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Argument and Argumentation

Argument is a central concept for philosophy. Philosophers rely heavily on arguments to justify claims, and these practices have been motivating reflections on what arguments and argumentation are for millennia. Moreover, argumentative practices are also pervasive elsewhere; they permeate scientific inquiry, legal procedures, education, and political institutions. The study of argumentation is an inter-disciplinary field of inquiry, involving philosophers, language theorists, legal scholars, cognitive scientists, computer scientists, and political scientists, among many others. This entry provides an overview of the literature on argumentation drawing primarily on philosophical sources, but also engaging extensively with relevant sources from other disciplines.

1. Terminological Clarifications

2.1 deduction, 2.2 induction, 2.3 abduction, 2.4 analogy, 2.5 fallacies, 3.1 adversarial and cooperative argumentation, 3.2 argumentation as an epistemic practice, 3.3 consensus-oriented argumentation, 3.4 argumentation and conflict management, 3.5 conclusion, 4.1 argumentation theory, 4.2 artificial intelligence and computer science, 4.3 cognitive science and psychology, 4.4 language and communication, 4.5 argumentation in specific social practices, 5.1 argumentative injustice and virtuous argumentation, 5.2 emotions and argumentation, 5.3 cross-cultural perspectives on argumentation, 5.4 argumentation and the internet, 6. conclusion, references for the main text, references for the historical supplement, other internet resources, related entries.

An argument can be defined as a complex symbolic structure where some parts, known as the premises, offer support to another part, the conclusion. Alternatively, an argument can be viewed as a complex speech act consisting of one or more acts of premising (which assert propositions in favor of the conclusion), an act of concluding, and a stated or implicit marker (“hence”, “therefore”) that indicates that the conclusion follows from the premises (Hitchcock 2007). [ 1 ] The relation of support between premises and conclusion can be cashed out in different ways: the premises may guarantee the truth of the conclusion, or make its truth more probable; the premises may imply the conclusion; the premises may make the conclusion more acceptable (or assertible).

For theoretical purposes, arguments may be considered as freestanding entities, abstracted from their contexts of use in actual human activities. But depending on one’s explanatory goals, there is also much to be gained from considering arguments as they in fact occur in human communicative practices. The term generally used for instances of exchange of arguments is argumentation . In what follows, the convention of using “argument” to refer to structures of premises and conclusion, and “argumentation” to refer to human practices and activities where arguments occur as communicative actions will be adopted.

Argumentation can be defined as the communicative activity of producing and exchanging reasons in order to support claims or defend/challenge positions, especially in situations of doubt or disagreement (Lewiński & Mohammed 2016). It is arguably best conceived as a kind of dialogue , even if one can also “argue” with oneself, in long speeches or in writing (in articles or books) for an intended but silent audience, or in groups rather than in dyads (Lewiński & Aakhus 2014). But argumentation is a special kind of dialogue: indeed, most of the dialogues we engage in are not instances of argumentation, for example when asking someone if they know what time it is, or when someone shares details about their vacation. Argumentation only occurs when, upon making a claim, someone receives a request for further support for the claim in the form of reasons, or estimates herself that further justification is required (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jackson, 2019). In such cases, dialogues of “giving and asking for reasons” ensue (Brandom, 1994; Bermejo Luque 2011). Since most of what we know we learn from others, argumentation seems to be an important mechanism to filter the information we receive, instead of accepting what others tell us uncritically (Sperber, Clément, et al. 2010).

The study of arguments and argumentation is also closely connected to the study of reasoning , understood as the process of reaching conclusions on the basis of careful, reflective consideration of the available information, i.e., by an examination of reasons . According to a widespread view, reasoning and argumentation are related (as both concern reasons) but fundamentally different phenomena: reasoning would belong to the mental realm of thinking—an individual inferring new information from the available information by means of careful consideration of reasons—whereas argumentation would belong to the public realm of the exchange of reasons, expressed in language or other symbolic media and intended for an audience. However, a number of authors have argued for a different view, namely that reasoning and argumentation are in fact two sides of the same coin, and that what is known as reasoning is by and large the internalization of practices of argumentation (MacKenzie 1989; Mercier & Sperber 2017; Mercier 2018). For the purposes of this entry, we can assume a close connection between reasoning and argumentation so that relevant research on reasoning can be suitably included in the discussions to come.

