view, this type of reliance was irrelevant to a proper stare-decisis framework. Id. We think that this analysis from Dobbs is in keeping with Poole. Indeed, in Poole, we expressed wariness for tests that are "malleable and do not lend themselves to objective, consistent, and predictable application." 297 So. 3d at 507 (criticizing North Florida Women's Health's multi-factor stare-decisis framework). And in the years since Poole issued, we have not employed the more malleable - 49 -

form of reliance that Dobbs declined to apply—the same sort of societal reliance interests now being advanced by Planned Parenthood. Apart from arguing reliance, Planned Parenthood does not offer any other valid reasons for keeping T.W. Accordingly, because Planned Parenthood has failed to demonstrate a valid reason for retaining T. W., we recede from it. We also recede from Gainesville Woman Care and North Florida Women's Health, which both applied T.W.'s flawed reasoning and offered no additional doctrinal justification for locating a right to abortion in the Privacy Clause. VII We now return to the specific facts of this case. Below, the trial court granted a temporary injunction, finding that Planned Parenthood would likely succeed in its constitutional challenge. Our holding, however, displaces the doctrinal justification for the trial court's decision. Planned Parenthood cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim, which alleged that the newly enacted statute was facially invalid under the Privacy Clause of the Florida Constitution. And since Planned Parenthood fails on this prong, it is not entitled to a temporary injunction. - 50 -

Although we do not adopt the reasoning of the First District, we approve the result it reached below. It is so ordered. MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. SASSO, J., concurs with an opinion. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. SASSO, J., concurring. I join the majority opinion because it correctly holds that the Florida Constitution does not contain a right to elective abortion. I write separately to explain why I believe it is appropriate to reach that decision considering the standing arguments raised by the State in the lower court proceedings and on appeal and as highlighted by Amici in this Court. In doing so, I will start with some observations regarding this Court's standing jurisprudence. I will then explain why I agree with the majority's decision to accept the State's waiver of any standing arguments here. Finally, I will explain why I believe, in the proper case, this Court should reconsider its standing precedent. - 51 -

I. Standing is the legal doctrine that defines when a litigant has a stake in a controversy sufficient to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. The doctrine keeps us in our constitutional lane by ensuring we do not become “roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the [State's] laws." See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973). At the federal level, standing requirements are derived from Article III of the United States Constitution's Case or Controversy Clause. Constitutional in origin, standing is therefore a jurisdictional prerequisite to a plaintiff's right to sue in federal court. See Indus. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Dobson, 68 F.4th 155, 167 (4th Cir. 2023) ("It is axiomatic that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that must be determined before a court can consider the merits of a case." (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88 (1998))). For that reason, federal courts have the ability, and indeed the obligation, to address standing sua sponte even if a defendant has not raised the issue. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) ("[W]e are required to address [standing] even if the courts - 52 -

below have not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us." (first alteration in original) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990))); Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Because the standing issue goes to this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, it can be raised sua sponte."). Likewise, the question of standing is not subject to waiver. Hays, 515 U.S. at 742. At the state level, it is different. As it relates to standing, the Florida Constitution is textually distinct from the Federal Constitution because it does not contain an explicit cases and controversies clause. It should go without saying, then, that federal law does not control standing requirements in state courts. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (noting that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy). Even so, this Court has at times reflexively adopted federal standing tests without examining whether the Florida Constitution demands similar requirements. See, e.g., State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1113 n.4 (Fla. 2004) (adopting three-part standing - 53 -

test established by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)); Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Est. of Shelley, 827 So. 2d 936, 941 (Fla. 2002) (adopting thirdparty standing test recognized by the United States Supreme Court). We have not done so consistently, though. At times, we have concluded that standing in Florida is less restrictive than at the federal level. For example, in Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1994), we said that the doctrine of standing does not exist in Florida "in the rigid sense employed in the federal system." See also Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. 1996) (noting that in Florida, unlike the federal system, the doctrine of standing has not been rigidly followed). Consistent with this observation, we have sometimes applied state-specific standing rules. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305, 1314 (Fla. 2012) (holding a litigant has standing if "he or she reasonably expects to be affected by the outcome of the proceedings, either directly or indirectly” (quoting Hayes v. Guardianship of Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2006))). Other times we have, either explicitly or implicitly, - 54 -

bypassed a standing analysis altogether. See, e.g., J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1113 ("Because the Second District never determined whether these juveniles have standing to assert the constitutional rights of their parents, we decline to rule on these claims." (footnote omitted)).21 Our inconsistent approach is especially evident in the context of third-party standing. Traditionally, this Court considered as well-settled the rule that one who is not himself denied some constitutional right or privilege cannot be heard to raise constitutional questions on behalf of some other person who may at some future time be affected. See, e.g., Steele v. Freel, 25 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1946). Eventually, though, we carved out exceptions. For example, in Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994), we determined that criminal defendants could raise the privacy rights 21. Despite the inconsistent application of various tests to determine whether a party has standing to pursue its claims, our standing precedent has been steady in one respect. We have always held that standing can be waived. See, e.g., Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Pol. Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 1993); Cowart v. City of West Palm Beach, 255 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1971). However, this is somewhat logically inconsistent, because we oftentimes have adopted federal standards ostensibly derived from the Federal Constitution without adopting the corresponding rule that standing is jurisdictional in nature and therefore not subject to waiver. - 55 -

of the female minors with whom they had sexual relations because the criminal defendants "st[oo]d to lose from the outcome of this case and yet they ha[d] no other effective avenue for preserving their rights." Id. at 1085 (referencing Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1990), for "vicarious standing" requirements). Later, in Alterra, we applied a federal test to determine when parties can sue on behalf of rights belonging to others. 827 So. 2d at 941-42. The test, as laid out in Alterra, goes like this: a litigant may bring an action on behalf of a third party if 1) the litigant suffered an “injury in fact,” thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; 2) the litigant has a close relation to the third party; and 3) there is some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests. Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991)). But we applied this test in Alterra without explicitly adopting it as doctrine and without addressing our previous application of the Stall standard in Jones. Only a year after Alterra was decided, we again backed away from applying federal standing tests at all in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2003). There, we reiterated - 56

that the doctrine of standing does not exist in Florida "in the rigid sense employed in the federal system." Id. at 895 (quoting Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d at 720). This made room for our conclusion that an insured could maintain an action against the insurer for nonpayment of personal injury protection automotive insurance benefits even though the insured had not paid the medical bills in question and the medical provider had not instituted legal action against the insured for nonpayment. Id. at 897. And later, we appeared to cabin Alterra to the employment context in Weaver v. Myers, 229 So. 3d 1118, 1129 (Fla. 2017). In that same case, we also cited favorably the “vicarious standing" test from Jones, a case that preceded Alterra.2² Id. 22. Our doctrinal inconsistency in third-party standing cases is not the only aspect of our standing jurisprudence that has been unclear. For example, as noted above we adopted the three-part standing test established by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, in J.P. But a few years later in Johnson, we stated broadly that “standing ‘requires a would-be litigant to demonstrate that he or she reasonably expects to be affected by the outcome of the proceedings, either directly or indirectly.'" 78 So. 3d at 1314 (quoting Hayes, 952 So. 2d at 505). We did so without any reference to our previous adoption of the Lujan test and over the dissenting justices' observation that the moving party would have met that standing requirement. And although we have, with more consistency, adhered to the Rickman v. Whitehurst, 74 So. 205 (Fla. 1917), rule when litigants have - 57 -

