reflective essay on terrorism

Terrorism Essay for Students and Teacher

500+ words essay on terrorism essay.

Terrorism is an act, which aims to create fear among ordinary people by illegal means. It is a threat to humanity. It includes person or group spreading violence, riots, burglaries, rapes, kidnappings, fighting, bombings, etc. Terrorism is an act of cowardice. Also, terrorism has nothing to do with religion. A terrorist is only a terrorist, not a Hindu or a Muslim.

Types of Terrorism

Terrorism is of two kinds, one is political terrorism which creates panic on a large scale and another one is criminal terrorism which deals in kidnapping to take ransom money. Political terrorism is much more crucial than criminal terrorism because it is done by well-trained persons. It thus becomes difficult for law enforcing agencies to arrest them in time.

Terrorism spread at the national level as well as at international level.  Regional terrorism is the most violent among all. Because the terrorists think that dying as a terrorist is sacred and holy, and thus they are willing to do anything. All these terrorist groups are made with different purposes.

Causes of Terrorism

There are some main causes of terrorism development  or production of large quantities of machine guns, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, nuclear weapons, missiles, etc. rapid population growth,  Politics, Social, Economic  problems, dissatisfaction of people with the country’s system, lack of education, corruption, racism, economic inequality, linguistic differences, all these are the major  elements of terrorism, and terrorism flourishes after them. People use terrorism as a weapon to prove and justify their point of view.  The riots among Hindus and Muslims are the most famous but there is a difference between caste and terrorism.

The Effects Of Terrorism

Terrorism spreads fear in people, people living in the country feel insecure because of terrorism. Due to terrorist attacks, millions of goods are destroyed, the lives of thousands of innocent people are lost, animals are also killed. Disbelief in humanity raises after seeing a terrorist activity, this gives birth to another terrorist. There exist different types of terrorism in different parts of the country and abroad.

Today, terrorism is not only the problem of India, but in our neighboring country also, and governments across the world are making a lot of effort to deal with it. Attack on world trade center on September 11, 2001, is considered the largest terrorist attack in the world. Osama bin Laden attacked the tallest building in the world’s most powerful country, causing millions of casualties and death of thousands of people.

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Terrorist Attacks in India

India has suffered several terrorist attacks which created fear among the public and caused huge destruction. Here are some of the major terrorist attacks that hit India in the last few years: 1991 – Punjab Killings, 1993 – Bombay Bomb Blasts, RSS Bombing in Chennai, 2000 – Church Bombing, Red Fort Terrorist Attack,2001- Indian Parliament Attack, 2002 – Mumbai Bus Bombing, Attack on Akshardham Temple, 2003 – Mumbai Bombing, 2004 – Dhemaji School Bombing in Assam,2005 – Delhi Bombings, Indian Institute of Science Shooting, 2006 – Varanasi Bombings, Mumbai Train Bombings, Malegaon Bombings, 2007 – Samjhauta Express Bombings, Mecca Masjid Bombing, Hyderabad Bombing, Ajmer Dargah Bombing, 2008 – Jaipur Bombings, Bangalore Serial Blasts, Ahmedabad Bombings, Delhi Bombings, Mumbai Attacks, 2010 – Pune Bombing, Varanasi Bombing.

The recent ones include 2011 – Mumbai Bombing, Delhi Bombing, 2012 – Pune Bombing, 2013 – Hyderabad Blasts, Srinagar Attack, Bodh Gaya Bombings, Patna Bombings, 2014 – Chhattisgarh Attack, Jharkhand Blast, Chennai Train Bombing, Assam Violence, Church Street Bomb Blast, Bangalore, 2015 –  Jammu Attack, Gurdaspur Attack, Pathankot Attack, 2016 – Uri Attack, Baramulla Attack, 2017 – Bhopal Ujjain Passenger Train Bombing, Amarnath Yatra Attack, 2018 Sukma Attack, 2019- Pulwama attack.

Agencies fighting Terrorism in India

Many police, intelligence and military organizations in India have formed special agencies to fight terrorism in the country. Major agencies which fight against terrorism in India are Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), National Investigation Agency (NIA).

Terrorism has become a global threat which needs to be controlled from the initial level. Terrorism cannot be controlled by the law enforcing agencies alone. The people in the world will also have to unite in order to face this growing threat of terrorism.

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To arrive at the edge of the world's knowledge, seek out the most complex and sophisticated minds, put them in a room together, and have them ask each other the questions they are asking themselves.

REFLECTIONS ON MODERN TERRORISM

GERALD HOLTON is Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics and Professor of the History of Science, Emeritus, at Harvard University. He obtained his Ph.D. at Harvard as a student of P. W. Bridgman. His chief interests are in the history and philosophy of science, in the physics of matter at high pressure, and in the study of career paths of young scientists.

Among his recent books are Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought ; Science and Anti-Science; Einstein, History, and Other Passions; The Advancement of Science, and its Burdens; Scientific Imagination; two books with Gerhard Sonnert: Gender Differences in Science Careers: The Project Access Study, and Who Succeeds in Science? The Gender Dimension;  Physics, The Human Adventure: From Copernicus to Einstein and Beyond (with S.G.Brush).

Professor Holton is a Fellow of the American Physical Society, the American Philosophical Society, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Life Honorary Fellow of the New York Academy of Sciences, and Fellow of several Learned Societies in Europe. Founding editor of the quarterly journal Daedalus,and founder of Science, Society, & Human Values, he is also on the editorial committee of the Collected Papers of Albert Einstein (Princeton University Press). Among the honors he has received are the Sarton Medal of the History of Science Society, and the selection by the National Endowment for the Humanities as the Jefferson Lecturer.

There has been an historic transition in which Type I terrorism and Type II terrorism are being combined.  Type I terrorism consists of acts by individuals or small groups that aim to impose terror on other individuals and groups, and through them indirectly on their governments.  Type II terrorism is the imposition by a government on groups of local or foreign populations. The new type of terrorism — Type III — is carried out by a substantially larger group of individuals, is aimed directly at a national population, and has all the components for success.  The article deals with how this new terrorism, at very little psychic cost on the perpetrators, disrupts personal and historic memory through large-scale catastrophe organized for that purpose. Type III terrorism is made easier by the ready availability of high-level technology.  Target nations will not have open to them the conventional responses, and will have to devise new, preventive measures.

Most 20th-century discussions on terrorism seem to me to have missed the point that, short of an unlikely act of international will, we have passed irreversibly through an historic transition.

Terrorism is a method of coercion of a population or its leadership or both, through fear or traumatization.  What usually has caught our attention was an act that attempts to impose terror, by individuals or small groups, on other individuals or groups, and through them indirectly on their governments.  I will call this Type I terrorism.  The record shows that such acts, from the bombing of buildings to skyjacking, in virtually every case have had three characteristics.  They have been carried out with conventional, i.e., paleotechnic means.  They become part of a long and numbing series of such acts (one study reported 2400 attacks by foreign terrorists on the U.S. between 1983 and 1998).  But above all, while they usually gain their fundamental aims of attracting worldwide attention for a time, of perhaps scoring a victory over a rival gang, and of satisfying a lust for blood by assassinating innocent people at relatively low risk, they have in most cases been failures— failures with respect to the long-range objective of coercing fundamental government policies.  One recalls here the dismissive remark in a letter of September 1870 from F. Engels to K. Marx: "Terror is for the most part useless cruelties committed by frightened people to reassure themselves." The situation is completely asymmetrical when we turn to Type II terrorism, namely the imposition of terror by governmentson individuals or on groups of local or foreign populations.  Although less frequent than Type I, such acts have claimed in the 20th century a far larger number of victims.  Above all, they have largely succeeded in their avowed aim, from Mussolini's bombing of the Abyssinians and the killing of all men in the town of Lidice in reprisal for the killing of one man, down to the "Christmas bombing" of Hanoi in 1972.  (There are only a few cases of failure, e.g., the German Blitzraids on England, and the coercive acts of French military groups and colonsin Algeria.)

It is my judgment that the asymmetries are now being dissolved.  There will be a progressive fusion of Types I and II terrorism that began with the process of governments co-opting and arming terrorist groups for transnational purposes; the legitimization of terrorism as part of so-called "national liberation" actions; and, most ominously, the training, arming, and financing by various countries of networks of international terrorists.  The last of these enables the two previously distinct types of terrorist agencies — states with potentially biblical scales of terror, and relatively independent small groups with limited powers of devastation--to collaborate, merge, or act, in secret or in more or less open collusion, in the new, Type III terrorism.

To understand the potential of this form, one must not stop with a prognosis of likely technicalmeans.  The new technological capabilities in the present context — e.g., nuclear and other spectacularly destructive physical means, or biological and chemical (binary) weapons — form only one part of the context.  Neotechnic means can vastly increase the scale of damage, and through television can almost instantly and repeatedly spread the news and imagery of the act; but by themselves they need not coerce a determined people.  One should be equally concerned with the other components that are essential to the successful act of terror.  For whether it is carried out by individuals, a group, a state, or a coalition of these, terror succeeds or fails on a "stage" that has four components, each of which is subject, in our time, to the enlargements of opportunity or scope:

1. The technological capabilities available to the terrorizing group. 2. The current model of normal or "regular" life as perceived by the targeted group. 3. The historic memory (including folklore and other social myths) of the affected group. 4.The international-political situation in which the terrorizers and their victims find themselves.

_____ Revision, at certain points, of a paper with the same title, presented at the Conference on Terrorism, held at Stanford, California, 1976, and published in TERRORISM: An International Journal, vol. 1, nos. 3/4, 1978 (pp. 265-276).

