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• Last Updated: Jul 16, 2023

Darwinism, named after its pioneer Charles Darwin, refers to the evolutionary theory he proposed, which has since served as the foundational concept of biological sciences [1] . This theory was first articulated in his seminal work, “On the Origin of Species,” where he argued that all species of organisms arise and develop through the natural selection of small, inherited variations that increase the individual’s ability to compete, survive, and reproduce [1] .

Before Darwin, theories of life were largely shaped by religious and philosophical views, most notably the concept of special creation, which posited that each species was independently created. However, Darwin’s ideas, based on empirical evidence and his extensive observations during his voyage on the Beagle, challenged these beliefs and set a new course for understanding the natural world [2] .

Darwin’s idea of natural selection, often described by the phrase “ survival of the fittest ,” suggested that individuals best adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and pass their traits onto their offspring [1] . Over generations, this process would lead to species gradually changing and new species emerging.

While Darwinism primarily focused on biological evolution, his ideas have had profound implications beyond the field of biology, influencing various domains, including psychology, sociology , and anthropology .

Importance and Relevance of the Topic

The relevance and importance of Darwinism in anthropological studies cannot be overstated. Darwin’s ideas have significantly shaped how anthropologists understand human evolution, behavior, culture, and society [3] . By emphasizing the role of natural selection and adaptation in human development, Darwinism offers a crucial lens through which to view the biological and cultural diversity of humans across time and space.

The concept of evolution is integral to biological anthropology , providing explanations for physical variation among humans and the biological processes involved. Meanwhile, cultural anthropologists use evolutionary concepts to analyze how human societies evolve and adapt, not just biologically but also in terms of their cultural practices and societal structures.

In the realm of linguistic anthropology , the evolutionary perspective helps in tracing the development and diversification of languages over time. And in archaeology , Darwinian principles guide understanding of how technological innovations spread and transform societies.

Moreover, despite being more than a century old, Darwinism remains relevant in the contemporary discourse. As we continue to grapple with challenges such as climate change, disease pandemics, and societal inequality, the principles of Darwinism can offer valuable insights into how human populations adapt and respond to changing environmental and social conditions.

Charles Darwin: Life and Legacy

Charles Darwin was born on February 12, 1809, in Shrewsbury, England, into a family of well-respected and well-off doctors. His early education included a stint studying medicine at the University of Edinburgh, but he was uninterested in the field. He then went to Christ’s College, Cambridge, intending to become a clergyman.

The turning point in his life was a five-year voyage aboard the HMS Beagle , which set sail in December 1831 [2] . The Beagle’s journey took Darwin around the world, and his duties as a naturalist provided him with ample opportunities to observe and document the natural world.

The voyage was pivotal in shaping Darwin’s ideas about natural selection. Particularly influential was his visit to the Galapagos Islands, where he noticed slight variations in the traits of animals from different islands, which would later inform his ideas about evolution.

After returning to England, Darwin spent decades developing his theory, eventually publishing “On the Origin of Species” in 1859. In it, he presented substantial evidence supporting his theory of evolution and the mechanism of natural selection, challenging the prevailing belief in the special creation of species [1] . His work ignited a revolution in scientific thought, and its influences continue to resonate across various scientific disciplines [3] .

Evolutionary Theory: Natural Selection and Survival of the Fittest

The theory of evolution by natural selection, as proposed by Darwin, posits that organisms with traits better suited to their environment are more likely to survive and reproduce. These advantageous traits, being heritable, are more likely to be passed on to the next generation, leading to gradual changes in species over time [1] .

The concept of “survival of the fittest” encapsulates this idea. Herbert Spencer, a contemporary of Darwin’s, coined this phrase after reading “On the Origin of Species.” It’s important to note that “fit” in this context refers to an organism’s reproductive success, rather than physical fitness [4] .

Evolution by natural selection emphasizes the dynamic relationship between organisms and their environment. Environmental pressures influence the survival and reproduction of individuals, and over time, populations evolve to exhibit traits that enhance survival and reproductive success in specific environmental conditions [5] .

This evolutionary framework provides a powerful tool for understanding the diversity of life on Earth, explaining how complex organisms and ecosystems can arise from simple, gradual processes over geological time scales. It remains a cornerstone of modern biology and related disciplines, including anthropology, offering insights into the evolutionary history and adaptive nature of humans [5] .

Debunking Misconceptions About Darwinism

Despite the acceptance of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection in scientific communities, public misunderstanding and misconceptions persist. Here, we will debunk some of the most common misconceptions.

• Survival of the Fittest Means “Survival of the Strongest”: The phrase “survival of the fittest” is often misunderstood to mean “survival of the strongest” or the most physically fit. In reality, “fit” in this context refers to an organism’s ability to survive and reproduce in its environment [5] . Sometimes, this might mean being the fastest or strongest, but it could also mean being the most resistant to a particular disease, the most adept at finding food, or even being the most attractive to potential mates.
• Humans Descended from Monkeys: While humans and monkeys share a common ancestor, humans did not evolve from monkeys. The common ancestor that humans share with monkeys existed millions of years ago and is now extinct. Over time, different evolutionary paths led to the diverse array of primates we see today, including both humans and monkeys.
• Evolution Is Just a Theory: In scientific terminology, a “theory” is a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world, based on a body of evidence. This is different from the everyday use of “theory” as a guess or a hunch. The theory of evolution is supported by an extensive body of evidence from a wide range of scientific disciplines, including paleontology, genetics, and comparative anatomy.
• Evolution Leads to Perfection: Evolution does not lead to perfect organisms. Instead, it leads to organisms that are well-suited for their specific environments at a particular time. Furthermore, evolution does not necessarily lead to increased complexity. In some cases, simpler traits or structures may be more advantageous [6] .

Biological Anthropology: Human Evolution and Physical Adaptation

Biological anthropology, also known as physical anthropology, applies the principles of evolution to understand human physical characteristics and behavior. Through the study of fossils, genetics, and human variation, biological anthropologists trace our species’ evolutionary history, shedding light on how we’ve physically adapted to changing environments.

One crucial area of study is the evolution of human traits such as bipedalism, increased brain size, and reduced dentition. By comparing the skeletal and genetic characteristics of modern humans with extinct hominins and other primates, researchers can gain insights into our species’ unique evolutionary pathway.

Cultural Anthropology: Cultural Evolution and Change

Cultural anthropology investigates human societies and cultures, studying how humans construct and interpret their social worlds [7] . Cultural anthropologists often employ Darwinian principles to explain cultural changes and diversity.

Cultural evolution refers to the change in human culture over time, driven by mechanisms such as innovation, social learning, and cultural selection. For instance, social norms, belief systems, or technologies that contribute to the survival or reproduction of a group may spread through a population, much like advantageous genes spread in biological evolution [3] .

Linguistic Anthropology: Language Evolution

Linguistic anthropology examines language in social and cultural contexts. The evolution of language, in particular, is a fascinating area of study. Although the origins of language remain shrouded in mystery due to lack of physical evidence, linguistic anthropologists use various approaches to trace language development and change.

Some theories propose that language evolved as a form of social bonding, while others suggest it arose from the need to share complex ideas. By studying existing languages and their changes over time, linguistic anthropologists can infer how languages may have evolved and diversified.

Archaeology: Technological Evolution and Material Culture

Archaeology, the study of past human societies through their material remains, often incorporates Darwinian principles to explain technological change and evolution. For instance, stone tools, pottery, and metal artifacts can all provide evidence of how technology has evolved in response to changing environmental and social conditions.

The spread of technologies, whether through independent invention, diffusion, or migration, can be studied in a similar vein to genetic spread in populations. Understanding the evolution of material culture can reveal insights into past human behaviors, adaptations, and societal changes.

Criticisms of Darwinism in Anthropological Theory

Despite its widely acknowledged significance, Darwinism is not free from critique within anthropological theory. Some criticisms argue that Darwinian principles, primarily derived from studies of non-human species, may not fully explain the complexity of human behavior and culture [8] . For example, the role of agency, conscious thought, and symbolic meanings, key aspects of human societies, are not easily incorporated into Darwinian frameworks.

Moreover, some argue that Darwinian theory, by focusing on adaptation and survival, may oversimplify human diversity, reducing cultural phenomena to mere survival strategies. In other words, not all cultural practices can be neatly explained by adaptive benefits. Critics also point out that Darwinism can lead to biological determinism, neglecting the influence of social, historical, and environmental contexts in shaping human behaviors and cultures.

Darwinism vs. Creationism: Cultural and Societal Perspectives

The ongoing debate between Darwinism and Creationism represents a clash of cultural and societal perspectives regarding the origins and development of life on Earth. Darwinism, grounded in scientific theory and evidence, posits that species have evolved over time through natural selection and common ancestry. Creationism, on the other hand, is rooted in religious beliefs and asserts that a divine being created the universe and all living organisms in their current form.

From a cultural perspective, beliefs about the origins of life are deeply intertwined with religious, philosophical, and cultural worldviews. Creationism often finds its roots in religious texts, such as the accounts of creation found in the Bible. For many adherents, these accounts hold profound spiritual and moral significance, providing a framework for understanding the purpose and meaning of human existence.

Societally, the debate between Darwinism and Creationism has had significant implications, particularly in educational settings. The teaching of evolutionary theory, as supported by scientific consensus, has faced opposition from Creationist groups and individuals who advocate for the inclusion of alternative views, such as Intelligent Design, in science curricula. These debates highlight larger societal tensions between science, religion, and the role of education in shaping public knowledge and understanding.

Moreover, the Darwinism versus Creationism debate is not limited to academic or scientific circles. It has found expression in legal battles, public policy discussions, and broader cultural discourse. For example, court cases regarding the teaching of evolution in schools, such as the famous Scopes Trial in 1925, have drawn public attention to the clash between scientific and religious perspectives. Similarly, controversies surrounding the inclusion or exclusion of Creationism in science education reflect divergent views on the appropriate role of religion in public schools.

It is important to note that many individuals and religious communities find ways to reconcile Darwinian evolutionary theory with their religious beliefs. They interpret religious texts metaphorically or see the process of evolution as part of the divine plan. The perspectives on Darwinism and Creationism within cultures and societies can be diverse, nuanced, and subject to personal interpretation.

The Darwinism versus Creationism debate raises profound questions about the nature of scientific inquiry, the limits of knowledge, and the interplay between science and religion in society . It underscores the complexities of navigating differing worldviews and the ongoing tension between empirical evidence and deeply held beliefs in cultural and societal contexts.

The Role of Determinism in Darwinism

Determinism in Darwinism refers to the idea that natural selection and genetic inheritance strictly determine biological characteristics and behaviors. This perspective, often known as biological determinism, asserts that genes determine everything about an organism, from physical traits to behaviors, with minimal influence from the environment or learning.

However, modern understandings of genetics and evolution reject such a simplistic view. Current research recognizes the importance of gene-environment interactions, epigenetics, and developmental plasticity, emphasizing that while genes provide a blueprint, they do not dictate the final outcome. This nuanced understanding challenges deterministic views, acknowledging that while Darwinian principles are integral to our understanding of life, they do not solely determine the trajectory of an organism’s development.

Case Study 1: Specific Anthropological Application of Darwinism (Biocultural Adaptation)

A perfect example of a biocultural adaptation, where both biological and cultural factors play a role, is the prevalence of lactose tolerance among certain human populations. Originally, all humans were lactose intolerant after weaning, but with the advent of dairy farming, a significant mutation allowed certain populations to digest lactose into adulthood. This adaptation was not evenly spread globally but is particularly prevalent among populations with a historical dependence on unfermented milk products, such as Northern Europeans.

Case Study 2: Cultural Evolution in a Particular Society (Technological Advancements)

The cultural evolution of Japanese society, particularly in terms of technology, provides a vivid illustration of Darwinian principles. Japan’s technological evolution can be seen as an adaptive response to both internal needs and external pressures. For instance, the rapid industrialization during the Meiji era (1868-1912) was a cultural adaptation to the need for modernization and international competition. More recently, Japan’s development of advanced robotics and AI technologies can be seen as cultural adaptations to an aging population and labor shortages.

Case Study 3: Linguistic Evolution (Evolution of a Particular Language)

The evolution of English provides a fascinating study in linguistic anthropology. Originally a Germanic language, Old English underwent substantial changes due to Norman French influence after the Norman Conquest in the 11th century. This period of contact led to significant lexical borrowing, resulting in a more complex vocabulary system. English continued to evolve through the centuries, adapting to societal changes, technological advancements, and increased globalization, resulting in the rich and varied language we know today.

Intersection of Darwinism and Genetics: Understanding Human Diversity

The fusion of Darwinian theory with the science of genetics has revolutionized our understanding of human diversity. This intersection is best exemplified in the field of population genetics, which studies the distribution and change of frequencies of genetic variants within populations, revealing insights into human evolutionary history.

For instance, studies on genetic diversity among human populations have deepened our understanding of migration patterns, interbreeding with archaic hominins, and adaptive evolution in response to diseases, diet, and climate. Moreover, the advent of genomics and advances in DNA sequencing technology have made it possible to trace human evolution and migration more precisely than ever before.

The Role of Darwinism in Contemporary Anthropology

In contemporary anthropology, Darwinian theory remains foundational, especially in areas like biological anthropology and archaeology. However, anthropologists today take a more nuanced approach, recognizing that while natural selection plays a critical role, human evolution is influenced by a multitude of other factors including cultural, social, and environmental variables.

Furthermore, contemporary anthropologists often draw upon theories of “dual inheritance” or “gene-culture coevolution,” which posit that human behavior and culture are products of the interaction between genetic and cultural evolution. Darwinism in the 21st-century, thus, continues to be a crucial part of anthropological theory, but its application is now more multifaceted and integrated with other scientific insights.

Implications for Future Anthropological Studies

In future anthropological studies, Darwinian theory will continue to play a crucial role, albeit within an increasingly interdisciplinary and nuanced context. For one, the burgeoning field of cultural evolutionary studies, which applies evolutionary concepts to understand cultural change over time, is reinvigorating the interface between anthropology and Darwinism. This research is not merely about identifying patterns of cultural change but understanding the mechanisms that drive these patterns, from technological advances to environmental shifts.

Moreover, advancements in genetics and genomics, coupled with archaeological and paleoanthropological evidence, are increasingly enriching our understanding of human evolution and diversity. Future anthropological studies will undoubtedly leverage these technological advancements, leading to deeper insights into how genes, culture, and environment interact over time.

An essential aspect of future anthropological research will be to critically examine and address the ethical, sociopolitical, and cultural implications of these scientific advancements. Anthropologists, for example, will need to carefully consider the ethical implications of genetic research, such as the privacy concerns of study participants and potential misuse of genetic data.

The growing recognition of the importance of culture in human evolution will also entail a more holistic and nuanced understanding of human behavior and societies. This includes not only focusing on how culture shapes human evolution but also understanding how societal structures, institutions, and power dynamics influence the process and direction of cultural evolution.

Finally, anthropological studies will continue to contribute to global conversations on critical issues, such as climate change and public health. By integrating evolutionary perspectives, anthropologists can offer unique insights into how humans have adapted to changing environments in the past and how we might respond to future challenges.

FAQs about Darwinism

Darwinism is the idea that species change over time because of natural selection. It’s like nature choosing who is fit to survive based on traits that help them live better.

An example of Darwinism is the finches on Galapagos Islands. Their beaks adapted to different types of food over time, showing that species can change based on what helps them survive.

Social Darwinism is a theory that says human societies work like nature. People who are stronger, smarter, or better in some way are more likely to succeed.

Yes, Darwin’s theory of evolution is largely accepted in the scientific community. It’s supported by a lot of evidence from fossils, genetics, and more, but it keeps evolving as we learn more.

The five points of Darwinism are: evolution happens; evolution is gradual; species share a common ancestry; species diverge through “speciation”; and natural selection is the primary mechanism of evolution.

Darwinism is known for explaining how species change over time. It’s famous for the idea of “survival of the fittest” where traits that help survival become more common in species over time.

The term “Darwinism” was coined by Thomas Henry Huxley, a supporter of Charles Darwin, to describe Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection.

The two main concepts of Darwinism are natural selection and common descent. Natural selection is the process where helpful traits become more common over time, and common descent means that all living things come from a common ancestor.

[1] Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life. London: John Murray. https://www.loc.gov/item/06017473/

[2] Darwin, C. (1839). Journal of researches into the geology and natural history of the various countries visited by H.M.S. Beagle. London: Henry Colburn. https://www.christies.com/en/lot/lot-5495303

[3] Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226712130.001.0001

[4] Spencer, H. (1864). Principles of Biology. London: Williams and Norgate.

[5] Mayr, E. (2001). What evolution is. New York, NY: Basic Books.

[6] Gould, S. J. (2002). The structure of evolutionary theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

[7] Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic Books.

[8] Ingold, T. (2007). The trouble with ‘Evolutionary Biology’. Anthropology Today, 23(2), 13–17.

[9] Mayr, E. (1982). The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.216.4548.842

Vasundhra, an anthropologist, embarks on a captivating journey to decode the enigmatic tapestry of human society. Fueled by an insatiable curiosity, she unravels the intricacies of social phenomena, immersing herself in the lived experiences of diverse cultures. Armed with an unwavering passion for understanding the very essence of our existence, Vasundhra fearlessly navigates the labyrinth of genetic and social complexities that shape our collective identity. Her recent publication unveils the story of the Ancient DNA field, illuminating the pervasive global North-South divide. With an irresistible blend of eloquence and scientific rigor, Vasundhra effortlessly captivates audiences, transporting them to the frontiers of anthropological exploration.

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Darwinism designates a distinctive form of evolutionary explanation for the history and diversity of life on earth. Its original formulation is provided in the first edition of On the Origin of Species in 1859. This entry first formulates ‘Darwin’s Darwinism’ in terms of five philosophically distinctive themes: (i) probability and chance, (ii) the nature, power and scope of selection, (iii) adaptation and teleology, (iv) nominalism vs. essentialism about species and (v) the tempo and mode of evolutionary change. Both Darwin and his critics recognized that his approach to evolution was distinctive on each of these topics, and it remains true that, though Darwinism has developed in many ways unforeseen by Darwin, its proponents and critics continue to differentiate it from other approaches in evolutionary biology by focusing on these themes. This point is illustrated in the second half of the entry by looking at current debates in the philosophy of evolutionary biology on these five themes.

1. Introduction

2.1 darwin’s life, 2.2 darwin’s darwinism, 2.3 philosophical problems with darwin’s darwinism, 3.1 the roles of chance in evolutionary theory, 3.2 the nature, power and scope of selection, 3.3 selection, adaptation and teleology, 3.4 species and the concept of ‘species’, further reading, other internet resources, related entries.

Scientific theories are historical entities. Often you can identify key individuals and documents that are the sources of new theories—Einstein’s 1905 papers, Copernicus’ 1539 De Revolutionibus , Darwin’s On the Origin of Species . Sometimes, but not always, the theory tends in popular parlance to be named after the author of these seminal documents, as is the case with Darwinism.

But like every historical entity, theories undergo change through time. Indeed a scientific theory might undergo such significant changes that the only point of continuing to name it after its source is to identify its lineage and ancestry. This is decidedly not the case with Darwinism. As Jean Gayon has put it:

The Darwin-Darwinism relation is in certain respects a causal relation, in the sense that Darwin influenced the debates that followed him. But there is also something more: a kind of isomorphism between Darwin’s Darwinism and historical Darwinism. It is as though Darwin’s own contribution has constrained the conceptual and empirical development of evolutionary biology ever after. (Gayon 2003, 241)

Darwinism identifies a core set of concepts, principles and methodological maxims that were first articulated and defended by Charles Darwin and which continue to be identified with a certain approach to evolutionary questions. [ 1 ] We will thus need to begin with Darwin’s Darwinism as articulated in On the Origin of Species in 1859. We will then examine these same themes as they have been discussed by evolutionary biologists and philosophers of biology from the beginnings of the Neo-Darwinian Synthesis to the present.

Charles Darwin was not, as we use the term today, a philosopher, though he was often so described during his lifetime. [ 2 ] Nevertheless, for an encyclopedia of philosophy what is needed is a discussion of the impact of philosophy on Darwin’s Darwinism, and the impact of Darwin’s Darwinism on topics that both he, and we, would consider philosophical. We focus here on the impact of philosophical discussions about the nature of science during Darwin’s lifetime on Darwin’s scientific research, thinking and writing; and on the impact of that research, thinking and writing on philosophy. Taking the time to do such philosophical archaeology stems from a conviction that if the concept of Darwinism has legitimate application today, it is due to a set of principles, both scientific and philosophical, that were articulated by Darwin and that are still widely shared by those who call themselves ‘Darwinians’ or ‘neo-Darwinians’.