II. With that background in mind, I now return to this case. It serves as a prime example of the challenges our doctrinal inconsistencies create for litigants and lower courts. In the trial court, the State argued Planned Parenthood lacked standing to challenge HB 5 because none of the plaintiffs could assert a personal right to privacy—instead, the plaintiffs sought to assert the privacy rights of their patients and/or customers. Working off the Alterra test, the State then argued Planned Parenthood could not meet the requirements for overcoming the general bar to third-party standing. In doing so, though, the State conceded that the second prong of the Alterra test (the close relationship requirement) was satisfied. In response, Planned Parenthood accepted the State's framing of the issue, arguing it could satisfy the Alterra test. This framework carried over to the trial court's order granting the challenged government action, we continue to carve out exceptions without a textual explanation justifying a new exception. See, e.g., Dep't of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972) (citing federal precedent to carve out exception for "ordinary citizens and taxpayers" to pursue constitutional claims in certain circumstances even absent a showing of special injury to themselves). - 58 -

temporary injunction, where it applied the Alterra test and concluded that Planned Parenthood has "third-party standing to bring this suit on behalf of their actual and potential patients." Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. State, No. 2022-CA-912, 2022 WL 2436704, at *17 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. July 5, 2022). But, in the First District, the court concluded that it did not need to address Petitioners' standing argument. Instead, the First District decided that Petitioners had not suffered irreparable harm sufficient to support the issuance of a temporary injunction. State v. Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla., 342 So. 3d 863, 867-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). That takes us to the parties' briefing filed in this Court. The State reasserted its argument as to Planned Parenthood's standing to pursue its claims. But as the majority opinion notes, the State essentially conceded the issue of standing at oral argument, urging this Court to reach the merits. So why do we accept that concession? First, as the majority notes, this case has been litigated under the umbrella of this Court's abortion jurisprudence. See, e.g., Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1253-54 (Fla. 2017); N. Fla. Women's - 59 -

Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 620 (Fla. 2003); In re T. W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1188-89 (Fla. 1989). And our abortion jurisprudence falls into the category of cases where we have, without explaining why, skipped over a standing analysis altogether. As a result, we have neither directly addressed standing nor applied the Alterra test in any of our abortion cases. Instead, to the extent standing was considered, we seem to have collapsed the analysis into the grounds for obtaining a temporary injunction without considering which standing test to apply or whether an abortion provider can meet that test. See Gainesville Woman Care, 210 So. 3d at 1247 (“Petitioners have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, one of the requirements of granting a temporary injunction, as well as all other grounds for the entry of a temporary injunction.” (emphasis added)). For that reason, addressing standing alone here would have only added to the inconsistencies in our cases. Second, both parties have asked us to apply the federal thirdparty standing test as applied in Alterra. But as explained above, we have applied that test once. And, for many reasons, I question the wisdom of perpetuating the standard here. For one, I do not - 60

think we should apply federal standards to textually distinct provisions of the Florida Constitution without considering whether that standard is independently justified on state law grounds. For another, reflexively adopting the federal third-party standing test is particularly troublesome because, in federal courts, it has been inconsistently applied and widely criticized. See, e.g., June Med. Servs. L. L. C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2142-46 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the test's inconsistent application, criticizing the characterization of third-party standing as prudential in nature, and concluding that third-party standing is inconsistent with the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III). Finally, and critically, neither party has challenged our characterization of standing as waivable rather than jurisdictional. Similarly, no party has offered an alternative standard to apply in the absence of Alterra or an argument as to whether Planned Parenthood fails to meet any alternative standard. As a result, I believe this Court properly reaches the merits of this case. III. While the State's concession takes care of this case, in future cases we should reconsider our standing precedents. Most - 61

fundamentally, we should consider from where our standing requirements are derived (spoiler alert-it is not the Federal Constitution). For example, is standing in Florida derived only from article V's conception of "judicial power"? See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 880 S.E.2d 168, 185-86 (Ga. 2022) (concluding that standing requirement arises from the Georgia Constitution's judicial power provision). Or does the access to courts provision of article I, section 21 have anything to say as to standing? Once decided, we will need to clarify the scope of any standing requirements, such as whether parties may assert both legal and factual injuries or whether only a legal injury will suffice. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 280-81 (2008) (noting that at common law "factual harm without a legal injury was damnum absque injuria and provided no basis for relief"). We will also need to examine whether standing requirements are truly subject to waiver, or instead whether they are jurisdictional in nature. And finally, we will need to provide a principled methodology to help litigants understand which tests to apply when. - 62 -

To decide these and other issues related to standing, we will need the benefit of the adversarial process and thorough briefing. For that reason, and in the proper case, I encourage parties to critically assess these and other standing issues and present argument to this Court should the opportunity arise. LABARGA, J., dissenting. When the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs23 “returned to the people and their elected representatives” “the authority to regulate abortion,” the decision did not force the state of Florida into uncharted territory. Instead, as history reveals and the majority acknowledges, the right to an abortion as a matter of Florida law was decided decades ago following two significant postRoe24 developments: (1) Florida voters' 1980 approval of an amendment to the Florida Constitution expressly providing a right of privacy, and (2) this Court's 1989 decision in In re T. W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989), holding that Florida's express right of privacy 23. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 292 (2022). 24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). - 63

encompasses the right to an abortion. Nonetheless, today's majority decision recedes from decades of this Court's precedent and holds that "there is no basis under [Florida's express right of privacy] to invalidate” “a recently amended statute that shortens the window of time in which a physician may perform an abortion." Majority op. at 2. I strongly dissent. The Right of Privacy Adopted by Florida voters in 1980, article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution provides: “Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." Contrary to the majority, I am convinced that in 1980, a Florida voter would have understood that the proposed privacy amendment “included broad protections for abortion." Id. at 46. The right of privacy is no novel concept. More than 100 years ago, former Michigan Supreme Court Justice and noted legal scholar Thomas Cooley described “[t]he right to one's person" as the right "to be let alone." Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of - 64 -

Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract 29 (2d ed. 1888). When the right "to be let alone" was discussed by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their Harvard Law Review article The Right to Privacy, the article primarily discussed the tort of invasion of privacy. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). However, the authors also made the following salient observation: THAT the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. Id. at 193. Thus, even in early considerations of the right of privacy, scholars recognized that the right would be one that would evolve over time and it did. During the twentieth century, political, social, and economic changes led to a host of changes in the legal landscape, resulting in an expansion of the right of privacy far beyond a right to be free from unwanted public exposure. Without question, one of the most significant legal developments was the United States Supreme Court's recognition in Roe of an implicit right of privacy - 65 -

guaranteeing the right to an abortion as a matter of federal law. However, the right of privacy in the context of decisional autonomy took hold several years earlier in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the right to marital privacy). It is relevant to the analysis of the public understanding of the right of privacy that Griswold's expansion of privacy to reach decisional autonomy occurred more than seven years before Roe and fifteen years before Florida voters' adoption of the right of privacy as a matter of state constitutional law. The State's argument, that the sole context for Florida's right of privacy is informational privacy, seems to have been a step too far even for the majority. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that the language of "shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law" provides context that "do[es] not lend support to a claim that voters clearly understood abortion to be part and parcel of the rights recognized" under the right of privacy. Majority op. at 23. What is more, it reaches this conclusion despite substantial evidence that - 66 -

overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the public understood the right of privacy to encompass the right to an abortion. Abortion as a Private Matter Before turning to the public understanding of the right of privacy, I write to address the majority's suggestion that abortion is ultimately not a private matter because “the procedure itself include[s] medical intervention and require[s] both the presence and intrusion of others.” Id. at 21 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). The majority acknowledges that an abortion "include[s] medical intervention,” see id., but beyond merely “includ[ing] medical intervention,” Florida’s statutes regulating abortion—then and now-require that the procedure be performed by a physician. See § 390.0111(2), Fla. Stat. (2023) (requiring that a termination of pregnancy be performed by a physician); Wright v. State, 351 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1977) (pre-1980 decision from this Court upholding the conviction of a registered nurse who performed an abortion in violation of statute requiring that the procedure be performed by a physician). The “others” required to be present and involved in the procedure are physicians and medical personnel. In the interest of - 67 -

patient privacy, medical matters, including countless forms of medical procedures, are broadly afforded confidentiality protections with narrowly tailored exceptions. And notably, the involvement of a physician was not fatal to the privacy issue in Griswold, where the United States Supreme Court said: "This law [prohibiting the use of contraceptives], however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.” 381 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added). As a matter of necessity, physicians and medical personnel are routinely involved in a wide range of medical procedures, decisions, and other medical matters. The majority attempts to limit today's decision to the issue of abortion. See majority op. at 10 note 7 ("[T]oday we do not revisit our precedents outside the abortion context."). However, I fear that parties will rely on the majority's reasoning that the involvement of "others" in an abortion procedure defeats privacy-in attempts to undermine the broad privacy protections that are extended in the medical context. - 68

The Public Understanding of Roe v. Wade and the Right of Privacy The majority "acknowledge[s] that the public understanding of the term 'privacy' was, to some extent, informed by the United States Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade," observing that "[following that decision, the phrase ‘right to privacy' gained new connotations that, for the first time, included the choice to have an abortion." Majority op. at 29 (emphasis added). The majority continues: In Planned Parenthood's view, this aspect of federal privacy jurisprudence should control our analysis here. Specifically, Planned Parenthood argues that Florida voters would have internalized Roe's definition of privacy when they voted for the privacy amendment. Indeed, Planned Parenthood has repeatedly asserted that the public understanding of this privacy definition was so engrained by 1980 that even without a specific mention of the term abortion, the Privacy Clause unequivocally included such a right by implication. Though this argument has some force, we cannot agree with Planned Parenthood that the backdrop of Roe conclusively establishes how a voter would have understood the provision. Id. at 29-30 (emphasis added). The majority concludes that "[c]onsequently, while Roe is relevant to our analysis of public meaning, it is not dispositive.” Id. at 32. I could not disagree more. - 69 -

The majority correctly recognizes the significant impact of Roe but stops short of the reality that Roe, having fundamentally changed the landscape of abortion rights on a national scale by redefining the scope of the right of privacy, was key to the public understanding of the right of privacy. During the seven-year interval between Roe and Florida voters' adoption of the right of privacy, I find it inconceivable that Americans and more specifically, Floridians were not aware that the right of privacy encompassed the right to an abortion. I agree with the petitioners that "the public understanding of [Roe's] privacy definition was so engrained by 1980 that even without a specific mention of the term abortion, the Privacy Clause unequivocally included such a right by implication." Id. at 29-30. In fact, the majority notes the controversial impact of Roe's reasoning, which reinforces that the public would have understood the right of privacy encompassed the right to an abortion. See id. at 14 (stating that Roe "left even progressive legal scholars baffled at how such a right could be gleaned from the constitution's text," and quoting Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 268 (“Roe's constitutional analysis was far outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretation of the - 70 -

various constitutional provisions to which it vaguely pointed.")). Contrary to the majority's position, evidence of the discussion surrounding Roe's reasoning is probative that the public understood the right of privacy to encompass the right to an abortion, and to so conclude does not require the "analytical leap" that the majority suggests it does. See id. at 31. Roe's opponents strenuously disapproved of basing the right to an abortion on the right of privacy; just as strenuously, Roe's supporters agreed with the Supreme Court's analysis. The common denominator is the understanding that the right to an abortion was tied to the right of privacy. The Nationwide Understanding of Roe and the Right of Privacy A decision that triggered pervasive national coverage, Roe was publicly discussed and debated in a way that most judicial decisions-even those decided by the United States Supreme Court are not. Media outlets across the nation reported on the landmark decision. On the day that Roe was decided, Associated Press articles announcing the seminal decision were published on the front pages of newspapers nationwide, many explaining that the decision "was - 71 -

based predominantly on what [Justice] Blackmun called a right of privacy."25 The nightly news programs on the major television networks also reported on Roe to an audience of tens of millions of viewers. The CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite-a news program with, at that time, a consistent audience of twenty million or more viewers-covered the decision in a segment lasting more than three minutes, noting that “[t]he nine justices made abortion 25. See, e.g., Associated Press, Abortion Law Out, Mexico Ledger, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Barry Schweid, Abortion Law Struck by Court, The Courier News (Blytheville), Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Abortions Allowed During 1st 6 Months, The Daily Chronicle (Centralia), Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Barry Schweid, Blackmun Cites 'Right of Privacy' Court Bars Restricting Three-Month Abortions, The Index-Journal (Greenwood), Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Court Strikes Down Abortion Law, The Neosho Daily News, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Court Strikes Down Abortion Law, Aiken Standard, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Court Strikes Down Texas Abortion Law, The Daily Times-News (Burlington), Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Barry Schweid, Decision Will Affect 44 States, Del Rio News-Herald, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, High Court Upholds Medical Abortions, Waukesha Daily Freeman, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Key Abortion Ruling by Supreme Court, Santa Cruz Sentinel, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Rule on Abortions, The Sedalia Democrat, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, States Can't Block Early Abortions, The Bismarck Tribune, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Supreme Court Upholds Women's Abortion Rights, Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Texas Law Struck Down, 7-2, The Vernon Daily Record, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1-2. - 72 -