Copyright © 2002, Gerald Holton

To see this point clearly, one must realize that the methods of terror of Type II, from the earliest historic period to our own, involved not merely inflicting horrid casualties, but succeeded when they produced a drastic modification of the traditional perception of society and nature within which human life had previously been thinkable.  It is through this modification that the victim is disoriented, robbed of integrity, and made manipulable.  That is the chief lesson of one of the primal examples of traumatization, namely, chapter 11 of Exodus: Not until the tenth plague, one that disrupted the whole familial and social fabric of Ancient Egypt, was the level of terror high enough to coerce the pharaoh's decision.  Another example is that of the Mayas, otherwise successful and valiant warriors, who are said to have been put to flight by the very appearance of Spaniards on horseback, who were thus representing a psychologically intolerable fusion of incommensurables. The modern terrorist may well try to determine consciously where the most effective place is in the personal and historic memory of his or her intended victims, in order to insert the crowbar there.  Conversely, a group and its leadership that fears victimization by terrorists might examine both the weak spots in its society that could at least partially be protected, and also what may be the hate-producing elements in the potential attackers' worldview and grievances that might be ameliorated.

Precisely because this subject is so rarely considered in such discussion, a digression will be useful to elaborate on, and to distinguish between, personal and historic memory.  The former, at least on the surface, is characterized by the remnants of specific and individual joys and traumata.  On a deeper level, to which long, thin roots penetrate from the surface, there are the universalized aspects that form the subject of the search for lawfulness in modern psychological studies.

Historic memory, partly of factual and partly of mythic events, can be regarded as a subset located within deep personal memory.  A good part of its contents are the possibilities of moving, ominous, foreboding, uncanny, magical happenings that are expressed in creation myths and apocalyptic myths, and in the stories that transform common personal events such as birth, danger, escape, and death — the realm of storytellers about the events in ancient kingdoms, exploits of armies and leaders, or great natural catastrophes (such as the eighteenth-century earthquake that devastated Lisbon and so helped change the Western optimism of the century).  While these stories and myths may seem ethnocentric in a specific population, there are important invariants here too.  Thus, the Motive-Index of Folk Literatureby Stith Thompson contains a classification of narrative elements through an enormous range of cultures and time periods; but it is significant that the antithetical couple, "world calamities" and "establishment of natural order," is among the very first "mythological motives" listed.

The potential of using this psychological ground as part of a stage for political action has been known for some time.  Thus, in Réflexions sur la violence(1908), a manual long influential in terrorist movements, Georges Sorel counseled the revolutionaries of his time to take advantage of these "social myths," as he termed them.  He noted that

"...the framing of a future...may be very effective....This happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths, which enclose with them all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party, or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life; and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, man can reform the desires, passions, and mental activity."

He argued that it made no sense to discuss how far such a myth can be taken literally in detail as future history:  "It is the myth in its entirety which is alone important: its parts are only of interest insofar as they bring out the main idea."  He proceeded to show that this conception can be used both in its positive and its negative sense.  That is, not only can a social myth stabilize a social order, but its destruction and replacement by another myth can be, and indeed has to be, the condition for the radical transformation of a society.  This, in his view, was the function of "Proletarian violence" and "plainest brutality."  The aim of this violence is the institution of a counter-myth, in the specific case of interest to him, the myth of "the General Strike...the myth in which Socialism is wholly comprised."  His whole essay, far from a call to violence for its own sake, had the grandiose aim to "confront man with a catastrophe" that would signify "absolute revolution."  While one might well doubt the details of Sorel's conceptions, the method of transformation through a large-scale catastrophe organized for the purposeis in our technologically more advanced era an even more powerful conception than it was in Sorel's time.

Another famous manual for using widespread terror in the service of an ideology is of course Leon Trotzky's book Terrorism and Communism(University of Michigan Press, 1961), written within two years of the Bolsheviks' victory in the Russian Revolution.  Thus, in his chapter titled simply "Terrorism," he writes with confidence passages such as these:  "The problem of revolution, as of war, consists in breaking the will of the foe, forcing him to capitulate and to accept the conditions of the conqueror" (p.56)...."Are we expected to consider them [the measures] 'intolerable'?" (p.57)...."As for us, we were never concerned with the Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle about the 'sacredness of human life.'" (p.63)

1 Conversely, the Mayas, being well advanced in the study of solar astronomy, are said to have been much less vulnerable than earlier European peoples to the appearance of solar eclipses.

2 Thompson, Stith, Motive-Index of Folk Literature  (Bloomingdale, IN: Indiana University Press, 1932-36).

3 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence,trans. T. E. Hulme and J. Roth, with an introduction by Edward A. Shils (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1950).

Twentieth-Century Cases

The key role of historic memory in the success of Type II terror acts becomes immediately clear when we consider the particular part of modern historic memory that refers to actual traumatic happenings which disrupted the familiar environment of human life.  The chief example that comes to mind is of course the release over Hiroshima and Nagasaki of artificial, man-made suns that rained down heat, gamma rays, and radioactive fallout — an injection of a new, essentially cosmological object into the ecology of human experience.  Secretary of War  Stimson accurately observed to the members of his scientific panel advising on the use of the bomb on 31 May 1945, prior to its first test over Alamogordo, that they should consider the atomic bomb not "as a new weapon merely but as creating a revolutionary change in the relation of man to the universe."  More than even most of the scientists present, Stimson seems to have realized early that the weapon was outside the normal frame of causality, not only of the intended victims but also of the victors.

The use of the atomic bomb is a classic case of successful traumatization by Type II terrorism.  But the historic memory contains other examples that share some of the same parameters, even if not the same scale or duration of effect.  Thus in some quarters, the impact of the injection in October 1957 of a new artificial moon, Sputnik, was near-hysteria, the more so as the object had been made in a country thought to be threatening, and (as far as the public was concerned) was made in secret.  A more relevant case was that of the replacement of natural air by a deadly gas produced by the Germans in World War I.  The Allies were initially terrified, but they soon absorbed the weapon into their own war plans.  Thus, as noted by Gilbert F. Wittemore, Jr., by March of 1918 the United States research group had developed a simple and efficient process for the production of the large supplies of mustard gas that had been ordered by the United States military in September 1917.  "By the time of the armistice, the Edgewood plant was producing 30 tons of mustard gas a day.  Chemists later pointed with pride to this accomplishment, noting that it was not their fault that these vast quantities of gas had not been fired in American shells.  The gas had been ready and waiting: the army had failed to provide the artillery shells.

The case, and the condition of non-use in Western society since, illustrate a maxim that state-controlled terror weapons lead to proliferation, just as do other weapons, but that there may then ensue a balance of terror — that peculiar state in which each side exhibits the behavior of both terrorizer and victim.

The historic consciousness of our time contains also another case that future historians may put on the list of developments that uniquely characterize the twentieth century.  I refer to the discovery by the civilized world, at the end of World War II, of the existence of the Nazi camps for genocide — or, more properly, of final proof that bore out the evidence long available to those who cared to know.  The process by which these concentration camps were used systematically to destroy specially selected and identified groups of the population under German domination was calculated to serve a triple purpose.

Not only were the camps designed to eliminate people.  They also were factories to "harvest" them methodically, rapidly, and on a huge scale.  Nothing in the exhibit area of Auschwitz has been more shattering than the carefully sorted, huge piles of eye glasses, shaving brushes, trusses, children's wear, human hair, and so forth, the last of such shipments to the German homeland, abandoned when the camp was liberated.  (It is a small part of the evidence of the involvement of large numbers of people in the transport and other aspects of the undertaking.)

But it is generally overlooked that a third purpose of the camps was precisely that they would act also as a terror weapon.  Certainly, at least the segment of the population that was the target of these camps was sufficiently aware of their existence, and consequently was traumatized by the threat to such an extent that the vast operation in which millions were killed could be carried on with considerable efficiency in terms of manpower needs. The existence of the Gulag in the Soviet Union was more generally known within the country; the disappearance of millions forced into those camps also had a paralyzing effect on the psyche of most in the population at large — although with splendid exceptions.

The use of systematic state terror in what became the Soviet Union has been most authoritatively described by Richard Pipes in his book, The Russian Revolution(Alfred A. Knopf, 1990).  Chapter 18, "The Red Terror," traces its early stages to Lenin's writings, as in an essay of 1908, where he first used the concept of "extermination" of class enemies.  Once in power, the Bolshevik dictatorship made terror part of its state policy.  Lenin's Commissar of Justice wrote in 1920:  "Terror is a system...a legalized plan of the regime for the purpose of mass intimidation, mass compulsion, mass extermination," all directed to segments of the state's own population.  Eventually, the Soviet security police were given a free hand to end the lives of millions of citizens that it regarded as "enemies."  Concentration camps, called by that name, had been first ordered to be set up by Trotzky and Lenin in August 1918, as part of the "Red Terror."  By 1923, there were 315 such camps.  In the Stalinist U.S.S.R., they grew ever larger and more numerous.

This is not the place to pursue this particular legacy of that tragic century to world history.  But in the absence of any agreements, incentives, or other forces that would tend to discourage continued development and use of terror of both types, we may expect the tacit taboo on this particular Type II terror weapon to be overcome also.  The campaigns of "ethnic cleansing," e.g., in Serbia and  Rwanda, came close to this model in recent years.

4 Quoted in Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), pp. 204-205.

5 Gilbert F. Wittemore, Jr.  "World War I, Poison Gas Research, and the Ideal of American Chemists," Social Studies of Science 5(1975): 151.

6 The same theme of efficiency is found in the detailed operations of the camps.  Thus, I have seen in the archives in Auschwitz records of experimental research to determine the number of calories needed in the food supply to keep the average inmate not so weak as to be unable to work in the labor sections of the camp, nor so strong as to survive for more than some nine months at the outset.  Moreover, when the available food supply was tuned to this particular aim, camp inmates could be persuaded to do a great deal for relatively small favors (e.g., being rewarded by scooping a ladleful of soup from the bottom of the kettle, where there might be some potatoes, rather than from the top).  Thus the camps were policeable with less manpower.