2. Types of Arguments

Arguments come in many kinds. In some of them, the truth of the premises is supposed to guarantee the truth of the conclusion, and these are known as deductive arguments. In others, the truth of the premises should make the truth of the conclusion more likely while not ensuring complete certainty; two well-known classes of such arguments are inductive and abductive arguments (a distinction introduced by Peirce, see entry on C.S. Peirce ). Unlike deduction, induction and abduction are thought to be ampliative: the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) contained in the premises. Moreover, a type of argument that features prominently across different philosophical traditions, and yet does not fit neatly into any of the categories so far discussed, are analogical arguments. In this section, these four kinds of arguments are presented. The section closes with a discussion of fallacious arguments, that is, arguments that seem legitimate and “good”, but in fact are not. [ 2 ]

Valid deductive arguments are those where the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion: the conclusion cannot but be true if the premises are true. Arguments having this property are said to be deductively valid . A valid argument whose premises are also true is said to be sound . Examples of valid deductive arguments are the familiar syllogisms, such as:

All humans are living beings. All living beings are mortal. Therefore, all humans are mortal.

In a deductively valid argument, the conclusion will be true in all situations where the premises are true, with no exceptions. A slightly more technical gloss of this idea goes as follows: in all possible worlds where the premises hold, the conclusion will also hold. This means that, if I know the premises of a deductively valid argument to be true of a given situation, then I can conclude with absolute certainty that the conclusion is also true of that situation. An important property typically associated with deductive arguments (but with exceptions, such as in relevant logic), and which differentiates them from inductive and abductive arguments, is the property of monotonicity : if premises A and B deductively imply conclusion C , then the addition of any arbitrary premise D will not invalidate the argument. In other words, if the argument “ A and B ; therefore C ” is deductively valid, then the argument “ A , B and D ; therefore C ” is equally deductively valid.

Deductive arguments are the objects of study of familiar logical systems such as (classical) propositional and predicate logic, as well as of subclassical systems such as intuitionistic and relevant logics (although in relevant logic the property of monotonicity does not hold, as it may lead to violations of criteria of relevance between premises and conclusion—see entry on relevance logic ). In each of these systems, the relation of logical consequence in question satisfies the property of necessary truth-preservation (see entry on logical consequence ). This is not surprising, as these systems were originally designed to capture arguments of a very specific kind, namely mathematical arguments (proofs), in the pioneering work of Frege, Russell, Hilbert, Gentzen, and others. Following a paradigm established in ancient Greek mathematics and famously captured in Euclid’s Elements , argumentative steps in mathematical proofs (in this tradition at least) must have the property of necessary truth preservation (Netz 1999). This paradigm remained influential for millennia, and still codifies what can be described as the “classical” conception of mathematical proof (Dutilh Novaes 2020a), even if practices of proof are ultimately also quite diverse. (In fact, there is much more to argumentation in mathematics than just deductive argumentation [Aberdein & Dove 2013].)

However, a number of philosophers have argued that deductive validity and necessary truth preservation in fact come apart. Some have reached this conclusion motivated by the familiar logical paradoxes such as the Liar or Curry’s paradox (Beall 2009; Field 2008; see entries on the Liar paradox and on Curry’s paradox ). Others have defended the idea that there are such things as contingent logical truths (Kaplan 1989; Nelson & Zalta 2012), which thus challenge the idea of necessary truth preservation. It has also been suggested that what is preserved in the transition from premises to conclusions in deductive arguments is in fact warrant or assertibility rather than truth (Restall 2004). Yet others, such as proponents of preservationist approaches to paraconsistent logic, posit that what is preserved by the deductive consequence relation is the coherence, or incoherence, of a set of premises (Schotch, Brown, & Jennings 2009; see entry on paraconsistent logic ). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the view that deductive validity is to be understood primarily in terms of necessary truth preservation is still the received view.