largely a private matter." CBS Evening News with Walter Cronkite, featuring George Herman in Washington (CBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 1973), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dccagy905yk (available on the CBS News YouTube channel). Throughout the nation, local journalists also published articles announcing and explaining Roe, as did opinion writers in making their arguments.26 In some articles, even the titles emphasized that the right to an abortion was based on the right of privacy. See, e.g., Supreme Court: Right of Privacy Includes Abortion, The Georgia Bulletin, Feb. 22, 1973, at 2 (calling Roe "one of the biggest news stories of the year"); Chicago Daily News Services, 'Privacy' is Reason for Abortion Ruling, Omaha World-Herald, 26. See, e.g., Bonni McKeown, Abortion's Status in West Virginia: Legal Question Affects Availability, Beckley Post-Herald, June 21, 1976, at 5 (explaining that Roe invalidated most states' abortion laws based on the balancing of the state's interests versus a woman's right of privacy); Washington Post, Editorial, Abortion: 19th Century, The Evening Times (Sayre), Feb. 3, 1973, at 4 (same); Joseph Kraft, Opinion, The High Court Speaks Up for Privacy, The Greensboro Record, Jan. 29, 1973, at 20 (same); Joseph Kraft, Opinion, Ruling Revealed Conservative Court, The Montana Standard, Jan. 28, 1973, at 6 (same); Joseph Kraft, Opinion, The Abortion Ruling, The Roanoke Times, Jan. 27, 1973, at 6 (same); Mary Smith, Abortion Ruling Draws Varied Reactions Here, The Lawton Constitution, Jan. 23, 1973, at 4 (same). - 73 -

Jan. 23, 1973, at 18; Associated Press, 'Right of Privacy' Cited in Action Against States, Reno Gazette-Journal, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1. Roe and its extensive coverage informed legislators and their constituents that the right of privacy under the U.S. Constitution protected the right to an abortion. Far from an issue that faded after one or two news cycles, abortion remained a prevalent issue during the seven years between Roe and the 1980 adoption of Florida's privacy amendment. The three-trimester framework laid out in Roe balanced the state's interests against the mother's right of privacy, and based on that balancing test, abortion laws in multiple states, including Florida, were struck down on federal privacy grounds. See Fla. Women's Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Smith, 478 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (holding unconstitutional, on federal privacy grounds, administrative rules implementing Florida abortion statute); Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (granting, on federal privacy grounds, a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Florida abortion statute); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (holding Florida abortion statute unconstitutional on federal privacy grounds). - 74 -

As courts, legislatures, and the public continued to confront the topic of abortion, the media continued to cover Roe, noting the historical and legal context: “In the famous 1973 Roe vs. Wade case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that choosing abortion was part of a woman's right to privacy";27 "The Supreme Court legalized abortions in 1973, basing its landmark ruling on a woman's right to privacy."28 In 1980, only two months before Florida's privacy amendment vote, a United States district court judge struck down North Dakota's new abortion law regulating first trimester abortions, applying Roe and stating that "[t]he decision to obtain an abortion free from governmental interference is a fundamental right founded 27. Kevin M. Russell, Letter to the Editor, Does The Bill Regulating Abortions Deny Women Their Rights?, The Record (Hackensack), June 17, 1979, at 105. 28. Associated Press, Top Court to Decide Abortion Law Rule, Gettysburg Times, Nov. 28, 1979, at 6; Associated Press, Abortion Issue Back Before Supreme Court, The Index-Journal (Greenwood), Nov. 27, 1979, at 8; Associated Press, Abortion Issue Goes Back to High Court, News-Journal (Mansfield), Nov. 27, 1979, at 7; Associated Press, Abortion Issue is Back Before the Supreme Court, Poughkeepsie Journal, Nov. 27, 1979, at 6; Associated Press, High Court to Rule on Abortion Issue, Daily Sitka Sentinel, Nov. 27, 1979, at 2. - 75 -

in the right of privacy implicit in the Constitution." Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (D.N.D. 1980); Associated Press, Most of Abortion Law Tossed Out, The Bismarck Tribune, Sept. 30, 1980, at 1 (front-page newspaper article in North Dakota quoting the court's decision). Following Roe, pro-choice advocates praised the decision for recognizing a woman's right of privacy, while Catholic bishops and other pro-life advocates spoke out against Roe, asserting that the decision let the right of privacy outweigh the right to life: “In effect, the Court is saying that the right of privacy takes precedence over the right to life." U.S. Bishops Issue Message on Abortion, Panama City News-Herald, Mar. 4, 1973, at 40; Bishops Reject High Court's Abortion Ruling, Issue Pastoral Applications for Catholics, The True Voice (Omaha), Feb. 16, 1973, at 1.29 at 29. See also Katherine Lunine, Letter to the Editor, Preserve Constitutional Rights, The Journal News (Hamilton), Feb. 1, 1977, 4 (showing that pro-choice actors argue that government interference with abortion is limited by a woman's right of privacy); Associated Press, Abortion Ban Voted by House, The Corbin TimesTribune, Sept. 17, 1976, at 12 (same); Associated Press, Betty Anne Williams, Anti-Abortionists Stage Ban Rally in Washington, The Robesonian (Lumberton), Jan. 22, 1976, at 2 (same); Associated Press, 'March for Life' Again Seeks Amendment to Ban Abortion, The Index-Journal (Greenwood), Jan. 22, 1976, at 3 (same); Associated - 76

Ultimately, whether they supported the Supreme Court's decision in Roe or not, Americans in 1980 would have understood that the right of privacy encompassed the right to an abortion. The Public Understanding of Florida Voters in 1980 More specifically, and especially relevant to the present case, Florida media coverage after Roe illustrates that in 1980 Florida voters would have understood the privacy amendment to encompass the right to an abortion. The wealth of primary sources from Florida strongly indicates what voters would have known. Newspapers across Florida began reporting on Roe the day it was decided: January 22, 1973. In explaining the decision, these articles discussed the federal right of privacy as the basis for the right to an abortion. Adam Richardson, The Originalist Case for Why the Florida Constitution's Right of Privacy Protects the Right to an Abortion, 53 Stetson L. Rev. 101, 125 (2023). Like newspapers throughout the nation, Florida newspapers published an Associated Press, Washington Rally Marks Abortion Anniversary, The Times Record (Troy), Jan. 22, 1976, at 3 (same); United Press International, High Court 7-2 Ruling on Abortion Praised, Condemned, Traverse City Record-Eagle, Jan. 23, 1973, at 24 (same). - 77 -

