to what extent is psychology a science essay

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List

Psychology’s Status as a Science: Peculiarities and Intrinsic Challenges. Moving Beyond its Current Deadlock Towards Conceptual Integration

School of Human Sciences, University of Greenwich, Old Royal Naval College, Park Row, London, SE10 9LS UK

Psychology holds an exceptional position among the sciences. Yet even after 140 years as an independent discipline, psychology is still struggling with its most basic foundations. Its key phenomena, mind and behaviour, are poorly defined (and their definition instead often delegated to neuroscience or philosophy) while specific terms and constructs proliferate. A unified theoretical framework has not been developed and its categorisation as a ‘soft science’ ascribes to psychology a lower level of scientificity. The article traces these problems to the peculiarities of psychology’s study phenomena, their interrelations with and centrality to everyday knowledge and language (which may explain the proliferation and unclarity of terms and concepts), as well as to their complex relations with other study phenomena. It shows that adequate explorations of such diverse kinds of phenomena and their interrelations with the most elusive of all—immediate experience—inherently require a plurality of epistemologies, paradigms, theories, methodologies and methods that complement those developed for the natural sciences. Their systematic integration within just one discipline, made necessary by these phenomena’s joint emergence in the single individual as the basic unit of analysis, makes psychology in fact the hardest science of all. But Galtonian nomothetic methodology has turned much of today’s psychology into a science of populations rather than individuals, showing that blind adherence to natural-science principles has not advanced but impeded the development of psychology as a science. Finally, the article introduces paradigmatic frameworks that can provide solid foundations for conceptual integration and new developments.

Psychology’s Status as a Discipline

Psychology holds an exceptional position among the sciences—not least because it explores the very means by which any science is made, for it is humans who perceive, conceive, define, investigate, analyse and interpret the phenomena of the world. Scientists have managed to explore distant galaxies, quantum particles and the evolution of life over 4 billion years—phenomena inaccessible to the naked eye or long deceased. Yet, psychology is still struggling with its most basic foundations. The phenomena of our personal experience, directly accessible to everyone in each waking moment of life, remain challenging objects of research. Moreover, psychical phenomena are essential for all sciences (e.g., thinking). But why are we struggling to scientifically explore the means needed to first make any science? Given the successes in other fields, is this not a contradiction in itself?

This article outlines three key problems of psychology (poor definitions of study phenomena, lack of unified theoretical frameworks, and an allegedly lower level of scientificity) that are frequently discussed and at the centre of Zagaria, Andò and Zennaro’s ( 2020 ) review. These problems are then traced to peculiarities of psychology’s study phenomena and the conceptual and methodological challenges they entail. Finally, the article introduces paradigmatic frameworks that can provide solid foundations for conceptual integration and new developments.

Lack of Proper Terms and Definitions of Study Phenomena

Introductory text books are supposed to present the corner stones of a science’s established knowledge base. In psychology, however, textbooks present definitions of its key phenomena—mind (psyche) and behaviour—that are discordant, ambiguous, overlapping, circular and context-dependent, thus inconclusive (Zagaria et al. 2020 ). Tellingly, many popular text books define ‘mind’ exclusively as ‘brain activity’, thus turning psychology’s central object of research into one of neuroscience. What then is psychology as opposed to neuroscience? Some even regard the definition of mind as unimportant and leave it to philosophers, thus categorising it as a philosophical phenomenon and shifting it again out of psychology’s own realm. At the same time, mainstream psychologists often proudly distance themselves from philosophers (Alexandrova & Haybron, 2016 ), explicitly referring to the vital distinction between science and philosophy. Behaviour, as well, is commonly reduced to ill-defined ‘activities’, ‘actions’ and ‘doings’ and, confusingly, often even equated with mind (psyche), such as in concepts of ‘inner and outer behaviours’ (Uher 2016b ). All this leaves one wonder what psychology is actually about.

As if to compensate the unsatisfactory definitional and conceptual status of its key phenomena in general, psychology is plagued with a chaotic proliferation of terms and constructs for specific phenomena of mind and behaviour (Zagaria et al. 2020 ). This entails that different terms can denote the same concept (jangle-fallacies; Kelley 1927 ) and the same terms different concepts (jingle-fallacies; Thorndike 1903 ). Even more basically, many psychologists struggle to explain what their most frequent study phenomena—constructs—actually are (Slaney and Garcia 2015 ). These deficiencies and inconsistencies involve a deeply fragmented theoretical landscape.

Lack of Conceptual Integration Into Overarching Frameworks

Like no other science, psychology embraces an enormous diversity of established epistemologies, paradigms, theories, methodologies and methods. Is that a result of the discipline’s unparalleled complexity and the therefore necessary scientific pluralism (Fahrenberg 2013 ) or rather an outcome of mistaking this pluralism for the unrestrained proliferation of perspectives (Zagaria et al. 2020 )?

The lack of a unified theory in psychology is widely lamented. Many ‘integrative theories’ were proposed as overarching frameworks, yet without considering contradictory presuppositions underlying different theories. Such integrative systems merely provide important overviews of the essential plurality of research perspectives and methodologies needed in the field (Fahrenberg 2013 ; Uher 2015b ). Zagaria and colleagues ( 2020 ) suggested evolutionary psychology could provide the much-needed paradigmatic framework. This field, however, is among psychology’s youngest sub-disciplines and its most speculative ones because (unlike biological phenomena) psychical, behavioural and social phenomena leave no fossilised traces in themselves. Their possible ancestral forms can only be reconstructed indirectly from archaeological findings and investigations of today’s humans, making evolutionary explorations prone to speculations and biases (e.g., gender bias in interpretations of archaeological findings; Ginge 1996 ). Cross-species comparative psychology offers important correctives through empirical studies of today’s species with different cognitive, behavioural, social and ecological systems and different degrees of phylogenetic relatedness to humans. This enables comparisons and hypothesis testing not possible when studying only humans but still faces limitations given human ancestors’ unavailability for direct study (Uher 2020a ).

But most importantly, evolutionary psychology does not provide consistent terms and concepts either; its key constructs ‘psychological adaptations’ and ‘evolved psychological mechanisms’ are as vague, ambiguous and ill-defined as ‘mind’ and ‘behaviour’. Moreover, the strong research heuristic formulated in Tinbergen’s four questions on the causation, function, development and evolution of behaviour is not an achievement of evolutionary psychology but originates from theoretical biology, thus again from outside of psychology.

Psychology—a ‘Soft Science’ in Pre-scientific Stage?

The pronounced inconsistencies in psychology’s terminological, conceptual and theoretical landscape have been likened to the pre-scientific stage of emerging sciences (Zagaria et al. 2020 ). Psychology was therefore declared a ‘soft science’ that can never achieve the status of the ‘hard sciences’ (e.g., physics, chemistry). This categorisation implies the belief that some sciences have only minor capacities to accumulate secured knowledge and lower abilities to reach theoretical and methodological consensus (Fanelli and Glänzel 2013 ; Simonton 2015 ). In particular, soft sciences would have only limited abilities to apply ‘the scientific method’, the general set of principles involving systematic observation, experimentation and measurement as well as deduction and testing of hypotheses that guide scientific practice (Gauch 2015 ). The idea of the presumed lack of methodological rigor and exactitude of ‘soft sciences’ goes back to Kant ( 1798 / 2000 ) and is fuelled by recurrent crises of replication, generalisation, validity, and other criteria considered essential for all sciences.

But classifying sciences into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, implying some would be more scientific than others, is ill-conceived and misses the point why there are different sciences at all. Crucially, the possibilities for implementing particular research practices are not a matter of scientific discipline or their ascribed level of scientificity but solely depend on the particular study phenomena and their properties (Uher 2019 ). For study phenomena that are highly context-dependent and continuously changing in themselves, such as those of mind, behaviour and society, old knowledge cannot have continuing relevance as this is the case for (e.g., non-living) phenomena and properties that are comparably invariant in themselves. Instead, accurate and valid investigations require that concepts, theories and methods must be continuously adapted as well (Uher 2020b ).

The classification of sciences by the degree to which they can implement ‘the scientific method’ as developed for the natural sciences is a reflection of the method-centrism that has taken hold of psychology over the last century, when the craft of statistical analysis became psychologists’ dominant activity (Lamiell 2019 ; Valsiner 2012 ). The development of ever more sophisticated tools for statistical analysis as well as of rating scales enabling the efficient generation of allegedly quantitative data for millions of individuals misled psychologists to adapt their study phenomena and research questions to their methods, rather than vice versa (Omi 2012 ; Toomela and Valsiner 2010 ; Uher 2013 ). But methods are just a means to an end. Sciences must be phenomenon-centred and problem-centred, and they must develop epistemologies, theories, methodologies and methods that are suited to explore these phenomena and the research problems in their field.

Psychology’s Study Phenomena and Intrinsic Challenges

Psychology’s exceptional position among the sciences and its key problems can be traced to its study phenomena’s peculiarities and the conceptual and methodological challenges they entail.

Experience: Elementary to All Empirical Sciences

Experience is elementary to all empirical sciences, which are experience-based by definition (from Greek empeiria meaning experience). The founder of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, already highlighted that every concrete experience has always two aspects, the objective content given and individuals’ subjective apprehension of it—thus, the objects of experience in themselves and the subjects experiencing them. This entails two fundamental ways in which experience is treated in the sciences (Wundt 1896a ).

Natural sciences explore the objective contents mediated by experience that can be obtained by subtracting from the concrete experience the subjective aspects always contained in it. Hence, natural scientists consider the objects of experience in their properties as conceived independently of the subjects experiencing them, using the perspective of mediate experience (mittelbare Erfahrung; Wundt 1896a ). Therefore, natural scientists develop theories, approaches and technologies that help minimise the involvement of human perceptual and conceptual abilities in research processes and filter out their effects on research outcomes. This approach is facilitated by the peculiarities of natural-science study phenomena (of the non-living world, in particular), in which general laws, immutable relationships and natural constants can be identified that remain invariant across time and space and that can be measured and mathematically formalised (Uher 2020b ).

Psychologists, in turn, explore the experiencing subjects and their understanding and interpretation of their experiential contents and how this mediates their concrete experience of ‘reality’. This involves the perspective of immediate experience (unmittelbare Erfahrung), with immediate indicating absence of other phenomena mediating their perception (Wundt 1896a ). Immediate experience comprises connected processes, whereby every process has an objective content but is, at the same time, also a subjective process. Inner experience, Wundt highlighted, is not a special part of experience but rather constitutes the entirety of all immediate experience; thus, inner and outer experience do not constitute separate channels of information as often assumed (Uher 2016a ). That is, psychology deals with the entire experience in its immediate subjective reality. The inherent relation to the perceiving and experiencing subject— subject reference —is therefore a fundamental category in psychology. Subjects are feeling and thinking beings capable of intentional action who pursue purposes and values. This entails agency, volition, value orientation and teleology. As a consequence, Wundt highlighted, research on these phenomena can determine only law-like generalisations that allow for exceptions and singularities (Fahrenberg 2019 ). Given this, it is meaningless to use theories-to-laws ratios as indicators of scientificity (e.g., in Simonton 2015 ; Zagaria et al. 2020 ).

Constructs: Concepts in Science AND Everyday Psychology

The processual and transient nature of immediate experience (and many behaviours) imposes further challenges because, of processual entities, only a part exists at any moment (Whitehead 1929 ). Experiential phenomena can therefore be conceived only through generalisation and abstraction from their occurrences over time, leading to concepts, beliefs and knowledge about them , which are psychical phenomena in themselves as well but different from those they are about (reflected in the terms experien cing versus experien ce ; Erleben versus Erfahrung; Uher 2015b , 2016a ). Abstract concepts, because they are theoretically constructed, are called constructs (Kelly 1963 ). All humans implicitly develop constructs (through abduction, see below) to describe and explain regularities they observe in themselves and their world. They use constructs to anticipate the unknown future and to choose among alterative actions and responses (Kelly 1963 ; Valsiner 2012 ).

Constructs about experiencing, experience and behaviour form important parts of our everyday knowledge and language. This entails intricacies because psychologists cannot simply put this everyday psychology aside for doing their science, even more so as they are studying the phenomena that are at the centre of everyday knowledge and largely accessible only through (everyday) language. Therefore, psychologists cannot invent scientific terms and concepts that are completely unrelated to those of everyday psychology as natural scientists can do (Uher 2015b ). But this also entails that, to first delineate their study phenomena, psychologists need not elaborate scientific definitions because everyday psychology already provides some terms, implicit concepts and understanding—even if these are ambiguous, discordant, circular, overlapping, context-dependent and biased. This may explain the proliferation of terms and concepts and the lack of clear definitions of key phenomena in scientific psychology.

Constructs and language-based methods entail further challenges. The construal of constructs allowed scientists to turn abstract ideas into entities, thereby making them conceptually accessible to empirical study. But this entification misguides psychologists to overlook their constructed nature (Slaney and Garcia 2015 ) by ascribing to constructs an ontological status (e.g., ‘traits’ as psychophysical mechanisms; Uher 2013 ). Because explorations of many psychological study phenomena are intimately bound to language, psychologists must differentiate their study phenomena from the terms, concepts and methods used to explore them, as indicated by the terms psych ical versus psych ological (from Greek -λογία, -logia for body of knowledge)—differentiations not commonly made in the English-language publications dominating in contemporary psychology (Lewin 1936 ; Uher 2016a ).

Psychology’s Exceptional Position Among the Sciences and Philosophy

The concepts of mediate and immediate experience illuminate psychology’s special interrelations with the other sciences and philosophy. Wundt conceived the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften; e.g., physics, physiology) as auxiliary to psychology and psychology, in turn, as supplementary to the natural sciences “in the sense that only together they are able to exhaust the empirical knowledge accessible to us“ (Fahrenberg 2019 ; Wundt 1896b , p. 102). By exploring the universal forms of immediate experience and the regularities of their connections, psychology is also the foundation of the intellectual sciences (Geisteswissenschaften, commonly (mis)translated as humanities; e.g., philology, linguistics, law), which explore the actions and effects emerging from humans’ immediate experiences (Fahrenberg 2019 ). Psychology also provides foundations for the cultural and social sciences (Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften; e.g., sociology; anthropology), which explore the products and processes emerging from social and societal interactions among experiencing subjects who are thinking and intentional agents pursuing values, aims and purposes. Moreover, because psychology considers the subjective and the objective as the two fundamental conditions underlying theoretical reflection and practical action and seeks to determine their interrelations, Wundt regarded psychology also a preparatory empirical science for philosophy (especially epistemology and ethics; Fahrenberg 2019 ).

Psychology’s exceptional position at the intersection with diverse sciences and with philosophy is reflected in the extremely heterogeneous study phenomena explored in its diverse sub-disciplines, covering all areas of human life. Some examples are individuals’ sensations and perceptions of physical phenomena (e.g., psychophysics, environmental psychology, engineering psychology), biological and pathological phenomena associated with experience and behaviour (e.g., biopsychology, neuropsychology, clinical psychology), individuals’ experience and behaviour in relation to others and in society (e.g., social psychology, personality psychology, cultural psychology, psycholinguistics, economic psychology), as well as in different periods and domains of life (e.g., developmental psychology, educational psychology, occupational psychology). No other science explores such a diversity of study phenomena. Their exploration requires a plurality of epistemologies, methodologies and methods, which include experimental and technology-based investigations (e.g., neuro-imaging, electromyography, life-logging, video-analyses), interpretive and social-science investigations (e.g., of texts, narratives, multi-media) as well as investigations involving self-report and self-observation (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, guided introquestion).

All this shows that psychology cannot be a unitary science. Adequate explorations of so many different kinds of phenomena and their interrelations with the most elusive of all—immediate experience—inherently require a plurality of epistemologies, paradigms, theories, methodologies and methods that complement those developed for the natural sciences, which are needed as well. Their systematic integration within just one discipline, made necessary by these phenomena’s joint emergence in the single individual as the basic unit of analysis, makes psychology in fact the hardest science of all.

Idiographic and Nomothetic Strategies of Knowledge Generation

Immediate experience, given its subjective, processual, context-dependent, and thus ever-changing nature, is always unique and unprecedented. Exploring such particulars inherently requires idiographic strategies, in which local phenomena of single cases are modelled in their dynamic contexts to create generalised knowledge from them through abduction. In abduction, scientists infer from observations of surprising facts backwards to a possible theory that, if it were true, could explain the facts observed (Peirce 1901 ; CP 7.218). Abduction leads to the creation of new general knowledge, in which theory and data are circularly connected in an open-ended cycle, allowing to further generalise, extend and differentiate the new knowledge created. By generalising from what was once and at another time as well, idiographic approaches form the basis of nomothetic approaches, which are aimed at identifying generalities common to all particulars of a class and at deriving theories or laws to account for these generalities. This Wundtian approach to nomothetic research, because it is case-by-case based , allows to create generalised knowledge about psychical processes and functioning, thus building a bridge between the individual and theory development (Lamiell 2003 ; Robinson 2011 ; Salvatore and Valsiner 2010 ).

