perception of analysis

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Supplement to Analysis

Definitions and descriptions of analysis.

The older a word, the deeper it reaches. (Wittgenstein NB , 40) { §6.5 }

This supplement collects together various definitions and descriptions of analysis that have been offered in the history of philosophy (including all the classic ones), to indicate the range of different conceptions and the issues that arise. (There are also some remarks on related topics such as analyticity, definition, and methodology more generally.) In most cases, abbreviated references are given; full details can be found in the Annotated Bibliography on Analysis, in the section mentioned in curly brackets after the relevant definition or description. Where there is more than one passage quoted from a particular author, passages are numbered in chronological order of composition (as far as that can be determined).

• Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy , 1999, ed. Robert Audi

Concise Oxford Dictionary , 1976, ed. J. B. Sykes

• Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology , 1925, ed. James Mark Baldwin

A Kant Dictionary , 1995, by Howard Caygill

Oxford dictionary of philosophy , 1996, by simon blackburn, philosophielexikon , 1997, ed. a. hügli and p. lübcke, routledge encyclopedia of philosophy , 1998, entry under ‘analytical philosophy’ by thomas baldwin, routledge encyclopedia of philosophy , 1998, entry under ‘conceptual analysis’ by robert hanna, alexander of aphrodisias, arnauld, antoine and nicole, pierre, ayer, a. j., bentham, jeremy, bergson, henri, bos, henk j. m., bradley, f. h., brandom, robert b., carnap, rudolf, cassirer, ernst, cohen, l. jonathan, collingwood, r. g., davidson, donald, de chardin, teilhard, derrida, jacques, descartes, rené, frege, gottlob, geertz, clifford, hegel, georg w.f., heidegger, martin, hobbes, thomas, hodges, wilfrid, holton, gerald, husserl, edmund, kant, immanuel, lakatos, imre, leibniz, gottfried wilhelm, lichtenberg, georg christoph, locke, john, lodge, david, mendelssohn, moses, moore, g. e., newton, isaac, nietzsche, friedrich, poincaré, jules henri, polya, george, quine, w.v.o., rorty, richard, rosen, stanley, russell, bertrand, ryle, gilbert, schiller, friedrich, sellars, wilfrid, soames, scott, stebbing, l. susan.

• Strawson, F. Peter

Urmson, J. O.

Whitehead, alfred north, wilson, john cook, wittgenstein, ludwig, 1. definitions of analysis, cambridge dictionary of philosophy , 2nd ed., 1999, ed. robert audi.

the process of breaking up a concept, proposition, linguistic complex, or fact into its simple or ultimate constituents. { §1.1 }

1. Resolution into simpler elements by analysing (opp. synthesis ); statement of result of this; … 2. (Math.) Use of algebra and calculus in problem-solving. { §1.1 }

Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology , 1925, ed. James Mark Baldwin, Vol. I

The isolation of what is more elementary from what is more complex by whatever method. { §1.1 }

Kant combines two senses of analysis in his work, one derived from Greek geometry, the other from modern physics and chemistry. Both remain close to the original Greek sense of analysis as a ‘loosening up’ or ‘releasing’, but each proceed in different ways. The former proceeds ‘lemmatically’ by assuming a proposition to be true and searching for another known truth from which the proposition may be deduced. The latter proceeds by resolving complex wholes into their elements. { §4.5 }

The process of breaking a concept down into more simple parts, so that its logical structure is displayed. { §1.1 }

Auflösung, Zerlegung in Bestandteile, im Gegensatz zu Synthese. { §1.1 }

Philosophical analysis is a method of inquiry in which one seeks to assess complex systems of thought by ‘analysing’ them into simpler elements whose relationships are thereby brought into focus. { §1.1 }

The theory of conceptual analysis holds that concepts – general meanings of linguistic predicates – are the fundamental objects of philosophical inquiry, and that insights into conceptual contents are expressed in necessary ‘conceptual truths’ (analytic propositions). { §1.1 }

Annotated Bibliography, §1.1

2. Descriptions of Analysis

And he [Aristotle] called them Analytics because the resolution of every compound into those things out of which the synthesis [is made] is called analysis . For analysis is the converse of synthesis. Synthesis is the road from the principles to those things that derive from the principles, and analysis is the return from the end to the principles. For geometers are said to analyze when, beginning from the conclusion they go up to the principles and the problem, following the order of those things which were assumed for the demonstration of the conclusion {1}. But he also uses analysis who reduces composite bodies into simple bodies {2}, and he analyzes who divides the word into the parts of the word {3}; also he who divides the parts of the word into the syllables {4}; and he who divides these into their components {5}. And they are severally said to analyse who reduce compound syllogisms into simple ones {6}, and simple ones into the premisses out of which they get their being {7}. And further, resolving imperfect syllogisms into perfect ones is called analyzing {8}. And they call analysis the reducing of the given syllogism into the proper schemata {9}. And it is especially in this meaning of analysis that these are entitled Analytics , for he describes for us a method at the end of the first book with which we shall be able to do this. ( Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics , §1.2.1 (7, lines 11-33); tr. in Gilbert 1960, 32; the square brackets are in the original translation, the curly brackets have been added here to highlight the nine senses that Alexander distinguishes) { §2.4 , §3.2 }

it is not the same thing to take an argument in one’s hand and then to see and solve its faults, as it is to be able to meet it quickly while being subjected to questions; for what we know, we often do not know in a different context. Moreover, just as in other things speed or slowness is enhanced by training, so it is with arguments too, so that supposing we are unpractised, even though a point is clear to us, we are often too late for the right moment. Sometimes too it happens as with diagrams; for there we can sometimes analyse the figure, but not construct it again: so too in refutations, though we know on what the connexion of the argument depends, we still are at a loss to split the argument apart. ( SR , 16, 175a20-30) { §2.4 }

We must next explain how to reduce syllogisms to the figures previously described; this part of our inquiry still remains. For if we examine the means by which syllogisms are produced, and possess the ability to discover them, and can also analyse [ analuoimen ] the syllogisms when constructed into the figures previously described, our original undertaking will be completed. (( PrA , I, 32, 46b40-47a6; Tredennick tr. slightly modified) { §2.4 }

Thus it is evident (1) that the types of syllogism which cannot be analysed in these figures [viz., second figure syllogisms into the third figure, and third figure syllogisms into the second figure] are the same as those which we saw could not be analysed into the first figure; and (2) that when syllogisms are reduced to the first figure these alone are established per impossibile .

It is evident, then, from the foregoing account [taken as including the discussion prior to chapter 45] how syllogisms should be reduced; and also that the figures can be analysed into one another. ( PrA , I, 45, 51a40-b5; Tredennick tr., substituting ‘analysed’ for ‘resolved’) { §2.4 }

If it were impossible to prove truth from falsehood, it would be easy to make analyses [ analuein ]; for then the propositions would convert from necessity. Let A be something that is the case; and if A is the case, then these things are the case (things which I know to be the case—call them B ). From the latter, then, I shall prove that the former is the case. (In mathematics conversion is more common because mathematicians assume nothing incidental—and in this too they differ from those who argue dialectically—but only definitions.) ( PoA , I, 12, 78a6-13) { §2.4 }

We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall convince, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. Having set the end, they consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For the person who deliberates seems to inquire and analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all inquiry appears to be deliberation—for instance mathematical inquiries—but all deliberation is inquiry), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming. And if we come on an impossibility, we give up the search, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it. ( NE , III, 3, 1112b8-27) { §2.4 }

The art of arranging a series of thoughts properly, either for discovering the truth when we do not know it, or for proving to others what we already know, can generally be called method.

Hence there are two kinds of method, one for discovering the truth, which is known as analysis , or the method of resolution , and which can also be called the method of discovery . The other is for making the truth understood by others once it is found. This is known as synthesis , or the method of composition , and can also be called the method of instruction .

Analysis does not usually deal with the entire body of a science, but is used only for resolving some issue. ( LAT , 233-4) { §4.1 }

Now analysis consists primarily in paying attention to what is known in the issue we want to resolve. The entire art is to derive from this examination many truths that can lead us to the knowledge we are seeking.

Suppose we wondered whether the human soul is immortal, and to investigate it we set out to consider the nature of the soul. First we would notice that it is distinctive of the soul to think, and that it could doubt everything without being able to doubt whether it is thinking, since doubting is itself a thought. Next we would ask what thinking is. Since we would see nothing contained in the idea of thought that is contained in the idea of the extended substance called body, and since we could even deny of thought everything belonging to body - such as having length, width, and depth, having different parts, having a certain shape, being divisible, etc. - without thereby destroying the idea we have of thought, from this we would conclude that thought is not at all a mode of extended substance, because it is the nature of a mode not to be able to be conceived while the thing of which it is a mode is denied. From this we infer, in addition, that since thought is not a mode of extended substance, it must be the attribute of another substance. Hence thinking substance and extended substance are two really distinct substances. It follows from this that the destruction of one in no way brings about the destruction of the other, since even extended substance is not properly speaking destroyed, but all that happens in what we call destruction is nothing more than the change or dissolution of several parts of matter which exist forever in nature. Likewise it is quite easy to judge that in breaking all the gears of a clock no substance is destroyed, although we say that the clock is destroyed. This shows that since the soul is in no way divisible or composed of parts, it cannot perish, and consequently is immortal.

This is what we call analysis or resolution . We should notice, first, that in this method - as in the one called composition - we should practice proceeding from what is better known to what is less known. For there is no true method which could dispense with this rule.

Second, it nevertheless differs from the method of composition in that these known truths are taken from a particular examination of the thing we are investigating, and not from more general things as is done in the method of instruction. Thus in the example we presented, we did not begin by establishing these general maxims: that no substance perishes, properly speaking; that what is called destruction is only a dissolution of parts; that therefore what has no parts cannot be destroyed, etc. Instead we rose by stages to these general notions.

Third, in analysis we introduce clear and evident maxims only to the extent that we need them, whereas in the other method we establish them first, as we will explain below.

Fourth and finally, these two methods differ only as the route one takes in climbing a mountain from a valley differs from the route taken in descending from the mountain into the valley, or as the two ways differ that are used to prove that a person is descended from St. Louis. One way is to show that this person had a certain man for a father who was the son of a certain man, and that man was the son of another, and so on up to St. Louis. The other way is to begin with St. Louis and show that he had a certain child, and this child had others, thereby descending to the person in question. This example is all the more appropriate in this case, since it is certain that to trace an unknown genealogy, it is necessary to go from the son to the father, whereas to explain it after finding it, the most common method is to begin with the trunk to show the descendants. This is also what is usually done in the sciences where, after analysis is used to find some truth, the other method is employed to explain what has been found.

This is the way to understand the nature of analysis as used by geometers. Here is what it consists in. Suppose a question is presented to them, such as whether it is true or false that something is a theorem, or whether a problem is possible or impossible; they assume what is at issue and examine what follows from that assumption. If in this examination they arrive at some clear truth from which the assumption follows necessarily, they conclude that the assumption is true. Then starting over from the end point, they demonstrate it by the other method which is called composition . But if they fall into some absurdity or impossibility as a necessary consequence of their assumption, they conclude from this that the assumption is false and impossible.

This is what may be said in a general way about analysis, which consists more in judgment and mental skill than in particular rules. ( LAT , 236-8) { §4.1 }

It is advisable to stress the point that philosophy, as we understand it, is wholly independent of metaphysics, inasmuch as the analytic method is commonly supposed by its critics to have a metaphysical basis. Being misled by the associations of the word ‘analysis’, they assume that philosophical analysis is an activity of dissection; that it consists in ‘breaking up’ objects into their constituent parts, until the whole universe is ultimately exhibited as an aggregate of ‘bare particulars’, united by external relations. If this were really so, the most effective way of attacking the method would be to show that its basic presupposition was nonsensical. For to say that the universe was an aggregate of bare particulars would be as senseless as to say that it was Fire or Water or Experience. It is plain that no such possible observation would enable to veify such an assertion. But, so far as I know, this line of criticism is in fact never adopted. The critics content themselves with pointing out that few, if any, of the complex objects in the world are simply the sum of their parts. They have a structure, an organic unity, which distinguishes them, as genuine wholes, from mere aggregates. But the analyst, so it is said, is obliged by his atomistic metaphysics to regard an object consisting of parts a , b , c , and d , in a distinctive configuration as being simply a + b + c + d , and thus gives an entirely false account of its nature.

If we follow the Gestalt psychologists, who of all men talk most constantly about genuine wholes, in defining such a whole as one in which the properties of every part depend to some extent on its position in the whole, then we may accept it as an empirical fact that there exist genuine, or organic, wholes. And if the analytic method involved a denial of this fact, it would indeed be a faulty method. But, actually, the validity of the analytic method is not dependent on any empirical, much less any metaphysical, presupposition about the nature of things. For the philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them.

In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character – that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. Accordingly, we may say that philosophy is a department of logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical inquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions and not with questions of empirical fact.

It follows that philosophy does not in any way compete with science. The difference in type between philosophical and scientific propositions is such that they cannot conceivably contradict one another. And this makes it clear that the possibility of philosophical analysis is independent of any empirical assumptions. That it is independent of any metaphysical assumptions should be even more obvious still. For it is absurd to suppose that the provision of definitions, and the study of their formal consequences, involves the nonsensical assertion that the world is composed of bare particulars, or any other metaphysical dogma.

What has contributed as much as anything to the prevalent misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical analysis is the fact that propositions and questions which are really linguistic are often expressed in such a way that they appear to be factual. A striking instance of this is provided by the proposition that a material thing cannot be in two places at once. This looks like an empirical proposition, and is constantly invoked by those who desire to prove that it is possible for an empirical proposition to be logically certain. But a more critical inspection shows that it is not empirical at all, but linguistic. It simply records the fact that, as the result of certain verbal conventions, the proposition that two sense-contents occur in the same visual or tactual sense-field is incompatible with the proposition that they belong to the same material thing. And this is indeed a necessary fact. But it has not the least tendency to show that we have certain knowledge about the empirical properties of objects. For it is necessary only because we happen to use the relevant words in a particular way. There is no logical reason why we should not so alter our definitions that the sentence ‘A thing cannot be in two places at once’ comes to express a self-contradiction instead of a necessary truth. (1936, 75-7) { §6.7 }

From our assertion that philosophy provides definitions, it must not be inferred that it is the function of the philosopher to compile a dictionary, in the ordinary sense. For the definitions which philosophy is required to provide are of a different kind from those which we expect to find in dictionaries. In a dictionary we look mainly for what may be called explicit definitions; in philosophy, for definitions in use . ...

We define a symbol in use , not by saying that it is synonymous with some other symbol, but by showing how the sentences in which it significantly occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences, which contain neither the definiendum itself, nor any of its synonyms. A good illustration of this process is provided by Bertrand Russell’s so-called theory of descriptions, which is not a theory at all in the ordinary sense, but an indication of the way in which all phrases of the form ‘the so-and-so’ are to be defined. ( Ibid ., 80-1) { §6.7 }

[A serious mistake in my account in Language, Truth and Logic ] was my assumption that philosophical analysis consisted mainly in the provision of ‘definitions in use’. It is, indeed, true that what I describe as philosophical analysis is very largely a matter of exhibiting the inter-relationship of different types of propositions; but the cases in which this process actually yields a set of definitions are the exception rather than the rule. ...

... Thus, when Professor Moore suggests that to say that ‘existence is not a predicate’ may be a way of saying that ‘there is some very important difference between the way in which “exist” is used in such a sentence as “Tame tigers exist” and the way in which “growl” is used in “Tame tigers growl”’, he does not develop his point by giving rules for the translation of one set of sentences into another. What he does is to remark that whereas it makes good sense to say ‘All tame tigers growl’ or ‘Most tame tigers growl’ it would be nonsense to say ‘All tame tigers exist’ or ‘Most tame tigers exist’. Now this may seem a rather trivial point for him to make, but in fact it is philosophically illuminating. For it is precisely the assumption that existence is a predicate that gives plausibility to ‘the ontological argument’; and the ontological argument is supposed to demonstrate the existence of a God. Consequently Moore by pointing out a peculiarity in the use of the word ‘exist’ helps to protect us from a serious fallacy; so that his procedure, though different from that which Russell follows in his theory of descriptions, tends to achieve the same philosophical end. (1946, 31-3) { §6.7 }

By the word paraphrasis may be designated that sort of exposition which may be afforded by transmuting into a proposition, having for its subject some real entity, a proposition which has not for its subject any other than a fictitious entity. ( EL , 246) { §5.6 }

By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyse, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, a development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number of its points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representation, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it may perfect the always imperfect translation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. But intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act. (1903, 6-7) { §5.1 }

[Analysis] operates always on the immobile, whilst intuition places itself in mobility, or, what comes to the same thing, in duration. There lies the very distinct line of demarcation between intuition and analysis. The real, the experienced and the concrete are recognised by the fact that they are variability itself, the element by the fact that it is invariable. And the element is invariable by definition, being a diagram, a simplified reconstruction, often a mere symbol, in any case a motionless view of the moving reality. (1903, 40-1) { §5.1 }

Modern science is neither one nor simple. It rests, I freely admit, on ideas which in the end we find clear; but these ideas have gradually become clear through the use made of them; they owe most of their clearness to the light which the facts, and the applications to which they led, have by reflection shed on them - the clearness of a concept being scarcely anything more at bottom than the certainty, at last obtained, of manipulating the concept profitably. At its origin, more than one of these concepts must have appeared obscure, not easily reconcilable with the concepts already admitted into science, and indeed very near the borderline of absurdity. This means that science does not proceed by an orderly dovetailing together of concepts predestined to fit each other exactly. True and fruitful ideas are so many close contacts with currents of reality, which do not necessarily converge on the same point. However the concepts in which they lodge themselves manage somehow, by rubbing off each other's corners, to settle down well enough together. (1903, 74) { §5.1 }

It may help to be reminded that many philosophers who might allow themselves to be described as “analysts” have been strongly influenced by the work of Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. For while all three have been engaged in “clarification of meaning” they have done so in different and distinctive ways; and the resulting divergences in conceptions of philosophical method have not yet been reconciled. This makes it hard to give any simple account of what is meant today by “philosophical analysis”. (1950a, 2) { §6.1 }

A man who had to describe “philosophical analysis” might resort to talking about a climate of opinion. The weather, he might say, is congenial to empiricists, naturalists, agnostics; the well acclimatized have admired the two Principia’s and the Tractatus and have read a hundred pages of Hume for one of Kant. Here rhetoric is viewed with suspicion and enthusiasm barely tolerated; this is a land of “prose writers, hoping to be understood” [J.M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability , 1921, preface].

... If a formula or a slogan is wanted, it is easy enough to say that these writers (like Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein before them) are engaged in clarification of meaning . ... And if those who are best at the work of clarification might feel embarrassed to provide a satisfactory analysis of “analysis”, that is perhaps no cause for apology or alarm. For it is a mark of life to resist arbitrary confinement, and “philosohical analysis” is still much alive. (1950a, 12-13) { §6.1 }

Analysis comprises mathematical methods for finding the solutions (in geometry: the constructions) of problems or the proofs of theorems, doing so by introducing unknowns. (2001, 129) { §4.2 }

It is a very common and most ruinous superstition to suppose that analysis is no alteration, and that, whenever we distinguish, we have at once to do with divisible existence. It is an immense assumption to conclude, when a fact comes to us as a whole, that some parts of it may exist without any sort of regard for the rest. Such naive assurance of the outward reality of all mental distinctions, such touching confidence in the crudest identity of thought and existence, is worthy of the school which so loudly appeals to the name of Experience. ... If it is true in any sense (and I will not deny it) that thought in the end is the measure of things, yet at least this is false, that the divisions we make within a whole all answer to elements whose existence does not depend on the rest. It is wholly unjustifiable to take up a complex, to do any work we please upon it by analysis, and then simply predicate as an adjective of the given these results of our abstraction. These products were never there as such, and in saying, as we do, that as such they are there, we falsify the fact. You can not always apply in actual experience that coarse notion of the whole as the sum of its parts into which the school of ‘experience’ so delights to torture phenomena. If it is wrong in physiology to predicate the results, that are reached by dissection, simply and as such of the living body, it is here infinitely more wrong. The whole that is given to us is a continuous mass of perception and feeling; and to say of this whole, that any one element would be what it is there, when apart from the rest, is a very grave assertion. We might have supposed it not quite self-evident, and that it was possible to deny it without open absurdity. ( PL , §64/ WLM , 77-8) { §5.6 }

judgement is the differentiation of a complex whole, and hence always is analysis and synthesis in one. ( AR , 149/ WLM , 158) { §5.6 }

At any moment my actual experience, however relational its contents, is in the end non-relational. No analysis into relations and terms can ever exhaust its nature or fail in the end to belie its essence. What analysis leaves for ever outstanding is no mere residue, but is a vital condition of the analysis itself. Everything which is got out into the form of an object implies still the felt background against which the object comes, and, further, the whole experience of both feeling and object is a non-relational immediate felt unity. The entire relational consciousness, in short, is experienced as falling within a direct awareness. This direct awareness is itself non-relational. It escapes from all attempts to exhibit it by analysis as one or more elements in a relational scheme, or as that scheme itself, or as a relation or relations, or as the sum or collection of any of these abstractions. And immediate experience not only escapes, but it serves as the basis on which the analysis is made. Itself is the vital element within which every analysis still moves, while, and so far as, and however much, that analysis transcends immediacy. ( ETR , 176/ WLM , 280-1) { §5.6 }

I would rather now lay more stress on the logical vice of all Analysis and Abstraction – so far as that means taking any feature in the Whole of Things as ultimately real except in its union with the Whole. ( Collected Works of F.H. Bradley: Selected Correspondence 1905-1924 , Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1999, 275)

Analysis and synthesis I take in the end to be two aspects of one principle … Every analysis proceeds from and on the basis of a unity ... The point before us is the question as to how, without separation in its existence, we can discriminate ideally in analysis. ( ETR , 300)

Socratic method is a way of bringing our practices under rational control by expressing them explicitly in a form in which they can be confronted with objections and alternatives, a form in which they can be exhibited as the conclusions of inferences seeking to justify them on the basis of premises advanced as reasons, and as premises in further inferences exploring the consequences of accepting them. (2000, 56) { §6.9 }

I think of analytic philosophy as having at its center a concern with semantic relations between what I will call ‘vocabularies’. … Its characteristic form of question is whether and in what way one can make sense of the meanings expressed by one kind of locution interms of the meanings expressed by another kind of locution. So, for instance, two early paradigmatic projects were to show that everything expressible in the vocabulary of number-theory, and again, everything expressible using definite descriptions, is expressible already in the vocabulary of first-order quantificational logic with identity.

The nature of the key kind of semantic relation between vocabularies has been variously characterized during the history of analytic philosophy: as analysis, definition, paraphrase, translation, reduction of different sorts, truth-making, and various kinds of supervenience—to name just a few contenders. In each case, however, it is characteristic of classical analytic philosophy that logical vocabulary is accorded a privileged role in specifying these semantic relations. It has always been taken at least to be licit to appeal to logical vocabulary in elaborating the relation between analysandum and analysans —target vocabulary and base vocabulary—and, according to stronger versions of this thesis, that may be the only vocabulary it is licit to employ in that capacity. I will refer to this aspect of the analytic project as its commitment to ‘ semantic logicism ’. (2006, Lecture One, §1) { §6.9 }

What I want to call the “classical project of analysis”, then, aims to exhibit the meanings expressed by various target vocabularies as intelligible by means of the logical elaboration of the meanings expressed by base vocabularies thought to be privileged in some important respects—epistemological, ontological, or semantic—relative to those others. This enterprise is visible in its purest form in what I have called the “core programs” of empiricism and naturalism, in their various forms. In my view the most significant conceptual development in this tradition—the biggest thing that ever happened to it—is the pragmatist challenge to it that was mounted during the middle years of the twentieth century. Generically, this movement of thought amounts to a displacement from the center of philosophical attention of the notion of meaning in favor of that of use : in suitably broad senses of those terms, replacing concern with semantics by concern with pragmatics . ( Ibid ., Lecture One, §2) { §6.9 }

the analysis or, more precisely, quasi-analysis of an entity that is essentially an indivisible unit into several quasi-constituents means placing the entity in several kinship contexts on the basis of a kinship relation, where the unit remains undivided. (1928a, §71; English tr. by Rolf A. George slightly altered) { §6.7 }

The logical analysis of a particular expression consists in the setting-up of a linguistic system and the placing of that expression in this system. (1936, 143) { §6.7 }

That part of the work of philosophers which may be held to be scientific in its nature—excluding the empirical questions which can be referred to empirical science—consists of logical analysis. The aim of logical syntax is to provide a system of concepts, a language, by the help of which the results of logical analysis will be exactly formulable. Philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science —that is to say, by the logical analysis of the concepts and sentences of the sciences, for the logic of science is nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of science . (1937, xiii) { §6.7 }

The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept, belongs among the most important tasks of logical analysis and logical construction. We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an explication for, the earlier concept … (1947, 8-9) { §6.7 }

By the procedure of explication we mean the transformation of an inexact, prescientific concept, the explicandum , into a new exact concept, the explicatum . Although the explicandum cannot be given in exact terms, it should be made as clear as possible by informal explanations and examples. ...

The term ‘explicatum’ has been suggested by the following two usages. Kant calls a judgement explicative if the predicate is obtained by analysis of the subject. Husserl, in speaking about the synthesis of identification between a confused, nonarticulated sense and a subsequently intended distinct, articulated sense, calls the latter the ‘Explikat’ of the former. (For both uses see Dictionary of philosophy [1942], ed. D. Runes, p. 105). What I mean by ‘explicandum’ and ‘explicatum’ is to some extent similar to what C.H. Langford calls ‘analysandum’ and ‘analysans’: “the analysis then states an appropriate relation of equivalence between the analysandum and the analysans” [Langford 1942, 323 { §6.4 }]; he says that the motive of an analysis “is usually that of supplanting a relatively vague idea by a more precise one” ( ibid ., p. 329).

(Perhaps the form ‘explicans’ might be considered instead of ‘explicatum’; however, I think that the analogy with the terms ‘definiendum’ and ‘definiens’ would not be useful because, if the explication consists in giving an explicit definition, then both the definiens and the definiendum in this definition express the explicatum, while the explicandum does not occur.) The procedure of explication is here understood in a wider sense than the procedures of analysis and clarification which Kant, Husserl, and Langford have in mind. The explicatum (in my sense) is in many cases the result of analysis of the explicandum (and this has motivated my choice of the terms); in other cases, however, it deviates deliberately from the explicandum but still takes its place in some way; this will become clear by the subsequent examples. (1950, 3) { §6.7 }

[T]he sense of all objective judgments reduces to a final original relation, which can be expressed in different formulations as the relation of “form” to “content”, as the relation of “universal” to “particular”, as the relation of “validity [ Geltung ]” to “being [ Sein ]”. Whatever designation one may finally choose here, what is alone decisive is that the basic relation itself is to be retained as a strictly unitary relation, which can only be designated through the two opposed moments that enter into it – but never constructed out of them, as if they were independent constituents present in themselves. The original relation is not to be defined in such a way that the “universal” somehow “subsists” next to or above the “particular” – the form somehow separate from the content – so that the two are then melded with one another by means of some or another fundamental synthesis of knowledge. Rather, the unity of mutual determination constitutes the absolutely first datum, behind which one can go back no further, and which can only be analyzed via the duality of two “viewpoints” in an artificially isolating process of abstraction. It is the basic flaw of all metaphysical epistemologies that they always attempt to reinterpret this duality of “moments” as a duality of “elements”. (1913, 13-14; cited and tr. by Friedman 2000, 34) { §5.4 }

conceptual analysis typically relates one kind of reason for using a certain word to another. (1986, 51) { §6.9 }

When philosophical analysis proceeds from intuitively sanctioned premisses to a reasoned conclusion, it may be described as moving from analysandum to analysans. It seeks to ensure that any muddles or inconsistencies in our unreasoned inclinations and passive prejudices are replaced by an explicitly formulated, consciously co-ordinated, adequately reasoned, and freely adopted system of acceptable principles. (1986, 96) { §6.9 }

Socrates was essentially the inventor of a method. ... His revolt against the study of nature was essentially a revolt against observation in favour of thought; and whereas mathematical method, as an example of thought, had already been discovered by his predecessors, his own discovery was that a similar method, for which he invented an appropriate technique, could be applied to ethical questions. This technique, as he himself recognized, depended on a principle which is of great importance to any theory of philosophical method: the principle that in a philosophical inquiry what we are trying to do is not to discover something of which until now we have been ignorant, but to know better something which in some sense we knew already; not to know it better in the sense of coming to know more about it, but to know it better in the sense of coming to know it in a different and better way—actually instead of potentially, or explicitly instead of implicitly, or in whatever terms the theory of knowledge chooses to express the difference: the difference itself has been a familiar fact ever since Socrates pointed it out. (1933, 10-11) { §5.6 }

[The] work of disentangling and arranging questions, which ... I [call] analysis, may be alternatively described as the work of detecting presuppositions. ... The analysis which detects absolute presuppositions I call metaphysical analysis; but as regards procedure and the qualifications necessary to carry it out there is no difference whatever between metaphysical analysis and analysis pure and simple ... (1940, 39-40) { §5.6 }

It is only by analysis that any one can ever come to know either that he is making any absolute presuppositions at all or what absolute presuppositions he is making.

Such analysis may in certain cases proceed in the following manner. If the inquirer can find a person to experiment upon who is well trained in a certain type of scientific work, intelligent and earnest in his devotion to it, and unaccustomed to metaphysics, let him probe into various presuppositions that his ‘subject’ has been taught to make in the course of his scientific education, and invite him to justify each or alternatively to abandon it. If the ‘inquirer’ is skilful and the ‘subject’ the right kind of man, these invitations will be contemplated with equanimity, and even with interest, so long as relative presuppositions are concerned. But when an absolute presupposition is touched, the invitation wil be rejected, even with a certain degree of violence.

The rejection is a symptom that the ‘subject’, co-operating with the work of analysis, has come to see that the presupposition he is being asked to justify or abandon is an absolute presupposition; and the violence with which it is expressed is a symptom that he feels the importance of this absolute presupposition for the kind of work to which he is devoted. This is what ... I called being ‘ticklish in one’s absolute presuppositions’; and the reader will see that this ticklishness is a sign of intellectual health combined with a low degree of analytical skill. A man who is ticklish in that way is a man who knows, ‘instinctively’ as they say, that absolute presuppositions do not need justification. ( Ibid. , 43-4) { §5.6 }

metaphysical analysis, the discovery that certain presuppositions actually made are absolute presuppositions, is an integral part or an indispensable condition, you can put it whichever way you like, of all scientific work.( Ibid. , 84) { §5.6 }

In philosophy we are used to definitions, analyses, reductions. Typically these are intended to carry us from concepts better understood, or clear, or more basic epistemologically or ontologically, to others we want to understand. The method I have suggested fits none of these categories. I have proposed a looser relation between concepts to be illuminated and the relatively more basic. (‘Radical Interpretation’, 1972, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 137)

Unlike the primitives who gave a face to every moving thing, or the early Greeks who defined all the aspects and forces of nature, modern man is obsessed by the need to depersonalise (or impersonalise) all that he most admires. There are two reasons for this tendency. The first is analysis , that marvellous instrument of scientific research to which we owe all our advances but which, breaking down synthesis after synthesis, allows one soul after another to escape, leaving us confronted with a pile of dismantled machinery, and evanescent particles. The second reason lies in the discovery of the sidereal world, so vast that it seems to do away with all proportion between our own being and the dimensions of the cosmos around us. ( The Phenomenon of Man , 1955, 282; tr. Bernard Wall, Fontana, 1965; tr. first publ. 1959)

Up until now the idea of philosophy remained defined in a formal way as an idea of an infinite task theoria . Could a history of this infinite theoretical life, which merges itself in its efforts and failures with a simple realization of the self , take on the value of a genetic description? Will the history of the “transcendental motive” through all the stages of European philosophy, enlighten us at last on the genesis of transcendental subjectivity? But such a history presupposes the possibility of such a going backward, the possibility of finding again the originary sense of the former presents as such. It implies the possibility of a transcendental “regression” ( Ruckfrage ) through a history that is intelligible and transparent to consciousness, a history whose sedimentations can be unmade and remade without alteration. ( The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy , The University of Chicago Press, 2003, 161; tr. Marian Hobson)

[discussing his ‘Rule Four’: “ We need a method if we are to investigate the truth of things ”] … the human mind has within it a sort of spark of the divine, in which the first seeds of useful ways of thinking are sown, seeds which, however neglected and stifled by studies which impede them, often bear fruit of their own accord. This is our experience in the simplest of sciences, arithmetic and geometry: we are well aware that the geometers of antiquity employed a sort of analysis which they went on to apply to the solution of every problem, though they begrudged revealing it to posterity. At the present time a sort of arithmetic called ‘algebra’ is flourishing, and this is achieving for numbers what the ancients did for figures. ( Rules for the Direction of the Mind , in PW , I, 16-17) { §4.2 }

As for the method of demonstration, this divides into two varieties: the first proceeds by analysis and the second by synthesis.

Analysis shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered methodically and as it were a priori , so that if the reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points, he will make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered it for himself. But this method contains nothing to compel belief in an argumentative or inattentive reader; for if he fails to attend even to the smallest point, he will not see the necessity of the conclusion. Moreover there are many truths which - although it is vital to be aware of them - this method often scarcely mentions, since they are transparently clear to anyone who gives them his attention.

Synthesis, by contrast, employs a directly opposite method where the search is, as it were, a posteriori (though the proof itself is often more a priori than it is in the analytic method). It demonstrates the conclusion clearly and employs a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems and problems, so that if anyone denies one of the conclusions it can be shown at once that it is contained in what has gone before, and hence the reader, however argumentative or stubborn he may be, is compelled to give his assent. However, this method is not as satisfying as the method of analysis, nor does it engage the minds of those who are eager to learn, since it does not show how the thing in question was discovered.

It was synthesis alone that the ancient geometers usually employed in their writings. But in my view this was not because they were utterly ignorant of analysis, but because they had such a high regard for it that they kept it to themselves like a sacred mystery.

Now it is analysis which is the best and truest method of instruction, and it was this method alone which I employed in my Meditations . As for synthesis, which is undoubtedly what you are asking me to use here, it is a method which it may be very suitable to deploy in geometry as a follow-up to analysis, but it cannot so conveniently be applied to these metaphysical subjects.

The difference is that the primary notions which are presupposed for the demonstration of geometrical truths are readily accepted by anyone, since they accord with the use of our senses. Hence there is no difficulty there, except in the proper deduction of the consequences, which can be done even by the less attentive, provided they remember what has gone before. Moreover, the breaking down of propositions to their smallest elements is specifically designed to enable them to be recited with ease so that the student recalls them whether he wants to or not.

In metaphysics by contrast there is nothing which causes so much effort as making our perception of the primary notions clear and distinct. Admittedly, they are by their nature as evident as, or even more evident than, the primary notions which the geometers study; but they conflict with many preconceived opinions derived from the senses which we have got into the habit of holding from our earliest years, and so only those who really concentrate and meditate and withdraw their minds from corporeal things, so far as is possible, will achieve perfect knowledge of them. Indeed, if they were put forward in isolation, they could easily be denied by those who like to contradict just for the sake of it. (‘Second Set of Replies’, in PW , II, 110-11) { §4.2 }

[interpolated into the text of the Elements ] What is analysis and what is synthesis. Analysis is the assumption of that which is sought as if it were admitted [and the arrival] by means of its consequences at something admitted to be true. Synthesis is an assumption of that which is admitted [and the arrival] by means of its consequences at something admitted to be true. ( E , Book XIII, Prop. 1; Vol. III, 442, where Heath comments on the interpolation) { §2.2 }

[In replying to the objections that Husserl had raised in his Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891) to Frege’s Grundlagen definitions] If words and combinations of words refer to [ bedeuten ] ideas, then for any two of them there are only two possibilities: either they designate the same idea or they designate different ideas. In the former case it is pointless to equate them by means of a definition: this is ‘an obvious circle’; in the latter case it is wrong. These are also the objections the author raises, one of them regularly. A definition is also incapable of analysing the sense, for the analysed sense just is not the original one. In using the word to be explained, I either think clearly everything I think when I use the defining expression: we then have the ‘obvious circle’; or the defining expression has a more richly articulated sense, in which case I do not think the same thing in using it as I do in using the word to be explained: the definition is then wrong. One would think that a definition was unobjectionable in the case where the word to be explained had as yet no sense at all, or where we were asked explicitly to regard its sense as non-existent so that it was first given a sense by the definition. But in the last case too, the author refutes the definition by reminding us of the difference between the ideas (p. 107). To evade all objections, one would accordingly have to create a new verbal root and form a word out of it. This reveals a split between psychological logicians and mathematicians. What matters to the former is the sense of the words, as well as the ideas which they fail to distinguish from the sense; whereas what matters to the latter is the thing itself: the Bedeutung of the words. The reproach that what is defined is not the concept but its extension actually affects all mathematical definitions. For the mathematician, it is no more right and no more wrong to define a conic as the line of intersection of a plane with the surface of a circular cone than to define it as a plane curve with an equation of the second degree in parallel coordinates. His choice of one or the other of these expressions or of some other one is guided solely by reasons of convenience and is made irrespective of the fact that the expressions have neither the same sense nor evoke the same ideas. I do not intend by this that a concept and its extension are one and the same, but that coincidence in extension is a necessary and sufficient criterion for the occurrence between concepts of the relation that corresponds to identity [ Gleichheit ] between objects. ( RH , 319-20/ FR , 225-6) { §6.2 }

We come to definitions . Definitions proper must be distinguished from elucidations [ Erläuterungen ]. In the first stages of any discipline we cannot avoid the use of ordinary words. But these words are, for the most part, not really appropriate for scientific purposes, because they are not precise enough and fluctuate in their use. Science needs technical terms that have precise and fixed Bedeutungen , and in order to come to an understanding about these Bedeutungen and exclude possible misunderstandings, we provide elucidations. Of course in so doing we have again to use ordinary words, and these may display defects similar to those which the elucidations are intended to remove. So it seems that we shall then have to provide further elucidations. Theoretically one will never really achieve one’s goal in this way. In practice, however, we do manage to come to an understanding about the Bedeutungen of words. Of course we have to be able to count on a meeting of minds, on others’ guessing what we have in mind. But all this precedes the construction of a system and does not belong within a system. In constructing a system it must be assumed that the words have precise Bedeutungen and that we know what they are. ( LM , 224/ FR , 313) { §6.2 }

We have ... to distinguish two quite different cases :

1. We construct a sense out of its constituents and introduce an entirely new sign to express this sense. This may be called a ‘constructive definition’ [‘ aufbauende Definition ’], but we prefer to call it a ‘definition’ tout court .

2. We have a simple sign with a long-established use. We believe that we can give a logical analysis [ Zerlegung ] of its sense, obtaining a complex expression which in our opinion has the same sense. We can only allow something as a constituent of a complex expression if it has a sense we recognize. The sense of the complex expression must be yielded by the way in which it is put together. That it agrees with the sense of the long established simple sign is not a matter for arbitrary stipluation, but can only be recognized by an immediate insight. No doubt we speak of a definition in this case too. It might be called an ‘analytic definition’ [‘ zerlegende Definition ’] to distinguish it from the first case. But it is better to eschew the word ‘definition’ altogether in this case, because what we should here like to call a definition is really to be regarded as an axiom. In this second case there remains no room for an arbitrary stipulation, because the simple sign already has a sense. Only a sign which as yet has no sense can have a sense arbitrarily assigned to it. So we shall stick to our original way of speaking and call only a constructive definition a definition. According to that a definition is an arbitrary stipulation which confers a sense on a simple sign which previously had none. This sense has, of course, to be expressed by a complex sign whose sense results from the way it is put together.

Now we still have to consider the difficulty we come up against in giving a logical analysis when it is problematic whether this analysis is correct.

Let us assume that A is the long-established sign (expression) whose sense we have attempted to analyse logically by constructing a complex expression that gives the analysis. Since we are not certain whether the analysis is successful, we are not prepared to present the complex expression as one which can be replaced by the simple sign A . If it is our intention to put forward a definition proper, we are not entitled to choose the sign A , which already has a sense, but we must choose a fresh sign B , say, which has the sense of the complex expression only in virtue of the definition. The question now is whether A and B have the same sense. But we can bypass this question altogether if we are constructing a new system from the bottom up; in that case we shall make no further use of the sign A – we shall only use B . We have introduced the sign B to take the place of the complex expression in question by arbitrary fiat and in this way we have conferred a sense on it. This is a definition in the proper sense, namely a constructive definition.

If we have managed in this way to construct a system for mathematics without any need for the sign A , we can leave the matter there; there is no need at all to answer the question concerning the sense in which – whatever it may be – this sign had been used earlier. In this way we court no objections. However, it may be felt expedient to use sign A instead of sign B . But if we do this, we must treat it as an entirely new sign which had no sense prior to the definition. We must therefore explain that the sense in which this sign was used before the new system was constructed is no longer of any concern to us, that its sense is to be understood purely from the constructive definition that we have given. In constructing the new system we can take no account, logically speaking, of anything in mathematics that existed prior to the new system. Everything has to be made anew from the ground up. Even anything that we may have accomplished by our analytical activities is to be regarded only as preparatory work which does not itself make any appearance in the new system itself.

Perhaps there still remains a certain unclarity. How is it possible, one may ask, that it should be doubtful whether a simple sign has the same sense as a complex expression if we know not only the sense of the simple sign, but can recognize the sense of the complex one from the way it is put together? The fact is that if we really do have a clear grasp of the sense of the simple sign, then it cannot be doubtful whether it agrees with the sense of the complex expression. If this is open to question although we can clearly recognize the sense of the complex expression from the way it is put together, then the reason must lie in the fact that we do not have a clear grasp of the sense of the simple sign, but that its outlines are confused as if we saw it through a mist. The effect of the logical analysis of which we spoke will then be precisely this – to articulate the sense clearly. Work of this kind is very useful; it does not, however, form part of the construction of the system, but must take place beforehand. Before the work of construction is begun, the building stones have to be carefully prepared so as to be usable; i.e. the words, signs, expressions, which are to be used, must have a clear sense, so far as a sense is not to be conferred on them in the system itself by means of a constructive definition.