2. Darwin and Darwinism

Charles Darwin was born February 12, 1809 and died April 18, 1882. It was a time of radical changes in British culture, and his family background put him in the midst of those changes. His grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, was a prosperous and highly respected physician living in Western England, south of Birmingham. He was also a philosophical radical, advocating Enlightenment ideas about human equality and liberty, including the liberty to think freely about the existence of God and about natural origins for the earth’s creatures. He wrote a number of very popular works of natural history, some in verse, in which he defended views about progress that included evolutionary speculations about the upward progress of living things from primordial beginnings.

Erasmus Darwin was an early member of an informal group of free thinkers self-styled the Lunar Society, [ 3 ] that met regularly in Birmingham to discuss everything from the latest philosophical and scientific ideas to the latest advances in technology and industry. The Society included James Watt, Joseph Priestly and Charles Darwin’s other grandfather, Josiah Wedgwood. Wedgwood, like Erasmus Darwin, lived in Staffordshire and was in the process of developing a family pottery works into a major industrial concern by applying new scientific and technological ideas to the production of ‘china’. The religious inclinations of the group were ‘non-conforming’ and included a number of Unitarians, a sect Erasmus Darwin referred to as ‘a featherbed to catch a falling Christian’. Looked upon with suspicion by High Church conservatives, they actively promoted in Great Britain the revolutionary philosophical, scientific and political ideas sweeping across Europe and the Americas. Most had spent considerable time absorbing Enlightenment ideas in Edinburgh, Scotland.

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that Robert Darwin, Charles’ father, should follow in his father’s footsteps and become a doctor, nor that he should end up marrying Susannah Wedgwood, by all reports Josiah’s favorite offspring. Politically and philosophically engaged, Susannah worked to organize her children’s education in the town of Shrewsbury, where she and Robert took up residence. She sent her children to a day school operated by Unitarian minister Rev. George Case and this is where Charles began his education. Unfortunately, Susannah died in 1817 when Charles was only 8, and his father then transferred him to the Shrewsbury School, operated by Dr. Samuel Butler, grandfather of the novelist (and sometime satirist of Darwin’s work) of the same name. “Nothing could have been worse for the development of my mind than Dr. Butler’s school” Charles proclaimed in the autobiography he wrote for his family, and he escaped down the street to his home whenever he could.

His older siblings took good care of him, under the Doctor’s watchful eye. Early letters indicate that he and his brother Erasmus were enthusiastic amateur chemists, and after his brother went up to Cambridge their letters were often full of possible experiments, orders to purchase chemicals and equipment for their ‘laboratory’, and discussions of the latest discoveries. This was an obvious enough passion that his classmates nicknamed him ‘Gas’. During summers he helped his father on his rounds to his patients, and when only 16 his father sent him and his brother to Edinburgh for the best medical education Great Britain had to offer. Erasmus needed to move from Cambridge to a proper medical school to complete his medical education, and young Charles was taken out of Shrewsbury School early to accompany his brother to Edinburgh, apparently being prepared to follow in his father’s and grandfather’s footsteps in medicine. The two brothers arrived in Edinburgh in October of 1825. Erasmus left after the first year, leaving his brother on his own during his second year at Edinburgh.

Privately, Darwin early on decided he could not practice medicine. But his already serious inclination toward science was considerably strengthened at Edinburgh both by some fine scientific lectures in chemistry, geology and anatomy and by the mentoring of Dr. Robert Grant. Grant certainly knew that young Charles was Erasmus Darwin’s grandson; Grant expounded evolutionary ideas derived from Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and Charles’ grandfather. But his primary gift to Charles was introducing him to marine invertebrate anatomy and the use of the microscope as a scientific tool and as an aid to dissecting extremely small creatures dredged out of the Firth of Forth. Darwin joined an Edinburgh scientific society, the Plinean society, of which Grant was a prominent member, and presented two lectures that reported discoveries he had made while working with Grant. This interest in marine invertebrates was to be a life long obsession, climaxing in his massive four-volume contribution to the comparative anatomy and systematics of fossil and living Cirripedia or ‘barnacles’ (Barrett & Freeman 1988, vols. 11–13).

When he finally broke the news of his distaste for medicine to his father, he enrolled to take a degree in Divinity at Christ College, Cambridge University, from which he graduated in January of 1831. As with the Shrewsbury School and Edinburgh, his official course of study had very little impact on him, but while in Cambridge he befriended two young men attempting to institute serious reforms in the natural science curriculum at Cambridge, Rev. John Henslow, trained in botany and mineralogy, and Rev. Adam Sedgwick, a leading member of the rapidly expanding community of geologists. Henslow and his wife treated Darwin almost as a son, and through Henslow Darwin was introduced to the men whose ideas were currently being debated in geology and natural history, as well as to men whom we look back on as among the very first to take up the historical and philosophical foundations of science as a distinct discipline, Sir John Herschel and Rev. William Whewell. As he wrote in his autobiography:

During my last year at Cambridge, I read with care and profound interest Humboldt’s Personal Narrative . This work, and Sir J. Herschel’s Introduction to the Study of Natural Philosophy , [ 4 ] stirred up in me a burning zeal to add even the most humble contribution to the noble structure of Natural Science. No one or a dozen other books influenced me nearly so much as these two.

In the next section we will discuss the influence of the philosophical ideals of Herschel and Lyell on Darwin.

Furthering his scientific training, Adam Sedgwick on two occasions took Darwin on extended geological tours of England and Wales. In addition Darwin and a cousin, William Darwin Fox, a year ahead of him at Cambridge, developed what began as an amateur passion for bug collecting into serious entomology.

His Edinburgh and Cambridge mentors were to shape Darwin’s philosophical attitudes and scientific career decisively. It was Henslow who was the final link to Darwin in a chain connected to Captain Robert Fitzroy of H. M. S. Beagle. Fitzroy sought a gentleman companion who could also collect information on geology and natural history during a proposed circumnavigation of the globe. Henslow’s note to Darwin, asking if he would be interested in being recommended for this post, arrived at the Darwin home, ‘the Mount’, while Charles Darwin was on a geological survey of Northern Wales with Adam Sedgwick. After resistance from his father had been overcome, Darwin was offered the post and accepted it.

The combination of meticulous field observation, collection and experimentation, note taking, reading and thinking during what turned into the Beagle’s five year journey through a very wide cross-section of the earth’s environments was to set the course for the rest of his life. During the voyage he read and reread Charles Lyell’s newly published Principles of Geology , a three-volume work that articulated a philosophical vision of rigorously empirical historical science, oriented around five key ideas:

• The geologist investigates both the animate and inanimate changes that have taken place during the earth’s history.
• His principal tasks are to develop an accurate and comprehensive record of those changes, to encapsulate that knowledge in general laws, and to search for their causes.
• This search must be limited to causes that can be studied empirically—those ‘now in operation’, as Lyell puts it in the sub-title of his Principles .
• The records or ‘monuments’ of the earth’s past indicate a constant process of the ‘introduction’ and ‘extinction’ of species, and it is the geologist’s task to search for the causes of these introductions and extinctions, according to the strictures note in 3., above.
• The only serious attempt to do so according to the idea that species are capable of ‘indefinite modification’, that of Jean Baptiste Lamarck, is a failure on methodological grounds. All the evidence supports the view that species variability is limited, and that one species cannot be transformed into another.

This vision influenced Darwin profoundly, as he freely admitted. While he became convinced by his observations and reading that the fossil record and current distribution of species could only be due to the gradual transformation of one species into another, he was determined to articulate a theory that measured up to Lyell’s principles. The crucial event in convincing him that this was to be his life’s work was likely a visit to Cape Town, South Africa during the Beagle’s return trip to England. John F. W. Herschel was in Cape Town on a mission to do for the Southern Hemisphere what his father William had done for the Northern, namely to develop a comprehensive star map with the new powerful telescopes developed by his father and aunt. As noted earlier, Darwin had been deeply impressed by Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy when it first appeared a year before the Beagle set sail, and in his private journal he referred to his meetings with Herschel during a week long stop in Cape Town in June of 1836 as among the most profound events of the entire voyage. Just five months before meeting Darwin, Herschel had finished reading the 2 nd edition of Lyell’s Principles . He sent Lyell a long letter filled with detailed constructive commentary. The letter opens by praising Lyell for facing the issue of the ‘introduction of new species’—which Herschel calls ‘that mystery of mysteries’—scientifically, and for advocating that we search for ‘intermediate causes’ to explain these ‘introductions’—code for natural, as opposed to ‘miraculous’, causes. [ 5 ] This part of the letter was quoted in Charles Babbage’s Bridgewater Treatise , published in 1837 while Darwin was struggling to develop just such a theory. Upon reading the Herschel quotation in Babbage, Darwin wrote in his private ‘species’ notebooks:

Babbage 2d Edit, p. 226.—Herschel calls the appearance of new species. the mystery of mysteries. & has grand passage upon problem.! Hurrah.—“intermediate causes”. (Barrett et al., 1987, 413; original punctuation)

He clearly recognizes that Herschel is here providing a philosophical justification for the project upon which Darwin was secretly working. And, in the very first paragraph of On the Origin of Species , Darwin looks back to this ‘Hurrah’, attributing the idea that the origin of species is ‘that mystery of mysteries’ to ‘one of our greatest philosophers’, without mentioning Herschel by name. The first mention of the possibility of an evolutionary solution to this problem is in his Ornithological Notebooks , in a note written shortly after departing Cape Town. [ 6 ]

Darwin’s theoretical task was, by the time he opened his species notebooks, tolerably clear: the only process that could produce the systematic patterns in the fossil record and the otherwise strange biogeographic distribution of species he now understood so widely and deeply was a process of slow, gradual transformation of species. He needed to come up with a natural, causal theory that would account for such transformations, and every element of that theory had to identify ‘causes now in operation’, causes that could be investigated empirically. The problem, and the methodological constraints, had been advocated by his geological hero, and now close friend, Charles Lyell; and they had been defended philosophically by his philosophical hero, Sir John Herschel.

Darwin, of course, expected, and got, outraged reactions from religiously conservative colleagues, such as his old geology teacher Sedgwick, who in a review expressed his “deep aversion to the theory; because of its unflinching materialism;--because it has deserted the inductive track,--the only track that leads to physical truth;--because it utterly repudiates final causes, and therby [sic] indicates a demoralized understanding on the part of its advocates.” What he had not expected was Lyell’s refusal to openly endorse his theory and Herschel’s decisive (if polite) rejection of its key elements. After we set out the theory in its Darwinian form, we can consider these reactions from those who apparently shared Darwin’s philosophical norms about scientific theory, explanation and confirmation.

The theory can be set out as a series of causal elements that, working together, will produce the needed transformations.

• Species are comprised of individuals that vary ever so slightly from each other with respect to their many traits.
• Species have a tendency to increase in numbers over generations at a geometric rate.
• This tendency is checked, to use the language of Thomas Malthus’ On the Principle of Population , by limited resources, disease, predation, and so on, creating a struggle for survival among the members of a species.
• Some individuals will have variations that give them a slight advantage in this struggle, variations that allow more efficient or better access to resources, greater resistance to disease, greater success at avoiding predation, and so on.
• These individuals will tend to survive better and leave more offspring.
• Offspring tend to inherit the variations of their parents.
• Therefore favorable variations will tend to be passed on more frequently than others and thus be preserved, a tendency Darwin labeled ‘Natural Selection’.
• Over time, especially in a slowly changing environment, this process will cause the character of species to change.
• Given a long enough period of time, the descendant populations of an ancestor species will differ enough both from it and each other to be classified as different species, a process capable of indefinite iteration. There are, in addition, forces that encourage divergence among descendant populations, and the elimination of intermediate varieties.

It will be noticed that there is no element of this theory that is incapable of empirical investigation—indeed by now the published confirmatory studies of this process would fill a small library. [ 7 ] One can understand why devout and orthodox Christians would have problems; but why Darwin’s philosophical and scientific mentors? It would seem to be the model of Herschelian/Lyellian orthodoxy.

The answer lies in five philosophically problematic elements of the theory.

2.3.1 Probability and Chance

First, notice the use of the language of ‘tendencies’ and ‘frequencies’ in the above principles. Privately, Darwin learned, Herschel had referred to his theory as ‘the Law of higgledy-piggledy’, presumably a reference to the large element played in its key principles by chance and probability. Darwin’s theory is, as we would say today, a ‘statistical’ theory. One cannot say that every individual with favorable variation v will survive or will leave more offspring than individuals without it; one cannot say that no environment will ever support all of the offspring produced in a given generation, and thus that there must always be a competitive struggle. These are things that tend to happen due to clearly articulated causes, and this allows us to make accurate predictions about trends , at the level of populations, but not to make absolute claims about what must happen in each and every case. Only well after Herschel’s time did philosophers of science become comfortable with the idea of a theory of this sort, and the proper philosophical understanding of such explanations is still debated.

2.3.2 The Nature, Power and Scope of Selection

The core of Darwin’s theory is the concept of natural selection. Perhaps because of his use of the term selection, this core element of his theory apparently baffled nearly everyone. Could it be, as Lyell, Herschel and Darwin’s great American defender Asa Gray would ask, an ‘intermediate cause’, i.e. a causal principle instituted and sustained by God? Or is it, in its very nature, the antithesis of such a principle, as his old geology teacher Sedgwick believed? Could it possibly create species, or is it, by its nature, a negative force, eliminating what has already been created by other means? In one of his copies of On the Origin of Species , Alfred Russell Wallace crosses out ‘natural selection’ and writes ‘survival of the fittest’ next to it. Wallace always felt that ‘selection’ inappropriately imported anthropomorphic notions of Nature choosing purposefully between variants into natural history. And, in a devastating review, Fleeming Jenkin happily accepted the principle of natural selection but challenged its power to modify an ancestral species into descendent species, and thus limited its scope to the production of varieties. A number of reviewers, even some sympathetic ones, questioned the possibility of extending the theory to account for the evolution of those characteristics that differentiate humans from their nearest relatives.

2.3.3 Selection, Adaptation and Teleology

Moreover, because Darwin was very fond of describing natural selection as a process that worked for the good of each species, Darwin’s followers seemed to have diametrically opposed views as to whether his theory eliminated final causes from natural science or breathed new life into them. In either case, there was also serious disagreement on whether this was a good thing or a bad thing. [ 8 ]

2.3.4 Nominalism and Essentialism

There is a fundamental philosophical problem with the idea that a species can undergo a series of changes that will cause it to become one or more other species. To illustrate it, look carefully at the first question that Charles Lyell wishes to address in the second volume of the Principles of Geology :

…first, whether species have a real and permanent existence in nature; or whether they are capable, as some naturalists pretend, of being indefinitely modified in the course of a long series of generations. (Lyell 1831, II. 1)

Lyell pretty clearly assumes that to allow for evolution is to deny the reality of species. For a species to be ‘real’, it must have ‘permanent existence in nature’, or as he puts it elsewhere , “…fixed limits beyond which the descendants from common parents can never deviate from a certain type…”. (Lyell 1831, II. 23) To accept evolutionary change, on this view, you must become comfortable with a variety of nominalism about species. And Darwin seems to have become so. [ 9 ]

Hence I look at individual differences, though of small interest to the systematist, as of high importance for us, as being the first step towards such slight varieties as are barely thought worth recording in works on natural history. And I look at varieties which are in any degree more distinct and permanent, as steps leading to more strongly marked and more permanent varieties; and at these latter, as leading to sub-species, and to species. (Darwin 1859, 52)

Permanence, as applied to species, is for Darwin a relative concept, and there are no fixed limits to variability within a species. Given enough time the individual differences found in all populations can give rise to more permanent and stable varieties, these to sub-species, and these to populations that systematists will want to class as distinct species. Moreover, he concludes the Origin with very strong words on this topic, words bound to alarm his philosophical readers:

Systematists will be able to pursue their labours as at present; but they will not be incessantly haunted by the shadowy doubt whether this or that form be in essence a species. …In short, we will have to treat species in the same manner as those naturalists treat genera, who admit that genera are merely artificial combinations made for convenience. This may not be a cheering prospect; but we shall at least be freed from the vain search for the undiscovered and undiscoverable essence of the term species. (Darwin 1859, 485)

Lyell, Herschel, Whewell, Sedgwick and many of Darwin’s contemporaries certainly would not find this a cheering prospect, since they were unrepentant essentialists about species. [ 10 ] Members of a species possess a ‘type’ established in the original parents, and this type provides ‘fixed limits’ to variability. Lyell clearly feels this is an empirically verifiable fact—most of chapters 2–4 of Principles Vol. II is devoted to presenting the evidence that such ‘fixed limits’ exist; and after the Origin’s publication this evidence was canvassed again in Fleeming Jenkin’s review. If this is so, then species extinction is easy to account for—there are fixed limits to a species’ ability to track environmental change. But a naturalistic account of species origination is more difficult, since there will need to be, in sexually reproducing species, a natural production of a new pair of parents with a new type. On the other hand, to adopt the sort of nominalism that Darwin seems to be advocating in the above quotations has undesirable consequences as well. How are we to formulate objective principles of classification? What sort of a science of animals and plants will be possible if there are no fixed laws relating their natures to their characteristics and behaviors? A good deal of chapter 2 of Darwin’s Origin is devoted to convincing the reader that current best practice among botanists and zoologists accepts a natural world organized as he is insisting rather than as his opponents claim:

It must be admitted that many forms, considered by highly competent judges as varieties, have so perfectly the character of species that they are ranked by other highly competent judges as good and true species. (Darwin 1859, 49)

From a Darwinian perspective, this is a predictable consequence of the fact that the organisms we today wish to classify as species are merely the most recent stage of a slow, gradual evolutionary process. Organisms within a genus have common ancestors, perhaps relatively recent common ancestors; some naturalists may see ten species with a few varieties in each; others may rank some of the varieties as species and divide the same genus into twenty species. Both classifications may be done with the utmost objectivity and care by skilled observers. As systematists like to say, some of us are ‘lumpers’, some of us are ‘splitters’. Reality is neither.

2.3.5 Tempo and Mode of Evolutionary Change

The question of nominalism versus realism regarding species points toward a final aspect of Darwin’s theory with which many of those otherwise sympathetic to him disagreed, his gradualism. For apart from the question of whether his views entailed ‘nominalism’ about natural kinds, they do seem to reflect a belief that the evolutionary process must be a slow and gradual one. It is perhaps here that we see the most lasting impact of Darwin’s careful study of Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology while on H.M.S. Beagle. I stress slow and gradual, for it is clear that one could have a slow but non-gradual evolutionary process (perhaps the long periods of evolutionary stasis punctuated by geologically rapid periods of speciation postulated by Eldridge and Gould’s ‘punctuated equilibrium model’ is such); and one could have a rapid but gradual one (for example the process George Gaylord Simpson labeled ‘adaptive radiation’, where a population migrates to a location with a variety of unexploited niches, and rapidly evolves to exploit them). Darwin stresses over and over again that he conceives of natural selection ‘adding up infinitely small variations’, and that he imagines the process of speciation to take place over a very long period of time.

One of the strongest arguments for insisting that ‘Darwinism’ as it is used today is isomorphic to Darwin’s Darwinism, as Gayon puts it, is that each of these questions is still hotly debated, and has been throughout the theory’s history. With all of the amazing changes that have been wrought by the genetic, biochemical, and molecular revolutions, with the development of mathematical models of population genetics and ecology, of sophisticated techniques for both field and laboratory investigation of evolutionary processes, and of cladistic analysis in systematics, it nevertheless remains true that one can find evolutionary biologists who adhere to Darwin’s Darwinism, and are recognized as doing so by both themselves and their critics. In the next section of this article, I will develop a portrait of contemporary Darwinism around each of these contested features.

By the same token, however, Darwinism has evolved. As one example of this truth, think for a moment of contemporary debates about the nature of selection. The problems people had with natural selection in the 19 th century continue to be problematic, but there are a variety of problems that were either not discussed, or discussed very differently, in the 19 th century. Can, and does, natural selection work at levels other than the level of Darwin’s focus, individual organisms; is there a non-vacuous way to formulate the theory abstractly; how are we to understand the relationships between the concepts of fitness, selection and adaptation? How strong are the constraints on the selection process, and what sorts of constraints are there? Are there other motors of evolutionary change besides selection, and if so, how important are they? In particular, how important is ‘drift’, and how are we to differentiate it from selection?