Press article quoting Roe's pronouncement that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." See, e.g., Associated Press, Court Strikes Down Abortion Laws, The Pensacola News, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, High Court KOs Ban on Abortion, Tallahassee Democrat, Jan. 22, 1973, at 1. Coverage of Roe and of this broad privacy right also made the front pages of newspapers in Orlando and Fort Myers. See Washington Post Dispatch, High Court Nullifies Abortion Laws, Sentinel Star (Orlando), Jan. 23, 1973, at 1; Associated Press, Six-Month Abortions Upheld, Fort Myers NewsPress, Jan. 23, 1973, at 1. In 1980, the right of privacy and its inextricable connection to the right to an abortion continued to permeate Florida news. When Justice Douglas died in January 1980, Florida newspapers reported his legacy with mention of his majority opinion in Griswold as a precursor to Roe. Richardson, supra, at 131; James W. Fox Jr., A Historical and Originalist Defense of Abortion in Florida, 75 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 393, 427-28 (2023). For example, a Miami Herald article noted that after Griswold, "the [United States Supreme] court moved to rule, in 1973, that a woman in early pregnancy has a - 78 -

constitutional right of privacy to choose abortion without government interference." Aaron Epstein, William O. Douglas: Champion of Underdogs, Unpopular Ideas, The Miami Herald, Jan. 27, 1980, at 5-E. Florida news coverage of the United States Supreme Court continued with reports of abortion cases―and their right of privacy issues. In discussing the Supreme Court's 1980 oral arguments in H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), which involved parental notification of abortion, the Miami Herald reported that “[o]ut of this conflict between a minor's right to privacy and her parents' obligation to care for her has emerged a constitutional issue that was accepted Monday for review by the U.S. Supreme Court." Aaron Epstein, Court Will Examine Parents' Notification for Minor's Abortion, The Miami Herald, Feb. 26, 1980, at 10-A. And explaining the Court's decision in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), which upheld the Hyde Amendment's restrictions on the use of federal funds to pay for an abortion, the Pensacola News reported that the decision "had nothing to do with the legality of abortion itself" because “[t]he Supreme Court legalized abortion in its landmark 1973 decision” in which "the court said a woman's right to privacy - 79 -

makes her decision to have an abortion a matter only for her and her doctor during the first three months of her pregnancy." Associated Press, High Court Rules on Abortions, The Pensacola News, June 30, 1980, at 1. Florida newspapers covered major party platforms, including their stances on abortion. These articles linked the abortion issue with the right of privacy. The Fort Lauderdale News and other Florida newspapers published a syndicated column indicating that although the Republican platform did not yet have a consensus on abortion, the Supreme Court had made its determination in 1973 by, in the author's view, “forging from a ‘privacy right' a scythe to mow down state laws that expressed various community judgments about abortion." See George Will, Opinion, Bridges to Cross; Bridges to Burn, Fort Lauderdale News, July 17, 1980, at 18A; Richardson, supra, at 132 n. 177 (observing that the column ran in Florida Today, Fort Myers News-Press, Palm Beach Post, Pensacola News, Sentinel Star (Orlando), St. Lucie News Tribune, St. Petersburg Times, Stuart News, and Tallahassee Democrat). Covering the Democratic platform, the St. Petersburg Times reported that delegates had voted for a platform statement opposing "government - 80 -

interference in the reproductive decisions of Americans" and "restrictions on funding for health services for the poor that deny poor women especially the right to exercise a constitutionallyguaranteed right to privacy." Charles Stafford, Kennedy Stirs Democrats with Rousing Call to Arms, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 13, 1980, at 1-A (quoting the statement under the label “ABORTION”). Florida newspapers also covered statements by pro-choice activists and by pro-life activists that demonstrate both groups' understanding of abortion as part of the right of privacy. See Associated Press, Planned Parenthood Waving the Flag, The Tampa Tribune, Oct. 4, 1980, at 7-D (“In recent years we have faced an increasingly vocal and at times violent minority which seeks to deny all of us our fundamental rights of privacy and individual decisionmaking."); Carol Jeffares, Her Love of Life Makes Her Stand, Fight for It, The Tampa Tribune, Sept. 20, 1980, at 5-Pasco ("The abortion law is based on the woman's right to privacy. It says ‘a woman's right to privacy supersedes the fetus's life." "); Richardson, supra, at 132. With inflammatory language, both pro-choice and pro-life letters to the editor in Florida newspapers further demonstrate this understanding. See Joyce Tarnow, Letter to the Editor, Vote Out - 81

Anti-Abortionists, Fort Lauderdale News, Jan. 29, 1980, at 26-A ("The U.S. Constitution guarantees each of us the right of privacy, the right of religious freedom and the right to pursue happiness however we define it. Compulsory pregnancy is a denial of each of these rights."); Hugh Pope, Letter to the Editor, The Tampa TribuneTimes, Nov. 2, 1980, at 2-C (“There cannot be a more compelling reason for intelligent and patriotic Americans to vote Republican than to save lives! Stripped of all its sugarcoated slogans-freedom of choice[,]' [] 'woman's right to privacy[,]' [] etc., etc., abortion is legalized murder.”). The foregoing primary sources from Florida and from across the United States are examples of many. These sources should not be overlooked, and their impact should not be undervalued. In a quest to uncover the original public meaning of the Florida Constitution's Privacy Clause, they reveal that Roe was widely known for its holding and for its reasoning. Thus, in 1980, Florida voters would have understood the right of privacy as encompassing the right to an abortion. I hasten to add that the coverage discussed above, specifically connecting Roe and the right to an abortion to the right of privacy, - 82 -

occurred at a time when Americans relied heavily on print media and national news broadcasts. Florida Courts Acknowledge Right of Privacy Under Roe By the time Florida voters adopted the privacy amendment in 1980, Florida court decisions had repeatedly acknowledged the right of privacy expanded under federal law by Roe. While these decisions did not conclude that a right of privacy existed on state law grounds, they do provide further support that the public would have understood the link between the right to an abortion and the right of privacy. In 1977, this Court stated that “Justice Blackmun's articulation in Roe v. Wade of the limited scope of the right to privacy remains the current state of the law." Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962, 965 (Fla. 1977) (emphasis added) (rejecting argument that a right of privacy protected the possession of marijuana in the home). Even the dissenting opinion in Laird observed: "A constitutional right to privacy has been clearly established by the United States Supreme Court in . . . Roe . . . .” Id. at 966 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). - 83 -

In Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, Jones v. Smith, 415 U.S. 958 (1974), a case involving the abortion context, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the claim of a putative father that he was entitled to prevent the mother from obtaining an abortion. The district court rejected that argument, saying: The recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade . . . and Doe v. Bolton [410 U.S. 179 (1973)], while dealing with the constitutionality of statutes, set forth what we perceive to be the essential and underlying factor in the determination of this appeal. That factor is the "right of privacy” of the mother. Id. at 341 (emphasis added). Additionally, in discussing the right of privacy, the district court noted an observation made by the United States Supreme Court in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891): “As well said by Judge Cooley, The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity to be let alone."" 278 So. 2d at 342 (quoting Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 299 (E.D. Wisc. 1970)). Moreover, in Wright, the statute at issue required that an abortion be performed by a physician and at an approved facility. The petitioner, a registered nurse, challenged the approved facility - 84 -

requirement on the basis that under Roe and other federal decisions, the requirement violated the right of privacy. 351 So. 2d at 710. This Court ultimately upheld the petitioner's conviction on the ground that the statute constitutionally prohibited nonphysicians from performing an abortion. Despite concluding that the approved facility requirement was unconstitutional, this Court rejected the petitioner's privacy argument, stating: “The right to privacy in the abortion decision, recognized in Roe . . . as belonging to the pregnant woman in consultation with her physician, gives way to state power to regulate as the embryo or fetus develops." Id. at 710.30 30. Other decisions not involving abortion-related issues also recognized the right of privacy established in Roe. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 8 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (“In Roe, the court balanced the fundamental right to privacy of a woman's decision whether or not to terminate pregnancy against state interest to limit that right to safeguard health and potential life.”); Franklin v. White Egret Condo., Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (observing on motion for rehearing that “[t]he right to be free of unwarranted interference with the decision to have children has been identified on numerous occasions by the United States Supreme Court as one of the matters protected by the right of privacy"); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (“The decision to have an abortion during the first trimester has been held to be private and personal to the individual woman. The primary interest, at least in the early stages of pregnancy, is that of the woman and her right to privacy." (citations - 85