We stick then to our original conception: a definition is an arbitrary stipulation by which a new sign is introduced to take the place of a complex expression whose sense we know from the way it is put together. A sign which hitherto had no sense acquires the sense of a complex expression by definition. ( LM , 227-9/ FR , 317-8) { §6.2 }

Analysis … is sorting out the structures of signification … and determining their social ground and import. ( The Interpretation of Cultures , New York: Basic Books, 1973, 9)

Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, not discovering the Continent of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape. ( Ibid ., 20)

The analysis of an idea, as it used to be carried out, was, in fact, nothing else than ridding it of the form in which it had become familiar. To break an idea up into its original elements is to return to its moments, which at least do not have the form of the given idea, but rather constitute the immediate property of the self. This analysis, to be sure, only arrives at thoughts which are themselves familiar, fixed, and inert determinations. But what is thus separated and non-actual is an essential moment; for it is only because the concrete does divide itself, and make itself into something non-actual, that it is self-moving. The activity of dissolution is the power and work of the Understanding , the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power. The circle that remains self-enclosed and, like substance, holds its moments together, is an immediate relationship, one therefore which has nothing astonishing about it. But that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is actual only in its context with others, should attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom—this is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure ‘I’. Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking strength, Beauty hates the Understanding for asking of her what it cannot do. But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this power, not as something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative, as when we say of something that it is nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, turn away and pass on to something else; on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being. This power is identical with what we earlier called the Subject, which by giving determinateness an existence in its own element supersedes abstract immediacy, i.e. the immediacy which barely is, and thus is authentic substance: that being or immediacy whose mediation is not outside of it but which is this mediation itself. ( PS , ‘Preface’, §32, 18-19)

[Summary of above passage offered by J.N. Findlay] The analysis of an idea is the removal of its familiarity, its reduction to elements that are the true possessions of the thinking self. In such reduction the idea itself changes and renders itself unreal. The force which effects analysis is that of the Understanding, the most remarkable and absolute of powers, the power of the thinking self and also of death. It is above all marvellous that this thinking self should be able to isolate, and to look at apart, what can only exist as an aspect or ‘moment’ in a living whole. Thinking Spirit can, however, only grasp such a whole by first tearing it into parts, each of which it must look at separately for a while, before putting them back in the whole. The thinking self must destroy an immediate, existent unity in order to arrive at a unity which includes mediation, and is in fact mediation itself. (‘Analysis of the Text’, §32, in PS , 499) { §5.2 }

What we are trying to bring to light here by means of phenomenological analysis in regard to the intentional structure of production is not contrived and fabricated but already present in the everyday, pre-philosophical productive behaviour of the Dasein. In producing, the Dasein lives in such an understanding of being without conceiving it or grasping it as such. (1927, §12, 114-15) { §5.8 }

every method by which we investigate the causes of things is either compositive, or resolutive, or partly compositive, partly resolutive. And the resolutive is usually called analytic, while the compositive is usually called synthetic. ( Logica , ‘On Method’, §1, 289) { §4.1 }

What philosophers seek to know. Philosophers seek scientific knowledge either simply or indefinitely, that is, they seek to knkow as much as they can when no definite question is proposed or the cause of some definite phenomenon or at least to discover something definite, such as what the cause of light is, or of heat, or gravity, of a figure which has been proposed, and similar things; or in what subject some proposed accident inheres; or which of many accidents is above all conducive to the production of some proposed effect; or in what way particular proposed causes ought to be conjoined in order to produce a definite effect. Because of the variety of the things sought for, sometimes the analytic method, sometimes the synthetic method, and sometimes both ought to be applied.

The first part, by which principles are found, is purely analytic. Seeing that the causes of all singulars are composed from the causes of universals or simples, it is necessary for those who are looking simply for scientific knowledge, which consists of the knowledge of the causes of all things insofar as this can be achieved, to know the causes of universals or those accidents which are common to all bodies, that is, to every material thing, before they know the causes of singular things, that is, of the accidents by which one thing is distinguished from another. Again, before the causes of those things can be known, it is necessary to know which things are universals. But since universals are contained in the nature of singular things, they must be unearthed by reason, that is, by resolution. For example, let any conception or idea of a singular thing be proposed, say a square. The square is resolved into: plane, bounded by a certain number of lines equal to one another, and right angles . Therefore we have these universals or components of every material thing: line, plane (in which a surface is contained), being bounded, angle, rectitude , and equality . If anyone finds the causes or origin of these, he will put them together as the cause of the square. Again, if he proposes to himself the conception of gold, the ideas of being solid, visible, and heavy (that is, of tending to the center of the earth or of motion downwards) and many others more universal than gold itself, which can be resolved further until one arrives at the most universal, will come from this by resolution. And by this same method of resolving things into other things one will know what those things are, of which, when their causes are known what those things are, of which, when their causes are known and composed one by one, the causes of all singular things are known. We thus conclude that the method of investigating the universal notions of things is purely analytic. ( Ibid ., §§ 3-4, 291-5) { §4.1 }

The method of scientific knowledge, civil as well as natural, [starting] from sense-experience and [going] to principles is analytic; while [starting] from principles is synthetic. ( Ibid ., §7, 301) { §4.1 }

it is obvious that in the investigation of causes there is a need partly for the analytic method, partly for the synthetic method. The analytic method is needed for understanding the circumstances of the effect one by one; the synthetic method for putting together those things which, single in themselves, act as one. ( Ibid ., §10, 311) { §4.1 }

that art of geometers which they call logistic is ... the method according to which by supposing that the thing asked about is true they come upon in reasoning either things known [to be true], from which they can prove the truth of the thing sought, or [they come upon] impossibilities, from which it can be understood that what was supposed [to be true] was false. ( Ibid ., §19, 329) { §4.1 }

[Logical analysis] stands somewhere between translating and paraphrasing. ( Logic , Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, 86)

The terms “analysis” and “synthesis” bring to mind, on the one hand, certain methodological practices in the works of Plato, Descartes, Newton, Kant, Hegel, and others and, on the other hand, techniques in fields as disparate as chemistry and logic, mathematics and psychology. The width of this spectrum of associations alerts us to the realization that at the base of these two related terms there lies a specific methodological thema-antithema ... pair. Indeed, it is one of the most pervasive and fundamental ones, in science and outside. This chapter attempts to uncover and identify this thematic content, to clarify the meanings and uses of the terms “analysis” and “synthesis”, and especially to distinguish among four general meanings: (1) Analysis and Synthesis, and particularly synthesis, used in the grand, cultural sense, (2) Analysis and Synthesis used in the reconstitutional sense (e.g., where an analysis, followed by a synthesis, re-establishes the original condition), (3) Analysis and Synthesis used in the transformational sense (e.g., where the application of Analysis and Synthesis advances one to a qualitatively new level), and (4) Analysis and Synthesis used in the judgmental sense (as in the Kantian categories and their modern critiques). (1998, 111) { §5.5 }

The point of view of function is the central one for phenomenology; the investigations radiating from it comprise almost the whole phenomenological sphere, and in the end all phenomenological analyses somehow enter into its service as component parts or preliminary stages. In place of analysis and comparison, description and classification restricted to particular experiences [ Erlebnisse ], the particulars are considered from the “teleological” point of view of their function, to make possible “synthetic unity”. ( IPP , I, §86; Kersten’s tr. modified) { §5.8 }

Explication is penetration of the internal horizon of the object by the direction of perceptual interest. In the case of the unobstructed realization of this interest, the protentional expectations fulfill themselves in the same way; the object reveals itself in its properties as that which it was anticipated to be, except that what was anticipated now attains original givenness. A more precise determination results, eventually perhaps partial corrections, or—in the case of obstruction—disappointment of the expectations, and partial modalization. ( EJ , §22, 105) { §5.8 }

The process of explication in its originality is that in which an object given at first hand is brought to explicit intuition. The analysis of its structure must bring to light how a twofold constitution of sense [ Sinngebung ] is realized in it: “object as substrate” and “determination α ...”; it must show how this constitution of sense is realized in the form of a process which goes forward in separate steps, through which, however, extends continuously a unity of coincidence —a unity of coincidence of a special kind, belonging exclusively to these sense-forms. ( EJ , §24a, 114) { §5.8 }

§1. MATHEMATICS ARRIVES AT ALL ITS DEFINITIONS SYNTHETICALLY, WHEREAS PHILOSOPHY ARRIVES AT ITS DEFINITIONS ANALYTICALLY

There are two ways in which one can arrive at a general concept: either by the arbitrary combination of concepts, or by separating out that cognition which has been rendered distinct by means of analysis. Mathematics only ever draws up its definitions in the first way. For example, think arbitrarily of four straight lines bounding a plane surface so that the opposite sides are not parallel to each other. Let this figure be called a trapezium . The concept which I am defining is not given prior to the definition itself; on the contrary, it only comes into existence as a result of that definition. Whatever the concept of a cone may ordinarily signify, in mathematics, the concept is the product of the arbitrary representation of a right-angled triangle which is rotated on one of its sides. In this and in all other cases the definition obviously comes into being as a result of synthesis .

The situation is entirely different in the case of philosophical definitions. In philosophy, the concept of a thing is always given, albeit confusedly or in an insufficiently determinate fashion. The concept has to be analysed; the characteristic marks which have been separated out and the concept which has been given have to be compared with each other in all kinds of contexts; and this abstract thought must be rendered complete and determinate. For example, everyone has a concept of time. But suppose that that concept has to be defined. The idea of time has to be examined in all kinds of relation if its characteristic marks which have been abstracted have to be combined together to see whether they yield an adequate concept; they have to be collated with each other to see whether one characteristic mark does not partly include another within itself. If, in this case, I had tried to arrive at a definition of time synthetically, it would have had to have been a happy coincidence indeed if the concept, thus reached synthetically, had been exactly the same as that which completely expresses the idea of time which is given to us. ( IDP , 2:276-7/ TP , 248-9) { §4.5 }

The true method of metaphysics is basically the same as that introduced by Newton into natural science and which has been of such benefit to it. Newton’s method maintains that one ought, on the basis of certain experience and, if need be, with the help of geometry, to seek out the rules in accordance with which certain phenomena of nature occur. ( IDP , 2:286/ TP , 259) { §4.5 }

What I am chiefly concerned to establish is this: in metaphysics one must proceed analytically throughout, for the business of metaphysics is actually the analysis of confused cognitions. If this procedure is compared with the procedure which is adopted by philosophers and which is currently in vogue in all schools of philosophy, one will be struck by how mistaken the practice of philosophers is. With them, the most abstracted concepts, at which the understanding naturally arrives last of all, constitute their starting point, and the reason is that the method of the mathematicians, which they wish to imitate throughout, is firmly fixed in their minds. This is why there is a strange difference to be found between metaphysics and all other sciences. In geometry and in the other branches of mathematics, one starts with what is easier and then one slowly advances to the more difficult operations. In metaphysics, one starts with what is the most difficult: one starts with possibility, with existence in general, with necessity and contingency, and so on – all of them concepts which demand great abstraction and close attention. And the reason for this is to be sought chiefly in the fact that the signs for these concepts undergo numerous and imperceptible modifications in use; and the differences between them must not be overlooked. One is told that one ought to proceed synthetically throughout. Definitions are thus set up right at the beginning, and conclusions are confidently drawn from them. Those who practise philosophy in this vein congratulate each other for having learnt the secret of thorough thought from the geometers. What they do not notice at all is the fact that geometers acquire their concepts by means of synthesis , whereas philosophers can only acquire their concepts by means of analysis – and that completely changes the method of thought. ...

Metaphysics has a long way to go yet before it can proceed synthetically. It will only be when analysis has helped us towards concepts which are understood distinctly and in detail that it will be possible for synthesis to subsume compound cognitions under the simplest cognition, as happens in mathematics. ( IDP , 2:289-90/ TP , 262-3) { §4.5 }

Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I hope myself to deliver under the title Metaphysics of Nature , which will be not half so extensive but will be incomparably richer in content than this critique, which had first to display the sources and conditions of its possibility, and needed to clear and level a ground that was completely overgrown. Here I expect from my reader the patience and impartiality of a judge , but there I will expect the cooperative spirit and assistance of a fellow worker ; for however completely the principles of the system may be expounded in the critique, the comprehensiveness of the system itself requires also that no derivative concepts should be lacking, which, however, cannot be estimated a priori in one leap, but must be gradually sought out; likewise, just as in the former the whole synthesis of concepts has been exhausted, so in the latter it would be additionally demanded that the same thing should take place in respect of their analysis , which would be easy and more entertainment than labor. ( CPR , Axxi) { §4.5 }

I understand by an analytic of concepts not their analysis, or the usual procedure of philosophical investigations, that of analyzing [ zergliedern ] the content of concepts that present themselves and bringing them to distinctness, but rather the much less frequently attempted analysis [ Zergliederung ] of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to research the possibility of a priori concepts by seeking them only in the understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in general; for this is the proper business of a transcendental philosophy; the rest is the logical treatment of concepts in philosophy in general. We will therefore pursue the pure concepts into their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding, where they lie ready, until with the opportunity of experience they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the very same understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them. ( CPR , A65-6/B90-1) { §4.5 }

[in offering a refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof of the persistence of the soul] If we take the above propositions in a synthetic connection, as valid for all thinking beings, as they must be taken in rational psychology as a system, and if from the category of relation, starting with the proposition “All thinking beings are, as such, substances” we go backward through the series of propositions until the circle closes, then we finally come up against the existence of thinking beings, which in this system are conscious of themselves not only as independent of external things but also as being able to determine themselves from themselves (in regard to the persistence belonging necessarily to the character of a substance). But from this it follows that idealism , at least problematic idealism, is unavoidable in that same rationalistic system, and if the existence of external things is not at all required for the determination of one’s own existence in time, then such things are only assumed, entirely gratuitously, without a proof of them being able to be given.

If, on the contrary, we follow the analytic procedure, grounded on the “I think” given as a proposition that already includes existence in itself, and hence grounded on modality, and then we take it apart so as to cognize its content, whether and how this I determines its existence in space or time merely through it, then the propositions of the rational doctrine of the soul begin not from the concept of a thinking being in general but from an actuality; and from the way this is thought, after everything empirical has been detached from it, it is concluded what pertains to a thinking being in general ... ( CPR , B416-19) { §4.5 }

Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out in his way how the sum of its angles might be related to a right angle. He has nothing but the concept of a figure enclosed by three straight lines, and in it the concept of equally many angles. Now he may reflect on this concept as long as he wants, yet he will never produce anything new. He can analyze [ zergliedern ] and make distinct the concept of a straight line, or of an angle, or of the number three, but he will not come upon any other properties that do not already lie in these concepts. But now let the geometer take up this question. He begins at once to construct a triangle. Since he knows that two right angles together are exactly equal to all of the adjacent angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line, he extends one side of his triangle, and obtains two adjacent angles that together are equal to two right ones. Now he divides the external one of these angles by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle, and sees that here there arises an external adjacent angle which is equal to an internal one, etc. In such a way, through a chain of inferences that is always guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully illuminating and at the same time general solution of the question. ( CPR , A716-7/B744-5) { §4.5 }

although a mere plan that might precede the Critique of Pure Reason would be unintelligible, undependable, and useless, it is by contrast all the more useful if it comes after. For one will thereby be put in the position to survey the whole, to test one by one the main points at issue in this science, and to arrange many things in the exposition better than could be done in the first execution of the work.

Here then is such a plan subsequent to the completed work, which now can be laid out according to the analytic method , whereas the work itself absolutely had to be composed according to the synthetic method , so that the science might present all of its articulations, as the structural organization of a quite peculiar faculty of cognition, in their natural connection. ( PFM , 4:263/ 13) { §4.5 }

In the Critique of Pure Reason I worked on this question [Is metaphysics possible at all?] synthetically , namely by inquiring within pure reason itself, and seeking to determine within this source both the elements and the laws of its pure use, according to principles. This work is difficult and requires a resolute reader to think himself little by little into a system that takes no foundation as given except reason itself, and that therefore tries to develop cognition out of its original seeds without relying on any fact whatever. Prolegomena should by contrast be preparatory exercises; they ought more to indicate what needs to be done in order to bring a science into existence if possible, than to present the science itself. They must therefore rely on something already known to be dependable, from which we can go forward with confidence and ascend to the sources, which are not yet known, and whose discovery not only will explain what is known already, but will also exhibit an area with many cognitions that all arise from these same sources. The methodological procedure of prolegomena, and especially of those that are to prepare for a future metaphysics, will therefore be analytic . ( PFM , 4:274-5/ 25-6) { §4.5 }

[interpreting the method of analysis in ancient Greek geometry] Rule of analysis and synthesis: Draw conclusions from your conjecture, one after the other, assuming that it is true. If you reach a false conclusion, then your conjecture was false. If you reach an indubitably true conclusion, your conjecture may have been true. In this case reverse the process, work backwards, and try to deduce your original conjecture via the inverse route from the indubitable truth to the dubitable conjecture. If you succeed, you have proved your conjecture. (1978a, 72-3) { §2.2 }

Synthesis is when, beginning from principles and running through truths in order, we discover certain progressions and form tables, as it were, or sometimes even general formulae, in which the answers to what arises later can be discovered. Analysis, however, goes back to principles solely for the sake of a given problem, just as if nothing had been discovered previously, by ourselves or by others. It is better to produce a synthesis, since that work is of permanent value, whereas when we begin an analysis on account of particular problems we often do what has been done before. However, to use a synthesis which has been established by others, and theorems which have already been discovered, is less of an art than to do everything by oneself by carrying out an analysis; especially as what has been discovered by others, or even by ourselves, does not always occur to us or come to hand. There are two kinds of analysis: one is the common type proceeding by leaps, which is used in algebra, and the other is a special kind which I call ‘reductive’. This is much more elegant, but is less well-known. In practice, analysis is more necessary, so that we may solve the problems which are presented to us; but the man who can indulge in theorising will be content to practice analysis just far enough to master the art. For the rest, he will rather practise synthesis, and will apply himself readily only to those questions to which order itself leads him. For in this way he will always progress pleasantly and easily, and will never feel any difficulties, nor be disappointed of success, and in a short time he will achieve much more than he would ever have hoped for at the outset. ( USA , 16-17) { §4.4 }

Primary truths are those which either state a term of itself, or deny an opposite of its opposite. For example, ‘A is A’, or ‘A is not not-A’ ...

All other truths are reduced to primary truths by the aid of definitions—i.e. by the analysis of notions; and this constitutes a priori proof , independent of experience. ...

The predicate or consequent, therefore, is always in the subject or antecedent, and this constitutes the nature of truth in general, or, the connexion between the terms of a proposition, as Aristotle also has observed. In identities this connexion and inclusion of the predicate in the subject is express, whereas in all other truths it is implicit and must be shown through the analysis of notions, in which a priori demonstration consists. ( PT , 87-8) { §4.4 }

There are two kinds of truths , those of reason and those of fact . Truths of reason are necessary and their opposite is impossible; truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and truths, until we come to those that are primitive. ( M , §33; tr. R. Latta) { §4.4 }

Our whole philosophy is rectification of colloquial linguistic usage. ( Aphorisms , 115) { §4.5 }

Writing is an excellent means of awakening in every man the system slumbering within him; and everyone who has ever written will have discovered that writing always awakens something which, though it lay within us, we failed clearly to recognize before. ( Ibid ., 119) { §4.5 }

Whichever way you look at it, philosophy is always analytical chemistry. The peasant employs all the propositions of the most abstract philosophy, only he employs them enveloped, concealed, compounded, latent, as the chemist and physicist says; the philosopher gives us the propositions pure. ( Ibid ., 162) { §4.5 }

There are therefore three ways whereby we get the complex Ideas of mixed Modes . 1. By Experience and Observation of things themselves. Thus by seeing two Men wrestle, or fence, we get the Idea of wrestling or fencing. 2. By Invention , or voluntary putting together of several simple Ideas in our own Minds: So he that first invented Printing, or Etching, had an Idea of it in his Mind, before it ever existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of Actions we never saw, or Notions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, setting before our Imaginations all those Ideas which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. For having by Sensation and Reflection stored our Minds with simple Ideas , and by use got the Names, that stand for them, we can by those Names represent to another any complex Idea , we would have him conceive; so that it has in it no simple Idea , but what he knows, and has, with us, the same name for. For all our complex Ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple Ideas , of which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate Ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex Ideas . Thus the mixed Mode , which the word Lye stands for, is made of these simple Ideas : 1. Articulate Sounds. 2. Certain Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker. 3. Those words the signs of those Ideas . 4. Those signs put together by affirmation or negation, otherwise than the Ideas they stand for, are in the mind of the Speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the Analysis of that complex Idea , we call a Lye : What I have said is enough to shew, that it is made up of simple Ideas : And it could not be an offensive tediousness to my Reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple Idea , that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex Ideas whatsoever; which however compounded, and decompounded, may at last be resolved into simple Ideas , which are all the Materials of Knowledge or Thought we have or can have. ( Essay , II, xxii, 9) { §4.3 }

Analysis has a way of unravelling the self: the longer you pull on the thread, the more flaws you find. ( Therapy , London, 31)

The certainty of mathematics is based upon the general axiom that nothing can be and not be at the same time. In this science each proposition such as, for example, “A is B”, is proven in one of two ways. Either one unpacks the concepts of A and shows “A is B”, or one unpacks the concepts of B and infers from this that not-B must also be not-A. Both types of proof are thus based upon the principle of contradiction, and since the object of mathematics in general is magnitude and that of geometry in particular extension , one can say that in mathematics in general our concepts of magnitude are unpacked and analyzed, while in geometry in particular our concepts of extension are unpacked and analyzed. In fact, since geometry lays nothing else as its basis than the abstract concept of extension and derives all its conclusions from this single source – deriving them, to be sure, in such a way that one recognizes distinctly that everything maintained in it is necessarily connected by the principle of contradiction with the abstracted concept of extension, there is no doubt that all geometric truths that geometry teaches us to unpack or untangle from the concept of extension must be encountered all tangled up in it. For what else can the profoundest inferences do but analyze a concept and make distinct what was obscure? Such inferences cannot bring in what is not to be found in the concept, and it is easy to see that it is also not possible, by means of the principle of contradiction, to derive from the concept what is not to be found in it. In the concept of extension, for example, there lies the inner possibility that a space is limited by three straight lines in such a way that two of them include a right angle. For it follows from the essence of extension that it is capable of many sorts of limitations and that the assumed sort of limitation of one of its level planes contains no contradiction. If one subsequently shows that the concept of this assumed limitation or of a right-angled triangle necessarily entails that the square of the hypotenuse is such-and-such, then it must have also been possible to find this truth originally and implicitly in the initial concept of extension. Otherwise it could never have been derived from it by means of the principle of contradiction. The idea of extension is inseparable from the idea of the possibility of such a limitation, as was previously assumed, and the limitation is in turn necessarily connected to the concept of the equality of the aforesaid square. Thus, this truth also lay tangled up, as one might say, in the original concept of extension, but it escaped our attention and could not be distinctly known and distinguished until, through analysis, we unpacked all the parts of this concept and separated them from one another. The analysis of concepts is for the understanding nothing more than what the maginfying glass is for sight. It does not produce anything that was not to be found in the object. But it spreads out the parts of the object and makes it possible for our senses to distinguish much that they would otherwise not have noticed. The analysis of concepts does nothing different from this; it makes the parts and members of these concepts, which were previously obscure and unnoticed, distinct and recognizable, but it does not introduce anything into the concepts that was not already to be found in them. (1763, §1/ PW , 257-8) { §4.5 }

It seems necessary, then, to regard the world as formed of concepts. These are the only objects of knowledge. They cannot be regarded fundamentally as abstractions either from things or from ideas; since both alike can, if anything is to be true of them, be composed of nothing but concepts. A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts. ( NJ , 8) { §6.4 }

It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of which its history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which you desire to answer. I do not know how far this source of error would be done away, if philosophers would try to discover what question they were asking, before they set about to answer it; for the work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult: we may often fail to make the necessary discovery, even though we make a definite attempt to do so. But I am inclined to think that in many cases a resolute attempt would be sufficient to ensure success; so that, if only this attempt were made, many of the most glaring difficulties and disagreements in philosophy would disappear. ( PE , vii) { §6.4 }

My point is that ‘good’ is a simple notion, just as ‘yellow’ is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is. Definitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you no longer define those terms. They are simply something which you think of or perceive, and to any one who cannot think of or perceive them, you can never, by any definition, make their nature known. ( PE , 7) { §6.4 }

As in Mathematicks, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the Induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from Phænomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the Method of Analysis: and the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover’d, and establish’d as Principles, and by them explaining the Phænomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations. ( Opticks , Book Three, Part I, 404-5) { §4.1 }

All concepts in which an entire process is semiotically telescoped elude definition. ( On the Genealogy of Morals , 1887, tr. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1968, 80)

the most valuable insights are methods . ( The Antichrist , 1895, §13)

The so-called Treasury of Analysis [ analuomenos ] .. is, in short, a special body of doctrines furnished for the use of those who, after going through the usual elements, wish to obtain the power of solving theoretical problems, which are set to them, and for this purpose only is it useful. It is the work of three men, Euclid the author of the Elements , Apollonius of Perga, and Aristaeus the Elder, and proceeds by the method of analysis and synthesis.

Now analysis is the way from what is sought—as if it were admitted—through its concomitants [ akolouthôn ] in order to something admitted in synthesis. For in analysis we suppose that which is sought to be already done, and we inquire from what it results, and again what is the antecedent [ proêgoumenon ] of the latter, until we on our backward way light upon something already known and being first in order. And we call such a method analysis, as being a solution backwards [ anapalin lysin ].

In synthesis, on the other hand, we suppose that which was reached last in analysis to be already done, and arranging in their natural order as consequents [ epomena ] the former antecedents [ proêgoumena ] and linking them one with another, we in the end arrive at the construction of the thing sought. And this we call synthesis.

Now analysis is of two kinds. One seeks the truth, being called theoretical. The other serves to carry out what was desired to do, and this is called problematical. In the theoretical kind we suppose the thing sought as being and as being true, and then we pass through its concomitants [ akolouthôn ] in order, as though they were true and existent by hypothesis, to something admitted; then, if that which is admitted be true, the thing sought is true, too, and the proof will be the reverse of analysis. But if we come upon something false to admit, the thing sought will be false, too. In the problematic kind we suppose the desired thing to be known, and then we pass through its concomitants [ akolouthôn ] in order, as though they were true, up to something admitted. If the thing admitted is possible or can be done, that is, if it is what the mathematicians call given, the desired thing will also be possible. The proof will again be the reverse of analysis. But if we come upon something impossible to admit, the problem will also be impossible. ( PAC , tr. in Hintikka and Remes 1974, 8-10) { §2.2 }

For we should remember that if a person goes on analyzing names into words, and inquiring also into the elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up the inquiry in despair … But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we at last reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further. (‘Cratylus’, Benjamin Jowett (trans.), in Hamilton and Cairns (ed.), Collected Dialogues , New York: Pantheon Books, 421e)

Then, said I, is not dialectic the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul is sunk in the barbaric slough of the Orphic Myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and cooperators in this conversation the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit, though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. ‘Understanding’ I believe was the term we employed. But, I presume we shall not dispute about the name when things of such moment lie before us for consideration. (‘Republic VII’, Paul Shorey (trans.), Ibid. , 533d)

Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason lays hold of by the power of dialectic, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas. (‘Republic VI’, Paul Shorey (trans.), Ibid ., 511b)

In mathematics logic is called analysis , and analysis means division , dissection . It can have, therefore, no tool other than the scalpel and the microscope. (‘Intuition and Logic in Mathematics’, 1900, in William Ewald, ed., From Kant to Hilbert , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 1018)

Nonmathematical illustration [of the method of analysis described by Pappus] . A primitive man wishes to cross a creek; but he cannot do so in the usual way because the water has risen overnight. Thus, the crossing becomes the object of a problem; “crossing the creek’ is the x of this primitive problem. The man may recall that he has crossed some other creek by walking along a fallen tree. He looks around for a suitable fallen tree which becomes his new unknown, his y . He cannot find any suitable tree but there are plenty of trees standing along he creek; he wishes that one of them would fall. Could he make a tree fall across the creek? There is a great idea and there is a new unknown; by what means could he tilt the tree over the creek?

This train of ideas ought to be called analysis if we accept the terminology of Pappus. If the primitive man succeeds in finishing his analysis he may become the inventor of the bridge and of the axe. What will be the synthesis? Translation of ideas into actions. The finishing act of the synthesis is walking along a tree across the creek.

The same objects fill the analysis and the synthesis; they exercise the mind of the man in the analysis and his muscles in the synthesis; the analysis consists in thoughts, the synthesis in acts. There is another difference; the order is reversed. Walking across the creek is the first desire from which the analysis starts and it is the last act with which the synthesis ends. (1957, 145) { §2.2 }

beauty and order are common to all branches of mathematics, as are the method of proceeding from things better known to things we seek to know and the reverse path from the latter to the former, the methods called analysis and synthesis. ( CEE , 8/6-7) { §2.2 }

as Nous is set over understanding and dispenses principles to it from above, perfecting it out of its own riches, so in the same way dialectic, the purest part of philosophy, hovers attentively over mathematics, encompasses its whole development, and of itself contributes to the special sciences their various perfecting, critical, and intellective powers—the procedures, I mean, of analysis, division, definition, and demonstration. Being thus endowed and led towards perfection, mathematics reaches some of its results by analysis, others by synthesis, expounds some matters by division, others by definition, and some of its discoveries binds fast by demonstration, adapting these methods to its subjects and employing each of them for gaining insight into mediating ideas. Thus its analyses are under the control of dialectic, and its definitions, divisions, and demonstrations are of the same family and unfold in conformity with the way of mathematical understanding. It is reasonable, then, to say that dialectic is the capstone of the mathematical sciences. It brings to perfection all the intellectual insight they contain, making what is exact in them more irrefutable, confirming the stability of what they have established and referring what is pure and incorporeal in them to the simplicity and immateriality of Nous, making precise their primary starting-points through definitions and explicating the distinctions of genera and species within their subject-matters, teaching the use of synthesis to bring out the consequences that follow from principles and of analysis to lead up to the first principles and starting-points. ( CEE , 42-3/35-6) { §2.2 }

Magnitudes, figures and their boundaries, and the ratios that are found in them, as well as their properties, their various positions and motions—these are what geometry studies, proceeding from the partless point down to solid bodies, whose many species and differences it explores, then following the reverse path from the more complex objects to the simpler ones and their principles. It makes use of synthesis and analysis, always starting from hypotheses and first principles that it obtains from the science above it and employing all the procedures of dialectic—definition and division for establishing first principles and articulating species and genera, and demonstrations and analyses in dealing with the consequences that follow from first principles, in order to show the more complex matters both as proceeding from the simpler and also conversely as leading back to them. ( CEE , 57/46) { §2.2 }

[Euclid’s Elements ] contains all the dialectical methods: the method of division for finding kinds, definitions for making statements of essential properties, demonstrations for proceeding from premises to conclusions, and analysis for passing in the reverse direction from conclusions to principles. ( CEE , 69/57) { §2.2 }

there are certain methods that have been handed down, the best being the method of analysis, which traces the desired result back to an acknowledged principle. Plato, it is said, taught this method to Leodamas, who also is reported to have made many discoveries in geometry by means of it. A second is the method of diaeresis , which divides into its natural parts the genus proposed for examination and which affords a starting-point for demonstration by eliminating the parts irrelevant for the establishment of what is proposed. This method also Plato praised as an aid in all the sciences. A third is the reduction to impossibility, which does not directly show the thing itself that is wanted but by refuting its contradictory indirectly establishes its truth. ( CEE , 211-12/165-6) { §2.2 }

for problems one common procedure, the method of analysis, has been discovered, and by following it we can reach a solution; for thus it is that even the most obscure problems are pursued. ( CEE , 242/189) { §2.2 }

In general we must understand that all mathematical arguments proceed either from or to the starting-points, as Porphyry somewhere says. Those that proceed from the starting-points are themselves of two kinds, as it happens, for they proceed either from common notions, that is, from self-evident clarity alone, or from things previously demonstrated. Those that proceed to the starting-points are either affirmative of them or destructive. But those that affirm first principles are called “analyses”, and their reverse procedures “syntheses” (for it is possible from those principles to proceed in orderly fashion to the thing sought, and this is called “synthesis”); when they are destructive, they are called “reductions to impossibility”, for it is the function of this procedure to show that something generally accepted and self-evident is overthrown. There is a kind of syllogism in it, though not the same as in analysis ... ( CEE , 255/198-9) { §2.2 }

A maxim of shallow analysis prevails: expose no more logical structure than seems useful for the deduction or other inquiry at hand. In the immortal words of Adolf Meyer, where it doesn’t itch don't scratch.

On occasion the useful degree of analysis may, conversely, be such as to cut into a simple word of ordinary language, requiring its paraphrase into a composite term in which other terms are compounded with the help of canonical notation. When this happens, the line of analysis adopted will itself commonly depend on what is sought in the inquiry at hand; again there need be no question of the uniquely right analysis, nor of synonymy. (1960, §33, 160-1) { §6.9 }

This construction [of the ordered pair as a class, such as Wiener’s identification of the ordered pair x , y > with the class {{ x }, { y , Λ}}] is paradigmatic of what we are most typically up to when in a philosophical spirit we offer an “analysis” or “explication” of some hitherto inadequately formulated “idea” or expression. We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and explicit what the users of the unclear expression had unconsciously in mind all along. We do not expose hidden meanings, as the words ‘analysis’ or ‘explication’ would suggest; we supply lacks. We fix on the particular functions of the unclear expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions. Beyond those conditions of partial agreement, dictated by our interests and purposes, any traits of the explicans come under the head of “don’t-cares” … Under this head we are free to allow the explicans all manner of novel connotations never associated with the explicandum. …

Philosophical analysis, explication, has not always been seen in this way. Only the reading of a synonymy claim into analysis could engender the so-called paradox of analysis, which runs thus: how can a correct analysis be informative, since to understand it we must already know the meanings of its terms, and hence already know that the terms which it equates are synonymous? The notion that analysis must consist somehow in the uncovering of hidden meanings underlies also the recent tendency of some of the Oxford philosophers to take as their business an examination of the subtle irregularities of ordinary language. And there is no mistaking the obliviousness of various writers to the point about the don’t-cares. …

... explication is elimination . We have, to begin with, an expression or form of expression that is somehow troublesome. It behaves partly like a term but not enough so, or it is vague in ways that bother us, or it puts kinks in a theory or encourages one or another confusion. But also it serves certain purposes that are not to be abandoned. Then we find a way of accomplishing those same purposes through other channels, using other and less troublesome forms of expression. The old perplexities are resolved.

According to an influential doctrine of Wittgenstein’s, the task of philosophy is not to solve problems but to dissolve them by showing that there were really none there. This doctrine has its limitations, but it aptly fits explication. For when explication banishes a problem it does so by showing it to be in an important sense unreal; viz., in the sense of proceeding only from needless usages. (1960, §53, 258-60) { §6.9 }

This brings us to the second of the five turning points, the shift from terms to sentences. The medievals had the notion of syncategorematic words, but it was a contemporary of John Horne Tooke who developed it into an explicit theory of contextual definition; namely, Jeremy Bentham. He applied contextual definition not just to grammatical particles and the like, but even to some genuine terms, categorematic ones. If he found some term convenient but ontologically embarrassing, contextual definition enabled him in some cases to continue to enjoy the services of the term while disclaiming its denotation. He could declare the term syncategorematic, despite grammatical appearances, and then could justify his continued use of it if he could show systematically how to paraphrase as wholes all sentences in which he chose to imbed it. Such was his theory of fictions: what he called paraphrasis, and what we now call contextual definition. The term, like the grammatical particles, is meaningful as a part of meaningful wholes. If every sentence in which we use a term can be paraphrased into a sentence that makes good sense, no more can be asked. (1975, 68-9) { §5.6 }

The issue is: is there such an activity as “conceptual analysis” or can philosophers do no more than describe usage and, perhaps, make recommendations for change in usage? One’s answer to this question will determine whether one thinks that Wittgenstein was wrong to give up on the idea of a systematic theory of meaning, and Quine right to suggest that the very notion of “meaning” was a hangover of Aristotelean essentialism. If they were right, it is hard to hang on to the idea that “conceptual clarity” is a goal of philosophical inquiry … Metaphilosophical issues hover in the wings of the debates over whether the content of an assertion varies from utterer to utterer and from audience to audience. If it does not, if something remains invariable – the concepts expressed by the words that make up the sentence – then perhaps there really are entities with intrinsic properties which philosophical analysis can hope to pin down. But, if content does vary in this way, then concepts are like persons - never quite the same twice, always developing, always maturing. You can change a concept by changing usage, but you cannot get a concept right, once and for all. (‘Analytic and Conversational Philosophy’, Philosophy as Cultural Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 122-3)

Analysis, to be sure, is articulation rather than dissolution. (1980, 8) { §1.2 , §5.8 }

we must see where we are going , or what will “count” as the successful resolution to the given exercise of analysis. … Analysis is the admittedly indispensable road to our destination, but it is no more the destination than it is the intention to begin the voyage. One could perhaps say that the destination is an articulated structure. But we know that we have reached the destination only when we recognize a given articulation as the explanation of that structure. We cannot see that an analysis explains a structure by performing an additional step in the analysis. At some point we must see that we are finished. And to see an analysis is not to analyze. It is rather to see an articulated structure as a unity, whole, or synthesis. ( Ibid ., 9) { §1.2 , §5.8 }

If to understand is to possess an explanation, and if an explanation is an analysis, it remains the case that an analysis is intelligible because it is also a synthesis. Explanation may be called “recollection” in the Platonic sense because it is the process of retracing, by the method of counting and measuring, the joints of an internally articulated unity, one prefigured within the initial formulation of the entire analytical exercise. In slightly more prosaic terms, analysis is never merely the application of rules. It is also at once a seeing of which rules to apply and how to apply them. This is what it means to say that analysis is also synthesis. And this is why it is false to say, as is at least implied by so much contemporary analytical philosophy, that we begin with intuitions and then replace them with ever more sophisticated analyses. Not only is it false to say this, but strictly speaking, it is meaningless. If “to mean” is “to provide an analysis”, there is no analysis of analysis without ingredient intuition. Without intuition, there is at each stage nothing to analyze. Intuition (of syntheses or unities) without analysis is mute, but analysis without intuition is inarticulate as well as blind: the sounds it utters cannot be distinguished from noise. ( Ibid ., 9-10) { §1.2 , §5.8 }

analysis is a cognitive activity and it cannot be coherently understood except by recourse to intuition. There is a non-discursive context of analysis . ( Ibid ., 27) { §1.2 , §5.8 }

conceptual analysis is rooted in intuitions which cannot be replaced by the process of analysis but which regulate that process. ( Ibid ., 48) { §1.2 , §5.8 }

That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions, is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof. That Leibniz’s philosophy began with such an analysis, is less evident, but seems to be no less true. ( PL , 8) { §6.3 }

It is necessary to realize that definition, in mathematics, does not mean, as in philosophy, an analysis of the idea to be defined into constituent ideas. This notion, in any case, is only applicable to concepts, whereas in mathematics it is possible to define terms which are not concepts. Thus also many notions are defined by symbolic logic which are not capable of philosophical definition, since they are simple and unanalyzable. ( POM , ch. 2, §31, 27) { §6.3 }

For the comprehension of analysis, it is necessary to investigate the notion of whole and part, a notion which has been wrapped in obscurity—though not without certain more or less valid logical reasons—by the writers who may be roughly called Hegelian. ( POM , ch. 16, §133, 137) { §6.3 }

I have already touched on a very important logical doctrine, which the theory of whole and part brings into prominence—I mean the doctrine that analysis is falsification. Whatever can be analyzed is a whole, and we have already seen that analysis of wholes is in some measure falsification. But it is important to realize the very narrow limits of this doctrine. We cannot conclude that the parts of a whole are not really its parts, nor that the parts are not presupposed in the whole in a sense in which the whole is not presupposed in the parts, nor yet that the logically prior is not usually simpler than the logically subsequent. In short, though analysis gives us the truth, and nothing but the truth, yet it can never give us the whole truth. This is the only sense in which the doctrine is to be accepted. In any wider sense, it becomes merely a cloak for laziness, by giving an excuse to those who dislike the labour of analysis. ( POM , ch. 16, §138, 141) { §6.3 }

We are sometimes told that things are organic unities, composed of many parts expressing the whole and expressed in the whole. This notion is apt to replace the older notion of substance, not, I think, to the advantage of precise thinking. The only kind of unity to which I can attach any precise sense—apart from the unity of the absolutely simple—is that of a whole composed of parts. But this form of unity cannot be what is called organic; for if the parts express the whole or the other parts, they must be complex, and therefore themselves contain parts; if the parts have been analyzed as far as possible, they must be simple terms, incapable of expressing anything except themselves. A distinction is made, in support of organic unities, between conceptual analysis and real division into parts. What is really indivisible, we are told, may be conceptually analyzable. This distinction, if the conceptual analysis be regarded as subjective, seems to me wholly inadmissible. All complexity is conceptual in the sense that it is due to a whole capable of logical analysis, but is real in the sense that it has no dependence upon the mind, but only upon the nature of the object. Where the mind can distinguish elements, there must be different elements to distinguish; though, alas! there are often different elements which the mind does not distinguish. The analysis of a finite space into points is no more objective than the analysis (say) of causality into time-sequence + ground and consequent, or of equality into sameness of relation to a given magnitude. In every case of analysis, there is a whole consisting of parts with relations; it is only the nature of the parts and the relations which distinguishes different cases. Thus the notion of an organic whole in the above sense must be attributed to defective analysis, and cannot be used to explain things.

It is also said that analysis is falsification, that the complex is not equivalent to the sum of its constituents and is changed when analyzed into these. In this doctrine, as we saw in Parts I and II, there is a measure of truth, when what is to be analyzed is a unity. A proposition has a certain indefinable unity, in virtue of which it is an assertion; and this is so completely lost by analysis that no enumeration of constituents will restore it, even though itself be mentioned as a constituent. There is, it must be confessed, a grave logical difficulty in this fact, for it is difficult not to believe that a whole must be constituted by its constituents. For us, however, it is sufficient to observe that all unities are propositions or propositional concepts, and that consequently nothing that exists is a unity. If, therefore, it is maintained that things are unities, we must reply that no things exist. ( POM , ch. 53, §439, 466-7) { §6.3 }

What we want to be clear about is the twofold method of analysis of a proposition, i.e. , first taking the proposition as it stands and analyzing it, second taking the proposition as a special case of a type of propositions. Whenever we use variables, we are already necessarily concerned with a type of propositions. E.g. “ p ⊃ q ” stands for any proposition of a certain type. When values are assigned to p and q , we reach a particular proposition by a different road from that which would have started with those values plus implication, and have so built up the particular proposition without reference to a type. This is how functions come in. (‘Fundamental Notions’, 1904, in 1994, 118) { §6.3 }

We ought to say, I think, that there are different ways of analysing complexes, and that one way of analysis is into function and argument, which is the same as type and instance. ( Ibid ., 256) { §6.3 }

The fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. ( KAKD , 159) { §6.3 }

when we say ‘the author of Waverley was Scott’ we mean ‘one and only one man wrote Waverley, and he was Scott’. Here the identity is between a variable, i.e. an indeterminate subject (‘he’), and Scott; ‘the author of Waverley’ has been analysed away, and no longer appears as a constituent of the proposition. ( KAKD , 165) { §6.3 }

Analysis may be defined as the discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of a given complex. The complex is to be one with which we are acquainted; the analysis is complete when we become acquainted with all the constituents and with their manner of combination, and know that there are no more constituents and that that is their manner of combination. We may distinguish formal analysis as the discovery of the manner of combination, and material analysis as the discovery of the constituents. Material analysis may be called descriptive when the constituents are only known by description, not by acquaintance. ( TK , 119) { §6.3 }

Philosophy, if what has been said is correct, becomes indistinguishable from logic as that word has now come to be used. The study of logic consists, broadly speaking, of two not very sharply distinguished portions. On the one hand it is concerned with those general statements which can be made concerning everything without mentioning any one thing or predicate or relation, such for example as ‘if x is a member of the class α and every member of α is a member of β , then x is a member of the class β , whatever x , α , and β may be.’. On the other hand, it is concerned with the analysis and enumeration of logical forms , i.e. with the kinds of propositions that may occur, with the various types of facts, and with the classification of the constituents of facts. In this way logic provides an inventory of possibilities, a repertory of abstractly tenable hypotheses. ( SMP , 84-5) { §6.3 }

The essence of philosophy as thus conceived is analysis, not synthesis. To build up systems of the world, like Heine’s German professor who knit together fragments of life and made an intelligible system out of them, is not, I believe, any more feasible than the discovery of the philosopher’s stone. What is feasible is the understanding of general forms, and the division of traditional problems into a number of separate and less baffling questions. ‘Divide and conquer’ is the maxim of success here as elsewhere. ( SMP , 86) { §6.3 }

Kant, under the influence of Newton, adopted, though with some vacillation, the hypothesis of absolute space, and this hypothesis, though logically unobjectionable, is removed by Occam’s razor, since absolute space is an unnecessary entity in the explanation of the physical world. Although, therefore, we cannot refute the Kantian theory of an a priori intuition, we can remove its grounds one by one through an analysis of the problem. Thus, here as in many other philosophical questions, the analytic method, while not capable of arriving at a demonstrative result, is nevertheless capable of showing that all the positive grounds in favour of a certain theory are fallacious and that a less unnatural theory is capable of accounting for the facts.