Relatedly, there are a number of pressing philosophical issues pertaining to the justification of deduction, such as the exact nature of the necessity involved in deduction (metaphysical, logical, linguistic, epistemic; Shapiro 2005), and the possibility of offering a non-circular foundation for deduction (Dummett 1978). Furthermore, it is often remarked that the fact that a deductive argument is not ampliative may entail that it cannot be informative, which in turn would mean that its usefulness is quite limited; this problem has been described as “the scandal of deduction” (Sequoiah-Grayson 2008).

Be that as it may, deductive arguments have occupied a special place in philosophy and the sciences, ever since Aristotle presented the first fully-fledged theory of deductive argumentation and reasoning in the Prior Analytics (and the corresponding theory of scientific demonstration in the Posterior Analytics ; see Historical Supplement ). The fascination for deductive arguments is understandable, given their allure of certainty and indubitability. The more geometrico (a phrase introduced by Spinoza to describe the argumentative structure of his Ethics as following “a geometrical style”—see entry on Spinoza ) has been influential in many fields other than mathematics. However, the focus on deductive arguments at the expense of other types of arguments has arguably skewed investigations on argument and argumentation too much in one specific direction (see (Bermejo-Luque 2020) for a critique of deductivism in the study of argumentation).

In recent decades, the view that everyday reasoning and argumentation by and large do not follow the canons of deductive argumentation has been gaining traction. In psychology of reasoning, Oaksford and Chater were the first to argue already in the 1980s that human reasoning “in the wild” is essentially probabilistic, following the basic canons of Bayesian probabilities (Oaksford & Chater 2018; Elqayam 2018; see section 5.3 below). Computer scientists and artificial intelligence researchers have also developed a strong interest in non-monotonic reasoning and argumentation (Reiter 1980), recognizing that, outside specific scientific contexts, human reasoning tends to be deeply defeasible (Pollock 1987; see entries on non-monotonic logic and defeasible reasoning ). Thus seen, deductive argumentation might be considered as the exception rather than the rule in human argumentative practices taken as a whole (Dutilh Novaes 2020a). But there are others, especially philosophers, who still maintain that the use of deductive reasoning and argumentation is widespread and extends beyond niches of specialists (Shapiro 2014; Williamson 2018).

Inductive arguments are arguments where observations about past instances and regularities lead to conclusions about future instances and general principles. For example, the observation that the sun has risen in the east every single day until now leads to the conclusion that it will rise in the east tomorrow, and to the general principle “the sun always rises in the east”. Generally speaking, inductive arguments are based on statistical frequencies, which then lead to generalizations beyond the sample of cases initially under consideration: from the observed to the unobserved. In a good, i.e., cogent , inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion. In contrast with a deductively valid argument, in an inductive argument the degree of support will never be maximal, as there is always the possibility of the conclusion being false given the truth of the premises. A gloss in terms of possible worlds might be that, while in a deductively valid argument the conclusion will hold in all possible worlds where the premises hold, in a good inductive argument the conclusion will hold in a significant proportion of the possible worlds where the premises hold. The proportion of such worlds may give a measure of the strength of support of the premises for the conclusion (see entry on inductive logic ).

Inductive arguments have been recognized and used in science and elsewhere for millennia. The concept of induction ( epagoge in Greek) was understood by Aristotle as a progression from particulars to a universal, and figured prominently both in his conception of the scientific method and in dialectical practices (see entry on Aristotle’s logic, section 3.1 ). However, a deductivist conception of the scientific method remained overall more influential in Aristotelian traditions, inspired by the theory of scientific demonstration of the Posterior Analytics . It is only with the so-called “scientific revolution” of the early modern period that experiments and observation of individual cases became one of the pillars of scientific methodology, a transition that is strongly associated with the figure of Francis Bacon (1561–1626; see entry on Francis Bacon ).

Inductive inferences/arguments are ubiquitous both in science and in everyday life, and for the most part quite reliable. The functioning of the world around us seems to display a fair amount of statistical regularity, and this is referred to as the “Uniformity Principle” in the literature on the problem of induction (to be discussed shortly). Moreover, it has been argued that generalizing from previously observed frequencies is the most basic principle of human cognition (Clark 2016).