But beliefs in the superiority of natural-science principles misled many psychologists to interpret nomothetic strategies solely in terms of the Galtonian methodology, in which many cases are aggregated and statistically analysed on the sample-level . This limits research to group-level hypothesis testing and theory development to inductive generalisation, which are uninformative about single cases and cannot reveal what is, indeed, common to all (Lamiell 2003 ; Robinson 2011 ). This entails numerous fallacies, such as the widespread belief between-individual structures would be identical to and even reflect within-individual structures (Molenaar 2004 ; Uher 2015d ). Galtonian nomothetic methodology has turned much of today’s psychology into a science exploring populations rather than individuals. That is, blind adherence to natural-science principles has not advanced but, instead, substantially impeded the development of psychology as a science.

Moving Psychology Beyond its Current Conceptual Deadlock

Wundt’s opening of psychology’s first laboratory marked its official start as an independent science. Its dynamic developments over the last 140 years testify to psychology’s importance but also to the peculiarities of its study phenomena and the intricate challenges that these entail for scientific explorations. Yet, given its history, it seems unlikely that psychology can finally pull itself out of the swamps of conceptual vagueness and theoretical inconsistencies using just its own concepts and theories, in a feat similar to that of the legendary Baron Münchhausen. Psychology can, however, capitalise on its exceptional constellation of intersections with other sciences and philosophy that arises from its unique focus on the individual. Although challenging, this constitutes a rich source for perspective-taking and stimulation of new developments that can meaningfully complement and expand its own genuine achievements as shown in the paradigm outlined now.

The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm)

The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals ( TPS-Paradigm 2 ) is targeted toward making explicit and scrutinising the most basic assumptions that different disciplines make about research on individuals to help scientists critically reflect on; discuss and refine their theories and practices; and to derive ideas for new developments (therefore philosophy-of–science ). It comprises a system of interrelated philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological frameworks that coherently build upon each other (therefore paradigm ). In these frameworks, concepts from various lines of thought, both historical and more recent, and from different disciplines (e.g., psychology, life sciences, social sciences, physical sciences, metrology, philosophy of science) that are relevant for exploring research objects in (relation to) individuals were systematically integrated, refined and complemented by novel ones, thereby creating unitary frameworks that transcend disciplinary boundaries (therefore transdisciplinary ; Uher 2015a , b , 2018c ).

The Philosophical Framework: Presuppositions About Research on Individuals

The philosophical framework specifies three sets of presuppositions that are made in the TPS-Paradigm about the nature and properties of individuals and the phenomena studied in (relations to) them as well as about the notions by which knowledge about them can be gained.

• All science is done by humans and therefore inextricably entwined with and limited by human’s perceptual and conceptual abilities. This entails risks for particular fallacies of the human mind (e.g., oversimplifying complexity, Royce 1891 ; reifying linguistic abstractions, Whitehead 1929 ). Scientists researching individuals face particular challenges because they are individuals themselves, thus inseparable from their research objects. This entails risks for anthropocentric, ethnocentric and egocentric biases influencing metatheories and methodologies (Uher 2015b ). Concepts from social, cultural and theoretical psychology, sociology, and other fields (e.g., Gergen 2001 ; Valsiner 1998 ; Weber 1949 ) were used to open up meta-perspectives on research processes and help scientists reflect on their own presuppositions, ideologies and language that may (unintentionally) influence their research.
• Individuals are complex living organisms , which can be conceived as open (dissipative) and nested systems. On each hierarchical level, they function as organised wholes from which new properties emerge not predictable from their constituents and that can feed back to the constituents from which they emerge, causing complex patterns of upward and downward causation. With increasing levels of organisation, ever more complex systems emerge that are less rule-bound, highly adaptive and historically unique. Therefore, dissecting systems into elements cannot reveal the processes governing their functioning and development as a whole; assumptions on universal determinism and reductionism must be rejected. Relevant concepts from thermodynamics, physics of life, philosophy, theoretical biology, medicine, psychology, sociology and other fields (e.g., Capra 1997 ; Hartmann 1964 ; Koffka 1935 ; Morin 2008 ; Prigogine and Stengers 1997 ; Varela et al. 1974 ; von Bertalanffy 1937 ) about dialectics, complexity and nonlinear dynamic systems were used to elaborate their relevance for research on individuals.
• The concept of complementarity is applied to highlight that, by using different methods, ostensibly incompatible information can be obtained about properties of the same object of research that are nevertheless all equally essential for an exhaustive account of it and that may therefore be regarded as complementary to one another. Applications of this concept, originating from physics (wave-particle dilemma in research on the nature of light; Bohr 1937 ; Heisenberg 1927 ), to the body-mind problem emphasise the necessity for a methodical dualism to account for observations of two categorically different realities that require different frames of reference, approaches and methods (Brody and Oppenheim 1969 ; Fahrenberg 1979 , 2013 ; Walach 2013 ). Complementarity was applied to specify the peculiarities of psychical phenomena and to derive methodological concepts (Uher, 2016a ). It was also applied to develop solutions for the nomothetic-idiographic controversy in ‘personality’ research (Uher 2015d ).

These presuppositions underlie the metatheoretical and the methodological framework.

Metatheoretical Framework

The metatheoretical framework formalises a phenomenon’s accessibility to human perception under everyday conditions using three metatheoretical properties: internality-externality, temporal extension, and spatiality conceived complementarily as physical (spatial) and “non-physical” (without spatial properties). The particular constellations of their forms in given phenomena were used to metatheoretically define and differentiate from one another various kinds of phenomena studied in (relation to) individuals: morphology, physiology, behaviour, psyche, semiotic representations (e.g., language), artificial outer-appearance modifications (e.g., clothing) and contexts (e.g., situations; Uher 2015b ).

These metatheoretical concepts allowed to integrate and further develop established concepts from various fields to elaborate the peculiarities of the phenomena of the psyche 3 and their functional connections with other phenomena (e.g., one-sided psyche-externality gap; Uher 2013 ), to trace their ontogenetic development and to explore the fundamental imperceptibility of others’ psychical phenomena and its role in the development of agency, language, instructed learning, culture, social institutions and societies in human evolution (Uher 2015a ). The metatheoretical definition of behaviour 4 enabled clear differentiations from psyche and physiology, and clarified when the content-level of language in itself constitutes behaviour, revealing how language extends humans’ behavioural possibilities far beyond all non-language behaviours (Uher 2016b ). The metatheoretical definition of ‘personality’ as individual-specificity in all kinds of phenomena studied in individuals (see above) highlighted the unique constellation of probabilistic, differential and temporal patterns that merge together in this concept, the challenges this entails and the central role of language in the formation of ‘personality’ concepts. This also enabled novel approaches for conceptual integrations of the heterogeneous landscape of paradigms and theories in ‘personality’ research (Uher 2015b , c , d , 2018b ). The semiotic representations concept emphasised the composite nature of language, comprising psychical and physical phenomena, thus both internal and external phenomena. Failure to consider the triadic relations among meaning, signifier and referent inherent to any sign system as well as their inseparability from the individuals using them was shown to underly various conceptual fallacies, especially regarding data generation and measurement (Uher 2018a , 2019 ).

Methodological Framework

The metatheoretical framework is systematically linked to the methodological framework featuring three main areas.

• General concepts of phenomenon-methodology matching . The three metatheoretical properties were used to derive implications for research methodology, leading to new concepts that help to identify fallacies and mismatches (e.g., nunc-ipsum methods for transient phenomena, intro questive versus extro questive methods to remedy methodological problems in previous concepts of introspection; Uher 2016a , 2019 ).
• Methodological concepts for comparing individuals within and across situations, groups and species were developed (Uher 2015e ). Approaches for taxonomising individual differences  in various kinds of phenomena in human populations and other species were systematised on the basis of their underlying rationales. Various novel approaches, especially behavioural ones, were developed to systematically test and complement the widely-used lexical models derived from everyday language (Uher 2015b , c , d , 2018b , c ).
• Theories and practices of data generation and measurement from psychology, social sciences and metrology, the science of measurement and foundational to the physical sciences, were scrutinised and compared. These transdisciplinary analyses identified two basic methodological principles of measurement underlying metrological concepts that are also applicable to psychological and social-science research (data generation traceability, numerical traceability; Uher 2020b ). Further analyses explored the involvement of human abilities in data generation across the empirical sciences (Uher 2019 ) and raters’ interpretation and use of standardised assessment scales (Uher 2018a ).

Empirical demonstrations of these developments and analyses in various empirical studies involving humans of different sociolinguistic backgrounds as well as several nonhuman primate species (e.g., Uher 2015e , 2018a ; Uher et al. 2013a , b ; Uher and Visalberghi 2016 ) show the feasibility of this line of research. Grounded in established concepts from various disciplines, it offers many possibilities for fruitful cross-scientific collaborations waiting to be explored in order to advance the fascinating science of individuals.

Author Contributions

I declare I am the sole creator of this research.

Funding Information

This research was conducted without funding.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

I declare to have no conflicting or competing interests.

2 http://researchonindividuals.org .

3 The psyche is defined as the “entirety of the phenomena of the immediate experiential reality both conscious and non-conscious of living organisms” (Uher 2015c , p. 431, derived from Wundt 1896a ).

4 Behaviours are defined as the “external changes or activities of living organisms that are functionally mediated by other external phenomena in the present moment” (Uher 2016b , p. 490).

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

• Alexandrova, A., & Haybron, D. M. (2016). Is construct validation valid? Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 1098–1109. 10.1086/687941
• Bohr N. Causality and complementarity. Philosophy of Science. 1937; 4 (3):289–298. doi: 10.1086/286465. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Brody N, Oppenheim P. Application of Bohr’s principle of complementarity to the mind-body problem. Journal of Philosophy. 1969; 66 (4):97–113. doi: 10.2307/2024529. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Capra F. The web of life: A new synthesis of mind and matter. New York: Anchor Books; 1997. [ Google Scholar ]
• Fahrenberg, J. (1979). The complementarity principle in psychophysiological research and somatic medicine. Zeitschrift für Klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie, 27 (2), 151–167. [ PubMed ]
• Fahrenberg J. Zur Kategorienlehre der Psychologie: Komplementaritätsprinzip; Perspektiven und Perspektiven-Wechsel. Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers; 2013. [ Google Scholar ]
• Fahrenberg, J. (2019). Wilhelm Wundt (1832 – 1920). Introduction, quotations, reception, commentaries, attempts at reconstruction . Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers.
• Fanelli D, Glänzel W. Bibliometric evidence for a hierarchy of the sciences. PLoS ONE. 2013; 8 (6):e66938. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0066938. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gauch, H. G. J. (2015). Scientific method in practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gergen, K. J. (2001). Psychological science in a postmodern context. American Psychologist, 56(10) , 803–813. 10.1037/0003-066X.56.10.803. [ PubMed ]
• Ginge, B. (1996). Identifying gender in the archaeological record: Revising our stereotypes. Etruscan Studies, 3, Article 4.
• Hartmann N. Der Aufbau der realen Welt. Grundriss der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre (3. Aufl.) Berlin: Walter de Gruyter; 1964. [ Google Scholar ]
• Heisenberg, W. (1927). Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik. Zeitschrift für Physik, 43 (3–4), 172–198. 10.1007/BF01397280.
• Kant, I. (1798/2000). Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (Reinhard Brandt, ed.). Felix Meiner.
• Kelley TL. Interpretation of educational measurements. Yonkers: World; 1927. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kelly, G. (1963). A theory of personality: The psychology of personal constructs . W.W. Norton.
• Koffka K. Principles of Gestalt psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World; 1935. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lamiell, J. (2003). Beyond individual and group differences: Human individuality, scientific psychology, and William Stern’s critical personalism . Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 10.4135/9781452229317.
• Lamiell, J. (2019). Psychology’s misuse of statistics and persistent dismissal of its critics . Springer International. 10.1007/978-3-030-12131-0.
• Lewin K. Principles of topological psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill; 1936. [ Google Scholar ]
• Molenaar PCM. A manifesto on psychology as idiographic science: Bringing the person back into scientific psychology, this time forever. Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspective. 2004; 2 (4):201–218. doi: 10.1207/s15366359mea0204_1. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Morin E. On complexity. Cresskill: Hampton Press; 2008. [ Google Scholar ]
• Omi Y. Tension between the theoretical thinking and the empirical method: Is it an inevitable fate for psychology? Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science. 2012; 46 (1):118–127. doi: 10.1007/s12124-011-9185-4. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Peirce, C. S. (1901/1935). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP 7.218—1901, On the logic of drawing history from ancient documents especially from testimonies) . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Prigogine, I., & Stengers, I. (1997). The end of certainty: Time, chaos, and the new laws of nature . Free Press.
• Robinson OC. The idiographic/nomothetic dichotomy: Tracing historical origins of contemporary confusions. History & Philosophy of Psychology. 2011; 13 :32–39. [ Google Scholar ]
• Royce, J. (1891). The religious aspect of philosophy: A critique of the bases of conduct and of faith. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.
• Salvatore S, Valsiner J. Between the general and the unique. Theory & Psychology. 2010; 20 :817–833. doi: 10.1177/0959354310381156. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Simonton DK. Psychology as a science within Comte’s hypothesized hierarchy: Empirical investigations and conceptual implications. Review of General Psychology. 2015; 19 (3):334–344. doi: 10.1037/gpr0000039. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Slaney KL, Garcia DA. Constructing psychological objects: The rhetoric of constructs. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. 2015; 35 (4):244–259. doi: 10.1037/teo0000025. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Thorndike EL. Notes on child study. 2. New York: Macmillan; 1903. [ Google Scholar ]
• Toomela, A., & Valsiner, J. (2010). Methodological thinking in psychology: 60 years gone astray? Information Age Publishing.
• Uher J. Personality psychology: Lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts reveal only half of the story-Why it is time for a paradigm shift. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science. 2013; 47 (1):1–55. doi: 10.1007/s12124-013-9230-6. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher, J. (2015a). Agency enabled by the psyche: Explorations using the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals. In C. W. Gruber, M. G. Clark, S. H. Klempe, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), Constraints of agency: Explorations of theory in everyday life. Annals of Theoretical Psychology (Vol. 12) (pp. 177–228). 10.1007/978-3-319-10130-9_13.
• Uher J. Conceiving “personality”: Psychologist’s challenges and basic fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science. 2015; 49 (3):398–458. doi: 10.1007/s12124-014-9283-1. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher J. Developing “personality” taxonomies: Metatheoretical and methodological rationales underlying selection approaches, methods of data generation and reduction principles. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science. 2015; 49 (4):531–589. doi: 10.1007/s12124-014-9280-4. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher J. Interpreting “personality” taxonomies: Why previous models cannot capture individual-specific experiencing, behaviour, functioning and development. Major taxonomic tasks still lay ahead. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science. 2015; 49 (4):600–655. doi: 10.1007/s12124-014-9281-3. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher, J. (2015e). Comparing individuals within and across situations, groups and species: Metatheoretical and methodological foundations demonstrated in primate behaviour. In D. Emmans & A. Laihinen (Eds.), Comparative Neuropsychology and Brain Imaging (Vol. 2), Series Neuropsychology: An Interdisciplinary Approach (pp. 223–284). 10.13140/RG.2.1.3848.8169
• Uher, J. (2016a). Exploring the workings of the Psyche: Metatheoretical and methodological foundations. In J. Valsiner, G. Marsico, N. Chaudhary, T. Sato & V. Dazzani (Eds.), Psychology as the science of human being: The Yokohama Manifesto (pp. 299–324). 10.1007/978-3-319-21094-0_18.
• Uher J. What is behaviour? And (when) is language behaviour? A metatheoretical definition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 2016; 46 (4):475–501. doi: 10.1111/jtsb.12104. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher J. Quantitative data from rating scales: An epistemological and methodological enquiry. Frontiers in Psychology. 2018; 9 :2599. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02599. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher J. Taxonomic models of individual differences: A guide to transdisciplinary approaches. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 2018; 373 (1744):20170171. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0171. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher, J. (2018c). The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals: Foundations for the science of personality and individual differences. In V. Zeigler-Hill & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Personality and Individual Differences: Volume I: The science of personality and individual differences (pp. 84–109). 10.4135/9781526451163.n4.
• Uher J. Data generation methods across the empirical sciences: differences in the study phenomena’s accessibility and the processes of data encoding. Quality & Quantity. International Journal of Methodology. 2019; 53 (1):221–246. doi: 10.1007/s11135-018-0744-3. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher J. Human uniqueness explored from the uniquely human perspective: Epistemological and methodological challenges. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 2020; 50 :20–24. doi: 10.1111/jtsb.12232. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher, J. (2020b). Measurement in metrology, psychology and social sciences: data generation traceability and numerical traceability as basic methodological principles applicable across sciences. Quality & Quantity. International Journal of Methodology, 54 , 975-1004. 10.1007/s11135-020-00970-2.
• Uher J, Addessi E, Visalberghi E. Contextualised behavioural measurements of personality differences obtained in behavioural tests and social observations in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) Journal of Research in Personality. 2013; 47 (4):427–444. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2013.01.013. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher J, Visalberghi E. Observations versus assessments of personality: A five-method multi-species study reveals numerous biases in ratings and methodological limitations of standardised assessments. Journal of Research in Personality. 2016; 61 :61–79. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2016.02.003. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uher J, Werner CS, Gosselt K. From observations of individual behaviour to social representations of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods. Journal of Research in Personality. 2013; 47 (5):647–667. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006. [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Valsiner, J. (1998). The guided mind : A sociogenetic approach to personality. Harvard University Press.
• Valsiner J. A guided science: History of psychology in the mirror of its making. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; 2012. [ Google Scholar ]
• Varela FG, Maturana HR, Uribe R. Autopoiesis: The organization of living systems, its characterization and a model. BioSystems. 1974; 5 (4):187–196. doi: 10.1016/0303-2647(74)90031-8. [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• von Bertalanffy L. Das Gefüge des Lebens. Leipzig: Teubner; 1937. [ Google Scholar ]
• Walach, H. (2013). Psychologie: Wissenschaftstheorie, Philosophische Grundlagen und Geschichte (3. Aufl.) . Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
• Weber, M. (1949). On the methodology of the social sciences (E. Shils & H. Finch, Eds.). New York: Free Press.
• Whitehead AN. Process and reality. New York: Harper; 1929. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wundt, W. (1896a). Grundriss der Psychologie . Stuttgart: Körner. Retrieved from https://archive.org/ .
• Wundt W. Über die Definition der Psychologie. Philosophische Studien. 1896; 12 :9–66. [ Google Scholar ]
• Zagaria, A., Andò, A., & Zennaro, A. (2020). Psychology: A giant with feet of clay. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science. 10.1007/s12124-020-09524-5. [ PubMed ]

Is Psychology a Science?