The Success of Terror

I have argued that cataclysmic events, the perpetration of enormities, and other precipitous changes in the human condition, stretch personal and historic memory beyond the limits of the accommodations of the ordinary elastic range; they make a plastic deformation, leaving the psyche different, distorted, and ready to crystalize experiences around the wound in new ways.  When we ask what lessons the historic memory of our time has drawn from these events, one finds that the most prominent response is, of course, self-protection on the conscious level.  The atomic bomb and the Holocaust are rarely made part of educational curricula.  On the contrary, for the masses the chief vehicle for presenting terror situations has been banalization(and exploitation).  Examples are such movies and TV productions as Hiroshima Mon Amour, "Hogan's Heroes," The Night Porter, Mel Brooks's The Producers, Lina Wertmüller's Seven Beauties, and, most recently, videogames using Nazi protagonists in full uniform.

The second lesson that the planned use of calamities as Type II terror weapons has left in historic memory is that on the whole they were successful, and, moreover, that the use of the weapons did not produce counterbalancing, severe psychic costs to the user.  Hence, there is no reason why future adventures along this line should not be seen "safe" enough by the perpetrators.  The effect that the dropping of the first atomic bombs had on the leadership and population of the Western Allies is an illustrative case in point.  When, in response to the reasonable likelihood that the Germans would preempt them, a number of scientists working on the design and manufacture of the bomb (James Franck, Eugene Rabinowitch, Glenn T. Seaborg, Leo Szilard, and others) pleaded in June 1945 (in "A Report to the Secretary of War") that the bomb should not be first used on a civilian target, one of their chief arguments was that "the military advantages and the saving of American lives achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and by a wave of horror and repulsion sweeping over the rest of the world and perhaps even dividing public opinion at home.">  Their advice was of course not heeded, and the explosions had their intended traumatizing effect on the Japanese leadership.  None of the expected "loss of confidence" and "wave of horror and repulsion sweeping over the rest of the world" materialized, at least not for some time.  Quite the contrary.  The New York Times, in an editorial on 7 August 1945, for example, hailed the Hiroshima bomb as "the magic key to victory [which] has been found in America....The new bomb...is the crowning demonstration of Allied technical, scientific and material superiority over the enemy."

Moreover, the Timesdeclared under the heading "Science and the Bomb," that the scientists had better shape up and learn a lesson from the event:

"University professors who are opposed to organizing, planning and directing research after the manner of industrial laboratories because in their opinion fundamental research is based on 'curiosity' and because great scientific minds must be left to themselves have something to think about.  A most important piece of research was conducted on behalf of the Army by precisely the means adopted in industrial laboratories.  And the result?  An invention is given to the world in three years which it would have taken perhaps half a century to develop if we had to rely on prima donna research scientists to work alone.  The internal logical necessities of atomic physics and the war led to the bomb.  A problem was stated.  It was solved by teamwork, by planning, by competent direction, and not by a mere desire to satisfy curiosity."

The intensity of violence in that war had become enormous even without the atomic bomb.  While the War Department's announcement concerning Hiroshima said the destruction force equaled the load of 2,000 B-29s and more than 2,000 times the blast power of what previously had been the world's most devastating type of bomb, it also said that more than 400 fighters and bombers pounded Tarumizu in Southern Kyushu on that same day in just one of the other actions.  On the next day, more than 225 B-29 "Super Fortresses," escorted by 140 P-47 Thunderbolt Fighters, dropped about 1,500 tons of demolition bombs on the city of Yawata.  (Yawata was one of the Japanese cities that had been publicly warned by the Air Force that it would be destroyed.)  Like the first nine biblical plagues, such devastation could somehow still be made of a previously known kind of order (or disorder).  But the new bomb provided a discontinuous jump to an unimagined higher order of magnitude.  In this respect, it was beyond the usual use of weapons in war, which have traditionally served primarily in the physicalincapacitation of the enemy and the subsequent conquest of his territory.

Indeed, the only objection to the use of the new weapon that found its way to the front of TheNew York Timesin the first days after its use was a story under the heading "Vatican Deplores Use of Atom Bomb.  Official Press Office Says the Weapon Has Created an Unfavorable Impression."

The New York Timeswent on to reprint part of the Vatican's Osservatore Romanoeditorial that deplored the development of the atomic bomb by reminding its readers about a story concerning Leonardo da Vinci:  "He planned a submarine, but he feared that man would not apply it to progress, namely to the constructive uses of civilization, but to its ruin.  He destroyed that possible instrument of destruction."  The accusing finger was clearly pointing at the scientists involved — and to this day, it is generally they who are singled out when the popular mind tries to assess responsibilities in this case.

In late November 1945, an opinion poll showed that only 5 percent of the public was opposed to the combat use of the atomic bomb.  Harry Truman, who made the decision to use it, shared with the electorate the opinion that the bomb was a legitimate weapon. As Truman wrote to a clergyman shortly after the Nagasaki explosion:

"Nobody is more disturbed over the use of atomic bombs than I am, but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and the murder of our prisoners of war.  The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them.  When you have to deal with a beast, you have to treat him as a beast."

It is a capsule illustration of what Erik Erikson has called "pseudo-speciation," a process by which an "enemy" traditionally is deprived of membership in the human race proper, thus solving the problem of guilt, if only on the surface.

7 Quoted from the Report as reprinted in The Project Physics Course Reader, Unit 6, The Nucleus(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 206. Edward Teller maintained that he also was sympathetic to the aims of that group in 1945:  "[In a letter by Einstein in 1945] it was emphasized that one should not use the atomic bomb except by way of demonstration.  I also was of the opinion at that time that this was correct.  In my opinion, it would have been sufficient to explode the bomb at a suitably harmless height above Tokyo....On the other hand, it was Oppenheimer who quite explicitly recommended the release of the atomic bomb."  (Translated from the interview "Professor Haber stellt vor: Edward Teller," Bild der Wissenschaft[October 1975], p. 106.)  However, the contemporaneous documentation, e.g., in the J. R. Oppenheimer papers in the Library of Congress, appears to lead one to a rather different conclusion.

8 The New York Times, 8 August 1945, p. 1.

9 This is obviously simpler to do in peacetime than in the middle of a war.  The Vatican paper might have counterposed Leonardo's supposed action with the declaration of the Italian scientist Nicolo Tartaglia, who in mid-sixteenth century had kept his treatise on ballistics to himself — until the Turks advanced: "Today, however, in the sight of the ferocious wolf preparing to set on our flock, and of our pastors united for the common defense, it does not seem to me any longer proper to hold these things [scientific discoveries of use in warfare] hid, and I have resolved to publish them partly in writing, and partly by word of mouth, for the benefit of Christians so that all should be in a better state either to attack the common enemy or to defend themselves against him."

11 An analogous process that tends to work toward the same end might be called "pseudo-professionalization."  It allows scientists and other "experts" not to oppose an insufficient political and sociological act or view, by regarding themselves incompetent to deal with the uses others make of their work.

Since operationally the condemnations that both Type I and Type II terrorism have received so far have generally been ineffective, there is no reason to think that Type I terrorists will continue to limit themselves to paleotechnic means and to essentially unsuccessful missions.  On the contrary, the same dynamic that escalated the technological sophistication of state terrorism is bound to act also within individual and group terrorism of Type III.  Therefore three developments may be expected.  One is the attempt by one or more states to disseminate, not directly but through hired gangs, both the technology and also the cultural ground for successful terror, i.e., to secure the marriage of advanced technology and the intent to traumatize through cataclysmic disaster.  The second is that gangs, not necessarily or openly associated with states but motivated by a fervid ideology (analogous to the case of the Bolsheviks), will perform that same sinister marriage on their own.

Third, a nation targeted for the new terrorism will not have open to it the conventional response — i.e., a balance of terror against an identifiable Type II threat.  Therefore it will have to devise new measures, both for making terror acts unacceptably costly to each or all probable instigators, and for initiating policies that might defuse the conditions likely to be animating the potential terrorists.

There is a final point.  As Type III terrorists scale up the levels of activity, chances are that some terrorists may experience technical failures, particularly in their early preparations.  Any attempt to produce damage on a very large scale requires a certain amount of technical mastery that may not be easy to transmit locally to what previously would have been merely a band of Type I terrorists.  The distance in competence between the supplier of the new weapon on the one hand and the operator on the other hand can be very large, even in the cases where such weapons are used by advanced states in warfare.

However, even "failures" of weapons (nuclear, chemical, or biological) on the scale of Type II agents but in the hands of Type III agents could be attended by enormous deleterious effects, devastating to life in unintended areas.  It may well be that precisely such a catastrophic "failure" could serve to mark the full extent of the discontinuity in world history.

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What have peacebuilding experts learned from twenty years of counterterrorism? Here are seven reflections.

1. Violent extremism results from fear and frustration paired with the fantasy of a “pure” society. 

Since 2001, Muslims have spoken out about the stigma they face related to media stereotypes and prejudices that terrorism is unique to Islam. Violent extremist goals of creating a “pure” society by using violence against other groups is found in many belief traditions. In Burma, violent extremist Buddhist monks used ethnic cleansing in their attempt to “purify” the state. In Europe , the United States, and Canada , white extremists have killed more people than Muslim extremists in their effort to establish a whites-only society. In India, Hindu extremists use violence against Muslims. In Israel, Jewish extremists use violence against Palestinians.

2. Violent extremism is similar to other forms of violence.

Decades of research suggest the motives of individuals who join VE groups are similar to those that drive recruitment into gangs and insurgencies. People join VE groups to gain a sense of belonging, identity, and purpose for a higher cause, and because of the perceived adventure and thrill. They join to escape complicated problems in their lives. And they share a sense of frustration at what they perceive to be corrupt governments and systemic injustices. The United States Institute of Peace program on Violent Extremist Disengagement and Reconciliation asserts the need to “de-exceptionalize” violent extremism . 

3. Preventing violent extremism requires a broad peacebuilding approach

Programs that prevent other types of violence will also prevent VE. Peacebuilding and violence prevention require a systems-based, ecological approach to VE that addresses the root causes of violence at the individual, community, and state level. At the individual level, VE prevention requires behavioral health and trauma recovery strategies.  At the community level, VE prevention requires designing inclusive programs to meet basic human needs for housing, meaningful work, healthcare, etc. Community dialogue and problem-solving forums empower people to improve their communities. At the state level, participatory governance enables citizens to address shared grievances. Multistakeholder peacebuilding approaches address the diverse challenges that societies face.