However, it has long been recognized that inductive inferences/arguments are not unproblematic. Hume famously offered the first influential formulation of what became known as “the problem of induction” in his Treatise of Human Nature (see entries on David Hume and on the problem of induction ; Howson 2000). Hume raises the question of what grounds the correctness of inductive inferences/arguments, and posits that there must be an argument establishing the validity of the Uniformity Principle for inductive inferences to be truly justified. He goes on to argue that this argument cannot be deductive, as it is not inconceivable that the course of nature may change. But it cannot be probable either, as probable arguments already presuppose the validity of the Uniformity Principle; circularity would ensue. Since these are the only two options, he concludes that the Uniformity Principle cannot be established by rational argument, and hence that induction cannot be justified.

A more recent influential critique of inductive arguments is the one offered in (Harman 1965). Harman argues that either enumerative induction is not always warranted, or it is always warranted but constitutes an uninteresting special case of the more general category of inference to the best explanation (see next section). The upshot is that, for Harman, induction should not be considered a warranted form of inference in its own right.

Given the centrality of induction for scientific practice, there have been numerous attempts to respond to the critics of induction, with various degrees of success. Among those, an influential recent response to the problem of induction is Norton’s material theory of induction (Norton 2003). But the problem has not prevented scientists and laypeople alike from continuing to use induction widely. More recently, the use of statistical frequencies for social categories to draw conclusions about specific individuals has become a matter of contention, both at the individual level (see entry on implicit bias ) and at the institutional level (e.g., the use of predictive algorithms for law enforcement [Jorgensen Bolinger 2021]). These debates can be seen as reoccurrences of Hume’s problem of induction, now in the domain of social rather than of natural phenomena.

An abductive argument is one where, from the observation of a few relevant facts, a conclusion is drawn as to what could possibly explain the occurrence of these facts (see entry on abduction ). Abduction is widely thought to be ubiquitous both in science and in everyday life, as well as in other specific domains such as the law, medical diagnosis, and explainable artificial intelligence (Josephson & Josephson 1994). Indeed, a good example of abduction is the closing argument by a prosecutor in a court of law who, after summarizing the available evidence, concludes that the most plausible explanation for it is that the defendant must have committed the crime they are accused of.

Like induction, and unlike deduction, abduction is not necessarily truth-preserving: in the example above, it is still possible that the defendant is not guilty after all, and that some other, unexpected phenomena caused the evidence to emerge. But abduction is significantly different from induction in that it does not only concern the generalization of prior observation for prediction (though it may also involve statistical data): rather, abduction is often backward-looking in that it seeks to explain something that has already happened. The key notion is that of bringing together apparently independent phenomena or events as explanatorily and/or causally connected to each other, something that is absent from a purely inductive argument that only appeals to observed frequencies. Cognitively, abduction taps into the well-known human tendency to seek (causal) explanations for phenomena (Keil 2006).

As noted, deduction and induction have been recognized as important classes of arguments for millennia; the concept of abduction is by comparison a latecomer. It is important to notice though that explanatory arguments as such are not latecomers; indeed, Aristotle’s very conception of scientific demonstration is based on the concept of explaining causes (see entry on Aristotle ). What is recent is the conceptualization of abduction as a special class of arguments, and the term itself. The term was introduced by Peirce as a third class of inferences distinct from deduction and induction: for Peirce, abduction is understood as the process of forming explanatory hypotheses, thus leading to new ideas and concepts (whereas for him deduction and induction could not lead to new ideas or theories; see the entry on Peirce ). Thus seen, abduction pertains to contexts of discovery , in which case it is not clear that it corresponds to instances of arguments, properly speaking. In its modern meaning, however, abduction pertains to contexts of justification , and thus to speak of abductive arguments becomes appropriate. An abductive argument is now typically understood as an inference to the best explanation (Lipton 1971 [2003]), although some authors contend that there are good reasons to distinguish the two concepts (Campos 2011).