Roe and the Privacy Amendment Debate According to the majority, the relative absence of the topic of abortion from the debate over Florida's proposed privacy amendment is evidence that the public did not understand that the right to an abortion was included in the scope of the proposed right of privacy. See majority op. at 41-42 (citing Fox, supra, at 443-44). However, Professor Fox explains why the topic of abortion was not a part of the amendment debate: Abortion would only have been debated if its coverage within the right to privacy were in dispute or were not yet established in law. But as of 1980 the protection of abortion through the right to privacy was the established law. It would hardly make sense for debates about section 23 to invest time and effort re-arguing the reasoning of Roe, let alone arguing that the terms “right to privacy," "right to be let alone," and "free from governmental intrusion" would plainly mean what they already meant in federal law. Fox, supra, at 442-43 (emphasis omitted). Indeed, Roe's extension of the right of privacy to the abortion context so dominated the abortion discussion that it would have been well understood that omitted)). Again, these cases are relevant to demonstrate that after Roe, and before voters adopted Florida's privacy amendment, the right to an abortion as a matter of a right of privacy would have been well understood. - 86 -

the right of privacy adopted by Florida voters included the right to an abortion. In re T.W. [S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977). Indeed, "[t]he citizens of Florida opted for more protection from governmental intrusion when they approved article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. This amendment is an independent, freestanding constitutional provision which declares the fundamental right to privacy." Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985). The amendment "was intentionally phrased in strong terms . in order to make the privacy right as strong as possible." Id. It was in the context of Florida's broad right of privacy that almost thirty-five years ago, this Court held as a matter of state - 87 -

constitutional law that "Florida's privacy provision is clearly implicated in a woman's decision of whether or not to continue her pregnancy." T. W., 551 So. 2d at 1192. T.W. explained: “[W]e have said that the [privacy] amendment provides ‘an explicit textual foundation for those privacy interests inherent in the concept of liberty which may not otherwise be protected by specific constitutional provisions."" Id. (quoting Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987)). Unfortunately, the majority's decision to recede from T. W. and its progeny constitutes the rejection of a “decades-long line of cases hold[ing] that the Privacy Clause ‘embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the individual in those interests, than [does] the federal Constitution."" Petitioners' Opening Brief at 41 (emphases omitted) (quoting T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192). The decision is an affront to this state's tradition of embracing a broad scope of the right of privacy.31 31. In 2012, Florida reaffirmed this tradition when voters rejected a state constitutional amendment that would have narrowed protections for abortion rights in Florida by requiring that the protections be no greater than those provided under federal law. Additionally, the amendment would have overruled T. W. and other decisions concluding that Florida protections for abortion rights - 88 -

In deciding to reexamine T. W. and ultimately to recede from T.W. and its progeny, the majority states: "Since Roe featured prominently in T.W., we think it fair to also point out that the T. W. majority did not examine or offer a reasoned response to the existing criticism of that decision or consider whether it was doctrinally coherent. This was a significant misstep because Roe did not provide a settled definition of privacy rights." Majority op. at 13-14. I disagree. T. W. did acknowledge that "the workability of the trimester system and the soundness of Roe itself have been seriously questioned in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).” T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190. However, this Court correctly exceed those provided under federal law. In a decisive vote, more than fifty-five percent of Florida voters rejected the amendment. See Initiative Information: Prohibition on Public Funding of Abortions; Construction of Abortion Rights, Fla. Dep't of State, Division of Elections, https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/initdetail.asp?accou nt=10&seqnum=82 (last visited Mar. 19, 2024). While the petitioners conceded during the oral argument in this case that Florida voters' rejection of the abortion amendment in 2012 was not relevant to the public understanding of the right of privacy adopted in 1980, the 2012 amendment rejection is still relevant to an understanding of Florida's tradition with respect to the right of privacy. - 89 -

observed that “[Roe] for now remains the federal law." See id. As such, this Court was not obligated in T.W. to “examine or offer a reasoned response to the existing criticism of [Roe] or consider whether it was doctrinally coherent." Majority op. at 13-14. It was "three years after T. W." and almost twelve years after Florida voters' 1980 adoption of the right of privacy that “the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned Roe's position that the right to abortion was grounded in any sort of [federal] privacy right." See id. at 15 (emphasis added) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)). Even then, the United States Supreme Court did not abandon Roe's “essential holding." Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. I reemphasize that T. W. was decided on state law grounds and with a clear understanding of the breadth of Florida's right of privacy as discussed in Winfield. To be certain, Roe was fundamental to the public understanding of the right of privacy as encompassing the right to an abortion. However, T. W. did not rely on Roe or the federal constitution to determine that Florida's right of privacy included the right to an abortion. See T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1196 ("We expressly decide this case on state law grounds and cite federal precedent only to the extent that it illuminates Florida - 90 -

law."). Because this Court based its decision squarely on Florida law, there is no basis for upending decades of precedent that give effect to Florida's broad right of privacy. Beyond Today's Decision The impact of today's decision extends far beyond the fifteenweek ban at issue in this case. By operation of state statute, the majority's decision will result in even more stringent abortion restrictions in this state. While not before this Court in the present case, it is an irrefutable effect of today's decision that chapter 202321, Laws of Florida, also known as the Heartbeat Protection Act, will take effect in short order. Chapter 2023-21 amends section 390.0111, Florida Statutes (among other statutes), and with limited exceptions, it bans abortions beyond the gestational age of six weeks. The Act provides that the ban will take effect thirty days after any of the following events: (1) a decision by this Court holding that Florida's constitutional right to privacy does not include a right to abortion; (2) a decision by this Court in the present case allowing the fifteen-week ban to remain in effect; (3) an amendment to the Florida Constitution clarifying that Florida's constitutional right of privacy - 91 -

does not include the right to an abortion; or (4) a decision from this Court after March 7, 2023, that recedes in whole or part from any of the following: T.W., North Florida Women's Health v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003), and Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017). See ch. 2023-21, § 9, Laws of Fla. Today's decision implicates three of these four events, meaning that the Act's six-week ban will take effect in thirty days. “The document that the [majority] releases [today] is in the form of a judicial opinion interpreting a [provision of the Florida Constitution]. Bostock v. Clayton Co., 590 U.S. 644, 683 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). However, I lament that what the majority has done today supplants Florida voters' understandingthen and now that the right of privacy includes the right to an abortion. Conclusion "" The majority concludes that the public understanding of the right of privacy did not encompass the right to an abortion. However, the dominance of Roe in the public discourse makes it inconceivable that in 1980, Florida voters did not associate abortion with the right of privacy. - 92 -