3. The Five Core Philosophical Problems Today

Theories need both essences and histories. Stephen Jay Gould (2002, 1)

So reads the heading of the very first section of the first chapter of Gould’s monumental The Structure of Evolutionary Theory . Opening with a subtle reading of an exchange of letters in 1863 between paleontologist Hugh Falconer and Charles Darwin, Gould eventually explains what he has in mind by this section heading:

In short, “The structure of evolutionary theory” combines enough stability for coherence with enough change to keep any keen mind in a perpetual mode of search and challenge. (Gould 2002, 6)

Gould, of course, was both an unabashed admirer of Charles Darwin and one of the most outspoken critics of the ‘neo-Darwinian synthesis’. I will be using both his account of ‘the Essence of Darwinism’ in Part I of this magnum opus and his arguments for a ‘Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory’ in its Part II as touchstones and targets.

In the preceding section of this essay, I organized my discussion of the problems that Darwin’s allies had with Darwin’s Darwinism around five issues: [i] the role of chance as a factor in evolutionary theory and the theory’s apparently probabilistic nature; [ii] the nature of selection; [iii] the question of whether selection/adaptation explanations are teleological; [iv] the ontological status of species and the epistemological status of species concepts; and [v] the implications of Darwin’s insistence on the slow and gradual nature of evolutionary change. I claimed that one very good reason for continuing to characterize one dominant approach to evolutionary biology, that represented by the so-called ‘Neo-Darwinian Synthesis’, as ‘Darwinism’ is that its proponents side with Darwin on these issues (and on many less fundamental ones besides). That in itself is remarkable, but it is the more so because the Darwinian position on each of these issues is under as much pressure from non-Darwinian evolutionary biologists today as it was in the wake of the Origin . It is not surprising, given the situation as I have just characterized it, that historians and philosophers of biology have made significant contributions to the discussion, especially in pointing out the underlying philosophical issues and conceptual confusions and ambiguities that stand in the way of resolving the issues at hand, and their historical origins.

It is my conviction that a full understanding of the underlying philosophical disagreements on these questions will only come from a patient historical study of how the ‘Synthesis’ positions on these various issues, and those of their critics, arose. That I cannot do here. Rather, in what follows I will simply be presupposing certain answers to these questions of historical origins. The list of references at the end of this essay includes a number of excellent pieces of work on this subject for those who share my convictions about its importance.

The evolutionary process, as Darwin understood it, involves the generation of variation and a process producing a differential perpetuation of variation. One simple way to think about Darwinism in relation to a logical space of alternatives, then, is by means of the following variation grid :

The above grid might lead you to conclude that both non-fitness biased generation of variation and non-fitness biased perpetuation of variation would be properly labeled ‘chance.’ By seeing why that would be a misleading conclusion to draw, we get to the heart of the problem of the concept of ‘chance’ in contemporary Darwinism.

Let us begin with the language Darwin uses when he first sketches his theory at the beginning of the fourth chapter of the Origin :

Can it, then, be thought improbable , seeing that variations useful to man have undoubtedly occurred, that other variations useful in some way to each being in the great and complex battle of life, should sometimes occur in the course of thousands of generations? If such do occur, can we doubt (remembering that many more individuals are born than can possibly survive) that individuals having any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating their kind? (Darwin 1859, 80–81)

Unlike Darwin’s contemporaries, the founders of the synthesis of Mendelian genetics and Darwinian selection theory, Sewall Wright, Ronald Fisher and J. B. S. Haldane, were entirely comfortable with a selection theory formulated in such terms. On this issue, contemporary Darwinism agrees whole-heartedly with Charles Darwin. Note one clear statement of the Principle of Natural Selection from the philosophical literature:

If a is better adapted than b to their mutual environment E , then (probably) a will have greater reproductive success than b in E . (Brandon1990, 11).

The theory trades pervasively in probabilities. To take a simple case: if there are three possible combinations of alleles at a given locus in a population, we can characterize the outcome of a reproductive cycle as ‘chance’ if each of the three possible combinations occurs at a frequency determined strictly by the laws of probability. In any given case of reproduction, we would say, which genotype emerged is a matter of chance. Given the fact that evolutionary biologists, especially in so far as they take their cues from population genetics, deal with large populations conceived as ‘gene pools’, and think of evolution as long run changes in the frequencies of different combinations of genes from generation to generation, it is clear that, in this sense, chance permeates contemporary Darwinism. The models of population biology provide a means of assigning probabilities to various outcomes, given information about population size, rates of mutation and migration (themselves given as averages and estimates). That is, as Darwin notes, being relatively better adapted increases an organism’s ‘chances’, i.e. increases its probability, of leaving viable offspring. It does not guarantee it. Since natural selection is a stochastic process, Darwinians from Darwin to the present rightly characterize it in terms of influencing the ‘chances’ of a given outcome, given variables such as selection pressure, population size or mutation rates.

Conceptual confusion arises, however, from the fact that ‘chance’ and ‘randomness’ are often contrasted, not with ‘deterministic’ outcomes but with ‘selected’ outcomes. For example, when John Beatty describes ‘random drift’ as ‘changes in frequencies of variations due to chance’ in the following passage, he presumably has something like a contrast with changes in frequencies due to selection in mind.

In Darwin’s scheme of things, recall, chance events and natural selection were consecutive rather than alternative stages of the evolutionary process. There was no question as to which was more important at a particular stage. But now that we have the concept of random drift taking over where random variation leaves off, we are faced with just such a question. That is, given chance variations, are further changes in the frequencies of those variations more a matter of chance or more a matter of natural selection? (Beatty 1984, 196)

Notice that in the above quote we first get a substitution of ‘random’ for ‘chance’ in the phrases ‘random variation’ and ‘chance variation’, and then at least the suggestion that the concept of ‘random drift’ can be characterized as ‘changes in frequencies of variations due to chance’, where the contrast class consists of similar changes due to natural selection.

With respect to the generation of variation, chapter 5 of On the Origin of Species opens with the following apology:

I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variations—so common and multiform in organic beings under domestication, and in a lesser degree in those in a state of nature—had been due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation. (Darwin 1859, 131)

Here Darwin is noting that, though to speak of ‘chance variations’ may seem to be citing chance as the cause of the variations, in fact it is simply acknowledging that they ‘appear to have no assignable cause’. But it is important to keep historical context in mind here. Whether Darwin himself ever flirted with the idea of ‘directed’ variation or not, he was acutely aware of two views from which his needed to be distinguished, very different from each other, but both holding to the view that variations arose for a purpose. [ 11 ] The most widely shared alternative was that found in natural theology. To quote the Reverend William Paley’s Natural Theology , regarding a beautiful instance of adaptation: “A conformation so happy was not the gift of chance”. Likewise, among Darwin’s followers, the American botanist Asa Gray, in an essay entitled ‘Natural Selection and Natural Theology’, uses the same contrast to advise Darwin against the notion of ‘chance variation’: “…we should advise Mr. Darwin to assume, in the philosophy of his hypothesis, that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines.”

Gray is here insisting that, since Darwin admits that using the term ‘chance’ merely signals ignorance of the true cause, and since the pervasive adaptations in nature suggest design, Darwin should avoid the suggestion that variations are due to chance in the sense of ‘absence of design’ . [ 12 ]

Darwin, in fact never refers to ‘chance variations’ in the Origin , though occasionally he will note that if a beneficial variation ‘chances [i.e. happens] to appear’, it will be favored by selection (see pp. 37, 82) What Darwin has in mind, however, is clear from his concluding remarks in his chapter on Laws of Variation :

Whatever the cause may be of each slight difference in the offspring from their parents—and a cause of each must exist—it is the steady accumulation, through natural selection, of such differences, when beneficial to the individual, that gives rise to all the more important modifications of structure…“ (Darwin 1859, 170)

Whatever the cause of the generation of a variation may be, the role of selection is to accumulate those already present variations that happen to be beneficial. As Beatty put it, the generation of variations and their selection are ‘consecutive’ processes. But to call the generation of variation a ‘chance’ process is to use ‘chance’ in this second sense, meaning not by design, not for some end.

Apart from those urging Darwin to give up chance in favor of design, he had pressure to abandon chance from another direction, the evolutionary philosophy of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. Lamarck’s is a materialistic argument against the variation in nature being a matter of chance. On the Lamarckian view, variations arise in an organism as a direct response to environmental stress or demand, giving rise to a stimulus, which in turn elicits a physiological response, which finally can be passed on via reproduction to offspring. Variations are not chance or random, since they are an appropriate response to an environmental stress. Here ‘chance’ signals a lack of relation or connection to adaptive needs , an idea akin to, but ontologically quite distinct from, the contrast between ‘chance’ and ‘design’.

The concept of ‘random variation’ is today often used as a synonym for ‘chance variation’ in precisely this latter sense. Here are two examples of this notion of chance or randomness as used by contemporary Darwinians.

…mutation is a random process with respect to the adaptive needs of the species. Therefore, mutation alone, uncontrolled by natural selection, would result in the breakdown and eventual extinction of life, not in adaptive or progressive evolution. (Dobzhansky 1970, 65)

Thus the production of variations may be a ‘chance’ process in that there are a number of possible outcomes with assignable probabilities, but it is also a ‘chance’ process in the sense that the probability assignments are not biased by ‘adaptive needs’ or ‘fitness’.

My second example is intended to take us back to problems with our first sense of ‘random’ and ‘chance’. Here, a champion of the neutral theory of molecular evolution characterizes his position:

…the great majority of evolutionary changes at the molecular (DNA) level do not result from Darwinian natural selection acting on advantageous mutants but, rather, from random fixation of selectively neutral or very nearly neutral mutants through random genetic drift, which is caused by random sampling of gametes in finite populations. (Kimura 1992, 225)

Here, it will be noticed, the focus is not on the generation of variations but on the perpetuation of variations. The contrast is between a random sampling of gametes that leads to the fixation of selectively neutral alleles and natural selection favoring advantageous variations. That is, the contrast between ‘chance’ and ‘fitness biased’ processes is now being used to distinguish different means of perpetuating certain variations . We are contrasting two sampling processes. Drift samples without concern for adaptation; selection samples discriminately on the basis of differences in fitness. Both samplings are ‘probabilistic’, of course, but that in no way obviates the above contrast.

However, as Beatty has pointed out, it was quite common until fairly recently to characterize natural selection in such a way as to make it almost indistinguishable from random drift (cf. Lennox 1992, Lennox and Wilson 1994). Numerous accounts of fitness characterized the fitness of a genotype as defined by its relative contribution to the gene pool of future generations—the genotype contributing the larger percentage being the fitter. But of course that could easily be the result of a ‘random’—non-fitness biased—sampling process; which organisms would be declared ‘fitter’ by this method might have nothing to do with natural selection. In order to provide a proper characterization of the role of chance in evolutionary change, then, it is critical to provide a more robust and sophisticated account of fitness. (For further information, see the entry on fitness .) This, in turn, requires that we discuss the conceptual network that includes the notions of adaptation and natural selection, to which we will turn shortly.

For now, let us assume that there is a way of characterizing fitness such that there is a substantial empirical question of what role indiscriminate sampling of genotypes (or phenotypes) plays in evolutionary change. This issue was first placed squarely before evolutionary biologists by Sewall Wright in the early 1930s. As Wright pointed out, genes that are neutral with respect to fitness can, due to the stochastic nature of any process of sampling from a population, increase their representation from one generation to the next. The likelihood of this happening goes up as effective population size goes down. Since Wright imagined that a quite typical scenario in evolutionary change was for species to be broken up into relatively small, relatively isolated, populations (or ‘demes’), with significantly more breeding within than between demes, the likelihood that such ‘neutral genotypes’ could become fixed at relatively high levels was significant. Though he gradually toned down this aspect of his work, a significant school of mathematical population geneticists in the 1960s and 70s took these ideas and ran with them, developing a ‘Neutralist’ approach to evolutionary change. This is the position characterized by Kimura (one of its most eloquent defenders) in the passage quoted above. Whether or not such a process plays a significant role in evolution is not a philosophical issue, but it is highly relevant to whether evolutionary biology should be seen as predominantly Darwinian. For if any view is central to Darwinism, it is that the evolutionary process is predominantly guided by the fitness-biasing force of natural selection, acting on variations that arise by chance. It is to natural selection and related concepts that we now turn.

The greatest number of females will, of course, fall to the share of the most vigorous males; and the strongest individuals of both sexes, by driving away the weakest, will enjoy the best food, and the most favourable situations, for themselves and for their offspring. A severe winter, or a scarcity of food, by destroying the weak and the unhealthy, has had all the good effects of the most skilful selection.

The words of Charles Darwin? No; these are the words of John Sebright, penned in The Art of Improving the Breeds of Domestic Animals in 1809, the year of Charles Darwin’s birth and fifty years before On the Origin of Species was published. Darwin refers to this passage in Notebook C of his Species Notebooks. [ 13 ] It will be noticed that Sebright is not discussing domestic selection, but is quite clearly saying that processes leading to differential survival and reproduction in nature will have ‘all the good effects of the most skilful selection’. Darwin, then, did not need to read Malthus to see what is here so plainly and clearly stated—namely, that the struggle for survival in nature will have the same ‘selective’ effects as the actions of the domestic breeder of plants and animals.

As this passage, and the argument of the Origin , shows, ‘natural selection’ began life as the product of analogical reasoning. Sebright sees clearly that the natural processes he is describing will have the same effects as the breeder’s selection, but he is not about to describe those processes as selection processes. Darwin took that step, and Darwinism has followed.

Darwin himself consistently refers to natural selection as a power of preserving advantageous, and eliminating harmful, variations. As noted in the last section, whether a particular variation is advantageous or harmful is, in once sense of that term, a matter of chance; and whether an advantageous variation is actually preserved by selection is, in another sense of the term, also a matter of chance. For Darwinism, selection is the force or power that biases survival and reproduction in favor of advantageous variations, or to look ahead to the next section, of adaptations. It is this that distinguishes selection from drift.

In a recent monograph entitled Natural Selection: Domains, Levels and Challenges in the Oxford Series in Ecology and Evolution , George C. Williams has vigorously defended Darwinian selection theory against a variety of challenges that have emerged over the last few decades. Those challenges can be placed into two broad categories: [i] proposed limitations on natural selection as an evolutionary force; and [ii] expansions of the scope of natural selection to include new ‘targets’ and ‘levels’. It will be noted that in neither case is it obvious that the theory itself requires modification in the face of such challenges—in principle these might be nothing more than challenges to the theory’s range of application . However, if it turned out that most evolutionary change could be explained without recourse to natural selection, this would be grounds for arguing that evolutionary biology was no longer Darwinian. And if it turned out that the theory of natural selection could only be integrated with our new understanding of the processes of inheritance and development by a wholesale modification of its foundations, it might be best to see the new theory as a modified descendent of Darwinism, rather than Darwinism itself. Theories may need essences, as Gould claims; but if what is fundamental to the theory has changed, then so has its essence. To borrow a phrase from Paul Griffiths, perhaps it is not that theories need histories and essences—perhaps what they need are historical essences .

Alfred Russell Wallace regularly urged Darwin to jettison the term ‘selection’ as misleadingly anthropomorphic, and substitute Herbert Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’. Darwin went half way—in later editions he added ‘or Survival of the Fittest’ to ‘Natural Selection’ in the title of chapter 4. As the theory developed in the mid-20 th century, the expression ‘survival of the fittest’ was gradually eliminated from any serious presentation of Darwinian selection theory. On the other hand, the concept of ‘fitness’ has played a prominent, and problematic, role. In the mathematical models used in population genetics, ‘fitness’ refers either to the abilities of the different genotypes in a population to leave descendants, or to the measures of those abilities, represented by the variable W . Here is a rather standard textbook presentation of the relevant concepts:

In the neo-Darwinian approach to natural selection that incorporates consideration of genetics, fitness is attributed to particular genotypes. The genotype that leaves the most descendants is ascribed the fitness value W =1, and all other genotypes have fitnesses, relative to this, that are less than 1. … Fitness measures the relative evolutionary advantage of one genotype over another, but it is often important also to measure the relative penalties incurred by different genotypes subject to natural selection. This relative penalty is the corollary of fitness and is referred to by the term selection coefficient . It is given the symbol s and is simply calculated by subtracting the fitness from 1, so that: s = 1 − W . (Skelton 1993 164)

The problem lies in the fact that the concept of fitness plays dual roles that are instructively conflated in this quotation. For when fitnesses are viewed as measures of differential abilities of organisms with different genotypes to leave different numbers of offspring, the language of fitness encourages us to suppose that ‘fitness’ refers to the relative selective advantages of genotypes. On the other hand, if ‘fitness’ simply refers to the measure of reproductive success, it is a quantitative representation of small scale evolutionary change in a population, and leaves entirely open the question of the causes of the change. But then the assumed connections among the concepts of fitness, adaptation and natural selection are severed. ‘Selection coefficients’ may have nothing to do with selection; what W represents may have nothing to do with selective advantage.

There is, however, a way of formulating the theory in its modern guise which maintains an essentially Darwinian character. Since there are a number of confirmed ways in which natural populations can evolve in the absence of natural selection, and since balancing selection, i.e. countervailing selection forces, may prevent a population from evolving in its presence, it is clear that establishing, by measuring different reproductive rates among its members, that the genetic make-up of a population has changed does not establish that natural selection was the source of that change; nor does the fact that no change has been measured establish that natural selection is not operative. Population genetics and its associated models should be treated as the ‘kinematics’, not the ‘dynamics’ of evolutionary processes. That is, it is a way of establishing that a population either is or is not in equilibrium, and it provides sophisticated tools for measuring rates of change in a population across generations. Moreover, like the kinematics of any physical theory, if it establishes cross-generational change, it also tells us that there are causes to be found—the detailed contours of those measures may even provide suggestions as to where to look for those causes. What it cannot do on its own is provide knowledge of the forces at work. To use language introduced by Elliott Sober, fitness, unlike natural selection, is causally inert . (For further information, see the entry on population genetics .)

That means that, as valuable as population genetics is, it should not be equated with the theory of natural selection. Too often in both biological presentations of the theory and philosophical discussions of it, this is forgotten. For example:

Most people are familiar with the basic theory of natural selection. Organisms vary in a heritable fashion. Some variants leave more offspring than others; their characteristics, therefore, are represented at a greater frequency in the next generation. (Wilson 1984, 273)

This is a presentation of ‘the basic theory of natural selection’ that makes no reference to natural selection at all!

Natural selection, if it is to resemble the Darwinian concept that bears that name, must be reserved for reference to an interaction between a variable, heritable feature of an organic system and the environment of that system . That interaction may or may not change the proportions of those features across generations, and those proportions may change for reasons other than those interactions. But a plausible natural selection hypothesis must posit some such interaction. On this issue I will give the last word to Stephen Jay Gould:

…when we consider natural selection as a causal process, we can only wonder why so many people confused a need for measuring the results of natural selection by counting the differential increase of some hereditary attribute (bookkeeping) with the mechanism that produces relative reproductive success (causality).” (Gould 2003, 619)

The concept of natural selection has to this point been presented broadly because of the other two critical questions surrounding the contemporary Darwinian concept of natural selection that I mentioned earlier—questions having to do with possible limiting constraints on natural selection and about the sorts of objects that can be viewed as appropriate organismic/environmental ‘interactors’ in the selection process.

If we suppose that for Darwin natural selection was almost exclusively thought of as an interaction between individual organisms and their organic and inorganic environments, then we can see two challenges to Darwinism today with respect to levels of selection. There are those, such as G. C. Williams and Richard Dawkins, who argue that selection is always and only of genes. Here is a clear statement:

These complications [those introduced by organism/environment interactions] are best handled by regarding individual [organismic] selection, not as a level of selection in addition to that of the gene, but as the primary mechanism of selection at the genic level. (Williams 1993, 16)

Dawkins’ preferred mode for making the same point is to refer to organisms—or interactors--as the vehicles of their genes, in fact vehicles constructed by the genome for its own perpetuation.

The original impulse for this approach, especially clear in Williams’ classic Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966) was philosophical—it was to use a sort of Ockham’s razor strategy against Group Selection hypotheses, showing that alleged group selection effects could be explained by explanations operating at the level of the genome. Throughout that book selection is always said to be of individual alleles, regardless of the role environments at various levels may play in the process.

This view has been extensively challenged by philosophers of biology on both methodological and conceptual grounds, though there are, among philosophers, enthusiastic supporters (cf. Dennett 1995). In all the give and take, it is seldom noticed that defenders of this view claim to be carrying the Darwinian flag (Gayon 1998 and Gould 2003 are exceptions). Yet it is certainly not a position that Darwin would recognize--and not merely because he lacked a coherent theory of the units of inheritance. It is not a Darwinian view because for Darwin it was differences in the abilities of organisms at various stages of development to respond to the challenges of life that had causal primacy in the explanation of evolutionary change. Among evolutionary biologists from the ‘neo-Darwinian synthesis’ on, it is those who stress the role of organisms in populations interacting differentially to ever-variable ecological conditions in causing changes in the gene pools of those populations who are the card-carrying Darwinians.