Another question by which the capacity of the analytic method can be shown is the question of realism. Both those who advocate and those who combat realism seem to me to be far from clear as to the nature of the problem which they are discussing. If we ask: ‘Are our objects of perception real and are they independent of the percipient?’ it must be supposed that we attach some meaning to the words ‘real’ and ‘independent’, and yet, if either side in the controversy of realism is asked to define these two words, their answer is pretty sure to embody confusions such as logical analysis will reveal. ( SMP , 90-1) { §6.3 }

The supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing is this:

Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.

Some examples of the substitution of construction for inference in the realm of mathematical philosophy may serve to elucidate the uses of this maxim. Take first the case of irrationals. In old days, irrationals were inferred as the supposed limits of series of rationals which had no rational limit; but the objection to this procedure was that it left the existence of irrationals merely optative, and for this reason the stricter methods of the present day no longer tolerate such a definition. We now define an irrational number as a certain class of ratios, thus constructing it logically by means of ratios, instead of arriving at it by a doubtful inference from them. Take again the case of cardinal numbers. Two equally numerous collections appear to have something in common: this something is supposed to be their cardinal number. But so long as the cardinal number is inferred from the collections, not constructed in terms of them, its existence must remain in doubt, unless in virtue of a metaphysical postulate ad hoc . By defining the cardinal number of a given collection as the class of all equally numerous collections, we avoid the necessity of this metaphysical postulate, and thereby remove a needless element of doubt from the philosophy of arithmetic. A similar method, as I have shown elsewhere, can be applied to classes themselves, which need not be supposed to have any metaphysical reality, but can be regarded as symbolically constructed fictions.

The method by which the construction proceeds is closely analogous in these and all similar cases. Given a set of propositions nominally dealing with the supposed inferred entities, we observe the properties which are required of the supposed entities in order to make these propositions true. By dint of a little logical ingenuity, we then construct some logical function of less hypothetical entities which has the requisite properties. The constructed function we substitute for the supposed inferred entities, and thereby obtain a new and less doubtful interpretation of the body of propositions in question. This method, so fruitful in the philosophy of mathematics, will be found equally applicable in the philosophy of physics, where, I do not doubt, it would have been applied long ago but for the fact that all who have studied this subject hitherto have been completely ignorant of mathematical logic. I myself cannot claim originality in the application of this method to physics, since I owe the suggestion and the stimulus for its application entirely to my friend and collaborator Dr Whitehead, who is engaged in applying it to the more mathematical portions of the region intermediate between sense-data and the points, instants and particles of physics.

A complete application of the method which substitutes constructions for inferences would exhibit matter wholly in terms of sense-data, and even, we may add, of the sense-data of a single person, since the sense-data of others cannot be known without some element of inference. This, however, must remain for the present an ideal, to be approached as nearly as possible, but to be reached, if at all, only after a long preliminary labour of which as yet we can only see the very beginning. ( RSDP , 115-6) { §6.3 }

In the special sciences, when they have become fully developed, the movement is forward and synthetic, from the simpler to the more complex. But in philosophy we follow the inverse direction: from the complex and relatively concrete we proceed towards the simple and abstract by means of analysis, seeking, in the process, to eliminate the particularity of the original subject-matter, and to confine our attention entirely to the logical form of the facts concerned. ( OKEW , 189-90) { §6.3 }

The nature of philosophic analysis … can now be stated in general terms. We start from a body of common knowledge, which constitutes our data. On examination, the data are found to be complex, rather vague, and largely interdependent logically. By analysis we reduce them to propositions which are as nearly as possible simple and precise, and we arrange them in deductive chains, in which a certain number of initial propositions form a logical guarantee for all the rest. ( OKEW , 214) { §6.3 }

the chief thesis that I have to maintain is the legitimacy of analysis. ( PLA , 189) { §6.3 }

it is very important to distinguish between a definition and an analysis. All analysis is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always depends, in the last analysis, upon direct acquaintance with the objects which are the meanings of certain simple symbols. It is hardly necessary to observe that one does not define a thing but a symbol. ( PLA , 194) { §6.3 }

Analysis is not the same thing as definition. You can define a term by means of a correct description, but that does not constitute an analysis. ( PLA , 196) { §6.3 }

The business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis. ( LA , 341) { §6.3 }

Ever since I abandoned the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, I have sought solutions of philosophical problems by means of analysis; and I remain firmly persuaded, in spite of some modern tendencies to the contrary, that only by analysing is progress possible. ( MPD , 11) { §6.3 }

Philosophy must then involve the exercise of systematic restatement. But this does not mean that it is a department of philology or literary criticism.

Its restatement is not the substitution of one noun for another or one verb for another. That is what lexicographers and translators excel in. Its restatements are transmutations of syntax, and transmutations of syntax controlled not be desire for elegance or stylistic correctness but by desire to exhibit the forms of the facts into which philosophy is the enquiry.

I conclude, then, that there is, after all, a sense in which we can properly enquire and even say “what it really means to say so and so”. For we can ask what is the real form of the fact recorded when this is concealed or disguised and not duly exhibited by the expression in question. And we can often succeed in stating this fact in a new form of words which does exhibit what the other failed to exhibit. And I am for the present inclined to believe that this is what philosophical analysis is, and that this is the sole and whole function of philosophy. (1932, 100) { §6.8 }

I have no special objection to or any special liking for the fashion of describing as ‘analysis’ the sort or sorts of conceptual examination which constitute philosophizing. But the idea is totally false that this examination is a sort of garage inspection of one conceptual vehicle at a time. On the contrary, to put it dogmatically, it is always a traffic inspector’s examination of a conceptual traffic-block, involving at least two streams of vehicles hailing from the theories, or points of view or platitudes which are at cross-purposes with one another. (1953, 32) { §6.8 }

It is certain that when I wrote “Systematically Misleading Expressions” I was still under the direct influence of the notion of an “ideal language”—a doctrine according to which there were a certain number of logical forms which one could somehow dig up by scratching away at the earth which covered them. I no longer think, especially not today, that this is a good method. I do not regret having traveled that road, but I am happy to have left it behind me. (In Rorty 1967, 305) { §6.8 }

alas! intellect must first destroy the object of Inner Sense if it would make it its own. Like the analytical chemist, the philosopher can only discover how things are combined by analysing them, only lay bare the workings of spontaneous Nature by subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques. In order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, he must first bind it in the fetters of rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and preserve its living spirit in a sorry skeleton of words. Is it any wonder that natural feeling cannot find itself again in such an image, or that in the account of the analytical thinker truth should appear as paradox? ( AE , I, 4) { §5.2 }

analysis without synopsis must be blind. (‘Time and the World Order’, in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science III , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962, 527)

[in discussing Ryle 1953 { Quotation }] Personally, I have no axe to grind about what it takes to analyze a concept. Very likely, there are different sorts of cases. It may well be that sometimes what we want from an analysis is the tracing of the sort of intricate web of conceptual relations in which Ryle delights. But there is little reason for thinking that this is always so—at least, if analysis is construed as whatever it is that philosophers do to solve their problems. What strikes me as worrisome is Ryle’ tendency to use the web metaphor as a rationale for rejecting the old, Russellian conception of analysis, with its emphasis on precisely formulated logical forms, and replacing it with methodology which, in some cases, may degenerate into a recipe for generating a conceptual fog. It is all well and good to recognize that sometimes the concepts philosophers deal with will be vague, imprecise, and open-ended, with close conceptual connections to other concepts of the same sort. We do have to be able to deal with such cases—perhaps along the lines Ryle suggests. What is not good is a prior ideological commitment to blurred edges, indirectness, and an unwillingness to separate tangential from central issues. Sometimes Ryle and other ordinary language philosophers seem to go too far in this direction; substituting one confining orthodoxy about analysis for another. When this happens, central philosophical points get missed ... (2003, II, 80-1) { §6.1 }

Philosophical analysis is a term of art. At different times in the twentieth century, different authors have used it to mean different things. What is to be analyzed (e.g., words and sentences versus concepts and propositions), what counts as a successful analysis, and what philosophical fruits come from analysis are questions that have been vigorously debated since the dawn of analysis as a self-conscious philosophical approach. Often, different views of analysis have been linked to different views of the nature of philosophy, the sources of philosophical knowledge, the role of language in thought, the relationship between language and the world, and the nature of meaning—as well to more focused questions about necessary and apriori truth. Indeed the variety of positions is so great as to make any attempt to extract a common denominator from the multiplicity of views sterile and not illuminating.

Nevertheless analytic philosophy—with its emphasis on what is called “philosophical analysis”—is a clear and recognizable tradition. Although the common core of doctrine uniting its practitioners scarcely exceeds the platitudinous, a pattern of historical influence is not hard to discern. The tradition begins with G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein (as well as Gottlob Frege, whose initial influence was largely filtered through Russell and Wittgenstein). These philosophers set the agenda, first, for logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap, Carl Hempel, and A.J. Ayer and then later for Wittgenstein, who in turn ushered in the ordinary language school led by Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin. More recently the second half of the twentieth century has seen a revival of Russellian and Carnapian themes in the work of W.V. Quine, Donald Davidson, and Saul Kripke. Analytic philosophy, with its changing views of philosophical analysis, is a trail of influence ... (2005, 144) { §6.1 }

In my opinion Logical Positivism fails in its treatment of analysis. Wittgenstein and the other Logical Positivists talk much about analysis, but they do not consider the various kinds of analysis, nor do they show in what sense philosophy is the analysis of facts. They make use of analytic definition of a symbolic expression, and of the analytic clarification of a concept, but they do not distinguish between them. They also employ postulational analysis. But they do not seem to understand directional analysis, and, accordingly, they fail to apprehend the need for it. In this way they depart, in my opinion, from the practice of Moore. Not only is their conception of analysis defective, but, further, their conception of the kinds of facts to be analysed is inadequate. They treat all facts as linguistic facts . Hence, they suppose that the first problem of philosophy is to determine the principles of symbolism, and from these principles to draw limits with regard to what we can think. This assumption has two important consequences. First, it leads to the view that philosophy is ‘the activity of finding meaning’, to quote Schlick’s statement. The second consequence is that they are apt to place too much reliance upon the construction of postulational systems. (1933b, 82-3) { §6.6 }

Strawson, Peter F.

An analysis, I suppose, may be thought of as a kind of breaking down or decomposing of something. So we have the picture of a kind of intellectual taking to pieces of ideas or concepts; the discovering of what elements a concept or idea is composed and how they are related. Is this the right picture or the wrong one—or is it partly right and partly wrong? That is a question which calls for a considered response … ( Analysis and Metaphysics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, 2)

If we took this notion [of analysis as decomposition] completely seriously for the case of conceptual analysis—analysis of ideas—we should conclude that our task was to find ideas that were completely simple, that were free from internal conceptual complexity; and then to demonstrate how the more or less complex ideas that are of interest to philosophers could be assembled by a kind of logical or conceptual construction out of these simple elements. The aim would be to get a clear grasp of complex meanings by reducing them, without remainder, to simple meanings. Thus baldly stated, this may seem a rather implausible project. And so it is. Nevertheless it, or some close relation of it, has been, and is, taken seriously. Even when not taken to the lengths I have just described, it continues to exercise a certain influence on the philosophical mind. ( Ibid. 18)

Among the philosophers who were most influential in England in the period between the two world wars were the analysts. Their analytic theories were sometimes associated with the metaphysical view which Russell called logical atomism, sometimes with the supposedly anti-metaphysical doctrines of logical positivism, and sometimes, as in the case of G. E. Moore, the analytic practice had no clearly defined dogmatic background at all. But they were united at least in the view that analysis was at least one of the most important tasks of the philosopher; and by analysis they meant something which, whatever precise description of it they chose, at least involved the attempt to rewrite in different and in some way more appropriate terms those statements which they found philosophically puzzling. (1956, vii) { §6.1 }

analysis is a familiar philosophical method. I shall not attempt to offer you a complete historical account of analytic philosophy. Even the minute examination of a particular analytic philosopher, or group of analytic philosophers, would not be of great interest. I propose rather to sketch, in broad strokes, four major forms of philosophical analysis which I think important to distinguish carefully from one another. I shall call the first of these: classical analysis. It corresponds, roughly, to the traditional method of analysis used by English philosophers, a method which Russell did so much to develop. I shall then examine three other, more recent forms of philosophical analysis: (1) the type of analysis which involves the construction of artificial languages; (2) the type of analysis practiced by Wittgenstein in his later period; (3) the type of analysis which characterizes present-day Oxford Philosophy.

The fundamental notion of classical analysis is that propositions couched in ordinary language are correct, in the sense that they are not objectionable in principle. They are neither logically nor metaphysically absurd. On the other hand, insofar as the form of these propositions of ordinary language hides their true meaning, they are neither metaphysically nor logically satisfactory. The task of the analyst is, therefore, to reformulate them so that this meaning will be clearly and explicitly presented, rather then to reject them. To analyze, is to reformulate,—to translate into a better wording. (1962, 294-5) { §6.1 }

The logical positivism of the Vienna Circle did not modify the methodology of classical analysis. However, because of the anti-metaphysical standpoint which was characteristic of positivism, it could not accept the notion of the goal of analysis as metaphysical discovery. For the positivists of this school, the goal of philosophical analysis is to clarify the language of science, a clarification which would result from, for example, elucidating the relationships between observation and theory, or between scientific concepts at different levels of abstraction. ( Ibid ., 296) { §6.1 }

A second school [or third school, after ‘classical analysis’ and logical positivism] was inspired (largely, but not entirely) by the thought of Wittgenstein in his later period. Wittgenstein had himself been led tothis new point of view in his criticism of his own Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ( Logische-Philosophische Abhandlung ), a book which itself espoused implicitly a certain form of classical analysis. According to Wittgenstein, classical analysis rested upon a false conception of language and of thought. ...

... for an analyst of this sort, philosophical problems do not result from ignorance of the precise meaning of a concept, but from an entirely false conception of its function. ... Such a false conception is what Ryle calls a “category mistake”. To resolve a philosophical problem, one should exhibit the generic character of the concepts involved in it, rather than attempting to give a perfect definition or explication of these concepts. ...

This conception of philosophical analysis—of analysis as the resolution of conceptual enigmas—has sometimes been condescendingly called “therapeutic positivism”. ( Ibid ., 297-9) { §6.1 }

The fourth method of analysis ... is that of Oxford Philosophy. ...

The analytic philosophers of the Cambridge School—for example, Russell and Wittgenstein—came to philosophy after considerable work in the sciences and in mathematics. Philosophy of mathematics was the first topic to which Russell applied his classical method of analysis. But the Oxford philosophers came to their subject, almost without exception, after extensive study of classics. Thus they were naturally interested in words, in syntax, and in (idioms. They did not wish to use linguistic analysis simply to resolve philosophical problems; they were interested in the study of language for its own sake. Therefore these philosophers are, perhaps, both more given to making linguistic distinctions, and better at finding such distinctions, than most. Ibid ., 299) { §6.1 }

Many English philosophers (including many who owe allegiance to Oxford Philosophy) would place themselves at a position between that of Wittgenstein and the view I have just sketched. It may therefore be in point to indicate briefly the principal differences between the two schools:

(1) Wittgensteinian analysis has, for its sole end, the resolution of philosophical enigmas. If there were no such enigmas, there would be no need for analysis. For Oxford, on the other hand, analysis has an intrinsic value.

(2) According to Wittgenstein and his disciples, all that is necessary is to exhibit the generic character of the concepts which we analyze. For Oxford, a minute analysis is indispensable.

(3) For Wittgenstein, analysis is the only useful method in philosophy. For Oxford, it is only one among others, and no one claims that it is sufficient, by itself, to resolve all philosophical problems. ( Ibid ., 301) { §6.1 }

It is not sensible to ask for the method of making one‘s fortune (or of ruining oneself); there are many. It is no more sensible to ask “What is the analytical method?” There is not one “analytic philosophy”. There are several. ( Ibid ., 301 [closing sentences]) { §6.1 }

The primary weapon is analysis. And analysis is the evocation of insight by the hypothetical suggestions of thought, and the evocation of thought by the activities of direct insight. In this process the composite whole, the interrelations, and the things related, concurrently emerge into clarity. ( Essays in Science and Philosophy , New York: Philosophical Library, 1947, 157)

Analysis is often understood to imply a whole of which the parts are explicitly known before the analysis; but logical elements are for our ordinary consciousness only implicit: we use them without reflecting on them, just as we use grammatical distinctions long before we have any knowledge of grammar. Logic does not merely analyse: it makes explicit what was implicit. ( Statement and Inference , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926, 49)

The hypothetical process therefore combines in itself both the method of discovery and the proof, and is the proper scientific exposition. The non-hypothetical proof to which we are accustomed is a sort of scientific pedantry, and it is consequently a great mistake first to give what is called analysis, which corresponds to the hypothetical process, and then to follow it by a synthesis, which is the non-hypothetical part, thus putting aside analysis as if it were a sort of accident. It is an error because it conceals the true process of thinking. ( Ibid. , 560)

I have changed my views on “atomic” complexes: I now think that qualities, relations (like love) etc. are all copulae! That means I for instance analyse a subject-predicate proposition, say, “Socrates is human” into “Socrates” and “something is human”, (which I think is not complex). The reason for this is a very fundamental one. I think that there cannot be different Types of things! In other words whatever can be symbolized by a simple proper name must belong to one type. And further: every theory of types must be rendered superfluous by a proper theory of symbolism: For instance if I analyse the proposition Socrates is mortal into Socrates, mortality and (∃x,y) ∈ 1 (x,y) I want a theory of types to tell me that “mortality is Socrates” is nonsensical, because if I treat “mortality” as a proper name (as I did) there is nothing to prevent me to make the substitution the wrong way round. But if I analyse (as I do now) into Socrates and (∃x).x is mortal or generally into x and (∃x) φx it becomes impossible to substitute the wrong way round because the two symbols are now of a different kind themselves. What I am most certain of is not however the correctness of my present way of analysis, but of the fact that all theory of types must be done away with by a theory of symbolism showing that what seem to be different kinds of things are symbolized by different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another’s places. I hope I have made this fairly clear!

Propositions which I formerly wrote ∈ 2 (a,R,b) I now write R(a,b) and analyse them into a,b and (∃x,y)R(x,y) [with (∃x,y)R(x,y) marked in the text as “not complex”] ( NB , 121-2) { §6.5 }

How is it reconcilable with the task of philosophy, that logic should take care of itself? If, for example, we ask: Is such and such a fact of the subject-predicate form?, we must surely know what we mean by “subject-predicate form”. We must know whether there is such a form at all. How can we know this? “From the signs”. But how? For we haven’t got any signs of this form. We may indeed say: We have signs that behave like signs of the subject-predicate form, but does that mean that there really must be facts of this form? That is, when those signs are completely analysed? And here the question arises again: Does such a complete analysis exist? And if not : then what is the task of philosophy?!!? ( NB , 2) { §6.5 }

Our difficulty now lies in the fact that to all appearances analysability, or its opposite, is not reflected in language. That is to say: We can not , as it seems, gather from language alone whether for example there are real subject-predicate facts or not. But how COULD we express this fact or its opposite? This must be shewn . ( NB , 10) { §6.5 }

The trivial fact that a completely analysed proposition contains just as many names as there are things contained in its reference [ Bedeutung ]; this fact is an example of the all-embracing representation of the world through language. ( NB , 11) { §6.5 }

The completely analysed proposition must image its reference [ Bedeutung ]. ( NB , 18) { §6.5 }

A question: can we manage without simple objects in LOGIC?

Obviously propositions are possible which contain no simple signs, i.e. no signs which have an immediate reference [ Bedeutung ]. And these are really propositions making sense, nor do the definitions of their component parts have to be attached to them.

But it is clear that components of our propositions can be analysed by means of a definition, and must be, if we want to approximate to the real structure of the proposition. At any rate, then, there is a process of analysis . And can it not now be asked whether this process comes to an end? And if so: What will the end be?

If it is true that every defined sign signifies via its definitions then presumably the chain of definitions must some time have an end. [Cf. TLP 3.261.]

The analysed proposition mentions more than the unanalysed.

Analysis makes the proposition more complicated than it was, but it cannot and must not make it more complicated than its meaning [ Bedeutung ] was from the first.

When the proposition is just as complex as its reference [ Bedeutung ], then it is completely analysed.

But the reference [ Bedeutung ] of our propositions is not infinitely complicated. ( NB , 46) { §6.5 }

But it also seems certain that we do not infer the existence of simple objects from the existence of particular simple objects, but rather know them—by description, as it were—as the end-product of analysis, by means of a process that leads to them. ( NB , 50) { §6.5 }

Let us assume that every spatial object consists of infintely many points, then it is clear that I cannot mention all these by name when I speak of that object. Here then would be a case in which I cannot arrive at the complete analysis in the old sense at all; and perhaps just this is the usual case.

But this is surely clear: the propositions which are the only ones that humanity uses will have a sense just as they are and do not wait upon a future analysis in order to acquire a sense.

Now, however, it seems to be a legitimate question: Are–e.g.–spatial objects composed of simple parts; in analysing them, does one arrive at parts that cannot be further analysed, or is this not the case?

—But what kind of question is this?—

Is it , A PRIORI, clear that in analysing we must arrive at simple components—is this, e.g., involved in the concept of analysis— , or is analysis ad infinitum possible?—Or is there in the end even a third possibility? ( NB , 62) { §6.5 }

In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought.

I call such elements ‘simple signs’, and such a proposition ‘completely analysed’. ( TLP , 3.2, 3.201) { §6.5 }

A proposition has one and only one complete analysis. ( TLP , 3.25) { §6.5 }

It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination.

This raises the question how such combination into propositions comes about. ( TLP , 4.221) { §6.5 }

If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their unanalysed form must know it. ( TLP , 5.5562) { §6.5 }

A proposition is completely logically analysed if its grammar is made completely clear: no matter what idiom it may be written or expressed in. ( PR , 51; cf. BT , 308) { §6.5 }

Logical analysis is the analysis of something we have, not of something we don’t have. Therefore it is the analysis of propositions as they stand . ( PR , 52) { §6.5 }

a mathematical proof is an analysis of the mathematical proposition. ( PR , 179) { §6.5 }

Complex is not like fact. For I can, e.g., say of a complex that it moves from one place to another, but not of a fact.

But that this complex is now situated here is a fact. ...

A complex is composed of its parts, the things of a kind which go to make it up. (This is of course a grammatical proposition concerning the words ‘complex’, ‘part’ and ‘compose’.)

To say that a red circle is composed of redness and circularity, or is a complex with these component parts, is a misuse of these words and is misleading. (Frege was aware of this and told me.) It is just as misleading to say the fact that this circle is red (that I am tired) is a complex whose component parts are a circle and redness (myself and tiredness).

Neither is a house a complex of bricks and their spatial relations; i.e. that too goes against the correct use of the word. ( PR , 301-2) { §6.5 }

When I say: “My broom is in the corner”,—is this really a statement about the broomstick and the brush? Well, it could at any rate be replaced by a statement giving the position of the stick and the position of the brush. And this statement is surely a further analysed form of the first one.—But why do I call it “further analysed”?—Well, if the broom is there, that surely means that the stick and brush must be there, and in a particular relation to one another; and this was as it were hidden in the sense of the first sentence, and is expressed in the analysed sentence. Then does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed in the brush?—If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought specially of the broomstick or specially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular. Suppose that, instead of saying “Bring me the broom”, you said “Bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted on to it.”!—Isn’t the answer: “DO you want the broom? Why do you put it so oddly?”——Is he going to understand the further analysed sentence better?—This sentence, one might say, achieves the same as the ordinary one, but in a more roundabout way.— Imagine a language-game in which someone is ordered to bring certain objects which are composed of several parts, to move them about, or something else of that kind. And two ways of playing it: in one (a) the composite objects (brooms, chairs, tables, etc.) have names, as in (15); in the other (b) only the parts are given names and the wholes are described by means of them.—In what sense is an order in the second game an analysed form of an order in the first? Does the former lie concealed in the latter, and is it now brought out by analysis?—True, the broom is taken to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; but does it follow that the order to bring the broom also consists of corresponding parts? ...

To say, however, that a sentence in (b) is an ‘analysed’ form of one in (a) readily seduces us into thinking that the former is the more fundamental form; that it alone shews what is meant by the other, and so on. For example, we think: If you have only the unanalysed form you miss the analysis; but if you know the analysed form that gives you everything.—But can I not say that an aspect of the matter is lost on you in the latter case as well as the former? ( PI , §§ 60, 63) { §6.5 }

Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.—Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called an “analysis” of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart.

But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our forms of language, and so a single completely resolved form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved.

It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of our investigation. ( PI , §§ 90-1) { §6.5 }

We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word. ( PI , §383) { §6.5 }

A list of key works on analysis (monographs and collections) can be found in the

Annotated Bibliography, §1.2 .

Copyright © 2014 by Michael Beaney < michael . beaney @ hu-berlin . de >

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Perception: a concept analysis

Affiliation.

• 1 Stephen F. Austin State University, Nacogdoches, Texas, USA. [email protected]
• PMID: 22613749
• DOI: 10.1111/j.2047-3095.2011.01198.x

Purpose: Concept analysis methodology by Walker and Avant (2005) was used to define, describe, and delimit the concept of perception.

Data source: Nursing literature in the Medline database was searched for definitions of "perception."

Data synthesis: Definitions, uses, and defining attributes of perception were identified; model and contrary cases were developed; and antecedents, consequences, and empirical referents were determined.

Conclusions: An operational definition for the concept was developed.

Implications for nursing practice: Nurses need to be cognizant of how perceptual differences impact the delivery of nursing care. In research, a mixed methodology approach may yield a richer description of the phenomenon and provide useful information for clinical practice.

© 2011, The Author. International Journal of Nursing Knowledge © 2011, NANDA International.

• Nursing Research
• Perception*

ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

A lightweight framework for perception analysis based on multimodal cognition-aware computing.

• 1 Institute of Systems Engineering and Collaborative Laboratory for Intelligent Science and Systems, Macau University of Science and Technology, Macao, China
• 2 School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
• 3 College of Business, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, SAR China
• 4 Shanghai Ineutech Technology Co., Ltd., Shanghai, China
• 5 College of Letters and Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, United States
• 6 China Science IntelliCloud Technology Co., Ltd., Shanghai, China

The VUCA environment challenged neuropsychological research conducted in conventional laboratories. Researchers expected to perform complex multimodal testing tasks in natural, open, and non-laboratory settings. However, for most neuropsychological scientists, the independent construction of a multimodal laboratory in a VUCA environment, such as a construction site, was a significant and comprehensive technological challenge. This study presents a generalized lightweight framework for perception analysis based on multimodal cognition-aware computing, which provided practical updated strategies and technological guidelines for neuromanagement and automation. A real-life test experiment on a construction site was provided to illustrate the feasibility and superiority of the method. The study aimed to fill a technology gap in the application of multimodal physiological and neuropsychological techniques in an open VUCA environment. Meanwhile, it enabled the researchers to improve their systematic technological capabilities and reduce the threshold and trial-and-error costs of experiments to conform to the new trend of VUCA.

Introduction

Nowadays, sensor technology has been rapidly developing, expanding its applications in industry and other fields. In psychology and cognitive science, experimental techniques and methods, such as electroencephalography (EEG), eye-tracking, and multichannel physiological monitoring, have emerged due to the successful application of sensor technology, significantly improving the scientific understanding of human cognition and behaviors.

There are two emerging trends in the advancement of instructions. First, techniques and methods in the behavioral and cognitive domains have changed from invasive to non-invasive and from explicit to implicit measures. For example, non-contact methods are less intrusive and more flexible for subjects. A second trend is that experiments using a single instruction have become insufficient to satisfy the requirements for increasingly refined cognitive and sensory detection. Social and economic development has demanded a more comprehensive exploration of science and technology.

In response to these two trends, researchers have proposed a concept called cognition-aware computing ( Zander and Kothe, 2011 ; Bulling and Zander, 2014 ). This is a systematic approach that acquires multidimensional data to analyze the cognitive states, such as behaviors, and brain activities of users. The approach has prominent advantages. Particularly, in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment, cognition-aware computing reduces the deficiencies associated with conventional self-reported driven research in psychology. Thus, neuropsychological perspectives are better suited for research in a non-conventional open laboratory environment, such as construction engineering and engineering management. Neuropsychological perspective and cognition-aware computing present an increasing potential with the continuous diversification of sensor and information technologies.

Cognition-aware computing with multiple devices is disparate from direct measurements using a single device following operating instructions. In some cases, the physiological device can be compatible with the access of other channel devices through the transmission line. Nevertheless, the environment covered by the approach is limited, and it is difficult to deal with the more complex experimental scenario of VUCA.

In contrast, the high-availability method has a unique technical threshold and requires systematic support to achieve command synchronization, data acquisition, and data fusion different from those in conventional laboratory scenarios. Although many scholars have realized and attempted to incorporate multimodal perception in scientific research, such application is limited by the lack of adequate technical support. A large number of studies on this topic are related to the mode of independent measurement even if with multiple channels. We refers which to “pseudo-multimodal cognition-aware computing”. The ideal multimodal method requires the utilization of a variety of instruments and analysis of diverse data. Therefore, to obtain a holistic framework, multimodal instruments and data can be aggregated and collaborated, thus building “a whole framework” in a real sense.

To solve these problems, this study presents a multimodality acquisition method based on the practical technical obstacles encountered in multimodal neuroscience and biobehavioral experiments in a non-laboratory, naturalized VUCA environment. This is a lightweight framework that supports real-time data aggregation, analysis, and interaction, and provides a systematic technological guide to neuromanagement and automation for researchers.

The other sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section Literature surveys works related to perceptual analysis and cognitive-aware computing. Section MCAC Framework introduces the proposed lightweight multimodal cognition-aware computing framework. Section Practice in Construction Site presents a real-life test experiment on a construction site and its operation results, followed by conclusions in Section Conclusion.

Perceptual Analysis

Human perceptual ability is a complex and integrated cognitive activity. Many researchers have conducted perceptual analysis studies of human cognitive activity. The model of human perception can be represented according to the physiological and behavioral information in the human brain. The model demonstrates that the information regarding human perceptual performance is stored in a particular form of expression, and the structure built by this stored information is combined with certain expectations, resulting in a specific behavior ( Ogiela, 2017 ). Thus, perception is closely linked to cognitive and decision-making processes.

The perceptual analysis is a methodological attempt to study human perception. Since the performance of perceptual behavior relates to many factors, a single research method cannot answer all the questions about the nature of perception. The perceptual analysis is a means of explaining this process or understanding perception and experience. Nowadays, an increasing number of scholars have obtained results using perceptual analysis based on multichannel participation ( Wang et al., 2021 ).

Cognitive-Aware Computing Approach

Single-mode cognition-aware computing approach.

There are many applications for single-mode cognition-aware computing. For example, it can be employed in any cognitive perception study that uses a single-mode instruction, such as neural observation instruments and IoT devices. In neuropsychology, the application of BCI and eye-tracker technologies is the most popular. Generally, these techniques and methods are adequate, and based on these tools, researchers can reveal human decision-making behaviors.

Cognition-Aware Computing With Multimodal Approach

In complex perceptual studies, single-mode cognition-aware computing is deficient in interpreting cognitive dimensions. Therefore, more technologies are incorporated into the cognitive and perceptual computing systems. For example, researchers combined eye movements with EEG in the latest study to reflect a more refined cognitive picture ( Carter and Luke, 2020 ). In addition, complex problems in human–computer interaction can be examined more accurately based on the integration of multimodal data, such as clickstream, eye movement, EEG, and wristband data ( Giannakos et al., 2019 ).

However, in general, the above-mentioned experiments were conducted in exchange for more dimensional cognitive data through an inefficient and demanding experimental process and experimental requirements. This constraint makes the results of these experiments difficult to measure in non-laboratory natural settings, especially in the VUCA environment, such as engineering, construction, and emergency management. Hence, conventional methods are difficult to replicate in the laboratory measurement environment, which challenges the applicability of the research conclusions.

Technology of Lightweight Framework

The lightweight framework is a method opposite to the heavyweight framework. Although researchers have not reached a consensus on the definition of a lightweight framework, their target scenarios are very specific, such as fast migration and deployment ( Crawl et al., 2016 ), and quick and easy adaptation to changes in the business strategy ( Kirk and Tempero, 2012 ). All in all, it is often considered that a lightweight framework does not come with an invasive interface. Moreover, it is not dependent on the container and is easy to configure, deploy, and generalize, as well as it is quick to start. Therefore, easy deployment, migration, and application are advantages of lightweight frameworks when compared to the industrial heavyweight ones. To sustain this consensus, this study considers the lightweight framework as a set of independent service implementations that can meet the requirements of easy migration, easy deployment, and fast response in multiple environments with low complexity, which facilities generalization and flexibility in meeting the requirements of research in the VUCA environment, as mentioned before, by using aggregated and collaborated multimodal instruments and data.

MCAC Framework

Currently, it is challenging for most neuropsychological researchers to be free to choose the instruments and independently build a holistic multimodal cognitive framework under the VUCA environment. The main problem is technical challenges. The specific difficulties are the following: commonly used PCs have limited computing and I/O throughput capacity, it is difficult to carry out data acquisition and fusion of various instruments, the starting schedules of sensors' acquisition times are different, and wireless networks often have unpredictable delay fluctuations in non-laboratory environments. The above-mentioned difficulties need a systematic solution, which is addressed by the proposed lightweight multimodal cognition-aware computing (MCAC) framework.

Framework Features

Multi-layer structure.

The MCAC framework described in this work is divided into three layers: instruments, service, and interaction ( Figure 1 ).

Figure 1 . The MCAC framework architecture.

The instrument layer includes instruments required for various experiments, such as EEG, eye trackers, and physiological instruments, which are usually applied in conventional unimodal cognition-aware computing systematic approaches. In particular, these instruments include both experimental instruments that are conventionally set up for experiments and equipment that are already available in open experimental scenarios (typically cameras). Incorporating these existing equipment in the study allows for the enrichment of data sources in the environment and reduces the additional costs related to the purchase of instruments, deployment, and dismantling. Therefore, if relevant instruments are already present in a particular environment, the possibility of including these instruments in future studies should be considered. All these instruments are connected via a LAN network or directly wired to the acquisition server. Internet connections are not recommended due to higher network latency with uncertainty, but can be chosen if necessary with time-delay corrections for data.

The service layer includes the acquisition, control, and algorithm services mentioned earlier, which is the main body of the whole framework and the primary focus of the study, and will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

The interaction layer includes application and visualization programs run on web, desktop, or mobile platforms. These applications can be connected to the service layer via a LAN or the Internet. The scalable form, which does not affect the main body of the service, supports various display forms and requirements, providing the possibility to transform the research scenario into practical applications, such as construction safety and smart retail.

Multi-Center Service

The core of the MCAC framework proposed in this paper is to adopt a loosely coupled approach with the separation of acquisition, algorithm, and control services at the service layer ( Figure 1 ). The acquisition server obtains the required data directly from the sensors through the data interface or indirectly from the corresponding data port of the computer installed with the receiving software of the sensor. In addition, the acquisition server has extended sub-acquisition based on specific acquisition requirements and load conditions. The algorithm server supports real-time analysis of the collected data. The control server is used to receive instructions from the experimenter, control and coordinate the data and algorithm server, and function as process control. The acquisition, algorithm, and control servers are wired for connection to ensure reliability and deploy the same framework protocols.

In view of the capacity limitations of the PCs typically used in the neuropsychology experiment, the framework might be necessary to separate the acquisition service from the algorithm service, which effectively meets the high throughput requirements for the hardware to write high frequency (e.g., more than 512 Hz for a single EEG instrument) and return data in the acquisition server, provides computational resource required by the algorithm server, and ensures interaction commands to be processed with high priority. Thus, the three servers spread out different I/O throughput, computing resources, and network bandwidth pressure. Although the PC capacity is very limited compared to commercial servers, such a model is not likely to cause congestion in hardware.

Researchers can add or reduce corresponding parts according to their study needs. For example, in scenarios that do not require real-time analysis, the algorithm server can be omitted. In scenarios with the need for more sensor access or unique software installation, a parallel architecture with a group of acquisition servers is used to achieve the needs of large and complex experimental scenarios.

Acquisition Service

The primary problem of the MCAC framework is how to acquire and preprocess the data collected from various sensors. The flow of the acquisition service is shown in Figure 2 .

Figure 2 . The flow of acquisition service.

Original Data Acquisition

In neuropsychology, portable instruments, such as portable EEG, fNIRS, eye trackers, and portable physiological recorders, are mainly suitable for the VUCA environments rather than large laboratory apparatus, such as fMRI. Data acquisition methods are divided into three types:

a) Acquire data from the application layer: this applies to acquiring data from the instruments in the application layer (referring to Open System Interconnection Reference Model, OSI) of the operation system directly, and it includes the devices that can customize the IP address of the data collector or be supported by the manufacturer with SDK (Software Development Kit) or API (Application Programming Interface). Representatives of such devices include ThinkGear AM ( Neuro Sky, 2015 ), Tobii ( Tobii, 2021 ), and TheEyeTribe ( The EyeTribe, 2014 ). Also, Ramadan and Vasilakosc ( Rabie et al., 2017 ) in their review listed eight kinds of popular BCI software platforms and tools most of which are open source. Based on the above, all can be achieved through simple programming data communication.

b) Acquire data from the session layer: this applies to acquiring data from the communication port of the operation system in the session layer. Instead of directly obtaining data from the reserved interface, the method acquires data based on the programs running on the PC by listening to the data port of session communication. Such acquisition mode encompasses most equipment with closed software or streaming media, such as surveillance cameras and microphones. For audio and video streaming media systems, data can be resolved directly according to the common coding format, such as h.264/h.265. For the data from the special acquisition instrument of special structure, the instrument manufacturers can generally provide document support. Data reverse engineering based on instrument self-test is usually an effective process. It should be noted that the reverse engineering of data decoding should comply with the requirements of local laws, operation manuals of the equipment, and intellectual property protection guidelines, and one has to ensure that it is not used for commercial purposes.

c) Acquire data from the existing data archive: this applies to acquiring data from two situations. First, most of the data can only be collected offline by using some special instruments. Second, some of the data itself is completed and has been collected, such as demographic information and neuropsychological test data collected offline or in advance. In this way, the existing or offline data can be integrated into the dynamic analysis with neural signal and behavioral data in a real-time setting.

Original Data Transformation

When multiple groups of independent instruments are used to collect the perceptual information of subjects, the data cannot simply be compiled together. One problem is that the sampling rates of different instruments are usually different. Generally, the sampling rate of a computer recording human–computer interaction behavior is 100 Hz, the sampling rate of an EEG sensor is 512 Hz, and the sampling rate of eye movement is 60-−200 Hz, and may even go up to 800 Hz. Another problem is that the data segments from different instruments have different meanings and cannot be simply spliced together. A typical example is the fusion of unstructured audio/video stream data. The proposed MCAC framework can handle the above-mentioned challenges by employing three data transformation methods corresponding to different structures and sampling granularity of the collected data:

a) Unstructured data feature recognition: processing and coding is a common method that can be applied to unstructured data, such as audio and video streams in the field of social science research. Typically, researchers have done this by watching videos or listening to recordings. With the advent of advanced artificial intelligence tools, extraction of structural features from these unstructured data has become possible, and these techniques can be further used in the MCAC framework. For example, Dlib ( Suwarno and Kevin, 2020 ) can capture the facial features in the video in real time, OpenPose ( Qiao et al., 2017 ) can analyze human actions in real time, and Meta-Updater ( Dai et al., 2020 ) can track multiple targets in the video for a long time. Researchers have embraced these techniques as an adjunct to neuroscience and biobehavioral observations ( Qian et al., 2022 ). Thus, the key information in the audio and video streams can be extracted from the stream and transformed into a new data structure, organized in time series.

b) Unifying granularity framework: the consistency in sampling granularity of the structured data is the key to fusion computing. According to different expectations and analysis requirements of the study, the method of data replication and filling or setting defect value can be selected to align the low sampling rate data into high sampling rate data, or averaging and moving window averaging technique can be used to reduce the frequency of high sampling rate data. It is worth noting that the performance load of the instruments is mainly concentrated in the I/O throughput of the acquisition server, so neither of the above two algorithms will have a greater impact on the performance of the acquisition server.

c) No transformation is required: the data in the scenario are structured and have a consistent temporal sampling granularity. For example, if the subject's eye movement and active selection behaviors are collected simultaneously at the granularity of 512 Hz, the collected data can be directly spliced into a complete time series with a time scale of 0.01 s.

Original Data Storage

If storage conditions are met, all the original data should be stored locally at the acquisition server to ensure the traceability of all the experimental data in the future. Experiments requiring public natural scenes and industrialization scenes need to comply with local legal requirements for personal privacy protection.

In the proposed MCAC framework, different databases can be selected for storage. The relational database has the advantages of better operability and universality, which is suitable for the storage needs of most structured data. NoSQL databases can also be involved, particularly for the unstructured data or large-scale sparse data storage generated in a natural experiment or industrial scenes, which can effectively improve the storage and access efficiency.

Original Data Transmission

All data acquired will be transformed into a new data structure with a consistent model and consistent data granularity according to the established rules of the control service, and will be transmitted to the control service.

To balance convenience, reliability, and network efficiency, lightweight WebSocket or RESTful is the preferred way of data transmission. WebSocket is a concise and persistent communication protocol based on TCP connection, which realizes the full-duplex communication between the client and the server. It has the advantages of light data format, low-performance overhead, and efficient communication. It is one of the most popular network link methods for fast and efficient communication. RESTful is a design style and developmental method for resource location and resource operation of web applications based on HTTP protocol. It can be defined in XML format or JSON format for more concise, hierarchical, and easy cache operation. At present, RESTful is widely used in the interface technology of mobile Internet. The above two technologies can effectively solve the problems of link establishment, data access, long connection maintenance, packet loss retransmission, and so on in a standardized way in most experimental scenarios. They are very simple to implement, highly portable, and extensible, and hence meet the various requirements of an MCAC lightweight framework.