Because of this, and with deep dismay at the action the majority takes today, I dissent. Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Direct Conflict of Decisions First District - Case No. 1D22-2034 (Leon County) Whitney Leigh White, Jennifer Dalven, and Johanna Zacarias of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, New York, for Petitioners Gainesville Woman Care, LLC, Indian Rocks Woman's Center, Inc., St. Petersburg Woman's Health Center, Inc., and Tampa Woman's Health Center, Inc., Autumn Katz and Caroline Sacerdote of Center for Reproductive Rights, New York, New York, for Petitioner A Woman's Choice of Jacksonville, Inc. Jennifer Sandman of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, New York, New York, for Petitioners Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida, Planned Parenthood of South, East, and North Florida, and Shelly Hsiao-Ying Tien, M.D., M.P.H. April A. Otterberg and Shoba Pillay of Jenner & Block LLP, Chicago, Illinois; and Daniel Tilley of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Miami, Florida; Benjamin James Stevenson, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Pensacola, Florida, and Nicholas L.V. Warren of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioners - 93 -

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Daniel William Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Nathan A. Forrester, Senior Deputy Solicitor General, David M. Costello, Deputy Solicitor General, Darrick W. Monson, Assistant Solicitor General, Zachary Grouev, Solicitor General Fellow, John M. Guard, Chief Deputy Attorney General, James H. Percival, Chief of Staff, and Natalie P. Christmas, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent Brad F. Barrios of Turkel Cuva Barrios, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Amici Curiae Law Professors Jonathan B. Miller and Hilary Burke Chan of Public Rights Project, Oakland, California; and Matthew A. Goldberger of Matthew A. Goldberger, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, for Amici Curiae Current and Former Elected Representatives for Reproductive Justice Kimberly A. Parker, Lesley F. McColl, and Aleksandr Sverdlik of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, and Meghan G. Wingert of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, New York; and Sean Shaw of Swope Rodante, Tampa, Florida, for Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Medical Association, and Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine Miranda Schiller, Sarah M. Sternlieb, Robert Niles-Weed, and Elizabeth McLean of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, New York, Charlotte McFaddin and Caroline Elvig of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Washington, District of Columbia, and Edward Soto of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Miami, Florida, - 94 -

for Amicus Curiae Floridians for Reproductive Freedom Angela C. Vigil, Robert H. Moore, and Paul Chander of Baker & McKenzie LLP, Miami, Florida; and Francisca D. Fajana of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, New York, New York, and Emily M. Galindo of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Orlando, Florida, for Amici Curiae LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Florida Access Network, National Latina Institute for Reproductive Justice, Esperanza United, and A.L. Brian J. Stack and Robert Harris of Stack Fernandez & Harris, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Sarah B. Gutman, Lilianna Rembar, and Caroline Soussloff of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, New York, New York, and Jennifer Kennedy Park of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae Sanctuary for Families, Legal Momentum, The National Organization for Women Foundation, The Rapid Benefits Group Fund, Women for Abortion and Reproductive Rights, Margaret A. Baldwin, JD, Professor Cyra Choudhury, Professor Donna K. Coker, Professor Zanita E. Fenton, Doctor Kathryn M. Nowotny, PhD, and Jodi Russell Eugene M. Gelernter and Caitlin A. Ross of Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New York, New York; and Courtney Brewer of The Mills Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Amici Curiae National Council of Jewish Women, Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice, Catholics for Choice, Metropolitan Community Churches, National Council of Jewish Women - Greater Miami Section, National Council of Jewish Women - Palm Beach Section, National Council of Jewish Women - Sarasota Manatee Section, National Council of Jewish Women - Kendall Section, National Council of Jewish Women - Valencia Shores Section, Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association, Women's Rabbinic Network, Moving Traditions, Avodah, Bend the Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice, Jewish Council for Public Affairs, Jewish Orthodox - 95 -

Feminist Alliance, Union for Reform Judaism, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Men of Reform Judaism, Women of Reform Judaism, Rabbinical Assembly, Society for Humanistic Judaism, Muslim Women's Organization, Hindus for Human Rights, Sadhana: Coalition of Progressive Hindus, Women's Alliance for Theology, Ethics, and Ritual (WATER), SACRED (Spiritual Alliance of Communities for Reproductive Dignity), Faith in Public Life, and Florida Interfaith Coalition for Reproductive Health and Justice Jordan E. Pratt and Christine K. Pratt of First Liberty Institute, Washington, District of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae National Institute of Family and Life Advocates Alan Lawson, Paul C. Huck, Jr., Jason Gonzalez, Amber Stoner Nunnally, and Caroline May Poor of Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Former State Representative John Grant Christopher Green, University, Mississippi; and Antony B. Kolenc, Naples, Florida, for Amici Curiae Scholars on original meaning in State Constitutional Law Lynn Fitch, Attorney General, Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General, and Justin L. Matheny, Deputy Solicitor General, Mississippi Attorney General's Office, Jackson, Mississippi; and Samuel J. Salario, Jr. of Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, Tampa, Florida, for Amici Curiae Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia Stephen C. Emmanuel of Ausley McMullen, Tallahassee, Florida, - 96

for Amici Curiae Florida Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Florida Baptist Convention Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan Sekulow, and Olivia F. Summers of American Center for Law & Justice, Washington, District of Columbia; and Edward L. White III of American Center for Law & Justice, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Amicus Curiae Charlotte Lozier Institute Christopher E. Mills of Spero Law LLC, Charleston, South Carolina; and Chad Mizelle, Tampa, Florida, for Amicus Curiae American College of Pediatricians Edward M. Wenger of Holtzman Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak, PLLC, Washington, District of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae American Cornerstone Institute Carlos A. Rey, General Counsel, Kyle E. Gray, Deputy General Counsel, The Florida Senate, David Axelman, General Counsel, and J. Michael Maida, Deputy General Counsel, The Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae The Florida Legislature Kenneth L. Connor of Connor & Connor, LLC, Aiken, South Carolina, for Amicus Curiae Liberty Counsel Action S. Dresden Brunner of S. Dresden Brunner, P.A., Naples, Florida, for Amicus Curiae The Prolife Center at the University of St. Thomas (MN) Patrick Leduc of Law Offices of Patrick Leduc, P.A., Tampa, Florida, - 97 -

for Amicus Curiae American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Hugh C. Phillips of Liberty Counsel, Orlando, Florida, for Amici Curiae Frederick Douglass Foundation, The National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference, Fiona Jackson Center for Pregnancy, and Issues4life Foundation D. Kent Safriet of Holtzman Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America Denise M. Harle of Alliance Defending Freedom, Lawrenceville, Georgia, and Joshua L. Rogers of Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Amicus Curiae Concerned Women for America - 98 -

The Doll’s House

Katherine mansfield, everything you need for every book you read., kezia burnell, isabel burnell, else kelvey.