Darwinism also has challenges from the opposite direction. In the 1970s a number of biologists working in the fields of paleontology and systematics challenged the Neo-Darwinian dogma that you could account for ‘macro-evolution’ by means of long term extrapolation from micro-evolution. Gould, in particular, opens Part II of The Structure of Evolutionary Theory ( Towards a Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory ), with a chapter entitled ‘Species as Individuals in the Hierarchical Theory of Selection’. That chapter title combines two conceptually distinct theses: first, the thesis defended by Michael Ghiselin (Ghiselin 1997) and championed and refined by David Hull (Hull 2001), that species are, in a robust sense of the term, ‘individuals’; and second, that there may well be selection among groups of organisms, qua groups. Gould’s title exemplifies one approach to group selection—the unit of selection is always the individual, but there are individuals other than individual organisms that are subject to selection. A very different result emerges if one assumes that groups of organisms such as demes, kin-groups, or species, though not individuals, are nevertheless subject to selection. Adding to the conceptual complexity, some researchers propose that the term ‘group selection’ be restricted to the process whereby group-level traits provide advantages to one group over another, in which case there are strict conditions delimiting cases of group selection. Others define group selection primarily in terms of group level effects . Thus a debate analogous to that earlier discussed regarding the definitions of ‘fitness’ emerges here—by group selection do we mean a distinct type of causal process that needs to be conceptually distinguished from selection at the level of individual organism or gene, or do we merely mean a tendency within certain populations for some well defined groups to displace others over time? (For further discussion, see Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 151–179; Hull 2001, 49–90; and see the entry on: levels and units of selection .)

Early in the Introduction to On the Origin of Species , Darwin observes that the conclusion that each species had descended from others “even if well founded, would be unsatisfactory, until it could be shown how the innumerable species inhabiting this world have been modified so as to acquire that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which most justly excites our admiration” (Darwin 1859, 3). One might say this was the central promise of Darwinism—to account for both phylogenic continuity and adaptive differentiation by means of the same principles; or as Darwin puts it, to integrate in one theory the supposed opposition between Unity of Type and Conditions of Existence.

But it is here that even the most sympathetic of Darwin’s theistic supporters were forced to qualify their support for the theory of descent with modification by means of natural selection. In Darwin’s day the reactions of Asa Gray and John Herschel are perhaps the most interesting in this respect. Both men saw in Darwin’s theory a way to account for ‘that mystery of mysteries,’ the regular appearance of new species by means of natural, or as they might say, ‘intermediate’ causes. However both instinctively recoiled from the irreducible and central role of ‘chance’ in the theory. They did not, but easily could have, said ‘God does not play dice with the universe.’ But as Darwin stated repeatedly, if gently, to Gray—if God ordained that variations should be along beneficial lines, natural selection would be redundant. Moreover, the evidence from the study of variation in domestic and natural populations put the lie to any claim that God directs all or most variation along beneficial lines. Darwinian selection theory is a two-step process—the production of variation unrelated to the adaptive requirements of the organism, and differential perpetuation of those variations that serve adaptive needs. Again, a theory of evolution that could not be so described would not be a Darwinian theory.

The nature of ‘selection explanations’ is a topic to which much philosophical attention has been devoted in recent years. Here I want to focus on only one important question—to what extent is the teleological appearance of such explanations simply that, an appearance masking a causal process in which goals play no role?

The appearance of teleology is certainly present in Darwinian explanations, and has been since Darwin spoke of natural selection working solely for the good of each being. The appearance of teleology stems from the ease with which both evolutionary biology and common sense take it for granted that animals and plants have the adaptations they do because of some benefit or advantage to the organism provided by those adaptations.

This is a hotly contested question, and I will here simply sketch a case that selective explanations of adaptations are robustly teleological. The interested reader may want to refer to the literature on this question referred to in the discussion and listed in the list of readings provided at the end of this entry. A question I think not worth discussing is whether the word ‘teleology’ should be replaced by ‘teleonomy’. Etymologically, they come to the same thing; and the philosophical arguments given in favor of the change all rest on an historically doubtful assumption—that philosophical defenses of teleology have always been either theistic or vitalistic. The serious philosophical issue can be put simply and directly: in selection explanations of adaptations, are the functions served by adaptations a central and irreducible feature of the explanans in such explanations? If the answer is yes, the explanations are teleological. [ 14 ]

A good place to begin is with a simple, yet realistic, example. In research carried out over many years and combining painstaking field work and laboratory experimentation, John Endler was able to demonstrate that the color patterns of males in the guppy populations he was studying in rivers feeding into the southern Caribbean were a consequence of a balance between mate selection and predator selection. To take one startling example, he was able to test and confirm a hypothesis that a group of males, with a color pattern that matched that of the pebbles on the bottoms of the streams and ponds they populated except for bright red spots, have that pattern because a common predator in those populations, a prawn, is color blind for red. Red spots did not put their possessors at a selective disadvantage, and were attractors for mates (Endler 1983, 173–190). We may refer to this pattern of coloration as a complex adaptation that serves the functions of predator avoidance and mate attraction. But what role do those functions play in explaining why it is that the males in this population have the coloration they do?

This color pattern is an adaptation, as that term is used in Darwinism, only if it is a production of natural selection (Williams 1966 261; Brandon 1985; Burian 1983). In order for it to be a product of natural selection, there must be an array of color variation available in the genetic/developmental resources of the species wider than this particular pattern but including this pattern. Which factors are critical, then, in producing differential survival and reproduction of guppies with this particular pattern? The answer would seem to be the value-consequences this pattern has compared to others available in promoting viability and reproduction. In popular parlance (and the parlance favored by Darwin), this color pattern is good for the male guppies that have it, and for their male offspring, and that is why they have it (Binswanger 1990; Brandon 1985; Lennox 2002). This answer strengthens the ‘selected effects’ or ‘consequence etiology’ accounts of selection explanations by stressing that selection ranges over value differences. The reason for one among a number of color patterns having a higher fitness value has to do with the value of that pattern relative to the survival and reproductive success of its possessors.

Selection explanations are, then, a particular kind of teleological explanation, an explanation in which that for the sake of which a trait is possessed, its valuable consequence , accounts for the trait’s differential perpetuation and maintenance in the population.

In listing the topics I would discuss under the heading of neo-Darwinism, I distinguished the question of the ontological status of species from the epistemological status of the species concept . Though they are closely related questions, it is important to keep them distinct. As will become clear as we proceed, this distinction is rarely honored. Moreover, it is equally important to distinguish the species concept from the categories of features that belong in a definition of species (Rheins 2011). Advances in our theoretical understanding may lead us to reconsider the sorts of attributes that are most important for determining whether a group of organisms is a species, and thus whether it deserves to be assigned a name at that taxonomic level. It should not be assumed that such changes constitute a change in the species concept, though at least some such changes may lead us to restrict or expand the range of taxa that are designated as species. In his contribution to the Neo-Darwinian Synthesis, Systematics and the Origin of Species , Ernst Mayr titled chapter five ‘The Systematic Categories and the New Species Concept’. Recall that Darwin made a point of treating the species category as continuous with ‘well-marked variety’ and ‘sub-species’, and made the radical suggestion that its boundaries would be just as fluid. Without explicitly acknowledging Darwin, Mayr takes the same tack, discussing ‘individual variants’ and ‘sub-species’ as a preliminary to discussing the species concept. Mayr notes that for someone studying the evolutionary process, speciation is a critical juncture; “…his interpretation of the speciation process depends largely on what he considers to be the final stage of this process, the species.” (Mayr 1942/1982, 113) With this in mind, he offers the following definition, the so-called ‘biological species concept’ (BSC):

Species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which are reproductively isolated from other such groups (Mayr 1942/1982, 120; 1976 518)

Mayr was well aware of the limitations of this definition, and treated it somewhat as a ‘regulative ideal’. Dobzhansky in 1937 gave what he claimed to be a definition of species, but which seems, as Mayr noted (Mayr 1976 481), much more a definition of speciation :

…that stage of evolutionary process, “at which the once actually or potentially interbreeding array of forms becomes segregated in two or more separate arrays which are physiologically incapable of interbreeding.” (312)

Simpson (1943) and others built even more historicity into the concept. These are all, of course, intended as definitions of the species category , and they attempt to provide a test (or a ‘yardstick’: Mayr 1976 479) that in principle will permit a researcher to decide whether a group of individuals should all be identified by a single species-level concept such as ‘homo sapiens’. The test for species membership is the capacity to interbreed; the test distinguishing two species is incapacity to interbreed. Dobzhansky makes the importance of this test transparent—the transition from a single interbreeding population to two reproductively isolated ones is the process of speciation.

Now in each of these definitions, little attention is paid to the actual methods used by taxonomists and systematists in differentiating between varieties of a species and distinct species, something to which Darwin gave a great deal of attention. Darwin’s apparent nominalism regarding the species concept likely stemmed from his close attention to his own taxonomic practices and those of other specialists. But nominalism typically combines a view about the ontology of species with one about the epistemological status of the species concept . On the first question, the nominalist insists that there are no species—there are more or less similar individuals. On the second question, the nominalist typically insists that the species concept is, at best, a useful or convenient grouping of similar individuals or, at worst, an arbitrary grouping of similar individuals. (An interesting alternative account of the species concept based on a sophisticated, multidimensional theory of similarity has recently been defended in Rheins 2011.)

In his work, Mayr relates different approaches to the species concept to the philosophical distinction between essentialism and nominalism. He associates essentialism with the view that a species concept refers to a universal or type. This view of the referent of the concept leads to the Typological Species Concept, which he traces from Linnaeus back to Plato and Aristotle, and which he claims ‘is now universally abandoned’ (1976 516). It is worth noting that serious doubt has been cast both on the historical and the philosophical credentials of Mayr’s ‘Typological Species Concept’ (see, e.g. Lennox, 1987; repr. in Lennox 2001b; Winsor 2001, 2006; Walsh 2006; Wilkins 2009). At the opposite extreme is nominalism, which combines the view that only individuals exist in nature and that species are concepts invented for the purpose of grouping these individuals collectively.

Mayr claims that his Biological Species Concept (BSC) is an advance on both; individual species members are objectively related to one another not by a shared relation to a type but by causal and historical relationships to one another. He can thus be understood as arguing for a new, objective way of understanding the epistemological grounds for grouping individuals into species. This new way of grouping stresses historical, genetic and various ecological relationships among the individuals as the grounds for determining species membership. His claim is that this is more reliable and objective than similarities of phenotypic characteristics. This makes sense of the importance he eventually places on the fact the BSC defines species relationally:

…species are relationally defined. The word species corresponds very closely to other relational terms such as, for instance, the word brother . … To be a different species is not a matter of degree of difference but of relational distinctness. (Mayr 1976, 518)

Mayr has in mind that brothers may or may not look alike; the question of whether two people are brothers is determined by their historical and genetic ties to a common ancestry. Notice, however, that this is a claim about which characteristics, among the many that they have, should be taken most seriously in determining the applicability to them of the concept ‘brother’. That is, it is a defense of a sort of essentialism.

A number of critics have pointed out that essentialism need not be committed to ‘types’ understood as universalia in re ; and on certain accounts of essences any species taxon that meets the standards of BSC does so in virtue of certain essential (though relational and historical) properties. At one extreme, Michael Ghiselin and David Hull have argued that this causal/historical structure of species provides grounds, at least within evolutionary biology, for considering species to be individuals. [ 15 ] Organisms are not members of a class or set, but ‘parts’ of a phylogenetic unit. Taking a very different tack, Denis Walsh has recently argued that a form of ‘evolutionary essentialism,’ bearing a striking resemblance to the essentialism of Aristotle’s zoological work, is implicit in the work of a number of evolutionary developmental theorists (Walsh, 2006).

A critical issue in this debate over the account of the species concept most appropriate for Darwinism is the extent to which the process of biological classification—taxonomy—should be informed by advances in biological theory. Besides those already discussed, the moderate pluralism associated with Robert Brandon and Brent Mischler or the more radical pluralism defended by Philip Kitcher, argues that different explanatory aims within the biological sciences will require different criteria for determining whether a group constitutes a species. Cladists, on the other hand, employ strictly defined phylogenetic tests to determine species rank (see Rheins 2011).

Unlike many of the other topics that define the history of Darwinism, there is no clear-cut position on this question that can be identified as ‘Darwinian’ or ‘neo-Darwinian’. In a recent collection of papers defending most of the alternatives currently being advanced (Ereshefsky 1992), my suspicion is that virtually every author in that collection would identify himself as Darwinian. This may be because, as different as they are, a number of positions currently being defended have their roots in Darwin’s own theory and practice (see Beatty 1985; reprinted in Ereshefsky 1992).

• Amundson, R., and Lauder, G. 1994, ‘Function without Purpose: The Uses of Causal Role Function in Evolutionary Biology’, Biology and Philosophy , 9: 443–469.
• Babbage, C., 1837, The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise , London: Murray.
• Barrett, P. H., and Freeman R. B., (eds.), 1988, The Works of Charles Darwin , Vols. 1–29, New York: New York University Press.
• Barrett, P. H. et al., (eds.), 1987, Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844: Geology, Transmutation of Species, Metaphysical Enquiries , Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
• Beatty, J., 1984, ‘Chance and Natural Selection’, Philosophy of Science , 51: 183–211.
• –––, 1992, ‘Teleology and the Relationship Between Biology and the Physical Sciences in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Durham and Purrington, 113–144.
• Binswanger H., 1990, The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts , Los Angeles : ARI Press.
• Brandon, Robert, 1981, ‘Biological Teleology: Questions and Explanations’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , 12: 91–105.
• –––, 1985, ‘Adaptation Explanations: Are Adaptations for the Good of Replicators or Interactors?’, in Weber and Depew, 81–96.
• –––, 1990, Adaptation and Environment , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Brandon, R. and Burian, R. (eds.), 1984, Genes, Organisms, Populations: Controversies over the Units of Selection , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
• Burian, R., 1983, ‘Adaptation’, in Grene, 287–314.
• Darwin, C., 1859 , On the Origin of Species , London: John Murray.
• Dennett, D., 1995, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life , New York: Simon and Shuster.
• Dobzhansky, T., 1937, Genetics and the Origin of Species , New York: Columbia University Press.
• –––, 1970, Genetics of the Evolutionary Process , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Durham, F. and Purrington R. (eds.), 1992, Some Truer Method: Reflections on the Heritage of Newton , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Eble, G., 1999, ‘On the Dual Nature of Chance in Evolutionary Biology and Paleobiology’, Paleobiology , 25: 75–87.
• Endler, J. 1983, ‘Natural and sexual selection on color patterns in poeciliid fishes’, Environmental Biology of Fishes , 9: 173–190.
• Ereshefsky, M. (ed.), 1992, The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
• Gayon, J., 1998, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2003, ‘From Darwin to Today in Evolutionary Biology’, in Hodge and Radick, 240–264.
• Gotthelf, A. and Lennox, J. G., 1987, Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Grene, M. (ed.), 1983, Dimensions of Darwinism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Stephen Jay Gould, 2002, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
• Herbert, S., (ed.), 1980, The Red Notebook of Charles Darwin , Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Herschel, J., 1830/1987, A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy , Chicago: Chicago University Press.
• Hodge, J. and Radick, G. (eds.), 2003, The Cambridge Companion to Darwin , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Horowitz, T. and Massey, G., (eds.), 1991, Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy , Savage MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Hull, D., 2001, Science and Selection: Essays on Biological Evolution and the Philosophy of Science , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Huxley, L. (ed.), 1901, Life and Letters of Thomas H. Huxley, Vols. I-II , New York: D. Appleton & Co.
• Keller, E. Fox and Lloyd, E. (eds.), 1992, Keywords in Evolutionary Biology , Cambridge MA,: Harvard University Press.
• Kimura, M., 1992, ‘Neutralism’, in Fox Keller and Lloyd, 225–230.
• Kitcher, P., 1993, The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lamarck, J-B., 1809/1984, Zoological Philosophy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Laudan, L., 1976, Progress and its Problems , Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Lennox, James G. 1987, ‘Kinds, forms of kinds, and the more and the less in Aristotle’s biology,’ in Gotthelf and Lennox 1987, 339–359.
• Lennox, J., 1991, ‘Darwinian Thought Experiments: A Function for Just-so Stories’, in Horowitz and Massey, 223-246.
• –––, 1993, ‘Darwin was a Teleologist’, Biology and Philosophy 8: 409–422.
• –––, ‘Philosophy of Biology’, in Salmon et al. 1992, 269–309.
• –––, 2000, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology: Essays on the Origins of Life Science , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Lennox, J. and Wilson, B., 1994, ‘Natural Selection and the Struggle for Existence’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , 25: 65–80.
• Lyell, C., 1831–3/1991, Principles of Geology, First Edition, Vol. I-III , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Millstein, R., 2000, ‘Chance and Macroevolution’, Philosophy of Science , 67: 603–624.
• Ospovat, D., 1980, The Development of Darwin’s Theory: Natural History, Natural Theology, and Natural Selection, 1838–1859 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Rheins, J., 2011, ‘Similarity and Species Concepts’, in Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science , in J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and M. Slater (eds.), Topics in Contemporary Philosophy (Volume 8), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 253–288..
• Robson, G. C. and Richards, O. W., 1936, The Variation of Animals in Natur e, London: Longmans.
• Salmon, M. et al., 1992, Introduction to Philosophy of Science , Indianapolis: Hackett.
• Shanahan, T., 1991, ‘Chance as an Explanatory Factor in Evolutionary Biology’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences , 13: 249–269.
• Skelton, P. (ed.), 1993, Evolution: A Biological and Palaeontological Approach , London: Pearson.
• Sterelny, K. and Griffiths, P., 1999, Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology , Chicago: Chicago University Press.
• Uglow, J., 2002, The Lunar Men: Five Friends Whose Curiosity Changed the World , New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.
• Weber, B. and Depew, D. (eds.), 1985, Evolution at a Crossroads: The New Biology and the New Philosophy of Science , Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
• George Williams, 1966, Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 1992, Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Walsh, D., 2006, ‘Evolutionary Essentialism’, British Journal for Philosophy of Science , 57: 425–448.
• Wilkins, J. S., 2009, Species: A History of the Idea , Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Wilson, D. S., 1984, ‘Individual Selection and the Concept of Structured Demes’, in Brandon and Burian, 272–291.
• Winsor, M. P., 2001, ‘Cain on Linnaeus: The Scientist-Historian as Unanalysed Entity,’ Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology and the Biomedical Sciences , 32 (2), 239–25.
• –––, 2006, ‘Linnaeus’s Biology was not Essentialist’, Annals of the Missouri Botanical Gardens , 93: 2–7.

Charles Darwin’s Life

• Browne, E. J. 1995, Charles Darwin: A Biography. Vol. 1: Voyaging , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2000, Charles Darwin: A Biography. Vol. 2: The Power of Place , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Desmond, A. and Moore, J., 1992, Darwin: The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist , New York: Norton.
• Herbert, S. 2005, Charles Darwin, Geologist , Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Charles Darwin: Primary Sources

• Barrett, P. H. (ed.), 1977, The Collected Papers of Charles Darwin , 2 Vols., Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Burkhardt, F. (ed.), 1985–2015, The Correspondence of Charles Darwin , Volumes 1–21, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Chancellor, G. and John van Wyhe (eds.), 2009, Charle’s Darwin’s Notebooks from the Voyage of the Beagle , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Keynes, R. (ed.), 2000, Charles Darwin’s Zoology Notes & Specimen Lists from H.M.S. Beagle , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Peckham, M. (ed.), 1959, The Origin of Species by Charles Darwin: A Variorum Text , Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. [1st Paperback edition, 2006]
• Weinshank, D. et al. (eds.), 1990, A Concordance to Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844 , Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Charles Darwin’s Context

• Owen, R., 1837/1992, The Hunterian Lectures in Comparative Anatomy, 1837 , Chicago: Chicago University Press.
• Rudwick, M., 1997, George Cuvier, Fossil Bones and Geological Catastrophes , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Ruse, M., 1999, The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and Claw (Revised edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Ruse, M. and Richards, R. J. (eds.), 2009, The Cambridge Companion to the Origin of Species, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Snyder, L., 2010, The Philosophical Breakfast Club , New York: Broadway Books.