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

On This Page:

Psychology is a science because it employs systematic methods of observation, experimentation, and data analysis to understand and predict behavior and mental processes, grounded in empirical evidence and subjected to peer review.

Science uses an empirical approach. Empiricism (founded by John Locke) states that the only source of knowledge is our senses – e.g., sight, hearing, etc.

In psychology, empiricism refers to the belief that knowledge is derived from observable, measurable experiences and evidence, rather than from intuition or speculation.

This was in contrast to the existing view that knowledge could be gained solely through the powers of reason and logical argument (known as rationalism).  Thus, empiricism is the view that all knowledge is based on or may come from experience.

Through gaining knowledge through experience, the empirical approach quickly became scientific and greatly influenced the development of physics and chemistry in the 17th and 18th centuries.

The idea that knowledge should be gained through experience, i.e., empirically, turned into a method of inquiry that used careful observation and experiments to gather facts and evidence.

The nature of scientific inquiry may be thought of at two levels:

1. That to do with theory and the foundation of hypotheses. 2. And actual empirical methods of inquiry (i.e. experiments, observations)

The prime empirical method of inquiry in science is the experiment.

The key features of the experiment are control over variables ( independent, dependent , and extraneous ), careful, objective measurement, and establishing cause and effect relationships.

Features of Science

Empirical evidence.

• Refers to data being collected through direct observation or experiment.
• Empirical evidence does not rely on argument or belief.
• Instead, experiments and observations are carried out carefully and reported in detail so that other investigators can repeat and attempt to verify the work.

Objectivity

• Researchers should remain value-free when studying; they should try to remain unbiased in their investigations. I.e., Researchers are not influenced by personal feelings and experiences.
• Objectivity means that all sources of bias are minimized and that personal or subjective ideas are eliminated. The pursuit of science implies that the facts will speak for themselves, even if they differ from what the investigator hoped.
• All extraneous variables need to be controlled to establish the cause (IV) and effect (DV).

Hypothesis testing

• E.g., a statement made at the beginning of an investigation that serves as a prediction and is derived from a theory. There are different types of hypotheses (null and alternative), which need to be stated in a form that can be tested (i.e., operationalized and unambiguous).

Replication

• This refers to whether a particular method and finding can be repeated with different/same people and/or on different occasions to see if the results are similar.
• If a dramatic discovery is reported, but other scientists cannot replicate it, it will not be accepted.
• If we get the same results repeatedly under the same conditions, we can be sure of their accuracy beyond a reasonable doubt.
• This gives us confidence that the results are reliable and can be used to build up a body of knowledge or a theory: which is vital in establishing a scientific theory.

Predictability

• We should aim to be able to predict future behavior from the findings of our research.

The Scientific Process

Before the twentieth century, science largely used induction principles – making discoveries about the world through accurate observations, and formulating theories based on the regularities observed.

Newton’s Laws are an example of this. He observed the behavior of physical objects (e.g., apples) and produced laws that made sense of what he observed.

The scientific process is now based on the hypothetico-deductive model proposed by Karl Popper (1935).  Popper suggested that theories/laws about the world should come first, and these should be used to generate expectations/hypotheses, which observations and experiments can falsify.

As Popper pointed out, falsification is the only way to be certain: ‘No amount of observations of white swans can allow the conclusion that all swans are white, but the observation of a single black swan is sufficient to refute that conclusion.

Darwin’s theory of evolution is an example of this. He formulated a theory and tested its propositions by observing animals in nature.  He specifically sought to collect data to prove his theory / disprove it.

Thomas Kuhn argued that science does not evolve gradually towards truth, science has a paradigm that remains constant before going through a paradigm shift when current theories can’t explain some phenomenon, and someone proposes a new theory. Science tends to go through these shifts; therefore, psychology is not a science as it has no agreed paradigm.

There are many conflicting approaches, and the subject matter of Psychology is so diverse; therefore, researchers in different fields have little in common.

Psychology is really a very new science, with most advances happening over the past 150 years or so.  However, it can be traced back to ancient Greece, 400 – 500 years BC.  The emphasis was a philosophical one, with great thinkers such as Socrates influencing Plato, who in turn influenced Aristotle.

Plato argued that there was a clear distinction between body and soul, believed very strongly in the influence of individual differences on behavior, and played a key role in developing the notion of “mental health,” believing that the mind needed stimulation from the arts to keep it alive.

Aristotle firmly believed that the body strongly affected the mind – you might say he was an early biopsychologist.

Psychology as a science took a “back seat” until Descartes (1596 – 1650) wrote in the 17th century. He believed strongly in the concept of consciousness, maintaining that it was that that separated us from animals.

He did, however, believe that our bodies could influence our consciousness and that the beginnings of these interactions were in the pineal gland – we know now that this is probably NOT the case!

From this influential work came other important philosophies about psychology, including the work by Spinoza (1632 – 1677) and Leibnitz (1646 – 1716). But there still was no single, scientific, unified psychology as a separate discipline (you could certainly argue that there still isn’t”t!).

When asked, “Who is the parent of psychology?” many people answer, “Freud.” Whether this is the case or not is open to debate, but if we were to ask who the parent of experimental psychology is, few would likely respond similarly.  So, where did modern experimental psychology come from, and why?

Psychology took so long to emerge as a scientific discipline because it needed time to consolidate.  Understanding behavior, thoughts, and feelings are not easy, which may explain why it was largely ignored between ancient Greek times and the 16th century.

But tired of years of speculation, theory, and argument, and bearing in mind Aristotle’s plea for scientific investigation to support the theory, psychology as a scientific discipline began to emerge in the late 1800s.

Wilheim Wundt developed the first psychology lab in 1879.  Introspection was used, but systematically (i.e., methodologically). It was really a place from which to start thinking about how to employ scientific methods to investigate behavior.

The classic movement in psychology to adopt these strategies was the behaviorists, who were renowned for relying on controlled laboratory experiments and rejecting any unseen or subconscious forces as causes of behavior. 

And later, cognitive psychologists adopted this rigorous (i.e., careful), scientific, lab-based approach.

Psychological Approaches

Psychoanalysis has great explanatory power and understanding of behavior. Still, it has been accused of only explaining behavior after the event, not predicting what will happen in advance, and being unfalsifiable.

Some have argued that psychoanalysis has approached the status more of a religion than a science. Still, it is not alone in being accused of being unfalsifiable (evolutionary theory has, too – why is anything the way it is? Because it has evolved that way!), and like theories that are difficult to refute – the possibility exists that it is actually right.

Kline (1984) argues that psychoanalytic theory can be broken down into testable hypotheses and tested scientifically. For example, Scodel (1957) postulated that orally dependent men would prefer larger breasts (a positive correlation) but, in fact, found the opposite (a negative correlation).

Although Freudian theory could be used to explain this finding (through reaction formation – the subject showing exactly the opposite of their unconscious impulses!), Kline has nevertheless pointed out that no significant correlation would have refuted the theory.

Behaviorism has parsimonious (i.e., economic / cost-cutting) theories of learning, using a few simple principles (reinforcement, behavior shaping, generalization, etc.) to explain a wide variety of behavior from language acquisition to moral development.

It advanced bold, precise, and refutable hypotheses (such as Thorndike’s law of effect ) and possessed a hard core of central assumptions such as determinism from the environment (it was only when this assumption faced overwhelming criticism by the cognitive and ethological theorists that the behaviorist paradigm/model was overthrown).

Behaviorists firmly believed in the scientific principles of determinism and orderliness. They thus came up with fairly consistent predictions about when an animal was likely to respond (although they admitted that perfect prediction for any individual was impossible).

The behaviorists used their predictions to control the behavior of both animals (pigeons trained to detect life jackets) and humans (behavioral therapies), and indeed Skinner , in his book Walden Two (1948), described a society controlled according to behaviorist principles.

Cognitive psychology – adopts a scientific approach to unobservable mental processes by advancing precise models and conducting experiments on behavior to confirm or refute them.

Full understanding, prediction, and control in psychology are probably unobtainable due to the huge complexity of environmental, mental, and biological influences upon even the simplest behavior (i.e., all extraneous variables cannot be controlled).

You will see, therefore, that there is no easy answer to the question, “is psychology a science?”. But many approaches of psychology do meet the accepted requirements of the scientific method, whilst others appear to be more doubtful in this respect.

Alternatives

However, some psychologists argue that psychology should not be a science. There are alternatives to empiricism, such as rational research, argument, and belief.

The humanistic approach (another alternative) values private, subjective conscious experience and argues for the rejection of science.

The humanistic approach argues that objective reality is less important than a person’s subjective perception and subjective understanding of the world. Because of this, Carl Rogers and Maslow placed little value on scientific psychology, especially using the scientific laboratory to investigate human and other animal behavior.

A person’s subjective experience of the world is an important and influential factor in their behavior. Only by seeing the world from the individual’s point of view can we really understand why they act the way they do. This is what the humanistic approach aims to do.

Humanism is a psychological perspective that emphasizes the study of the whole person. Humanistic psychologists look at human behavior not only through the eyes of the observer but through the eyes of the person doing the behavior. Humanistic psychologists believe that an individual’s behavior is connected to his inner feelings and self-image.

The humanistic approach in psychology deliberately steps away from a scientific viewpoint, rejecting determinism in favor of free will, aiming to arrive at a unique and in-depth understanding. The humanistic approach does not have an orderly set of theories (although it does have some core assumptions).

It is not interested in predicting and controlling people’s behavior – the individuals themselves are the only ones who can and should do that.

Miller (1969), in “Psychology as a Means of Promoting Human Welfare,” criticizes the controlling view of psychology, suggesting that understanding should be the main goal of the subject as a science since he asks who will do the controlling and whose interests will be served by it?

Humanistic psychologists rejected a rigorous scientific approach to psychology because they saw it as dehumanizing and unable to capture the richness of conscious experience.

In many ways, the rejection of scientific psychology in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was a backlash to the dominance of the behaviorist approach in North American psychology.

Common Sense Views of Behavior

In certain ways, everyone is a psychologist. This does not mean that everyone has been formally trained to study and be trained in psychology. 

People have common sense views of the world, of other people, and of themselves. These common-sense views may come from personal experience, from our upbringing as a child, and through culture, etc.

People have common-sense views about the causes of their own and other people’s behavior, personality characteristics they and others possess, what other people should do, how to bring up your children, and many more aspects of psychology.

Informal psychologists acquire common-sense knowledge in a rather subjective (i.e., unreliable) and anecdotal way.  Common-sense views about people are rarely based on systematic (i.e., logical) evidence and are sometimes based on a single experience or observation.

Racial or religious prejudices may reflect what seems like common sense within a group of people. However, prejudicial beliefs rarely stand up to what is actually the case.

Common sense, then, is something that everybody uses in their day-to-day lives, guides decisions and influences how we interact with one another.

However, because it is not based on systematic evidence or derived from scientific inquiry, it may be misleading and lead to one group of people treating others unfairly and in a discriminatory way.

Limitations of Scientific Psychology

Despite having a scientific methodology worked out (we think), some further problems and arguments doubt psychology is ever a science.

Limitations may refer to the subject matter (e.g., overt behavior versus subjective, private experience), objectivity, generality, testability, ecological validity, ethical issues, and philosophical debates, etc.

Science assumes that there are laws of human behavior that apply to each person. Therefore, science takes both a deterministic and reductionist approach.

Science studies overt behavior because overt behavior is objectively observable and can be measured, allowing different psychologists to record behavior and agree on what has been observed. This means that evidence can be collected to test a theory about people.

Scientific laws are generalizable, but psychological explanations are often restricted to specific times and places. Because psychology studies (mostly) people, it studies (indirectly) the effects of social and cultural changes on behavior.

Psychology does not go on in a social vacuum. Behavior changes over time and in different situations. These factors, and individual differences, make research findings reliable for a limited time only.

Are traditional scientific methods appropriate for studying human behavior? When psychologists operationalize their IV, it is highly likely that this is reductionist, mechanistic, subjective, or just wrong.

Operationalizing variables refers to how you will define and measure a specific variable as it is used in your study. For example, a biopsychologist may operationalize stress as an increased heart rate. Still, it may be that in doing this, we are removed from the human experience of what we are studying. The same goes for causality.

Experiments are keen to establish that X causes Y, but taking this deterministic view means that we ignore extraneous variables and the fact that at a different time, in a different place, we probably would not be influenced by X. There are so many variables that influence human behavior that it is impossible to control them effectively. The issue of ecological validity ties in really nicely here.

Objectivity is impossible. It is a huge problem in psychology, as it involves humans studying humans, and it is very difficult to study people’s behavior in an unbiased fashion.

Moreover, in terms of a general philosophy of science, we find it hard to be objective because a theoretical standpoint influences us (Freud is a good example). The observer and the observed are members of the same species are this creates problems of reflectivity.

A behaviorist would never examine a phobia and think in terms of unconscious conflict as a cause, just like Freud would never explain it as a behavior acquired through operant conditioning.

This particular viewpoint that a scientist has is called a paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). Kuhn argues that most scientific disciplines have one predominant paradigm that the vast majority of scientists subscribe to.

Anything with several paradigms (e.g., models – theories) is a pre-science until it becomes more unified. With a myriad of paradigms within psychology, it is not the case that we have any universal laws of human behavior. Kuhn would most definitely argue that psychology is not a science.

Verification (i.e., proof) may be impossible. We can never truly prove a hypothesis; we may find results to support it until the end of time, but we will never be 100% confident that it is true.

It could be disproved at any moment. The main driving force behind this particular grumble is Karl Popper, the famous philosopher of science and advocator of falsificationism.

Take the famous Popperian example hypothesis: “All swans are white.” How do we know for sure that we will not see a black, green, or hot pink swan in the future? So even if there has never been a sighting of a non-white swan, we still haven’t really proven our hypothesis.

Popper argues that the best hypotheses are those which we can falsify – disprove. If we know something is not true, then we know something for sure.

Testability: much of the subject matter in psychology is unobservable (e.g., memory) and, therefore, cannot be accurately measured. The fact that there are so many variables that influence human behavior that it is impossible to control the variables effectively.

So, are we any closer to understanding a) what science is and b) if psychology is a science? Unlikely. There is no definitive philosophy of science and no flawless scientific methodology.

When people use the term “Scientific,” we all have a general schema of what they mean, but when we break it down in the way that we just have done, the picture is less certain. What is science? It depends on your philosophy. Is psychology a science? It depends on your definition. So – why bother, and how do we conclude all this?

Slife and Williams (1995) have tried to answer these two questions:

1) We must at least strive for scientific methods because we need a rigorous discipline. If we abandon our search for unified methods, we’ll lose a sense of what psychology is (if we knew it in the first place).

2) We need to keep trying to develop scientific methods that are suitable for studying human behavior – it may be that the methods adopted by the natural sciences are not appropriate for us.

Further Information

• Psychology as a Science (PDF)

The “Is Psychology a Science?” Debate

Reviewing the ways in which psychology is and is not a science..