While the main ideas behind abduction may seem simple enough, cashing out more precisely how exactly abduction works is a complex matter (see entry on abduction ). Moreover, it is not clear that abductive arguments are always or even generally reliable and cogent. Humans seem to have a tendency to overshoot in their quest for causal explanations, and often look for simplicity where there is none to be found (Lombrozo 2007; but see Sober 2015 on the significance of parsimony in scientific reasoning). There are also a number of philosophical worries pertaining to the justification of abduction, especially in scientific contexts; one influential critique of abduction/inference to the best explanation is the one articulated by van Fraassen (Fraassen 1989). A frequent concern pertains to the connection between explanatory superiority and truth: are we entitled to conclude that the conclusion of an abductive argument is true solely on the basis of it being a good (or even the best) explanation for the phenomena in question? It seems that no amount of philosophical a priori theorizing will provide justification for the leap from explanatory superiority to truth. Instead, defenders of abduction tend to offer empirical arguments showing that abduction tends to be a reliable rule of inference. In this sense, abduction and induction are comparable: they are widely used, grounded in very basic human cognitive tendencies, but they give rise to a number of difficult philosophical problems.

Arguments by analogy are based on the idea that, if two things are similar, what is true of one of them is likely to be true of the other as well (see entry on analogy and analogical reasoning ). Analogical arguments are widely used across different domains of human activity, for example in legal contexts (see entry on precedent and analogy in legal reasoning ). As an example, take an argument for the wrongness of farming non-human animals for food consumption: if an alien species farmed humans for food, that would be wrong; so, by analogy, it is wrong for us humans to farm non-human animals for food. The general idea is captured in the following schema (adapted from the entry on analogy and analogical reasoning ; S is the source domain and T the target domain of the analogy):

• S is similar to T in certain (known) respects.
• S has some further feature Q .
• Therefore, T also has the feature Q , or some feature Q * similar to Q .

The first premise establishes the analogy between two situations, objects, phenomena etc. The second premise states that the source domain has a given property. The conclusion is then that the target domain also has this property, or a suitable counterpart thereof. While informative, this schema does not differentiate between good and bad analogical arguments, and so does not offer much by way of explaining what grounds (good) analogical arguments. Indeed, contentious cases usually pertain to premise 1, and in particular to whether S and T are sufficiently similar in a way that is relevant for having or not having feature Q .

Analogical arguments are widely present in all known philosophical traditions, including three major ancient traditions: Greek, Chinese, and Indian (see Historical Supplement ). Analogies abound in ancient Greek philosophical texts, for example in Plato’s dialogues. In the Gorgias , for instance, the knack of rhetoric is compared to pastry-baking—seductive but ultimately unhealthy—whereas philosophy would correspond to medicine—potentially painful and unpleasant but good for the soul/body (Irani 2017). Aristotle discussed analogy extensively in the Prior Analytics and in the Topics (see section 3.2 of the entry on analogy and analogical reasoning ). In ancient Chinese philosophy, analogy occupies a very prominent position; indeed, it is perhaps the main form of argumentation for Chinese thinkers. Mohist thinkers were particularly interested in analogical arguments (see entries on logic and language in early Chinese philosophy , Mohism and the Mohist canons ). In the Latin medieval tradition too analogy received sustained attention, in particular in the domains of logic, theology and metaphysics (see entry on medieval theories of analogy ).

Analogical arguments continue to occupy a central position in philosophical discussions, and a number of the most prominent philosophical arguments of the last decades are analogical arguments, e.g., Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument purportedly showing the permissibility of abortion (Thomson 1971), and Searle’s Chinese Room argument purportedly showing that computers cannot display real understanding (see entry on the Chinese Room argument ). (Notice that these two arguments are often described as thought experiments [see entry on thought experiments ], but thought experiments are often based on analogical principles when seeking to make a point that transcends the thought experiment as such.) The Achilles’ heel of analogical arguments can be illustrated by these two examples: both arguments have been criticized on the grounds that the purported similarity between the source and the target domains is not sufficient to extrapolate the property of the source domain (the permissibility of disconnecting from the violinist; the absence of understanding in the Chinese room) to the target domain (abortion; digital computers and artificial intelligence).