The Evolution of Darwinism

• Amundson, R., 2005, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Roots of Evo-Devo , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Depew, D. and Weber, B., 1995, Darwinism Evolving: Systems Dynamics and the Genealogy of Natural Selection , Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
• Kohn, D. (ed.), 1995, The Darwinian Heritage , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Mayr, E., 1976, Evolution and the Diversity of Life , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
• Ruse, M. (ed.), 2013, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Darwin and Evolutionary Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Philosophy and Evolutionary Theory

• Brandon, R. N., 1996, Concepts and Methods in Evolutionary Biology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Burian, R. M., 2005, The Epistemology of Development, Evolution, and Genetics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Ereshefsky, M. (ed.), 1992, The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Godfrey-Smith, P., 2014, The Philosophy of Biology , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Hull, D. and Ruse, M. (eds.), 1998, The Philosophy of Biology , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lloyd, E., 1994, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory , 2 nd edition Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Sober, E., 1984, The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus , Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
• –––, (ed.), 1994, Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology , 2 nd edition, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
• –––, 2008, Evidence and Evolution: The Logic Behind the Science , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Walsh, D. M., 2015, Organisms, Agency, and Evolution , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Though there are an abundance of web sites on Darwinism, the three most useful sites meeting the highest of academic standards are listed below. The first is the official site for the publication of material in the extensive Darwin Archives at Cambridge University, but has grown to become the default site for Darwin texts and related literature as well. The second is the official site for on-line publication of Darwin’s extensive correspondence. The third site is a very good starting point amd links to sites related to Charles Darwin’s historical context.

• Complete World of Charles Darwin Online
• Darwin Correspondence Project
• Victorian Science: An Overview , The Victorian Web (funded by the University Scholars Program, National University of Singapore)

adaptationism | biology: philosophy of | creationism | developmental biology: evolution and development | essential vs. accidental properties | evolution | fitness | -->individuals and individuation --> | laws of nature | natural selection | natural selection: units and levels of | scientific explanation | Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century | Scottish Philosophy: in the 19th century | species | teleology: teleological notions in biology | Whewell, William

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Course: US history   >   Unit 6

• Introduction to the Gilded Age
• The Gilded Age and the Second Industrial Revolution
• What was the Gilded Age?

Social Darwinism in the Gilded Age

• Misunderstanding evolution: a biologist's perspective on Social Darwinism
• Misunderstanding evolution: a historian's perspective on Social Darwinism
• America moves to the city
• Development of the middle class
• Politics in the Gilded Age
• Gilded Age politics: patronage
• Laissez-faire policies in the Gilded Age
• The Knights of Labor
• Labor battles in the Gilded Age
• The Populists
• Immigration and migration in the Gilded Age
• Continuity and change in the Gilded Age
• The Gilded Age
• Social Darwinism is a term scholars use to describe the practice of misapplying the biological evolutionary language of Charles Darwin to politics, the economy, and society.
• Many Social Darwinists embraced laissez-faire capitalism and racism. They believed that government should not interfere in the “survival of the fittest” by helping the poor, and promoted the idea that some races are biologically superior to others.
• The ideas of Social Darwinism pervaded many aspects of American society in the Gilded Age , including policies that affected immigration, imperialism, and public health.

Charles Darwin

Social darwinism, social darwinism, poverty, and eugenics, social darwinism, immigration, and imperialism, what do you think.

• See Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (London: John Murray, 1859).
• For more on Social Darwinism see Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944); Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
• Herbert Spencer, The Man Versus the State (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1981), 110.
• For more on eugenics in the United States, see Paul A. Lombardo, A Century of Eugenics in America: From the Indiana Experiment to the Human Genome Era (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011).
• See Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).

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How Lincoln and Darwin Shaped the Modern World

Born on the same day, Lincoln and Darwin would forever influence how people think about the modern world

Adam Gopnik

We are all pebbles dropped in the sea of history, where the splash strikes one way and the big tides run another, and though what we feel is the splash, the splash takes place only within those tides. In almost every case, the incoming current drowns the splash; once in a while the drop of the pebble changes the way the ocean runs. On February 12, 1809, two boys were born within a few hours of each other on either side of the Atlantic. One entered life in a comfortable family home, nicely called the Mount, that still stands in the leafy English countryside of Shrewsbury, Shropshire; the other opened his eyes for the first time in a nameless, long-lost log cabin in the Kentucky woods. Charles Darwin was the fifth of six children, born into comfort but to a family that was far from "safe," with a long history of free-thinking and radical beliefs. He came into a world of learning and money—one grandfather, Josiah Wedgwood, had made a fortune in ceramic plates. Abraham Lincoln was the second of three, born to a dirt-poor farmer, Thomas Lincoln, who, when he wrote his name at all, wrote it (his son recalled) "bunglingly."

The obvious truths of 1809, the kind that were taught in school, involved what could be called a "vertical" organization of life—one in which we imagine a hierarchy of species on earth, descending from man on down toward animals, and a judge appraising us up above in heaven. Man was stuck in the middle, looking warily up and loftily down. People mostly believed that the kinds of organisms they saw on earth had always been here and always would be, that life had been fixed in place since the beginning of a terrestrial time that was thought to go back a few thousand years at most.

People also believed, using what they called examples ancient and modern—and the example of the Terror in France, which had only very recently congealed into Napoleon's Empire, was a strong case—that societies without inherited order were intrinsically weak, unstable and inclined to dissolve into anarchy or tyranny. "Democracy" in the sense we mean it now was a fringe ideal of a handful of radicals. Even in America, the future of the democracy was unclear, in part because of the persistence of slavery. Although many people knew it to be wrong, other people thought it acceptable, or tolerable, or actually benevolent, taking blacks toward Christianity. Democracy was hard to tell from mob rule, and the style of mob rule. Democracy existed, and was armed, but didn't feel entirely liberal; the space between reformist parliamentary government and true democracy seemed disturbingly large, even to well-intentioned people. In the 1830s, Tocqueville, sympathetic to American democracy, was still skeptical about its chances, writing that "until men have changed their nature and are completely transformed, I will refuse to believe in the duration of a government which is called upon to hold together forty different nations covering an area half that of Europe."

No era's ideas are monolithic, and the people of 1809 in England and America did not believe these things absolutely. The new science of geology was pressing back the history of earth; old bones would start turning up that threatened old stories; the new studies of the text of the Bible were pressing against a literal acceptance of biblical truth, too. And there were many Utopian democrats in both countries. We can find plenty of radical ideas in that day, just as we will find traces of the astonishing ideas of the next century somewhere on the fringes of our own time. But on the whole these ideas belonged to the world of what would have been called "fancy," not fact.

By the time Abraham Lincoln and Charles Darwin were dead—the American murdered by a pro-slavery terrorist in 1865, the Englishman after a long illness in 1882—the shape of history had changed, and the lives they had led and the things they had said had done a lot to change it. Two small splashes had helped to change the tide of time. Very different beliefs, ones that we now treat as natural and recognize as just part of the background hum of our time, were in place. People were beginning to understand that the world was very, very old, and that the animals and plants in it had changed dramatically over the eons—and though just how they had changed was still debated, the best guesses, then as now, involved slow alteration through a competition for resources over a very long time. People were convinced, on the whole, that democratic government, arrived at by reform or revolution, was a plausible and strong way to organize a modern nation. (A giant statue, one of the largest since antiquity, of a goddess of Liberty was under construction in once-again Republican France to be sent to a vindicated Republican America, to commemorate this belief.) Slavery in the Western world was finished. (Although racism wasn't.)

Most of all, people thought that the world had changed, and would continue to change, that the hierarchies of nature and race and class that had governed the world, where power flowed in a fixed chain on down, were false. Life was increasingly lived on what we can think of as a "horizontal," with man looking behind only to see what had happened before, and forward to see what he could make next. On that horizontal plane, we are invested in our future as much as in our afterlife, and in our children more than in our ancestors. These beliefs, which we hold still, are part of what we call the modern condition—along with the reactive desire to erase the instability that change brings with it.

The two boys born on the same day into such different lives had become, as they remain, improbable public figures of that alteration of minds—they had become what are now called in cliché "icons," secular saints. They hadn't made the change, but they had helped to midwife the birth. With the usual compression of popular history, their reputations have been reduced to single words, mottoes to put beneath a profile on a commemorative coin or medal: "Evolution!" for one and "Emancipation!" for the other. Though, with the usual irony of history, the mottoes betray the men. Lincoln came late—in the eyes of Frederick Douglass, maddeningly late—and reluctantly to emancipation, while perhaps the least original thing in Darwin's amazingly original work was the idea of evolution. (He figured out how it ran; he took a fancy poetic figure that his granddad, Erasmus Darwin, had favored and put an engine and a fan belt in it.) We're not wrong to work these beautiful words onto their coins, though: they were the engineers of the alterations. They found a way to make those words live. Darwin and Lincoln did not make the modern world. But, by becoming "icons" of free human government and slow natural change, they helped to make our moral modernity.

The shared date of their birth is, obviously, "merely" a coincidence—what historians like to call an "intriguing coincidence." But coincidence is the vernacular of history, the slang of memory—the first strong pattern where we begin to search for more subtle ones. Like the simultaneous deaths of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams on July 4, 1826, the accidental patterns of birth and death point to other patterns of coincidence in bigger things. Lincoln and Darwin can be seen as symbols of the two pillars of the society we live in: one representing liberal democracy and a faith in armed republicanism and government of the people, the other the human sciences, a belief that objective knowledge about human history and the human condition, who we are and how we got here, exists. This makes them, plausibly, "heroes." But they are also amazing men, something more than heroes, defined by their private struggles as much as by their public acts.

Both men are our contemporaries still, because they were among the first big men in history who belonged to what is sometimes called "the bourgeois ascendancy." They were family men. They loved their wives uxo­riously, lived for their children and were proud of their houses. Darwin was born to money, and though he kept some gentry tastes and snobberies, like the royal family of Albert and Victoria, who superintended most of his life, he chose to live not in imitation of the old aristocracy but in the manner of the new bourgeoisie—involving his children in every element of his life, having them help with his experiments, writing an autobiography for them and very nearly sacrificing his chance at history for the love of his religious wife. Lincoln's rise in history was to the presidency—but his first and perhaps even harder rise was to the big middle-class house and expensive wife he adored. What we wonder at is that a simple Springfield lawyer could become president; from his point of view, what probably was really amazing was that a cabin-born bumpkin had become a Springfield lawyer.

Both men were shaped in crucial ways by the worst of still-present 19th-century woes, the death of children at the height of their charm and wisdom. They both even had what one might call the symptomatic diseases of middle-class modernity, the kind that we pick out among the great roll call of human ills to name and obsess over. Lincoln was a depressive; Darwin subject to anxiety so severe that he wrote down one of the most formidable definitions of a panic attack that exists. Though the source of these ailments—in nature or genes, bugs or traumas—remains mysterious, their presence, the way they manifested themselves, is part of the familiarity the two men have for all the distance between us. They had the same domestic pleasures, and the same domestic demons, as we do.

We must be realistic about what they were like; not saints nor heroes nor Gods but people. Darwin and Lincoln are admirable and in their way even lovable men. But Lincoln, we have always to remember, was a war commander, who had men shot and boy deserters hanged. We would, I think, be taken aback at a meeting. Lincoln summed up in one word was shrewd , a backwoods lawyer with a keen sense of human weakness and a knack for clever argument, colder than we would think, and more of a pol and more of a wiseguy than we would like him to be: someone more concerned with winning—elections, cases and arguments—than with looking noble. Lincoln was smart, shrewd and ambitious before he was, as he became, wise, far-seeing and self-sacrificing. If we were around to watch him walk across a room, instead of stride through history, what we would see is the normal feet that left the noble prints.

Darwin we would likely find far more frumpy and tedious than we would like our heroes to be—one of those naturalists who run on and on narrowly on their pet subjects. He would have frowned and furrowed his brow and made helpless discomfited harrumphs if any of today's fervent admirers arrived and asked him what he thought of man's innate tendencies to relish Tchaikovsky. One can easily imagine him brought back to earth and forced onto a television studio platform with eager admirers (like this one) pressing him for his views on sexual equality or the origins of the love of melody in the ancient savanna, and his becoming more and more unhappy and inarticulate, and at last swallowed up in a vast, sad, melancholy, embarrassed English moan.

Not that Lincoln didn't care about morality; but he cared more about winning wars and arguments than about appearing to be a paragon. Not that Darwin wasn't interested in speculative consequences of his theory—he was—but the habit of pontification was completely alien to him, unless it was reassuringly tied with a bow of inductive observation.

Fifty years ago, not many would have chosen Darwin and Lincoln as central figures of the modern imagination. Freud and Marx would perhaps have been the minds that we saw as the princes of our disorder. But with the moral (and lesser intellectual) failure of Marxism, and the intellectual (and lesser moral) failure of Freud, their ideas have retreated back into the history of modernity, of the vast systematic ideas that proposed to explain it all to you. Lincoln and Darwin, by contrast, have never been more present: Lincoln is the subject of what seems to be the largest biographical literature outside those of Jesus and Napoleon, while Darwin continues not only to cause daily fights but to inspire whole new sciences—or is it pseudosciences? For the irony is that the most radical thing around, at the birth of the new millennium, turned out to be liberal civilization—both the parliamentary, "procedural" liberalism of which Lincoln, for all his inspirational gifts, was an adherent, and the scientific liberalism, the tradition of cautious pragmatic free thought, that engaged Darwin, who was skeptical of grand systems even as he created one. Science and democracy still look like the hope of the world (even as we recognize that their intersection gave us the means to burn alive every living thing on the planet at will).

The deepest common stuff the two men share, though, is in what they said and wrote—their mastery of a new kind of liberal language. They matter most because they wrote so well. Lincoln got to be president essentially because he made a couple of terrific speeches, and we remember him most of all because he gave a few more as president. Darwin was a writer who published his big ideas in popular books. A commercial publishing house published The Origin of Species in the same year that it published novels and memoirs, and Darwin's work remains probably the only book that changed science that an amateur can still sit down now and read right through. It's so well written that we don't think of it as well written, just as Lincoln's speeches are so well made that they seem to us as obvious and natural as smooth stones on the beach. (We don't think, "Well said!" we just think, "That's right!")

Darwin and Lincoln helped remake our language and forge a new kind of rhetoric that we still respond to in politics and popular science alike. They particularized in everything, and their general vision rises from the details and the nuance, their big ideas from small sightings. They shared logic as a form of eloquence, argument as a style of virtue, close reasoning as a form of uplift. Each, using a kind of technical language—the fine, detailed language of naturalist science for Darwin; the tedious language of legal reasoning for the American—arrived at a new ideal of liberal speech. The way that Darwin uses insanely detailed technical arguments about the stamen of an orchid to pay off, many pages later, in a vast cosmic point about the nature of survival and change on a planetary time scale, and the way that Lincoln uses lawyerly arguments about who signed what and when among the Founders to make the case for war, if necessary, to end slavery—these things have in common their hope, their faith, in plain English, that people's minds and hearts can be altered by the slow crawl of fact as much as by the long reach of revelation. Their phrases still ring because they were struck on bells cast of solid bronze, not chimes set blowing in the breeze.

In all these ways—their love of family, their shrewdness and sensitivity, their invention of a new kind of plain speaking—these two men are worth looking at together precisely because they aren't particularly remarkable. The things that they loved and pursued, the things that intrigued and worried them, were the same things that most other intelligent people in their day worried about and that worry and intrigue us still. Even mountains are made of pebbles, built up over time, and an entire mountain range of minds has risen slowly between them and us. Most of the rest have been submerged by time, but Darwin and Lincoln remain high peaks within those mountains of modernity, and they look out toward each other. From the top of one you can see the other, and what you see is what we are.

Copyright © 2009 by Adam Gopnik. Adapted by the author from Angels and Ages , by Adam Gopnik, published by Alfred A. Knopf in January.

Adam Gopnik is a staff writer at the New Yorker . Joe Ciardiello 's artwork has appeared regularly in the New York Times Book Review .

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Social Darwinism Theory: Definition & Examples

Charlotte Nickerson

Research Assistant at Harvard University

Undergraduate at Harvard University

Charlotte Nickerson is a student at Harvard University obsessed with the intersection of mental health, productivity, and design.

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On This Page:

• Social Darwinism refers to a set of theories and social practices that apply Darwin’s natural selection to other domains, notably the development of societies.
• There are two notable early theories of social Darwinism: Spencerism and Taylorism.
• Spencer aimed to explain the persistence of inequality by theorizing that humans adapt to their sociological circumstances.
• Coining the term “survival of the fittest,” Spencer believed that successful individuals (those who acquire wealth and status) pass their predisposition for success to their children. The cycle continues, and the most successful become more successful, while — in an “ideal” society — the least successful die off.
• Tylor, meanwhile, used social Darwinism to describe the development of societies on a meta scale. He believed that all humans shared a culture, and that societies advanced linearly. Cultural differences, in his view, are the result of some societies being less “advanced” than others.
• Social Darwinism has been heavily criticized and widely rejected by the scientific community for its lack of adherence to Darwinism, as well as in its use in justifying social inequality, imperialism, and eugenics. Nonetheless, social Darwinistic beliefs still persist in public conscience.

What is Social Darwinism?

Social Darwinism is a set of theories and societal practices that apply Darwin’s biological concepts of natural selection and survival of the fittest to sociology, economics, and politics.

Darwin’s natural selection modeled the work of many thinkers in the late 19th century.

Many scientists during that period, as well as geographers, described themselves as Darwinian despite displaying the influence of a number of biological evolutionary theories, such as Lamarckism, which emphasized the linear progression of a species.

Sociocultural evolutionary theories developed in parallel to biological theories of evolution rather than emerging from them (Winlow, 2009).

Because social Darwinism conglomerates a large number of theories that often hold little-to-no resemblance to Darwinism, scholars question whether the label refers to an actual social movement or is merely one created by historians.

Over the course of the 20th century, Social Darwinism took up negative connotations as it became associated with racism, Nazism, and eugenics (Winlow, 2009).

Principles of Social Darwinism

Social Darwinist theories and the actions that used them as justifications share a few themes in common. These are:

The belief is that humans, like plants and animals, compete in a struggle for existence. The result is the “survival of the fittest;”

The belief that governments should not interfere with human competition by attempting to regulate the economy or cure social problems such as poverty;

Advocating for a laissez-faire political and economic system favoring competition and self-interest in social and business affairs; and,

A justification for the imbalances of power between individuals, races, and nations.

Rather than arguing that the whole human species evolved over time socially, social Darwinism argues that only certain groups of people did.

Thus, some groups of people, in the view of social Darwinistic theories, are superior to others.

Forms of Social Darwinism

Herbert spencer’s social darwinism.

Spencerianism is the set of theories most commonly associated with social Darwinism, despite the fact that it was primarily influenced by Lamarckian, rather than Darwinian, evolution (Winlow, 2009).

Spencer published the book Social Statistics (2021), in which he integrated Lamarck’s ideas around a progressive change in species with laissez-faire economics and developed the metaphor of the social organism.

He used this synthesis of biological, psychological, and social evolution to describe the origin of racial difference, to account for deviations from Lamarck’s one-line sequence of development, and to explain the evolution of high-level brain functioning.

Spencer reasoned that humans adapt to changes in their physical environment through cultural rather than biological adaptation. In doing so, Spencer coined the term “survival of the fittest,” which later became linked to Darwinism.

According to Spencer, those who are most successful at adapting to a changing cultural environment are those most likely to enjoy societal success in the form of status and resources.

These successful individuals pass on their culturally-adaptive advantages to their offspring. Because these people’s offspring enjoy the luxury of a more advantageous position in society, they are in an even better position to evolve further on the socioeconomic ladder.

Spencer argued that this process of cultural evolution was a process that could not be stopped (Delaney, 2009).

In his book (1851), Spencer concluded that the evolution of any human society is a matter of “survival of the fittest.” As evolutionary processes filter out the unfit, the outcome is a more advanced society.

According to Spencer, society exists solely for the benefit of the individual and emerges in response to the social and natural environment. Civilization is a process by which humans adjust to an increasingly complex social environment.

Because the results of interfering with the natural social order cannot be predicted, government intervention could distort the natural and necessary adaptation of society to its environment.

Thus, according to Spencer, governments should not intervene in social problems. Spencer criticized government attempts to regulate levies and opposed subsidies for education and housing.

Additionally, Spencer believed that businesses and institutions that could not adapt to the social environment were unfit for survival.