Posted January 27, 2016 | Reviewed by Jessica Schrader

If one is a psychologist or even has a passing interest in the field, one has likely encountered the question about whether psychology is truly a science or not. The debate has been prominent since psychology’s inception in the second half of the 19th century, and is evident in comments like that by William James who referred to it as “that nasty little subject." Scholars of the field know this debate has continued on and off, right up through the present day. The debate flared in the blogosphere a couple of years ago, after an op-ed piece by a microbiologist in the LA Times declared definitively that psychology was not a science , followed by several pieces in Psychology Today and Scientific American declaring definitively that psychology is, in fact, a science. Just last month, a long time scholar of the field authored the paper, Why Psychology Cannot Be an Empirical Science , and once again the blogosphere was debating the issue .

So what is the right answer? Is psychology a science or not? The answer is that it is complicated and the reason is that both science and psychology are complex, multifaceted constructs. As such, binary, blanket “yes” or “no” answers to the question fail. The answer I offer is that yes, it is largely a science, but there are important ways that it fails to live up to this description. To get a handle on why this is the right answer, let’s start with the construct of science, because if we are going to talk about the ways in which psychology is or is not a science, we had better have an idea of what we mean by both of these confusing terms.

Defining Science and Its Key Elements

For clarity of communication, it is often a good idea to start with some basic definitions, so let’s start with some generally agreed-upon definitions of science from reputable organizations.

Science is the pursuit and application of knowledge and understanding of the natural and social world following a systematic methodology based on evidence .

Science refers to a system of acquiring knowledge [based on] observation and experimentation to describe and explain natural phenomena .

These are solid definitions, but we need to flesh them out a bit. I consider science to be made up of four elements: 1) the scientific mindset; 2) the scientific method; 3) the knowledge system of science and 4) science as a rhetorical label. The first three are fairly straightforward and the fourth is particularly relevant for this debate and debates like it (i.e., involving what does or does not get classified as a science). These elements are crucial to understanding the ways in which psychology is and is not a science.

The first point to make is that the scientific mindset involves a set of assumptions about causality and complexity and how an observer can know things about the way the world works (technically, this is called a scientific epistemology). When one is thinking scientifically, one assumes that the natural world is a closed system that follows cause-effect processes that are lawful and discoverable (i.e., that there is no supernatural interference). The scientific mindset also includes the following characteristics: emphasis on empirical evidence (i.e., data collection) to develop explanations; attitudes of openness to possible (natural) explanations and a skepticism about tradition, revelation and authority; an emphasis on objectivity (i.e., independent from the bias of the observer); an emphasis on logical coherence; and the belief that humans can build systems of knowledge that do, in fact, correspond to the way the world actually works.

Another defining feather of science is its reliance on systematic methods of data collection and critical analyses of the ideas of science. These are the methods that students learn about when they are introduced to “doing science," and include elements such as systematic observation, measurement and quantification, data gathering, hypothesis testing, controlled experimentation (where possible), and theory construction.

Although the scientific method is often touted as the sin qua non of science, it is not. Indeed, if science were solely a method, then it would not be all that valuable, a point that is sometimes lost on empiricists enamored with the scientific method. Thus, it is crucial to keep in mind that the scientific method is not an end unto itself, but rather is a means to an end. The ultimate desired product of the method is a cumulative body of knowledge that offers an approximate description of how the world works. In concrete terms, this refers to the body of peer-reviewed journals, textbooks, and academic courses and domains of inquiry. Ideally, the body of knowledge will have a center that is consensually agreed upon (e.g., the Periodic Table in chemistry) and peripheral domains that represent the edges of scientific inquiry and where one will find much debate, innovation , and differences of the opinion.

A final element that is particularly relevant in this context is that the term science has much rhetorical value in our culture. If something falls under the heading “science” then it is justified in receiving respect in the knowledge that it offers. Indeed, it is the “justifiability” argument that is at play in many of the debates about whether psychology warrants the title. For example, Alex Bezerow’s op-ed piece on Why Psychology Isn’t a Science explicitly hits on this issue:

The dismissive attitude scientists have toward psychologists isn't rooted in snobbery; it's rooted in intellectual frustration. It's rooted in the failure of psychologists to acknowledge that they don't have the same claim on secular truth that the hard sciences do. It's rooted in the tired exasperation that scientists feel when non-scientists try to pretend they are scientists.

Thus for Bezerow, (real) scientists dismiss psychologists because they are rightfully defending their turf. In contrast, defenders of psychology as science have told haters to “shut up already” about psychology not being a science because, although messy, psychology clearly has the “chops” to warrant the term .

Defining Psychology as a Science

Let’s turn from defining science to defining psychology. In what follows, I will be referring to psychology as it is presented in the academy, such as in Psych 101 textbooks. I mention this because it is different than the psychology that many people have in mind when they hear the term, which is the professional they might go see to talk with about their personal problems (note, the profession and practice of psychology is a whole separate issue).

There can be little doubt that academic psychology values and aspires to be a science, views itself as a science and, in many ways, looks and acts like a science. For starters, virtually every definition of psychology from every major group of psychologists define the field as a science. In addition, academic psychologists have long adopted the scientific mindset when it comes to their subject matter and have long employed scientific methods. Indeed, the official birth of psychology (Wundt’s lab) was characterized by virtue of the fact that it employed the methods of science (i.e., systematic observation, measurement, hypothesis testing, etc.) to understanding human conscious experience. And to this day, training in academic psychology is largely defined by training in the scientific method, measurement and data gathering, research design, and advanced statistical techniques, such as structural equation modeling, meta-analyses, and hierarchical linear regression . Individuals get their PhD in academic psychology by conducting systematic research and, if they want a career in the academy, they need to publish in peer reviewed journals and often need to have a program of (fundable) research. To see how much the identity of a scientist is emphasized, consider that a major psychological organization (APS) profiles its members, ending with the catch phrase “and I am a psychological scientist !” Indeed, mainstream academic psychologists are so focused on empirical data collection and research methods that I have accused them of being “methodological fundamentalists,” meaning that they often act as if the only questions that are worthy of attention in the field are reducible to empirical methods.

In sum, academic psychology looks like a scientific discipline and it has a home in the academy largely as a science, and psychologists very much behave like scientists and employ the scientific method to answer their questions. So, at this level, it seems like a pretty closed case. If something looks like a science and acts like a science, then it likely should be considered a science. But we are not quite done with the debate because the question remains: If all these things are true, then what is the problem? Why are there still so many skeptics? And why has psychology had such a long period of critics both inside and outside the discipline claiming that there is a “crisis” at the core of our field?

How Psychology Fails as a Science

From where I sit, the reasons for the skepticism are very clear. And it is NOT found in the methods nor the mindsets of psychologists, both of which are “scientific.” Nor is the primary problem found in the fact that what psychologists study can be very difficult to measure, nor is it because people are too complicated, nor because humans make choices, nor because it involves consciousness. Nor is it because psychology is a young science (note that this is a myth—there are many ‘real’ sciences that are much younger than psychology). These are all red herrings to the “Is psychology a science?” debate.

The reason many are rightfully skeptical about its status is found in the body of scientific knowledge—psychology has failed to produce a cumulative body of knowledge that has a clear conceptual core that is consensually agreed upon by mainstream psychological experts. The great scholar of the field, Paul Meehl, captured this perfectly when he proclaimed that the sad fact that in psychology:

theories rise and decline, come and go, more as a function of baffled boredom than anything else; and the enterprise shows a disturbing absence of that cumulative character that is so impressive in disciplines like astronomy, molecular biology and genetics .

Another great scholar of the field, Kenneth Gergen, likened acquiring psychological knowledge to building castles in the sand; the information gained from our methods might be impressive, but it is temporary, contextual, and socially dependent, and will be washed away when new cultural tides come in. Even mainstream icons, like Daniel Gilbert, readily acknowledge the cumulative knowledge problem. In this clip, he comments that one of psychology's big problems is that new paradigms simply “throw the babies out with the bathwater” and he wonders whether psychology as we know it will even be around in 10 or 15 years.

In technical terms, I am claiming that the core problem with the field is that it is “pre-paradigmatic," which means that psychology completely lacks agreement from the experts about what it is and what it is about, what its foundational theories or even frameworks are, what its key findings are, and how it fits with the rest of the body of scientific knowledge. The fact that psychology has been around now for almost 150 years and remains pre-paradigmatic is undeniably a very serious threat to the field's status as a real science.

To understand what paradigmatic science looks like, study Isaac Newton. Newton created a paradigm for understanding matter in motion that stands as a pinnacle of real scientific achievement. He mapped the behavior of objects in motion onto a new mathematics (calculus). Of course, those who know science know that Newton’s ideas were overturned at the beginning of the 20th Century, and his single paradigm was replaced by two paradigms, quantum mechanics and general relativity. But physics remains paradigmatic in the sense that these two paradigms are pillars that mainstream physicists agree on as providing us knowledge about how the world actually works. Likewise, chemistry is paradigmatic in that it has the Periodic Table and the laws of molecular forces to describe how matter changes chemically. Biology has cell theory, natural selection, and genetics, which together give it a foundational paradigm to describe living matter. Moreover, these broad domains of inquiry create a broad consilient (i.e., coherent) network of explanation that gives us knowledge of energy, matter, and life that is clearly worthy of the term "scientific."

Now, let’s shift and focus on psychology. In deep contrast to the broad disciplines of physics, chemistry and biology, psychology has no consensually agreed upon definition. Its most common definition, ‘the science of mind and behavior’ carries with it a deep dualism that is fundamentally unresolved by the competing paradigms of behaviorism and cognitivism (among others). Likewise, the field of psychology is completely unclear as to whether it deals in animals in general, with some animals (e.g., social mammals) in particular, or with humans only. Pick up any textbook or skim any basic intro to the field and what you get is a summary of major, competing, incommensurate models/paradigms that spell out a mushy territory between biology and human society. In addition, the start of the field begins with a review of major approaches that all have merit, such as behaviorism, cognitivism, humanism, psychoanalysis , evolutionary and cultural approaches (not to mention purely physiological or nonwestern approaches), all of which are different and competing angles on the subject matter, however that is defined.

When this paradigmatic mess is then combined with other problems people point out, such as how complicated animals/humans are, the problems of consciousness, the problems of human science that blend objective and subjective, the problems of the role of science in culture (and on and on), the confusion becomes overwhelming.

But we are not quite done because the problems of consensual knowledge grow ever deeper when we consider how psychology is currently structured. The combination of: (a) psychology being separated from philosophy by its scientific methods; (b) the failure of the major historical paradigms to achieve consensual clarity; and (c) the fact that many psychologists anxiously try to defend against claim they are not a real science by doubling down on data collection has given rise to a massive empiricism within psychology. That is, mainstream psychologists are almost obsessed with data and data collection. With few exceptions, for a psychologist to make a name for herself, she needs a program of research, a method of data collection, a way of scientifically cutting through folk understanding via operationalization, measurement and data analysis to achieve evidence for one’s perspective.

Why is this a problem? Because the mainstream is confused about where exactly the deep scientific problem within the field lies. To understand where the problem is, it is helpful to reference the well-known DIKW knowledge hierarchy, which shows that data and information are the base levels, which are then organized into knowledge systems (and, hopefully, ultimately wisdom ).

What mainstream psychologists generally fail to realize is that the fundamental problem of psychology exists at the level of Knowledge and Wisdom, NOT at the levels of data and information. Unfortunately, the reward structures and existing justification systems are all about data gathering and information (i.e., the never-ending call for more research). Unfortunately, religiously following the scientific method per se does not yield knowledge. It only yields data and information. From the vantage point offered here, there is no shortage of data and information—we already have an abundance of data and information. And certainly, no study is going to resolve the problems. Instead, the problems exist and have existed for more than a century at the level of knowledge—we can't even define what our field is about. Thus, the reason psychology fails to be a science is because it fails as a coherent system of knowledge that maps the relevant portion of the world. To see this obvious fact, ask 10 different psychologists the portion of the world they are trying to map when they use the term psychology and you will get 10 different answers. If you can’t even define the territory, you can’t develop consensual knowledge about it.

The Bottom Line

Is psychology a science? Yes, in the sense that psychology was defined by the application of scientific method(s) and psychologists conduct valuable research and have developed some key insights into animal behavior , cognition , consciousness, and the human condition. But a key feature of real scientific knowledge is that there is a clear, consensual center that provides a foothold to describe how (portions of) the world actually work. And it is here that psychology falls down in ways that physics, chemistry and biology do not. And it is in that sense that psychology is not a real science.

Gregg Henriques, Ph.D. , is a professor of psychology at James Madison University.

• Find a Therapist
• Find a Treatment Center
• Find a Psychiatrist
• Find a Support Group
• Find Teletherapy
• United States
• Brooklyn, NY
• Chicago, IL
• Houston, TX
• Los Angeles, CA
• New York, NY
• Portland, OR
• San Diego, CA
• San Francisco, CA
• Seattle, WA
• Washington, DC
• Asperger's
• Bipolar Disorder
• Chronic Pain
• Eating Disorders
• Passive Aggression
• Personality
• Goal Setting
• Positive Psychology
• Stopping Smoking
• Low Sexual Desire
• Relationships
• Child Development
• Therapy Center NEW
• Diagnosis Dictionary
• Types of Therapy

Understanding what emotional intelligence looks like and the steps needed to improve it could light a path to a more emotionally adept world.

• Coronavirus Disease 2019
• Affective Forecasting
• Neuroscience

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

1.1 Psychology as a Science

Learning objectives.

• Explain why using our intuition about everyday behavior is insufficient for a complete understanding of the causes of behavior.
• Describe the difference between values and facts and explain how the scientific method is used to differentiate between the two.

Despite the differences in their interests, areas of study, and approaches, all psychologists have one thing in common: They rely on scientific methods. Research psychologists use scientific methods to create new knowledge about the causes of behavior, whereas psychologist-practitioners , such as clinical, counseling, industrial-organizational, and school psychologists, use existing research to enhance the everyday life of others. The science of psychology is important for both researchers and practitioners.

In a sense all humans are scientists. We all have an interest in asking and answering questions about our world. We want to know why things happen, when and if they are likely to happen again, and how to reproduce or change them. Such knowledge enables us to predict our own behavior and that of others. We may even collect data (i.e., any information collected through formal observation or measurement ) to aid us in this undertaking. It has been argued that people are “everyday scientists” who conduct research projects to answer questions about behavior (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). When we perform poorly on an important test, we try to understand what caused our failure to remember or understand the material and what might help us do better the next time. When our good friends Monisha and Charlie break up, despite the fact that they appeared to have a relationship made in heaven, we try to determine what happened. When we contemplate the rise of terrorist acts around the world, we try to investigate the causes of this problem by looking at the terrorists themselves, the situation around them, and others’ responses to them.

The Problem of Intuition

The results of these “everyday” research projects can teach us many principles of human behavior. We learn through experience that if we give someone bad news, he or she may blame us even though the news was not our fault. We learn that people may become depressed after they fail at an important task. We see that aggressive behavior occurs frequently in our society, and we develop theories to explain why this is so. These insights are part of everyday social life. In fact, much research in psychology involves the scientific study of everyday behavior (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967).

The problem, however, with the way people collect and interpret data in their everyday lives is that they are not always particularly thorough. Often, when one explanation for an event seems “right,” we adopt that explanation as the truth even when other explanations are possible and potentially more accurate. For example, eyewitnesses to violent crimes are often extremely confident in their identifications of the perpetrators of these crimes. But research finds that eyewitnesses are no less confident in their identifications when they are incorrect than when they are correct (Cutler & Wells, 2009; Wells & Hasel, 2008). People may also become convinced of the existence of extrasensory perception (ESP), or the predictive value of astrology, when there is no evidence for either (Gilovich, 1993). Furthermore, psychologists have also found that there are a variety of cognitive and motivational biases that frequently influence our perceptions and lead us to draw erroneous conclusions (Fiske & Taylor, 2007; Hsee & Hastie, 2006). In summary, accepting explanations for events without testing them thoroughly may lead us to think that we know the causes of things when we really do not.

Research Focus: Unconscious Preferences for the Letters of Our Own Name

A study reported in the Journal of Consumer Research (Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2005) demonstrates the extent to which people can be unaware of the causes of their own behavior. The research demonstrated that, at least under certain conditions (and although they do not know it), people frequently prefer brand names that contain the letters of their own name to brand names that do not contain the letters of their own name.

The research participants were recruited in pairs and were told that the research was a taste test of different types of tea. For each pair of participants, the experimenter created two teas and named them by adding the word stem “oki” to the first three letters of each participant’s first name. For example, for Jonathan and Elisabeth, the names of the teas would have been Jonoki and Elioki.

The participants were then shown 20 packets of tea that were supposedly being tested. Eighteen packets were labeled with made-up Japanese names (e.g., “Mataku” or “Somuta”), and two were labeled with the brand names constructed from the participants’ names. The experimenter explained that each participant would taste only two teas and would be allowed to choose one packet of these two to take home.

One of the two participants was asked to draw slips of paper to select the two brands that would be tasted at this session. However, the drawing was rigged so that the two brands containing the participants’ name stems were always chosen for tasting. Then, while the teas were being brewed, the participants completed a task designed to heighten their needs for self-esteem, and that was expected to increase their desire to choose a brand that had the letters of their own name. Specifically, the participants all wrote about an aspect of themselves that they would like to change.