Parallel Acquisition Extension

The computing resources of a lightweight framework are limited. In this, the most commonly used equipment is a normal PC, which is essential for all neuropsychological labs. In the meantime, dozens of different types of experimental acquisition instruments may be accessed and long-term tests continuously carried out for a long time in the VUCA environment supported by the MCAC, and therefore, it is necessary to adopt a scalable parallel architecture.

Multiple clusters consisting of acquisition servers are connected with the control server to form a parallel storage architecture (parallel database) that is prevalent in the industry today. In the lightweight framework of MCAC, each acquisition server performs data extraction, transformation, and storage operations independently, making the parallel architecture a loosely coupled architecture for the shared data, as shown in Figure 3 . Each database structure can be completely heterogeneous due to the different collection instruments that correspond to each collection server.

Figure 3 . The parallel acquisition architecture.

This structure has excellent scalability, and by only adding additional processing nodes (server), the processing capacity of the framework can be increased in a nearly linear proportion. Compared with the tightly coupled shared memory mode, the loosely coupled mode is more convenient to implement. Currently, main BMSs can support this parallelization extension easily.

It is worth noting that in the field of computer science, parallel database and distributed database are two different architectures, though they are both produced to improve database performance and availability. However, in the environment targeted by this study, the purpose of the parallel extension is to expand the processing capacity of the acquisition and meet special acquisition conditions. For example, to avoid run conflicts caused by some programs running at the same time. It is more important for social science researchers to know and apply this extension model so that all the acquisition instruments in the experiment become a whole system, rather than delving into the differences in the principles of the architecture.

Control Service

The control service of the MCAC deals with the alignment problem after data collection and provides data support for the subsequent analysis and interaction process. The flow of the control service is shown in Figure 4 .

Figure 4 . The flow of control service.

Acquisition Coordination

Due to the complexity and openness of the VUCA environment, it may be difficult to ensure a straightforward and fixed test process like a conventional laboratory test. For example, subjects' information cannot be confirmed before the experiment, since all the experimental equipment cannot start simultaneously. Specifically, in the follow-up experiment examining the behavior of a construction safety inspector, the surveillance cameras at each point remain open. In this process, all personnel on the site are captured by the camera. However, the experiment will not begin until the safety inspector with a portable EEG is captured by a camera. Typically, this part of the work will require a lot of human effort to view and edit video clips, but in the proposed MCAC framework, this will be achieved by the automatic collaboration of the control service. The process of acquisition coordination is shown in Figure 5 .

Figure 5 . The flow of acquisition coordination.

Timeline Alignment

In neuropsychological research, tiny inconsistent timelines may have a great impact on the final results. However, in the VUCA environment where the MCAC is deployed, some devices acquire data through wireless communication, causing inevitable time delays due to the physical network. Therefore, it is necessary for the control service to make each device align with the timeline when their data is combined.

In the field of computers, there are two main network time protocols for time alignment, NTP and PTP. On the other hand, since the wireless acquisition instruments used in the neuropsychological research are mainly IoT embedded devices that rarely support NTP or PTP services, the framework needs targeted adjustments. There are two modes (reliable connection and unreliable connection), and the timeline alignment strategies are shown in Figure 6 .

Figure 6 . The timeline alignment strategy in two model.

Reliable connection mode ( Figure 6A ) is primarily for network interactions that require keeping a connection and is mainly represented by the TCP protocol. In this mode, the server and the acquisition device will be in continuous interaction during the transmission. We can consider the time that the server receives the client's first round of interaction instruction (SYN ACK) as t 1 and the time the server receives the first data packet (ACK) as t 2 . Because the front-end acquisition device does not involve complex computation, the instrument processing time, theta (Θ), can be regarded as a constant approaching 0. Thus, the network transmission in-transit delay, delta (δ), can be calculated by (t 2 -t 1 )/2. In order to avoid the impact of network fluctuation, the process can be repeated for 10 times or more, and then calculate its trimmed mean.

Unreliable connection mode ( Figure 6B ) is primarily for network interactions that do not require keeping a connection and is mainly represented by the UDP protocol. In this mode, some servers and the acquisition device will not be in continuous interaction during the transmission after the transfer has started. Since the sensor is transmitting data back at a fixed acquisition frequency, the instrument processing time (Θ) can also be regarded as a constant approaching 0. Taking the response of the first 10 data packets or more, the network transmission in-transit delay is calculated as δ. In this situation, the δ value is equal to.

It is worth noting that the premise of the above calculation is that the in-transit delay of the experimental network transmission is symmetric. But due to network fluctuation and congestion, transmission in-transit delay is different even in the same wireless LAN. Therefore, the above-mentioned model is only a modification of the theoretical model. At the same time, researchers need to pay attention to the network stability of the acquisition instruments in the VUCA environment, and reduce the network instability through network separation and acquisition service expansion as far as possible. In this study, it is considered that it is not reliable that two times of delta (δ) is large than 0.8 times the derivative of the model's default frequency. For example, calculating the model default frequency of 10 Hz needs the transmission in-transmit delay <40 ms.

Data Reload and Data Services

After acquisition coordination and timeline alignment, the control server will combine the data from different instruments to form the following recommendation model that one objective's all dimensions at each time point will be aggregated into one row, the model and example as Figure 7 . Next, load them into the structured database of the control server.

Figure 7 . The recommendation model and example.

The database provides data services for analysis and interaction servers. If specific analysis and display are necessary, the above data formats can also be optimized to improve the efficiency of real-time analysis and display.

Collaborative Query

The parallel extension service in MCAC should also be able to handle the subsequent query requirements for the original test stored in different acquisition servers. The queries for this requirement flow out are shown in Figure 8 .

Figure 8 . The flow of collaborative query.

The figure shows that the interaction layer provides an interactive interface with the experimenter, accepts query requests for specific data, and returns query results. The control service centrally processes query requests in the data query server which deploys process logic and data dictionary, whether a parallel query or not.

Since the MCAC is not designed for industrial scenarios, it does not involve the complex development of industrial load balancing, failure transfer, data isolation, and low-level efficiency optimization. Also, the lightweight framework's basic query and loading needs can be met by packaging technologies, such as ODBC and JDBC.

Specifically, when a query service request is received from the control service, it will be sent to the query server which is located in the control server through the parallel database query interface. The query server generates the parallel query execution plan, and performs the query task flow in all parallel extended collection servers (database nodes) of the MCAC framework through the parallel data query interface, including control of parallel execution and data transfer between nodes. During this process, the query server is responsible for overall control and task synchronization. After the query is executed, the execution results of each node are summarized to the query server node and returned to the requester in the interaction layer by the control service. In order to ensure the reliability and correctness of the data query, the middleware Service Manager module constantly detects the execution process and returns it as a message to the control side (the data query server).

Analysis Service

The core of analysis service is the integration of algorithms and automation. Typically, nonlinear analysis methods are commonly used in EEG data analysis and processing, but these methods are very much dependent on offline analysis after test completion. The MCAC that provides real-time preliminary results based on the consolidated data is logic. Multidimensional analysis is possible based on the preprocessing and alignment of multidimensional data at the acquisition server and control server in the MCAC framework. It is useful to be able to get preliminary analysis results in real time along with the testing process, which can provide more diverse possibilities for research, such as support for complex interactive research.

Interaction Layer

The interaction layer of the MCAC is mainly presented in the form of a software system and undertakes the human–computer interaction with the whole framework. Because of the design pattern of the separation of data, service, presentation, and interaction in the MCAC framework, all the interactive applications of the web, desktop client, and mobile application, according to the needs of users and experiments, are available in MCAC in order to interact with users more efficiently under the lightweight framework.

Furthermore, relying on the structured data model at the control service, MCAC laid the groundwork for the use of almost any language and specification, including HTML, XHTML, CSS, flash, MathML, scalable vector graphics (SVG), Java, JavaScript, Adobe Flex, and other mainstream interaction modes.

It is important to note that the design pattern of MVC (Model-View-Controller) should be considered to maintain the high availability of a lightweight framework in a complex VUCA environment. The model layer undertakes the task of a business module, the view layer undertakes the interaction between view presentation and users, and the controller layer accepts the interaction request information of the view layer. By separating MVC's three-tier functions, the coupling degree of framework code is reduced. It is also conducive to the reuse of multiple components and supports the migration and extension of the framework.

Practice in Construction Site

A construction site is a typical VUCA environment because of its cluttered and open environment, and complex and irregular material. The construction industry is universally accepted as one of the most dangerous industries. Therefore, many scholars have focused on a series of behavioral and decision-making studies in construction management.

This study illustrates the feasibility and superiority of the described MCAC framework for a specific research application in construction management. It provides technical guidelines for researchers to set up an experimental environment when conducting complex measurements with multimodal devices in a VUCA environment.

Description

Safety inspection at construction sites has always been essential to ensure the safety and progress of the project. However, as a non-productive activity in real-life construction, it is easily neglected. Common problems have attracted much scholarly attention, including safety inspection not covering all areas, safety inspectors not being careful enough, and fatigue operations. Yet, previous technological limitations have led to studies conducted in simulated laboratory environments. Mobile brain imaging instruments (such as portable EEG and fNIRS) and wearable eye-tracking instruments have promoted the conductance of several studies ( Li et al., 2019 ; Liao et al., 2021 ; Cheng et al., 2022 ). However, these artificially created “out- laboratories” are significantly different from the natural VUCA environment of a construction site, so the experimental results were questioned about the reproducibility of research and robustness of scientific findings.

Methodology

For the purpose of this experiment, the ideal research method is to equip inspectors with neural sensing devices during a safety inspection and record their movement and behavior on-site simultaneously.

Conventional Method

Experimental procedure: first, researchers select a construction site for screening and stack some construction materials (items to be screened). Then the participant inspectors put on a neuro-observation instrument (to detect cognitive activity) and wearable eye-tracker (to detect line of sight). The researchers observe and record timestamps of each subject's behavior in detail and videotape the entire experimental process. For the operability of experiment, the subjects' routes and activities cannot be fully open instead of following certain experiment restrictions.

Data processing: The manual workload of the data acquisition stage in conventional methods is onerous and time-consuming. Valid EEG data and behavioral data are manually selected. The corresponding signal data from the overall test data of EEG and eye-tracking have to be segmented according to the timestamps of subjects' behaviors, while the audio and video signals have to be encoded for the target test subjects manually by the researchers.

Moreover, for several reasons, with the above-mentioned methods, the acquired data would be far away from the actual data in the natural and practical scenarios. First, considering the use of sensors, such as wearable eye-tracking instruments, subjects are imposed strong psychological hints on carefully facing each test, which can interfere with the results. Second, the compulsive construction safety rules of wearing helmets for all on-site personnel restrict the applicability of neural observation instruments. Third, the harsh environment of the construction site poses a risk to the sophisticated instruments. Finally, the testing paradigm requires staffing commitment and occupying construction sites for a long time, both of which hinder the involvement of subjects and raise the threshold for research.

In addition, even after overcoming the above difficulties, such a research method is merely “simulate-natural,” since the scenario cannot be reproduced in a daily real-site environment. In other words, the events that occurred can only be observed in an experimental study environment, which is not the original purpose of the research “outside the laboratory” environment and “into the VUCA environment”.

The MCAC Method

The VUCA environment needs data collection and studies based on large samples and regularity, which can be effectively supported by the MCAC framework proposed in this paper.

Experimental procedure: a portable EEG with fewer channels is used, and surveillance cameras deployed inside construction sites replace wearable eye-tracking instruments. The algorithm identifies the behavioral features of the subjects, such as action trajectories, movement, and direction of vision, from the video stream signal of the surveillance cameras. Based on the MCAC framework, subjects' behavioral features can be employed as trigger conditions to identify the EEG and behavioral features at each detection point automatically. Thus, the experiment can allow safety inspectors to conduct activity within the vast area of the construction site without restrictions.

It is worth noting that other workers may appear during the experiment or multiple subjects may be tested at the same time in the VUCA environment, which is also a situation that MCAC needs to deal with. The MCAC can mainly rely on the following two approaches: First, in cases of some devices binding with a specific subject, the device ID is naturally the unique identification. Second, the subjects could be distinguished by computer vision. It can be based on the identification of features worn by participants, such as the special color of a helmet and even the characteristic height and posture of participants. The continuous mobility of the subjects' real-time coordinates will be monitored by the algorithm to maintain the unique binding of ID and subject behavior until he/she leaves the detection area.

In this way, data of each subject are claimed for real-time analysis and feedback. The improvement simplifies the subsequent data analysis and makes the test scenario close to the natural environment. The comparison of this advantage is shown in Figure 9 .

Figure 9 . The comparison of MCAC and conventional method in the same scenario.

Based on the comparison shown in Figure 9 , we can clearly see the advantages of the new technology framework proposed in the paper for multi-mode complex experiments in large-scale complex scenes. The behavioral and physiological data of the subjects can be immediately aggregated by the framework, and WYSIWYG analysis can be realized. Comprehensive technological support allows for more ambitious experimental programs that allow subjects to carry out more open-ended tasks in a larger space. Compared with the conventional methods that rely on manual data editing, data processing, and data merging, it is not only more convenient and efficient, but, in terms of methodology, it can also produce more original and abundance data to achieve the more enrichment of data discoveries by the most natural ways in data aggregation and automatic algorithm data analysis.

Architecture Deployment

The strategy of the MCAC framework deployed in the experiment construction site is shown in Figure 10 . There were three cameras covering more than 200 m 2 of the construction site connected by wires, which allowed everyone including the safety inspector to move freely. There were three laptops that functioned as acquisition server, control server, and algorithm server. In addition, there was one portable EEG device that was developed based on ThinkGear AM and connected wirelessly by UDP protocol. The parallel extension was not needed.

Figure 10 . The diagrammatic sketch of experiment construction site and camera sets.

The service module of the framework in the experiment is described earlier. The time granularity of the final analysis model is 100 ms (a moving window is used to reduce the granularity of EEG data).

The recognition algorithm in the experiment practice, the human skeleton point detection algorithm, and the face orientation detection algorithm adopt the commercial algorithm of intellicloud, but they can also be replaced by OpenPose, Openface, solvePnPRansac, or the combination of OpenCV, Dlib, and Numpy. All these algorithms can be accessed in the open-source algorithm library, and the technical parameters of equipment are presented in Table 1 .

Table 1 . Technical parameters of the selected camera.

The technical parameters of the selected camera are listed in Table 1 .

The technical parameters of the selected laptop are listed in Table 2 .

Table 2 . Technical parameters of the selected laptop.

The technical parameters of the selected wireless network are listed in Table 3 .

Table 3 . Technical parameters of the selected wireless network.

Operation Results

The real-time activities of the safety inspector (subject) visualized during the experiment are shown in Figure 11 .

Figure 11 . Real-time visualization during the experiment.

Despite the fact that the actual experimental environment needed small number of equipment, the research team increased the number of cameras to 10 and the number of EEGs to 10 and conducted an experiment for 1 h based on the above MCAC framework in order to test the pressure. The performance of the main system is presented in Table 4 .

Table 4 . The main operation results of system performance.

The current trend in psychology and neuroscience is to go out of the lab and use multimodal data to perform a test in a more natural setting. However, this real-time multimodal study, limited by technical limitations, is still rarely reported.

The MCAC framework proposed in this study is a generalized systematic method to support this trend of large-scale application in research. The MCAC framework provides specific technological strategies for the problems that may be encountered during the application of multimodal physiological and neuropsychological techniques in an open VUCA environment. It is therefore a systematic approach to the development of such research studies and a practical technological guide. This article fills a technology gap in the methodology of neuromanagement and automation in VUCA, such as construction scenarios. This is also the main innovation and contribution of this paper.

In the experimental part, we demonstrate the feasibility of this approach by sharing a real test case. Compared with the conventional methods for the same purpose of the experiment, it shows its superiority in improving the efficiency of experiment and data analysis. Also, experiments that are difficult to implement in a complex VUCA environment can now be implemented easily and conveniently.

It is worth noting that the focus of this paper is to find a solution for the dilemma regarding the general application techniques in the fields of neuroscience and psychology, rather than computer architecture. Therefore, we do not discuss systematically the performance and load limits of the computer hardware used in the laboratory, which has nothing to do with the topic of neuromanagement. The objective of this study was to just show that with the support of lightweight, scalable technology architecture, based on common commercial devices like PC instead of large dedicated instruments, it is possible to meet all the requirements of large-scale and complex experiments. This is also a key revelation to the field of psychology and neuroscience.

In the future, we will try to further modify it so that it can be directly applied to the automation of neuromanagement. In addition, the research findings of the above construction experiment will be published.

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author/s.

Ethics Statement

Ethical review and approval was not required for the study on human participants in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study. Written informed consent was obtained from the individual(s) for the publication of any potentially identifiable images or data included in this article.

Author Contributions

XQ, YQ, and WD contributed to the conception and design of this study. XQ, YQ, and MW carried out the methodology. YQ, MW, and MC fulfill the technical implementation. YQ and MW performed the practice. XW wrote the original draft of the manuscript. WD managed this manuscript. All authors participated in the revision of the manuscript, read, and approved the submitted version.

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71971066 and 72074052), Project of the Ministry of Education of China (No. 18YJA630019), Science and Technology Innovation Action Plan of Shanghai (No. 18411952000), and 2021 Fudan University-Minhang District Health Association Project of Shanghai.

Conflict of Interest

MW was employed by the company—Shanghai Ineutech Technology Co., Ltd. and MC was employed by the company—China Science IntelliCloud Technology Co., Ltd.

The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher's Note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Acknowledgments

We extend our thanks to Shanghai INEUTECH Technology Co., Ltd, for supporting system integration, Shanghai Digitown Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd, for implementation of construction engineering experiments, and China Science IntelliCloud Technology Co., Ltd, for supporting with recognition algorithm.

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Keywords: lightweight framework, multimodal cognition-aware computing, VUCA environment, construction site, non-laboratory

Citation: Qian X, Qiao Y, Wang M, Wang X, Chen M and Dai W (2022) A Lightweight Framework for Perception Analysis Based on Multimodal Cognition-Aware Computing. Front. Neurosci. 16:879348. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2022.879348

Received: 19 February 2022; Accepted: 26 April 2022; Published: 26 May 2022.

Reviewed by:

Copyright © 2022 Qian, Qiao, Wang, Wang, Chen and Dai. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Weihui Dai, whdai@fudan.edu.cn

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Visual Perception Theory In Psychology

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

On This Page:

What is Visual Perception?

To receive information from the environment, we are equipped with sense organs, e.g., the eye, ear, and nose.  Each sense organ is part of a sensory system that receives sensory inputs and transmits sensory information to the brain.

A particular problem for psychologists is explaining how the physical energy received by sense organs forms the basis of perceptual experience. Sensory inputs are somehow converted into perceptions of desks and computers, flowers and buildings, cars and planes, into sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and touch experiences.

A major theoretical issue on which psychologists are divided is the extent to which perception relies directly on the information present in the environment.  Some argue that perceptual processes are not direct but depend on the perceiver’s expectations and previous knowledge as well as the information available in the stimulus itself.

This controversy is discussed with respect to Gibson (1966), who has proposed a direct theory of perception which is a “bottom-up” theory, and Gregory (1970), who has proposed a constructivist (indirect) theory of perception which is a “top-down” theory.

Psychologists distinguish between two types of processes in perception: bottom-up processing and top-down processing .

Bottom-up processing is also known as data-driven processing because perception begins with the stimulus itself. Processing is carried out in one direction from the retina to the visual cortex, with each successive stage in the visual pathway carrying out an ever more complex analysis of the input.

Top-down processing refers to the use of contextual information in pattern recognition. For example, understanding difficult handwriting is easier when reading complete sentences than reading single and isolated words. This is because the meaning of the surrounding words provides a context to aid understanding.

Gregory (1970) and Top-Down Processing Theory

Psychologist Richard Gregory (1970) argued that perception is a constructive process that relies on top-down processing.

Stimulus information from our environment is frequently ambiguous, so to interpret it, we require higher cognitive information either from past experiences or stored knowledge in order to make inferences about what we perceive. Helmholtz called it the ‘likelihood principle’.

For Gregory, perception is a hypothesis which is based on prior knowledge. In this way, we are actively constructing our perception of reality based on our environment and stored information.

• A lot of information reaches the eye, but much is lost by the time it reaches the brain (Gregory estimates about 90% is lost).
• Therefore, the brain has to guess what a person sees based on past experiences. We actively construct our perception of reality.
• Richard Gregory proposed that perception involves a lot of hypothesis testing to make sense of the information presented to the sense organs.
• Our perceptions of the world are hypotheses based on past experiences and stored information.
• Sensory receptors receive information from the environment, which is then combined with previously stored information about the world which we have built up as a result of experience.
• The formation of incorrect hypotheses will lead to errors of perception (e.g., visual illusions like the Necker cube).

Supporting Evidence

There seems to be an overwhelming need to reconstruct the face, similar to Helmholtz’s description of “unconscious inference.” An assumption based on past experience.

Perceptions can be ambiguous

The Necker cube is a good example of this. When you stare at the crosses on the cube, the orientation can suddenly change or “flip.”

It becomes unstable, and a single physical pattern can produce two perceptions.

Gregory argued that this object appears to flip between orientations because the brain develops two equally plausible hypotheses and is unable to decide between them.

When the perception changes though there is no change in the sensory input, the change of appearance cannot be due to bottom-up processing. It must be set downwards by the prevailing perceptual hypothesis of what is near and what is far.

Perception allows behavior to be generally appropriate to non-sensed object characteristics.

Critical Evaluation of Gregory’s Theory

1. the nature of perceptual hypotheses.

If perceptions make use of hypothesis testing, the question can be asked, “what kind of hypotheses are they?” Scientists modify a hypothesis according to the support they find for it, so are we, as perceivers, also able to modify our hypotheses? In some cases, it would seem the answer is yes.  For example, look at the figure below:

This probably looks like a random arrangement of black shapes. In fact, there is a hidden face in there; can you see it? The face is looking straight ahead and is in the top half of the picture in the center.  Now can you see it?  The figure is strongly lit from the side and has long hair and a beard.

Once the face is discovered, very rapid perceptual learning takes place and the ambiguous picture now obviously contains a face each time we look at it. We have learned to perceive the stimulus in a different way.

Although in some cases, as in the ambiguous face picture, there is a direct relationship between modifying hypotheses and perception, in other cases, this is not so evident.  For example, illusions persist even when we have full knowledge of them (e.g., the inverted face, Gregory 1974).

One would expect that the knowledge we have learned (from, say, touching the face and confirming that it is not “normal”) would modify our hypotheses in an adaptive manner. The current hypothesis testing theories cannot explain this lack of a relationship between learning and perception.

2. Perceptual Development

A perplexing question for the constructivists who propose perception is essentially top-down in nature is “how can the neonate ever perceive?”  If we all have to construct our own worlds based on past experiences, why are our perceptions so similar, even across cultures?  Relying on individual constructs for making sense of the world makes perception a very individual and chancy process.

The constructivist approach stresses the role of knowledge in perception and therefore is against the nativist approach to perceptual development.

However, a substantial body of evidence has been accrued favoring the nativist approach. For example, Newborn infants show shape constancy (Slater & Morison, 1985); they prefer their mother’s voice to other voices (De Casper & Fifer, 1980); and it has been established that they prefer normal features to scrambled features as early as 5 minutes after birth.

3. Sensory Evidence

Perhaps the major criticism of the constructivists is that they have underestimated the richness of sensory evidence available to perceivers in the real world (as opposed to the laboratory, where much of the constructivists” evidence has come from).

Constructivists like Gregory frequently use the example of size constancy to support their explanations. That is, we correctly perceive the size of an object even though the retinal image of an object shrinks as the object recedes. They propose that sensory evidence from other sources must be available for us to be able to do this.

However, in the real world, retinal images are rarely seen in isolation (as is possible in the laboratory). There is a rich array of sensory information, including other objects, background, the distant horizon, and movement. This rich source of sensory information is important to the second approach to explaining perception that we will examine, namely the direct approach to perception as proposed by Gibson.

Gibson argues strongly against the idea that perception involves top-down processing and criticizes Gregory’s discussion of visual illusions on the grounds that they are artificial examples and not images found in our normal visual environments.

This is crucial because Gregory accepts that misperceptions are the exception rather than the norm. Illusions may be interesting phenomena, but they might not be that information about the debate.

Gibson (1966) and Bottom-Up Processing

Gibson’s bottom-up theory suggests that perception involves innate mechanisms forged by evolution and that no learning is required. This suggests that perception is necessary for survival – without perception, we would live in a very dangerous environment.

Our ancestors would have needed perception to escape from harmful predators, suggesting perception is evolutionary.

James Gibson (1966) argues that perception is direct and not subject to hypothesis testing, as Gregory proposed. There is enough information in our environment to make sense of the world in a direct way.

His theory is sometimes known as the ‘Ecological Theory’ because of the claim that perception can be explained solely in terms of the environment.

For Gibson: the sensation is perception: what you see is what you get.  There is no need for processing (interpretation) as the information we receive about size, shape, distance, etc., is sufficiently detailed for us to interact directly with the environment.

Gibson (1972) argued that perception is a bottom-up process, which means that sensory information is analyzed in one direction: from simple analysis of raw sensory data to the ever-increasing complexity of analysis through the visual system.

Features of Gibson’s Theory

The optic array.

Perception involves ‘picking up’ the rich information provided by the optic array in a direct way with little/no processing involved.

Because of movement and different intensities of light shining in different directions, it is an ever-changing source of sensory information. Therefore, if you move, the structure of the optic array changes.

According to Gibson, we have the mechanisms to interpret this unstable sensory input, meaning we experience a stable and meaningful view of the world.

Changes in the flow of the optic array contain important information about what type of movement is taking place. The flow of the optic array will either move from or towards a particular point.

If the flow appears to be coming from the point, it means you are moving towards it. If the optic array is moving towards the point, you are moving away from it.

Invariant Features

the optic array contains invariant information that remains constant as the observer moves. Invariants are aspects of the environment that don’t change. They supply us with crucial information.

Two good examples of invariants are texture and linear perspective.

Another invariant is the horizon-ratio relation. The ratio above and below the horizon is constant for objects of the same size standing on the same ground.

OPTICAL ARRAY : The patterns of light that reach the eye from the environment.

RELATIVE BRIGHTNESS : Objects with brighter, clearer images are perceived as closer

TEXTURE GRADIENT : The grain of texture gets smaller as the object recedes. Gives the impression of surfaces receding into the distance.

RELATIVE SIZE : When an object moves further away from the eye, the image gets smaller. Objects with smaller images are seen as more distant.

SUPERIMPOSITION : If the image of one object blocks the image of another, the first object is seen as closer.

HEIGHT IN THE VISUAL FIELD : Objects further away are generally higher in the visual field

Evaluation of Gibson’s (1966) Direct Theory of Perception

Gibson’s theory is a highly ecologically valid theory as it puts perception back into the real world.

A large number of applications can be applied in terms of his theory, e.g., training pilots, runway markings, and road markings.

It’s an excellent explanation for perception when viewing conditions are clear. Gibson’s theory also highlights the richness of information in an optic array and provides an account of perception in animals, babies, and humans.

His theory is reductionist as it seeks to explain perception solely in terms of the environment. There is strong evidence to show that the brain and long-term memory can influence perception. In this case, it could be said that Gregory’s theory is far more plausible.

Gibson’s theory also only supports one side of the nature-nurture debate, that being the nature side. Again, Gregory’s theory is far more plausible as it suggests that what we see with our eyes is not enough, and we use knowledge already stored in our brains, supporting both sides of the debate.

Visual Illusions

Gibson’s emphasis on DIRECT perception provides an explanation for the (generally) fast and accurate perception of the environment. However, his theory cannot explain why perceptions are sometimes inaccurate, e.g., in illusions.

He claimed the illusions used in experimental work constituted extremely artificial perceptual situations unlikely to be encountered in the real world, however, this dismissal cannot realistically be applied to all illusions.

For example, Gibson’s theory cannot account for perceptual errors like the general tendency for people to overestimate vertical extents relative to horizontal ones.

Neither can Gibson’s theory explain naturally occurring illusions. For example, if you stare for some time at a waterfall and then transfer your gaze to a stationary object, the object appears to move in the opposite direction.

Bottom-up or Top-down Processing?

Neither direct nor constructivist theories of perception seem capable of explaining all perceptions all of the time.

Gibson’s theory appears to be based on perceivers operating under ideal viewing conditions, where stimulus information is plentiful and is available for a suitable length of time. Constructivist theories, like Gregory”s, have typically involved viewing under less-than-ideal conditions.

Research by Tulving et al. manipulated both the clarity of the stimulus input and the impact of the perceptual context in a word identification task. As the clarity of the stimulus (through exposure duration) and the amount of context increased, so did the likelihood of correct identification.

However, as the exposure duration increased, so the impact of context was reduced, suggesting that if stimulus information is high, then the need to use other sources of information is reduced.

One theory that explains how top-down and bottom-up processes may be seen as interacting with each other to produce the best interpretation of the stimulus was proposed by Neisser (1976) – known as the “Perceptual Cycle.”

DeCasper, A. J., & Fifer, W. P. (1980). Of human bonding: Newborns prefer their mothers” voices . Science , 208(4448), 1174-1176.

Gibson, J. J. (1966). The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Gibson, J. J. (1972). A Theory of Direct Visual Perception. In J. Royce, W. Rozenboom (Eds.). The Psychology of Knowing . New York: Gordon & Breach.

Gregory, R. (1970). The Intelligent Eye . London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Gregory, R. (1974). Concepts and Mechanisms of Perception . London: Duckworth.

Necker, L. (1832). LXI. Observations on some remarkable optical phenomena seen in Switzerland; and on an optical phenomenon which occurs on viewing a figure of a crystal or geometrical solid . The London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, 1 (5), 329-337.

Slater, A., Morison, V., Somers, M., Mattock, A., Brown, E., & Taylor, D. (1990). Newborn and older infants” perception of partly occluded objects. Infant behavior and Development , 13(1), 33-49.

Further Information

Trichromatic Theory of Color Vision

Held and Hein (1963) Movement-Produced Stimulation in the Development of Visually Guided Behavior

What do visual illusions teach us?

Perception-Based Analysis: An innovative approach for brand positioning assessment

• Original Article
• Published: 18 January 2010
• Volume 17 , pages 6–18, ( 2010 )

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• Edar Anana 1 &
• Walter Nique  

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The work discusses the Perception-Based Analysis (PBA) and its adequacy for evaluating brands positioning from the point of view of the consumers. PBA is a relatively new post hoc segmentation method, based on a topology representing neural network, able to identify homogeneous segments of perceptions in an indiscriminate mass of data. The ‘Neural Gas’ algorithm was used to find clusters in a sample of 376 students who evaluated the Nike brand across 42 items of Brand Personality Scale. Discriminant Analysis was performed to check the ability of PBA to form homogeneous segments, and an Exploratory/Confirmatory Factor Analysis (E/CFA) was carried out to confirm the validation. Five prototypes of perception were identified and described according to the importance respondents put on brand attributes. Four (among five) prototypes demonstrate a significant relationship (positive or inverse) with two or more dimensions of brand perception. Homogeny of the segments was attested, both, by Discriminant and by the E/CFA. Results suggest that PBA was both valid and reliable for capturing output brand positioning, once it succeeded in performing two important segmentation tasks: (a) identifying clusters relatively homogeneous in terms of brand perception, and (b) portraying the general opinion prevailing in every group of consumers about the brand assessed.

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INTRODUCTION

Economists have come to accept consumers’ perceptions of choice alternatives as necessary ingredients of their standard model. According to McFadden 1 ‘economists investigating consumer behavior can learn a great deal from careful study of market research findings and marketing practice’, and ‘cognitive illusions in purchase behavior seem to coexist comfortably with the use of discrete response models’ (p. 368). Brands, on the other hand, act as shorthand in the consumers’ minds, of the set of functional and emotional associations and of trust, so that they do not have to think much about their purchase decision. 2

Brands are powerful entities because they blend functional, performance-based values with emotional values. 3 Therefore, while the Jaguar may compete with other brands of cars on rationally evaluated performance value, it may be bought because of the emotional value of prestige. A brand can be defined from a dyadic perspective, the manufacturers’ (input) perspective or the consumers’ imaginary (output) perspective. From the input perspective the notion of a brand is encapsulated in ideas portraying a brand as a legal instrument, as a logo, a company and as an identity system; from the output perspective a brand can be an image in consumers’ minds, a personality, a relationship, an adding value or an evolving entity. However, ‘the number of authors adhering to the concept of brands as associations in consumers’ minds attests the growing support for consumer-centered perspective on the meaning of brands’ (p. 91). 2

This work analyzes the brand from the output, more specifically from the consumers’ imaginary description, using Perception-Based Analysis (PBA) 4 to evaluate consumers’ perceptions about a well-known brand. The work is exploratory in nature and a Topology Representing Network (TRN) algorithm is employed both to identify groups of consumers with relatively homogeneous perceptions and to typify their perceptions. Results suggested that PBA succeeded in correctly typifying the post hoc segments 5 , 6 with acceptable fit measures and minimum overlaps, thus constituting an attractive alternative for brand perception evaluation.

BRAND PERSONALITY

According to the American Marketing Association, a ‘brand’ is as ‘a name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or combination of them, intended to identify the goods or services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of competitors’. This definition has been criticized for stressing the importance of visual features as the basis for differentiation and for being too mechanical and excessively concerned with the physical product. 2

Research has shown that brands are a multifaceted concept, and to talk about ‘a brand’ sometimes overlooks the richness of this concept. A useful tool for understanding the nature of brands is the ‘brand iceberg’. An iceberg is drawn with 15 per cent visible above the water and 85 per cent invisible beneath the water; the visible parts are logo and name and the invisible are values, intellect and culture. 3 ‘Brands are complex offerings that are conceived in brand plans, but ultimately they reside in consumers’ minds’ (p. 27). Brands exist mainly by virtue of a continuous process whereby organizational activities are interpreted and internalized by customers as a cluster of values.

Brand personality is a metaphoric way of portraying a brand that facilitates the attribution of emotional values to brands, especially when advertising involves celebrity endorsement. Consumers show no difficulty in assigning personal qualities to inanimate brand objects, 7 in thinking about brands as if they were human characters 8 or to animate products of their own.

The vitality of a brand can be realized by different forms of animism. A brand can be perceived as an animated entity by the assumption that it somehow possesses the spirit of an endorser (for example a celebrity), or of a person whose image can be associated with it (for example a grandmother and a chocolate brand she used to gift us). The association between a brand and a person can be so strong that the person's spirit is evoked in one's mind when using the brand. 9 Another form of animism involves the complete anthropomorphization of the brand itself with the transcendence of human qualities, like emotion, thought and volition. ‘A brand's emotional values are also inferred from its design and packing, along with other marketer-controlled clues such as pricing and type of outlet selling the brand’ (p. 40). 3

An interesting way to comprehend the essence of brand personality is exploring the brand pyramid concept ( Figure 1 ). The logic behind the brand pyramid is that when managers devise a new brand, they are initially concerned with unexploited gaps in markets and try to conceive a brand able to deliver unique attributes. However, consumers are less concerned with attributes (for example a multifunction remote controller) and are more attentive to the benefits gained from these attributes (for example ease of recording TV shows). With experience, consumers begin to understand the brand for its benefits and emotional rewards.

The brand pyramid (Adapted from Chenatony) 3 .

At the top of the pyramid is a personality representing the personality traits associated with the values of the brand. By using a personality who exhibits the traits of the brand (for example a film star, pop star, athlete and so on) to promote the brand consumers draw inferences that the brand has some of the values of the promoting personality. Ultimately, the laddering in the pyramid is used to enable the brand to make a unique and welcomed promise.

Brand personality also acts as a symbolic or self-expressive function. People do not buy a Mercedes just because of the brand's performance, but rather because of the meanings of status and lifestyle represented by the brand. Brands acquire symbolic meanings in society and, through people interacting with each other, the meanings represented by a brand become better understood by people. When choosing between competing brands, customers assess the fit between the personalities of competing brands and the personality they wish to project. 3

PERCEPTION-BASED ANALYSIS

Perception-Based Analysis (PBA) 4 , 10 and Perception-Based Market Segmentation (PBMS) 11 are alternatives to more traditional Response-Based Market Segmentation (RBMS). RBMS derives the market segments directly from class-specific parameter estimates for the variables that are assumed to determine brand choice. PBA and PBMS can be classified as post hoc methods of segmentation, 5 , 6 as the number and type of segments are determined directly from data analysis, without any reference a priori . To employ PBMS it is suggested that one thinks about analysis as decomposed into an exploratory and an inferential step. During the exploratory step brand identity is ignored and the profiles/vectors in the stacked matrix are examined to determine the number of generic patterns in the data. These generic product profiles serve as the raw material for extracting a number of distinguished perceptual positions. These positions (or patterns) represent a typical combination of attributes (prototypes) consumers have on their minds. Deriving a limited number of patterns can be done using a cluster analysis procedure like K-means or vector quantization (VQ) method. 12 The TRN was the alternative of choice in this work as being superior to simple K-means in reproducing intricate cluster structures. 13

In the PBA inferential step the brand names are then incorporated and used for cross-tabulating the joint distribution of perceptual positions of any pair of brands the analyst is interested in. This procedure required some adaptation to be employed in this work: instead of identifying a general perception about each brand, as Mazanec and Strasser 10 did, we were interested in getting different perceptions about the same brand. As a consequence, instead of portraying consumers’ views about brands A, B, C,…, N we were interested in capturing the patterns A, B, C,…, N, representing different positions of a brand in the consumers’ minds.

Another reason for choosing TRN was its ability to evaluate the best number of segments existing in data. As 5 ‘a general problem of the nonhierarchical methods is the determination of the number of cluster present in the data’ (p. 19), the percentage of uncertainty reduction index (per cent UR) incorporated in TRN conveys an intuitively appealing piece of information to decide on the best number of clusters to identify. 14 The per cent UR is based on pairs of data points misplaced across replicated VQ runs; the few data misplacements over replications, the higher per cent UR.

BRAND PERCEPTION

The identification of different brand perceptions was based on PBA, 4 , 10 , 11 which, in a technical sense, corresponds to identifying latent segments in an indiscriminate mass of data. According to that model the term perception corresponds to the attributes that respondents valuate the most in a set of choice alternatives. Our data were interval-type resultant from ‘NIKE’ evaluation using the 42 items of the Brand Personality Scale (BPS), 7 reduced to five factors during the work to improve interpretability. A previous logarithmic transformation had been performed to reduce the skewness and kurtosis. 15

According to the PBA, during the exploratory step perceptions are analyzed at the generic level and compressed into typical profiles. These profiles represent typical combinations of attributes (prototypes) consumers have on their minds. If, for example, consumers have four typical images of a brand, then respondents’ reactions can be recoded into a single feature variable like A, B, C and D or simply P1 (Perception 1), P2, P3 and P4.

PROTOTYPING

Before prototyping data an earlier step was carried out to assess the best number of clusters to be formed. This was based on the improvement of the uncertainty reduction index (per cent UR) 14 for solutions ranging from two to ten clusters. The per cent UR suggested five clusters as the best solution. The clustering process was handled with TRN software, which implements the Neural Gas Algorithm. The model introduced under the name of ‘Topology Representing Network’, 13 employs the competitive learning principle in which the prototypes rival one against each other in attempting to approximate the frequency distribution of empirical data. However, unlike other networks 4 ‘the training rule adjusts not only the winning prototype but all prototypes according to the rank of distances between data point and the first winner, second winner, etc.’ (p. 49).

Two measures were saved during the classification process: parameter estimation and cluster labels. Parameter estimation is a TRN output resulting from the network training and represents the importance of each variable for cluster identification: the higher a variable load in a cluster, the more important it is for the respondents in that cluster. 16 Cluster labels is another output of the same algorithm and correspond to a vector representing each cluster as a category (say clusters no. 1, 2, 3…,  n ).

Interpretation of prototypes characteristics can be done visually but is not an easy task. According to Dolnicar et al 14 ‘the interpretation of these prototypes is left to the researcher and thus to a great extent is subjective (making this procedure more objective is obviously an important future research task)’ (p. 29). For them, the meaning of every perceptual position can be inferred from the loads of marker variables in every prototype. In this work some variables have been considered marker for loading distinctively (highly or poorly) in one or another cluster. Attributes such as ‘successful’ and ‘leader’, for example, distinguished for loading heavily in Cluster 5; and others, such as ‘real’ marked for loading weakly in Clusters 2 and 3.

To improve prototype interpretability, the cluster identification was done in two rounds: a first round including all the 42 variables of the original scale, and a second with a more distinctive set of variables. The reduced set of five dimensions (Cronbach α s > 0.77) was identified throughout an Exploratory Factor Analysis from the original 26 variables, explaining 57.7 per cent of variance. Results of both rounds did not differ significantly (Wilcoxon signed ranks test z =−1.324, Sig. 0.185; sign test z =−0.651, Sig. 0.515), and therefore the reduced set of variables was adopted to facilitate the prototypes’ description. Clusters’ size and prototypes’ loads are reported in Table 1 . The terms ‘clusters’ and ‘prototypes’ are assumed as equivalents in this work, as they represent the same groups of respondents: the former refers to the people in the groups and the latter describes the characteristics of the groups.

INTERPRETATION OF PROTOTYPES

After evaluating the latent positions existing in complex data and prototyping them labels have been added to every case according to the group they fit better. Five distinct groups have been identified. At a first glimpse on the parameter estimation it was possible to recognize a minor group (7 per cent) expressing severe criticism about the brand. In general terms, it was possible to see that for members of Cluster 4 ‘almost nothing fits’ Nike. Even the more pronounced attributes, such as down to earth, cheerful, trendy and successful, load around 0.55 in a 0–1 range, as shown in Figures 2 and 3 .

Personality traits importance across clusters.

Personality traits importance for Clusters 1 and 4.

Contrasting with the ‘almost nothing fits’ group, people in Cluster 1 (16 per cent) manifested a relatively favorable view about Nike, as 18 of 26 items in this group loaded over 0.9 in a 0–1 range. As we can see in Figure 3 , while Cluster 1 concentrates most of the personality traits’ loads at the top of scale (between 0.8 and 1.0), Cluster 4 concentrates the loads around 0.5. But even showing the most favorable view about Nike, Cluster 1 cannot be characterized as an ‘everything fits’ group, because some attributes suggesting sincerity (sincere, real and wholesome) or sophistication (feminine and smooth) loaded around 0.6, which can be interpreted as a sign of relative criticism.

Clusters 2, 3 and 5 share the space between the extreme perceptions of Clusters 1 and 4. In general terms, it is possible to say that people in Clusters 2, 3 and 5 are less generous about Nike than those in Cluster 1, but not too critical as those in Cluster 4. Some differences between these three clusters are quite subtle and not easily perceived. To make the differences more evident loads pertaining to the Clusters 2–5 were standardized in a 0–1 interval using the normal distribution, and plotted on a two-axis graph ( Figure 4 ).

Personality traits importance for Clusters 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Among the three ‘intermediary’ clusters, perceptions regarding Nike reliability, glamour, energy and competence can be interpreted by the loads of some variables in every cluster. Nike reliability (expressed by variables like real, sincere and wholesome), for example, is better perceived in Cluster 5 than in Clusters 2 and 3. Or say, Nike is fairly reliable for people in Clusters 2 and 3 but is quite trustworthy for Cluster 5s.