The government’s support of poorly functioning people, groups, organizations, and institutions allows weak institutions to endure, weakening society. Survival of the fittest, meanwhile, was a honing tool that societies could use to achieve perfection over time.

Spencer also opposed social welfare, believing it to lead to tyrannical and militant social order that entered with natural selection and degraded the species.

In a world without assistance for the poor, the least intelligent could die off, leading to rising levels of general intelligence.

Edward Burnett Tylor’s Cultural Evolutionary Theory

Edward Burnett Tylor’s cultural evolutionary theory also stressed that cultures develop linearly.

Tylor argued that the similarities between cultures in different areas of the world could be explained by independent invention; cultures were forced into developing in parallel ways because they needed to follow a hierarchy of cultural stages.

Edward Burnett Tylor’s so-called science of culture had three premises: the existence of one culture, its development through one progression, and humanity as united by one mind.

In Tylor’s view, all societies were essentially alike. Thus, according to Tylor, societies could be ranked by their different levels of cultural advancement, and less advanced societies provided hints as to what earlier human development looked like (Tremlett, Harvey, & Sutherland, 2017).

Tylor emphasized the earliest stage of “savagery.” The progression from savage to civilized, in Taylor’s view, did not occur evenly or at the same pace in every society; however, the distinct stages were always the same.

Tylor held that the progress of culture entailed a slow replacement of magical thinking with the power of reason. Savage societies, according to Tylor, had global supernaturalism.

This global supernaturalism remained in the barbaric stage with the development of language, laws, and institutions.

Finally, in advanced civilizations, such as Tylor’s own Victorian society, reason and scientific thinking predominate (Tremlett, Harvey, & Sutherland, 2017).

Controversies and Criticism

Evolutionary anthropology came under fire in its early days. The most notable early criticism of social Darwinism came from the German-American anthropologist Franz Boas.

Boas challenged Tylor’s notions that human culture was universal and that this explained the independent invention of different societal structures (Halliday, 1971).

Social Darwinism has also been commonly criticized for its misreading of the ideas first described in Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species.

One element of this criticism regards the evolutionarily short time scales under which the societal changes seen in social Darwinism supposedly take place.

While evolutionarily change takes place over many, many generations, social Darwinism change supposedly happens over a much shorter time period.

Many have called social Darwinism a misnomer in that its two originating theorists — Spencer and Tylor — take more influence from discredited Lamarckian ideas of evolution than Darwinian ones.

In essence, Spencer and Tylor both assumed that sociocultural characteristics acquired over a lifetime could be passed onto offspring, while Darwinism believes that only genetic characteristics can (Halliday, 1971).

Social Darwinism lost favor after the Second World War and the subsequent crash of eugenicist regimes.

For this reason, the field carries the connotation of a justification for forced sterilization and a number of policies leading to the deaths and domination of many from groups determined to be “inferior.”

Examples of Implications

Eugenics is the theory and practice involving the belief that control of reproduction can improve human heredity.

Although the concept dates to at least the ancient Greeks, the modern eugenics movement arose in the 19th century when Galton (1883) applied his cousin Charles Darwin’s theories to humans.

Galton believed that, by being cognisant of more suitable human characteristics, the human race could progress more speedily in its development than it otherwise would have.

While some forms of eugenics promote breeding by those, who have “superior” genetic qualities, “negative” eugenics determines breeding by those with perceived physical, mental, or moral defects (Paul, 2001).

Eugenics, in practice, was largely influenced by the principles of Social Darwinism, particularly in justifications for sterilizing those who came from “inferior” social positions.

In Germany, the Nazi government passed a law that enforced compulsory sterilization from a wide range of ostensibly genetic conditions. This law was praised by a number of non-German commentators (Bock, 2013).

Imperialism

Social Darwinism was also used as a justification for imperialism in the 19th and 20th centuries. During this time, the British Empire, in particular, controlled large portions of the globe and exerted dominion over the conquered peoples of their territories.

In order to justify their control of colonial populations, Europeans had stated that the colonial population was subhuman, therefore needing to be controlled by the more intelligent Europeans.

The work of Charles Darwin and Henry Lamarck — and the sociocultural theorists such as Spencer and Tylor, who extrapolated upon it — became a scientific explanation for the dominance of Europeans.

This provided a moral and rational justification for continued dominion (Koch, 1984).

Social Inequality

Social Darwinism has also played a large control in justifying various social inequalities from the 19th century to the present (Rudman & Saud, 2020).

Spencer (2021), for example, justified laissez-faire capitalism by arguing that the wealthy were biologically and socially superior to the lower class and that this superiority was heritable.

Some, such as Rudman and Saud (2020), have argued that certain modern social phenomena — such as justifications for police brutality and support for reducing social safety nets — are motivated by Social Darwinism.

In doing so, the researchers conducted two studies. In each of these studies, participants filled out a scale measuring the extent to which they believed that a person’s traits and abilities are ingrained in their race or economic status and the extent to which they can be changed.

Rudman Saud considered those who scored high on these scales to be high in essentialism.

In both studies, Rudman and Saud (2020) found that those who had beliefs aligning with social Darwinism were more likely to justify police brutality and support the reduction of social safety nets.

Bock, G. (2013). Antinatalism, maternity and paternity in National Socialist racism (pp. 122-152). Routledge.

Delaney, T. (2009). Social spencerism. Philosophy Now, 71, 20-21.

Galton, F. (1883). Inquiries into human faculty and its development. Macmillan.

Halliday, R. J. (1971). Social Darwinism: a definition. Victorian Studies, 14(4), 389-405.

Koch, H. W. (1984). Social Darwinism as a Factor in the ‘New Imperialism’. In The Origins of the First World War (pp. 319-342). Palgrave, London.

Paul, D. B. (2003). Darwin, social Darwinism and eugenics. The Cambridge Companion to Darwin, 214(10.1017).

Rudman, L. A., & Saud, L. H. (2020). Justifying social inequalities: The role of social Darwinism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 46(7), 1139-1155.

Spencer, H., & Taylor, M. (2021). Social statics. Routledge.

Tremlett, P. F., Harvey, G., & Sutherland, L. T. (Eds.). (2017). Edward Burnett Tylor, religion and culture. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Winlow, H. (2009). Darwinism (and Social Darwinism). International Encyclopedia of Human Geography.

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—by asa gray, what is darwinism, the nation, may 28, 1874.

The question which Dr. Hodge asks he promptly and decisively answers: ‘ What is Darwinism? it is atheism. ’

Leaving aside all subsidiary and incidental matters, let us consider–1. What the Darwinian doctrine is, and 2. How it is proved to be atheistic. Dr. Hodge’s own statement of it cannot be very much bettered:

‘ His [Darwin's] work on the “ Origin of Species ” does not purport to be philosophical. In this aspect it is very different from the cognate works of Mr. Spencer. Darwin does not speculate on the origin of the universe, on the nature of matter or of force. He is simply a naturalist, a careful and laborious observer, skillful in his descriptions, and singularly candid in dealing with the difficulties in the way of his peculiar doctrine. He set before himself a single problem–namely, How are the fauna and flora of our earth to be accounted for? . . . To account for the existence of matter and life, Mr. Darwin admits a Creator. This is done explicitly and repeatedly. . . . He assumes the efficiency of physical causes, showing no disposition to resolve them into mind-force or into the efficiency of the First Cause . . . . He assumes, also, the existence of life in the form of one or more primordial germs. . . . How all living things on earth, including the endless variety of plants and all the diversity of animals, . . . have descended from the primordial animalcule, he thinks, may be accounted for by the operation of the following natural laws, viz.: First, the law of Heredity, or that by which like begets like–the offspring are like the parent. Second, the law of Variation; that is, while the offspring are in all essential characteristics like their immediate progenitor, they nevertheless vary more or less within narrow limits from their parent and from each other. Some of these variations are indifferent, some deteriorations, some improvements–that is, such as enable the plant or animal to exercise its functions to greater advantage. Third, the law of Over-Production. All plants and animals tend to increase in a geometrical ratio, and therefore tend to overrun enormously the means of support. If all the seeds of a plant, all the spawn of a fish, were to arrive at maturity, in a very short time the world could not contain them. Hence, of necessity, arises a struggle for life. Only a few of the myriads born can possibly live. Fourth, here comes in the law of Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest; that is, if any individual of a given species of plant or animal happens to have a slight deviation from the normal type favorable to its success in the struggle for life, it will survive. This variation, by the law of heredity, will be transmitted to its offspring, and by them again to theirs. Soon these favored ones gain the ascendency, and the less favored perish, and the modification becomes established in the species. After a time, another and another of such favorable variations occur, with like results. Thus, very gradually, great changes of structure are introduced, and not only species, but genera, families, and orders, in the vegetable and animal world, are produced ’ (pp. 26-29).

Now, the truth or the probability of Darwin’s hypothesis is not here the question, but only its congruity or incongruity with theism. We need take only one exception to this abstract of it, but that is an important one for the present investigation. It is to the sentence which we have italicized in the earlier part of Dr. Hodge’s own statement of what Darwinism is. With it begins our inquiry as to how he proves the doctrine to be atheistic.

First, if we rightly apprehend it, a suggestion of atheism is infused into the premises in a negative form: Mr. Darwin shows no disposition to resolve the efficiency of physical causes into the efficiency of the First Cause. Next (on page 48) comes the positive charge that ‘ Mr. Darwin, although himself a theist, ’ maintains that ‘ the contrivances manifested in the organs of plants and animals . . . are not due to the continued cooperation and control of the divine mind, nor to the original purpose of God in the constitution of the universe. ’ As to the negative statement, it might suffice to recall Dr. Hodge’s truthful remark that Darwin ‘ is simply a naturalist, ’ and that ‘ his work on the origin of species does not purport to be philosophical. ’ In physical and physiological treatises, the most religious men rarely think it necessary to postulate the First Cause, nor are they misjudged by the omission. But surely Mr. Darwin does show the disposition which our author denies him, not only by implication in many instances, but most explicitly where one would naturally look for it, namely–at the close of the volume in question: ‘ To my mind, it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator, ’ etc. If that does not refer the efficiency of physical causes to the First Cause, what form of words could do so? The positive charge appears to be equally gratuitous. In both Dr. Hodge must have overlooked the beginning as well as the end of the volume which he judges so hardly. Just as mathematicians and physicists, in their systems, are wont to postulate the fundamental and undeniable truths they are concerned with, or what they take for such and require to be taken for granted, so Mr. Darwin postulates, upon the first page of his notable work, and in the words of Whewell and Bishop Butler: 1. The establishment by divine power of general laws, according to which, rather than by insulated interpositions in each particular case, events are brought about in the material world; and 2. That by the word ‘ natural ’ is meant ‘ stated, fixed, or settled, ’ by this same power, ‘ since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so–i.e., to effect it continually or at stated times–as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. ’[VIII-2] So when Mr. Darwin makes such large and free use of ‘ natural as antithetical to supernatural ’ causes, we are left in no doubt as to the ultimate source which he refers them to. Rather let us say there ought to be no doubt, unless there are other grounds for it to rest upon.

Such ground there must be, or seem to be, to justify or excuse a veteran divine and scholar like Dr. Hodge in his deduction of pure atheism from a system produced by a confessed theist, and based, as we have seen, upon thoroughly orthodox fundamental conceptions. Even if we may not hope to reconcile the difference between the theologian and the naturalist, it may be well to ascertain where their real divergence begins, or ought to begin, and what it amounts to. Seemingly, it is in their proximate, not in their ultimate, principles, as Dr. Hodge insists when he declares that the whole drift of Darwinism is to prove that everything ‘ may be accounted for by the blind operation of natural causes, without any intention, purpose, or cooperation of God. ’ ‘ Why don’t he say, ’ cries the theologian, ‘ that the complicated organs of plants and animals are the product of the divine intelligence? If God made them, it makes no difference, so far as the question of design is concerned, how he made them, whether at once or by process of evolution. ’ But, as we have seen, Mr. Darwin does say that, and he over and over implies it when he refers the production of species ‘ to secondary causes, ’ and likens their origination to the origination of individuals; species being series of individuals with greater difference. It is not for the theologian to object that the power which made individual men and other animals, and all the differences which the races of mankind exhibit, through secondary causes, could not have originated congeries of more or less greatly differing individuals through the same causes.

Clearly, then, the difference between the theologian and the naturalist is not fundamental, and evolution may be as profoundly and as particularly theistic as it is increasingly probable. The taint of atheism which, in Dr. Hodge’s view, leavens the whole lump, is not inherent in the original grain of Darwinism–in the principles posited–but has somehow been introduced in the subsequent treatment. Possibly, when found, it may be eliminated. Perhaps there is mutual misapprehension growing out of some ambiguity in the use of terms. ‘ Without any intention, purpose, or cooperation of God. ’- These are sweeping and effectual words. How came they to be applied to natural selection by a divine who professes that God ordained whatsoever cometh to pass? In this wise: ‘ The point to be proved is, that it is the distinctive doctrine of Mr. Darwin that species owe their origin–1. Not to the original intention of the divine mind; 2. Not to special acts of creation calling new forms into existence at certain epochs; 3. Not to the constant and everywhere operative efficiency of God guiding physical causes in the production of intended effects; but 4. To the gradual accumulation of unintended variations of structure and instinct securing some advantage to their subjects. ’ Then Dr. Hodge adduces ‘ Darwin’s own testimony, ’ to the purport that natural selection denotes the totality of natural causes and their interactions, physical and physiological, reproduction, variation, birth, struggle, extinction–in short, all that is going on in Nature; that the variations which in this interplay are picked out for survival are not intentionally guided; that ‘ nothing can be more hopeless than the attempt to explain this similarity of pattern in members of the same class by utility or the doctrine of final causes ’ (which Dr. Hodge takes to be the denial of any such thing as final causes); and that the interactions and processes going on which constitute natural selection may suffice to account for the present diversity of animals and plants (primordial organisms being postulated and time enough given) with all their structures and adaptations–that is, to account for them scientifically, as science accounts for other things.

A good deal may be made of this, but does it sustain the indictment? Moreover, the counts of the indictment may be demurred to. It seems to us that only one of the three points which Darwin is said to deny is really opposed to the fourth, which he is said to maintain, except as concerns the perhaps ambiguous word unintended . Otherwise, the origin of species through the gradual accumulation of variations–i.e., by the addition of a series of small differences–is surely not incongruous with their origin through ‘ the original intention of the divine mind ’ or through ‘ the constant and everywhere operative efficiency of God. ’- One or both of these Mr. Darwin (being, as Dr. Hodge says, a theist) must needs hold to in some form or other; wherefore he may be presumed to hold the fourth proposition in such wise as not really to contradict the first or the third. The proper antithesis is with the second proposition only, and the issue comes to this: Have the multitudinous forms of living creatures, past and present, been produced by as many special and independent acts of creation at very numerous epochs? Or have they originated under causes as natural as reproduction and birth, and no more so, by the variation and change of preceding into succeeding species?

Those who accept the latter alternative are evolutionists. And Dr. Hodge fairly allows that their views, although clearly wrong, may be genuinely theistic. Surely they need not become the less so by the discovery or by the conjecture of natural operations through which this diversification and continued adaptation of species to conditions is brought about. Now, Mr. Darwin thinks–and by this he is distinguished. from most evolutionists–that he can assign actual natural causes, adequate to the production of the present out of the preceding state of the animal and vegetable world, and so on backward–thus uniting, not indeed the beginning but the far past with the present in one coherent system of Nature. But in assigning actual natural causes and processes, and applying them to the explanation of the whole case, Mr. Dar-win assumes the obligation of maintaining their general sufficiency–a task from which the numerous advocates and acceptors of evolution on the general concurrence of probabilities and its usefulness as a working hypothesis (with or without much conception of the manner how) are happily free. Having hit upon a modus operandi which all who understand it admit will explain something, and many that it will explain very much, it is to be expected that Mr. Darwin will make the most of it. Doubtless he is far from pretending to know all the causes and operations at work; he has already added some and restricted the range of others; he probably looks for additions to their number and new illustrations of their efficiency; but he is bound to expect them all to fall within the category of what he calls natural selection (a most expansible principle), or to be congruous with it–that is, that they shall be natural causes. Also–and this is the critical point–he is bound to maintain their sufficiency without intervention .

Here, at length, we reach the essential difference between Darwin, as we understand him, and Dr. Hodge. The terms which Darwin sometimes uses, and doubtless some of the ideas they represent, are not such as we should adopt or like to defend; and we may say once for all–aside though it be from the present issue–that, in our opinion, the adequacy of the assigned causes to the explanation of the phenomena has not been made out. But we do not understand him to deny ‘ purpose, intention, or the cooperation of God ’ in Nature. This would be as gratuitous as unphilosophical, not to say unscientific. When he speaks of this or that particular or phase in the course of events or the procession of organic forms as not intended, he seems to mean not specially and disjunctively intended and not brought about by intervention. Purpose in the whole, as we suppose, is not denied but implied. And when one considers how, under whatever view of the case, the designed and the contingent lie inextricably commingled in this world of ours, past man’s disentanglement, and into what metaphysical dilemmas the attempt at unraveling them leads, we cannot greatly blame the naturalist for relegating such problems to the philosopher and the theologian. If charitable, these will place the most favorable construction upon attempts to extend and unify the operation of known secondary causes, this being the proper business of the naturalist and physicist; if wise, they will be careful not to predicate or suggest the absence of intention from what comes about by degrees through the continuous operation of physical causes, even in the organic world, lest, in their endeavor to retain a probable excess of supernaturalism in that realm of Nature, they cut away the grounds for recognizing it at all in inorganic Nature, and so fall into the same condemnation that some of them award to the Darwinian.

Moreover, it is not certain that Mr. Darwin would very much better his case, Dr. Hodge being judge, if he did propound some theory of the nexus of divine causation and natural laws, or even if he explicitly adopted the one or the other of the views which he is charged with rejecting. Either way he might meet a procrustean fate; and, although a saving amount of theism might remain, he would not be sound or comfortable. For, if he predicates ‘ the constant and everywhere operative efficiency of God, ’ he may ‘ lapse into the same doctrine ’ that the Duke of Argyll and Sir John Herschel ‘ seem inclined to, ’ the latter of whom is blamed for thinking ‘ it but reasonable to regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or will existing somewhere, ’ and the former for regarding ‘ it unphilosophical “ to think or speak as if the forces of Nature were either independent of or even separate from the Creator’s power ” ’: while if he falls back upon an ‘ original intention of the divine mind, ’ endowing matter with forces which he foresaw and intended should produce such results as these contrivances in Nature, he is told that this banishes God from the world, and is inconsistent with obvious facts. And that because of its implying that ‘ He never interferes to guide the operation of physical causes. ’ We italicize the word, for interference proves to be the keynote of Dr. Hodge’s system. Interference with a divinely ordained physical Nature for the accomplishment of natural results! An unorthodox friend has just imparted to us, with much misgiving and solicitude lest he should be thought irreverent, his tentative hypothesis, which is, that even the Creator may be conceived to have improved with time and experience! Never before was this theory so plainly and barely put before us. We were obliged to say that, in principle and by implication, it was not wholly original.

But in such matters, which are far too high for us, no one is justly to be held responsible for the conclusions which another may draw from his principles or assumptions. Dr. Hodge’s particular view should be gathered from his own statement of it:

‘ In the external world there is always and everywhere indisputable evidence of the activity of two kinds of force, the one physical, the other mental. The physical belongs to matter, and is due to the properties with which it has been endowed; the other is the everywhere present and ever-acting mind of God. To the latter are to be referred all the manifestations of design in Nature, and the ordering of events in Providence. This doctrine does not ignore the efficiency of second causes; it simply asserts that God overrules and controls them. Thus the Psalmist says: “ I am fearfully and wonderfully made. My substance was not hid from Thee when I was made in secret, and curiously wrought (or embroidered) in the lower parts of the earth. . . . God makes the grass to grow, and herbs for the children of men. ”- He sends rain, frost, and snow. He controls the winds and the waves. He determines the casting of the lot, the flight of an arrow, and the falling of a sparrow ’ (pages 43, 44).