After the teas were ready, the participants tasted them and then chose to take a packet of one of the teas home with them. After they made their choice, the participants were asked why they chose the tea they had chosen, and then the true purpose of the study was explained to them.

The results of this study found that participants chose the tea that included the first three letters of their own name significantly more frequently (64% of the time) than they chose the tea that included the first three letters of their partner’s name (only 36% of the time). Furthermore, the decisions were made unconsciously; the participants did not know why they chose the tea they chose. When they were asked, more than 90% of the participants thought that they had chosen on the basis of taste, whereas only 5% of them mentioned the real cause—that the brand name contained the letters of their name.

Once we learn about the outcome of a given event (e.g., when we read about the results of a research project), we frequently believe that we would have been able to predict the outcome ahead of time. For instance, if half of a class of students is told that research concerning attraction between people has demonstrated that “opposites attract” and the other half is told that research has demonstrated that “birds of a feather flock together,” most of the students will report believing that the outcome that they just read about is true, and that they would have predicted the outcome before they had read about it. Of course, both of these contradictory outcomes cannot be true. (In fact, psychological research finds that “birds of a feather flock together” is generally the case.) The problem is that just reading a description of research findings leads us to think of the many cases we know that support the findings, and thus makes them seem believable. The tendency to think that we could have predicted something that has already occurred that we probably would not have been able to predict is called the hindsight bias , or the tendency to think that we could have predicted something that has already occurred that we probably would not have been able to predict.

Why Psychologists Rely on Empirical Methods

All scientists, whether they are physicists, chemists, biologists, sociologists, or psychologists, use empirical methods to study the topics that interest them. Empirical methods include the processes of collecting and organizing data and drawing conclusions about those data. The empirical methods used by scientists have developed over many years and provide a basis for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data within a common framework in which information can be shared. We can label the scientific method as the set of assumptions, rules, and procedures that scientists use to conduct empirical research .

Psychologists use a variety of techniques to measure and understand human behavior.

Tim Sheerman-Chase – “Volunteer Duty” Psychology Testing – CC BY 2.0 CAFNR – CC BY-NC 2.0

Although scientific research is an important method of studying human behavior, not all questions can be answered using scientific approaches. Statements that cannot be objectively measured or objectively determined to be true or false are not within the domain of scientific inquiry. Scientists therefore draw a distinction between values and facts. Values are personal statements such as “Abortion should not be permitted in this country,” “I will go to heaven when I die,” or “It is important to study psychology.” Facts are objective statements determined to be accurate through empirical study. Examples are “There were more than 21,000 homicides in the United States in 2009,” or “Research demonstrates that individuals who are exposed to highly stressful situations over long periods of time develop more health problems than those who are not.”

Because values cannot be considered to be either true or false, science cannot prove or disprove them. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 1.1 “Examples of Values and Facts in Scientific Research” , research can sometimes provide facts that can help people develop their values. For instance, science may be able to objectively measure the impact of unwanted children on a society or the psychological trauma suffered by women who have abortions. The effect of capital punishment on the crime rate in the United States may also be determinable. This factual information can and should be made available to help people formulate their values about abortion and capital punishment, as well as to enable governments to articulate appropriate policies. Values also frequently come into play in determining what research is appropriate or important to conduct. For instance, the U.S. government has recently supported and provided funding for research on HIV, AIDS, and terrorism, while denying funding for research using human stem cells.

Although scientists use research to help establish facts, the distinction between values and facts is not always clear-cut. Sometimes statements that scientists consider to be factual later, on the basis of further research, turn out to be partially or even entirely incorrect. Although scientific procedures do not necessarily guarantee that the answers to questions will be objective and unbiased, science is still the best method for drawing objective conclusions about the world around us. When old facts are discarded, they are replaced with new facts based on newer and more correct data. Although science is not perfect, the requirements of empiricism and objectivity result in a much greater chance of producing an accurate understanding of human behavior than is available through other approaches.

Levels of Explanation in Psychology

The study of psychology spans many different topics at many different levels of explanation which are the perspectives that are used to understand behavior . Lower levels of explanation are more closely tied to biological influences, such as genes, neurons, neurotransmitters, and hormones, whereas the middle levels of explanation refer to the abilities and characteristics of individual people, and the highest levels of explanation relate to social groups, organizations, and cultures (Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000).

The same topic can be studied within psychology at different levels of explanation, as shown in Figure 1.3 “Levels of Explanation” . For instance, the psychological disorder known as depression affects millions of people worldwide and is known to be caused by biological, social, and cultural factors. Studying and helping alleviate depression can be accomplished at low levels of explanation by investigating how chemicals in the brain influence the experience of depression. This approach has allowed psychologists to develop and prescribe drugs, such as Prozac, which may decrease depression in many individuals (Williams, Simpson, Simpson, & Nahas, 2009). At the middle levels of explanation, psychological therapy is directed at helping individuals cope with negative life experiences that may cause depression. And at the highest level, psychologists study differences in the prevalence of depression between men and women and across cultures. The occurrence of psychological disorders, including depression, is substantially higher for women than for men, and it is also higher in Western cultures, such as in the United States, Canada, and Europe, than in Eastern cultures, such as in India, China, and Japan (Chen, Wang, Poland, & Lin, 2009; Seedat et al., 2009). These sex and cultural differences provide insight into the factors that cause depression. The study of depression in psychology helps remind us that no one level of explanation can explain everything. All levels of explanation, from biological to personal to cultural, are essential for a better understanding of human behavior.

Figure 1.3 Levels of Explanation

The Challenges of Studying Psychology

Understanding and attempting to alleviate the costs of psychological disorders such as depression is not easy, because psychological experiences are extremely complex. The questions psychologists pose are as difficult as those posed by doctors, biologists, chemists, physicists, and other scientists, if not more so (Wilson, 1998).

A major goal of psychology is to predict behavior by understanding its causes. Making predictions is difficult in part because people vary and respond differently in different situations. Individual differences are the variations among people on physical or psychological dimensions. For instance, although many people experience at least some symptoms of depression at some times in their lives, the experience varies dramatically among people. Some people experience major negative events, such as severe physical injuries or the loss of significant others, without experiencing much depression, whereas other people experience severe depression for no apparent reason. Other important individual differences that we will discuss in the chapters to come include differences in extraversion, intelligence, self-esteem, anxiety, aggression, and conformity.

Because of the many individual difference variables that influence behavior, we cannot always predict who will become aggressive or who will perform best in graduate school or on the job. The predictions made by psychologists (and most other scientists) are only probabilistic. We can say, for instance, that people who score higher on an intelligence test will, on average, do better than people who score lower on the same test, but we cannot make very accurate predictions about exactly how any one person will perform.

Another reason that it is difficult to predict behavior is that almost all behavior is multiply determined , or produced by many factors. And these factors occur at different levels of explanation. We have seen, for instance, that depression is caused by lower-level genetic factors, by medium-level personal factors, and by higher-level social and cultural factors. You should always be skeptical about people who attempt to explain important human behaviors, such as violence, child abuse, poverty, anxiety, or depression, in terms of a single cause.

Furthermore, these multiple causes are not independent of one another; they are associated such that when one cause is present other causes tend to be present as well. This overlap makes it difficult to pinpoint which cause or causes are operating. For instance, some people may be depressed because of biological imbalances in neurotransmitters in their brain. The resulting depression may lead them to act more negatively toward other people around them, which then leads those other people to respond more negatively to them, which then increases their depression. As a result, the biological determinants of depression become intertwined with the social responses of other people, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of each cause.

Another difficulty in studying psychology is that much human behavior is caused by factors that are outside our conscious awareness, making it impossible for us, as individuals, to really understand them. The role of unconscious processes was emphasized in the theorizing of the Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), who argued that many psychological disorders were caused by memories that we have repressed and thus remain outside our consciousness. Unconscious processes will be an important part of our study of psychology, and we will see that current research has supported many of Freud’s ideas about the importance of the unconscious in guiding behavior.

Key Takeaways

• Psychology is the scientific study of mind and behavior.
• Though it is easy to think that everyday situations have commonsense answers, scientific studies have found that people are not always as good at predicting outcomes as they think they are.
• The hindsight bias leads us to think that we could have predicted events that we actually could not have predicted.
• People are frequently unaware of the causes of their own behaviors.
• Psychologists use the scientific method to collect, analyze, and interpret evidence.
• Employing the scientific method allows the scientist to collect empirical data objectively, which adds to the accumulation of scientific knowledge.
• Psychological phenomena are complex, and making predictions about them is difficult because of individual differences and because they are multiply determined at different levels of explanation.

Exercises and Critical Thinking

• Can you think of a time when you used your intuition to analyze an outcome, only to be surprised later to find that your explanation was completely incorrect? Did this surprise help you understand how intuition may sometimes lead us astray?
• Describe the scientific method in a way that someone who knows nothing about science could understand it.
• Consider a behavior that you find to be important and think about its potential causes at different levels of explanation. How do you think psychologists would study this behavior?

Brendl, C. M., Chattopadhyay, A., Pelham, B. W., & Carvallo, M. (2005). Name letter branding: Valence transfers when product specific needs are active. Journal of Consumer Research, 32 (3), 405–415.

Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Sheridan, J. F., & McClintock, M. K. (2000). Multilevel integrative analyses of human behavior: Social neuroscience and the complementing nature of social and biological approaches. Psychological Bulletin, 126 (6), 829–843.

Chen, P.-Y., Wang, S.-C., Poland, R. E., & Lin, K.-M. (2009). Biological variations in depression and anxiety between East and West. CNS Neuroscience & Therapeutics, 15 (3), 283–294.

Cutler, B. L., & Wells, G. L. (2009). Expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. In J. L. Skeem, S. O. Lilienfeld, & K. S. Douglas (Eds.), Psychological science in the courtroom: Consensus and controversy (pp. 100–123). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2007). Social cognition: From brains to culture . New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Gilovich, T. (1993). How we know what isn’t so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life . New York, NY: Free Press.

Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations . Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Hsee, C. K., & Hastie, R. (2006). Decision and experience: Why don’t we choose what makes us happy? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10 (1), 31–37.

Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (Vol. 15, pp. 192–240). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment . Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Seedat, S., Scott, K. M., Angermeyer, M. C., Berglund, P., Bromet, E. J., Brugha, T. S.,…Kessler, R. C. (2009). Cross-national associations between gender and mental disorders in the World Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys. Archives of General Psychiatry, 66 (7), 785–795.

Wells, G. L., & Hasel, L. E. (2008). Eyewitness identification: Issues in common knowledge and generalization. In E. Borgida & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Beyond common sense: Psychological science in the courtroom (pp. 159–176). Malden, NJ: Blackwell.

Williams, N., Simpson, A. N., Simpson, K., & Nahas, Z. (2009). Relapse rates with long-term antidepressant drug therapy: A meta-analysis. Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and Experimental, 24 (5), 401–408.

Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The unity of knowledge . New York, NY: Vintage Books

Introduction to Psychology Copyright © 2015 by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Academic Degrees , Health Science News

How Is Psychology a Science: What You Should Know

There’s been a long debate about the question: “Is psychology a science?” By defining what psychology is and looking at the ways in which academics have defined science, we can come to see how psychology is classified as a science.

To get to this endpoint, let’s explore the details about psychology and science.

What is Psychology?

The term psychology can be broken down into its root words that are Greek. Psyche means “mind” or “soul.” Logos means “the study of.” Psychology is the study of mental processes and human behavior.

Psychology consists of the following scientific steps:

• Collecting facts
• Developing theories and hypotheses to explain the facts
• Testing the theories

What Makes Psychology a Science?

Regardless of how you view psychology, it’s either going to be placed into the social sciences or science category. To support psychology as a science, we turn to the idea of empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is able to be supported and verified by way of observation and experience, as opposed to simply relying on logic or theory.

Through empirical evidence, psychologists can understand human behavior because of observation. Since the mind cannot be directly observed, it is through actions that psychologists are able to better grasp what may be happening in the mind.

Going deeper, psychology leverages the following:

• Reasoning: Psychologists rely on scientific reasoning to interpret and design psychological research and interpret phenomena.
• Discipline: At the core of psychology sits the scientific method. Psychologists conduct studies and contribute to research based on verifiable evidence.
• Research: Like traditional science, psychologists make use of quantitative and qualitative research methods that are necessary for performing analysis and drawing conclusions.
• Application: To practice psychology in a practical setting, students must complete further education beyond a bachelor’s degree. In most instances, a psychologist will need to obtain a PhD. This advanced education will consist of research skills and robust knowledge and application of the scientific method.

Key Characteristics of a Science

To define any field as a science, it generally will cover these key elements:

Objectivity

When conducting any study, researchers must remain unbiased and objective. They cannot let their own emotions and feelings enter the process. Additionally, while it’s not always possible to fully remove bias, it is necessary to minimize it as much as possible. That’s a main tenet of science.

Empirical evidence

Evidence is collected through experiments and observations. Again, this negates the entry of belief. While data is being collected, the information is diligently recorded so that other researchers can review the validity and the process.

In order to deduce cause and effect (independent variables and dependent variables), variables must be controlled.

Hypothesis testing

To start off the process, an observation is made. Then, scientists, academics, and researchers create their hypothesis, which is a prediction that’s rooted in theory. These hypotheses should be clearly stated and then tested through unbiased experiments.

Predictability

Based on the findings of research, scientists should technically be able to forecast and predict the future.

Replication

When scientists develop experiments, they should be able to be replicated to test if the outcomes are the same given different variables. When the same results occur based on the same conditions, then that provides credibility and accuracy to the findings, which can give way to the creation of a scientific theory or discovery.

Social Science: A Definition

It’s clear to see how psychology maintains the elements of science. However, the argument exists because it also can fall into the category of a social science based on the definition.

A social science is any academic study or science that looks at human behavior in a social and cultural aspect. Such studies include: sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, and for some, psychology.

Psychology as a Social Science

When it comes to studying psychology in college, most institutions will classify psychology under social science. As a student, you’ll study social behaviors, human development, and emotions, which all include social science methods. However, depending on the speciality of psychology you can pursue, some align more closely with hard science and others with social science.

For example, neuropsychology and biological psychology are closer to physical sciences. Social psychology, as you probably guessed, is closely aligned to the social sciences.

What Do Psychologists Do?

The main goal of a psychologist is to understand humans’ emotions, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. In both the short term and long term, clinical psychologists work with patients to help them deal with and overcome their problems.

Psychologists have the opportunity to work in a variety of settings and study various sub disciplines. For example, a psychologist can work as a clinical psychologist, child psychologist, career counselor, professor, or neuropsychologist, to name a few.

Psychologists can be found working in private practice, rehabilitation facilities, schools, hospitals, clinics, corporations, sports teams, and other settings.

How to Become a Psychologist

To practice as a psychologist, you must complete the licensure process. Before becoming licensed, you’ll need to earn a degree.

Here are the basics steps you’ll need to follow to work in this rewarding field:

• Undergraduate Studies: Begin by earning your bachelor’s degree. You can do so in psychology or a related field like education, communication, or sociology, for example.
• Graduate Studies: To specialize, you’ll continue your formal education with a master’s, doctor of psychology (PsyD), PhD in Psychology, or education specialist (EdS) in Psychology.
• Intern: Based on your level of study, you’ll have to fulfill a specified number of hours working under a licensed psychologist and learning from them while completing projects.
• Licensure: To legally call yourself a psychologist and work as a psychologist, you’ll have to obtain licensure . The steps to do so will vary by state and location. However, the general idea is that you will have to pass national exams and work under supervision of a licensed psychologist. Some states also may require an oral examination or jurisprudence examination to understand the legal issues concerning psychology.

The Bottom Line

No matter how you look at it, the answer is yes to the question, “Is psychology a science?” While some people will argue that psychology is a social science, others will view it as a hard science.

Regardless of how you categorize the area of study and career, there are a variety of subspecialties and career paths to choose within the realm.

Related Articles

Is Psychology a True Science? Essay

There is reasonable doubt as to the classification of psychology as a science in the minds of the lay person. This is mostly as a result of the overly simplified and logical manner in which psychology and indeed psychologists are represented by popular media.

As such, psychology is seen to be more of a subjective human-oriented art as opposed to an objective and exact science. This paper shall set out to make a case for psychology as a science. The arguments made by people who do not accept the status of psychology as a science shall also be presented and their due merits evaluated.

Science is defined as knowledge which emanates from factual evidence. This being the case, there are certain features which are fundamental to all sciences and they make up the scientific methods. They include the collecting of quantitative data under controlled conditions, objectivity as opposed to subjectivity and an establishment of general laws and theories after experimentation. An interesting consideration is that this laws apply universally and as such, there is the element of repeatability.

Proponents of psychology as a science contend that psychology uses the stated scientific methods to study both human and non-human behaviors in various settings. Studies such as the genetic theory of IQ involve carefully controlled scientific experiments which are not only objective but are also high reliable and verifiable.