Results can be interpreted both by the clusters’ lines proximity (a sign of importance) and by the clusters’ lines distance (a sign of avoidance). Analyzing Figure 4 , it is possible to see that some variables expressing sophistication (charming, glamorous, good looking) are more important for people in Clusters 2 and 3 than for those in Clusters 4 and 5.

Some variables expressing competence (successful, leader, technical) are more important for consumers in Clusters 3 and 5 than for those in Clusters 2 and 4; some variables suggesting energy (exciting, western, tough) are clearly in opposition to the Cluster 4 direction but not too distant from Cluster 2; and some variables suggesting sincerity (sincere, real, wholesome) are in the opposite way of Cluster 2 but not too distant from Cluster 4. A condensed interpretation of the five clusters is shown in Table 2 .

METHOD VALIDATION

To evaluate the neural algorithm ability to form clusters of homogeneous perceptions a Discriminant Analysis and an E/CFA were carried out using cluster numbers as a dependent category variable. The sole objective of the Discriminant Analysis, in this work, was to produce a spatial map to visualize the main dimensions; not a statistical inference. The resulting Figure 5 shows that the algorithm succeeded in producing homogenous groups of respondents according to their perceptions with minimum overlapping. It also confirmed that Cluster 4 is not only a minor group but that perceptions of its members are fairly dispersed and are difficult to typify.

Spatial distribution of clusters identified.

An E/CFA was used for being a useful precursor to CFA, which allows the researcher to explore measurement structures more fully before moving into a confirmatory framework. 17 It represents an intermediary step between EFA and CFA, which provides substantial information, important in the development of realistic confirmatory solutions. The E/CFA purpose in this work was twofold: (a) to verify data ability to reproduce BPS original dimensions in a Brazilian context, and (b) to estimate the parameters and dimensions to be compared with perceptions produced from PBA clusters loads.

Since an EFA had been carried out during the prototyping procedure, the exploratory step was considered superfluous. The dimensions identified on that previous procedure, explaining 57.7 per cent of variance, were assumed as the underlying structure existing in data and variables with highest factor loads taken as factors’ anchors. The confirmatory step assumed that each variable had non-zero loading on the factor it was assigned to measure, and zero loading on all other factors.

Three of the five factors (sincerity, competence and sophistication) were assumed as equivalent to the original dimensions, as most of the variables coincided. Excitement and ruggedness factors mixed variables from different dimensions and had to be re-specified. Excitement received some variables from the sincerity dimension and therefore was re-specified as conventional modernity, for expressing actuality and affectivity at the same time, or say: a factor suggesting up-to-dateness but not young wildness. Ruggedness mixed some of its own original variables with excitement’ and was re-specified as vanguardism, for mixing fashion tendency (trendy) and adventure. As we can see in Table 3 , all the variables used in the measurement model were very significant (Estimate/Standard Error > 2) to explain the dimensions they had been assigned to, and except for ‘smooth’ and ‘feminine’ – two attributes of sophistication – all variables counted more than 30 per cent of their variance for the latent corresponding factor ( R 2 ). Brand dimensions were allowed to correlate, according to the original work. 7 Factors’ correlations are shown in Table 4 .

Except for brand sincerity, which seems to be less associated, all the latent factors show correlations over 0.5. The two factors resulting from re-specification (Challenge and Cheerfulness) showed high correlation (0.89), which can be interpreted as a sign of proximity in terms of meaning. This was somewhat expected as both the re-specified factor received variables from excitement (E) original dimension. The high correlation (0.92) involving challenge and sophistication was not expected, as the first one comprises variables from the ruggedness original factor, an idea almost opposite to sophistication. Even conceding that both dimensions suggest some energy the high correlation was considered surprising here.

The structural model was specified with all the five prototypes of perception as dependent on brand dimensions. As the prototypes were binary-type, the Robust Weighted Least Square (WLSMV) estimator was chosen for being the most appropriate estimator for categorical indicators. 17 , 18 Fit measures (TLI=0.915; RMSEA=0.076) were considered acceptable for that purpose. 17

Some segments, but not all, showed a significant relationship with brand dimensions probit regression coefficients, confirming that every prototype has a different view about Nike. Prototype 1, for example, sees positively sincerity and challenge, but the latter is more than double the former, confirming that sincerity is not a good facet of Nike. Prototype 2 has a positive view in relation to cheerfulness and sophistication but a negative view in relation to challenge. Prototype 3 shows a negative view about Nike cheerfulness and sincerity. Prototype 4 did not show significant dependency from any dimension. And Prototype 5 sees Nike as challenging and relatively sincere but not as a sophisticated brand. The R 2 included in last row of Table 5 , just below the standardized coefficients, confirms that all the prototypes, except number four, accounts more than 50 per cent of its variance for model adjustment.

Most of those findings are in accordance with PBA evaluation. For example, comparing the challenge and sincerity standardized coefficients for Prototype 1, it is possible to see that the former is more than twice the value of the last. Taking into consideration that both are highly significant, this confirms that even among the most generous group of consumers, honesty is not a strong facet of Nike. The highest positive coefficient for variables suggesting sophistication in Prototype 2 confirms that group as the one that best perceives charm in Nike. The positive coefficient for cheerfulness is also in accordance with PBA, but the criticism about challenge (−3.467) was not elicited by that procedure.

The negative coefficients for cheerfulness and sincerity in Prototype 3 confirm that this group does not see distinctive attributes on Nike and is seriously critical about its reliability. Criticism about brand reliability can be inferred in two ways: (a) straightforwardly derived from the negative value of sincerity and (b) indirectly from the sincerity variables that were assigned to the cheerfulness dimension in this work. The criticism about brand glamour captured by PBA could not be confirmed by E/CFA.

The lack of a significant relationship between Prototype 4 and brand dimensions seems reasonable, as people in this group did not valuate any distinctive trait of Nike. In consequence, no significant relationship could be expected between their perception and brand dimensions. Coefficients of Prototype 5 confirmed that this perception remembers in some way the positive evaluations of Prototypes 1 and 2, but sharply differ in terms of glamour, which is severely criticized by people in this group.

To conclude, the result of E/CFA suggests that PBA succeeded in performing two important tasks related to post hoc segmentation: (a) identified groups of consumers with relatively homogeneous perceptions, and (b) offered appropriate information for prototype’ description. The accuracy with which consumers were assigned to the clusters was attested by the fit measures. The convergence of results produced by different methods can be interpreted as a sign of validity; moreover, in this situation, when the E/CFA could reproduce most of the non-parametric PBA results. This way it seems reasonable to conclude that the Neural Gas Algorithm constitutes an appealing alternative to finding a latent segment in an indiscriminate mass of data, or when the bases for a priori segmentation are not trustworthy, as occurred in the present study.

Most of the prototype perceptions based on PBA were validated by E/CFA. Even requiring some re-specifications the original dimensions could be used to estimate parameters for prototypes. Most of the significant relationships found coincided with the PBA-based description. The release of some variables that could not be used for not fitting the model was not considered problematic once the data were collected in a country other than USA. According to Aaker, 7 the scale might not be appropriate for measuring brand personality in different cultural contexts and ‘with the use of the Brand Personality Scale, the variables can be manipulated systematically and their impact on brand's personality measured’ (p. 354).

Four of five prototypes demonstrate a significant relationship (positive or inverse) with two or more dimensions of brand perception. According to E/CFA it was possible to confirm that: (a) people in Cluster 1 see Nike as a challenger and a quite sincere brand; (b) people in Cluster 2 see Nike as sophisticated and cheerful but not as an adventurer brand; (c) people in Cluster 3 see Nike as low profile and non-reliable brand; (d) people in Cluster 4 do not see any significant quality in Nike; and (e) people in Cluster 5 see Nike as a challenger, and a quite sincere and unsophisticated brand.

Even being considered adequate for brand assessment this approach requires some care. PBA was considered appropriate for post hoc segmentation and therefore for capturing brand positioning. But the ability of BPS 7 to measure brand personality has some restrictions. Azoulay and Kapferer, 19 for example, argue from the personality literature that Aaker's scale 7 of brand personality merges a number of dimensions of brand identity that cannot be interpreted as personality. Others claim that it cannot generalize to all brands and that some traits, like ‘western’ and ‘small town’ are difficult to be interpreted. 3

Despite any semantic discussion regarding which real facet of the brand BPS is able to measure, it does not seem to be decisive for brand managers. It does not matter whether the scale describes real traits of personality or just reflects some facets of brand identity. It was most important for the purpose of this work to confirm PBA as an adequate tool to interpret the brands’ output positioning.

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration ( Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien ) for providing the software, and Professor Josef Mazanec for his comments and suggestions about this study.

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1 got his Master's degree in Business Administration (Finance) from the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and his PhD from the same university. Now he is Professor at Universidade Federal de Pelotas (Brazil).

2 got his Master's degree in Business Administration from the University of Chile and his PhD in Sciences de Gestion from Pierre Mendès University (Grenoble – France). Now he is Professor at Ecole Supérieure de Commerce of Troyes (France) and Professor at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil).

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Anana, E., Nique, W. Perception-Based Analysis: An innovative approach for brand positioning assessment. J Database Mark Cust Strategy Manag 17 , 6–18 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/dbm.2009.32

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Received : 21 December 2009

Revised : 21 December 2009

Published : 18 January 2010

Issue Date : 01 March 2010

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/dbm.2009.32

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The role of language in the experience and perception of emotion: a neuroimaging meta-analysis

Jeffrey a. brooks.

1 Department of Psychology, New York University

Holly Shablack

2 Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Maria Gendron

3 Department of Psychology, Northeastern University

Ajay B. Satpute

4 Department of Psychology, Pomona College

Michael H. Parrish

5 Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles

Kristen A. Lindquist

6 Biomedical Research Imaging Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Associated Data

Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies demonstrate that labeling one’s emotional experiences and perceptions alters those states. Here, we used a comprehensive meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature to systematically explore whether the presence of emotion words in experimental tasks has an impact on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions across studies. Using a database of 386 studies, we assessed brain activity when emotion words (e.g. ‘anger’, ‘disgust’) and more general affect words (e.g. ‘pleasant’, ‘unpleasant’) were present in experimental tasks vs not present. As predicted, when emotion words were present, we observed more frequent activations in regions related to semantic processing. When emotion words were not present, we observed more frequent activations in the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally. The presence of affect words did not have the same effect on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions, suggesting that our observed effects are specific to emotion words. These findings are consistent with the psychological constructionist prediction that in the absence of accessible emotion concepts, the meaning of affective experiences and perceptions are ambiguous. Findings are also consistent with the regulatory role of ‘affect labeling’. Implications of the role of language in emotion construction and regulation are discussed.

Introduction

It is often assumed that language merely labels or communicates emotional states that have already been generated ( Ekman and Cordaro, 2011 ; Wood and Niedenthal, 2015 ). However, psychological constructionist models of emotion suggest that words that name emotion concepts (‘fear’, ‘disgust’, ‘anger’) are in fact constitutive of emotions. In these models, emotion words support the conceptual knowledge that helps the brain make meaning of affective sensations in a given context. In doing so, conceptual knowledge helps ‘construct’ emotions because it transforms ambiguous affective sensations into experiences and perceptions of certain discrete emotions ( Barrett et al. , 2007 ; Lindquist and Gendron, 2013 ; Lindquist et al. , 2015a , b ).

Consistent with the psychological constructionist view, a growing body of research demonstrates the behavioral and cognitive impact of emotion concept words on emotional experiences and perceptions ( Pennebaker & Beall, 1986 ; Fugate et al. , 2010 ; Widen and Russell, 2010 ; Lieberman, 2011 ; Lieberman et al. , 2011 ; Kircanski et al. , 2012 ; Kassam & Mendes, 2013 ; Lindquist and Gendron, 2013 ; Lindquist et al. , 2015a , b ; Niles et al. , 2015 for reviews). Yet only a handful of neuroimaging experiments have explicitly assessed how emotion concept words impact the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions ( Banks et al. , 2007 ; Lieberman et al. , 2007 ; Satpute et al. in press). We thus performed a comprehensive meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature on emotion to examine whether the presence or absence of emotion concept words in experimental paradigms alters brain activity during experiences and perceptions of emotion. This meta-analysis allowed us to examine whether emotion concept words consistently influence the neural representation of emotions, demonstrating that emotion concept words have more than a trivial impact on how the brain processes affective stimuli.

Language and the psychological construction of emotion

Psychological constructionist models uniquely predict a constitutive role of language in emotion. In particular, the psychological constructionist approach predicts that emotions are the product of more basic affective and conceptual processes ( Lindquist and Barrett, 2008 ). Consistent with recent predictive coding approaches to perception ( Panichello et al. , 2012 ), the psychological constructionist view hypothesizes that the brain is continuously making affective predictions about how stimuli in the world will impact the organism, and then refining those affective predictions into more specific emotional experiences and perceptions using conceptual knowledge about emotion (e.g. anger, disgust, fear, etc.) ( Cunningham et al. , 2013 ; Lindquist, 2013 ; Barrett and Simmons, 2015 ). The brain’s initial affective predictions help to determine how stimuli will impact the body—determining whether something is good, bad, arousing or calming—and prepares the organism for action. These predictions are referred to as ‘core affect’ ( Russell and Barrett, 1999 ; Russell, 2003 ) and are supported by limbic and paralimbic cortices ( Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009 ; Barrett and Simmons, 2015 ). In particular, a distributed network consisting of the dorsal and ventral anterior insula, dorsal and ventral anterior cingulate cortex, basal ganglia, and amygdala (i.e. a ‘salience’ or ‘ventral attention’ network; Seeley et al. , 2007 ; Lindquist et al. , 2012 ; Barrett and Simmons, 2015 ; Lindquist et al. , 2016b ) is hypothesized to compute these early affective predictions. The amygdala is thought to play a key role in this core affective network by marshaling autonomic changes in the body and increasing sensory processing to particularly uncertain and motivationally relevant stimuli (for discussions, see Cunningham and Brosch, 2012 ; Lindquist et al. , 2012 ). Uncertainty about the meaning of a stimulus suggests that the brain needs to make further predictions to ascertain that stimulus’ impact for the organism.

The psychological constructionist account predicts that initial affective predictions are subsequently refined into experiences and perceptions of discrete emotions when the brain draws on semantic knowledge to improve predictions about the more specific meaning of core affective sensations in that context (e.g. that feelings of unpleasantness and arousal are an indication that a stimulus is disgusting v s fearful) ( Cunningham et al. , 2013 ; Lindquist, 2013 ; Barrett, 2014 ). This type of prediction is referred to as ‘conceptualization’ and is supported by regions that are thought to represent prior experiences and semantic knowledge such as the dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, hippocampus, lateral temporal cortex, anterior temporal lobe and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (i.e. the ‘default network’; Raichle et al. , 2001 ; ‘association network’; Schacter et al. , 2007 ; ‘context network’; Bar, 2009 ; or ‘conceptual hub network’; Binder, 2016 ) ( Lindquist and Barrett, 2012 ; Barrett and Satpute, 2013 ). It is known that conceptualization helps make predictions about the meaning of visual sensations by spontaneously retrieving semantic knowledge that exerts a top-down predictive influence on ongoing perceptions (e.g. to determine if an object is a gun v s hairdryer) ( Bar, 2007 ; Chaumon, et al. , 2014 ). A psychological constructionist view predicts that one’s own internal core affective sensations ( Russell, 2003 ; Barrett, 2006 ; Lindquist, 2013 ) or visual sensations of another person’s core affective facial muscle movements ( Barrett et al. , 2007 ; Lindquist and Gendron, 2013 ) are similarly made meaningful as instances of anger, disgust, fear, etc. by drawing on emotion concept knowledge acquired over prior experiences and organized by linguistic category labels such as ‘anger’, ‘disgust’, etc. Ventral aspects of the lateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), in particular, play a key role in this network by retrieving these semantic representations ( Thompson-Schill et al. , 2007 ) and autobiographical representations ( Simons and Spiers, 2003 ; St. Jacques et al. , 2012 ) of prior experiences for use in the moment. Activity within vlPFC is thus often considered evidence that the brain is accessing the rich cache of situation-specific knowledge about a concept for online use.

Important to the present paper, there is much evidence that in humans, conceptualization works in tandem with language. Research demonstrates that language not only helps individuals acquire new concepts ( Xu, 2002 ; Lupyan et al. , 2007 ) but that access to linguistic concepts also shapes online processing of visual sensations ( Lupyan, 2012 ). For instance, activating linguistic concepts warps memories of perceptual objects towards more categorical representations ( Hemmer and Persaud, 2014 ), and even shapes online visual perception ( Lupyan and Spivey, 2010 ). The relationship between conceptual knowledge and language is especially critical for abstract concepts such as emotion categories, which are comprised of embodied representations of prior experiences combined with culturally acquired knowledge about the situations, bodily feelings and facial expressions associated with a particular emotion category ( Vigliocco et al. , 2009 ; Lindquist et al. , 2015b ). The psychological constructionist approach thus hypothesizes that emotion words play a role in constituting emotional experiences and perceptions because they help people store and then access the conceptual knowledge about emotions used to make predictions about the meaning of external (e.g. visual) and internal (i.e. interoceptive) sensations in the moment.

Of course, not every emotional experience or perception occurs in the explicit presence of emotion words, or is explicitly categorized with language. However, the psychological constructionist approach predicts that conceptualization occurs implicitly when semantic knowledge about emotion categories is used to make meaning of ambiguous affective predictions in a given context ( Lindquist and Barrett, 2008 ; Wilson-Mendenhall et al. , 2011 ). In a particular instance, an individual’s conceptual knowledge is rapidly and implicitly integrated to make meaning of ongoing sensory experiences, which allows ambiguous affective sensations from the body and environment to be made meaningful as instances of a specific emotion. For instance, access to the linguistic concept of ‘fear’ ( v s ‘anger’ or no emotion-specific concepts) transforms unpleasant and highly aroused core affect into an experience of fear, as indicated by participants’ increased perceptions of threat in the environment ( Lindquist and Barrett, 2008 ). Therefore, an emotion is a constructed event that is a product of core affect, conceptualization and the features of the present context.

Importantly, according to our psychological constructionist approach, not all words are created equally when it comes to constructing emotional experiences and perceptions. We hypothesize that words that name emotion concepts (e.g. ‘anger’, ‘disgust’, ‘fear’, ‘sadness’, ‘joy’, ‘amusement’, etc.) possess greater predictive power than words that name affective states (e.g. ‘pleasant’, ‘unpleasant’, ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘good’, ‘bad’) insofar as emotion concept words help refine the meaning of otherwise ambiguous core affective predictions by transforming them into experiences and perceptions of specific emotion categories (e.g. transforming a feeling of unpleasant, high arousal into the experience of fear v s anger; Lindquist and Barrett, 2008 ). We thus hypothesized that words that name emotion concepts will be more likely than words that name affective concepts to prompt semantic retrieval of specific instances of prior discrete emotional experiences and perceptions. Specifically, we predict that discrete emotion words, but not affect words will help the brain make meaning of ambiguous core affective predictions, refining those core affective representations into experiences and perceptions of anger, fear, sadness, joy, amusement and so on.

Neuroimaging evidence for the role of language in emotion

Most research thus far has focused on the role of language in emotion using behavioral experiments ( Lindquist and Gendron, 2013 ; Lindquist et al. , 2015a , b , 2016a , for reviews), but growing evidence from neuroimaging is also consistent with the idea that emotion concepts supported by language help constitute emotions. A meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on emotion ( Lindquist et al. , 2012 ) found that brain regions consistently activated across studies of semantic processing such as the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, lateral temporal cortex and anterior temporal lobe ( Binder et al. , 2009 ) also showed consistent increases in activation across studies of emotion (see Lindquist et al. , 2015b for areas of consistent overlap during emotions and semantics). A neuroimaging study observed that thinking about emotions, experiencing an emotion, and attending to body feelings share overlapping activity within the ‘default network’ hypothesized to support semantic retrieval and use ( Oosterwijk et al. , 2012 ). In particular, the anterior temporal lobe, a brain region involved in representing semantic knowledge ( Patterson et al. , 2007 ) had greater activity during emotions as compared to general positive and negative body feelings ( Oosterwijk et al. , 2012 ). These findings suggest that emotional experiences and perceptions may draw on conceptual knowledge of emotion during the construction of emotional states.

A separate, yet compatible, line of research has specifically investigated how the neural representation of emotion changes when participants are asked to explicitly label their affective states. This research finds that explicit, forced-choice labeling of negative facial expressions during an emotion perception task increases activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and decreases amygdala activity ( Hariri et al. , 2000 ; Lieberman et al. , 2007 ). The strength of connectivity between vlPFC and amygdala is also increased by the presence of emotion concept words, which results in decreased amygdala activity ( Torrisi et al. , 2013 ). Additionally, labeling negative emotional experiences and pairing aversive stimuli with emotion category labels reduces autonomic reactivity to threatening images ( Tabibnia et al. , 2008 ), and increases the efficacy of exposure interventions in clinical populations such as sufferers of public speaking anxiety ( Niles et al. , 2015 ) and arachnophobia ( Kircanski et al. , 2012 ). Due to the overlap of regions involved in “affect labeling” and emotion regulation ( Payer et al. , 2012 ; but see Burklund et al. , 2014 for some subtle distinctions), it is argued that affect labeling serves as a form of implicit emotion regulation ( Lieberman, 2011 ).

A neuroimaging meta-analysis of the role of language in emotion

Although individual studies suggest that language may play a constitutive role in emotion by transforming initial affective predictions into experiences and perceptions of discrete emotions, no study has systematically addressed this hypothesis on a large scale. In the present report, we use a comprehensive coordinate-based meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature on emotion to build upon the predictions of the psychological constructionist approach and previous empirical findings. In particular, we use meta-analysis to systematically investigate how emotion concept words alter brain activity in emotion. If emotion words had no impact on how the brain represented emotion, then this would suggest that language is indeed epiphenomenal to emotion ( Ekman and Cordaro, 2011 ). In contrast, if the neural basis of emotions is fundamentally different when emotion concept words are present v s absent in tasks, then this would suggest that emotion words are impacting emotional experiences and perceptions in more than trivial ways.

Meta-analysis is particularly advantageous for addressing questions about the role of language in emotion because meta-analysis reveals brain regions that are consistently activated during certain conditions, even when individual studies were not specifically designed to address the hypothesis at hand. In the present meta-analysis, we coded individual contrasts from 386 studies containing 7333 participants reporting peak coordinates from 876 contrasts (see Supplementary Table S1 in Supplementary Material ). Studies were published between 1993 and the end of 2014. Studies were coded to indicate whether those contrasts included experimental tasks with emotion words or affect words present. We hypothesized that the presence of emotion words anywhere throughout a task would implicitly prime emotion concepts, causing participants to draw on conceptual knowledge of certain discrete emotion categories when making meaning of initial affective predictions about stimuli. This would in turn, reduce the ambiguity of those initial affective predictions by refining them as being about an instance of anger, fear, etc. We thus predicted that experimental contrasts in which emotion concept words were present would be associated with consistent activations in brain regions involved in the retrieval and representation of semantic knowledge, such as ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and aspects of the lateral temporal lobe (including superior temporal gyrus and anterior temporal lobe) ( Visser et al. , 2010 ). In contrast, in studies that did not explicitly include emotion concept words throughout their experiment, we predicted that participants would be relatively less likely to access emotion concepts and thus fail to further elaborate on and refine initial affective predictions into experiences and perceptions of discrete emotions, causing those initial affective predictions to remain ambiguous. We thus predicted that contrasts in which emotion words were absent we would observe consistent activity in the amygdala, an aspect of the salience network particularly activated by uncertainty ( Whalen, 2007 ). Finally, we predicted that when compared to emotion concept words, affect words (e.g. ‘unpleasant’, ‘pleasant’) would have less of an impact on the neural basis of emotional experiences and perceptions because they would not provide the same amount of refinement about the meaning of initial affective predictions.

The database of studies used in this meta-analysis included fMRI and PET studies that employed tasks related to emotional (e.g. anger, fear, disgust, happy, sad, etc.) and affective (e.g. positive and negative) experiences and perceptions published between January 1993 and December 2014. See Supplementary Materials for specific details about the database and a list of studies included. We began by coding contrasts from individual studies to indicate whether the experimental tasks included emotion concept words or not, and the frequency with which emotion words were present in that task. For example, contrasts were considered to have emotion words present if they contained words that were present in verbal or visual instructions at points throughout the task (e.g. an instructions screen at the beginning of each experimental block told participants they would see ‘angry’ faces on the next block of trials) or if words were present on the screen in every trial (e.g. asking for ratings of discrete emotions with response options like ‘anger’, ‘disgust’, etc. after the neural response to the stimulus was modeled on every trial). To be able to titrate the effect of the presence of emotion concept words, we separated contrasts that had a lot of word priming (e.g. on every trial throughout the contrast; Level 2; 33 studies) and those that had relatively less (e.g. at the beginning of end of blocks; Level 1; 67 studies). Studies were considered to not have emotion words present (Level 0; 264 studies) if the methods section explicitly reported that no emotion words were used or if the methods did not mention the use of emotion words during instructions, as response options, or as stimuli. To be conservative, studies were not included if they included the very minimal use of emotion words prior to scanning (e.g. emotion words were present in a behavioral task performed prior to scanning, or included in a verbal instruction phase conducted outside of the scanner). Of note, half the studies including emotion words modeled the neural response to an emotionally evocative stimulus (e.g. an image, autobiographical memory, scenario, sound, facial expression, etc.) separately from portions of the task in which any words were on screen. Thus, in many studies, the only difference between Levels 0, 1 and 2 contrasts were that emotion words had not been primed (Level 0) or had been primed (Levels 1 and 2) at some point preceding emotional experiences and perceptions.

To address the role of emotion concept words v s more general affect words, contrasts were additionally coded for the presence of affect-related words in tasks. Coding followed that for emotion words, but specifically applied to affect-general words such as ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’ (Level 2; 13 studies; Level 1; 49 studies; Level 0; 319 studies. We focused specifically on words describing valence since this described the majority of affect-related words in tasks (i.e. arousal words were less frequent).

Multilevel kernel density analysis

The present meta-analysis used a Multi-level Kernel Density Analysis (MKDA) ( Wager et al. , 2007 ) implemented in NeuroElf ( http://neuroelf.net ). This technique summarizes the overlap in peak activations from individual study contrasts in order to report voxels that show consistent increases in activation for a given meta-analytic contrast (e.g. emotion words present v s not present). The MKDA treats each individual contrast as the unit of analysis, rather than each individual study, which keeps single studies that report several highly related contrasts from unduly influencing the meta-analytic results. Contrasts from all studies assessing emotional experiences and perceptions were included in the present meta-analysis, including contrasts assessing a difference in neural activity between emotion categories (e.g. anger v s disgust) and those assessing neural activity associated with a specific emotion category (e.g. anger v s neutral).

Following the standard MKDA procedure ( Wager et al. , 2007 ; Kober et al. , 2008 ; Lindquist et al. , 2016b ), coordinates from each study contrast were first convolved with 12 mm spheres to produce binary indicator maps. The resulting maps for each contrast were then weighted to control for differences in sample size and rigor of statistical analysis: each individual contrast map was weighted by the square root of the sample size used so that studies with higher sample sizes would have greater influence on the results, and studies which used fixed-effects analyses were down-weighted by 0.75 to reduce their contribution to the meta-analytic results. Finally, we computed meta-analytic contrasts to assess the role of emotion and affect words in shaping neural activity associated with emotion (described in more detail below). For each meta-analytic contrast, inferences were made by comparing the proportion of study contrasts that report activation in a given voxel to an empirically derived null distribution created using Monte Carlo simulations. On each simulation, an MKDA map was calculated based on the probability of a particular proportion of studies reporting activation near a given voxel, and was compared to a null distribution calculated through random sampling of scrambled peak activations across the whole brain, excluding ventricles and white matter. Five thousand simulations were performed for each voxel-level analysis and voxels surpassing the primary threshold of P < 0.001 were retained. The resulting maps were cluster-level thresholded using a family wise error rate of P < 0.05.

Isolating the effect of emotion words

In our first analysis, we wanted to implement the most conservative test of the hypothesis that emotion concept words impact the neural representation of emotions. To do this, we sought a meta-analytic contrast that would isolate the presence vs absence of emotion concept words while keeping constant as many other task features as possible. We thus targeted consistent neural activity that was associated with labeling faces with emotion words vs. labeling faces with gender words, and vice-versa. There were 23 studies including 66 contrasts in our database that asked participants to categorize emotional stimuli (in particular, faces and voices) with emotion labels and 34 studies including 86 contrasts in our database that asked participants to categorize similar stimuli by gender ( Supplementary Table S1 in Supplementary Material ). Importantly, both types of studies used emotional facial or vocal expressions as their target stimuli and required participants to use a category label to make a response on every trial, meaning that the only difference between the conditions was the presence of emotion or gender words. Making this comparison also reduced the likelihood that there were differences between the conditions related to degrees of attention or cognitive control enlisted by the tasks. To assess the difference between emotion and gender categorizations, we computed two meta-analytic contrasts: (1) ‘emotion words present’ v s ‘gender words present’, and (2) ‘gender words present’ v s ‘emotion words present’.

Demonstrating the broader effect of emotion words on the neural representation of emotions

After completing the first, narrower, test of our hypothesis, we extended our analysis to our entire database of studies to assess whether our results would generalize across a wide variety of experimental tasks (see Supplementary Materials for details on the tasks and stimuli used by the studies). This analysis was less controlled than the first set of analyses we ran since studies varied in the tasks they employed. However, this analysis was more powerful, insofar as it examines whether the impact of emotion concept words on the neural basis of emotion generalizes across a variety of experimental contexts. To first assess the role of emotion words in shaping neural activity related to a variety of emotional experiences and perceptions, we computed two meta-analytic contrasts: (1) ‘emotion words present’ v s ‘emotion words not present’, and (2) ‘emotion words not present’ v s ‘emotion words present’. Here, we examined the effect of any emotion words present (Levels 1 and 2) v s no words present (Level 0) and vice versa. We also ran four additional contrasts to assess incremental effects caused by varying degrees of emotion concept knowledge present in experimental tasks: (1) ‘emotion words present in every trial’ v s ‘emotion words present throughout the task’ (Level 2 > Level 1), (2) ‘emotion words present throughout the task’ v s ‘emotion words present in every trial’ (Level 1 > Level 2), (3) ‘emotion words present throughout the task’ v s ‘emotion words not present’ (Level 1 > Level 0) and (4) ‘emotion words not present’ v s ‘emotion words present throughout the task’ (Level 0 > Level 1).

Testing the effect of emotion words on the neural representation of experiences and perceptions of emotion and positive and negative emotions

To examine whether language played a comparable role across all types of emotional states (experiences or perceptions and positive or negative emotions), we next computed the main contrasts ‘emotion words present’ vs ‘emotion words not present’ (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0), and ‘emotion words not present’ vs ‘emotion words present’ (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2) on four subsets of the database: (1) studies of emotion experience including positive and negative emotions, (2) studies of emotion perception including positive and negative emotions, (3) studies of emotion experience and perception which focused on negative emotions and (4) studies of emotion experience and perception which focused on positive emotions.

Testing the effect of affect-related words

Finally, to examine whether emotion concept words had a differential impact on the neural basis of emotions than affect words, we performed two analyses. First, we computed a meta-analytic contrast comparing the presence of emotion concept words (Levels 1 and 2) with the presence of affect words (Levels 1 and 2). Second, we replicated the main emotion word analyses with affect words [any affect word present (Levels 1 and 2) > no affect word present (Level 0)].

The first meta-analytic contrast focused on studies of emotional face and voice perception where categorization of either emotion or gender was required on every trial. Within this subset of the database, we computed two meta-analytic contrasts: emotion words present > gender words present and gender words present > emotion words present ( Figure 1A and B ). We observed a single cluster in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; centered on −47, 15, 4; k  = 998) for the emotion words present > gender words present contrast. The left IFG is implicated in semantic retrieval and use ( Thompson-Schill et al. , 1997 ; Grindrod et al. , 2008 ; Huang et al. , 2012 ), consistent with our constructionist hypothesis that emotion words prompt retrieval of emotion concepts.

Regions with greater activity for the (A) emotion categorization > gender categorization contrast include clusters in left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and left dorsal anterior insula and left superior temporal gyrus and (B) gender categorization > emotion categorization contrast include clusters in right and left parahippocampal gyrus (PHG), amygdala, and right declive, culmen and fusiform gyrus.

Also consistent with predictions, we observed clusters in the right amygdala and left PHG (centered on 24, −10, −22; k  = 761 and −24, −14, −24; k  = 385) for the gender words present > emotion words present contrast. That the amygdala had more frequent activation to facial and vocal expressions in the presence of gender words suggest that in the absence of emotion words, the affective meaning of faces may be relatively more ambiguous and prompt further processing in the brain. Finally, we observed consistent activity in the cerebellum (right declive centered on 32 −50 −16; k  = 502) for this contrast.

After running the emotion words present > gender words present analysis on a subset of the database, we sought to observe whether the impact of emotion words generalized to the rest of the database, including both studies of emotion experience and perception and a much larger variety of experimental tasks. For the main emotion words present > emotion words not present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0) contrast ( Table 1 ), we observed consistent activations in large clusters of voxels in the right and left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and right medial temporal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus ( Figure 2A ), all regions that are consistently implicated in semantic retrieval and use ( Visser et al. , 2010 ; Binder et al. , 2009 ).

Effect of emotion words on emotion experience and perception

Note : voxel-wise P < 0.001, cluster-wise FWER P < 0.05.

Regions with greater activity for the (A) emotion words present > emotion words not present contrast include clusters in left and right superior temporal gyrus (STG) and (B) emotion words not present > emotion words present contrast include clusters in bilateral PHG and amygdala and bilateral fusiform gyrus.

We also examined regions that were modulated by the presence of emotion words by isolating regions that had more frequent activations when emotion words were not present relative to when they were present. For this emotion words not present > emotion words present contrast (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2) ( Table 1 ), we observed a set of findings similar to those observed when gender words, but not emotion words were present. Specifically, we observed consistent activation in clusters in bilateral amygdala/parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) and bilateral fusiform gyrus ( Figure 2B ).

To assess whether any incremental effects could be observed between tasks with varying frequencies of emotion words present (i.e. emotion words present on the screen in every trial v s included in instruction screens at the beginning of each block), we computed four additional contrasts across the whole database ( Table 1 ). For the emotion words present in every trial > emotion words present throughout the task (Level 2 > Level 1) contrast, we observed consistent activations in left middle temporal gyrus extending to middle occipital gyrus. For the emotion words present throughout the task > emotion words present in every trial (Level 1 > Level 2) contrast, we observed consistent activations in a large cluster anchored in the left subcallosal gyrus, including left amygdala and PHG.

For the emotion words present throughout the task > no emotion words present (Level 1 v s Level 0) contrast, we observed a pattern similar to the emotion words present > emotion words not present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0) contrast. In particular, we again found consistent activations in right STG. We also found consistent activations in the left medial frontal gyrus, right superior frontal gyrus, and aspects of the cerebellum. For the emotion words not present > emotion words present throughout the task (Level 0 > Level 1) contrast, we again observed consistent activations in bilateral amygdala/PHG, fusiform gyrus and middle occipital gyrus.

Testing the effect of emotion words on the neural representation of emotion experiences or perceptions

The results for studies that focused on emotion experience were generally consistent with those observed for our targeted facial expressions contrast as well as our contrasts on the broader database of experience and perception studies ( Table 2 ). For studies of emotion experience when emotion words were present > no emotion words present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0), we observed consistent activations in a cluster located in the cerebellum. In contrast, when no emotion words were present > emotion words present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2) we observed clusters in bilateral amygdala/PHG and left fusiform gyrus.

Effect of emotion words on emotion experience or perception

Note: voxel-wise P < 0.001, except where noted by * P < 0.005, cluster-wise FWER P < 0.05.

The results for studies that focused on emotion perception also revealed a similar pattern of activations to the results from our previous analyses. For studies of emotion perception when emotion words were present > no emotion words present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0), there were no consistent activations at our primary threshold, but we observed consistent activations in a single cluster located in the right STG at P < 0.005. For studies of emotion perception when no emotion words were present > emotion words present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2), we observed consistent activations in clusters in bilateral amygdala/PHG. Taken together, the consistency of the findings when assessed separately for studies of emotion experience and perception suggests that the results from the whole database were not solely driven by studies on emotion experience or emotion perception. Consistent with psychological constructionist hypotheses ( Lindquist et al. , 2015a ), language may play a similar role in emotion whether involved in making meaning of sensations internal to one’s body (as in emotion experiences) or sensations external to one’s body (as in perceptions of someone else’s facial, bodily or vocal expressions).

Testing the effect of emotion words on the neural representation of positive or negative emotions

For studies of negative emotion experiences and perceptions when emotion words were present > no emotion words present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0), we observed no consistent activations at P < 0.001. However, we observed consistent activations in one cluster in the left claustrum, extending to STG and dorsal anterior insula at P < 0.005. Like the STG, the claustrum and dorsal anterior insula have been implicated in semantic retrieval during priming ( Rossell et al. , 2001 ; Rissman et al. , 2003 ). For studies of negative emotion experiences and perceptions when no emotion words were present > emotion words present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2) we again observed consistent activity within bilateral amygdala/PHG and the left fusiform gyrus at P < 0.001 ( Table 3 ). For studies that focused on positive emotion experiences and perceptions, we found no consistent activations at any threshold when emotion words were present > no emotion words present (Levels 1 and 2 > Level 0) contrast. This finding may be related to the fact that studies often only include a single positive emotion category (happiness), which limits the brain’s need to retrieve and differentiate between same-valence concepts when making meaning of positive affective predictions. However, for the no emotion words present > emotion words present (Level 0 > Levels 1 and 2) contrast we once again observed clusters in bilateral amygdala/PHG ( Table 3 ).

Effect of emotion words on negative or positive emotions

Note : voxel-wise P < 0.001, except where noted by * P < 0.005, cluster-wise FWER P < 0.05.

Finally, to specifically address our predictions that emotion words would be more effective at reducing amygdala activity than affect words, we ran a meta-analytic contrast comparing frequent brain activations in studies that used emotion words v s affect words. In the emotion words present > affect words present contrast, we observed a cluster in STG ( Figure 3A ), replicating previous findings that emotion concept words prompt semantic processing. In contrast, in the affect words present > emotion words present contrast, we observed consistent amygdala activity ( Figure 3B ), replicating our previous analyses and underscoring the fact that affective predictions remain ambiguous in the presence of affect, but not emotion words.

Regions with greater activity for the (A) emotion words present > affect words present contrast include clusters in left middle temporal gyrus, and right STG and (B) affect words present > emotion words present contrast include clusters in bilateral PHG/amygdala, left cingulate gyrus and left and right culmen.

To examine more closely how affect words impacted on the neural basis of emotion, we next focused specifically on experimental contrasts that contained only affect words. In the affect words present  >  no affect words present , we did not find any clusters that survived the P < 0.001 threshold. However, at the very lenient threshold of P < 0.05, we observed a large cluster in the parahippcampal gyrus/amygdala. There were no significant activations for no affect words present > affect words present . Together, these findings suggest that as predicted, the presence of affect words in studies did not serve the same function as emotion words.

In the present meta-analysis, we found that emotion words impact the neural representation of emotion, as reflected by more frequent activations in the IFG, STG and MTG when emotion words are present across emotional experiences and perceptions. The IFG is routinely implicated in semantic retrieval ( Thompson-Schill et al. , 1997 ; Grindrod et al. , 2008 ; Huang et al. , 2012 ) and the STG and middle temporal gyrus also have an undisputed role in language ( Friederici et al. , 2003 ; Bigler et al. , 2007 ). More anterior portions of STG, such as what we observed in our meta-analysis, are involved in the representation of semantic knowledge and are thought to be a hub in a distributed semantic network containing the IFG, lateral temporal cortices, medial temporal lobe and midline cortical areas such as the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex (see Visser et al. , 2010 for a meta-analysis). Together, these findings suggest that tasks involving emotion words prompted semantic retrieval and use of relevant emotion concept knowledge during the experience and perception of emotions. This is notable given that in many experiments in our database, the neural response to an emotional stimulus was modeled separately from the neural response to emotion words involved in instructions or trial-by-trial labeling—thus our findings do not merely reflect processing words per se but accessing conceptual knowledge during emotional experiences and perceptions.

In contrast, when emotion studies across the literature did not involve emotion words, we consistently observed frequent amygdala activity. In fact, we observed frequent amygdala activity any time emotion concept words were not present in a task. Our findings are consistent with a role for the amygdala in signaling uncertainty about the meaning of affective sensations when emotion concept knowledge is not readily accessible (as predicted by a psychological constructionist approach; see Lindquist et al. , 2015a ). This hypothesized role of the amygdala is also consistent with recent accounts suggesting that the amygdala more generally responds to uncertainty, arousal and the ‘motivational salience’ of visual stimuli in particular ( Cunningham and Brosch, 2012 ; Touroutoglou et al. , 2014 ). According to the psychological constructionist view, the uncertainty of the meaning of affective stimuli is resolved when conceptual knowledge about emotion is made more readily accessible and used to categorize the meaning of affective sensations.

Frequent amygdala activity even occurred in the more conservative case of gender v s emotion categorizations of emotional facial expressions and when affect words were present, suggesting that not just any type of words decrease the frequency of amygdala activity—the effect appeared to be specific to the presence of emotion concept words across studies. This is likely because emotion concept words name discrete emotion concepts that help refine the meaning of otherwise ambiguous affective states. Once a person categorizes unpleasant affect as, e.g. fear, he knows what his affective state means, what to do about it, and even how to regulate it. This process would in turn decrease the arousing nature of those stimuli, performing an implicit emotion regulation function ( Lieberman, 2011 ). Consistent with this interpretation, when emotion words were absent from paradigms, we also observed more frequent activations in the parahippocampal gyrus and aspects of ventral temporal cortex (e.g. fusiform), suggesting that participants may have been engaging in increased episodic memory retrieval and sensory processing to make meaning of the affective stimuli they were experiencing and perceiving in the absence of readily available emotion concept knowledge. The parahippocampal gyrus is also implicated in the processing of visual context ( Aminoff et al. , 2013 ), potentially suggesting a greater reliance on contextual cues to resolve uncertain affective experiences in the absence of specific conceptual knowledge. Given the role of the fusiform in downstream visual processing important for successful object and face recognition ( Haxby et al. , 2001 ), frequent activations in this region when words are not present could reflect more elaborate visual processing of emotional stimuli when conceptual knowledge is not readily available to make meaning of visual input.

Implications

Taken together, our findings are consistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis that language helps constitute emotion by representing conceptual knowledge that is necessary to make meaning of otherwise ambiguous affective states. These findings are important in that they begin to shine light on the dynamics of neural systems that help construct emotions. It is common to observe increased activity within brain regions associated with semantics during emotions ( Kober et al. , 2008 ; Vytal and Hamann, 2010 ; Lindquist et al. , 2012 ; see Lindquist et al. , 2015a ). However, it is unclear from these findings whether language is merely an epiphenomenon to emotion, only labeling emotions after the fact, or whether these regions are performing another function entirely. In contrast, our meta-analytic neuroimaging findings suggest that the mere presence v s absence of emotion words in a task change emotional brain activity in a consistent manner.