Far be it from us to object to this mode of conceiving divine causation, although, like the two other theistic conceptions referred to, it has its difficulties, and perhaps the difficulties of both. But, if we understand it, it draws an unusually hard and fast line between causation in organic and inorganic Nature, seems to look for no manifestation of design in the latter except as ‘ God overrules and controls ’ second causes, and, finally, refers to this overruling and controlling (rather than to a normal action through endowment) all embryonic development, the growth of vegetables, and the like. He even adds, without break or distinction, the sending of rain, frost, and snow, the flight of an arrow, and the falling of a sparrow. Somehow we must have misconceived the bearing of the statement; but so it stands as one of ‘ the three ways, ’ and the right way, of ‘ accounting for contrivances in Nature; the other two being–1. Their reference to the blind operation of natural causes; and, 2. That they were foreseen and purposed by God, who endowed matter with forces which he foresaw and intended should produce such results, but never interferes to guide their operation. ’

In animadverting upon this latter view, Dr. Hodge brings forward an argument against evolution, with the examination of which our remarks must close:

‘ Paley, indeed, says that if the construction of a watch be an undeniable evidence of design, it would be a still more wonderful manifestation of skill if a watch could be made to produce other watches, and, it may be added, not only other watches, but all kinds of timepieces, in endless variety. So it has been asked, If a man can make a telescope, why cannot God make a telescope which produces others like itself? This is simply asking whether matter can be made to do the work of mind. The idea involves a contradiction. For a telescope to make a telescope supposes it to select copper and zinc in due proportions, and fuse them into brass; to fashion that brass into inter-entering tubes; to collect and combine the requisite materials for the different kinds of glass needed; to melt them, grind, fashion, and polish them, adjust their densities, focal distances, etc., etc. A man who can believe that brass can do all this might as well believe in God ’ (pp. 45, 46).

If Dr. Hodge’s meaning is, that matter unconstructed cannot do the work of mind, he misses the point altogether; for original construction by an intelligent mind is given in the premises. If he means that the machine cannot originate the power that operates it, this is conceded by all except believers in perpetual motion, and it equally misses the point; for the operating power is given in the case of the watch, and implied in that of the reproductive telescope. But if he means that matter cannot be made to do the work of mind in constructions, machines, or organisms, he is surely wrong. ‘ Sovitur ambulando, ’ vel scribendo; he confuted his argument in the act of writing the sentence. That is just what machines and organisms are for; and a consistent Christian theist should maintain that is what all matter is for. Finally, if, as we freely suppose, he means none of these, he must mean (unless we are much mistaken) that organisms originated by the Almighty Creator could not be endowed with the power of producing similar organisms, or slightly dissimilar organisms, without successive interventions. Then he begs the very question in dispute, and that, too, in the face of the primal command, ‘ Be fruitful and multiply, ’ and its consequences in every natural birth. If the actual facts could be ignored, how nicely the parallel would run! ‘ The idea involves a contradiction. ’ For an animal to make an animal, or a plant to make a plant, supposes it to select carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, to combine these into cellulose and protoplasm, to join with these some phosphorus, lime, etc., to build them into structures and usefully-adjusted organs. A man who can believe that plants and animals can do this (not, indeed, in the crude way suggested, but in the appointed way) ‘ might as well believe in God. ’ Yes, verily, and so he probably will, in spite of all that atheistical philosophers have to offer, if not harassed and confused by such arguments and statements as these.

There is a long line of gradually-increasing divergence from the ultra-orthodox view of Dr. Hodge through those of such men as Sir William Thomson, Herschel, Argyll, Owen, Mivart, Wallace, and Darwin, down to those of Strauss, Vogt, and Buchner. To strike the line with telling power and good effect, it is necessary to aim at the right place. Excellent as the present volume is in motive and clearly as it shows that Darwinism may bear an atheistic as well as a theistic interpretation, we fear that it will not contribute much to the reconcilement of science and religion.

The length of the analysis of the first book on our list precludes the notices which we intended to take of the three others. They are all the production of men who are both scientific and religious, one of them a celebrated divine and writer unusually versed in natural history. They all look upon theories of evolution either as in the way of being established or as not unlikely to prevail, and they confidently expect to lose thereby no solid ground for theism or religion. Mr. St. Clair, a new writer, in his ‘ Darwinism and Design; or, Creation by Evolution, ’ takes his ground in the following succinct statement of his preface:

‘ It is being assumed by our scientific guides that the design-argument has been driven out of the field by the doctrine of evolution. It seems to be thought by our theological teachers that the best defense of the faith is to deny evolution in toto , and denounce it as anti-Biblical. My volume endeavors to show that, if evolution be true, all is not lost; but, on the contrary, something is gained: the design-argument remains unshaken, and the wisdom and beneficence of God receive new illustration. ’

Of his closing remark, that, so far as he knows, the subject has never before been handled in the same way for the same purpose, we will only say that the handling strikes us as mainly sensible rather than as substantially novel. He traverses the whole ground of evolution, from that of the solar system to ‘ the origin of moral species. ’ He is clearly a theistic Darwinian without misgiving, and the arguments for that hypothesis and for its religious aspects obtain from him their most favorable presentation, while he combats the dysteleology of Hackel, Buchner, etc., not, however, with any remarkable strength.

Dr. Winchell, chancellor of the new university at Syracuse, in his volume just issued upon the ‘ Doctrine of Evolution, ’ adopts it in the abstract as ‘ clearly as the law of universal intelligence under which complex results are brought into existence ’ (whatever that may mean), accepts it practically for the inorganic world as a geologist should, hesitates as to the organic world, and sums up the arguments for the origin of species by diversification unfavorably for the Darwinians, regarding it mainly from the geological side. As some of our zoologists and palaeontologists may have somewhat to say upon this matter, we leave it for their consideration. We are tempted to develop a point which Dr. Winchell incidentally refers to–viz., how very modern the idea of the independent creation and fixity of species is, and how well the old divines got on without it. Dr. Winchell reminds us that St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas were model evolutionists; and, where authority is deferred to, this should count for something.

Mr. Kingsley’s eloquent and suggestive ‘ Westminster Sermons, ’ in which he touches here and there upon many of the topics which evolution brings up, has incorporated into the preface a paper which he read in 187i to a meeting of London clergy at Sion College, upon certain problems of natural theology as affected by modern theories in science. We may hereafter have occasion to refer to this volume. Meanwhile, perhaps we may usefully conclude this article with two or three short extracts from it:

‘ The God who satisfies our conscience ought more or less to satisfy our reason also. To teach that was Butler’s mission; and he fulfilled it well. But it is a mission which has to be refulfilled again and again, as human thought changes, and human science develops, For if, in any age or country, the God who seems to be revealed by Nature seems also different from the God who is revealed by the then-popular religion, then that God and the religion which tells of that God will gradually cease to be believed in. ‘ For the demands of reason–as none knew better than good Bishop Butler–must be and ought to be satisfied. And, therefore, when a popular war arises between the reason of any generation and its theology, then it behooves the ministers of religion to inquire, with all humility and godly fear, on whose side lies the fault; whether the theology which they expound is all that it should be, or whether the reason of those who impugn it is all that it should be. ’

Pronouncing it to be the duty of the naturalist to find out the how of things, and of the natural theologian to find out the why, Mr. Kingsley continues:

‘ But if it be said, “ After all, there is no why; the doctrine of evolution, by doing away with the theory of creation, does away with that of final causes, ” let us answer boldly, “ Not in the least. ” We might accept all that Mr. Darwin, all that Prof. Huxley, all that other most able men have so learnedly and acutely written on physical science, and yet preserve our natural theology on the same basis as that on which Butler and Paley left it. That we should have to develop it I do not deny. ‘ Let us rather look with calmness, and even with hope and good-will, on these new theories; they surely mark a tendency toward a more, not a less, Scriptural view of Nature. ‘ Of old it was said by Him, without whom nothing is made, “ My Father worketh hitherto, and I work. ” Shall we quarrel with Science if she should show how these words are true? What, in one word, should we have to say but this: “ We know of old that God was so wise that he could make all things; but, behold, he is so much wiser than even that, that he can make all things make themselves? ” ’

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Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, Essay Example

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Although there have been various theories of evolution throughout time, the most revolutionary theory for its era was developed by Charles Darwin, and described in his book On The Origin of Species.   This major work became the accepted science to explain evolution during its time and afterwards, although then as now, there continues to be controversy about this theory, since it contradicts the original ideas about Creationism and most recently, the notion of “intelligent design.” This paper shall discuss various aspects of Darwin’s theory of evolution, and its importance to our understanding of the development of all living things.

The concept of natural selection, or as some refer to it, “survival of the fittest,” has been the key element of Darwin’s theory that distinguished it from those that preceded it.  It is one of the basic elements of modern biology.  The idea of natural selection evolved in part because at that time, there was no legitimate explanation of heredity.  How did one explain the changes that occurred within various species over time?  Among the individuals of any group of organisms, there are many differences that do not have any relevance to the issue of survival, such as hair color.  However, some of the variations among people may increase the likelihood of survival of any particular person.  For example, a person with a history of heart disease is less likely to survive to old age than an individual with no such history.  Natural selection is a process by which certain characteristics of individuals increase their chances of reproduction and survival; if those characteristics are inherited from generation to generation, there will be a greater number of the healthier people over time that will survive and continue to reproduce.

As a result, if the reproductive advantage occurs over many generations, then those people will become a larger percentage of the population due to their exponential growth.  Darwin concluded that this produces in the environment the selection of people who survive, and over time, this causes gradual changes in the species.  The strongest prevail and survive, and the weakest die off.  Natural selection, as explained by Darwin, continues to be the main explanation for adaptive evolution.

Darwin’s theory of evolution involved several provable facts as well as certain inferences that contributed to the questioning of his theoretical basis.  Included among the factual aspects were: the knowledge that every species is fertile enough that if all offspring survive to reproduce, the population of that species would increase.  Despite subtle changes over time, the population would stay approximately the same in number.  However, because certain resources such as food and water occur in limited supply, and remain stable over time, while the population continues to explode, a struggle for survival develops.

According to natural selection theory, individuals are different from each other significantly, and many of these differences are passed down from generation to generation.  Finally, people who are less equipped to manage the environmental factors that affect their survival are less likely to reproduce or survive; those people who are more compatible with their environment are more likely to reproduce and to pass on these strong, adaptive traits to future offspring.

When it was introduced, Darwin’s theory was met with mixed reviews at best.  Primarily, the theory of evolution challenged the notion of Creationism, thereby creating a huge controversy and vehement condemnation of his “blasphemous” explanation of the universe.  As one writer put it, “Darwin’s theory is the culmination of a process which destroyed forever for us the oldest classification system in our history, the way in which our culture since the ancient Greeks has understood the world.”(Johnston, 1998.)  The previous ideas that came from ancient Greece combined Christianity with Plato’s theories regarding the goodness of God.  According to Plato, God’s perfection meant that all of his creations were perfect.  Therefore, any changes in beings which were seen as coming from the theory of evolution were considered to be a violation of the perfection of the highest power.  According to these theories, all possible forms of life were created in a hierarchy, which ranked the lowest, most primitive forms of life such as plants and animals, to the highest forms, human beings.  Even the range of human beings ranked from lowest to highest in status, from slaves to kings and queens and popes, and beyond that, to the angels, ultimately reaching God himself. (Johnston, 1998.)

Such vehement reactions against Darwinism and natural selection contrast with the theory’s acceptance by biologists, who considered it to be the basis for all aspects of the study of their discipline.  Natural selection helps to provide a basis for the classification of all living things, and an explanation of the variations and similarities that exist between such beings.  Replacing the divine elements of Creationist theories with Darwin’s theory of natural selection, while being extremely unsettling for people who were looking to God for explanations of how the universe began, allowed biologists and other scientific disciplines to move forward with pursuits that were demonstrably and scientifically sound.  Darwin did not publish his book casually; as a religious man himself, he worked on the book for a full decade before he had it published.  The suggestion of the theory of evolution is that God is not needed to create living organisms.  Darwin’s work freed up other scientists and philosophers to examine the creation of people, plants, and animals so that today, it is possible to find scientific advances that can save lives, prevent illnesses, and allow people to have more knowledge and freedom to decide personal issues such as reproductive freedoms.

Browne, Janet. Charles Darwin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Da Silva, W.. “Darwin at 200: the importance of dangerous ideas.” Cosmos.  December 2008: n. pag. Web. 20 Jun 2010. http://www.cosmosmagazine.com/features/print/2538/the-importance-dangerous-ideas

Johnston, Ian. “Some Non-Scientific observations on the importance of Darwin.” Malaspina-University. Nanaimo,BC: Malaspina-University College, 1998.  Web. 20 June 2010. http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/introser/darwin.htm

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Home — Essay Samples — Sociology — Sociological Theories — Social Darwinism

Essays on Social Darwinism

The importance of writing an essay on social darwinism.

Writing an essay on Social Darwinism is important because it helps to understand the historical and social implications of this controversial theory. Social Darwinism, which emerged in the 19th century, applied Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection to human society, suggesting that certain races or social classes were inherently superior to others. This ideology had a significant impact on politics, economics, and social policies, contributing to the justification of imperialism, colonialism, and discrimination.

By writing an essay on Social Darwinism, students can delve into the complexities of this theory and its repercussions on society. It provides an opportunity to critically analyze the ethical and moral implications of Social Darwinism, as well as its lasting effects on contemporary issues such as racism, inequality, and social injustice.

When writing an essay on Social Darwinism, it is important to conduct thorough research to understand the historical context and various interpretations of the theory. It is crucial to present a balanced argument, acknowledging both the proponents and critics of Social Darwinism, and to provide evidence to support your claims. Additionally, it is essential to articulate the connections between Social Darwinism and modern-day societal issues, demonstrating the relevance of the topic.

To effectively convey your ideas, it is important to use clear and concise language, and to organize your essay in a logical manner. Utilize proper citations and references to support your arguments and to give credit to the sources of your information. Finally, proofread and edit your essay to ensure coherence and accuracy in your writing.

Writing an essay on Social Darwinism is important for gaining insight into the historical and contemporary implications of this theory. It allows for critical analysis and reflection on the societal impacts of Social Darwinism, and provides an opportunity to engage in meaningful discourse on ethical and moral issues.

• The origins and development of Social Darwinism as a concept
• The influence of Social Darwinism on 19th and 20th century political and social ideologies
• The impact of Social Darwinism on colonialism and imperialism
• The role of Social Darwinism in shaping ideas about race and eugenics
• The ethical implications of Social Darwinism in relation to human society
• The relationship between Social Darwinism and the rise of capitalism
• The use of Social Darwinism to justify inequality and exploitation
• The ways in which Social Darwinism has been used to justify discrimination and oppression
• The criticism and opposition to Social Darwinism within intellectual and academic circles
• The legacy of Social Darwinism in contemporary social and political thought
• The ways in which Social Darwinism has shaped modern ideas about competition and success
• The impact of Social Darwinism on education and social welfare policies
• The intersection of Social Darwinism with other social theories and philosophies
• The ways in which Social Darwinism has been used to justify environmental exploitation and destruction
• The relationship between Social Darwinism and the concept of "survival of the fittest"
• The impact of Social Darwinism on the field of psychology and ideas about human behavior
• The ways in which Social Darwinism has been used to justify militarism and war
• The influence of Social Darwinism on popular culture and media representations
• The implications of Social Darwinism for global inequality and development
• The role of Social Darwinism in shaping ideas about individual responsibility and social welfare
• The relationship between Social Darwinism and the rise of nationalism and xenophobia
• The ways in which Social Darwinism has been used to justify discrimination against marginalized groups
• The impact of Social Darwinism on ideas about health and healthcare policies
• The relationship between Social Darwinism and ideas about gender and sexuality
• The ways in which Social Darwinism has been used to justify colonialism and exploitation of natural resources

Social Darwinism is a complex and controversial concept that has had a profound impact on the development of modern societies. It has been used to justify a wide range of ideologies and policies, from colonialism and imperialism to eugenics and social welfare. Understanding the origins and implications of Social Darwinism is essential for grappling with the complex legacies of this concept in contemporary society.

One of the key aspects of Social Darwinism is its influence on political and social ideologies in the 19th and 20th centuries. The concept of "survival of the fittest" was often used to justify the unequal distribution of resources and power within societies, as well as the expansion of empires and the subjugation of indigenous peoples. This justification of inequality and exploitation has had lasting implications for global power dynamics and the distribution of wealth and resources.

Social Darwinism has also played a significant role in shaping ideas about race and eugenics. The concept of "natural selection" was often used to justify discriminatory policies and practices against marginalized racial and ethnic groups, as well as to promote ideas about the "improvement" of the human gene pool through selective breeding. These ideas have had lasting implications for ideas about race and genetics, as well as for the development of racist and eugenicist policies.

The ethical implications of Social Darwinism are also significant, as the concept has been used to justify a wide range of discriminatory and exploitative practices. The idea that competition and inequality are natural and inevitable has often been used to justify the exclusion of marginalized groups from access to resources and opportunities, as well as to promote ideologies of individualism and self-interest over collective welfare. These ideas have had lasting implications for social and economic inequality, as well as for the development of policies that prioritize the interests of the powerful over those of the marginalized.

Criticism and opposition to Social Darwinism have also been significant within intellectual and academic circles. Many scholars and activists have challenged the concept on both ethical and scientific grounds, arguing that it is based on flawed assumptions about human nature and the natural world. These critiques have played a significant role in shaping contemporary understandings of inequality and exploitation, as well as in promoting alternative visions of social and economic justice.

The legacy of Social Darwinism in contemporary society is also significant, as the concept continues to shape ideas about competition, success, and individual responsibility in the modern world. The influence of Social Darwinism can be seen in a wide range of social and political ideologies, from neoliberalism and libertarianism to nationalist and xenophobic movements. Understanding the ways in which Social Darwinism continues to shape contemporary society is essential for grappling with the complex legacies of this concept in the modern world.

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78 Social Darwinism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

🏆 best social darwinism topic ideas & essay examples, 📌 good essay topics on social darwinism, 🔎 simple & easy social darwinism essay titles, ❓ questions about social darwinism.

• Social Darwinism in European Imperialism Darwinism, in general, is a biological theory describing the appearance of new species and extinction of the existing ones defining species through the process of natural selection1 that is the core of Darwin’s theory and […]
• Social Darwinism Through the History The social Darwinism progress before the 19th century was preceded by the concept of Darwinism. In this respect, the aspect of the evolution of animals and humans was greatly respected. We will write a custom essay specifically for you by our professional experts 808 writers online Learn More
• Social Darwinism and the Success or Failures of Individuals in the Society According to Darwin, while the fittest survive in nature, in human society such fitness is determined by the ability of people to adjust to the changing circumstances.
• Social Darwinism: Evolutionary Explanations in Sociology In order to understand the reasons behind the failure of social Darwinism to describe society objectively, it is essential to review this ideology’s common arguments.
• Social Darwinism and Legality of Panhandling It is impossible to judge the value of panhandlers’ life; however, panhandling should be outlawed to give people an opportunity to live a decent life.
• Impact of Social Darwinism on the Perception of Human Disabilities In addition, connecting behavior such as the likeliness of criminality to genetics is incorrect and damaging not only to the individual but to a community and society as a whole.
• Social Darwinism in “Battle Royal” by Ralph Ellison The Battle Royal is a non-fictional work of Ralph Ellison and talks of the black people fighting for their freedom in the Whites’ society. Furthermore, a good life is also embedded in hard work and […]
• Scientific Racism: the Eugenics of Social Darwinism I think that the development of Scientific Racism and further Eugenics became the result of people’s attempts to justify their unethical behavior toward other individuals and to support their material goals to develop slavery, and […]
• Social Darwinism and the Mixing of the Races All of his heinous acts at the time was meant to highlight the weakness of a particular race of people, in this case, the Jews, and how allowing them to continue to lay claim to […]
• Social Darwinism and Nazi Genocide Ideology It is possible to trace the way the Jews settled and assimilated in western countries and the way the ideas of Social Darwinism affected the society to see the link between Nazi genocidal ideology and […]
• Why Did the Ideas of Social Darwinism Appeal to Many Americans in the Late 19th Century? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to clear up what the main idea of Social Darwinism was and what the peculiarities of the Americans in the 19th century were.
• Justifying Business Practices Through Social Darwinism
• The Connection Between Malthus’ Economics, Social Darwinism, and Eugenics
• The Role of Social Darwinism in the Construction of Nazi Ideology
• Position Nationalistic Ambitions and Social Darwinism
• Government Laws Preventing Social Darwinism
• Emotivism and Social Darwinism and Its Ethical Applications
• Social Darwinism and Reform in the Gilded Era and Modern Time
• Spencer’s Theory Of Social Darwinism
• Andrew Carnie’s Social Darwinism Principles
• Social Darwinism in American Politics
• Social Darwinism Impact Anti Semitism
• Racism and Social Darwinism and Its Impact on the World
• 19th Century Developments and the Relevance of Social Darwinism
• The Ideological Ties Between Darwinism, Social Darwinism, and Imperialism
• The Role and Influence of Social Darwinism in America
• George Pullman’s Influence on Social Darwinism
• How Was Social Darwinism Used to Justify Imperialism
• The Connection Between Social Darwinism and Race Superiority in the West
• Comparing Social Darwinism and the Gospel of Wealth During the Gilded Age
• Social Darwinism and Its Effect on Society
• Class Conduct: Social Darwinism and the Industrial Elite
• Social Darwinism as the Reaction to Growing Empires
• Description of The Social Darwinism and Charles Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection
• What Is a Strict Social Darwinism Right
• The History and Applications of Social Darwinism in Business Practices
• Capitalism and Social Darwinism in the Novel “The Jungle”
• What Is the Ideal of Social Darwinism
• Darwin, Darwinism, and Social Darwinism: What Do We Learn From Darwin’s Theory
• Causes and Influence of Social Darwinism
• Impact of The Social Darwinism on the Development of the Humanity
• Effects of Social Darwinism on Critical Race Theory
• How Is Social Darwinism Different From Natural Selection
• Frank Norris’ Expression of Social Darwinism
• Racism and Social Darwinism in Regards to Imperialism
• The Most Dangerous Game and Social Darwinism
• Scientific Racisms: The Eugenics of Social Darwinism
• How Does Social Darwinism Differ From Reform Darwinism
• Social Darwinism Was the Cause of European Domination
• Social Darwinism and Eugenics During The 19th Century
• The Connection Between Eugenics, Social Darwinism, and Hitler’s Aryan Master Race
• Why Is It Called Social Darwinism?
• Who Is Known as Social Darwinist?
• What Was the Impact of Social Darwinism?
• What Is Social Darwinism Simple Explanation?
• What Is Another Word for Social Darwinism?
• What Is the Main Point of Social Darwin’s Theory?
• What Is an Example of Social Darwinism?
• What Are the Key Assumptions of Social Darwinism?
• How Does Social Darwinism Explain Poverty?
• What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Social Darwinism?
• When Has Social Darwinism Been Used?
• Why Is Social Darwinism a Problem?
• How Did Social Darwinism Play a Role in Imperialism?
• What Is a Good Sentence for Social Darwinism?
• How Did Social Darwinism Affect Economics?
• How Was Social Darwinism Criticized?
• What Impact Did Social Darwinism Have on Society?
• How Does Social Darwinism Apply to Society?
• Why Is Social Darwinism No Longer Accepted?
• What Did Social Darwinism Discourage?
• Who Benefited From Social Darwinism?
• How Did Social Darwinism Affect Capitalism?
• Why Did Social Darwinism Appeal to the Wealthy Classes?
• When Did Social Darwinism End?
• How Did Social Darwinism Affect European Behavior?
• Is Social Darwinism an Element of Realism?
• How Did Robber Barons Use Social Darwinism?
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IvyPanda . "78 Social Darwinism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples." February 29, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/topic/social-darwinism-essay-topics/.