As with other scientific experiment findings, psychology results are produced and made open to the public domain for the interest of furthering science. The findings are also presented over for peer review to ensure their critical analysis. This is in line with the requirements set forth for scientific findings.

There exist theories in the psychology field which have been proven time and time again. This is a concept that is common to science whereby prediction of future events can be made by derivations obtained from experimentation.

An example is the behaviourist theory of operant conditioning which proposes that behavior is learned through reinforcement. Since this theory is objective and quantifiable one can from this theory make predictions about learning. The concept of generalization which is core to science is therefore exhibited in psychology as well.

On the other hand the seeming lack of objectivity in most psychological endevour is advanced as the most common argument advanced by opponents of psychology as a science. This claim is affirmed by the labeling theory of schizophrenia which proposes that schizophrenia is not caused so much by biological factors but rather, diagnosis of the disease is a result of subjective factors. This is because the social construct and reality will play a big role in the diagnosis process therefore presenting psychology as a hugely subjective art.

Science requires that there by measurable concepts meaning that the phenomena should not only be perceivable through our senses but also quantifiable as data. Psychology fails in this count since unobservable behaviour such as feelings play a pivotal role in psychology. This is contrary to the methods of science which dictate that all data must be quantifiable.

This paper set out to reinforce the notion that psychology is a science. In light of the arguments presented in this paper, it can be stated that to some extent, those who propose that psychology is not a science are right in that psychology can never be an exact science given the dynamic nature of the human subject which psychology sets out to examine.

However, most of the other attributes of psychology reinforce the claim that psychology is indeed a fully-fledged science deserving the same merits as physics or any of the other “accepted” sciences. This being the case, we can authoritatively state that psychology is indeed a true science.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2019, February 7). Is Psychology a True Science? https://ivypanda.com/essays/is-psychology-a-true-science/

"Is Psychology a True Science?" IvyPanda , 7 Feb. 2019, ivypanda.com/essays/is-psychology-a-true-science/.

IvyPanda . (2019) 'Is Psychology a True Science'. 7 February.

IvyPanda . 2019. "Is Psychology a True Science?" February 7, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/is-psychology-a-true-science/.

1. IvyPanda . "Is Psychology a True Science?" February 7, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/is-psychology-a-true-science/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Is Psychology a True Science?" February 7, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/is-psychology-a-true-science/.

• Experimentation on Animals
• Objectivity of Science
• Psychological Classification of Schizophrenia
• How Managers Can Positively Reinforce Desirable Behavior?
• Reinforce Training on a Horse
• Utilitarianism for Animals: Testing and Experimentation
• Ethics and Self-Experimentation Argument
• Mental Health: Analysis of Schizophrenia
• Schizophrenia in Young Men and Women
• Ethics Problems in Animal Experimentation
• Clinical Psychology, Its Methods and Approaches
• Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Developed in Repeated War Zones Deployment
• Towards Understanding Stress-Related Issues Affecting First Year Students on Their Transition Into University Culture
• Comparison of Normal and Abnormal Psychology
• Women in Psychology: Assessing the Contributions of Margaret Floy Washburn

Online Students

For All Online Programs

International Students

On Campus, need or have Visa

Campus Students

For All Campus Programs

Is Psychology a Science?

Although many people who studied psychology may work in jobs that perhaps do not, on the surface, seem “scientific,” the practice and education of psychology is guided by research findings that are firmly grounded in the scientific method. There are some disciplines within psychology  that are even more aligned with the natural sciences, such as neuropsychology, which is the study of the brain’s influence on behavior. Psychology is commonly recognized as a social science, and is included on the National Science Foundation’s roster of recognized STEM disciplines.

Psychology as a Science

Many psychology undergraduate programs are shaped by the goals laid out in the American Psychology Association’s "Guidelines for the Undergraduate Psychology Major", said Dr. Michelle Hill , senior associate dean of psychology programs  at Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU). Goal two of the American Psychology Association (APA) guidelines version 2.0 is “Scientific Inquiry and Critical Thinking,” which includes the following subgoals: Use scientific reasoning to interpret psychological phenomena, demonstrate psychology information literacy, and interpret, design, and conduct basic psychological research.

More widespread recognition of psychology as a science is one of the points of emphasis in the APA guidelines, Hill said.

A Scientific Discipline

Psychology’s status as a science is grounded in the use of the scientific method, said Dominello. Psychologists base their professional practice in knowledge that is obtained through verifiable evidence of human behavior and mental processes. Psychological studies are designed very much like studies in other scientific fields. It is through these studies that psychologists contribute to the body of research in their field.“Professionals in the field who ‘do psychology’ (e.g. research, teaching, psychotherapy) understand that psychology is a scientific discipline,” said Dr. Nickolas H. Dominello , lead faculty for SNHU’s undergraduate psychology program.

Learning to design these studies and interpret the findings is a significant part of psychology education. Undergraduate students learn to develop a research question and select a data collection method, and have the opportunity to design and refine a hypothetical research investigation, said Dominello.

Psychology is always growing and always building on itself, he said. “The subject of psychological science, behavior and mental processes is vast and complex,” said Dominello. “Therefore, establishing conclusive evidence is challenging. Psychological research is cyclical, and published research findings often spawn additional inquiries. Each 'brick' of knowledge contributes to the overall structure of knowledge for a particular phenomenon.”

So, if psychologists agree that psychology is a science, where does the confusion come from? What prompts some people to think of psychology as a soft science?

“I feel that in part, this misrepresentation of psychology stems from the diversity within the field (i.e. the various subfields) and the fact that psychological science findings often lead to more questions and avenues of future research. This contrasts with some of the more traditional sciences that only search for concrete, definitive answers,” said Dominello.

Research Methods in Psychology

Psychology also utilizes a wider array of qualitative methods than some traditional sciences.

“Although qualitative research provides a different route to understanding than traditional quantitative methods, I feel that is also ‘scientific,’ just grounded in different philosophical underpinnings," said Dominello.

Research methods can be categorized as either quantitative or qualitative . Quantitative research results in numerical data that can be analyzed. Qualitative research employs methods like questionnaires, interviews and observations. Qualitative research can be analyzed by grouping responses into broad themes. This melding of quantitative and qualitative methods is essential to understand the human factor inherent in psychology.

“Psychology as a science embraces this broader exploratory perspective in order to better understand human phenomena. When merged, qualitative data can breathe life into quantitative data,” Dominello said.

“Psychology is unique in that it adds breadth and depth of knowledge in conjunction with so many other disciplines, because we are all curious about understanding human behavior to some extent, whether it’s one’s own behavior or the behavior of others,” said Hill.

This rich combination of qualitative and quantitative skills makes psychology a good undergraduate degree that can prepare students for a wide array of careers. Individuals with a bachelor’s degree in psychology can pursue careers in social services, education, human resources and medical fields, using their education and skills as a foundation for understanding and working with others, Dominello said.

Where the Science of Psychology Can Be Applied

Hill said that a psychology undergraduate program’s focus on effective communication, information literacy and understanding human behavior can lend itself to many areas outside psychology, including sales, marketing and many others.

Those who wish to practice as psychologists  or work in academic research must pursue additional education beyond a bachelor’s degree, including a master's degree in psychology  and often a PhD. This advanced education in psychology often involves a strengthening of research skills, and an increased focus on the scientific method and the design of research studies, according to Dominello.

Is psychology a science? The short answer is yes, but the long answer is much more expansive and flexible. Psychology begins with the scientific method, and researchers employ many of the same methods as their colleagues in the natural and physical sciences, but psychology also calls for a deep understanding of human behavior that goes beyond science alone.

Pete Davies is a marketing and communications director in higher education. Follow him on Twitter @daviespete or connect on LinkedIn .

Explore more content like this article

What is Political Science All About?

SNHU Spotlight: Mellissa Honings, BA in Psychology Grad

SNHU Spotlight: Emily Bevens, MS in Forensic Psychology Grad

About southern new hampshire university.

SNHU is a nonprofit, accredited university with a mission to make high-quality education more accessible and affordable for everyone.

Founded in 1932, and online since 1995, we’ve helped countless students reach their goals with flexible, career-focused programs . Our 300-acre campus in Manchester, NH is home to over 3,000 students, and we serve over 135,000 students online. Visit our about SNHU  page to learn more about our mission, accreditations, leadership team, national recognitions and awards.

Psychology’s Status as a Science: Peculiarities and Intrinsic Challenges. Moving Beyond its Current Deadlock Towards Conceptual Integration

• Regular Article
• Open access
• Published: 17 June 2020
• Volume 55 , pages 212–224, ( 2021 )

Cite this article

You have full access to this open access article

• Jana Uher   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-2450-4943 1  

14k Accesses

13 Citations

65 Altmetric

Explore all metrics

Psychology holds an exceptional position among the sciences. Yet even after 140 years as an independent discipline, psychology is still struggling with its most basic foundations. Its key phenomena, mind and behaviour, are poorly defined (and their definition instead often delegated to neuroscience or philosophy) while specific terms and constructs proliferate. A unified theoretical framework has not been developed and its categorisation as a ‘soft science’ ascribes to psychology a lower level of scientificity. The article traces these problems to the peculiarities of psychology’s study phenomena, their interrelations with and centrality to everyday knowledge and language (which may explain the proliferation and unclarity of terms and concepts), as well as to their complex relations with other study phenomena. It shows that adequate explorations of such diverse kinds of phenomena and their interrelations with the most elusive of all—immediate experience—inherently require a plurality of epistemologies, paradigms, theories, methodologies and methods that complement those developed for the natural sciences. Their systematic integration within just one discipline, made necessary by these phenomena’s joint emergence in the single individual as the basic unit of analysis, makes psychology in fact the hardest science of all. But Galtonian nomothetic methodology has turned much of today’s psychology into a science of populations rather than individuals, showing that blind adherence to natural-science principles has not advanced but impeded the development of psychology as a science. Finally, the article introduces paradigmatic frameworks that can provide solid foundations for conceptual integration and new developments.

Similar content being viewed by others

Positive Psychology: An Introduction

Motivation: Introduction to the Theory, Concepts, and Research

Is Evolutionary Psychology a Scientific Revolution? A Bibliometric Analysis

Andrea Zagaria

Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.

Psychology’s Status as a Discipline

Psychology holds an exceptional position among the sciences—not least because it explores the very means by which any science is made, for it is humans who perceive, conceive, define, investigate, analyse and interpret the phenomena of the world. Scientists have managed to explore distant galaxies, quantum particles and the evolution of life over 4 billion years—phenomena inaccessible to the naked eye or long deceased. Yet, psychology is still struggling with its most basic foundations. The phenomena of our personal experience, directly accessible to everyone in each waking moment of life, remain challenging objects of research. Moreover, psychical phenomena are essential for all sciences (e.g., thinking). But why are we struggling to scientifically explore the means needed to first make any science? Given the successes in other fields, is this not a contradiction in itself?

This article outlines three key problems of psychology (poor definitions of study phenomena, lack of unified theoretical frameworks, and an allegedly lower level of scientificity) that are frequently discussed and at the centre of Zagaria, Andò and Zennaro’s ( 2020 ) review. These problems are then traced to peculiarities of psychology’s study phenomena and the conceptual and methodological challenges they entail. Finally, the article introduces paradigmatic frameworks that can provide solid foundations for conceptual integration and new developments.

Lack of Proper Terms and Definitions of Study Phenomena

Introductory text books are supposed to present the corner stones of a science’s established knowledge base. In psychology, however, textbooks present definitions of its key phenomena—mind (psyche) and behaviour—that are discordant, ambiguous, overlapping, circular and context-dependent, thus inconclusive (Zagaria et al. 2020 ). Tellingly, many popular text books define ‘mind’ exclusively as ‘brain activity’, thus turning psychology’s central object of research into one of neuroscience. What then is psychology as opposed to neuroscience? Some even regard the definition of mind as unimportant and leave it to philosophers, thus categorising it as a philosophical phenomenon and shifting it again out of psychology’s own realm. At the same time, mainstream psychologists often proudly distance themselves from philosophers (Alexandrova & Haybron, 2016 ), explicitly referring to the vital distinction between science and philosophy. Behaviour, as well, is commonly reduced to ill-defined ‘activities’, ‘actions’ and ‘doings’ and, confusingly, often even equated with mind (psyche), such as in concepts of ‘inner and outer behaviours’ (Uher 2016b ). All this leaves one wonder what psychology is actually about.

As if to compensate the unsatisfactory definitional and conceptual status of its key phenomena in general, psychology is plagued with a chaotic proliferation of terms and constructs for specific phenomena of mind and behaviour (Zagaria et al. 2020 ). This entails that different terms can denote the same concept (jangle-fallacies; Kelley 1927 ) and the same terms different concepts (jingle-fallacies; Thorndike 1903 ). Even more basically, many psychologists struggle to explain what their most frequent study phenomena—constructs—actually are (Slaney and Garcia 2015 ). These deficiencies and inconsistencies involve a deeply fragmented theoretical landscape.

Lack of Conceptual Integration Into Overarching Frameworks

Like no other science, psychology embraces an enormous diversity of established epistemologies, paradigms, theories, methodologies and methods. Is that a result of the discipline’s unparalleled complexity and the therefore necessary scientific pluralism (Fahrenberg 2013 ) or rather an outcome of mistaking this pluralism for the unrestrained proliferation of perspectives (Zagaria et al. 2020 )?

The lack of a unified theory in psychology is widely lamented. Many ‘integrative theories’ were proposed as overarching frameworks, yet without considering contradictory presuppositions underlying different theories. Such integrative systems merely provide important overviews of the essential plurality of research perspectives and methodologies needed in the field (Fahrenberg 2013 ; Uher 2015b ). Zagaria and colleagues ( 2020 ) suggested evolutionary psychology could provide the much-needed paradigmatic framework. This field, however, is among psychology’s youngest sub-disciplines and its most speculative ones because (unlike biological phenomena) psychical, behavioural and social phenomena leave no fossilised traces in themselves. Their possible ancestral forms can only be reconstructed indirectly from archaeological findings and investigations of today’s humans, making evolutionary explorations prone to speculations and biases (e.g., gender bias in interpretations of archaeological findings; Ginge 1996 ). Cross-species comparative psychology offers important correctives through empirical studies of today’s species with different cognitive, behavioural, social and ecological systems and different degrees of phylogenetic relatedness to humans. This enables comparisons and hypothesis testing not possible when studying only humans but still faces limitations given human ancestors’ unavailability for direct study (Uher 2020a ).

But most importantly, evolutionary psychology does not provide consistent terms and concepts either; its key constructs ‘psychological adaptations’ and ‘evolved psychological mechanisms’ are as vague, ambiguous and ill-defined as ‘mind’ and ‘behaviour’. Moreover, the strong research heuristic formulated in Tinbergen’s four questions on the causation, function, development and evolution of behaviour is not an achievement of evolutionary psychology but originates from theoretical biology, thus again from outside of psychology.

Psychology—a ‘Soft Science’ in Pre-scientific Stage?

The pronounced inconsistencies in psychology’s terminological, conceptual and theoretical landscape have been likened to the pre-scientific stage of emerging sciences (Zagaria et al. 2020 ). Psychology was therefore declared a ‘soft science’ that can never achieve the status of the ‘hard sciences’ (e.g., physics, chemistry). This categorisation implies the belief that some sciences have only minor capacities to accumulate secured knowledge and lower abilities to reach theoretical and methodological consensus (Fanelli and Glänzel 2013 ; Simonton 2015 ). In particular, soft sciences would have only limited abilities to apply ‘the scientific method’, the general set of principles involving systematic observation, experimentation and measurement as well as deduction and testing of hypotheses that guide scientific practice (Gauch 2015 ). The idea of the presumed lack of methodological rigor and exactitude of ‘soft sciences’ goes back to Kant ( 1798 / 2000 ) and is fuelled by recurrent crises of replication, generalisation, validity, and other criteria considered essential for all sciences.

But classifying sciences into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, implying some would be more scientific than others, is ill-conceived and misses the point why there are different sciences at all. Crucially, the possibilities for implementing particular research practices are not a matter of scientific discipline or their ascribed level of scientificity but solely depend on the particular study phenomena and their properties (Uher 2019 ). For study phenomena that are highly context-dependent and continuously changing in themselves, such as those of mind, behaviour and society, old knowledge cannot have continuing relevance as this is the case for (e.g., non-living) phenomena and properties that are comparably invariant in themselves. Instead, accurate and valid investigations require that concepts, theories and methods must be continuously adapted as well (Uher 2020b ).

The classification of sciences by the degree to which they can implement ‘the scientific method’ as developed for the natural sciences is a reflection of the method-centrism that has taken hold of psychology over the last century, when the craft of statistical analysis became psychologists’ dominant activity (Lamiell 2019 ; Valsiner 2012 ). The development of ever more sophisticated tools for statistical analysis as well as of rating scales enabling the efficient generation of allegedly quantitative data for millions of individuals misled psychologists to adapt their study phenomena and research questions to their methods, rather than vice versa (Omi 2012 ; Toomela and Valsiner 2010 ; Uher 2013 ). But methods are just a means to an end. Sciences must be phenomenon-centred and problem-centred, and they must develop epistemologies, theories, methodologies and methods that are suited to explore these phenomena and the research problems in their field.