The idea that affective feelings are ambiguous in the absence of conceptual knowledge about emotion is consistent with findings suggesting that ‘affect labeling’ helps a person regulate their feelings ( Pennebaker and Beall, 1986 ; Lieberman, 2011 ). Understanding more specifically what you are feeling helps you know what caused the feeling and what to do about it. It is thus no surprise that learning to label feelings is at the core of many types of psychotherapy. Similarly, re-conceptualizing the meaning of a feeling with a different linguistic category (as in the cognitive reappraisal tasks used in standard emotion regulation paradigms) would also help regulate emotions by helping transform one type of experience (e.g. fear) into another (e.g. anger). Not surprisingly, reappraisal, although it does not explicitly involve affect labeling, involves many of the same brain regions involved in semantics such as the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, anterior temporal lobe and posterior cingulate cortex ( Buhle et al. , 2014 ; Burklund et al. , 2014 ). There is debate about whether the processes involved in emotion regulation are the same or different than those involved in emotion generation ( Gross and Barrett, 2011 ), but evidence suggests that the neural mechanisms involved in both are similar ( Ochsner et al. , 2012 ). These findings underscore the psychological constructionist point that conceptualization is a fundamental ‘ingredient’ in emotions ( Wilson-Mendenhall et al. , 2011 ; Lindquist, 2013 ; Barrett, 2014 ).

The present meta-analysis is also an important step in extending behavioral research ( Lindquist et al. , 2015a , b ) that investigates the impact of language on emotion. Our results are particularly striking given the wide variety of tasks included in our meta-analytic database. That the general pattern of less frequent amygdala activity when words are present holds for the entire database of studies strongly suggests emotion words confer an implicit emotion regulation effect, but none of the studies included in our database assessed emotion regulation. Showing that the mere presence of emotion words can confer this consistent effect is a pivotal step in investigating the degree to which language is constitutive of emotion. These findings additionally present a cautionary methodological note, as researchers studying emotion should be as aware as possible of how subtle task characteristics such as the inclusion of emotion words can actually have a large influence over the affective processes under investigation ( Kassam and Mendes, 2013 ).

Limitations

Despite its promises, this work is limited by existing neuroimaging meta-analysis techniques, which rely on studies with subtraction analyses to isolate regions more frequently activated for one task condition vs another. Additionally, a general issue with neuroimaging meta-analysis is that one can never truly know the details and idiosyncrasies of every individual task that comprises the meta-analytic database in use, and further, whether there are qualitative differences between the tasks in each meta-analytic conditions used (e.g. ‘words present’ vs ‘words not present’) that could bias the results. For instance, it is possible that meta-analytic conditions differed in the amount of arousal content shown, cognitive load or in other task demand characteristics. Our examination of the database did not reveal systematic differences in the arousal content (furthermore, most neuroimaging studies tend to use highly arousing stimuli; see Lindquist et al. , 2016b ). However, it remains a possibility that there are unknown qualitative differences that impacted our findings. Nonetheless, we are reassured by the fact that our findings replicate the findings of single ‘affect labeling’ neuroimaging studies ( Hariri et al. , 2000 ; Lieberman et al. , 2007 ) that tightly control for these confounds, suggesting that these additional confounds do not likely account for our findings. Furthermore, the stability of our findings across our different analyses reduces this concern; we demonstrate the same effects when we restricted our analyses to a tightly controlled subset of the database (in which both emotion and gender labeling conditions were nearly identical in terms of task constraints) as well as when examining a more heterogeneous set of contrasts using different methods of inducing emotional experience and perceptions.

Our meta-analysis is also limited more specifically by which hypotheses can be tested at the meta-analytic level. Future research should advance our meta-analytic results using individual neuroimaging studies to address more fine-grained questions about the parametric role of labeling on brain activity and how language impacts activity within and between broad-scale neural networks supporting core affect and conceptualization. Another possibility for future neuroimaging studies would be to use multivariate techniques to assess whether patterns of neural activity elicited by emotional stimuli can be classified by the degree of conceptual knowledge present in the task. We look forward to future research that will continue to explore the important, yet often overlooked, role of language as it shapes our experiences, perceptions and regulation of emotions.

Supplementary data

Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.

Conflict of interest . None declared.

Construction of the meta-analytic database was supported by the Army Research Institute (W5J9CQ-11-C-0046).

Supplementary Material

Supplementary data.

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• Open access
• Published: 02 April 2024

Enhancing knowledge, attitude, and perceptions towards fall prevention among older adults: a pharmacist-led intervention in a primary healthcare clinic, Gemas, Malaysia

• Priya Manirajan 1 ,
• Palanisamy Sivanandy 1 &
• Pravinkumar Vishwanath Ingle 1  

BMC Geriatrics volume  24 , Article number:  309 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

Metrics details

Falls and fall-related injuries are very common among older adults, and the risk of falls increases with the aging process. The lack of awareness of falls and fall-related injuries among older adults can contribute to an increasing risk of falls. Hence, a study was carried out to improve the knowledge, attitude, and perception of falls and fractures among older adults in a primary care setting in Gemas, a rural area of the Selangor state of Malaysia.

A structured educational intervention was provided to older adults who visited the primary care setting in Gemas and provided written informed consent to participate in the study. A total of 310 older adult patients was included in the study using a convenience sampling technique.

Before the intervention, 74.84% of the respondents ( n  = 232) agreed that falls and related fractures are the leading causes of hospital admission among older adults. In post-intervention, the number of respondents who agreed with this statement increased to 257 (82.91%). At baseline, 28 respondents (9.03%) had poor knowledge, 160 respondents (51.61%) had average knowledge levels, and 122 respondents (39.35%) had good knowledge. In post-intervention, respondents with poor and average knowledge reduced to 1.93% ( n  = 6) and 29.35% ( n  = 91) respectively. A majority of respondents’ knowledge levels improved significantly after the intervention ( n  = 213; 68.71%). About eight respondents (2.58%) had a negative perception of falls. In post-intervention, the percentage reduced to 0.65% as only two respondents had a negative perception. A total of 32 types of fall-risk-increasing drugs (FRIDs) have been prescribed to the respondents. A strong correlation ( r  = 0.89) between pre- and post-intervention knowledge was shown among the respondents. Paired t-test analysis showed a statistically significant difference.

The pharmacist-led educational intervention significantly improved the knowledge, attitude, and perception of falls among older adults. More structured and periodical intervention programmes are warranted to reduce the risk of falls and fractures among older adults.

Peer Review reports

Introduction

Fall incidents among older adults have a negative impact on their personal lives and the economy as well. It burdens the health care sector as well because of the treatment cost. A past history of a fall is a significant predictor of future fall risk [ 1 , 2 , 3 ]. Hence, it is essential to find solutions to prevent fall incidents, and fall-related injuries and fractures. As falls contribute to increased mortality, reduction of quality of life, increased hospitalization, and medical costs, this has led to the development of prevention strategies [ 4 , 5 , 6 ]. Multifactorial prevention measures have been identified and implemented in various countries. Many interventional studies have been conducted in the past that show prescribing multiple medications is likely to increase the risk of falls. Several drugs can increase the risk of falls and are termed fall-risk-increasing drugs (FRIDs) which include antihypertensives, antihistamines, sedatives-hypnotics, antipsychotics, antidepressants, opioids, and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs [ 6 , 7 , 8 ]. Around one-third of older adults experience at least one fall incident every year while 10% of them experience multiple falls [ 1 ]. An earlier study found that amlodipine, a FRID increases the risk of falls among older adults compared to chlorthalidone (HR: 2.24; p  = 0.03) or lisinopril (HR: 2.61; p  = 0.04) [ 6 ]. Polypharmacy and FRIDs were the most common cause of falls reported by many studies [ 6 , 7 , 8 ], 74.19% ( n  = 230) of older adults were prescribed polypharmacy (Mean: 5.18 ± 0.64), and 22.85% ( n  = 69) received four types of medications, majorly cardiovascular medications, that might have increased the risk falls in their population [ 6 ].

Deprescribing FRIDs may benefit in preventing falls among older adults [ 7 , 8 ]. Besides deprescribing FRIDs and assessment of knowledge, attitude, and perception (KAP), an educational intervention was found to help reduce fall incidents among older adults [ 9 , 10 , 11 ]. Optimistic fall outcomes such as reducing the risk of falls can be achieved by the utilisation of multiple intervention strategies [ 7 ]. These strategies include medication reviews, home safety checklists, fall brochures, and many more [ 12 ]. Educational materials are useful as they provide information and tips on ways to avoid falls. Any health programme’s outcome will be more effective if older adults take a more active role in fall prevention strategies.

Compared to other developed countries such as North America and Europe, fall prevention strategies and programmes in Southeast Asia are still in their infancy, as the aging population in these countries is expected to surpass in the future [ 13 , 14 , 15 ].. The majority of studies conducted to date in Malaysia only assess the prevalence of falls as well as identify the risk factors that contribute to falls [ 16 , 17 , 18 ]. Furthermore, these studies did not include older adult patients at primary care clinics; instead, they focused on older adults in hospital or community settings. Nonetheless, a pharmacist-led fall intervention study is scarce in the country. A multidisciplinary approach including educational intervention by pharmacists has proven to be effective in controlling chronic medical conditions and better health outcomes among the patient population. Pharmacists doesn’t only dispenses medications, but they do play a vital role in the health care sector to improve the health of the patient population. Educational intervention by pharmacists is essential, especially for older adults with fall risk to be aware of their medical condition and medications [ 19 , 20 , 21 ]. Hence, health care policies governing fall prevention measures in primary care settings have yet to be developed. To fulfill the future demands arising from the increasingly aging population, changes in the current health policies are required. Thus, this will be the first study of its kind conducted in Malaysia as well as in Asia assessing the KAP of falls among older adults in primary healthcare, reviewing FRIDs and offering FRIDs intervention, and providing a pharmacist-led educational intervention to improve the outcome.

Study design, population, and sample recruitment

An interventional study was carried out in a primary care setting in Gemas, Malaysia. The data collection targeting older adults was carried out from February to August 2022. The participants who were 65 years and above and seeking medical treatment at this primary clinic were included in the study. The participants must be able to read, understand, and respond to the questionnaire and study materials provided to them. Participants with hearing and visual impairment were not included in the study. Participants who met the inclusion criteria and were willing to participate in the study were recruited by the clinical pharmacist who is one of the researchers in the current study. The older adults seeking medical treatment at this study site were approached by the clinical pharmacist, who provided an explanation of the study’s purposes and requested them to participate in the present study.

The study was approved by the institutional research and ethics committee, the head of the facility of the study setting. Confidentiality of all the information gathered during the data collection process was maintained throughout the study. Informed written consent was obtained from each participant prior to enrolling in the study.

Study questionnaires and intervention materials

The validated study questionnaire was obtained from a published study by Gamage et al. which investigated knowledge and perception of falls among older adults in Sri Lanka [ 22 ]. Prior permission was obtained to use the questionnaire. The study questionnaire was modified and validated with an additional set of questionnaires on attitudes towards falls. The study questionnaire was sectioned into two parts that examined the participants’ demographic characteristics, and KAP of falls. The knowledge component consists of eight subcomponents assessing risk factors associated with falls and fractures, sites of fall-related fractures, fall prevention, and sources of information related to falls and fractures. The attitude and perception component, on the other hand, consists of eight statements each, targeting falls and falls-related fractures. A total of 26 questions were used in this study. The initial questionnaire was designed in English and later was translated and validated in Bahasa Melayu as most participants only comprehend the national language. The study questionnaire is presented in Supplementary Table 1 .

Intervention procedure

As the study was conducted among older adults, all the participants were included in the intervention group, and no control group was created. The KAP of falls before the intervention was assessed for every individual participant by the clinical pharmacist. The questionnaires were disseminated to the participants while waiting to be examined by the doctors. Once the KAP of falls had been assessed, a fall prevention poster and video (educational intervention materials) were made available to all the participants in the study. The educational intervention on falls, fall risk, complications, and FRIDs was provided individually through one-to-one pharmacist-patient interview sessions. After the educational intervention was provided, KAP was assessed again on the same day. Pre- and post-KAP assessments were carried out by face-to-face interviews. While intervention material was being disseminated, a medication review for each participant was carried out to identify potential FRID. Intervention on the FRID medications was done after consulting the prescriber regarding the potential increased risk of falls when consuming FRID medications. A duration of 15–20 min was spent on the intervention process for each participant. The details are shown in Fig.  1 schematic diagram.

A schematic diagram of the study design and the intervention procedures

Statistical analysis

The sample size for the present study was calculated using Raosoft® sample size calculator, with a 5% margin of error, 95% confidence interval, and 50% response distribution. The calculated sample size for this study was 310. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 26.0 was used to tabulate and analyse the data. The correlation between pre- and post-intervention was assessed using Pearson’s correlation test. The paired t-test was used to determine the mean difference between pre- and post-intervention. A p -value of less than 0.05 was considered statistically significant.

Based on the previous study conducted by Gamage et al. [ 22 ]. each positive response to knowledge-based questions was given a mark of five. A mark of zero was given to each negative response. The maximum mark an individual could be obtained was 100. The total score was divided into three categories. An individual scored between 0 and 33 was considered to have poor knowledge, scores between 34 and 66 were categorised as average knowledge, while individuals with scores of 67 to 100 were deemed to have good knowledge.

Each statement under the perception and attitude section was scored based on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. The maximum number of marks that could be obtained was 40, with a minimum of 08. Individuals with scores of 8–24 were considered to have negative perceptions or attitudes, while those with scores of 25–40 were considered to have positive perceptions or attitudes [ 22 ].

Respondent’s demographic characteristics

In the present study, the majority of the respondents are females ( n  = 169; 54.52%), followed by males ( n  = 141; 45.48%). A majority of the respondents fall between the age group of 65 and 69 ( n  = 171; 55.15%), followed by 70 to 74 years ( n  = 104; 33.57%), and the mean age was 69.72 (SD: 2.85) years and about 74% of the participants obtained primary-level education. Less than half of the respondents ( n  = 120; 38.71%) experienced falls after the age of 65 years, and 63 respondents (20.32%) experienced one or more incidents of falls within the last 12-month period. The demographic details are presented in Table  1 .

Respondent’s comorbidities and fall -risk- increasing drugs (FRIDs)

A majority of the respondents in this study were diagnosed with multiple comorbidities ( n  = 295; 95.16%). Most of them ( n  = 139; 44.84%) were diagnosed with three types of diseases which were type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM), hypertension (HTN), and dyslipidaemia. Twenty of them (6.45%) had been diagnosed with four types of diseases, and 15 respondents (4.84%) were only diagnosed with a single medical condition which is either HTN, dyslipidaemia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), or myocardial infarction (MI). The details are presented in Supplementary Table 2 .

A total of 32 types of FRIDs has been prescribed to the respondents. A majority of the FRIDs belong to the class of cardiovascular medications ( n  = 23; 71.88%), followed by endocrine ( n  = 5; 15.62%), and central nervous system (CNS) ( n  = 4; 12.50%). The majority of the respondents ( n  = 259; 83.55%) were prescribed simvastatin, amlodipine ( n  = 232; 74.84%), perindopril ( n  = 163; 52.58%), and metformin ( n  = 171; 55.16%). The details are presented in Supplementary Table 3 .

Respondent’s knowledge of falls, risk factors, and fall prevention

Before the intervention, the majority of the respondents ( n  = 232; 74.84%) agreed that falls and related fractures are the leading causes of hospital admission among older adults while 31 respondents (10.0%) disagreed, and 47 (15.16%) said don’t know. In post-intervention, the number of respondents who agreed with this statement increased to 257 (82.91%) while the number of respondents who disagreed and were unsurely decreased to 25 (8.06%) and 28 (9.03%), respectively. A strong correlation ( r  = 0.89) between pre- and post-intervention knowledge was shown among the respondents. Paired t-test analysis showed a statistically significant difference.

For the question “According to your knowledge, which of the following are risk factors for falls among people in your age?” the majority of the respondents during pre-intervention answered that the biological factors ( n  = 241; 77.74%) and unsafe environment ( n  = 237; 76.45%) can be risk factors for falls. In post-intervention, the number of respondents who agreed to both the risk factors increased to 296 (95.48%) and 303 (97.74%) respectively. The improvement after the intervention showed a significant positive correlation with r-values of 0.37 and 0.27 respectively. The majority of the respondents ( n  = 166; 53.55%) during pre-intervention didn’t agree that behavioural factors can be a risk for falls, however, in post-intervention, 241 respondents (77.74%) agreed that it can be a risk factor for falls ( r  = 0.49). The majority of the respondents ( n  = 228; 73.55%) didn’t agree medications can contribute to falls among older adults, during pre-intervention. In post-intervention, more than half ( n  = 216; 69.98%) of the respondents agreed that medications can be a risk factor for falls ( r  = 0.39). Paired t-test analysis showed statistically significant differences for each question.

Prior to intervention, about 55 (17.74%) respondents didn’t agree with any of the suggested medical conditions that may lead to falling. Post-intervention showed improvement in the knowledge whereby the number of respondents agreed that the following medical conditions that may lead to a person falling; Parkinson’s disease ( n  = 37; 11.94%; r  = 0.44), hypertension ( n  = 263; 84.84%; r-value = 0.73), diabetes ( n  = 116; 37.42%; r  = 0.75), and bone disorders ( n  = 100; 32.26%; r-value = 0.73). Paired t-test analysis showed statistically significant differences for each question. The details are presented in Table  2 . The details of respondents’ knowledge of fall prevention and fall risk factors are presented in Supplementary Tables 4 and 5 .

Before the intervention, most of the respondents agreed that falls may result in reduced mobility ( n  = 280; 90.32%) and restriction in daily activities ( n  = 281; 90.65%). Some respondents felt that social isolation ( n  = 139; 44.84%) can be experienced by someone who fell. Around 24 respondents (7.74%) were unsure of the outcome of falls. In Post-intervention, the number of respondents who agreed that falls can cause reduced mobility and restriction of activities increased to 293 (96.52%; r  = 0.74; p  = < 0.05) and 288 (92.90%; r  = 0.86; p  = = 0.01). However, the number of respondents who agreed to social isolation decreased by one ( n  = 138; 44.52%; r  = 0.99).

The majority of the respondents felt that proper nutrition ( n  = 283; 91.29%), regular exercise and active lifestyle ( n  = 281; 90.65%), proper medication intake ( n  = 294; 94.84%), and a conducive environment such as good lighting, clean and clutter-free floor ( n  = 289; 93.23%) can prevent older adults from falling. In post-intervention, their knowledge was significantly improved. The details are presented in Supplementary Table 4 .

Respondents’ attitude and perception of falls and fractures

The respondents’ perception of falls and fractures was analysed during pre-and post-intervention. During the pre-intervention, for the first statement, few respondents strongly agreed ( n  = 50; 16.13%) and agreed ( n  = 70; 22.58%) that there is nothing that can be done to prevent falls. In post-intervention, the majority of the participants disagreed ( n  = 208; 67.10%) with the statement. During the pre-intervention, 107 respondents (34.52%) disagreed that they were weak and needed to do fall intervention activities. In post-intervention, the majority of the respondents agreed ( n  = 157; 50.65%) that they are weak and need to do fall intervention activities. In post-intervention, the majority of the respondents ( n  = 219; 70.65%) agreed that the intervention given after the first fall can prevent recurrent falls. Similarly, about one-third of the respondents ( n  = 100; 32.26%) were unsure that carrying out a knowledge training programme in fall-induced injuries in the community is a great necessity. After the intervention, majority of the respondents ( n  = 227; 73.22%) agreed that a knowledge training programme could be beneficial for the community. A positive correlation between pre- and post-intervention was obtained. The details are presented in Supplementary Tables 6 and 7 .

Intervention on FRIDs medications

The intervention was provided to all the participants, and their prescriptions were reviewed for the appropriateness of prescribed medications. The prescriptions were reviewed for medication appropriateness, dose, frequency, duration, possible side effects, and inclusion of FRIDs. Upon the pharmacist’s medication review, there were 15 prescriptions found to have FRIDs with a potential chance of causing fall-related injuries. FRIDs prescribed in these 15 prescriptions were amended by the prescribers upon pharmacist recommendations by replacing the drugs with suitable alternatives ( n  = 5; 33.33%), deprescribing ( n  = 3; 20.0%), and dose alteration ( n  = 7; 46.67%). The details are presented in Table  3 .

Effectiveness of educational intervention

The effectiveness of the educational intervention was assessed based on the scores assigned to each appropriate answer. At baseline, 28 respondents (9.03%) had poor knowledge, 160 respondents (51.61%) had average knowledge levels, and 122 respondents (39.35%) had good knowledge. In post-intervention, respondents with poor and average knowledge reduced to 1.93% ( n  = 6) and 29.35% ( n  = 91) respectively. A majority of respondents’ knowledge levels improved significantly after intervention ( n  = 213; 68.71%). About eight respondents (2.58%) had a negative perception of falls. In post-intervention, the percentage reduced to 0.65% as only two respondents had a negative perception. A similar scenario was observed in attitudes towards falls and fractures where the negative attitude was observed in seven respondents (2.26%) prior to intervention and after the intervention, only two respondents were observed with a negative attitude. The differences in post-intervention scores were found to be statistically significant. The results are presented in Table  4 .

The effectiveness of the educational intervention was compared between respondents’ educational level as well as sex. Improvements in KAP scores were seen after educational intervention provided to respondents with no formal education ( n  = 12; 3.87%), primary education ( n  = 229; 73.87%), and secondary education ( n  = 69; 22.26%). The details are presented in the Supplementary Table 8 .

The current study evaluates the effectiveness of pharmacist-led educational intervention in improving the KAP of falls, fractures, and FRIDs among older adults and revealed that in post-intervention the majority of the current study participants had a good level of knowledge, a positive perception, and attitude towards falls. The medication review revealed that 32 types of FRIDs had been identified and 4.8% of respondents intervened for FRIDs. Generally, older adults are known to have multiple comorbidities. Multiple co-morbidities are more common with aging causing visual impairment, muscle weakness, a decline in organ function, and so forth. Long-standing medical conditions such as hypertension and diabetes in addition to the aging process will worsen the health condition [ 23 , 24 , 25 ]. The comorbidities identified in this study reflect the overall prevalence data collected from the Malaysian National Health and Morbidity Survey (NHMS) conducted in 2019, pointing out T2DM, hypertension, and dyslipidaemia being the major non-communicable disease in this country [ 26 ]. As this study was carried out at a primary care clinic in a rural area, complex morbidities such as dementia and osteoporosis were not detected. Patients with high morbidity burden tend to obtain specialist services at secondary or tertiary health care facilities commonly situated in the urban area [ 27 , 28 , 29 ]. The maximum number of comorbidities a respondent has detected in this study is up to four.

In the present study, 32 types of FRIDs have been identified. The majority of these belong to the cardiovascular medication classes. A majority of the respondents were taking prescription medication of four or more. Polypharmacy may indicate the presence of multiple FRIDs being prescribed to a single patient which in turn increases the risk of falls. Aging combined with multiple FRIDs are strong indicators of falls. There is evidence showing that multiple FRIDs either from the same class of medications or combining different classes such as cardiovascular and psychotropic medications can lead to increased fall incidents [ 30 , 31 ]. There were considerably less psychotropic agents detected in this study probably because in this locality not many residents with psychiatric disorders or are seeking medical care at a tertiary care facility. There are numerous studies published have focused on the impact of psychotropic agents and falls [ 32 , 33 ]. Cardiovascular medications such as diuretics, antihypertensive agents, and statins greatly affect the risk of falls. Statins use may exacerbate a decline in muscle mass leading to reduced muscle performance thus increasing the risk of falls among older adults [ 34 , 35 , 36 ]. Besides muscle weakness, statins are also found to affect balance and gait performances in older adults [ 37 ].

Prior to educational intervention, a majority of the respondents were aware that biological factors and unsafe environments are risk factors for falls. This awareness comes from their own experience either from falling or observing other older people who experience falls. Initially, a majority of the respondents disagreed that behavioural issues such as lack of physical activity and alcoholism can be risk factors for falls. This can be due to a lack of awareness and low health literacy. Their understanding was improved after providing educational intervention. The socioeconomic status of older adults refers to an individual’s social standing, which is typically measured by several indicators such as occupation, income, education, and wealth [ 38 ]. Hence, older adults with poor socioeconomic status have an increased risk of falls as compared to older people with higher socioeconomic status [ 38 , 39 ]. In Malaysia, the majority of the citizens obtain health care services from public health facilities as the services provided are heavily subsidised by the government. Due to this reason, the majority of the respondents don’t feel the socioeconomic status is a risk factor for falls. Besides easily accessible health care services, lack of awareness that it can be a risk factor could also be a possible reason. A similar situation was encountered when respondents asked if medications can be a risk factor for falls. The majority of them didn’t agree so because they feel medications bring benefits rather than harms. In the educational material provided, an explanation was given on how some classes of medications can contribute to the risk of falling through side effects. As compared to a study conducted in Sri Lanka, respondents from the current study had average knowledge at baseline [ 22 ]. In post-intervention, there was a significant improvement in respondents’ knowledge regarding medications as a possible risk factor for falls.

In the present study, respondents do perceive that fall is a preventable event after educating them about fall prevention measures. This group of respondents was aware that they were susceptible to falling. The respondents also perceive that the safety of the house is adequate and educational intervention does not have much impact on this perception. This can be probably due to the majority of fall incidents being experienced in outdoor settings. Less than a majority, perceive weakness negatively thus denying that they require help to prevent them from falling. Educational interventions help to change their negative perception to positive ones as they accept that they are frail and require fall prevention activities [ 40 , 41 , 42 ]. The majority of the respondents were aware that recurrent falls can be prevented, if necessary, and steps are taken to avoid falling. They also agree that knowledge training programmes on fall-related injuries should be implemented in the community as they are beneficial. Currently, knowledge training programmes on fall-related injury are not widely implemented, particularly in the rural areas of Malaysia. Despite the education level and locality, the respondents do understand the importance of taking care of their health.

A majority of the participants don’t adjust their beds as they still use conventional bed frames. Hence, the educational intervention does not show any effect on this attitude. Attitude in terms of stopping medications when experiencing side effects improved after the intervention. Educating older adults about the possible side effects of medications and subsequent countermeasures is vital to avoid falls. This activity can be carried out during medication review and counselling by pharmacists. This is a novel study in the Malaysian setting analysing the attitude of older adults towards falls. So forth, no such studies have been carried out in the Malaysian setting, and hence this study will provide an insight into the attitude of older adults towards their experiences and practices towards falls. Moreover, the findings of this study may help healthcare providers in the management of fall risk and will help them to improve the quality of life of older adults. The outcomes reported in the current study are consistent with outcomes reported from other Asian studies proving that educational intervention does improve one’s attitude and perception towards fall [ 22 , 43 ].

Out of 310 prescriptions reviewed, only 4.8% of prescriptions were found to have FRIDs with a potential chance of inducing falls and were intervened. Pharmacotherapies were not changed for the remaining respondents as the treatment was found to be more beneficial than harmful. Based on a prospective cohort study done by Van Der Velde et al. FRIDs intervention was effective in reducing fall incidents with an absolute risk reduction of 19% and relative risk reduction of 49%. Most of the intervention in the present study was done for cardiovascular medications as a majority was diagnosed with cardiovascular diseases. Since a majority of the intervention was done on cardiovascular medications, the risk reduction of fall incidents might be similar to the above-mentioned study.

Based on the statistical analysis carried out, the pharmacist-led educational intervention was found to be significantly effective in improving the respondent’s KAP of falls. This is evident by the scores reported before and after the intervention had been provided. The result from the statistical analysis also pointed out that the educational materials used in this study benefit the patients regardless of sex and education level. The educational materials can be used even for patients without formal education living in the rural areas.

Pharmacist-led education intervention was proven to be effective in controlling chronic medical condition(s). An earlier study conducted among the Malaysian diabetic population showed that pharmacist-led education intervention significantly improved their knowledge of diabetes and medication adherence behaviour [ 44 ]. Another study reported that Pharmacist-led educational interventions have reduced the rate of medication errors [ 45 ], and improved health outcomes, particularly medication adherence among patients with hypertension [ 46 ]. A study among asthmatic patients revealed that pharmacist-led educational intervention has shown a positive impact on the knowledge of asthma and self-management of the disease [ 47 ].

As the study was conducted only in a rural area of a single state, the findings may not represent the actual knowledge, attitude, perception, and practice of older adults in the whole country. Moreover, the ethnicity distribution in this study does not represent the nation’s ethnicity distribution as 99% of the respondents who participated in the study are Malays. There is a possibility of recall bias as some of the respondents may need to recall past events such as fall incidents.

The study was carried out in a rural area with a limited number of respondents, and hence it is recommended to extend the study to other parts of the country with a greater number of older adults to improve the generalisability. It is also recommended to carry out the interventional study with a control group and also for a longer duration of time with follow-up to assess the reduction in fall risk with educational intervention provided to older adults.

The findings of the study concluded that the older adults in this primary care setting had good knowledge, attitude, and perception (KAP) of falls and fractures in post-intervention. The review of the fall risk-increasing drugs (FRIDs) among older adults found that most of the patients were receiving polypharmacy or multiple medications that significantly contributed to the development of falls. The educational intervention provided to the respondents was significantly effective in improving the awareness of falls and FRIDs. More robust and comprehensive educational interventions on the falls and FRIDs are needed to prevent the occurrence of falls among the wider older adult population.

Data availability

The datasets used and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

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We would like to deeply thank the management of International Medical University for the necessary support to carry out this research.

This study was funded by the International Medical University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the grant approval number is MPP1-2021(09).

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Manirajan, P., Sivanandy, P. & Ingle, P.V. Enhancing knowledge, attitude, and perceptions towards fall prevention among older adults: a pharmacist-led intervention in a primary healthcare clinic, Gemas, Malaysia. BMC Geriatr 24 , 309 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12877-024-04930-5

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Where there’s misalignment that might not be as significant

Effectiveness.

There is a noticeably wide gap, however, between the C-Suite and its legal team when it comes to effectiveness . In fact, the size of the gap is potentially troubling at first glance — Why would corporate legal professionals be placing so low a priority on the effectiveness of their department in comparison to how the C-Suite characterizes it?

Another wide gap can be found in return-to-office (RTO) policies. Here too, the gap is understandable. The C-Suite is tasked with setting and managing RTO policies for the entire business; GCs, on the other hand, are often less concerned with setting policy than with ensuring compliance and enforcement. Therefore, it is understandable that RTO policies would be less of a top-of-mind priority for GCs.

However, there are components to this gap that GCs would do well to remember, particularly as they relate to talent issues. Indeed, the C-Suite is demonstrating a much higher degree of expectation around employee engagement and well-being than are in-house legal teams. Yet, this can be an opportunity for GCs to show their alignment with enterprise priorities by reporting how they are managing and improving employee engagement and well-being issues within their departments.

Much like effectiveness , there was also a gap between the perspectives of the C-Suite and the law department when it comes to protection , albeit in the opposite direction. Here, GCs are actually placing greater emphasis on protecting the business than the C-Suite would necessarily expect. This is not a bad thing. In fact, the gap may reflect a reality in which the GC and legal team does such a good job of understanding and mitigating the full spectrum of risk that the C-Suite might not actually be fully aware of all potential risks, simply because these risks don’t evolve into crises that need C-Suite attention. In fact, such an outcome — one in which nothing much happens, crisis-wise — would be a testament to the risk-management abilities of the GC.

However, GCs should also be aware that they may be more sensitive to potential risk than their C-Suite and exercise caution to not allow this heightened perception to stand in the way of progress for the business. Managing risk, without doubt, is a core function for the GC, and the most effective GCs will be able to balance managing risk without their department falling into the trap of becoming the dreaded Department of No — a function that other units in the organization are hesitant to engage because of the negative impacts on progress and growth. Instead, GCs should use their heightened focus on protecting the business to transform their function into the Department of How , presenting less risky options to drive the business forward.

Where there’s misalignment that could be a benefit

Which brings us to the third alignment consideration between GCs and the C-Suite — the situations in which GCs can craft messages that might help to shape the C-Suite’s perceptions.

GCs view themselves as having a higher potential for helping to enable the business than does the C-Suite, which too often fails to credit the department for this task. Specifically, GCs believe they can play a larger role in enabling growth and that shifting toward a Department of How can play a large role in this enabling function as well. As the report states, the law department can be a place where growth can run into roadblocks, or it can be a place that helps find a smoother path around those roadblocks. By consistently focusing on becoming the latter, GCs can show their commitment to helping drive the business forward.

At the same time, if properly messaged to the C-Suite, GCs can use these efforts to shape the perception within the C-Suite of the legal function’s ability to help drive growth, pushing the GC into a role as a more vital strategic leader within the overall business.

We will likely never see a scenario in which GCs and the C-Suite are in perfect alignment in all facets of the GC’s function. However, the gaps between what the C-Suite would like to see out of its in-house law department and what that law department views as its reality can provide invaluable opportunities for growth within the department itself and can help to shape how the law department is perceived and valued across the entire business.

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• Published: 26 March 2024

Predicting and improving complex beer flavor through machine learning

• Michiel Schreurs   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-9449-5619 1 , 2 , 3   na1 ,
• Supinya Piampongsant 1 , 2 , 3   na1 ,
• Miguel Roncoroni   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7461-1427 1 , 2 , 3   na1 ,
• Lloyd Cool   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-9936-3124 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
• Beatriz Herrera-Malaver   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-5096-9974 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Christophe Vanderaa   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7443-5427 4 ,
• Florian A. Theßeling 1 , 2 , 3 ,
• Łukasz Kreft   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7620-4657 5 ,
• Alexander Botzki   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-6691-4233 5 ,
• Philippe Malcorps 6 ,
• Luk Daenen 6 ,
• Tom Wenseleers   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-1434-861X 4 &
• Kevin J. Verstrepen   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-3077-6219 1 , 2 , 3  

Nature Communications volume  15 , Article number:  2368 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

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The perception and appreciation of food flavor depends on many interacting chemical compounds and external factors, and therefore proves challenging to understand and predict. Here, we combine extensive chemical and sensory analyses of 250 different beers to train machine learning models that allow predicting flavor and consumer appreciation. For each beer, we measure over 200 chemical properties, perform quantitative descriptive sensory analysis with a trained tasting panel and map data from over 180,000 consumer reviews to train 10 different machine learning models. The best-performing algorithm, Gradient Boosting, yields models that significantly outperform predictions based on conventional statistics and accurately predict complex food features and consumer appreciation from chemical profiles. Model dissection allows identifying specific and unexpected compounds as drivers of beer flavor and appreciation. Adding these compounds results in variants of commercial alcoholic and non-alcoholic beers with improved consumer appreciation. Together, our study reveals how big data and machine learning uncover complex links between food chemistry, flavor and consumer perception, and lays the foundation to develop novel, tailored foods with superior flavors.

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Introduction

Predicting and understanding food perception and appreciation is one of the major challenges in food science. Accurate modeling of food flavor and appreciation could yield important opportunities for both producers and consumers, including quality control, product fingerprinting, counterfeit detection, spoilage detection, and the development of new products and product combinations (food pairing) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 . Accurate models for flavor and consumer appreciation would contribute greatly to our scientific understanding of how humans perceive and appreciate flavor. Moreover, accurate predictive models would also facilitate and standardize existing food assessment methods and could supplement or replace assessments by trained and consumer tasting panels, which are variable, expensive and time-consuming 7 , 8 , 9 . Lastly, apart from providing objective, quantitative, accurate and contextual information that can help producers, models can also guide consumers in understanding their personal preferences 10 .

Despite the myriad of applications, predicting food flavor and appreciation from its chemical properties remains a largely elusive goal in sensory science, especially for complex food and beverages 11 , 12 . A key obstacle is the immense number of flavor-active chemicals underlying food flavor. Flavor compounds can vary widely in chemical structure and concentration, making them technically challenging and labor-intensive to quantify, even in the face of innovations in metabolomics, such as non-targeted metabolic fingerprinting 13 , 14 . Moreover, sensory analysis is perhaps even more complicated. Flavor perception is highly complex, resulting from hundreds of different molecules interacting at the physiochemical and sensorial level. Sensory perception is often non-linear, characterized by complex and concentration-dependent synergistic and antagonistic effects 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 that are further convoluted by the genetics, environment, culture and psychology of consumers 22 , 23 , 24 . Perceived flavor is therefore difficult to measure, with problems of sensitivity, accuracy, and reproducibility that can only be resolved by gathering sufficiently large datasets 25 . Trained tasting panels are considered the prime source of quality sensory data, but require meticulous training, are low throughput and high cost. Public databases containing consumer reviews of food products could provide a valuable alternative, especially for studying appreciation scores, which do not require formal training 25 . Public databases offer the advantage of amassing large amounts of data, increasing the statistical power to identify potential drivers of appreciation. However, public datasets suffer from biases, including a bias in the volunteers that contribute to the database, as well as confounding factors such as price, cult status and psychological conformity towards previous ratings of the product.

Classical multivariate statistics and machine learning methods have been used to predict flavor of specific compounds by, for example, linking structural properties of a compound to its potential biological activities or linking concentrations of specific compounds to sensory profiles 1 , 26 . Importantly, most previous studies focused on predicting organoleptic properties of single compounds (often based on their chemical structure) 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , thus ignoring the fact that these compounds are present in a complex matrix in food or beverages and excluding complex interactions between compounds. Moreover, the classical statistics commonly used in sensory science 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 require a large sample size and sufficient variance amongst predictors to create accurate models. They are not fit for studying an extensive set of hundreds of interacting flavor compounds, since they are sensitive to outliers, have a high tendency to overfit and are less suited for non-linear and discontinuous relationships 40 .

In this study, we combine extensive chemical analyses and sensory data of a set of different commercial beers with machine learning approaches to develop models that predict taste, smell, mouthfeel and appreciation from compound concentrations. Beer is particularly suited to model the relationship between chemistry, flavor and appreciation. First, beer is a complex product, consisting of thousands of flavor compounds that partake in complex sensory interactions 41 , 42 , 43 . This chemical diversity arises from the raw materials (malt, yeast, hops, water and spices) and biochemical conversions during the brewing process (kilning, mashing, boiling, fermentation, maturation and aging) 44 , 45 . Second, the advent of the internet saw beer consumers embrace online review platforms, such as RateBeer (ZX Ventures, Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV) and BeerAdvocate (Next Glass, inc.). In this way, the beer community provides massive data sets of beer flavor and appreciation scores, creating extraordinarily large sensory databases to complement the analyses of our professional sensory panel. Specifically, we characterize over 200 chemical properties of 250 commercial beers, spread across 22 beer styles, and link these to the descriptive sensory profiling data of a 16-person in-house trained tasting panel and data acquired from over 180,000 public consumer reviews. These unique and extensive datasets enable us to train a suite of machine learning models to predict flavor and appreciation from a beer’s chemical profile. Dissection of the best-performing models allows us to pinpoint specific compounds as potential drivers of beer flavor and appreciation. Follow-up experiments confirm the importance of these compounds and ultimately allow us to significantly improve the flavor and appreciation of selected commercial beers. Together, our study represents a significant step towards understanding complex flavors and reinforces the value of machine learning to develop and refine complex foods. In this way, it represents a stepping stone for further computer-aided food engineering applications 46 .

To generate a comprehensive dataset on beer flavor, we selected 250 commercial Belgian beers across 22 different beer styles (Supplementary Fig.  S1 ). Beers with ≤ 4.2% alcohol by volume (ABV) were classified as non-alcoholic and low-alcoholic. Blonds and Tripels constitute a significant portion of the dataset (12.4% and 11.2%, respectively) reflecting their presence on the Belgian beer market and the heterogeneity of beers within these styles. By contrast, lager beers are less diverse and dominated by a handful of brands. Rare styles such as Brut or Faro make up only a small fraction of the dataset (2% and 1%, respectively) because fewer of these beers are produced and because they are dominated by distinct characteristics in terms of flavor and chemical composition.

Extensive analysis identifies relationships between chemical compounds in beer

For each beer, we measured 226 different chemical properties, including common brewing parameters such as alcohol content, iso-alpha acids, pH, sugar concentration 47 , and over 200 flavor compounds (Methods, Supplementary Table  S1 ). A large portion (37.2%) are terpenoids arising from hopping, responsible for herbal and fruity flavors 16 , 48 . A second major category are yeast metabolites, such as esters and alcohols, that result in fruity and solvent notes 48 , 49 , 50 . Other measured compounds are primarily derived from malt, or other microbes such as non- Saccharomyces yeasts and bacteria (‘wild flora’). Compounds that arise from spices or staling are labeled under ‘Others’. Five attributes (caloric value, total acids and total ester, hop aroma and sulfur compounds) are calculated from multiple individually measured compounds.

As a first step in identifying relationships between chemical properties, we determined correlations between the concentrations of the compounds (Fig.  1 , upper panel, Supplementary Data  1 and 2 , and Supplementary Fig.  S2 . For the sake of clarity, only a subset of the measured compounds is shown in Fig.  1 ). Compounds of the same origin typically show a positive correlation, while absence of correlation hints at parameters varying independently. For example, the hop aroma compounds citronellol, and alpha-terpineol show moderate correlations with each other (Spearman’s rho=0.39 and 0.57), but not with the bittering hop component iso-alpha acids (Spearman’s rho=0.16 and −0.07). This illustrates how brewers can independently modify hop aroma and bitterness by selecting hop varieties and dosage time. If hops are added early in the boiling phase, chemical conversions increase bitterness while aromas evaporate, conversely, late addition of hops preserves aroma but limits bitterness 51 . Similarly, hop-derived iso-alpha acids show a strong anti-correlation with lactic acid and acetic acid, likely reflecting growth inhibition of lactic acid and acetic acid bacteria, or the consequent use of fewer hops in sour beer styles, such as West Flanders ales and Fruit beers, that rely on these bacteria for their distinct flavors 52 . Finally, yeast-derived esters (ethyl acetate, ethyl decanoate, ethyl hexanoate, ethyl octanoate) and alcohols (ethanol, isoamyl alcohol, isobutanol, and glycerol), correlate with Spearman coefficients above 0.5, suggesting that these secondary metabolites are correlated with the yeast genetic background and/or fermentation parameters and may be difficult to influence individually, although the choice of yeast strain may offer some control 53 .

Spearman rank correlations are shown. Descriptors are grouped according to their origin (malt (blue), hops (green), yeast (red), wild flora (yellow), Others (black)), and sensory aspect (aroma, taste, palate, and overall appreciation). Please note that for the chemical compounds, for the sake of clarity, only a subset of the total number of measured compounds is shown, with an emphasis on the key compounds for each source. For more details, see the main text and Methods section. Chemical data can be found in Supplementary Data  1 , correlations between all chemical compounds are depicted in Supplementary Fig.  S2 and correlation values can be found in Supplementary Data  2 . See Supplementary Data  4 for sensory panel assessments and Supplementary Data  5 for correlation values between all sensory descriptors.