4. Education and the “Books not Bombs” strategy is not a simple formula.

In the early years of the Afghan war, peacebuilders touted education and building schools as a key component. USAID funded many schools, but today many of these stand empty as there was no long-term plan for sustainability . U.S. military personnel with bags of cash fueled corruption with short-term projects to build schools in an attempt to buy (or rent) the allegiance of local communities. In some cases, the Taliban targeted schools funded by the military. In other cases, corrupt construction crews ran off with the money and left unfinished schools, or schools were built but there were no funds to hire teachers.  

An important lesson is that school building is better done by local communities, using government grants from pooled international funds. The World Bank’s evaluation of the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program found that it supported an effective strategy for communities using participatory decision-making to determine development priorities and make long-term sustainability plans.

5. We need national mental health approaches to prevent violent extremism.

Violent extremism, like other forms of violence, is a behavioral health challenge. Early childhood trauma contributes to a propensity to join violent extremist groups. A recent study in 2021 found that most right-wing extremists in the U.S. had experienced four or more adverse childhood experiences before they were 18 years old, as compared to only 16 percent of other U.S. Americans. African countries are leading the way in innovating national mental health programs. In Liberia, the Carter Center’s Mental Health Program is supporting a sustainable mental health system to address the crisis following the civil war. They are training a mental health workforce, supporting the passage of a national mental health law, reducing public stigma of behavioral health challenges, and assisting Liberia’s Ministry of Health in implementing the national mental health policy and plan.

6. The future will likely hold more violent extremism. 

A cocktail of global crises is likely to increase violent extremism around the world. The climate catastrophe will drive millions of migrants toward other countries. And in many of those countries, thriving atavistic nationalist movements are undermining democratic institutions. Weaponizable technology spreads fear and disinformation to foster recruitment, and mass digital movements fueled by social media are buying into violent extremist worldviews.

7. Counterterrorism distracted us from far greater threats from the climate crisis.

Peacebuilders should continue to reflect on how best to prevent and help people recover from terrorism. But we should recognize that the climate crisis poses far greater dangers to U.S. citizens and all life on the planet. A 2014 U.S. military report clearly stated that climate change is a “threat multiplier” for terrorism . 

Where might we be if we had addressed the climate crisis with the 6 trillion dollars the U.S. spent on the Global War on Terror? What if we had harnessed the vast people power of the U.S. military and two decades of policymaking attention on preventing the climate catastrophe rather than going to war in Iraq and Afghanistan?  

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Lisa Schirch is the Richard G. Starmann, Sr., Visiting Professorship Chair in Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute and Senior Research Fellow at the Toda Institute. She is also a Senior Fellow with the Alliance for Peacebuilding and Visiting Scholar at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. She is the author of ten books, including the edited volume “The Ecology of Violent Extremism: Perspectives in Peacebuilding and Human Security” (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

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17 The Causes of Terrorism

Jeff Goodwin, New York University

• Published: 04 April 2019
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Terrorism, understood as the killing of noncombatants in order to frighten, intimidate, or provoke others, has long been an important method of warfare or contention for both states and non-state groups. Yet states and rebels clearly do not attack just any noncombatants. Indeed, both states and rebels are also usually interested in securing the support of noncombatants. So who are the noncombatants whom warriors choose to attack? Armed groups have an incentive to attack and terrorize those noncombatants who support enemy states or rebels politically or economically. Terrorism is thus a method of undermining indirectly one’s armed enemies. By contrast, armed groups do not have an incentive to attack noncombatants who do not support enemy states or rebels. Whether noncombatants are supporters of states or rebels, in other words, is the key to understanding why terror tactics are or are not likely to be employed against them in any particular conflict.

Ascertaining the causes of terrorism depends of course on how we define terrorism. Alas, as is well known, scholars have been unable to reach a consensus on the meaning of the word. In 1981, Martha Crenshaw, a well-known scholar of terrorism, wrote an important article titled “The Causes of Terrorism,” published in the journal Comparative Politics . Crenshaw was interested in discovering the causes of “symbolic, low-level violence by conspiratorial organizations” (Crenshaw 1981 , 379), which is one of the ways in which scholars have defined terrorism. Crenshaw had in mind violence by such groups as the Irish Republican Army, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Red Army Faction in West Germany. To be sure, Crenshaw was well aware that states as well as dissident groups can employ terrorism—in some sense of the word. In fact, the first sentence of her article states, “Terrorism occurs both in the context of violent resistance to the state as well as in the service of state interests” (Crenshaw 1981 , 379). But Crenshaw focused exclusively on anti-state terrorism by “conspiratorial organizations” in her article.

In this chapter, I want to consider the possible causes of terrorism defined in a rather different way, one which encompasses both state and anti-state or rebel violence. I define terrorism, like many scholars, as violence against noncombatants, usually common or ordinary people, in order to advance a political cause (cf. Richards 2014 ). The immediate purpose of this violence, furthermore, is not just to kill or injure people but to frighten, intimidate, provoke, or otherwise influence a larger population, among which the killed and wounded were either randomly or selectively targeted (Goodwin 2006 ). Terrorism thus differs from other forms of political violence, such as conventional (or guerrilla) warfare and assassination, which aim to kill soldiers (whether state or rebel troops) and political leaders, respectively.

Formally, I define terrorism as any tactic or set of tactics used by any government, group, organization, or individual, in pursuit of a political goal (broadly defined), which is intended to kill or harm civilians or noncombatants (as opposed to soldiers or political leaders) so as to frighten, intimidate, demoralize, provoke, or pressure other civilians and/or political leaders . A shorter, “sound bite” definition of terrorism is the killing or harming of civilians to intimidate others .

Terrorism, then, is not an ideological movement like socialism or conservatism, nor is it violence by a particular type of organization (e.g. covert or conspiratorial). Rather, terrorism refers to tactics that may be employed by either states or rebels, whether they are ideologically conservative, moderate, or radical. This definition encompasses (1) forms of violence or other lethal actions against noncombatants by rebel groups (i.e. “terrorism” as many if not most people tend to think of it today) but also (2) forms of violence or other lethal actions by states or allied paramilitary forces against noncombatants in conflicts with rebels. (Much counter-insurgent and indeed counterterrorist violence is itself terrorist in nature.) It also encompasses (3) violence or other lethal actions by states against noncombatants in international conflicts, and (4) violence or other lethal actions against an oppressed racial or ethnic (or other) group for purposes of controlling or intimidating that group.

“State terrorism,” for its part, is important for scholars to consider for several reasons, not least because state violence against noncombatants has claimed many more victims than has anti-state violence, and because terrorism by rebel groups is sometimes a strategic response to state terrorism (see e.g. Herman and O’Sullivan 1989 , chs 2 – 3 ; Gareau 2004 ).

My definition of terrorism entails a distinct understanding of what exactly we must explain in order to explain terrorism. What we must explain, plainly, is not why states or political groups sometimes resort to violence as such, but why they employ violence against (or otherwise seek to harm) civilians or noncombatants in particular, with the further goal of intimidating many others in the process. Indeed, one virtue of this definition is that it squarely focuses our attention on violations of the idea (and the ideal) of noncombatant immunity —the principle that noncombatants should never be targeted in wars or civil conflicts, whether by states or rebels. Noncombatant immunity is a fundamental principle of “just war” theory and international law, including the Geneva Conventions.

How, then, are we to explain terrorism defined in this way? In the remainder of this chapter I will critically review two traditional theories of terrorism, then examine at greater length the currently dominant “radicalization” perspective on terrorism, and then develop and briefly illustrate an alternative account of terrorism, which I call the “indirect-war” theory. I argue that neither the traditional theories nor the radicalization perspective tell us much at all about terrorism as I have defined it, but that the indirect-war perspective offers greater promise for the empirical analysis of a wide range of cases of terrorism.

Traditional Theories of Terrorism

How have social scientists and other analysts traditionally attempted to explain why states or rebels have sometimes used violence against, or otherwise sought to harm, civilians? Many theories have been proposed—far more than I can review here—but prior to the 9/11 attacks two hypotheses were especially influential: (1) terrorism is a product of the weakness and/or desperation of some rebels or states (a “weapon of the weak”), and (2) much terrorism is a retaliatory response to violence, including terrorism, by the perpetrators’ armed enemies, whether states or rebels. After 9/11, a new theory of terrorism has become dominant. This theory holds that terrorism is the result of the “radicalization” of particular individuals or groups.

Before the radicalization perspective became dominant, perhaps the most common idea about what causes terrorism was the notion that oppositional or rebel movements turn to terrorism when they are very weak, lack popular support, and yet are desperate to redress their grievances. A similar argument has been proposed as an explanation for state terrorism, claiming that states turn to terrorism—or “civilian victimization”—when they become desperate to win wars (Downes 2008 ). The core idea here is that rebels and states which lack the capacity or leverage to pressure their opponents either nonviolently or through conventional or guerrilla warfare, or who fail to attain their goals when they do employ these strategies, will turn to terrorism as a “last resort.” Disaffected elites sometimes resort to violence, according to Crenshaw’s influential account ( 1981 ), because it is easier and cheaper than strategies that require mass mobilization, especially when government repression makes mass mobilization extremely difficult if not impossible.

There are, however, a number of logical and empirical problems with this “desperation” theory of terrorism, as we might call it. Most importantly, the theory seems simply to assume that desperate rebels or politicians would automatically view attacks upon civilians as beneficial instead of detrimental to their cause. But even if terrorism is cheaper and easier than many other strategies, why would one employ it at all? We need to know what beneficial consequences rebels or state officials believe their attacks on civilians, or on specific kinds of civilians, would bring about. How exactly will these attacks advance their cause? Why would officials or rebels not assume that attacks on civilians would undermine their popularity or otherwise hurt their cause?