Psychology’s Study Phenomena and Intrinsic Challenges

Psychology’s exceptional position among the sciences and its key problems can be traced to its study phenomena’s peculiarities and the conceptual and methodological challenges they entail.

Experience: Elementary to All Empirical Sciences

Experience is elementary to all empirical sciences, which are experience-based by definition (from Greek empeiria meaning experience). The founder of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, already highlighted that every concrete experience has always two aspects, the objective content given and individuals’ subjective apprehension of it—thus, the objects of experience in themselves and the subjects experiencing them. This entails two fundamental ways in which experience is treated in the sciences (Wundt 1896a ).

Natural sciences explore the objective contents mediated by experience that can be obtained by subtracting from the concrete experience the subjective aspects always contained in it. Hence, natural scientists consider the objects of experience in their properties as conceived independently of the subjects experiencing them, using the perspective of mediate experience (mittelbare Erfahrung; Wundt 1896a ). Therefore, natural scientists develop theories, approaches and technologies that help minimise the involvement of human perceptual and conceptual abilities in research processes and filter out their effects on research outcomes. This approach is facilitated by the peculiarities of natural-science study phenomena (of the non-living world, in particular), in which general laws, immutable relationships and natural constants can be identified that remain invariant across time and space and that can be measured and mathematically formalised (Uher 2020b ).

Psychologists, in turn, explore the experiencing subjects and their understanding and interpretation of their experiential contents and how this mediates their concrete experience of ‘reality’. This involves the perspective of immediate experience (unmittelbare Erfahrung), with immediate indicating absence of other phenomena mediating their perception (Wundt 1896a ). Immediate experience comprises connected processes, whereby every process has an objective content but is, at the same time, also a subjective process. Inner experience, Wundt highlighted, is not a special part of experience but rather constitutes the entirety of all immediate experience; thus, inner and outer experience do not constitute separate channels of information as often assumed (Uher 2016a ). That is, psychology deals with the entire experience in its immediate subjective reality. The inherent relation to the perceiving and experiencing subject— subject reference —is therefore a fundamental category in psychology. Subjects are feeling and thinking beings capable of intentional action who pursue purposes and values. This entails agency, volition, value orientation and teleology. As a consequence, Wundt highlighted, research on these phenomena can determine only law-like generalisations that allow for exceptions and singularities (Fahrenberg 2019 ). Given this, it is meaningless to use theories-to-laws ratios as indicators of scientificity (e.g., in Simonton 2015 ; Zagaria et al. 2020 ).

Constructs: Concepts in Science AND Everyday Psychology

The processual and transient nature of immediate experience (and many behaviours) imposes further challenges because, of processual entities, only a part exists at any moment (Whitehead 1929 ). Experiential phenomena can therefore be conceived only through generalisation and abstraction from their occurrences over time, leading to concepts, beliefs and knowledge about them , which are psychical phenomena in themselves as well but different from those they are about (reflected in the terms experien cing versus experien ce ; Erleben versus Erfahrung; Uher 2015b , 2016a ). Abstract concepts, because they are theoretically constructed, are called constructs (Kelly 1963 ). All humans implicitly develop constructs (through abduction, see below) to describe and explain regularities they observe in themselves and their world. They use constructs to anticipate the unknown future and to choose among alterative actions and responses (Kelly 1963 ; Valsiner 2012 ).

Constructs about experiencing, experience and behaviour form important parts of our everyday knowledge and language. This entails intricacies because psychologists cannot simply put this everyday psychology aside for doing their science, even more so as they are studying the phenomena that are at the centre of everyday knowledge and largely accessible only through (everyday) language. Therefore, psychologists cannot invent scientific terms and concepts that are completely unrelated to those of everyday psychology as natural scientists can do (Uher 2015b ). But this also entails that, to first delineate their study phenomena, psychologists need not elaborate scientific definitions because everyday psychology already provides some terms, implicit concepts and understanding—even if these are ambiguous, discordant, circular, overlapping, context-dependent and biased. This may explain the proliferation of terms and concepts and the lack of clear definitions of key phenomena in scientific psychology.

Constructs and language-based methods entail further challenges. The construal of constructs allowed scientists to turn abstract ideas into entities, thereby making them conceptually accessible to empirical study. But this entification misguides psychologists to overlook their constructed nature (Slaney and Garcia 2015 ) by ascribing to constructs an ontological status (e.g., ‘traits’ as psychophysical mechanisms; Uher 2013 ). Because explorations of many psychological study phenomena are intimately bound to language, psychologists must differentiate their study phenomena from the terms, concepts and methods used to explore them, as indicated by the terms psych ical versus psych ological (from Greek -λογία, -logia for body of knowledge)—differentiations not commonly made in the English-language publications dominating in contemporary psychology (Lewin 1936 ; Uher 2016a ).

Psychology’s Exceptional Position Among the Sciences and Philosophy

The concepts of mediate and immediate experience illuminate psychology’s special interrelations with the other sciences and philosophy. Wundt conceived the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften; e.g., physics, physiology) as auxiliary to psychology and psychology, in turn, as supplementary to the natural sciences “in the sense that only together they are able to exhaust the empirical knowledge accessible to us“ (Fahrenberg 2019 ; Wundt 1896b , p. 102). By exploring the universal forms of immediate experience and the regularities of their connections, psychology is also the foundation of the intellectual sciences (Geisteswissenschaften, commonly (mis)translated as humanities; e.g., philology, linguistics, law), which explore the actions and effects emerging from humans’ immediate experiences (Fahrenberg 2019 ). Psychology also provides foundations for the cultural and social sciences (Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften; e.g., sociology; anthropology), which explore the products and processes emerging from social and societal interactions among experiencing subjects who are thinking and intentional agents pursuing values, aims and purposes. Moreover, because psychology considers the subjective and the objective as the two fundamental conditions underlying theoretical reflection and practical action and seeks to determine their interrelations, Wundt regarded psychology also a preparatory empirical science for philosophy (especially epistemology and ethics; Fahrenberg 2019 ).

Psychology’s exceptional position at the intersection with diverse sciences and with philosophy is reflected in the extremely heterogeneous study phenomena explored in its diverse sub-disciplines, covering all areas of human life. Some examples are individuals’ sensations and perceptions of physical phenomena (e.g., psychophysics, environmental psychology, engineering psychology), biological and pathological phenomena associated with experience and behaviour (e.g., biopsychology, neuropsychology, clinical psychology), individuals’ experience and behaviour in relation to others and in society (e.g., social psychology, personality psychology, cultural psychology, psycholinguistics, economic psychology), as well as in different periods and domains of life (e.g., developmental psychology, educational psychology, occupational psychology). No other science explores such a diversity of study phenomena. Their exploration requires a plurality of epistemologies, methodologies and methods, which include experimental and technology-based investigations (e.g., neuro-imaging, electromyography, life-logging, video-analyses), interpretive and social-science investigations (e.g., of texts, narratives, multi-media) as well as investigations involving self-report and self-observation (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, guided introquestion).

All this shows that psychology cannot be a unitary science. Adequate explorations of so many different kinds of phenomena and their interrelations with the most elusive of all—immediate experience—inherently require a plurality of epistemologies, paradigms, theories, methodologies and methods that complement those developed for the natural sciences, which are needed as well. Their systematic integration within just one discipline, made necessary by these phenomena’s joint emergence in the single individual as the basic unit of analysis, makes psychology in fact the hardest science of all.

Idiographic and Nomothetic Strategies of Knowledge Generation

Immediate experience, given its subjective, processual, context-dependent, and thus ever-changing nature, is always unique and unprecedented. Exploring such particulars inherently requires idiographic strategies, in which local phenomena of single cases are modelled in their dynamic contexts to create generalised knowledge from them through abduction. In abduction, scientists infer from observations of surprising facts backwards to a possible theory that, if it were true, could explain the facts observed (Peirce 1901 ; CP 7.218). Abduction leads to the creation of new general knowledge, in which theory and data are circularly connected in an open-ended cycle, allowing to further generalise, extend and differentiate the new knowledge created. By generalising from what was once and at another time as well, idiographic approaches form the basis of nomothetic approaches, which are aimed at identifying generalities common to all particulars of a class and at deriving theories or laws to account for these generalities. This Wundtian approach to nomothetic research, because it is case-by-case based , allows to create generalised knowledge about psychical processes and functioning, thus building a bridge between the individual and theory development (Lamiell 2003 ; Robinson 2011 ; Salvatore and Valsiner 2010 ).

But beliefs in the superiority of natural-science principles misled many psychologists to interpret nomothetic strategies solely in terms of the Galtonian methodology, in which many cases are aggregated and statistically analysed on the sample-level . This limits research to group-level hypothesis testing and theory development to inductive generalisation, which are uninformative about single cases and cannot reveal what is, indeed, common to all (Lamiell 2003 ; Robinson 2011 ). This entails numerous fallacies, such as the widespread belief between-individual structures would be identical to and even reflect within-individual structures (Molenaar 2004 ; Uher 2015d ). Galtonian nomothetic methodology has turned much of today’s psychology into a science exploring populations rather than individuals. That is, blind adherence to natural-science principles has not advanced but, instead, substantially impeded the development of psychology as a science.

Moving Psychology Beyond its Current Conceptual Deadlock

Wundt’s opening of psychology’s first laboratory marked its official start as an independent science. Its dynamic developments over the last 140 years testify to psychology’s importance but also to the peculiarities of its study phenomena and the intricate challenges that these entail for scientific explorations. Yet, given its history, it seems unlikely that psychology can finally pull itself out of the swamps of conceptual vagueness and theoretical inconsistencies using just its own concepts and theories, in a feat similar to that of the legendary Baron Münchhausen. Psychology can, however, capitalise on its exceptional constellation of intersections with other sciences and philosophy that arises from its unique focus on the individual. Although challenging, this constitutes a rich source for perspective-taking and stimulation of new developments that can meaningfully complement and expand its own genuine achievements as shown in the paradigm outlined now.

The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm)

The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals ( TPS-Paradigm Footnote 1 ) is targeted toward making explicit and scrutinising the most basic assumptions that different disciplines make about research on individuals to help scientists critically reflect on; discuss and refine their theories and practices; and to derive ideas for new developments (therefore philosophy-of–science ). It comprises a system of interrelated philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological frameworks that coherently build upon each other (therefore paradigm ). In these frameworks, concepts from various lines of thought, both historical and more recent, and from different disciplines (e.g., psychology, life sciences, social sciences, physical sciences, metrology, philosophy of science) that are relevant for exploring research objects in (relation to) individuals were systematically integrated, refined and complemented by novel ones, thereby creating unitary frameworks that transcend disciplinary boundaries (therefore transdisciplinary ; Uher 2015a , b , 2018c ).

The Philosophical Framework: Presuppositions About Research on Individuals

The philosophical framework specifies three sets of presuppositions that are made in the TPS-Paradigm about the nature and properties of individuals and the phenomena studied in (relations to) them as well as about the notions by which knowledge about them can be gained.

All science is done by humans and therefore inextricably entwined with and limited by human’s perceptual and conceptual abilities. This entails risks for particular fallacies of the human mind (e.g., oversimplifying complexity, Royce 1891 ; reifying linguistic abstractions, Whitehead 1929 ). Scientists researching individuals face particular challenges because they are individuals themselves, thus inseparable from their research objects. This entails risks for anthropocentric, ethnocentric and egocentric biases influencing metatheories and methodologies (Uher 2015b ). Concepts from social, cultural and theoretical psychology, sociology, and other fields (e.g., Gergen 2001 ; Valsiner 1998 ; Weber 1949 ) were used to open up meta-perspectives on research processes and help scientists reflect on their own presuppositions, ideologies and language that may (unintentionally) influence their research.

Individuals are complex living organisms , which can be conceived as open (dissipative) and nested systems. On each hierarchical level, they function as organised wholes from which new properties emerge not predictable from their constituents and that can feed back to the constituents from which they emerge, causing complex patterns of upward and downward causation. With increasing levels of organisation, ever more complex systems emerge that are less rule-bound, highly adaptive and historically unique. Therefore, dissecting systems into elements cannot reveal the processes governing their functioning and development as a whole; assumptions on universal determinism and reductionism must be rejected. Relevant concepts from thermodynamics, physics of life, philosophy, theoretical biology, medicine, psychology, sociology and other fields (e.g., Capra 1997 ; Hartmann 1964 ; Koffka 1935 ; Morin 2008 ; Prigogine and Stengers 1997 ; Varela et al. 1974 ; von Bertalanffy 1937 ) about dialectics, complexity and nonlinear dynamic systems were used to elaborate their relevance for research on individuals.

The concept of complementarity is applied to highlight that, by using different methods, ostensibly incompatible information can be obtained about properties of the same object of research that are nevertheless all equally essential for an exhaustive account of it and that may therefore be regarded as complementary to one another. Applications of this concept, originating from physics (wave-particle dilemma in research on the nature of light; Bohr 1937 ; Heisenberg 1927 ), to the body-mind problem emphasise the necessity for a methodical dualism to account for observations of two categorically different realities that require different frames of reference, approaches and methods (Brody and Oppenheim 1969 ; Fahrenberg 1979 , 2013 ; Walach 2013 ). Complementarity was applied to specify the peculiarities of psychical phenomena and to derive methodological concepts (Uher, 2016a ). It was also applied to develop solutions for the nomothetic-idiographic controversy in ‘personality’ research (Uher 2015d ).

These presuppositions underlie the metatheoretical and the methodological framework.

Metatheoretical Framework

The metatheoretical framework formalises a phenomenon’s accessibility to human perception under everyday conditions using three metatheoretical properties: internality-externality, temporal extension, and spatiality conceived complementarily as physical (spatial) and “non-physical” (without spatial properties). The particular constellations of their forms in given phenomena were used to metatheoretically define and differentiate from one another various kinds of phenomena studied in (relation to) individuals: morphology, physiology, behaviour, psyche, semiotic representations (e.g., language), artificial outer-appearance modifications (e.g., clothing) and contexts (e.g., situations; Uher 2015b ).

These metatheoretical concepts allowed to integrate and further develop established concepts from various fields to elaborate the peculiarities of the phenomena of the psyche Footnote 2 and their functional connections with other phenomena (e.g., one-sided psyche-externality gap; Uher 2013 ), to trace their ontogenetic development and to explore the fundamental imperceptibility of others’ psychical phenomena and its role in the development of agency, language, instructed learning, culture, social institutions and societies in human evolution (Uher 2015a ). The metatheoretical definition of behaviour Footnote 3 enabled clear differentiations from psyche and physiology, and clarified when the content-level of language in itself constitutes behaviour, revealing how language extends humans’ behavioural possibilities far beyond all non-language behaviours (Uher 2016b ). The metatheoretical definition of ‘personality’ as individual-specificity in all kinds of phenomena studied in individuals (see above) highlighted the unique constellation of probabilistic, differential and temporal patterns that merge together in this concept, the challenges this entails and the central role of language in the formation of ‘personality’ concepts. This also enabled novel approaches for conceptual integrations of the heterogeneous landscape of paradigms and theories in ‘personality’ research (Uher 2015b , c , d , 2018b ). The semiotic representations concept emphasised the composite nature of language, comprising psychical and physical phenomena, thus both internal and external phenomena. Failure to consider the triadic relations among meaning, signifier and referent inherent to any sign system as well as their inseparability from the individuals using them was shown to underly various conceptual fallacies, especially regarding data generation and measurement (Uher 2018a , 2019 ).

Methodological Framework

The metatheoretical framework is systematically linked to the methodological framework featuring three main areas.

General concepts of phenomenon-methodology matching . The three metatheoretical properties were used to derive implications for research methodology, leading to new concepts that help to identify fallacies and mismatches (e.g., nunc-ipsum methods for transient phenomena, intro questive versus extro questive methods to remedy methodological problems in previous concepts of introspection; Uher 2016a , 2019 ).

Methodological concepts for comparing individuals within and across situations, groups and species were developed (Uher 2015e ). Approaches for taxonomising individual differences  in various kinds of phenomena in human populations and other species were systematised on the basis of their underlying rationales. Various novel approaches, especially behavioural ones, were developed to systematically test and complement the widely-used lexical models derived from everyday language (Uher 2015b , c , d , 2018b , c ).

Theories and practices of data generation and measurement from psychology, social sciences and metrology, the science of measurement and foundational to the physical sciences, were scrutinised and compared. These transdisciplinary analyses identified two basic methodological principles of measurement underlying metrological concepts that are also applicable to psychological and social-science research (data generation traceability, numerical traceability; Uher 2020b ). Further analyses explored the involvement of human abilities in data generation across the empirical sciences (Uher 2019 ) and raters’ interpretation and use of standardised assessment scales (Uher 2018a ).