In sum, while analogical arguments in general perhaps confer a lesser degree of conviction than the other three kinds of arguments discussed, they are widely used both in professional circles and in everyday life. They have rightly attracted a fair amount of attention from scholars in different disciplines, and remain an important object of study (see entry on analogy and analogical reasoning ).

One of the most extensively studied types of arguments throughout the centuries are, perhaps surprisingly, arguments that appear legitimate but are not, known as fallacious arguments . From early on, the investigation of such arguments occupied a prominent position in Aristotelian logical traditions, inspired in particular by his book Sophistical Refutations (see Historical Supplement ). The thought is that, to argue well, it is not sufficient to be able to produce and recognize good arguments; it is equally (or perhaps even more) important to be able to recognize bad arguments by others, and to avoid producing bad arguments oneself. This is particularly true of the tricky cases, namely arguments that appear legitimate but are not, i.e., fallacies.

Some well-know types of fallacies include (see entry on fallacies for a more extensive discussion):

• The fallacy of equivocation, which occurs when an arguer exploits the ambiguity of a term or phrase which has occurred at least twice in an argument to draw an unwarranted conclusion.
• The fallacy of begging the question, when one of the premises and the conclusion of an argument are the same proposition, but differently formulated.
• The fallacy of appeal to authority, when a claim is supported by reference to an authority instead of offering reasons to support it.
• The ad hominem fallacy, which involves bringing negative aspects of an arguer, or their situation, to argue against the view they are advancing.
• The fallacy of faulty analogy, when an analogy is used as an argument but there is not sufficient relevant similarity between the source domain and the target domain (as discussed above).

Beyond their (presumed?) usefulness in teaching argumentative skills, the literature on fallacies raises a number of important philosophical discussions, such as: What determines when an argument is fallacious or rather a legitimate argument? (See section 4.3 below on Bayesian accounts of fallacies) What causes certain arguments to be fallacious? Is the focus on fallacies a useful approach to arguments at all? (Massey 1981) Despite the occasional criticism, the concept of fallacies remains central in the study of arguments and argumentation.

3. Types of Argumentation

Just as there are different types of arguments, there are different types of argumentative situations, depending on the communicative goals of the persons involved and background conditions. Argumentation may occur when people are trying to reach consensus in a situation of dissent, but it may also occur when scientists discuss their findings with each other (to name but two examples). Specific rules of argumentative engagement may vary depending on these different types of argumentation.

A related point extensively discussed in the recent literature pertains to the function(s) of argumentation. [ 3 ] What’s the point of arguing? While it is often recognized that argumentation may have multiple functions, different authors tend to emphasize specific functions for argumentation at the expense of others. This section offers an overview of discussions on types of argumentation and its functions, demonstrating that argumentation is a multifaceted phenomenon that has different applications in different circumstances.

A question that has received much attention in the literature of the past decades pertains to whether the activity of argumentation is primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative. This question in fact corresponds to two sub-questions: the descriptive question of whether instances of argumentation are on the whole primarily adversarial or cooperative; and the normative question of whether argumentation should be (primarily) adversarial or cooperative. A number of authors have answered “adversarial” to the descriptive question and “cooperative” to the normative question, thus identifying a discrepancy between practices and normative ideals that must be remedied (or so they claim; Cohen 1995).

A case in point: recently, a number of far-right Internet personalities have advocated the idea that argumentation can be used to overpower one’s opponents, as described in the book The Art of the Argument: Western Civilization’s Last Stand (2017) by the white supremacist S. Molyneux. Such aggressive practices reflect a vision of argumentation as a kind of competition or battle, where the goal is to “score points” and “beat the opponent”. Authors who have criticized (overly) adversarial practices of argumentation include (Moulton 1983; Gilbert 1994; Rooney 2012; Hundleby 2013; Bailin & Battersby 2016). Many (but not all) of these authors formulated their criticism specifically from a feminist perspective (see entry on feminist perspectives on argumentation ).