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Analysis of Katherine Mansfield's The Doll's House
Published in The Dove's Nest, Katherine Mansfield's last collection of short stories, "The Doll's House" belongs with "Prelude" (1920) and "At the Bay" (1922) among the Burnell stories, a trilogy based on the re-creation of a New Zealand childhood that threads family life with social satire while exploring issues of identity and belonging.
PDF THE DOLL'S HOUSE (1922)
THE DOLL'S HOUSE (1922) By Katherine Mansfield When dear old Mrs. Hay went back to town after staying with the Burnells she sent the children a doll's house. It was so big that the carter and Pat carried it into the courtyard, and there it stayed, propped up on two wooden boxes beside the feed-room door. No harm could come to it; it was summer.
The Doll's House Summary & Analysis
The family's handyman, Pat, carries the doll's house into the courtyard, and places it next to the feed-room to let it air out. It smells strongly of paint, so much so that Aunt Beryl thinks it could make someone sick. The fact that the doll's house has been sent from town emphasizes that the Burnells live out in the country.
The Doll's House Analysis
Last Updated September 5, 2023. "The Doll's House" by Katherine Mansfield is an extended metaphor for social class discrimination and warfare. The story centers on three wealthy sisters and ...
The Doll's House Summary
Last Updated September 5, 2023. Katherine Mansfield's short story "The Doll's House" commences when Mrs. Hay, a previous guest of the wealthy Burnell family, sends the Burnell daughters a ...
The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield Plot Summary
A doll's house arrives at the Burnell home as a gift. The dollhouse smells so strongly of paint that Aunt Beryl thinks it could make someone sick. Isabel, Lottie, and Kezia, the Burnell's three daughters, do not mind the smell, however, and couldn't be more delighted by the house.Kezia, the youngest sister, notices a small lamp, which she thinks it the best part of it.
The Doll's House Full Text and Analysis
The Doll's House. In "The Doll's House," Mansfield depicts the cruelty of class discrimination inflicted upon two little girls and examines how children learn their behavior from the adults in their lives and soon know their place in the social order. "The Doll's House," like many other short stories by Katherine Mansfield, reflects ...
The Doll's House Study Guide
Katherine Mansfield was born Kathleen Beauchamp in New Zealand to a prominent English family in New Zealand. Much of her childhood was spent in the small, country village of Karori, where she was educated in a village school alongside the children of housekeepers, milkmen, and other lower-class children, just like the Burnell sisters in "The Doll's House."
The Doll's House Themes
Discussion of themes and motifs in Katherine Mansfield's The Doll's House. eNotes critical analyses help you gain a deeper understanding of The Doll's House so you can excel on your essay or test.
The Doll's House Summary
The Doll's House study guide contains a biography of Katherine Mansfield, literature essays, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis. Best summary PDF, themes, and quotes.
The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield
Analysis of The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield. The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield, published in 1922, is a short story written in third-person, through an omniscient narrator. It discusses societal class and ostracization through the lens of two sets of school-going sisters from different family backgrounds.
The Doll's House (short story)
The Doll's House" is a 1922 short story by Katherine Mansfield. It was first published in The Nation and Atheneum on 4 February 1922 and subsequently appeared in The Doves' Nest and Other Stories (1923). Mansfield used an alternative title in other editions, including "At Karori".
The Doll's House Summary and Analysis of Paragraphs 1
Katherine Mansfield begins "The Doll's House" by introducing the object around which the story's conflict develops. With its many delicate details and the joy it induces in the Burnell girls, the elaborate doll's house the girls receive from a wealthy friend of the family appears innocuous enough at first.
The Doll's House Essay Topics
for only $0.70/week. Subscribe. By Katherine Mansfield. Thanks for exploring this SuperSummary Study Guide of "The Doll's House" by Katherine Mansfield. A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
The Doll's House Background
4,950+ Quick-Read Plot Summaries. Downloadable PDFs. Subscribe for $3 a Month. In 1903, Mansfield moved to London to attend Queen's College. After extensive travel, she returned to New Zealand to write. However, she grew bored with the slower pace of life and returned to Europe, where she spent the rest of her life.
"The Doll's House" by Katherine Mansfield Essay
Katherine Mansfield's "The Dolls House" seems to be a simple story about children receiving a own ideas and opinions. Even though everyone is entitled to their own opinion it is often bizarre to see how our opinions are based on those of others. This essay will outline the events that occurred in the story which are a big part in regards to the ...
The Doll's House Themes
Class prejudice (classism) is the principal theme in " The Doll's House ." Through the story, Mansfield depicts a society in which people are invisibly divided into a hierarchy of social classes based on economic prosperity or lack thereof. The narrator begins by showing the perspective of the Burnell children, who live in a large house and ...
The Doll's House Themes
Based on Mansfield's own childhood experiences of moving from the New Zealand town of Wellington to the rural village of Karori, The Doll's House is a critique of small-town vanity. Beyond emphasizing the arbitrary nature of class division, the story also mocks the narrow-minded provincialism of the Burnells—the most distinguished family in a tiny village, outside a small town, on a far ...
The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield
The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield. The Doll's House. WHEN dear old Mrs. Hay went back to town after staying with the Burnells she sent the children a doll's house. It was so big that the carter and Pat carried it into the courtyard, and there it stayed, propped up on two wooden boxes beside the feed-room door.
The Dolls House By Katherine Mansfield English Literature Essay
The Dolls House By Katherine Mansfield English Literature Essay. Apart from the old story of rich and poor you can find another interesting theme of rebel child in the story. In the story school is used as a small society representing the bigger one in real life where different kinds of people interact and live together with all their ...
The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield
The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield - Summary. ''The Doll's House'' begins when an elaborate doll's house is delivered to the home of the Burnell family. It is a gift from Mrs. Hay, who has been staying with them for a while in their house out in the suburbs but has recently returned to the city. The doll's house is ...
cfp
Abstracts of 200 words for 20-minute papers, together with a 50-word bio-sketch, should be sent to the conference organisers at: [email protected]. Conference organisers: Dr Jenny McDonnell (IADT); Dr Janka Kaščáková, Dr Erika Baldt, Dr Anna Kwiatkowska (Katherine Mansfield Society) Extended deadline: April 30th 2024.
Innocence and Cruelty Theme in The Doll's House
Innocence and Cruelty. LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in The Doll's House, which you can use to track the themes throughout the work. While The Doll's House mostly focuses on the interactions between young girls with one another, it is not simply a story about how children behave. These girls are, in many ways, simply ...
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See also Katherine Lunine, Letter to the Editor, Preserve Constitutional Rights, The Journal News (Hamilton), Feb. 1, 1977, 4 (showing that pro-choice actors argue that government interference ...
The Doll's House Character Analysis
The Doll's House by Katherine Mansfield. Upgrade to A + Download this LitChart! (PDF) Teachers and parents! Our Teacher Edition on The Doll's House makes teaching easy. Introduction Intro. Plot Summary Plot. Summary & Analysis. Themes. All Themes; Insiders, Outsiders, and Class Innocence and Cruelty Provincialism and Pretense

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