Second, there does not in fact seem to be a particularly strong empirical relationship between the strength of states and rebel groups, on the one hand, and their use (or not) of terrorism, on the other. For example, the US government was hardly desperate when it imposed economic sanctions on Iraq during the 1990s, which may have resulted in the deaths of more than half a million children (Gordon 2010 ). (Although these sanctions did not entail direct violence against Iraqi civilians, they fit our definition of terrorism because they deliberately resulted in the deaths and suffering of noncombatants.) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, to take another example, was a powerful rebel movement during the 1990s according to most accounts. The LTTE sometimes even waged conventional warfare against Sri Lankan government forces, and it used small aircraft in some of its attacks. Yet the LTTE, which was predominantly Tamil, also engaged in indiscriminate attacks on ethnic Sinhalese civilians, and it did so long after it had decimated rival Tamil nationalist groups (Bloom 2005 , ch. 3 ). So its growing strength did not lead it to abandon terror tactics. The desperation theory does not tell us why.

One can also point, conversely, to relatively weak states and rebel movements that have largely eschewed terrorism. Perhaps the best example of the latter is the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. In 1961, as many of their leaders were being arrested and many others driven into exile, the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa established an armed wing called Umkhonto weSizwe (“Spear of the Nation” or MK). The ANC explicitly adopted armed struggle as one of its main political strategies. By most accounts, however, MK failed to become an effective guerrilla force, as the South African Defense Forces were simply too strong and effective (Cherry 2011 ). And yet MK did not then embrace terror tactics against the dominant white minority, despite the fact, as Gay Seidman points out, that, “In a deeply segregated society, it would have been easy to kill random whites. Segregated white schools, segregated movie theaters, segregated shopping centers meant that if white deaths were the only goal, potential targets could be found everywhere” (Seidman 2001 , 118). (I address the question of why the ANC rejected terrorism later in this chapter.)

In short, weak and desperate rebels and states do not necessarily adopt terror tactics, and strong states and rebels do not necessarily eschew such tactics. As Turk concludes, “Because any group may adopt terror tactics, it is misleading to assume either that ‘terrorism is the weapon of the weak’ or that terrorists are always small groups of outsiders—or at most a ‘lunatic fringe’” (Turk 1982 , 122). Indeed, terrorism is often and perhaps usually a weapon of the strong, and of strong states in particular.

The main insight of the desperation theory of terrorism is that states and rebel groups do often take up arms after they have concluded that diplomacy and nonviolent politics cannot work or that these work far too slowly or ineffectively to redress urgent grievances. But notice that this does not tell us why armed actors would employ violence against noncombatants in particular. Moreover, the argument that attacking “soft” targets such as unprotected civilians is easier than waging conventional or guerrilla warfare does not explain why states or rebels would ever wage conventional or guerrilla warfare. The argument implies that rational people would always prefer terrorism to these strategies, which is clearly not the case. In sum, the most we can say is that weakness and desperation may be a necessary but not sufficient cause of terrorism in some cases. But as a general theory of terrorism, this perspective is clearly inadequate.

A second traditional view of terrorism is that it is a retaliatory response to violence, including terrorism. Leftist and radical analysts of terrorism have often made this claim about oppositional terrorism, and it is emphasized by Herman and O’Sullivan ( 1989 ). They suggest that the “retail” terrorism of dissident groups is caused or provoked by the “wholesale” or “primary” terrorism of states, especially powerful Western states, above all the United States. The terms “wholesale” and “retail” are meant to remind readers that state terrorism has generally been much more deadly than oppositional terrorism, which is undeniable. Other scholars have rightly emphasized how state and non-state terrorism have been dynamically intertwined (e.g. English, 2016 ) and how, as a result, revenge often becomes a powerful motivation for terrorism (e.g. Richardson, 2006 : ch. 4 ).

But how far does this view take us? It is certainly true that indiscriminate state violence, especially when perpetrated by relatively weak and ineffective states, has encouraged the development of violent rebel movements (Goodwin 2001 ). But the question is why these movements would attack and threaten civilians as opposed to the state’s armed forces. If rebels are responding to state terrorism, after all, why would they not employ violence against the state ? State terrorism, in other words, would seem more likely to induce rebels to employ guerrilla or conventional warfare than terror tactics.

Empirically, one can also point to dissident organizations that have arisen in contexts of extreme state violence which have nonetheless largely eschewed terror tactics. For example, Central American guerrilla movements of the 1970s and 1980s, including the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation in El Salvador, confronted states that engaged in extensive violence against noncombatants, yet neither movement engaged in much terrorism. Another example is, again, the ANC in South Africa. Interestingly, Herman and O’Sullivan’s book devotes considerable attention to both South African and Israeli state terrorism ( 1989 , ch. 2 ). And yet, while they note the “retail” terrorism of the Palestine Liberation Organization during the 1970s and 1980s—emphasizing that Israeli state terrorism was responsible for a great many more civilian deaths during this period—they do not discuss the oppositional terrorism in South Africa which their theory would seem to predict. In fact, as we have noted, the ANC simply did not carry out much terrorism at all. So “wholesale” state terrorism, clearly, does not always cause or provoke “retail” oppositional terrorism.

Having said this, it is indeed difficult to find a rebel group that has carried out extensive terrorism which has not arisen in a context of considerable state violence. For example, those rebels in French Algeria, the West Bank and Gaza, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya who engaged in extensive terrorism have been drawn from, and claim to act on behalf of, populations that have themselves suffered extensive and often indiscriminate state repression. The question is what to make of this correlation. Why, in these particular contexts, have rebels attacked certain civilians as well as government forces? The retaliatory theory of terrorism does not tell us.

The Radicalization Perspective

A huge literature on terrorism has appeared following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Much of this literature is descriptive or focuses on particular aspects of terrorism, broadly conceived (e.g. recruitment, organization, ideology, etc.). Surprisingly little of this literature is concerned with proposing general causal hypotheses about the choice of terror tactics by either rebels or states. One theory of terrorism, however, has clearly risen to a position of dominance in both the journalistic and academic literature—the idea that terrorism is the result of “radicalization.”

At its core, the radicalization approach to terrorism has a simple thesis: not all radicals may be terrorists, but all terrorists are radicals . It thus follows that a process of ideological “radicalization” (or “violent radicalization” in some accounts) is a necessary if not sufficient cause of terrorism . And it follows in turn that scholars need to identify the factors and processes that cause or facilitate “radicalization” if we are to explain terrorism. It also follows that individuals will be weaned away from terrorism if they can somehow be “de-radicalized.”

These claims, alas, are based on a misunderstanding and misappropriation of the concept of radicalization. Indeed, there are several fundamental problems with the radicalization perspective. This approach often assumes, first of all, that terrorism is a kind of ideological movement—like socialism or conservatism, for example—which seeks out converts. The idea is that terrorists seek to radicalize people or recruit people who are already radicalized. But terror tactics have clearly been employed by groups and states with a very wide range of ideologies, not all of them “radical” in any sense of the word. In fact, the basic theoretical assumption of this approach—that only radicals engage in terrorism—is plainly wrong, unless one defines “radicalism,” tautologically, as a propensity to kill civilians in order to intimidate others. It follows that the basic causal claim or hypothesis of this perspective—that radicalization is a necessary cause of political violence and terrorism—is also plainly wrong.

What does it mean, we might ask, to be a “radical”? The word has had a straightforward, uncontroversial meaning in historical and social-science discourse for many decades. According to the Oxford English Dictionary , “radical” means “Advocating thorough or far-reaching political or social reform … Now more generally: revolutionary, esp. left-wing” ( Oxford English Dictionary online: < www.oed.com/view/Entry/157251#eid27277866 >). A radical, in other words, is a revolutionary—usually on the left but possibly on the right. A radical desires fundamental as opposed to limited social change. Radicals differ from reformists, who desire modest or incremental socio-political changes, and from conservatives, who seek to preserve the existing order more or less as it is.

It follows from this longstanding definition that to “radicalize” means that one comes to have revolutionary or at least far-reaching goals. Historians and social scientists have always used the concept in just this sense, especially those who have written about revolutions or revolutionary movements. The point to emphasize is that the concept of radicalization clearly speaks to ends, not means, let alone violent means . “Radical” has never meant “violent.” In fact, violence and coercion are not associated with any of the several definitions of “radical” which are found in the Oxford English Dictionary . The close association between radicalism and violence, alas, is a very recent and not particularly helpful invention of certain scholars of political violence and terrorism.

Many scholars who employ the term, to be sure, do not explicitly define “radicalization” at all (see e.g. Sageman 2008 ; Horgan 2008 ; Ranstorp 2010 ). And many understand “radicalization” tautologically, that is, as nothing other than the process or processes—whatever they may be—by which one becomes a terrorist. So, for example, according to two leading scholars of terrorism, “Radicalization may be understood as a process leading towards the increased use of political violence, while de-radicalization, by contrast, implies reduction in the use of political violence” (della Porta and LaFree 2012 , 5). “Radicalization” and “de-radicalization” seem to have no other content or meaning for these authors. According to two other prominent scholars,

Functionally, political radicalization is increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict. Descriptively, radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the ingroup … [B]ehavioral radicalization means increasing time, money, risk-taking, and violence in support of a political group. (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008 , 416)

These definitions empty the words “radical” and “radicalization” of their traditional meaning. The word “radical” no longer means revolutionary, but is simply used as a synonym or placeholder for the word terrorist, and the word “radicalization” becomes a synonym for whatever process or processes might lead people to become terrorists. The underlying claim is thus entirely circular and unenlightening: Terrorism is a product of radicalization, we are told, and radicalization is the process which leads to terrorism.

It is not clear why some scholars have emptied the word “radicalization” of its traditional meaning in this way. It may be that they have done so because of the obvious fallaciousness of the basic theoretical assumption of the radicalization perspective, namely, that only revolutionaries engage in political violence or terrorism. Of course, no one would deny that revolutionaries have sometimes used violence and terrorism. The term terrorism, after all, was first used to describe the actions of French revolutionaries. Moreover, some scholars who write from the radicalization perspective have correctly emphasized that not all radicals use violence or terrorism. Indeed, some employ the concept of “violent radicalization” precisely in order to address this reality (e.g. Bartlett and Miller 2012 ).