Feminist critiques of adversarial argumentation challenge ideals of argumentation as a form of competition, where masculine-coded values of aggression and violence prevail (Kidd 2020). For these authors, such ideals encourage argumentative performances where excessive use of forcefulness is on display. Instances of aggressive argumentation in turn have a number of problematic consequences: epistemic consequences—the pursuit of truth is not best served by adversarial argumentation—as well as moral/ethical/political consequences—these practices exclude a number of people from participating in argumentative encounters, namely those for whom displays of aggression do not constitute socially acceptable behavior (women and other socially disadvantaged groups in particular). These authors defend alternative conceptions of argumentation as a cooperative, nurturing activity (Gilbert 1994; Bailin & Battersby 2016), which are traditionally feminine-coded values. Crucially, they view adversarial conceptions of argumentation as optional , maintaining that the alternatives are equally legitimate and that cooperative conceptions should be adopted and cultivated.

By contrast, others have argued that adversariality, when suitably understood, can be seen as an integral and in fact desirable component of argumentation (Govier 1999; Aikin 2011; Casey 2020; but notice that these authors each develop different accounts of adversariality in argumentation). Such authors answer “adversarial” both to the descriptive and to the normative questions stated above. One overall theme is the need to draw a distinction between (excessive) aggressiveness and adversariality as such. Govier, for example, distinguishes between ancillary (negative) adversariality and minimal adversariality (Govier 1999). The thought is that, while the feminist critique of excessive aggression in argumentation is well taken, adversariality conceived and practiced in different ways need not have the detrimental consequences of more extreme versions of belligerent argumentation. Moreover, for these authors, adversariality in argumentation is simply not optional: it is an intrinsic feature of argumentative practices, but these practices also require a background of cooperation and agreement regarding, e.g., the accepted rules of inference.

But ultimately, the presumed opposition between adversarial and cooperative conceptions of argumentation may well be merely apparent. It may be argued for example that actual argumentative encounters ought to be adversarial or cooperative to different degrees, as different types of argumentation are required for different situations (Dutilh Novaes forthcoming). Indeed, perhaps we should not look for a one-fits-all model of how argumentation ought to be conducted across different contexts and situation, given the diversity of uses of argumentation.

We speak of argumentation as an epistemic practice when we take its primary purpose to be that of improving our beliefs and increasing knowledge, or of fostering understanding. To engage in argumentation can be a way to acquire more accurate beliefs: by examining critically reasons for and against a given position, we would be able to weed out weaker, poorly justified beliefs (likely to be false) and end up with stronger, suitably justified beliefs (likely to be true). From this perspective, the goal of engaging in argumentation is to learn , i.e., to improve one’s epistemic position (as opposed to argumentation “to win” (Fisher & Keil 2016)). Indeed, argumentation is often said to be truth-conducive (Betz 2013).

The idea that argumentation can be an epistemically beneficial process is as old as philosophy itself. In every major historical philosophical tradition, argumentation is viewed as an essential component of philosophical reflection precisely because it may be used to aim at the truth (indeed this is the core of Plato’s critique of the Sophists and their excessive focus on persuasion at the expense of truth (Irani 2017; see Historical Supplement ). Recent proponents of an epistemological approach to argumentation include (Goldman 2004; Lumer 2005; Biro & Siegel 2006). Alvin Goldman captures this general idea in the following terms:

Norms of good argumentation are substantially dedicated to the promotion of truthful speech and the exposure of falsehood, whether intentional or unintentional. […] Norms of good argumentation are part of a practice to encourage the exchange of truths through sincere, non-negligent, and mutually corrective speech. (Goldman 1994: 30)

Of course, it is at least in theory possible to engage in argumentation with oneself along these lines, solitarily weighing the pros and cons of a position. But a number of philosophers, most notably John Stuart Mill, maintain that interpersonal argumentative situations, involving people who truly disagree with each other, work best to realize the epistemic potential of argumentation to improve our beliefs (a point he developed in On Liberty (1859; see entry on John Stuart Mill ). When our ideas are challenged by engagement with those who disagree with us, we are forced to consider our own beliefs more thoroughly and critically. The result is that the remaining beliefs, those that have survived critical challenge, will be better grounded than those we held before such encounters. Dissenters thus force us to stay epistemically alert instead of becoming too comfortable with existing, entrenched beliefs. On this conception, arguers cooperate with each other precisely by being adversarial, i.e., by adopting a critical stance towards the positions one disagrees with.