Interestingly, different beer styles show distinct patterns for some flavor compounds (Supplementary Fig.  S3 ). These observations agree with expectations for key beer styles, and serve as a control for our measurements. For instance, Stouts generally show high values for color (darker), while hoppy beers contain elevated levels of iso-alpha acids, compounds associated with bitter hop taste. Acetic and lactic acid are not prevalent in most beers, with notable exceptions such as Kriek, Lambic, Faro, West Flanders ales and Flanders Old Brown, which use acid-producing bacteria ( Lactobacillus and Pediococcus ) or unconventional yeast ( Brettanomyces ) 54 , 55 . Glycerol, ethanol and esters show similar distributions across all beer styles, reflecting their common origin as products of yeast metabolism during fermentation 45 , 53 . Finally, low/no-alcohol beers contain low concentrations of glycerol and esters. This is in line with the production process for most of the low/no-alcohol beers in our dataset, which are produced through limiting fermentation or by stripping away alcohol via evaporation or dialysis, with both methods having the unintended side-effect of reducing the amount of flavor compounds in the final beer 56 , 57 .

Besides expected associations, our data also reveals less trivial associations between beer styles and specific parameters. For example, geraniol and citronellol, two monoterpenoids responsible for citrus, floral and rose flavors and characteristic of Citra hops, are found in relatively high amounts in Christmas, Saison, and Brett/co-fermented beers, where they may originate from terpenoid-rich spices such as coriander seeds instead of hops 58 .

Tasting panel assessments reveal sensorial relationships in beer

To assess the sensory profile of each beer, a trained tasting panel evaluated each of the 250 beers for 50 sensory attributes, including different hop, malt and yeast flavors, off-flavors and spices. Panelists used a tasting sheet (Supplementary Data  3 ) to score the different attributes. Panel consistency was evaluated by repeating 12 samples across different sessions and performing ANOVA. In 95% of cases no significant difference was found across sessions ( p  > 0.05), indicating good panel consistency (Supplementary Table  S2 ).

Aroma and taste perception reported by the trained panel are often linked (Fig.  1 , bottom left panel and Supplementary Data  4 and 5 ), with high correlations between hops aroma and taste (Spearman’s rho=0.83). Bitter taste was found to correlate with hop aroma and taste in general (Spearman’s rho=0.80 and 0.69), and particularly with “grassy” noble hops (Spearman’s rho=0.75). Barnyard flavor, most often associated with sour beers, is identified together with stale hops (Spearman’s rho=0.97) that are used in these beers. Lactic and acetic acid, which often co-occur, are correlated (Spearman’s rho=0.66). Interestingly, sweetness and bitterness are anti-correlated (Spearman’s rho = −0.48), confirming the hypothesis that they mask each other 59 , 60 . Beer body is highly correlated with alcohol (Spearman’s rho = 0.79), and overall appreciation is found to correlate with multiple aspects that describe beer mouthfeel (alcohol, carbonation; Spearman’s rho= 0.32, 0.39), as well as with hop and ester aroma intensity (Spearman’s rho=0.39 and 0.35).

Similar to the chemical analyses, sensorial analyses confirmed typical features of specific beer styles (Supplementary Fig.  S4 ). For example, sour beers (Faro, Flanders Old Brown, Fruit beer, Kriek, Lambic, West Flanders ale) were rated acidic, with flavors of both acetic and lactic acid. Hoppy beers were found to be bitter and showed hop-associated aromas like citrus and tropical fruit. Malt taste is most detected among scotch, stout/porters, and strong ales, while low/no-alcohol beers, which often have a reputation for being ‘worty’ (reminiscent of unfermented, sweet malt extract) appear in the middle. Unsurprisingly, hop aromas are most strongly detected among hoppy beers. Like its chemical counterpart (Supplementary Fig.  S3 ), acidity shows a right-skewed distribution, with the most acidic beers being Krieks, Lambics, and West Flanders ales.

Tasting panel assessments of specific flavors correlate with chemical composition

We find that the concentrations of several chemical compounds strongly correlate with specific aroma or taste, as evaluated by the tasting panel (Fig.  2 , Supplementary Fig.  S5 , Supplementary Data  6 ). In some cases, these correlations confirm expectations and serve as a useful control for data quality. For example, iso-alpha acids, the bittering compounds in hops, strongly correlate with bitterness (Spearman’s rho=0.68), while ethanol and glycerol correlate with tasters’ perceptions of alcohol and body, the mouthfeel sensation of fullness (Spearman’s rho=0.82/0.62 and 0.72/0.57 respectively) and darker color from roasted malts is a good indication of malt perception (Spearman’s rho=0.54).

Heatmap colors indicate Spearman’s Rho. Axes are organized according to sensory categories (aroma, taste, mouthfeel, overall), chemical categories and chemical sources in beer (malt (blue), hops (green), yeast (red), wild flora (yellow), Others (black)). See Supplementary Data  6 for all correlation values.

Interestingly, for some relationships between chemical compounds and perceived flavor, correlations are weaker than expected. For example, the rose-smelling phenethyl acetate only weakly correlates with floral aroma. This hints at more complex relationships and interactions between compounds and suggests a need for a more complex model than simple correlations. Lastly, we uncovered unexpected correlations. For instance, the esters ethyl decanoate and ethyl octanoate appear to correlate slightly with hop perception and bitterness, possibly due to their fruity flavor. Iron is anti-correlated with hop aromas and bitterness, most likely because it is also anti-correlated with iso-alpha acids. This could be a sign of metal chelation of hop acids 61 , given that our analyses measure unbound hop acids and total iron content, or could result from the higher iron content in dark and Fruit beers, which typically have less hoppy and bitter flavors 62 .

Public consumer reviews complement expert panel data

To complement and expand the sensory data of our trained tasting panel, we collected 180,000 reviews of our 250 beers from the online consumer review platform RateBeer. This provided numerical scores for beer appearance, aroma, taste, palate, overall quality as well as the average overall score.

Public datasets are known to suffer from biases, such as price, cult status and psychological conformity towards previous ratings of a product. For example, prices correlate with appreciation scores for these online consumer reviews (rho=0.49, Supplementary Fig.  S6 ), but not for our trained tasting panel (rho=0.19). This suggests that prices affect consumer appreciation, which has been reported in wine 63 , while blind tastings are unaffected. Moreover, we observe that some beer styles, like lagers and non-alcoholic beers, generally receive lower scores, reflecting that online reviewers are mostly beer aficionados with a preference for specialty beers over lager beers. In general, we find a modest correlation between our trained panel’s overall appreciation score and the online consumer appreciation scores (Fig.  3 , rho=0.29). Apart from the aforementioned biases in the online datasets, serving temperature, sample freshness and surroundings, which are all tightly controlled during the tasting panel sessions, can vary tremendously across online consumers and can further contribute to (among others, appreciation) differences between the two categories of tasters. Importantly, in contrast to the overall appreciation scores, for many sensory aspects the results from the professional panel correlated well with results obtained from RateBeer reviews. Correlations were highest for features that are relatively easy to recognize even for untrained tasters, like bitterness, sweetness, alcohol and malt aroma (Fig.  3 and below).

RateBeer text mining results can be found in Supplementary Data  7 . Rho values shown are Spearman correlation values, with asterisks indicating significant correlations ( p  < 0.05, two-sided). All p values were smaller than 0.001, except for Esters aroma (0.0553), Esters taste (0.3275), Esters aroma—banana (0.0019), Coriander (0.0508) and Diacetyl (0.0134).

Besides collecting consumer appreciation from these online reviews, we developed automated text analysis tools to gather additional data from review texts (Supplementary Data  7 ). Processing review texts on the RateBeer database yielded comparable results to the scores given by the trained panel for many common sensory aspects, including acidity, bitterness, sweetness, alcohol, malt, and hop tastes (Fig.  3 ). This is in line with what would be expected, since these attributes require less training for accurate assessment and are less influenced by environmental factors such as temperature, serving glass and odors in the environment. Consumer reviews also correlate well with our trained panel for 4-vinyl guaiacol, a compound associated with a very characteristic aroma. By contrast, correlations for more specific aromas like ester, coriander or diacetyl are underrepresented in the online reviews, underscoring the importance of using a trained tasting panel and standardized tasting sheets with explicit factors to be scored for evaluating specific aspects of a beer. Taken together, our results suggest that public reviews are trustworthy for some, but not all, flavor features and can complement or substitute taste panel data for these sensory aspects.

Models can predict beer sensory profiles from chemical data

The rich datasets of chemical analyses, tasting panel assessments and public reviews gathered in the first part of this study provided us with a unique opportunity to develop predictive models that link chemical data to sensorial features. Given the complexity of beer flavor, basic statistical tools such as correlations or linear regression may not always be the most suitable for making accurate predictions. Instead, we applied different machine learning models that can model both simple linear and complex interactive relationships. Specifically, we constructed a set of regression models to predict (a) trained panel scores for beer flavor and quality and (b) public reviews’ appreciation scores from beer chemical profiles. We trained and tested 10 different models (Methods), 3 linear regression-based models (simple linear regression with first-order interactions (LR), lasso regression with first-order interactions (Lasso), partial least squares regressor (PLSR)), 5 decision tree models (AdaBoost regressor (ABR), extra trees (ET), gradient boosting regressor (GBR), random forest (RF) and XGBoost regressor (XGBR)), 1 support vector regression (SVR), and 1 artificial neural network (ANN) model.

To compare the performance of our machine learning models, the dataset was randomly split into a training and test set, stratified by beer style. After a model was trained on data in the training set, its performance was evaluated on its ability to predict the test dataset obtained from multi-output models (based on the coefficient of determination, see Methods). Additionally, individual-attribute models were ranked per descriptor and the average rank was calculated, as proposed by Korneva et al. 64 . Importantly, both ways of evaluating the models’ performance agreed in general. Performance of the different models varied (Table  1 ). It should be noted that all models perform better at predicting RateBeer results than results from our trained tasting panel. One reason could be that sensory data is inherently variable, and this variability is averaged out with the large number of public reviews from RateBeer. Additionally, all tree-based models perform better at predicting taste than aroma. Linear models (LR) performed particularly poorly, with negative R 2 values, due to severe overfitting (training set R 2  = 1). Overfitting is a common issue in linear models with many parameters and limited samples, especially with interaction terms further amplifying the number of parameters. L1 regularization (Lasso) successfully overcomes this overfitting, out-competing multiple tree-based models on the RateBeer dataset. Similarly, the dimensionality reduction of PLSR avoids overfitting and improves performance, to some extent. Still, tree-based models (ABR, ET, GBR, RF and XGBR) show the best performance, out-competing the linear models (LR, Lasso, PLSR) commonly used in sensory science 65 .

GBR models showed the best overall performance in predicting sensory responses from chemical information, with R 2 values up to 0.75 depending on the predicted sensory feature (Supplementary Table  S4 ). The GBR models predict consumer appreciation (RateBeer) better than our trained panel’s appreciation (R 2 value of 0.67 compared to R 2 value of 0.09) (Supplementary Table  S3 and Supplementary Table  S4 ). ANN models showed intermediate performance, likely because neural networks typically perform best with larger datasets 66 . The SVR shows intermediate performance, mostly due to the weak predictions of specific attributes that lower the overall performance (Supplementary Table  S4 ).

Model dissection identifies specific, unexpected compounds as drivers of consumer appreciation

Next, we leveraged our models to infer important contributors to sensory perception and consumer appreciation. Consumer preference is a crucial sensory aspects, because a product that shows low consumer appreciation scores often does not succeed commercially 25 . Additionally, the requirement for a large number of representative evaluators makes consumer trials one of the more costly and time-consuming aspects of product development. Hence, a model for predicting chemical drivers of overall appreciation would be a welcome addition to the available toolbox for food development and optimization.

Since GBR models on our RateBeer dataset showed the best overall performance, we focused on these models. Specifically, we used two approaches to identify important contributors. First, rankings of the most important predictors for each sensorial trait in the GBR models were obtained based on impurity-based feature importance (mean decrease in impurity). High-ranked parameters were hypothesized to be either the true causal chemical properties underlying the trait, to correlate with the actual causal properties, or to take part in sensory interactions affecting the trait 67 (Fig.  4A ). In a second approach, we used SHAP 68 to determine which parameters contributed most to the model for making predictions of consumer appreciation (Fig.  4B ). SHAP calculates parameter contributions to model predictions on a per-sample basis, which can be aggregated into an importance score.

A The impurity-based feature importance (mean deviance in impurity, MDI) calculated from the Gradient Boosting Regression (GBR) model predicting RateBeer appreciation scores. The top 15 highest ranked chemical properties are shown. B SHAP summary plot for the top 15 parameters contributing to our GBR model. Each point on the graph represents a sample from our dataset. The color represents the concentration of that parameter, with bluer colors representing low values and redder colors representing higher values. Greater absolute values on the horizontal axis indicate a higher impact of the parameter on the prediction of the model. C Spearman correlations between the 15 most important chemical properties and consumer overall appreciation. Numbers indicate the Spearman Rho correlation coefficient, and the rank of this correlation compared to all other correlations. The top 15 important compounds were determined using SHAP (panel B).

Both approaches identified ethyl acetate as the most predictive parameter for beer appreciation (Fig.  4 ). Ethyl acetate is the most abundant ester in beer with a typical ‘fruity’, ‘solvent’ and ‘alcoholic’ flavor, but is often considered less important than other esters like isoamyl acetate. The second most important parameter identified by SHAP is ethanol, the most abundant beer compound after water. Apart from directly contributing to beer flavor and mouthfeel, ethanol drastically influences the physical properties of beer, dictating how easily volatile compounds escape the beer matrix to contribute to beer aroma 69 . Importantly, it should also be noted that the importance of ethanol for appreciation is likely inflated by the very low appreciation scores of non-alcoholic beers (Supplementary Fig.  S4 ). Despite not often being considered a driver of beer appreciation, protein level also ranks highly in both approaches, possibly due to its effect on mouthfeel and body 70 . Lactic acid, which contributes to the tart taste of sour beers, is the fourth most important parameter identified by SHAP, possibly due to the generally high appreciation of sour beers in our dataset.

Interestingly, some of the most important predictive parameters for our model are not well-established as beer flavors or are even commonly regarded as being negative for beer quality. For example, our models identify methanethiol and ethyl phenyl acetate, an ester commonly linked to beer staling 71 , as a key factor contributing to beer appreciation. Although there is no doubt that high concentrations of these compounds are considered unpleasant, the positive effects of modest concentrations are not yet known 72 , 73 .

To compare our approach to conventional statistics, we evaluated how well the 15 most important SHAP-derived parameters correlate with consumer appreciation (Fig.  4C ). Interestingly, only 6 of the properties derived by SHAP rank amongst the top 15 most correlated parameters. For some chemical compounds, the correlations are so low that they would have likely been considered unimportant. For example, lactic acid, the fourth most important parameter, shows a bimodal distribution for appreciation, with sour beers forming a separate cluster, that is missed entirely by the Spearman correlation. Additionally, the correlation plots reveal outliers, emphasizing the need for robust analysis tools. Together, this highlights the need for alternative models, like the Gradient Boosting model, that better grasp the complexity of (beer) flavor.

Finally, to observe the relationships between these chemical properties and their predicted targets, partial dependence plots were constructed for the six most important predictors of consumer appreciation 74 , 75 , 76 (Supplementary Fig.  S7 ). One-way partial dependence plots show how a change in concentration affects the predicted appreciation. These plots reveal an important limitation of our models: appreciation predictions remain constant at ever-increasing concentrations. This implies that once a threshold concentration is reached, further increasing the concentration does not affect appreciation. This is false, as it is well-documented that certain compounds become unpleasant at high concentrations, including ethyl acetate (‘nail polish’) 77 and methanethiol (‘sulfury’ and ‘rotten cabbage’) 78 . The inability of our models to grasp that flavor compounds have optimal levels, above which they become negative, is a consequence of working with commercial beer brands where (off-)flavors are rarely too high to negatively impact the product. The two-way partial dependence plots show how changing the concentration of two compounds influences predicted appreciation, visualizing their interactions (Supplementary Fig.  S7 ). In our case, the top 5 parameters are dominated by additive or synergistic interactions, with high concentrations for both compounds resulting in the highest predicted appreciation.

To assess the robustness of our best-performing models and model predictions, we performed 100 iterations of the GBR, RF and ET models. In general, all iterations of the models yielded similar performance (Supplementary Fig.  S8 ). Moreover, the main predictors (including the top predictors ethanol and ethyl acetate) remained virtually the same, especially for GBR and RF. For the iterations of the ET model, we did observe more variation in the top predictors, which is likely a consequence of the model’s inherent random architecture in combination with co-correlations between certain predictors. However, even in this case, several of the top predictors (ethanol and ethyl acetate) remain unchanged, although their rank in importance changes (Supplementary Fig.  S8 ).

Next, we investigated if a combination of RateBeer and trained panel data into one consolidated dataset would lead to stronger models, under the hypothesis that such a model would suffer less from bias in the datasets. A GBR model was trained to predict appreciation on the combined dataset. This model underperformed compared to the RateBeer model, both in the native case and when including a dataset identifier (R 2  = 0.67, 0.26 and 0.42 respectively). For the latter, the dataset identifier is the most important feature (Supplementary Fig.  S9 ), while most of the feature importance remains unchanged, with ethyl acetate and ethanol ranking highest, like in the original model trained only on RateBeer data. It seems that the large variation in the panel dataset introduces noise, weakening the models’ performances and reliability. In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that both datasets are fundamentally different, with the panel dataset obtained by blind tastings by a trained professional panel.

Lastly, we evaluated whether beer style identifiers would further enhance the model’s performance. A GBR model was trained with parameters that explicitly encoded the styles of the samples. This did not improve model performance (R2 = 0.66 with style information vs R2 = 0.67). The most important chemical features are consistent with the model trained without style information (eg. ethanol and ethyl acetate), and with the exception of the most preferred (strong ale) and least preferred (low/no-alcohol) styles, none of the styles were among the most important features (Supplementary Fig.  S9 , Supplementary Table  S5 and S6 ). This is likely due to a combination of style-specific chemical signatures, such as iso-alpha acids and lactic acid, that implicitly convey style information to the original models, as well as the low number of samples belonging to some styles, making it difficult for the model to learn style-specific patterns. Moreover, beer styles are not rigorously defined, with some styles overlapping in features and some beers being misattributed to a specific style, all of which leads to more noise in models that use style parameters.

Model validation

To test if our predictive models give insight into beer appreciation, we set up experiments aimed at improving existing commercial beers. We specifically selected overall appreciation as the trait to be examined because of its complexity and commercial relevance. Beer flavor comprises a complex bouquet rather than single aromas and tastes 53 . Hence, adding a single compound to the extent that a difference is noticeable may lead to an unbalanced, artificial flavor. Therefore, we evaluated the effect of combinations of compounds. Because Blond beers represent the most extensive style in our dataset, we selected a beer from this style as the starting material for these experiments (Beer 64 in Supplementary Data  1 ).

In the first set of experiments, we adjusted the concentrations of compounds that made up the most important predictors of overall appreciation (ethyl acetate, ethanol, lactic acid, ethyl phenyl acetate) together with correlated compounds (ethyl hexanoate, isoamyl acetate, glycerol), bringing them up to 95 th percentile ethanol-normalized concentrations (Methods) within the Blond group (‘Spiked’ concentration in Fig.  5A ). Compared to controls, the spiked beers were found to have significantly improved overall appreciation among trained panelists, with panelist noting increased intensity of ester flavors, sweetness, alcohol, and body fullness (Fig.  5B ). To disentangle the contribution of ethanol to these results, a second experiment was performed without the addition of ethanol. This resulted in a similar outcome, including increased perception of alcohol and overall appreciation.

Adding the top chemical compounds, identified as best predictors of appreciation by our model, into poorly appreciated beers results in increased appreciation from our trained panel. Results of sensory tests between base beers and those spiked with compounds identified as the best predictors by the model. A Blond and Non/Low-alcohol (0.0% ABV) base beers were brought up to 95th-percentile ethanol-normalized concentrations within each style. B For each sensory attribute, tasters indicated the more intense sample and selected the sample they preferred. The numbers above the bars correspond to the p values that indicate significant changes in perceived flavor (two-sided binomial test: alpha 0.05, n  = 20 or 13).

In a last experiment, we tested whether using the model’s predictions can boost the appreciation of a non-alcoholic beer (beer 223 in Supplementary Data  1 ). Again, the addition of a mixture of predicted compounds (omitting ethanol, in this case) resulted in a significant increase in appreciation, body, ester flavor and sweetness.

Predicting flavor and consumer appreciation from chemical composition is one of the ultimate goals of sensory science. A reliable, systematic and unbiased way to link chemical profiles to flavor and food appreciation would be a significant asset to the food and beverage industry. Such tools would substantially aid in quality control and recipe development, offer an efficient and cost-effective alternative to pilot studies and consumer trials and would ultimately allow food manufacturers to produce superior, tailor-made products that better meet the demands of specific consumer groups more efficiently.

A limited set of studies have previously tried, to varying degrees of success, to predict beer flavor and beer popularity based on (a limited set of) chemical compounds and flavors 79 , 80 . Current sensitive, high-throughput technologies allow measuring an unprecedented number of chemical compounds and properties in a large set of samples, yielding a dataset that can train models that help close the gaps between chemistry and flavor, even for a complex natural product like beer. To our knowledge, no previous research gathered data at this scale (250 samples, 226 chemical parameters, 50 sensory attributes and 5 consumer scores) to disentangle and validate the chemical aspects driving beer preference using various machine-learning techniques. We find that modern machine learning models outperform conventional statistical tools, such as correlations and linear models, and can successfully predict flavor appreciation from chemical composition. This could be attributed to the natural incorporation of interactions and non-linear or discontinuous effects in machine learning models, which are not easily grasped by the linear model architecture. While linear models and partial least squares regression represent the most widespread statistical approaches in sensory science, in part because they allow interpretation 65 , 81 , 82 , modern machine learning methods allow for building better predictive models while preserving the possibility to dissect and exploit the underlying patterns. Of the 10 different models we trained, tree-based models, such as our best performing GBR, showed the best overall performance in predicting sensory responses from chemical information, outcompeting artificial neural networks. This agrees with previous reports for models trained on tabular data 83 . Our results are in line with the findings of Colantonio et al. who also identified the gradient boosting architecture as performing best at predicting appreciation and flavor (of tomatoes and blueberries, in their specific study) 26 . Importantly, besides our larger experimental scale, we were able to directly confirm our models’ predictions in vivo.

Our study confirms that flavor compound concentration does not always correlate with perception, suggesting complex interactions that are often missed by more conventional statistics and simple models. Specifically, we find that tree-based algorithms may perform best in developing models that link complex food chemistry with aroma. Furthermore, we show that massive datasets of untrained consumer reviews provide a valuable source of data, that can complement or even replace trained tasting panels, especially for appreciation and basic flavors, such as sweetness and bitterness. This holds despite biases that are known to occur in such datasets, such as price or conformity bias. Moreover, GBR models predict taste better than aroma. This is likely because taste (e.g. bitterness) often directly relates to the corresponding chemical measurements (e.g., iso-alpha acids), whereas such a link is less clear for aromas, which often result from the interplay between multiple volatile compounds. We also find that our models are best at predicting acidity and alcohol, likely because there is a direct relation between the measured chemical compounds (acids and ethanol) and the corresponding perceived sensorial attribute (acidity and alcohol), and because even untrained consumers are generally able to recognize these flavors and aromas.

The predictions of our final models, trained on review data, hold even for blind tastings with small groups of trained tasters, as demonstrated by our ability to validate specific compounds as drivers of beer flavor and appreciation. Since adding a single compound to the extent of a noticeable difference may result in an unbalanced flavor profile, we specifically tested our identified key drivers as a combination of compounds. While this approach does not allow us to validate if a particular single compound would affect flavor and/or appreciation, our experiments do show that this combination of compounds increases consumer appreciation.

It is important to stress that, while it represents an important step forward, our approach still has several major limitations. A key weakness of the GBR model architecture is that amongst co-correlating variables, the largest main effect is consistently preferred for model building. As a result, co-correlating variables often have artificially low importance scores, both for impurity and SHAP-based methods, like we observed in the comparison to the more randomized Extra Trees models. This implies that chemicals identified as key drivers of a specific sensory feature by GBR might not be the true causative compounds, but rather co-correlate with the actual causative chemical. For example, the high importance of ethyl acetate could be (partially) attributed to the total ester content, ethanol or ethyl hexanoate (rho=0.77, rho=0.72 and rho=0.68), while ethyl phenylacetate could hide the importance of prenyl isobutyrate and ethyl benzoate (rho=0.77 and rho=0.76). Expanding our GBR model to include beer style as a parameter did not yield additional power or insight. This is likely due to style-specific chemical signatures, such as iso-alpha acids and lactic acid, that implicitly convey style information to the original model, as well as the smaller sample size per style, limiting the power to uncover style-specific patterns. This can be partly attributed to the curse of dimensionality, where the high number of parameters results in the models mainly incorporating single parameter effects, rather than complex interactions such as style-dependent effects 67 . A larger number of samples may overcome some of these limitations and offer more insight into style-specific effects. On the other hand, beer style is not a rigid scientific classification, and beers within one style often differ a lot, which further complicates the analysis of style as a model factor.

Our study is limited to beers from Belgian breweries. Although these beers cover a large portion of the beer styles available globally, some beer styles and consumer patterns may be missing, while other features might be overrepresented. For example, many Belgian ales exhibit yeast-driven flavor profiles, which is reflected in the chemical drivers of appreciation discovered by this study. In future work, expanding the scope to include diverse markets and beer styles could lead to the identification of even more drivers of appreciation and better models for special niche products that were not present in our beer set.

In addition to inherent limitations of GBR models, there are also some limitations associated with studying food aroma. Even if our chemical analyses measured most of the known aroma compounds, the total number of flavor compounds in complex foods like beer is still larger than the subset we were able to measure in this study. For example, hop-derived thiols, that influence flavor at very low concentrations, are notoriously difficult to measure in a high-throughput experiment. Moreover, consumer perception remains subjective and prone to biases that are difficult to avoid. It is also important to stress that the models are still immature and that more extensive datasets will be crucial for developing more complete models in the future. Besides more samples and parameters, our dataset does not include any demographic information about the tasters. Including such data could lead to better models that grasp external factors like age and culture. Another limitation is that our set of beers consists of high-quality end-products and lacks beers that are unfit for sale, which limits the current model in accurately predicting products that are appreciated very badly. Finally, while models could be readily applied in quality control, their use in sensory science and product development is restrained by their inability to discern causal relationships. Given that the models cannot distinguish compounds that genuinely drive consumer perception from those that merely correlate, validation experiments are essential to identify true causative compounds.

Despite the inherent limitations, dissection of our models enabled us to pinpoint specific molecules as potential drivers of beer aroma and consumer appreciation, including compounds that were unexpected and would not have been identified using standard approaches. Important drivers of beer appreciation uncovered by our models include protein levels, ethyl acetate, ethyl phenyl acetate and lactic acid. Currently, many brewers already use lactic acid to acidify their brewing water and ensure optimal pH for enzymatic activity during the mashing process. Our results suggest that adding lactic acid can also improve beer appreciation, although its individual effect remains to be tested. Interestingly, ethanol appears to be unnecessary to improve beer appreciation, both for blond beer and alcohol-free beer. Given the growing consumer interest in alcohol-free beer, with a predicted annual market growth of >7% 84 , it is relevant for brewers to know what compounds can further increase consumer appreciation of these beers. Hence, our model may readily provide avenues to further improve the flavor and consumer appreciation of both alcoholic and non-alcoholic beers, which is generally considered one of the key challenges for future beer production.

Whereas we see a direct implementation of our results for the development of superior alcohol-free beverages and other food products, our study can also serve as a stepping stone for the development of novel alcohol-containing beverages. We want to echo the growing body of scientific evidence for the negative effects of alcohol consumption, both on the individual level by the mutagenic, teratogenic and carcinogenic effects of ethanol 85 , 86 , as well as the burden on society caused by alcohol abuse and addiction. We encourage the use of our results for the production of healthier, tastier products, including novel and improved beverages with lower alcohol contents. Furthermore, we strongly discourage the use of these technologies to improve the appreciation or addictive properties of harmful substances.

The present work demonstrates that despite some important remaining hurdles, combining the latest developments in chemical analyses, sensory analysis and modern machine learning methods offers exciting avenues for food chemistry and engineering. Soon, these tools may provide solutions in quality control and recipe development, as well as new approaches to sensory science and flavor research.

Beer selection

250 commercial Belgian beers were selected to cover the broad diversity of beer styles and corresponding diversity in chemical composition and aroma. See Supplementary Fig.  S1 .

Chemical dataset

Sample preparation.

Beers within their expiration date were purchased from commercial retailers. Samples were prepared in biological duplicates at room temperature, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Bottle pressure was measured with a manual pressure device (Steinfurth Mess-Systeme GmbH) and used to calculate CO 2 concentration. The beer was poured through two filter papers (Macherey-Nagel, 500713032 MN 713 ¼) to remove carbon dioxide and prevent spontaneous foaming. Samples were then prepared for measurements by targeted Headspace-Gas Chromatography-Flame Ionization Detector/Flame Photometric Detector (HS-GC-FID/FPD), Headspace-Solid Phase Microextraction-Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (HS-SPME-GC-MS), colorimetric analysis, enzymatic analysis, Near-Infrared (NIR) analysis, as described in the sections below. The mean values of biological duplicates are reported for each compound.

HS-GC-FID/FPD

HS-GC-FID/FPD (Shimadzu GC 2010 Plus) was used to measure higher alcohols, acetaldehyde, esters, 4-vinyl guaicol, and sulfur compounds. Each measurement comprised 5 ml of sample pipetted into a 20 ml glass vial containing 1.75 g NaCl (VWR, 27810.295). 100 µl of 2-heptanol (Sigma-Aldrich, H3003) (internal standard) solution in ethanol (Fisher Chemical, E/0650DF/C17) was added for a final concentration of 2.44 mg/L. Samples were flushed with nitrogen for 10 s, sealed with a silicone septum, stored at −80 °C and analyzed in batches of 20.

The GC was equipped with a DB-WAXetr column (length, 30 m; internal diameter, 0.32 mm; layer thickness, 0.50 µm; Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA, USA) to the FID and an HP-5 column (length, 30 m; internal diameter, 0.25 mm; layer thickness, 0.25 µm; Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA, USA) to the FPD. N 2 was used as the carrier gas. Samples were incubated for 20 min at 70 °C in the headspace autosampler (Flow rate, 35 cm/s; Injection volume, 1000 µL; Injection mode, split; Combi PAL autosampler, CTC analytics, Switzerland). The injector, FID and FPD temperatures were kept at 250 °C. The GC oven temperature was first held at 50 °C for 5 min and then allowed to rise to 80 °C at a rate of 5 °C/min, followed by a second ramp of 4 °C/min until 200 °C kept for 3 min and a final ramp of (4 °C/min) until 230 °C for 1 min. Results were analyzed with the GCSolution software version 2.4 (Shimadzu, Kyoto, Japan). The GC was calibrated with a 5% EtOH solution (VWR International) containing the volatiles under study (Supplementary Table  S7 ).

HS-SPME-GC-MS

HS-SPME-GC-MS (Shimadzu GCMS-QP-2010 Ultra) was used to measure additional volatile compounds, mainly comprising terpenoids and esters. Samples were analyzed by HS-SPME using a triphase DVB/Carboxen/PDMS 50/30 μm SPME fiber (Supelco Co., Bellefonte, PA, USA) followed by gas chromatography (Thermo Fisher Scientific Trace 1300 series, USA) coupled to a mass spectrometer (Thermo Fisher Scientific ISQ series MS) equipped with a TriPlus RSH autosampler. 5 ml of degassed beer sample was placed in 20 ml vials containing 1.75 g NaCl (VWR, 27810.295). 5 µl internal standard mix was added, containing 2-heptanol (1 g/L) (Sigma-Aldrich, H3003), 4-fluorobenzaldehyde (1 g/L) (Sigma-Aldrich, 128376), 2,3-hexanedione (1 g/L) (Sigma-Aldrich, 144169) and guaiacol (1 g/L) (Sigma-Aldrich, W253200) in ethanol (Fisher Chemical, E/0650DF/C17). Each sample was incubated at 60 °C in the autosampler oven with constant agitation. After 5 min equilibration, the SPME fiber was exposed to the sample headspace for 30 min. The compounds trapped on the fiber were thermally desorbed in the injection port of the chromatograph by heating the fiber for 15 min at 270 °C.

The GC-MS was equipped with a low polarity RXi-5Sil MS column (length, 20 m; internal diameter, 0.18 mm; layer thickness, 0.18 µm; Restek, Bellefonte, PA, USA). Injection was performed in splitless mode at 320 °C, a split flow of 9 ml/min, a purge flow of 5 ml/min and an open valve time of 3 min. To obtain a pulsed injection, a programmed gas flow was used whereby the helium gas flow was set at 2.7 mL/min for 0.1 min, followed by a decrease in flow of 20 ml/min to the normal 0.9 mL/min. The temperature was first held at 30 °C for 3 min and then allowed to rise to 80 °C at a rate of 7 °C/min, followed by a second ramp of 2 °C/min till 125 °C and a final ramp of 8 °C/min with a final temperature of 270 °C.

Mass acquisition range was 33 to 550 amu at a scan rate of 5 scans/s. Electron impact ionization energy was 70 eV. The interface and ion source were kept at 275 °C and 250 °C, respectively. A mix of linear n-alkanes (from C7 to C40, Supelco Co.) was injected into the GC-MS under identical conditions to serve as external retention index markers. Identification and quantification of the compounds were performed using an in-house developed R script as described in Goelen et al. and Reher et al. 87 , 88 (for package information, see Supplementary Table  S8 ). Briefly, chromatograms were analyzed using AMDIS (v2.71) 89 to separate overlapping peaks and obtain pure compound spectra. The NIST MS Search software (v2.0 g) in combination with the NIST2017, FFNSC3 and Adams4 libraries were used to manually identify the empirical spectra, taking into account the expected retention time. After background subtraction and correcting for retention time shifts between samples run on different days based on alkane ladders, compound elution profiles were extracted and integrated using a file with 284 target compounds of interest, which were either recovered in our identified AMDIS list of spectra or were known to occur in beer. Compound elution profiles were estimated for every peak in every chromatogram over a time-restricted window using weighted non-negative least square analysis after which peak areas were integrated 87 , 88 . Batch effect correction was performed by normalizing against the most stable internal standard compound, 4-fluorobenzaldehyde. Out of all 284 target compounds that were analyzed, 167 were visually judged to have reliable elution profiles and were used for final analysis.

Discrete photometric and enzymatic analysis

Discrete photometric and enzymatic analysis (Thermo Scientific TM Gallery TM Plus Beermaster Discrete Analyzer) was used to measure acetic acid, ammonia, beta-glucan, iso-alpha acids, color, sugars, glycerol, iron, pH, protein, and sulfite. 2 ml of sample volume was used for the analyses. Information regarding the reagents and standard solutions used for analyses and calibrations is included in Supplementary Table  S7 and Supplementary Table  S9 .

NIR analyses

NIR analysis (Anton Paar Alcolyzer Beer ME System) was used to measure ethanol. Measurements comprised 50 ml of sample, and a 10% EtOH solution was used for calibration.

Correlation calculations

Pairwise Spearman Rank correlations were calculated between all chemical properties.

Sensory dataset

Trained panel.

Our trained tasting panel consisted of volunteers who gave prior verbal informed consent. All compounds used for the validation experiment were of food-grade quality. The tasting sessions were approved by the Social and Societal Ethics Committee of the KU Leuven (G-2022-5677-R2(MAR)). All online reviewers agreed to the Terms and Conditions of the RateBeer website.

Sensory analysis was performed according to the American Society of Brewing Chemists (ASBC) Sensory Analysis Methods 90 . 30 volunteers were screened through a series of triangle tests. The sixteen most sensitive and consistent tasters were retained as taste panel members. The resulting panel was diverse in age [22–42, mean: 29], sex [56% male] and nationality [7 different countries]. The panel developed a consensus vocabulary to describe beer aroma, taste and mouthfeel. Panelists were trained to identify and score 50 different attributes, using a 7-point scale to rate attributes’ intensity. The scoring sheet is included as Supplementary Data  3 . Sensory assessments took place between 10–12 a.m. The beers were served in black-colored glasses. Per session, between 5 and 12 beers of the same style were tasted at 12 °C to 16 °C. Two reference beers were added to each set and indicated as ‘Reference 1 & 2’, allowing panel members to calibrate their ratings. Not all panelists were present at every tasting. Scores were scaled by standard deviation and mean-centered per taster. Values are represented as z-scores and clustered by Euclidean distance. Pairwise Spearman correlations were calculated between taste and aroma sensory attributes. Panel consistency was evaluated by repeating samples on different sessions and performing ANOVA to identify differences, using the ‘stats’ package (v4.2.2) in R (for package information, see Supplementary Table  S8 ).

Online reviews from a public database

The ‘scrapy’ package in Python (v3.6) (for package information, see Supplementary Table  S8 ). was used to collect 232,288 online reviews (mean=922, min=6, max=5343) from RateBeer, an online beer review database. Each review entry comprised 5 numerical scores (appearance, aroma, taste, palate and overall quality) and an optional review text. The total number of reviews per reviewer was collected separately. Numerical scores were scaled and centered per rater, and mean scores were calculated per beer.

For the review texts, the language was estimated using the packages ‘langdetect’ and ‘langid’ in Python. Reviews that were classified as English by both packages were kept. Reviewers with fewer than 100 entries overall were discarded. 181,025 reviews from >6000 reviewers from >40 countries remained. Text processing was done using the ‘nltk’ package in Python. Texts were corrected for slang and misspellings; proper nouns and rare words that are relevant to the beer context were specified and kept as-is (‘Chimay’,’Lambic’, etc.). A dictionary of semantically similar sensorial terms, for example ‘floral’ and ‘flower’, was created and collapsed together into one term. Words were stemmed and lemmatized to avoid identifying words such as ‘acid’ and ‘acidity’ as separate terms. Numbers and punctuation were removed.

Sentences from up to 50 randomly chosen reviews per beer were manually categorized according to the aspect of beer they describe (appearance, aroma, taste, palate, overall quality—not to be confused with the 5 numerical scores described above) or flagged as irrelevant if they contained no useful information. If a beer contained fewer than 50 reviews, all reviews were manually classified. This labeled data set was used to train a model that classified the rest of the sentences for all beers 91 . Sentences describing taste and aroma were extracted, and term frequency–inverse document frequency (TFIDF) was implemented to calculate enrichment scores for sensorial words per beer.

The sex of the tasting subject was not considered when building our sensory database. Instead, results from different panelists were averaged, both for our trained panel (56% male, 44% female) and the RateBeer reviews (70% male, 30% female for RateBeer as a whole).

Beer price collection and processing

Beer prices were collected from the following stores: Colruyt, Delhaize, Total Wine, BeerHawk, The Belgian Beer Shop, The Belgian Shop, and Beer of Belgium. Where applicable, prices were converted to Euros and normalized per liter. Spearman correlations were calculated between these prices and mean overall appreciation scores from RateBeer and the taste panel, respectively.

Pairwise Spearman Rank correlations were calculated between all sensory properties.

Machine learning models

Predictive modeling of sensory profiles from chemical data.

Regression models were constructed to predict (a) trained panel scores for beer flavors and quality from beer chemical profiles and (b) public reviews’ appreciation scores from beer chemical profiles. Z-scores were used to represent sensory attributes in both data sets. Chemical properties with log-normal distributions (Shapiro-Wilk test, p  <  0.05 ) were log-transformed. Missing chemical measurements (0.1% of all data) were replaced with mean values per attribute. Observations from 250 beers were randomly separated into a training set (70%, 175 beers) and a test set (30%, 75 beers), stratified per beer style. Chemical measurements (p = 231) were normalized based on the training set average and standard deviation. In total, three linear regression-based models: linear regression with first-order interaction terms (LR), lasso regression with first-order interaction terms (Lasso) and partial least squares regression (PLSR); five decision tree models, Adaboost regressor (ABR), Extra Trees (ET), Gradient Boosting regressor (GBR), Random Forest (RF) and XGBoost regressor (XGBR); one support vector machine model (SVR) and one artificial neural network model (ANN) were trained. The models were implemented using the ‘scikit-learn’ package (v1.2.2) and ‘xgboost’ package (v1.7.3) in Python (v3.9.16). Models were trained, and hyperparameters optimized, using five-fold cross-validated grid search with the coefficient of determination (R 2 ) as the evaluation metric. The ANN (scikit-learn’s MLPRegressor) was optimized using Bayesian Tree-Structured Parzen Estimator optimization with the ‘Optuna’ Python package (v3.2.0). Individual models were trained per attribute, and a multi-output model was trained on all attributes simultaneously.

Model dissection

GBR was found to outperform other methods, resulting in models with the highest average R 2 values in both trained panel and public review data sets. Impurity-based rankings of the most important predictors for each predicted sensorial trait were obtained using the ‘scikit-learn’ package. To observe the relationships between these chemical properties and their predicted targets, partial dependence plots (PDP) were constructed for the six most important predictors of consumer appreciation 74 , 75 .

The ‘SHAP’ package in Python (v0.41.0) was implemented to provide an alternative ranking of predictor importance and to visualize the predictors’ effects as a function of their concentration 68 .

Validation of causal chemical properties

To validate the effects of the most important model features on predicted sensory attributes, beers were spiked with the chemical compounds identified by the models and descriptive sensory analyses were carried out according to the American Society of Brewing Chemists (ASBC) protocol 90 .

Compound spiking was done 30 min before tasting. Compounds were spiked into fresh beer bottles, that were immediately resealed and inverted three times. Fresh bottles of beer were opened for the same duration, resealed, and inverted thrice, to serve as controls. Pairs of spiked samples and controls were served simultaneously, chilled and in dark glasses as outlined in the Trained panel section above. Tasters were instructed to select the glass with the higher flavor intensity for each attribute (directional difference test 92 ) and to select the glass they prefer.

The final concentration after spiking was equal to the within-style average, after normalizing by ethanol concentration. This was done to ensure balanced flavor profiles in the final spiked beer. The same methods were applied to improve a non-alcoholic beer. Compounds were the following: ethyl acetate (Merck KGaA, W241415), ethyl hexanoate (Merck KGaA, W243906), isoamyl acetate (Merck KGaA, W205508), phenethyl acetate (Merck KGaA, W285706), ethanol (96%, Colruyt), glycerol (Merck KGaA, W252506), lactic acid (Merck KGaA, 261106).

Significant differences in preference or perceived intensity were determined by performing the two-sided binomial test on each attribute.

Reporting summary

Further information on research design is available in the  Nature Portfolio Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability

The data that support the findings of this work are available in the Supplementary Data files and have been deposited to Zenodo under accession code 10653704 93 . The RateBeer scores data are under restricted access, they are not publicly available as they are property of RateBeer (ZX Ventures, USA). Access can be obtained from the authors upon reasonable request and with permission of RateBeer (ZX Ventures, USA).  Source data are provided with this paper.

Code availability

The code for training the machine learning models, analyzing the models, and generating the figures has been deposited to Zenodo under accession code 10653704 93 .

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Acknowledgements

We thank all lab members for their discussions and thank all tasting panel members for their contributions. Special thanks go out to Dr. Karin Voordeckers for her tremendous help in proofreading and improving the manuscript. M.S. was supported by a Baillet-Latour fellowship, L.C. acknowledges financial support from KU Leuven (C16/17/006), F.A.T. was supported by a PhD fellowship from FWO (1S08821N). Research in the lab of K.J.V. is supported by KU Leuven, FWO, VIB, VLAIO and the Brewing Science Serves Health Fund. Research in the lab of T.W. is supported by FWO (G.0A51.15) and KU Leuven (C16/17/006).