But the assumption remains for most who write from this perspective that all terrorists are revolutionaries (or “extremists”). This assumption, however, is empirically wrong. There is, to begin with, what we might call conservative terrorism or what some have termed “pro-state” terrorism—in other words, non-state terrorism in defense of the status quo (e.g. Bruce 1992 ; White 1999 ). Two better-known cases of such conservative terrorist movements would be the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, which for many decades used terror tactics to reinforce white supremacy, and the Loyalist paramilitary movement in Northern Ireland, which used terrorism in order to maintain Protestant domination of those six counties as well as their union with Great Britain. It simply makes no sense to describe Klan members or Loyalists as radicals or revolutionaries who sought “fundamental socio-political changes.”

The radicalization perspective fails just as clearly to explain most state terrorism, which, like conservative or pro-state terrorism, has also been mainly employed to defend the status quo. Again, state terrorism has sometimes been employed in the service of political projects aimed at radically transforming societies, as in France and Russia. But much more state violence has been used to intimidate civilians so as to maintain the existing social order or to defeat domestic rebels or foreign enemies (Downes 2008 ). State terrorism, indeed, is quite often counter -revolutionary violence in defense of the status quo.

The Indirect-War Theory of Terrorism

A causal explanation of terrorism, as we have defined it, requires us to specify why and under what conditions armed actors (state or non-state) come to regard the killing and intimidation of civilians or noncombatants as a reasonable and perhaps necessary (although not necessarily exclusive) means to attain their political ends. A causal theory should also tell us why and under what conditions armed groups consider terror tactics unnecessary and perhaps even counterproductive. Because terrorism cannot be unintended according to our (and most) definitions, the deliberate targeting of civilians—often just ordinary people—may be considered the sine qua non of terrorism.

Of course, terrorism, like other forms of violence, requires a certain infrastructure (weaponry, means of gaining proximity to targets, etc.) as well as warriors willing and able to carry out the violence. But neither of these is specific to terrorism. Conventional and guerrilla warfare as well as a strategy of assassination also require these things. The essential characteristic of terrorism is the intent to kill or harm as well as to intimidate civilians, and it is this intent which demands an explanation.

Let me now sketch what I call the indirect-war theory of terrorism, which follows in the footsteps of Charlies Tilly’s “relational” approach to terrorism (Tilly 2004 , 2005 ), so named because social relations among key actors (states, armed rebels, and civilians) carry the primary explanatory burden. The indirect-war theory is based on the idea that terrorism is an indirect way for armed groups (state or non-state) to attack their enemies. The theory proposes that an armed group will employ terror tactics against those civilians who are supporters of the group’s armed enemies—provided those civilians are not also seen by the group as their own potential supporters. Terrorism arises, in other words, when one or more parties to an armed conflict seeks to harm their adversaries by harming the civilians who support those adversaries. Killing and terrorizing civilians is thus an indirect means of undermining one’s armed enemies, instead of, or in addition to, directly attacking these enemies. By contrast, there is no incentive to attack civilians who are not supporters of one’s armed enemies.

The indirect-war theory requires a consideration of the characteristics of the civilians or noncombatants whom states and rebels (sometimes) target for violence or harm. Why and how states and rebels come to see particular noncombatants as enemies or appropriate targets of violence is a puzzle that the aforementioned theories of terrorism, as we have seen, generally ignore. Yet states and rebels clearly do not attack just any civilians or noncombatants. Indeed, both states and rebels are also usually interested in winning the active support or allegiance of civilians—or at least civilians of a certain type. So who are the “bad” or enemy civilians whom warriors choose to attack? And what good, from the warriors’ perspective, might come from attacking them?

When states or rebels employ terror tactics in a civil or international conflict, they generally attack and try to intimidate civilians who in one way or another are valuable to or support their armed enemies. These are civilians upon whom enemy armed actors are dependent in different ways. Again, attacking such civilians is a way to attack indirectly one’s armed opponents, and it is perfectly rational from this standpoint, despite the widespread moral condemnation of terror tactics.

The main tactical objective of and incentive for terrorism in armed conflicts is to induce the targeted civilians to stop supporting certain government or rebel policies. Terrorism, in other words, typically aims to apply such intense pressure to civilians that they will demand that their government or movement change certain policies or activities. Better yet, from the perpetrators’ perspective, these civilians may even cease supporting the government or rebels altogether in order to end the violence directed at them. The perpetrators may also hope that the states or rebels they are fighting will unilaterally change or abandon certain policies or activities in order to end the killing of civilians. In either case, the government or rebels cannot be indifferent to attacks on civilians who are valuable to them.

In short, there is a general incentive for armed groups to attack and intimidate those civilians who are supporters of states or rebels with whom they are at war. But how exactly do certain civilians support armed groups? Civilians may support armed groups in two main ways—politically and economically—each of which produces a distinct incentive for armed enemies to attack them. First, terrorism is likely to be employed against noncombatants who politically support one’s armed enemies. In this context, terror tactics are a reasonable means to weaken civilian political support (or tolerance) for violence by “their” government or rebels. For example, Al Qaeda and other “jihadist” groups have attacked civilians in the United States, the UK, France, and other Western countries in order to erode political support for their governments’ policies in the Middle East. By contrast, terrorism is much less likely to be employed against civilians who do not politically support—or are substantially divided in their support for—one’s armed enemies. In this case, terrorism may alienate potential allies.

Second, terrorism is likely to be employed against noncombatants who economically support one’s armed enemies by, for example, supplying them with weapons, transportation (or the means thereof), food, and other supplies needed to employ violence. In this context, terrorism is a reasonable means to weaken civilian economic support for violence by “their” government or rebels. For example, the “terror bombing” of World War II, which resulted in hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of civilian deaths, was undertaken primarily to destroy the industrial economies of England, Germany, and Japan (in part by eroding civilian morale), on which those countries’ armed forces were dependent. Such destruction required massive civilian victimization. By contrast, terrorism is much less likely when soldiers are supplied by foreign states, for example, or through covert, black markets that involve few civilians.

Terrorism is also likely to spread and escalate in conflicts in which an armed actor has begun to attack the civilian supporters of their armed enemies. When this occurs, terrorism may become a reasonable means (other things being equal) to deter terrorism by armed enemies, thereby protecting one’s civilian supporters, or, alternatively, to avenge such terrorism, thereby winning or reinforcing the political support of those civilians who feel they have been avenged.

Generally speaking, civilians who enjoy extensive civil and political rights are more likely to support their government than those who do not enjoy such rights. It follows that civilians with rights are more likely to be attacked by rebels or enemy states during times of conflict than civilians without rights, other things being equal. For example, when extensive and indiscriminate state violence appears to be supported by civilians, it is hardly surprising that rebel movements would tend to view such civilians, as well as the states perpetrating such violence, as legitimate targets of violence; the purpose of such violence is to undermine these civilians’ support for their government. Extensive state (“wholesale”) terrorism thus begets extensive rebel (“retail”) terrorism in conflicts in which a citizenry with significant democratic rights supports the state’s violence. Such a citizenry would appear to be a common if not strictly necessary precondition for extensive terrorism by rebel movements (see Pape 2005 ; Goodwin 2006 ).

The indirect-war theory also helps us to understand why rebels who are fighting autocratic or authoritarian regimes tend to eschew terror tactics. Relatively few civilians tend to support such regimes, so there is no benefit in employing terror tactics against the general civilian population, unless for economic purposes. For example, the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua carried out virtually no terror attacks during its armed conflict with the autocratic Somoza dictatorship during the late 1970s, an otherwise bloody insurgency during which some 30,000 people were killed (Booth 1983 ). Civilians who supported the dictatorship consisted of a small number of Somoza cronies and a loyal elite opposition, both of which were drawn mainly from Nicaragua’s small bourgeoisie. Virtually all other civilians in Nicaragua, from the poorest peasant to Somoza’s bourgeois opponents, were viewed by the Sandinistas as potential allies, and indeed many would become such. It obviously made no sense to attack such people. Of course, had the Somoza dictatorship been supported by broader sectors of the population—by a broader class coalition, for example, or a large ethnic group—then the Sandinistas might very well have employed terror tactics against such sectors in order to undermine their support for the dictatorship.

In summary, armed groups, whether states or rebels, are likely to attack and terrorize noncombatants who politically or economically support enemy states or rebels. This is a way to undermine indirectly one’s armed enemies. By contrast, armed groups are unlikely to attack noncombatants who do not support enemy states or rebels. In such instances, attacking such noncombatants would serve no purpose and would alienate potential allies. Whether civilians are supporters of states or rebels, in other words, is the key to understanding why terror tactics are or are not likely to be employed against them in specific conflicts.

Contrasting Case Studies: Al Qaeda and the ANC

In the final section of this chapter, I want to illustrate, if only briefly, how the indirect-war theory of terrorism just outlined can help us to understand the contrasting tactics of two non-state armed groups—one that decided to employ terror tactics and one that rejected terror tactics, although not violence as such.

Al Qaeda, and armed groups affiliated with it, have carried out a number of terrorist attacks in recent years against US and certain European noncombatants (see e.g. Hoffman and Reinares 2014 ). Why does Al Qaeda attack such civilians? Why, in other words, has it chosen to employ terror tactics?

Al Qaeda adheres to the view that the global Muslim community, or umma , is currently oppressed by both “apostate” secular and “hypocritical” pseudo-Islamic regimes, from Morocco to the Philippines, as well as by the “Zionist entity” (Israel) in Palestine. And standing behind these regimes is the powerful US government and its European allies, especially the UK and France. Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups are hostile toward the United States and its allies for supporting repressive, un-Islamic regimes in Muslim countries. Al Qaeda believes that unless and until the US and its allies—the “far enemy”—can be compelled to end their support for these regimes—the “near enemy”—and withdraw their troops and other agents from Muslim countries, local struggles to overthrow these regimes cannot succeed (Gerges 2009 ).

Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups have attacked US military forces in the Middle East. But why have they also decided that ordinary civilians are legitimate targets of violence? After all, terrorism is rejected not only by mainstream Islamists, but also by many jihadists themselves. In fact, “when finally informed about the major attack against the United States [i.e. the 9/11 plot], most senior members of the Al Qaeda Shura Council reportedly objected on religious and strategic grounds; bin Laden overrode the majority’s decision, and the attacks went forward” (Gerges 2009 , 19).

Shortly after 9/11, Osama bin Laden described the rationale for the 9/11 attacks in an interview that first appeared in the Pakistani newspaper Ausaf on November 7, 2001:

The United States and their allies are killing us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine and Iraq. That’s why Muslims have the right to carry out revenge attacks on the U.S. … The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a committee that represents the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the atrocities that it is committing against Muslims. I demand the American people to take note of their government’s policy against Muslims. They described their government’s policy against Vietnam as wrong. They should now take the same stand that they did previously. The onus is on Americans to prevent Muslims from being killed at the hands of their government. (Quoted in Lawrence 2005 , 140–1.)

In short, bin Laden believed that American citizens support their government and its policies in the Middle East. They have elected and pay taxes to their government, which in his view makes them responsible for its actions in Muslim countries (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003 , 88–9). Al Qaeda views American citizens, in other words, not as “innocents,” but as economically and politically complicit in US-sponsored massacres and the oppression of Muslims. Bin Laden hoped that attacks on US citizens would lead them to reject and demand a change in the policies of their government in the Middle East. He hoped that Americans would oppose their government’s actions—as they did during the Vietnam War—in order to stop it from killing more Muslims and supporting oppressive regimes (Lawrence 2005 , 141). In short, Al Qaeda has attacked US citizens because they support Al Qaeda’s armed enemy (the US government) both politically and economically, and the purpose of such attacks is to undermine this support. All this is consonant with the indirect-war theory of terrorism.

The indirect-war theory, as we have seen, also proposes that armed groups are unlikely to employ terror tactics against civilians who are not supporters—or are divided in their support—of these groups’ armed enemies. An armed group is especially unlikely to employ terror tactics against a particular civilian group when some significant fraction of it has come to support that group; it would obviously make no sense for an armed group to attack a civilian population from which it draws a substantial number of supporters. Such terrorism would not only put at risk the support these warriors are receiving from those civilians, but would also make it much less likely that additional civilians would come to support these warriors.

The existence of a substantial group of “dissident civilians” of this type (i.e. civilians who support the armed enemies of “their” government or rebel group) seems largely to explain why the African National Congress—the leading anti-apartheid organization in South Africa—rejected the use of terror tactics against white South Africans. The ANC eschewed such tactics even though the apartheid regime that it sought to topple employed extensive violence, including terrorism, against its opponents. This violence, moreover, was clearly supported or tolerated by large segments of the white population. The Nationalist Party governments of the apartheid era which unleashed the security forces against the regime’s enemies were elected and widely supported by the white population, which enjoyed a range of political privileges and economic benefits under apartheid.

So why did the ANC refuse to view whites as such as enemies or to employ terror tactics against them? The answer lies in the ANC’s long history of “multiracialism,” that is, the collaboration of whites with black South Africans in the ANC (and with South Asian and “colored” or mixed race people), both inside the ANC and in allied organizations. Especially important in this respect was the ANC’s long collaboration with the South African Communist Party, which also has a long history of multiracialism. Tellingly, an important, long-time leader of the ANC’s armed wing was Joe Slovo, a white Communist. (This is analogous to an Israeli Jew leading Hamas’s armed wing or a Christian American directing Al Qaeda’s covert operations.)

For the ANC to have indiscriminately attacked white South Africans would have soured this strategic relationship, which, among other things, was essential for securing substantial Soviet aid for the ANC. Terrorism directed at white South Africans would also have put at risk the large amount of aid that the ANC received from Western Europe during the anti-apartheid struggle. In sum, given the longstanding multiracial—including international—support for the anti-apartheid movement, the use of terrorism against white civilians made little strategic sense to ANC leaders. The ANC would have been much more likely to employ terror tactics against white South Africans if the latter (as well as Europeans) more or less exclusively supported the apartheid regime and opposed the ANC.

Terrorism, understood as the killing of noncombatants in order to frighten or intimidate others, has long been an important method of warfare or contention for both states and non-state armed groups. However, neither traditional theories nor the currently dominant “radicalization” perspective on terrorism help us very much in understanding why states or rebels would choose to attack and intimidate civilians as opposed to soldiers or political elites. Some armed groups undoubtedly employ terrorism out of weakness and desperation, as a “last resort,” but many and probably most do not. Similarly, some warriors use terrorism as a retaliatory response to violence by others, but not always; and this claim fails to explain why warriors would retaliate against noncombatants in particular as opposed to soldiers. And the radicalization perspective, for its part, errs in assuming that all terrorists are ideologically radical and that individuals therefore become terrorists through a process of radicalization. In fact, terror tactics have been employed by rebels and states with a wide range of ideological views. Not all radicals, furthermore, employ terrorism or any other type of violent tactic for that matter.

I have argued, by contrast, that what I have called the indirect-war theory of terrorism offers a more adequate causal account of why some but not all states and armed groups have employed terror tactics. I have suggested that armed groups are likely to attack those civilians who are supporters—politically or economically—of these groups’ armed enemies. The purpose of terror tactics is to undermine civilian support for armed groups—and thereby to attack the latter indirectly. On the other hand, I have suggested that armed groups are unlikely to employ terror tactics against a civilian population when such groups are themselves supported by some significant fraction of that population. I illustrated this theory with the contrasting cases of Al Qaeda, which has employed terrorism in order to undermine civilian support for US and European government policies in the Middle East, and the African National Congress, which largely rejected terror tactics in its fight against apartheid, tactics which would have undermined the support it received from white South Africans and Europeans.

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Terrorism in International Relations Problem Solution Essay

Introduction.

Terrorism is no longer a new term in the international system. However, it is apparently clear that terrorism remains to be one of the most challenging problems as far as maintenance of security and order in the international system is concerned. It is quite difficult to clearly attain a complete definition of terrorism because of the increase in the number of terrorist actions in the world today.

Impacts of terrorism have become real and a challenge not only to the small states in the world, but also to the seeming giant nation states in the world, like the United States. A lot of efforts have been diverted at exploring terrorism as a result of the rate of insecurity in the international system that comes from terrorism and the fear of terrorism. One key finding is that terrorism is used both as a strategy and a tactic by diverse groups to advance their interests in the international system.

This paper presents an analysis of terrorism as a problem in international relations. The paper begins by defining terrorism and giving an overview of terrorism in the international system. The paper then explores the various aspects of terrorism and how they impact on relations within and between states in the international system. The paper brings out two main policy areas that are critical in addressing the problem of terrorism.

Overview of terrorism in international relations

As observed in the introduction, the effort of maintaining order and human security in the international system has been hampered by the emergence of terrorism in the international system. Efforts to develop mechanisms of combating terrorism have resulted in the development of the broader definition of terrorism.

According to the US Department of Defense, terrorism is defined as: “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (Terrorism Research, para. 3).

From the definition, it is clear that terrorism is a broad term that entails a broad range of criminal activities that are pursued by different groups to attain political, religious, as well as other ideologies that are portrayed in the nature of terrorism that is advanced by a given group. While it is argued that terrorism is not a new thing in the international system, it has become apparent that the scale of terrorism is advancing to the levels that are lethal to human security (Terrorism Research, para. 4).

Terrorism presents a challenge to the issue of arms deterrence and the proliferation of arms and weapons in the world. The other daunting task as far as efforts to combat terrorism are concerned is that terrorism has advanced to an extent that different forms of terrorism prevail. Terrorism has gone far beyond the use of real weapons to launch attacks on targets, to the use of biological weapons as well as breaches on information from terrorist groups as a way of causing insecurity and advancing their cause.

This is referred to as cyberterrorism. Other forms of terrorism include narcoterrorism and nuclear terrorism and ecoterrorism. The most important question to ask at this juncture concerns the motivation behind the acts or actions of terrorism in the international system. This question can be explored by unearthing different kinds of terrorism (Lake 18).

Perspectives and impacts of terrorism on actors and behaviors in the international system

From the exploration of the meaning of terrorism, it comes out that terrorism is a term that includes a wide range of activities that are meant to unleash violence and threats for the sake of advancing several goals. The mere linkage of terrorism to extremism as was associated with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States has been subjected to criticism due to the diverse number of terrorism forms that prevailed before and after the attack.

However, this does not mean that there are no acts of extremism in terrorism. In fact, terrorism itself is a form of expressing ideas and opinions through the use of outrageous forms of actions that depict extremism. The modern world is characterized by a lot of competition for development (Lake 15). As competition mounts, it is critical to note that the impacts of competition between and among states become real, and so is the contest between states and regions in different matters.

The likening of extremism to terrorism comes from the theories of international relations, where a number of actors in the international system seek relevance and recognition through advancement of extremist courses like terrorism. It is vital to bring out these actors as a leeway for understanding terrorism and what makes it daunting to deal with the problems of terrorism (Lake 18-19).

Actors in the international system as opined by the proponents of idealism include states, religious groups, non-governmental and international organizations, as well as different interest groups pursuing different courses for instance environmental and socioeconomic groups.

It is apparent that terrorism prevails in different regions in the world and is advanced by different groups, which are inclined to different agendas or ideologies. The presence of the Hezbollah terrorist group in the Middle East region and the emergence of Al Shabaab are indicators of the underlying issues of human security that need to be addressed in wholesome by actors in the international system (Lake 15-19).

According to Walter (335), the prevalence of insecurity in different regions due to acts of terrorism affects relations between states in economic and political matters. An example is giving out travel advisories by states as a result of the state of insecurity in a given state as posed by the presence of terrorist groups and the advancement of violence by the groups.