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Write an essay on Darwinism.

Darwinism Theory of natural selection:-The theory of natural selection is based on the following factor:-i Rapid multiplication:- All animals and plants tends to multiply in geometrical progression. Every species produces more offsprings than can be supported in a particular environment and can survive.ii Limited environmental resources Space and food:- Increase of population in animals and plants requires more space and food. The space in the universe remains constant. The ultimate source of food for all plants and also animals consists of CO2 of the air and water and mineral salts of the soil. These material do not increase. The carrying capacity of environment that is the number of individuals it can support does not allow its population to grow beyond the limit and equilibrium is reached. Hence the population size remains nearly constant.iii Struggle for existance:- Every individual makes efforts for fulfilment of its basic needs. This competition for the primary necessities of life is called struggle for existence.iv Variation:- Variation is the law of nature. Every individual varies in some respects such as size shape structure and behaviour from other of its species.v Natural selection survival of the fittest:- In the struggle for existence the individuals which have more favourable variations well enjoy a competitive advantage over others which have less favourable of unfavourable variations and will survive and reproduce.vi Inheritance of usefuI variation:- The individuals after their selection by nature in the struggle for existence pass on their useful variations to the next generation. Thus the offspring of the fit individuals will also be fit.vii Formation of new species:- In each generation new favourable variations appear and supplement the favourable variations inherited from the parents.

Related solutions.

नवडार्विनवाद पर एक निबन्ध लिखिए ।

Darwin was influenced by reading the population theory of

Essay on Population was written by Darwin.

Write True or False: 'Essay on Human Population' was written by Charles Darwin.

Essay on Human Population' was written by Charles Darwin.

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पर्यावरण संरक्षण पर निबंध लिखिए।

बेरोजगारी पर निबंध लिखिए।

निबंध लिखें: महँगाई

निबंध लिखें: वसंतु ऋतु

निबंध लिखें : गणतंत्र दिवस

निबंध लिखें : वर्तमान बिहार ।

राजनीति और छात्र पर निबंध लिखें।

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The Anti-Abortion Endgame That Erin Hawley Admitted to the Supreme Court

Somewhat lost in the debate around abortion pills and oral arguments that took place at the Supreme Court in FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine on Tuesday was one deeply uncomfortable truth: The very notion of what it means to practice emergency medicine is in dispute, with anti-abortion doctors insisting upon a right to refuse treatment for any patient who doesn’t meet their test of moral purity. Indeed, the right asserted is that in the absence of certainty about which patients are morally pure, the doctors want to deny medication to all patients, nationwide.

In public, the plaintiffs in this case—a group of doctors and dentists seeking to ban medication abortion—have long claimed they object to ending “unborn life” by finishing an “incomplete or failed” abortion at the hospital. But in court, they went much further. Their lawyer, Erin Hawley, admitted at oral argument that her clients don’t merely oppose terminating a pregnancy—they are pursuing the right to turn away a patient whose pregnancy has already been terminated . Indeed, they appear to want to deny even emergency care to patients whose fetus is no longer “alive,” on the grounds that the patient used an abortion drug earlier in the process. And they aim to deploy this broad fear of “complicity” against the FDA, to demand a nationwide prohibition on the abortion pill to ensure that they need never again see (and be forced to turn away) patients who’ve previously taken it. This is not a theory of being “complicit” in ending life. It is a theory that doctors can pick and choose their patients based on the “moral distress” they might feel in helping them.

It should come as no surprise that the same judge who tried to ban mifepristone in this case, Matthew Kacsmaryk, has also attempted to legalize anti-LGBTQ+ discrimination in health care nationwide. This is the ballgame: weaponize subjective religious beliefs against secular society to degrade the quality of care for everyone. If you can’t persuade Americans to adopt hardcore evangelical views, exploit the legal system to coerce them into it anyway.

Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine is at once embarrassingly frivolous and existentially important. Don’t let the jokes about how silly the Comstock Act seems , or how speculative the theory of standing is, get in the way of taking a serious look at the claims on offer. The plaintiffs say they are terrified that one day, a patient may walk into their emergency room suffering complications from a medication abortion prescribed by some other doctor. This patient may need their assistance completing the abortion or simply recovering from the complete abortion, which these plaintiffs deem “complicity” in sin. And they say the solution is either a total, nationwide ban on mifepristone, the first drug in the medication abortion sequence, or a draconian (and medically unnecessary) set of restrictions that would place mifepristone out of reach for many patients. (The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5 th Circuit ruled to reinstate those restrictions at their behest.)

It is a twisted line of logic, one that should never have reached the Supreme Court in the first place. But it is also a product of the court’s past indulgence of outlandish claims about moral “complicity.” As was made plain in the oral arguments and briefing, activist doctors are no longer satisfied with personal conscience exemptions already granted under state and federal law; they now insist that nobody, anywhere, should have access to the abortion pill, in order to ensure that they themselves won’t have to treat patients who took one. At a minimum, they say, they should be able to radically roll back access to the pill in all 50 states to reduce the odds that one of these handful of objectors might someday encounter a patient who took it. This extremist argument lays bare the transformation of the idea of “complicity” from a shield for religious dissenters to a sword for ideologues desperate to seize control over other people’s lives and bodies.

At oral arguments, several justices pressed Hawley, who argued on behalf of Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, with an obvious retort: Why can’t her clients simply refuse to treat these hypothetical someday patients on the grounds that they cannot help end the “life” of a fetus or embryo? After all, federal law guarantees doctors the right not to have to provide an abortion if doing so is “contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.” Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Brett Kavanaugh secured assurances from Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar, early in the arguments, that under no circumstances could the government force any health care provider to ever participate in an abortion in violation of their conscience. Justice Elena Kagan asked Prelogar: “Suppose somebody has bled significantly, needs a transfusion, or, you know, any of a number of other things that might happen.” Would the plaintiffs object to treating them? Prelogar said the record was unclear.

Hawley, who is married to far-right Republican Sen. Josh Hawley, then approached the lectern and cleared up any confusion: Yes, she insisted, treating a patient who has undergone a medication abortion violates the conscience of the plaintiff physicians even if there is no “live” fetus or embryo to terminate anymore. “Completing an elective abortion means removing an embryo fetus, whether or not they’re alive, as well as placental tissue,” Hawley told Kagan. So the plaintiffs don’t object just to taking a “life.” They also object to the mere act of removing leftover tissue, even from the placenta.

Of course, these doctors must remove “dead” fetal tissue and placentas all the time—from patients who experienced a spontaneous miscarriage. By their own admission, the plaintiffs regularly help women complete miscarriages through surgery or medication. Those women they will gladly treat. Other women, though—the ones who induced their own miscarriage via medication—are too sinful to touch. Before the plaintiffs can administer even lifesaving emergency treatment, they need to know the circumstances of this pregnancy loss: Spontaneous miscarriages are OK; medication abortions are not.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, too, zeroed in on this admission. She told Hawley that she had thought the objection was to “participating in a procedure that is ending the life [of the fetus].” Hawley told her no: Any participation in an abortion, even through the indirect treatment of a patient without a “live” fetus, violated the doctors’ conscience. So, wait. What about “handing them a water bottle?” Jackson asked. Hawley dodged the question, declining to say whether helping a patient hydrate would constitute impermissible complicity in sin.

All this is reminiscent of Little Sisters of the Poor , a case about a Catholic charitable group that was afforded an exemption from the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate. The Little Sisters were asked to check a box signaling to the government that they could not comply with the mandate, at which point the government would step in to cover their employees. But the Little Sisters refused, viewing this action—the checking of a box to opt out of coverage—as “complicity” in abortion because it would in turn trigger government payment for contraception (which they viewed as abortifacients). The Supreme Court and the Trump administration ultimately indulged the Little Sisters’ claim .

Here, we have emergency room physicians asserting that they will not participate in lifesaving medical intervention unless they approve of the reason for the pregnancy loss. Presumably, if the pregnant patient is an unwed mother, or a gay or transgender person, the doctor would be similarly complicit in sin and decline service. Seen through this lens, since one can never know which sins one is enabling in the ER, each and every day, a narrow conscience exemption becomes a sweeping guarantee that absolutely nobody in the country can ever have access to basic health care, let alone miscarriage management. (Of course, these plaintiffs might focus only on one set of “sins” they see as relevant.) In a country effectively governed by Kacsmaryk and his plaintiff friends, a gay person suffering a stroke could be turned away from any hospital because of his sexual orientation, all to spare a doctor from a glancing encounter with prior sin. As Tobias Barrington Wolff, a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, put it to us in an email, this unbounded view of complicity “is part of enacting the social death of people and practices you abhor, which in turn can contribute to the material death of people and practices you abhor.”

One of the most exhausting lessons of post- Roe America is that being “pro-life” definitively means privileging the life of the presumptively sin-free unborn—or even their “dead” remains—over the life of the sin-racked adults who carry them. This is why women are left to go septic or to hemorrhage in hospital parking lots; it is why C-sections are performed in nonviable pregnancies, at high risk to mothers; it’s why the women who sued in Texas to secure exceptions to that state’s abortion ban are condemned by the state as sinners and whores . And it’s why—in the eyes of the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine — it is a greater hardship for a physician to “waste precious moments scrubbing in, scrubbing out” of emergency surgery, as Hawley put it, so long as they don’t believe that the emergency warrants their professional services, than it is for a pregnant person, anywhere in the country, including in states that permit abortion, to be forced to give birth.

At oral argument, Hawley explained that her clients have “structured [their] medical practice to bring life into the world. When they are called from their labor and delivery floor down to the operating room to treat a woman suffering from abortion drug harm, that is diametrically opposed to why they entered the medical profession. It comes along with emotional harm.” The emotional harm alleged here is that unless these doctors approve of the specific circumstances of the ER visit, they violate not only their own medical preference but also their religious convictions. But they will never truly know enough about the sins of their patients to be able to shield themselves against being a link in a chain of subjective lifelong sin. And to be a doctor, especially an emergency physician, should be to understand that your patients’ private choices and spiritual life are not really open to your pervasive and vigilant medical veto. This deep-rooted suspicion of patients deemed insufficiently pure for lifesaving treatment didn’t begin with the availability of medication abortion. It will assuredly not end there.

Is a robot writing your kids’ essays? We asked educators to weigh in on the growing role of AI in classrooms.

Educators weigh in on the growing role of ai and chatgpt in classrooms..

Remember writing essays in high school? Chances are you had to look up stuff in an encyclopedia — an actual one, not Wikipedia — or else connect to AOL via a modem bigger than your parents’ Taurus station wagon.

Now, of course, there’s artificial intelligence. According to new research from Pew, about 1 in 5 US teens who’ve heard of ChatGPT have used it for schoolwork. Kids in upper grades are more apt to have used the chatbot: About a quarter of 11th- and 12th-graders who know about ChatGPT have tried it.

For the uninitiated, ChatGPT arrived on the scene in late 2022, and educators continue to grapple with the ethics surrounding its growing popularity. Essentially, it generates free, human-like responses based on commands. (I’m sure this sentence will look antiquated in about six months, like when people described the internet as the “information superhighway.”)

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I used ChatGPT to plug in this prompt: “Write an essay on ‘The Scarlet Letter.’” Within moments, ChatGPT created an essay as thorough as anything I’d labored over in AP English.

Is this cheating? Is it just part of our strange new world? I talked to several educators about what they’re seeing in classrooms and how they’re monitoring it. Before you berate your child over how you wrote essays with a No. 2 pencil, here are some things to consider.

Adapting to new technology isn’t immoral. “We have to recalibrate our sense of what’s acceptable. There was a time when every teacher said: ‘Oh, it’s cheating to use Wikipedia.’ And guess what? We got used to it, we decided it’s reputable enough, and we cite Wikipedia all the time,” says Noah Giansiracusa, an associate math professor at Bentley University who hosts the podcast “ AI in Academia: Navigating the Future .”

“There’s a calibration period where a technology is new and untested. It’s good to be cautious and to treat it with trepidation. Then, over time, the norms kind of adapt,” he says — just like new-fangled graphing calculators or the internet in days of yore.

“I think the current conversation around AI should not be centered on an issue with plagiarism. It should be centered on how AI will alter methods for learning and expressing oneself. ‘Catching’ students who use fully AI-generated products ... implies a ‘gotcha’ atmosphere,” says Jim Nagle, a history teacher at Bedford High School. “Since AI is already a huge part of our day-to-day lives, it’s no surprise our students are making it a part of their academic tool kit. Teachers and students should be at the forefront of discussions about responsible and ethical use.”

Teachers and parents could use AI to think about education at a higher level. Really, learning is about more than regurgitating information — or it should be, anyway. But regurgitation is what AI does best.

“If our system is just for students to write a bunch of essays and then grade the results? Something’s missing. We need to really talk about their purpose and what they’re getting out of this, and maybe think about different forms of assignments and grading,” Giansiracusa says.

After all, while AI aggregates and organizes ideas, the quality of its responses depends on the users’ prompts. Instead of recoiling from it, use it as a conversation-starter.

“What parents and teachers can do is to start the conversation with kids: ‘What are we trying to learn here? Is it even something that ChatGPT could answer? Why did your assignment not convince you that you need to do this thinking on your own when a tool can do it for you?’” says Houman Harouni , a lecturer on education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education.

Harouni urges parents to read an essay written by ChatGPT alongside their student. Was it good? What could be done better? Did it feel like a short cut?

“What they’re going to remember is that you had that conversation with them; that someone thought, at some point in their lives, that taking a shortcut is not the best way ... especially if you do it with the tool right in front of you, because you have something real to talk about,” he says.

Harouni hopes teachers think about its implications, too. Consider math: So much grunt work has been eliminated by calculators and computers. Yet kids are still tested as in days of old, when perhaps they could expand their learning to be assessed in ways that are more personal and human-centric, leaving the rote stuff to AI.

“We could take this moment of confusion and loss of certainty seriously, at least in some small pockets, and start thinking about what a different kind of school would look like. Five years from now, we might have the beginnings of some very interesting exploration. Five years from now, you and I might be talking about schools wherein teaching and learning is happening in a very self-directed way, in a way that’s more based on … igniting the kid’s interest and seeing where they go and supporting them to go deeper and to go wider,” Harouni says.

Teachers have the chance to offer assignments with more intentionality.

“Really think about the purpose of the assignments. Don’t just think of the outcome and the deliverable: ‘I need a student to produce a document.’ Why are we getting students to write? Why are we doing all these things in the first place? If teachers are more mindful, and maybe parents can also be more mindful, I think it pushes us away from this dangerous trap of thinking about in terms of ‘cheating,’ which, to me, is a really slippery path,” Giansiracusa says.

AI can boost confidence and reduce procrastination. Sometimes, a robot can do something better than a human, such as writing a dreaded resume and cover letter. And that’s OK; it’s useful, even.

“Often, students avoid applying to internships because they’re just overwhelmed at the thought of writing a cover letter, or they’re afraid their resume isn’t good enough. I think that tools like this can help them feel more confident. They may be more likely to do it sooner and have more organized and better applications,” says Kristin Casasanto, director of post-graduate planning at Olin College of Engineering.

Casasanto says that AI is also useful for de-stressing during interview prep.

“Students can use generative AI to plug in a job description and say, ‘Come up with a list of interview questions based on the job description,’ which will give them an idea of what may be asked, and they can even then say, ‘Here’s my resume. Give me answers to these questions based on my skills and experience.’ They’re going to really build their confidence around that,” Casasanto says.

Plus, when students use AI for basics, it frees up more time to meet with career counselors about substantive issues.

“It will help us as far as scalability. … Career services staff can then utilize our personal time in much more meaningful ways with students,” Casasanto says.

We need to remember: These kids grew up during a pandemic. We can’t expect kids to resist technology when they’ve been forced to learn in new ways since COVID hit.

“Now we’re seeing pandemic-era high school students come into college. They’ve been channeled through Google Classroom their whole career,” says Katherine Jewell, a history professor at Fitchburg State University.

“They need to have technology management and information literacy built into the curriculum,” Jewell says.

Jewell recently graded a paper on the history of college sports. It was obvious which papers were written by AI: They didn’t address the question. In her syllabus, Jewell defines plagiarism as “any attempt by a student to represent the work of another, including computers, as their own.”

This means that AI qualifies, but she also has an open mind, given students’ circumstances.

“My students want to do the right thing, for the most part. They don’t want to get away with stuff. I understand why they turned to these tools; I really do. I try to reassure them that I’m here to help them learn systems. I’m focusing much more on the learning process. I incentivize them to improve, and I acknowledge: ‘You don’t know how to do this the first time out of the gate,’” Jewell says. “I try to incentivize them so that they’re improving their confidence in their abilities, so they don’t feel the need to turn to these tools.”

Understand the forces that make kids resort to AI in the first place . Clubs, sports, homework: Kids are busy and under pressure. Why not do what’s easy?

“Kids are so overscheduled in their day-to-day lives. I think there’s so much enormous pressure on these kids, whether it’s self-inflicted, parent-inflicted, or school-culture inflicted. It’s on them to maximize their schedule. They’ve learned that AI can be a way to take an assignment that would take five hours and cut it down to one,” says a teacher at a competitive high school outside Boston who asked to remain anonymous.

Recently, this teacher says, “I got papers back that were just so robotic and so cold. I had to tell [students]: ‘I understand that you tried to use a tool to help you. I’m not going to penalize you, but what I am going to penalize you for is that you didn’t actually answer the prompt.”

Afterward, more students felt safe to come forward to say they’d used AI. This teacher hopes that age restrictions become implemented for these programs, similar to apps such as Snapchat. Educationally and developmentally, they say, high-schoolers are still finding their voice — a voice that could be easily thwarted by a robot.

“Part of high school writing is to figure out who you are, and what is your voice as a writer. And I think, developmentally, that takes all of high school to figure out,” they say.

And AI can’t replicate voice and personality — for now, at least.

Kara Baskin can be reached at [email protected] . Follow her @kcbaskin .