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These authors contributed equally: Michiel Schreurs, Supinya Piampongsant, Miguel Roncoroni.

Authors and Affiliations

VIB—KU Leuven Center for Microbiology, Gaston Geenslaan 1, B-3001, Leuven, Belgium

Michiel Schreurs, Supinya Piampongsant, Miguel Roncoroni, Lloyd Cool, Beatriz Herrera-Malaver, Florian A. Theßeling & Kevin J. Verstrepen

CMPG Laboratory of Genetics and Genomics, KU Leuven, Gaston Geenslaan 1, B-3001, Leuven, Belgium

Leuven Institute for Beer Research (LIBR), Gaston Geenslaan 1, B-3001, Leuven, Belgium

Laboratory of Socioecology and Social Evolution, KU Leuven, Naamsestraat 59, B-3000, Leuven, Belgium

Lloyd Cool, Christophe Vanderaa & Tom Wenseleers

VIB Bioinformatics Core, VIB, Rijvisschestraat 120, B-9052, Ghent, Belgium

Łukasz Kreft & Alexander Botzki

AB InBev SA/NV, Brouwerijplein 1, B-3000, Leuven, Belgium

Philippe Malcorps & Luk Daenen

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Contributions

S.P., M.S. and K.J.V. conceived the experiments. S.P., M.S. and K.J.V. designed the experiments. S.P., M.S., M.R., B.H. and F.A.T. performed the experiments. S.P., M.S., L.C., C.V., L.K., A.B., P.M., L.D., T.W. and K.J.V. contributed analysis ideas. S.P., M.S., L.C., C.V., T.W. and K.J.V. analyzed the data. All authors contributed to writing the manuscript.

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Correspondence to Kevin J. Verstrepen .

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Schreurs, M., Piampongsant, S., Roncoroni, M. et al. Predicting and improving complex beer flavor through machine learning. Nat Commun 15 , 2368 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-46346-0

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Nurses’ perceptions of how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care to nursing home residents– a qualitative study

• Rachel Gilbert 1 &
• Daniela Lillekroken   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-7463-8977 1  

BMC Nursing volume  23 , Article number:  216 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

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Over the years, caring has been explained in various ways, thus presenting various meanings to different people. Caring is central to nursing discipline and care ethics have always had an important place in nursing ethics discussions. In the literature, Joan Tronto’s theory of ethics of care is mostly discussed at the personal level, but there are still a few studies that address its influence on caring within the nursing context, especially during the provision of end-of-life care. This study aims to explore nurses’ perceptions of how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents.

This study has a qualitative descriptive design. Data were collected by conducting five individual interviews and one focus group during a seven-month period between April 2022 and September 2022. Nine nurses employed at four Norwegian nursing homes were the participants in this study. Data were analysed by employing a qualitative deductive content analysis method.

The content analysis generated five categories that were labelled similar to Tronto’s five phases of the care process: (i) caring about, (ii) caring for, (iii) care giving, (iv) care receiving and (v) caring with. The findings revealed that nurses’ autonomy more or less influences the decision-making care process at all five phases, demonstrating that the Tronto’s theory contributes to greater reflectiveness around what may constitute ‘good’ end-of-life care.

Conclusions

Tronto’s care ethics is useful for understanding end-of-life care practice in nursing homes. Tronto’s care ethics provides a framework for an in-depth analysis of the asymmetric relationships that may or may not exist between nurses and nursing home residents and their next-of-kin. This can help nurses see and understand the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents during their final days. Moreover, it helps handle moral responsibility around end-of-life care issues, providing a more complex picture of what ‘good’ end-of-life care should be.

Peer Review reports

In recent decades, improving end-of-life care has become a global priority [ 1 ]. The proportion of older residents dying in nursing homes is rising across the world [ 2 ], resulting in a significant need to improve the quality of end-of-life care provided to residents. Therefore, throughout the world, nursing homes are becoming increasingly important as end-of-life care facilities [ 3 ]. As the largest professional group in healthcare [ 4 ], nurses primarily engage in direct care activities [ 5 ] and patient communication [ 6 ] positioning them in close proximity to patients. This proximity affords them the opportunity to serve as information brokers and mediators in end-of-life decision-making [ 7 ]. They also develop trusting relationships with residents and their next-of-kin, relationships that may be beneficial for the assessment of residents and their next-of-kin’s needs [ 8 ]. Moreover, nurses have the opportunity to gain a unique perspective that allows them to become aware of if and when a resident is not responding to a treatment [ 9 ].

When caring for residents in their critical end-of-life stage, nurses form a direct and intense bond with the resident’s next-of-kin, hence nurses become central to end-of-life care provision and decision-making in nursing homes [ 10 ]. The degree of residents and their next-of-kin involvement in the decision-making process in practice remains a question [ 11 ]. Results from a study conducted in six European countries [ 12 ], demonstrate that, in long-term care facilities, too many care providers are often involved, resulting in difficulties in reaching a consensus in care. Although nurses believe that their involvement is beneficial to residents and families, there is a need for more empirical evidence of these benefits at the end-of-life stage. However, the question of who should be responsible for making decisions is still difficult to answer [ 13 ]. One study exploring nurse’s involvement in end-of-life decisions revealed that nurses experience ethical problems and uncertainty about the end-of-life care needs of residents [ 14 ]. Another study [ 10 ] reported patients being hesitant to discuss end-of‐life issues with their next-of-kin, resulting in nurses taking over; thus, discussing end-of-life issues became their responsibility. A study conducted in several nursing homes from the UK demonstrated that ethical issues associated with palliative care occurred most frequently during decision-making, causing greater distress among care providers [ 15 ].

Previous research has revealed that there are some conflicts over end-of-life care that consume nurses’ time and attention at the resident’s end-of-life period [ 16 ]. The findings from a meta-synthesis presenting nurses’ perspectives dealing with ethical dilemmas and ethical problems in end-of-life care revealed that nurses are deeply involved with patients as human beings and display an inner responsibility to fight for their best interests and wishes in end-of-life care [ 17 ].

Within the Norwegian context, several studies have explored nurses’ experiences with ethical dilemmas when providing end-of-life care in nursing homes. One study describing nurses’ ethical dilemmas concerning limitation of life-prolonging treatment suggested that there are several disagreements between the next-of-kin’s wishes and what the resident may want or between the wishes of the next-of-kin and what the staff consider to be right [ 18 ]. Another study revealed that nurses provide ‘more of everything’ and ‘are left to dealing with everything on their own’ during the end-of-life care process [ 19 ] (p.13) . Several studies aiming to explore end-of-life decision-making in nursing homes revealed that nurses experience challenges in protecting the patient’s autonomy regarding issues of life-prolonging treatment, hydration, nutrition and hospitalisation [ 20 , 21 , 22 ]. Other studies conducted in the same context have described that nurses perceive ethical problems as a burden and as barriers to decision-making in end-of-life care [ 8 , 23 ].

Nursing, as a practice, is fundamentally grounded in moral values. The nurse-patient relationship, central to nursing care provision, holds ethical importance and significance. It is crucial to recognise that the context within which nurses practice can both shape and be shaped by nursing’s moral values. These values collectively constitute what can be termed the ethical dimension of nursing [ 24 ]. Nursing ethos and practices are rooted in ethical values and principles; therefore, one of the position statements of the International Council of Nurses [ 25 ] refers to nurses’ role in providing care to dying patients and their families as an inherent part of the International Classification for Nursing Practice [ 26 ] (e.g., dignity, autonomy, privacy and dignified dying). Furthermore, ethical competence is recognised as an essential element of nursing practice [ 27 ], and it should be considered from the following viewpoints: ethical decision-making, ethical sensitivity, ethical knowledge and ethical reflection.

The term ‘end-of-life care’ is often used interchangeably with various terms such as terminal care, hospice care, or palliative care. End-of life care is defined as care ‘to assist persons who are facing imminent or distant death to have the best quality of life possible till the end of their life regardless of their medical diagnosis, health conditions, or ages’ [ 28 ] (p.613) . From this perspective, professional autonomy is an important feature of nurses’ professionalism [ 29 ]. Professional autonomy can be defined based on two elements: independence in decision-making and the ability to use competence, which is underpinned by three themes: shared leadership, professional skills, inter- and intraprofessional collaboration and a healthy work environment [ 30 ].

As presented earlier, research studies have reported that nurses experience a range of difficulties or shortcomings during the decision-making process; therefore, autonomous practice is essential for safe and quality care [ 31 ]. Moreover, autonomous practice is particularly important for the moral dimension in end-of-life care, where nurses may need to assume more responsibility in the sense of defining and giving support to matters that are at risk of not respecting ethical principles or fulfilling their ethical, legal and professional duties towards the residents they care for.

To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, little is known about nurses’ perceptions of how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents; therefore, the aim of this study is to explore nurses’ perceptions of how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents.

Theoretical framework

Joan Tronto is an American political philosopher and one of the most influential care ethicists. Her theory of the ethics of care [ 32 , 33 , 34 ] has been chosen as the present study’s theoretical framework. The ethics of care is a feminist-based ethical theory, focusing on caring as a moral attitude and a sensitive and supportive response of the nurse to the situation and circumstances of a vulnerable human being who is in need of help [ 33 , 34 , 35 ]. In this sense, nurses’ caring behaviour has the character of a means—helping to reach the goal of nursing practice—which here entails providing competent end-of-life care.

Thinking about the process of care, in her early works [ 32 , 33 , 34 ], Tronto proposes four different phases of caring and four elements of care. Although the phases may be interchangeable and often overlap with each other, the elements of care are fundamental to demonstrate caring. The phases of caring involve cognitive, emotional and action strategies.

The first phase of caring is caring about , which involves the nurse’s recognition of being in need of care and includes concern, worry about someone or something. In this phase, the element of care is attentiveness, which entails the detection of the patient and/or family need.

The second phase is caring for , which implies nurses taking responsibility for the caring process. In this phase, responsibility is the element of care and requires nurses to take responsibility to meet a need that has been identified.

The third phase is care giving , which encompasses the actual physical work of providing care and requires direct engagement with care. The element of care in this phase is competence, which involves nurses having the knowledge, skills and values necessary to meet the goals of care.

The fourth phase is care receiving , which involves an evaluation of how well the care giving meets the caring needs. In this phase, responsiveness is the element of care and requires the nurse to assess whether the care provided has met the patient/next-of-kin care needs. This phase helps preserve the patient–nurse relationship, which is a distinctive aspect of the ethics of care [ 36 ].

In 2013, Tronto [ 35 ] updated the ethics of care by adding a fifth phase of caring— caring with —which is the common thread weaving among the four phases. When care is responded to through care receiving and new needs are identified, nurses return to the first phase and begin again. The care elements in this phase are trust and solidarity. Within a healthcare context, trust builds as patients and nurses realise that they can rely on each other to participate in their care and care activities. Solidarity occurs when patients, next-of-kin, nurses and others (i.e., ward leaders, institutional management) engage in these processes of care together rather than alone.

To the best of our knowledge, these five phases of caring and their elements of caring have never been interpreted within the context of end-of-life care. The ethics of care framework offers a context-specific way of understanding how nurses’ professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents, revealing similarities with Tronto’s five phases, which has motivated choosing her theory.

Aim of the study

The present study aims to explore nurses’ perceptions of how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents.

The current study has a qualitative descriptive design using five individual interviews and one focus group to explore nurses’ perceptions of how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents.

Setting and participants

The setting for the study was four nursing homes located in different municipalities from the South-Eastern region of Norway. Nursing homes in Norway are usually public assisted living facilities and offer all-inclusive accommodation to dependent individuals on a temporary or permanent basis [ 37 ]. The provision of care in the Norwegian nursing homes is regulated by the ‘Regulation of Quality of Care’ [ 38 ], aiming to improve nursing home residents’ quality of life by offering quality care that meets residents’ fundamental physiological and psychosocial needs and to support their individual autonomy through the provision of daily nursing care and activities tailored to their specific needs, and, when the time comes, a dignified end-of-life care in safe milieu.

End-of-life care is usually planned and provided by nurses having a post graduate diploma in either palliative nursing or oncology nursing– often holding an expert role, hence ensuring that the provision of end-of-life care meets the quality criteria and the resident’s needs and preferences [ 39 ].

To obtain rich information to answer the research question, it was important to involve participants familiar with the topic of study and who had experience working in nursing homes and providing end-of-life care to residents; therefore, a purposive sample was chosen. In this study, a heterogeneous sampling was employed, which involved including participants from different nursing homes with varying lengths of employment and diverse experiences in providing end-of-life care to residents. This approach was chosen to gather data rich in information [ 40 ]. Furthermore, when recruiting participants, the first author was guided by Malterud et al.’s [ 41 ] pragmatic principle, suggesting that the more ‘information power’ the participants provided, the smaller the sample size needed to be, and vice versa. Therefore, the sample size was not determined by saturation but instead by the number of participants who agreed to participate. However, participants were chosen because they had particular characteristics such as experience and roles which would enable understanding how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents.

The inclusion criteria for the participants were as follows: (i) to be a registered nurse, (ii) had a minimum work experience of two years employed at a nursing home, and (iii) had clinical experience with end-of-life/palliative care. To recruit participants, the first author sent a formal application with information about the study to four nursing homes. After approval had been given, the participants were asked and recruited by the leadership from each nursing home. The participants were then contacted by the first author by e-mail and scheduled a time for meeting and conducting the interviews.

Ten nurses from four different nursing homes were invited to participate, but only nine agreed. The participants were all women, aged between 27 and 65 and their work experience ranged from 4 to 21 years. Two participants had specialist education in palliative care, and one was currently engaged in a master’s degree in nursing science. Characteristics of the participants are presented in Table  1 :

Data collection methods

Data were collected through five semistructured individual and one focus group interviews. Both authors conducted the interviews together. The study was carried out between April and September 2022. Due to the insecurity related to the situation caused by the post-SARS-CoV-2 virus pandemic and concerns about potential new social distancing regulations imposed by the Norwegian government, four participants from the same nursing home opted for a focus group interview format. This decision was motivated by a desire to mitigate the potential negative impact that distancing regulations might have on data collection. The interviews were guided by an interview guide developed after reviewing relevant literature on end-of-life care and ethical dilemmas. The development of the interview guide consisted of five phases: (i) identifying the prerequisites for using semi-structured interviews; (ii) retrieving and using previous knowledge; (iii) formulating the preliminary semi-structured interview guide; (iv) pilot testing the interview guide; and (v) presenting the complete semistructured interview guide [ 42 ]. The interview guide was developed by both authors prior to the onset of the project and consisted of two demographic questions and eight main open-ended questions. The interview guide underwent initial testing with a colleague employed at the same nursing home as the first author. After the pilot phase in phase four, minor language revisions were made to specific questions to bolster the credibility of the interview process and ensure the collection of comprehensive and accurate data. The same interview guide was used to conduct individual interviews and focus group (Table  2 ).

The interviews were all conducted in a quiet room at a nursing home. Each interview lasted between 30 and 60 min and were digitally recorded. The individual interviews were transcribed verbatim by the first author. The focus group interview was transcribed by the second author.

Ethical perspectives

Prior to the onset of the data collection, ethical approval and permission to conduct the study were sought from the Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research (Sikt/Ref. number 360,657) and from each leader of the nursing home. The study was conducted in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical Association [ 43 ]: informed consent, consequences and confidentiality. The participants received written information about the aim of the study, how the researcher would ensure their confidentiality and, if they chose to withdraw from the study, their withdrawal would not have any negative consequences for their employment at nursing homes. Data were anonymised, and the digital records of the interviews were stored safely on a password-protected personal computer. The transcripts were stored in a locked cabinet in accordance with the existing rules and regulations for research data storage at Oslo Metropolitan University. The participants did not receive any financial or other benefits from participating in the study. Written consent was obtained prior to data collection, but verbal consent was also provided before each interview. None of the participants withdrew from the study.

Data analysis

The data were analysed by employing a qualitative deductive content analysis, as described by Kyngäs and Kaakinen [ 44 ]. Both researchers independently conducted the data analysis manually. The empirical data consisted of 63 pages (34,727 words) of transcripts from both individual and focus group interviews. The deductive content analysis was performed in three steps: (i) preparation, (ii) organisation and (iii) reporting of the results.

During the first step—preparation—each researcher, individually, read the transcripts several times to get an overview of the data and select units of analysis by searching for recurring codes and meanings and to carefully compare the similarities and differences between coded data. These codes were labelled independently by both researchers and placed into an analysis matrix.

During the next step—organisation—the researchers met and discussed and then compared and revised the labels several times until they agreed about the preliminary findings. During the interpretative process towards developing an understanding of the empirical data, the content of the labels referred to nurses’ perceptions about how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents, revealing similarities with the five phases of Tronto’s theory of ethics of care [ 32 , 33 ], thus assigning them to the five phases of the theory. Following this final refinement, one main category and five categories, each supported by several subcategories, were identified, as presented in Table  3 .

Reporting the results was the last step in the analysis. To enhance the understanding of the study’s findings, the findings are presented with supporting excerpts from the participants.

In qualitative studies, trustworthiness is the main parameter for appraising the rigour of the study [ 45 ]. To enhance the trustworthiness of the study, four criteria—credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, as described by Lincoln and Guba [ 46 ]—were applied.

To support credibility, a detailed description of the sample and the sampling process was provided. Furthermore, the interview guide and the questions that the participants were asked during the interviews are made available to the readers. Moreover, although the data were collected from five individual interviews and one focus group, triangulation of two data collection methods allowed researchers to ensure that the study is based on diverse perceptions and experiences, strengthening the credibility and impact of the study’s findings [ 47 ].

Detailed information about the sample and setting supports the assessment of the transferability of the findings. In this way, the readers can recognise and evaluate whether the findings would be applicable to similar contexts with a similar sample. Quotes from the participants’ statements are given to support the findings. Each quote ends with a number representing the code that each nurse was given before conducting the interviews (i.e., Participant in interview 1, PI1 or participant 6 in focus group interview, P6FG).

To increase dependability, the same interview guide was used to ask all participants the same questions. Dependability was also increased by the researchers reading and analysing the interviews independently and then checking the consistency of the data analysis technique with each other and discussing the analytical process until a consensus was reached.

To enhance confirmability, excerpts from the participants’ statements were included when presenting the findings, thus verifying the concordance of findings with the raw data. This demonstrates that the data were not based on preconceived notions.

Trustworthiness was also supported by member checking, meaning that the researchers sent the participants the transcripts of the interviews immediately after data collection; then, the interviews were transcribed. The participants were asked to review the transcripts and check the accuracy of the data; hence, they had the opportunity to add, remove or clarify their statements. Only one participant answered this request, stating that the transcripts were accurate, and she did not have any further comments. Despite encountering a suboptimal response from participants, the authors remain confident in the trustworthiness of the study. Rich data, derived from a combination of individual and focus group interviews, yielded diverse and nuanced responses from participants, reinforcing the credibility of the findings.

Reflexivity is the researcher’s reflection on their position during the research process [ 48 ]. Both researchers have clinical experience in providing end-of-life care to nursing home residents. Therefore, it was critical to be aware of the impact that their clinical backgrounds might have on the research process from information seeking during the analysis of data and discussion of the findings. To avoid early interpretation of the data, the researchers were aware of their preunderstanding and tried to put it on hold. Both authors engaged in discussions regarding apprehensions and reflections, actively participating in the triangulation process throughout the study to prevent potential bias during data collection, analysis, and interpretation. The theoretical framework was brought in the end of the analysis process, which helped label the emerged findings.

The analysis of the empirical data combined with an ethical reflection helped researchers to identify and understand the moral dimension of nurses’ experiences with end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents. During the analysis, an overarching category emerged– ‘The moral dimension of the provision of end-of life care’– describing nurses’ perceptions about how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents. The participants agreed that end-of-life care is a care process that undergoes several phases, with each phase having its own ethical quality or its own element of care, here according to Tronto’s moral qualities [ 34 ]. In the following section, the findings are described using Tronto’s identified moral qualities for each of the five phases of the care process [ 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 ].

Caring about—being attentive

For the participants, being autonomous was perceived as a feature that increased their awareness of the resident’s caring needs during their last days of life. The participants agreed that the caring process involves paying attention, listening and recognising residents’ unspoken needs. Moreover, it implies nurses being able to make autonomous decisions when deciding which needs to care about at one particular moment.

The participants agreed that the core values of providing end-of-life care were to alleviate suffering, maintain dignity and provide comfort care. The participants perceived caring about as having sufficient knowledge, along with the experience and autonomy in practice, as well as providing comprehensive end-of-life care for residents. For the participants, caring about during the end-of-life process means them being present and dedicated. This implies nurses carefully observing, autonomously acting, and making decisions based on their judgements, and thus, they can decide and choose their course of action promptly based on resident’s condition or side effects. Moreover, caring about involved participants being attentive to perceiving the residents’ needs when the residents could no longer articulate themselves. The participants expressed their worries about resident’s bodily deterioration, leading them to lose their ability to express needs, as shown by the following quote:

There is not much communication when residents go into their last stage of life. Well… some of them are consciously until their death, but most are sedated; therefore, it is necessary to use your knowledge and experience to assess not only their needs for food and liquids or bodily hygiene, but also, we have to monitor their response to pain killers and other medication, and if it’s too much or too little, we need to do what’s needed to reduce or increase the medication and not let them suffer (PI3).

Some of the participants expressed that attentiveness to the residents’ care needs was a skill based on their clinical gaze developed during their careers. Other participants discussed that building a close relationship with the residents while they still could walk and talk was a precondition that helped them develop a clinical gaze, hence facilitating the nurses’ being attentive. Attentiveness allowed the participants to do what was needed when knowing the residents’ needs during the provision of end-of-life care. This may be interpreted as the moral or ethical quality of caring about during the end-of-life caring process, as demonstrated by the following statement:

We have time to know the resident before their health condition worsens… We previously knew what they wanted and how they wanted… their stay at nursing home gives us the opportunity to know their preferences and needs. Morally, we are obliged to provide the same quality of care they received when they could express themselves (PI4).

Caring for—taking responsibility

According to several participants, another phase within the end-of-life caring process was taking responsibility to care for. The participants agreed that monitoring the residents in their last days implies assuming responsibility. Assuming responsibility was perceived as an autonomous caring activity. They also discussed taking this responsibility seriously, which is a moral dimension of the end-of-life caring process and, ultimately, of the nursing profession. Usually, this responsibility was taken by a nurse, but it also involved other healthcare personnel or even next-of-kin. Among these responsibilities, the participants mentioned that the end-of-life caring process included not only caring for the resident’s physiological and psychosocial needs, but also assigning permanent healthcare personnel to continuously monitor the resident. Although the participants were aware that they share responsibilities for the caring process, ‘who does what…’, they ultimately had the overall responsibility for the whole end-of-life caring process.

Another responsibility included communication, which included listening, providing information, and supporting the residents’ next-of-kin. One of the participants expressed this as follows:

When I observe that the resident’s health worsens, I inform the next-of-kin and invite the spouse or the children to a meeting together with the responsible doctor and I, and we inform the next-of-kin what they might expect. The end-of-life care is not only about the resident and their last days, but also is to care for their next-of-kin to meet their needs and to overcome guilt feelings, anger or sadness.… (PI1).

Another way to care for patients was to deliberately increase opportunities to exercise autonomy during the caring process. For instance, the focus group participants discussed issues around advanced life support during the resident’s last days of life. Being prepared and having knowledge were the preconditions that gave them the authority to identify and make decisions about residents’ needs in here-and-now moments, hence exercising their autonomy. Some participants shared their experiences with controversies between next-of-kins’ and nurses’ assessments of what is the best care for the residents during their last days of life. Therefore, the importance of taking the initiative to discuss and clarify the resident’s needs and preferences was emphasised during the focus group interview, as shown in the following quote:

Some next-of-kins express wishes for advance life support and hospitalisation for their loved ones… and sometimes, to meet their needs, we try this, but the resident is suffering. The resident comes back to us after one or two days… To avoid this, clear guidelines, and a dialogue between the resident, their next-of-kin and us at the very beginning [when the resident enters the nursing home] is important… I think that minimalising the occurrence of difficult or conflictual situations and relieving the sufferance is care for both resident and their next-of-kin (P8FG).

Care giving—knowing what, why, how and when

During the interviews, the participants also discussed the caregiving process and provided concrete examples of what their caregiving encompassed. Spending extra time with the resident, choosing to be in the room and holding their hand to maintain physical contact was perceived as an autonomous caring act and a deliberate choice. One participant described this as follows:

For me, it is important that the dying person feels or hears that I am here with him or her… how he or she feels in these moments matters to me. I do it because I want to do it.… (PI5).

Other participants said that being autonomous when they actually provided caregiving to residents helped them make continuous assessments based on knowledge about what , how , how much , when and why to care. Knowledge and skills were decisive factors in providing competent care and making autonomous decisions during the caregiving phase; hence, competence was perceived as a moral dimension of caregiving. One of the participants said the following:

Caregiving at end-of-life is not only about giving morphine according to the doctor’s prescription… it involves all the judgements you have to make, all the skills you have… from preventing the occurrence of bedsores to knowing when to stop feeding but preventing thirst… think about all this knowledge and experience you must have to be able to make autonomous bedside judgements about when , why and so on.… (PI2).

Care giving at the end-of-life was described as all the necessary activities a nurse does to provide comfort and compassionate care to a dying resident. Among these activities, providing fundamental care and keeping residents comfortable and free of pain were seen as parts of the caregiving process. Moreover, adequate pain relief and symptom management were described as the moral dimension of care giving at this stage of end-of-life care, as one of the participants from the focus group interview said:

You cannot be passive when you see that the resident is suffering. I cannot go home and think that I should have done one or the other. It is against the nurses’ code of ethics and my personal moral and ethical principles. You have to act… I have to do what is needed… first thing first… pain relief and then personal hygiene! (P9FG)

Some of the participants mentioned some challenges they encountered during the care giving process. They said that care giving implies also standing in demanding situations. The lack of healthcare personnel with necessary knowledge or formal palliative care education or handling ethical dilemmas was seen as demanding situations that influenced the provision of care giving. Most of the participants felt that they were alone during the decision-making processes, which increased their awareness of their professional autonomy:

Sometimes, during weekends or evenings, I am the only nurse among the healthcare staff, and I have an overall responsibility for all nursing home residents. I have to prioritise who gets my attention and who needs me the most. Things can happen, regardless of whether it is Friday evening or weekend. I have to make a decision and do what is needed: to be with the dying resident and to support his or her next-of-kin in that moment. (PI5)

Care receiving—assessing caregiving

Several participants stated that, during the care-giving process, it was important to assess how the resident receive the care provided at the end-of-life stage. This was possible by monitoring the resident’s state of being but to also assess the outcomes of their care giving activities. They also reflected on their assessments and how they subsequently dealt with those assessments.

All the participants were confident in their knowledge and with their care giving at the end-of-life stage. They were aware that their care activities had consequences for the residents’ physiological and psychosocial needs. The assessment of the resident’s state of being was made by nurses listening, observing and interpreting resident’s response to care giving as signs of comfort or discomfort. One of the participants explained this as follows:

When providing personal care, if the resident presents any signs that can be interpreted as discomfort, I think that priority number one is me not causing more pain or suffering. However, I also understand that this person needs more pain killers, so I have to make sure that this person receives adequate medicine. (PI5)

Some participants also discussed the importance of assessing their care giving activities. They mentioned the importance of their assessments of the benefits of all care giving against the burden of all interventions and treatments. Their professional autonomy allowed them to make decisions about how to eschew care giving that was inappropriately and burdensome and choose the best comforting care for the resident. The participants stated that knowledge and experience were important in making such decisions, and their professional autonomy facilitated making choices of the best and less burdensome care giving. One of the participants said the following:

We have to assess whether the care giving provided meets the resident’s needs or not, whether the care comforts or perceives it as a burden and how the resident responds to this provision of care. (PI4)

During the interviews, some of the participants revealed a feeling of guilt when assessing that care giving altered the resident’s state of being, thus leading to new needs for care. They also discussed that the moral obligation and intention to relieve the suffering of the resident should override the foreseen but unintended harmful effects of care giving, including medication or other care interventions. One of the participants shared her experience as follows:

I still remember the attitude some of us had for a while ago… too much or too often morphine depresses the respiration and leads to death… I was struggling with feelings of guilt and even moral distress when I observed residents were still suffering because the medication they received had little or maybe no effect. I called the doctor and explained the situation… usually, the experienced doctors listen to us… and he [the doctor] prescribed more morphine.… (PI3).

Documentation of the response to care giving was also an issue discussed during the interviews. Some participants emphasised the importance of keeping detailed reports for a proper assessment of the care giving and medication and its outcomes. All reports were digitally written. Informal discussions between nurses and next-of-kin were also documented, especially when next-of-kin evaluated the care their loved ones received. The participants indicated that the more written information there was, the better. One participant acknowledged the following:

There is no such thing as ‘too much information’… being open about the morphine’s side effects and what to expect in the next hours or days is important for them [next-of-kin]. It helps them understand that end-of-life care is a process, not a quick fix procedure. (PI5)

Caring with—It is a teamwork process

During the interviews, most of the participants reflected upon the end-of-life caring process and its occurrence within the context of care in nursing home. The participants discussed that end-of-life care is not only about the responsibilities nurses have towards residents and their next-of-kin, but also the responsibilities of others who may influence the caring process. They perceived the caring process as an interplay between residents, next-of-kin, and themselves, along with how they relate to each other, which influences the caring process. However, as several participants asserted, this process did not occur in a vacuum: it occurred within an organisational context, which then influenced the caring process from the very beginning. One participant emphasised the importance of stable healthcare personnel within a caring organisation:

High staff turnover does not facilitate good end-of-life caregiving. Both residents and their next-of-kin need continuity and predictability in caring for and among healthcare personnel. They need somebody they know and trust… being exposed to new people every day increases their stress levels. (PI1)

Other participants discussed the importance of the leadership style and how the leader’s support influenced the culture of end-of-life care at the ward. The participants revealed that, within a caring context where their natural potential was enhanced through an enabling leadership style, they felt that they could provide competent and compassionate end-of-life care. One of the participants from the focus group stated that a positive leadership style supports nurses’ professional autonomy, thus helping them control the caring process, to have independence and to increase their ability to make clinical decisions and competent judgements regarding resident’s end-of-life care. One participant shared her experience as follows:

My leader gives me the freedom to make decisions when it comes to deciding what is best for the resident… She [the leader] enables me to be autonomous during the caring process, and this makes me aware of what and how to care.… (PI2).

The participants from the focus group interview also discussed how the nursing home’s caring culture influences care practice. They perceived the nursing home’s caring culture as positive, enabling good end-of-life care but also defective and an obstacle to care. They emphasised the importance of providing dignifying end-of-life care for residents. During the focus group interview, two of the participants engaged in a dialogue:

End-of-life care is providing care to the most vulnerable people, and it should be dignified… To do so, I have to provide care in a ‘caring room’ filled with dignity. (P7FG) Although next-of-kin and I have different perspectives of what good end-of-life care might be, we care together, we are a caring team which ensures in our own way that the resident receives competent care.… Yes, you [P7] mentioned this ‘caring room’… maybe we should open the door more often into this room and invite next-of-kin. (P6FG)

The aim of the present study was to explore nurses’ perceptions of how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents. In the following, we discuss these perceptions in relation to Tronto’s [ 32 , 35 ] ethics of care framework and other supporting literature. To identify the moral dimension of these perceptions, we have related them to the moral qualities corresponding to each phase of the care process, as described by Tronto [ 33 , 35 ].

In the first phase of the care process—caring about—the participants discussed the importance of being attentive to which type of care needs to be provided, which is the moral quality of the first phase of care. Similar to findings from another study [ 49 ], findings from the present study revealed that some participants perceived autonomous practice as carrying out actions based on their decisions. Caring about entails detecting the resident’s needs, hence obliging nurses to ‘do something’ [ 50 ]. This particular skill was seen as an autonomous caring activity, that is, the nurses’ deliberate choice of putting on hold their self-interest and/or agenda and ‘a capacity genuinely to understand the perspective of the other in need’ [ 35 ] (p.34) , here nursing home resident.

In Tronto’s view [ 33 ], nurses’ attentiveness contributes to building up a caring relationship with a patient. The findings from the current study reveal that nurses perceived the provision of competent and compassionate end-of-life care as a result of their clinical gaze developed through certain activities, attitudes and knowledge of the patient, and through mutual relationships between the residents, next-of-kin and them. These results are supported by findings from previous studies that emphasise the importance of the nurse’s past experiences with the resident [ 51 ] and the significance of developing a good relationship with the resident and their next-of-kin [ 8 , 23 , 52 , 53 , 54 ] to provide adequate care. Moreover, similar to findings from other studies [ 55 , 56 ], the present study reveal that, to respond to the resident’s end-of-life care needs, nurses must bring not only their professional knowledge, clinical experience and ability to work autonomously but even ethical sensitivity. These findings enforce Gastman’s [ 50 ] view on caring, in which caring should respond to the patient’s care needs. This involves nurses having empathy, capacity of judgement and the ability to see what is required in a specific situation (here, end-of-life care), which, according to Gastmans [ 50 ], is inherent in the moral dimension of nursing practice.

The second phase of care—caring for—refers to nurses taking on the burden of meeting the needs identified in the first phase, that is, caring about. There was no ambiguity, and the participants had no doubts regarding who had the responsibility for the provision of end-of-life care to nursing home residents. The nurses’ responsibility was seen as a moral dimension of care. In line with Pursio et al.’s study [ 30 ], the present findings indicate that the freedom to make patient care decisions and work independently has a positive impact on the moral dimension of end-of-life care for nursing home residents. However, nurses’ work was not only about meeting residents’ needs, but also to create a safe milieu, a communicative space together with each other and with the resident’s next-of-kin, thus sharing power and control over the care process. Similar findings are displayed in an integrative literature review [ 53 ], demonstrating that a positive culture of collaborative and reciprocal relationships, a willingness to engage and become engaged and nurses communicating with intent to share and support rather than inform all lead to facilitating decision-making in nursing homes. According to Tronto [ 35 ], to facilitate end-of-life decision-making, nurses must take the initiative to allocate responsibilities; otherwise, the nurses withdraw themselves from their responsibility. By exercising their professional autonomy to assign responsibilities, nurses strive to mitigate the power imbalance among residents, their next-of-kin, and themselves, thereby preventing the occurrence of potential power struggles in their relationships [ 34 ]. This proactive approach helps prevent the emergence of end-of-life care dilemmas that could undermine the moral dimension of end-of-life care.

The third phase of care—care giving—requires, according to Tronto [ 35 ], the moral quality of nurses’ competence, meaning nurses directly engaging with care. The findings revealed that the nurses provided end-of-life care, and to do so, they needed to have competence, which implies the nurses having the knowledge, skills and values necessary to know what, why, how and when to provide end-of-life adequately. In addition, good end-of-life care requires the competence to individualise care—to provide competent care based on the resident’s physical, psychological, cultural and spiritual needs [ 57 ] while considering the resident’s context of care. Nurses’ competence is crucial for their autonomy; however, to effectively utilize their competence, nurses must be capable of assessing care needs and responding promptly [ 30 ]. Otherwise, delays in assessing residents’ care needs could undermine the moral dimension of end-of-life care. To provide individualised competent care, it is necessary that nurses make continuous assessments. As the findings reveal, the nurses were concerned with providing competent care, that is, adequate pain management. If the care provided was incompetent and led to more pain for the resident, the nurses perceived psychological distress—a state of being that resulted in response to a variety of moral events—leading to the nurses feeling anger, frustration, guilt, powerlessness and stress [ 58 ]. According to Tronto [ 34 ] (p.17) , ‘incompetent care is not only a technical problem, but a moral one’; however, as the findings reveal, the provision of competent care also depends on the nurses’ ability to prioritise decision-making when standing alone. Although nurses’ professional autonomy enabled them to make decisions and choose the right what , how , how much , when , and why , the lack of adequately educated healthcare personnel make the decision-making process a technical problem, which could weaken the moral dimension of end-of -life care.

The fourth phase—care receiving—involves the moral quality responsiveness. This means nurses being responsive to the reaction of the nursing home residents to end-of-life care process. As the findings have revealed, nursing home residents are vulnerable to nurses’ act of care or lack of care. According to Gastmans [ 59 ], care is a reciprocal practice that occurs within the framework of a relationship between the care provider (nurse) and care receiver (resident). The reciprocity consists of nurses assessing that the care provided actually meets the resident’s needs for pain management and other physiological and spiritual needs. The nurses had to make autonomous end-of-life care decisions to meet the resident’s needs. This involved the nurse’s attention to care giving to not be perceived as power abuse, which could have negative consequences for the moral dimension of end-of-life care provision.

According to Tronto [ 33 ], vulnerability may lead to unequal relationships where power abuse may occur. Nursing home residents are in a vulnerable position because they rely on nurses’ competence and ability to alleviate suffering and assess and reassess the residents’ responsiveness to pain management. To avoid an unequal relationship between resident and nurse, nurses must assess whether the care provided is competent or incompetent. Besides assessing and documenting the care provided and its outcomes, informal discussions between the resident’s next-of-kin and nurses were also assessed as important for next-of-kin perceiving a balanced power and equal position within the relationship. However, because each end-of-life act of care may alter the resident’s state of being, responsiveness requires more attentiveness [ 34 ]. Nurses must therefore meet the resident’s new needs for care with compassion and a commitment to maintaining the highest quality of life throughout the evolving stages of the resident’s end-of-life journey.

The final phase of care—caring with—requires that solidarity and trust are the foundation of all care giving to meet caring needs [ 35 ]. The moral quality of this caring phase is solidarity. The findings from the present study suggest that the nurses felt solidarity with both the residents and their leaders. The nurses felt that they were given the support and freedom to act autonomously when making decisions regarding end-of-life care, but similar to findings from a previous study [ 22 ], they also recognised the impact that organisational factors, such as leadership and care culture, may have on the justice and equality of the care provided when they prioritise care to whom needed it the most. Similar to findings from another study [ 49 ], participants in the present study described autonomy as the ability to make independent decisions and prioritise care for those who needed it most. However, according to Tronto [ 35 ], all nurses have a responsibility to help determine how care activities and responsibilities should be allocated. Residents, their next-of-kin and other healthcare personnel may have different views on how they may perceive appropriate, compassionate and dignified end-of-life care [ 20 , 21 ].Therefore, it is important to have transparency in nurse–resident–next-of-kin relations if the element of power within the relationship should be replaced by trust. Otherwise, the nurses’ autonomy may negatively influence the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents. By opening the door of the “caring room” and inviting next-of-kin to participate in the care process, nurses may contribute to a greater reflectiveness around what may constitute ‘good’ end-of-life care.

Strengths and limitations

One of the strengths of the study is the use of Joan Tronto’s theory of the ethics of care [ 32 , 34 , 35 ] and its five phases and elements of care to discuss the study’s findings. This allows a deeper understanding of how nurses’ professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care provided to nursing home residents. Another strength lies in the utilisation of two distinct methods of data collection: individual and focus group interviews. These approaches provided diverse datasets that shed light on various aspects of how nurses’ professional autonomy impacts the moral dimension of end-of-life care. Furthermore, the inclusion of participants with varying work experiences from four nursing homes enhances the richness and depth of the data generated from the interviews, further strengthening the quality of the study. Member checking ensures that the researcher’s interpretations accurately reflect the participants’ experiences and perspectives, thereby enhancing the validity of the study. This practice can be considered one of the methodological strengths of the study.

The current study has also some limitations that need to be considered. First, a limitation may be related to the size of the participant sample. The sample consisted of only nine nurses, a number that may be seen as a limitation in data collection. To challenge this limitation, the researchers posed follow-up questions during the interviews, thus offering the participants the opportunity to provide rich descriptions of their experiences with end-of-life care. Even though the sample consisted of only nine nurses, these participants reflected on and described their everyday work experiences. The participants’ rich descriptions were evaluated as possessing sufficient information power [ 41 ], thereby enhancing the overall quality of dialogues during interviews– a notable strength.

Second, the findings are limited to these nine participants and their personal work experiences in four different Norwegian nursing homes. This means that the sample is small and context dependent, which may limit the transferability and generalisability of the findings.

A third limitation pertains to the potential influence of the chosen theoretical framework on researchers’ preunderstanding during data analysis. To avoid bias, the theoretical framework was introduced at the end of the data analyses and after the coding process was conducted. The theoretical framework contributed to situating the knowledge from the empirical data into theoretical knowledge and vice versa. However, to be certain about interpretations and knowing that the qualitative nature of the study cannot completely exclude the impact of the preunderstanding on the analysis of the data, both researchers were aware of their theoretical preunderstanding and tried not to make conclusions beforehand.

The ethics of care framework provides opportunities for nurses to analyse their own caring activities during the provision of end-of-life care to nursing home residents. The exploration of the moral dimension of the provision of end-of-life care, utilising Tronto’s theory, revealed that moral qualities, such as attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness, and solidarity are influenced to a certain extent by nurses’ autonomy. What is crucial for the provision of competent end-of-life care is the nurses’ awareness of acting properly in accordance with the moral qualities to each of the phases of caring. Therefore, to provide competent end-of-life care nurses must be attentive to residents’ care needs, take on the responsibility for the care provided to ensure that residents’ needs are met, provide competent care based on knowledge, skills and values and assess how residents respond to the care provided. In other words, this is the basic nursing process in action, and this problem-solving approach is needed for the provision of competent end-of-life care.

Data availability

The data that support the findings of this study are not openly available due to reasons of sensitivity and are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. Data are located in controlled access data storage at Oslo Metropolitan University.

Abbreviations

Participant in interview [number of the individual interview

Participant [number] in Focus Group interview

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Acknowledgements

We would like to express gratitude to the nurses who participated in this study, thereby contributing to the data collection. Additionally, we extend our thanks to the Oslo Metropolitan University Library for granting approval and for their support in covering the publication fee of this article.

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

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D.L. contributed to the study conception, data collection, and analysis, and wrote the main manuscript text. R.G. was involved in data collection, analysis, reflection, and manuscript writing. D.L. was responsible for administrative work related to journal submission and was also involved in reviewing and editing the manuscript. R.G. and D.L. have read and approved the manuscript before submission.

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The Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research approved the study protocol (Sikt/Ref. number 360657) and concluded that the study was not subject to the Norwegian Health Research Act (LOV-2008-06-20-44; https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2008-06-20-44 ). An English version of the Norwegian Health Research Act can be found at: https://www.uib.no/en/med/81598/norwegian-health-research-act . This study does not aim to get insight into participants’ health status, sexuality, ethnicity, and political affiliation (sensitive information), therefore, no additional approval from a local ethics committee or institutional review board (IRB) was necessary to be obtained to conduct the study. This study was performed according to principles outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki, and in accordance with Oslo Metropolitan University’s guidelines and regulations. Data were kept confidential and used only for this research purpose. The researchers provided verbal and written information about the study. Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior data collection.

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Gilbert, R., Lillekroken, D. Nurses’ perceptions of how their professional autonomy influences the moral dimension of end-of-life care to nursing home residents– a qualitative study. BMC Nurs 23 , 216 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12912-024-01865-5

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1186/s12912-024-01865-5

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