An example that can be given in this case is the de-linkage of a substantial number of states from Somalia due to the prevalence of the state of lawlessness in the country, which further encourages terrorism and sea piracy. This implies that terrorism results in a set of other complexities of states, resulting in socioeconomic and political complexities for states and affecting their status and influence in the international system.

Somalia and Pakistan have been categorized as terrorist zones. This continues to jeopardize the state of economic and social progress of these countries. The most critical question to pose concerns what other countries can do to improve the state of security in the world, and especially in the countries and regions that are prone to conflicts (Walter 335-338).

Jones and Libicki (9) observed that the mere fact that suspects of terrorism in the United States are Muslims has resulted in the tense relations between Islamic states in the world and the United States, and Western Europe in general. Relations between the United States and Islamic States have remained tense even as the United States accelerates its efforts to combat terrorism.

Even with the killing of Osama Bin Laden, who was termed as the leader of AL Qaeda, the state of insecurity as posed by danger of terrorism remains due to the prevalence of other interest groups that seek to pursue their interests in the international system. As a matter of fact, AL Qaeda is still termed as a threat to international security, which means that the group is not just possessed and driven by their leaders, but is influenced by an agenda or ideology that they want to make real.

A lot of focus by the main actors in the international system still looks into nuclear terrorism as a result of environmental extremism and the growth of different sub-forms of ecoterrorism. There are currently two conflicts between the United States and South Korea, on the one hand, and Iran on the other hand due to the development of nuclear power by these countries.

The main argument that comes out of these conflicts is that nuclear development can be diverted to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons that have far reaching impacts on human security (Jones and Libicki 11).

Policy recommendations on combating terrorism

As observed in the discussion, terrorism has evolved into different forms. In this regard, effective combat of terrorism and its subsequent threats to security in the international system requires the deployment of multi-faceted strategies.

A substantial number of antiterrorism policies have been developed as measures to combat terrorism. However, one thing that is eminent in these strategies is that they do not explore the underlying issues behind development and sustenance of terrorist groups in the world (Frey and Luechinger 509-510).

Terrorist groups have diverse ideologies, thus the use of deterrence to lock out these groups from advancing their course has failed to work. There is a need to dig deeper into the diverse strains of terrorism and their underlying factors in order to neutralize the terrorist groups. One thing that is eminent in terrorism is that terrorist groups, in one way or another, have economic, social and political agendas.

Therefore, it is critical to decentralize the decision making environment to allow incorporation of the grievances of these groups in decision making in the national and international arenas, instead of strengthening the grounds to deny the terrorist groups a chance to pursue their activities (Frey and Luechinger 513).

Countries seem to act in a unitary way in the deployment of counterterrorism measures. The diverse forms of terrorism that prevail in the globalized world today require establishment of a thick intelligence network. Such a network cannot be easily advanced by a solitary state, but it requires the cooperation of all states (Trager and Zagorcheva 87-88).

Terrorism has resounding impacts on human security across the globe. From the discussion, it can be concluded that different forms of terrorism have emerged, thus posing a challenge to states and policy makers who aim to combat terrorism.

There is need to adopt a holistic approach in counterterrorism. The implication of this is that states have to cooperate with other states, as well as the terrorist networks as a way of bringing out and addressing the underlying issues that cultivate the ground for advancement of terrorism.

Works Cited

Frey, Bruno S, and Simon, Luechinger. “Decentralization as a Disincentive for Terror.” European Journal of Political Economy 20.2(2004): 509-515. Print.

Jones, Seth G, and Martin C. Libicki. How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida . Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008. Print.

Lake, David A. “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century.” Dialogue IO 1.1(2002): 15-29. Print.

Terrorism Research. What is Terrorism?, n.d. Web.

Trager, Robert F, and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done.” International Security 30.3(2006): 87-123. Print.

Walter, Barbara F. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International Organization 51.3(1997): 335-64. Print.

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Philippine Anti-Terrorism Law: Critical Reflections

Posted by CenPEG 03 April 2021

On July 3, 2020, at a time when death toll continued to rise due to the COVID-19 pandemic and President Duterte’s “war on drugs” campaign, the highly contentious Republic Act No. 11479 or Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) repealing Human Security Act of 2007, was signed into law. At this time when local laws can seem to hardly safeguard human rights which now are at stake, can international law and treaty be used as a recourse? Or will it further legitimize the order?

A virtual forum shedding light on these issues was hosted on March 20, 2021 by the policy think tank Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG). Entitled “International Counterterrorism Law and the Challenge to the Revised Philippine Anti-Terrorism Law: Critical Reflections,” the forum had three human rights lawyers and academics in the panel: Atty. Jayson Lamchek, PhD, as the main speaker, with former Bayan Muna Representative Atty. Neri Colmenares, and Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Director Francis Tom Temprosa as reactors.

Dr. Lamchek is an Honorary Fellow at Australian National University’s (ANU) College of Law. He obtained his PhD also at ANU’s Asia Pacific College of Diplomacy. He has two MA degrees: M.A. in Human Rights Practice (Erasmus Mundus) (Distinction), University of Roehampton (UK); and M.A. in Public Administration
(Peace and Conflict Studies concentration), International Christian University Tokyo. Lamchek is an alumnus of the University of the Philippines where he took up law and BA in Philosophy (magna cum laude).

Dr. Lamchek began his presentation by disclosing that various concepts found in the ATA are adopted from international sources, particularly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373, as previously reiterated by ATA author Sen. Panfilo Lacson justifying its passage. The same was also cited by the Supreme Court during a series of oral arguments in the wake of petitions questing its validity.

International counterterrorism law, as Dr. Lamchek posited, is a sprawling, transnational body of laws that counters terrorism as a national and global security concern. Its main resources are the UNSC resolutions under UN Charter Chapter VII, which are furthered by the concurrence of regional (e.g. European Union), and informal organizations (e.g. Financial Action Task Force), clubs (e.g. Global Counterterrorism Forum), and foreign national legal systems.

Due to the vastness and complexity of international laws related to counterterrorism, reactor Atty. Temprosa regarded international counterterrorism as fragmented, from which Dr. Lamchek dissented due to the order it is able to create and maintain.

To concretize counterterrorism, soft measures or “Human Rights-Compliant Counterterrorism” underscoring other forms of terrorism such as community policing and ordinary legal system, were introduced as an alternative to hard measures (military operation). In his recently published book “Human Rights-Compliant Counterterrorism: Myth-making and Reality in the Philippines and Indonesia,” Dr. Lamchek emphasized that human rights, while being recognized, is not comprehensively underscored in the global discourse. Firmly distinguished from non-state sponsored terrorism, state violence is always justified in the name of state security. By disregarding and derogating constitutional rights and values, the international counterterrorism is deemed “anti-constitutionalist,” he said.

In reality, a treaty on global counterterrorism, a potential mitigating measure against the human rights violations on both local and global levels, is non-existent. This problematic nature of counterterrorism, as Atty. Temprosa pointed out, stems from the lack of a universal definition of terrorism, which, for Atty. Colmenares, can be attributed to the framers – UN Security Council member states – the same governments practicing “legitimate” terrorism and are responsible for the proliferation of terrorist groups.

Smaller and weaker states, CenPEG Chair Dr. Temario Rivera added, while in theory are represented in the UN General Assembly, are generally “voiceless” as compared to dominant states occupying highest positions in the decision making body, such as the case of UNSC. This “hegemonic order” and the weak participation of other stakeholders will make any efforts of human rights protection futile, Atty. Colmenares argued.

This legitimacy descending from the international milieu makes the Supreme Court “caught up” which in turn will make the legal challenge to the ATA a risky move, according to Dr. Lamchek. However, for Atty. Colmenares, the “push back,” of this body of laws, as evidenced by foreign domestic terror laws flagged down by UN agencies and courts, can also be used as a bullet against the state-protected ATA. This is not to mention the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and international tribunals’ decisions on top of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which after all, as Atty. Colmenares underscored, will be the main source of all argumentations. In the end, Dr. Lamchek advised to exhaust all the means to defend human rights guided by a critical perspective.

As terrorism sabotages state security, state prerogative to safeguard itself at the expense of citizens’ rights is permitted through the lens of the international community. But human rights and the battle against terrorism are “mutually reinforcing and complementary.” Hence, the perspective that “the state should really espouse international values at the altar of sacrificing human dignity and morals” should never be embraced, according to Atty. Temprosa.

As a band-aid solution that jeopardizes basic human rights, the Anti-Terrorism Law will not deter or eradicate terrorism. It is the “conditions conducive to terrorism” – poverty, inequality, and injustice – that deserve a critical look, if and only if there is a miniscule of truth behind the government’s pledge to address the issue. And creating laws respectful of human rights, as well as reviving the disrupted peace process can potentially jumpstart the pursuit of a just and humane society.

Moderating the forum was Dr. Temario C. Rivera, CenPEG’s Board chair. It was attended by more than 100 participating, with Facebook streamlining.

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Terrorism Essay Examples

Terrorism is a topic that encompasses a wide range of issues, including its causes, effects, and strategies to combat it. Essays on this subject can be informative, persuasive, argumentative or a combination of these types.

These essays demand thorough research and critical thinking, as they explore complex and often controversial issues. The goal is not only to present facts but also to make a compelling argument, drawing on evidence and logical reasoning

The structure of an essay on terrorism generally follows the traditional essay format, which includes an introduction, body paragraphs, and a conclusion. However, the specific content within these sections may vary depending on the type of essay (e.g., informative, argumentative, persuasive, etc.).

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Essays about terrorism play a crucial role in understanding one of the most pressing global challenges of our time. The purpose of such essays is to analyze the motivations, methods, impacts, and countermeasures related to acts of terrorism. By examining the complexities of terrorism, these essays contribute to informed discussions, policy decisions, and efforts to prevent and counteract terrorism.

One of the primary goals of essays about terrorism is to understand the motivations that drive individuals and groups to engage in acts of terrorism. These essays explore factors such as political, religious, ideological, and social grievances that may contribute to radicalization.

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