Empirical demonstrations of these developments and analyses in various empirical studies involving humans of different sociolinguistic backgrounds as well as several nonhuman primate species (e.g., Uher 2015e , 2018a ; Uher et al. 2013a , b ; Uher and Visalberghi 2016 ) show the feasibility of this line of research. Grounded in established concepts from various disciplines, it offers many possibilities for fruitful cross-scientific collaborations waiting to be explored in order to advance the fascinating science of individuals.

http://researchonindividuals.org .

The psyche is defined as the “entirety of the phenomena of the immediate experiential reality both conscious and non-conscious of living organisms” (Uher 2015c , p. 431, derived from Wundt 1896a ).

Behaviours are defined as the “external changes or activities of living organisms that are functionally mediated by other external phenomena in the present moment” (Uher 2016b , p. 490).

Alexandrova, A., & Haybron, D. M. (2016). Is construct validation valid? Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 1098–1109. https://doi.org/10.1086/687941

Bohr, N. (1937). Causality and complementarity. Philosophy of Science, 4 (3), 289–298.

Article   Google Scholar  

Brody, N., & Oppenheim, P. (1969). Application of Bohr’s principle of complementarity to the mind-body problem. Journal of Philosophy, 66 (4), 97–113. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024529 .

Capra, F. (1997). The web of life: A new synthesis of mind and matter . New York: Anchor Books.

Google Scholar  

Fahrenberg, J. (1979). The complementarity principle in psychophysiological research and somatic medicine. Zeitschrift für Klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie, 27 (2), 151–167.

Fahrenberg, J. (2013). Zur Kategorienlehre der Psychologie: Komplementaritätsprinzip; Perspektiven und Perspektiven-Wechsel . Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers.

Fahrenberg, J. (2019). Wilhelm Wundt (1832 – 1920). Introduction, quotations, reception, commentaries, attempts at reconstruction . Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers.

Fanelli, D., & Glänzel, W. (2013). Bibliometric evidence for a hierarchy of the sciences. PLoS ONE, 8 (6), e66938. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066938 .

Article   PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Gauch, H. G. J. (2015). Scientific method in practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gergen, K. J. (2001). Psychological science in a postmodern context. American Psychologist, 56(10) , 803–813. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.10.803 .

Ginge, B. (1996). Identifying gender in the archaeological record: Revising our stereotypes. Etruscan Studies, 3, Article 4.

Hartmann, N. (1964). Der Aufbau der realen Welt. Grundriss der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre (3. Aufl.) . Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Book   Google Scholar  

Heisenberg, W. (1927). Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik. Zeitschrift für Physik, 43 (3–4), 172–198. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01397280 .

Kant, I. (1798/2000). Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (Reinhard Brandt, ed.). Felix Meiner.

Kelley, T. L. (1927). Interpretation of educational measurements . Yonkers: World.

Kelly, G. (1963). A theory of personality: The psychology of personal constructs . W.W. Norton.

Koffka, K. (1935). Principles of Gestalt psychology . New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World.

Lamiell, J. (2003). Beyond individual and group differences: Human individuality, scientific psychology, and William Stern’s critical personalism . Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452229317 .

Lamiell, J. (2019). Psychology’s misuse of statistics and persistent dismissal of its critics . Springer International. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12131-0 .

Lewin, K. (1936). Principles of topological psychology . New York: McGraw-Hill.

Molenaar, P. C. M. (2004). A manifesto on psychology as idiographic science: Bringing the person back into scientific psychology, this time forever. Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspective, 2 (4), 201–218. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15366359mea0204_1 .

Morin, E. (2008). On complexity . Cresskill: Hampton Press.

Omi, Y. (2012). Tension between the theoretical thinking and the empirical method: Is it an inevitable fate for psychology? Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 46 (1), 118–127. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-011-9185-4 .

Article   PubMed   Google Scholar  

Peirce, C. S. (1901/1935). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP 7.218—1901, On the logic of drawing history from ancient documents especially from testimonies) . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Prigogine, I., & Stengers, I. (1997). The end of certainty: Time, chaos, and the new laws of nature . Free Press.

Robinson, O. C. (2011). The idiographic/nomothetic dichotomy: Tracing historical origins of contemporary confusions. History & Philosophy of Psychology, 13 , 32–39.

Royce, J. (1891). The religious aspect of philosophy: A critique of the bases of conduct and of faith. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.

Salvatore, S., & Valsiner, J. (2010). Between the general and the unique. Theory & Psychology, 20 , 817–833. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354310381156 .

Simonton, D. K. (2015). Psychology as a science within Comte’s hypothesized hierarchy: Empirical investigations and conceptual implications. Review of General Psychology, 19 (3), 334–344. https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000039 .

Slaney, K. L., & Garcia, D. A. (2015). Constructing psychological objects: The rhetoric of constructs. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 35 (4), 244–259. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000025 .

Thorndike, E. L. (1903). Notes on child study (2nd ed.). New York: Macmillan.

Toomela, A., & Valsiner, J. (2010). Methodological thinking in psychology: 60 years gone astray? Information Age Publishing.

Uher, J. (2013). Personality psychology: Lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts reveal only half of the story-Why it is time for a paradigm shift. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 47 (1), 1–55. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-013-9230-6 .

Uher, J. (2015a). Agency enabled by the psyche: Explorations using the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals. In C. W. Gruber, M. G. Clark, S. H. Klempe, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), Constraints of agency: Explorations of theory in everyday life. Annals of Theoretical Psychology (Vol. 12) (pp. 177–228). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10130-9_13 .

Uher, J. (2015b). Conceiving “personality”: Psychologist’s challenges and basic fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49 (3), 398–458. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-014-9283-1 .

Uher, J. (2015c). Developing “personality” taxonomies: Metatheoretical and methodological rationales underlying selection approaches, methods of data generation and reduction principles. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49 (4), 531–589. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-014-9280-4 .

Uher, J. (2015d). Interpreting “personality” taxonomies: Why previous models cannot capture individual-specific experiencing, behaviour, functioning and development. Major taxonomic tasks still lay ahead. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49 (4), 600–655. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-014-9281-3 .

Uher, J. (2015e). Comparing individuals within and across situations, groups and species: Metatheoretical and methodological foundations demonstrated in primate behaviour. In D. Emmans & A. Laihinen (Eds.), Comparative Neuropsychology and Brain Imaging (Vol. 2), Series Neuropsychology: An Interdisciplinary Approach (pp. 223–284). https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.3848.8169

Uher, J. (2016a). Exploring the workings of the Psyche: Metatheoretical and methodological foundations. In J. Valsiner, G. Marsico, N. Chaudhary, T. Sato & V. Dazzani (Eds.), Psychology as the science of human being: The Yokohama Manifesto (pp. 299–324). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21094-0_18 .

Uher, J. (2016b). What is behaviour? And (when) is language behaviour? A metatheoretical definition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 46 (4), 475–501. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12104 .

Uher, J. (2018a). Quantitative data from rating scales: An epistemological and methodological enquiry. Frontiers in Psychology, 9 , 2599. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02599 .

Uher, J. (2018b). Taxonomic models of individual differences: A guide to transdisciplinary approaches. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 373 (1744), 20170171. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0171 .

Uher, J. (2018c). The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals: Foundations for the science of personality and individual differences. In V. Zeigler-Hill & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Personality and Individual Differences: Volume I: The science of personality and individual differences (pp. 84–109). https://doi.org/10.4135/9781526451163.n4 .

Uher, J. (2019). Data generation methods across the empirical sciences: differences in the study phenomena’s accessibility and the processes of data encoding. Quality & Quantity. International Journal of Methodology, 53 (1), 221–246. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-018-0744-3 .

Uher, J. (2020a). Human uniqueness explored from the uniquely human perspective: Epistemological and methodological challenges. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 50 , 20–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12232 .

Uher, J. (2020b). Measurement in metrology, psychology and social sciences: data generation traceability and numerical traceability as basic methodological principles applicable across sciences. Quality & Quantity. International Journal of Methodology, 54 , 975-1004. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-020-00970-2 .

Uher, J., Addessi, E., & Visalberghi, E. (2013). Contextualised behavioural measurements of personality differences obtained in behavioural tests and social observations in adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of Research in Personality, 47 (4), 427–444. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.01.013

Uher, J., & Visalberghi, E. (2016). Observations versus assessments of personality: A five-method multi-species study reveals numerous biases in ratings and methodological limitations of standardised assessments. Journal of Research in Personality, 61 , 61–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2016.02.003 .

Uher, J., Werner, C. S., & Gosselt, K. (2013). From observations of individual behaviour to social representations of personality: Developmental pathways, attribution biases, and limitations of questionnaire methods. Journal of Research in Personality, 47 (5), 647–667. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.03.006

Valsiner, J. (1998). The guided mind : A sociogenetic approach to personality. Harvard University Press.

Valsiner, J. (2012). A guided science: History of psychology in the mirror of its making . New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., & Uribe, R. (1974). Autopoiesis: The organization of living systems, its characterization and a model. BioSystems, 5 (4), 187–196. https://doi.org/10.1016/0303-2647(74)90031-8 .

von Bertalanffy, L. (1937). Das Gefüge des Lebens . Leipzig: Teubner.

Walach, H. (2013). Psychologie: Wissenschaftstheorie, Philosophische Grundlagen und Geschichte (3. Aufl.) . Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Weber, M. (1949). On the methodology of the social sciences (E. Shils & H. Finch, Eds.). New York: Free Press.

Whitehead, A. N. (1929). Process and reality . New York: Harper.

Wundt, W. (1896a). Grundriss der Psychologie . Stuttgart: Körner. Retrieved from https://archive.org/ .

Wundt, W. (1896b). Über die Definition der Psychologie. Philosophische Studien, 12 , 9–66.

Zagaria, A., Andò, A., & Zennaro, A. (2020). Psychology: A giant with feet of clay. Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-020-09524-5 .

Download references

This research was conducted without funding.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

School of Human Sciences, University of Greenwich, Old Royal Naval College, Park Row, London, SE10 9LS, UK

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Contributions

I declare I am the sole creator of this research.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jana Uher .

Ethics declarations

Conflicts of interest/competing interests.

I declare to have no conflicting or competing interests.

Additional information

Publisher's note.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ .

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Uher, J. Psychology’s Status as a Science: Peculiarities and Intrinsic Challenges. Moving Beyond its Current Deadlock Towards Conceptual Integration. Integr. psych. behav. 55 , 212–224 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-020-09545-0

Download citation

Published : 17 June 2020

Issue Date : March 2021

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-020-09545-0

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Terminology
• Soft Science
• Integrative framework
• Find a journal
• Publish with us
• Track your research

Home — Essay Samples — Psychology — Social Psychology — Why Psychology Is Considered A Science

A Discussion of Whether Psychology is a Science

• Categories: Social Psychology

About this sample

Words: 496 |

Published: Dec 16, 2021

Words: 496 | Page: 1 | 3 min read

Works Cited

• Bunge, M. (2009). Is psychology a unified science? Cognitive Systems Research, 10(2), 162-176.
• Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
• Fuchs, T., & Mahr, A. (2019). Psychology as science: The theoretical framework of psychology as a natural science. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy (pp. 38-53). Routledge.
• Gergen, K. J. (2015). The science of psychology as methodologically embodied skepticism. In The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives (pp. 225-242). Oxford University Press.
• Kuhn, T. S. (2012). The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
• Lambert, A. J. (2013). Toward a positive psychology of religion: Belief science in the postmodern era. Journal of Humanistic Psychology , 53(2), 195-215.
• Popper, K. R. (2002). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge.
• Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference. Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
• Thagard, P. (2012). The cognitive science of science: Explanation, discovery, and conceptual change. MIT Press.
• Wundt, W. (1897). Outlines of Psychology. Wilhelm Engelmann.

Cite this Essay

Let us write you an essay from scratch

• 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
• Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

Get high-quality help

Prof. Kifaru

Verified writer

• Expert in: Science Psychology

+ 120 experts online

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

Related Essays

1 pages / 662 words

2 pages / 1100 words

5 pages / 2203 words

1 pages / 671 words

Remember! This is just a sample.

You can get your custom paper by one of our expert writers.

121 writers online

Still can’t find what you need?

Browse our vast selection of original essay samples, each expertly formatted and styled

Related Essays on Social Psychology

Social dilemmas happen when the members of a group, culture, or society are in possible conflict over the establishment and use of shared “public goods”. Public goods are benefits that are shared by a community and that everyone [...]

Higher education has become an essential part of society in the modern world. As the job market becomes increasingly competitive, the value of a college education has never been greater. While some may argue that college is not [...]

Florida, the Sunshine State, is a popular destination for travelers seeking warm weather, beautiful beaches, and a variety of attractions. I recently had the opportunity to visit Florida for a week-long vacation, and the [...]

The Role Of Humor In Society Humor is an essential aspect of human life, and its role in society is significant. From ancient times to the present day, humor has been used as a powerful tool for communication, social [...]

The four main models to explain psychological abnormality are the biological, behavioral, cognitive, and psychodynamic models. We will also be discussing the humanistic-existential and the sociocultural model. They all attempt [...]

What is psychology, what is science, is psychology considered science or art? We can easily answer the first two questions but to decide whether psychology is science or art has been a never-ending debate. Psychology has earned [...]

Related Topics

By clicking “Send”, you agree to our Terms of service and Privacy statement . We will occasionally send you account related emails.

Where do you want us to send this sample?

By clicking “Continue”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy.

Be careful. This essay is not unique

This essay was donated by a student and is likely to have been used and submitted before

Download this Sample

Free samples may contain mistakes and not unique parts

Sorry, we could not paraphrase this essay. Our professional writers can rewrite it and get you a unique paper.

Please check your inbox.

We can write you a custom essay that will follow your exact instructions and meet the deadlines. Let's fix your grades together!

Get Your Personalized Essay in 3 Hours or Less!

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

• Instructions Followed To The Letter
• Deadlines Met At Every Stage
• Unique And Plagiarism Free

Psychology Discussion

Is psychology a science | psychology.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

The question has often been raised in the past and is perhaps raised even today as to whether psychology is a science. People who raise these questions compare psychology with physics, chemistry and other sciences and start wondering how we can study the behaviour of human beings in the same way as properties of matter or investigation of chemical changes.

To a certain extent such a question is justified because of the very nature of the subject-matter of psychology, that is, behaviour. The physicist or chemist investigates processes and events which remain Stable and constant to a large extent. This makes it possible to measure and predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy. But this is not the case with human behaviour.

Firstly, human behaviour appears to be much more unpredictable than the reactions of physical and chemical substances.

Secondly, it is found that human behaviour shows a lot of variation from individual to individual.

Given the same circumstances, people differ widely from each other and the same person behaves in different ways at different times though the circumstances appear to be the same. This type of situation appears bewildering and makes one wonder how even measurement, let alone prediction, is ever possible.

Let us look into this and examine why behaviour is so variable. The answer is that human behaviour is just much more complex than the reactions of physical substances. Man is much more sensitive. It is this which makes behaviour more complex. So, the difference between human behaviour and other events or occurrences is only in the degree of complexity and there is no other basic difference. This means that we should employ different types of methods and analysis.

At this point we may even examine the concept of science itself. The concept of science is not a fixed and static concept. For example, until recently mathematics was treated as a discipline falling under the category of liberal arts even though physics and chemistry made extensive use of mathematics.

Similarly, for a long time, laboratory experimentation was regarded as the only legitimate method in science. But with the expansion of fields like geology, astronomy, geography and other disciplines, methods like field survey, observation, data collection etc., came to be accepted.

All this shows that the term science is today not used in the same way as during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Today, it means, not a body of knowledge but an approach to understand and study events. In simple terms, any investigation or enquiry which is systematic, careful and methodical is scientific. Thus, economics, history, political science etc., are today regarded as sciences. They are known as social sciences.

Similarly we may talk of behavioural sciences which include psychology, sociology and anthropology. The scientist today does not look for a simple and isolated cause-and-effect relationship. He is interested in a comprehensive understanding of things and events in nature. He does not look for simple and mechanical explanations.

Twentieth century physics is totally different from the physics of the nineteenth century. This shows that what is considered science today is different from the traditional concept of science. In the light of this, the reader will appreciate that psychology is a science though very much different from the other sciences.

Its methods are scientific though different from those of other sciences. As a science it deals with phenomena much more complex, and, therefore, not very predictable. This only means that the challenges before the psychologist are more difficult but certainly not insurmountable. It is a science with a difference.

Yet another factor which makes psychology a different type of science is that whereas other sciences investigate things around man, psychology studies man himself. Of course, biological sciences do study man but psychology does it with a difference. It is interested in behaviour, which is more subtle, less obvious and, of course, more varied, whereas the bodily processes are to a large extent uniform. This is not the case with human actions and their motivations.

Related Articles:

• Psychology and Other Disciplines: Relationship
• What is Psychology ? | Meaning | Psychology
• History and Origin of Science of Psychology
• Relation between Psychology and Behavioural Science

Psychology , Psychology as a Science , Science