The view that argumentation aims at epistemic improvement is in many senses appealing, but it is doubtful that it reflects the actual outcomes of argumentation in many real-life situations. Indeed, it seems that, more often than not, we are not Millians when arguing: we do not tend to engage with dissenting opinions with an open mind. Indeed, there is quite some evidence suggesting that arguments are in fact not a very efficient means to change minds in most real-life situations (Gordon-Smith 2019). People typically do not like to change their minds about firmly entrenched beliefs, and so when confronted with arguments or evidence that contradict these beliefs, they tend to either look away or to discredit the source of the argument as unreliable (Dutilh Novaes 2020c)—a phenomenon also known as “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998).

In particular, arguments that threaten our core beliefs and our sense of belonging to a group (e.g., political beliefs) typically trigger all kinds of motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge 2006; Kahan 2017) whereby one outright rejects those arguments without properly engaging with their content. Relatedly, when choosing among a vast supply of options, people tend to gravitate towards content and sources that confirm their existing opinions, thus giving rise to so-called “echo chambers” and “epistemic bubbles” (Nguyen 2020). Furthermore, some arguments can be deceptively convincing in that they look valid but are not (Tindale 2007; see entry on fallacies ). Because most of us are arguably not very good at spotting fallacious arguments, especially if they are arguments that lend support to the beliefs we already hold, engaging in argumentation may in fact decrease the accuracy of our beliefs by persuading us of false conclusions with incorrect arguments (Fantl 2018).

In sum, despite the optimism of Mill and many others, it seems that engaging in argumentation will not automatically improve our beliefs (even if this may occur in some circumstances). [ 4 ] However, it may still be argued that an epistemological approach to argumentation can serve the purpose of providing a normative ideal for argumentative practices, even if it is not always a descriptively accurate account of these practices in the messy real world. Moreover, at least some concrete instances of argumentation, in particular argumentation in science (see section 4.5 below) seem to offer successful examples of epistemic-oriented argumentative practices.

Another important strand in the literature on argumentation are theories that view consensus as the primary goal of argumentative processes: to eliminate or resolve a difference of (expressed) opinion. The tradition of pragma-dialectics is a prominent recent exponent of this strand (Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). These consensus-oriented approaches are motivated by the social complexity of human life, and the attribution of a role of social coordination to argumentation. Because humans are social animals who must often cooperate with other humans to successfully accomplish certain tasks, they must have mechanisms to align their beliefs and intentions, and subsequently their actions (Tomasello 2014). The thought is that argumentation would be a particularly suitable mechanism for such alignment, as an exchange of reasons would make it more likely that differences of opinion would decrease (Norman 2016). This may happen precisely because argumentation would be a good way to track truths and avoid falsehoods, as discussed in the previous section; by being involved in the same epistemic process of exchanging reasons, the participants in an argumentative situation would all come to converge towards the truth, and thus the upshot would be that they also come to agree with each other. However, consensus-oriented views need not presuppose that argumentation is truth-conducive: the ultimate goal of such instances of argumentation is that of social coordination, and for this tracking truth is not a requirement (Patterson 2011).

In particular, the very notion of deliberative democracy is viewed as resting crucially on argumentative practices that aim for consensus (Fishkin 2016; see entry on democracy ). (For present purposes, “deliberation” and “argumentation” can be treated as roughly synonymous). In a deliberative democracy, for a decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic public deliberation—a discussion of the pros and cons of the different options—not merely the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. Moreover, in democratic deliberation, when full consensus does not emerge, the parties involved may opt for a compromise solution, e.g., a coalition-based political system.

A prominent theorist of deliberative democracy thus understood is Jürgen Habermas, whose “discourse theory of law and democracy” relies heavily on practices of political justification and argumentation taking place in what he calls “the public sphere” (Habermas 1992 [1996]; 1981 [1984]; see entry on Habermas ). He starts from the idea that politics allows for the collective organization of people’s lives, including the common rules they will live by. Political argumentation is a form of communicative practice, so general assumptions for communicative practices in general apply. However, additional assumptions apply as well (Olson 2011 [2014]). In particular, deliberating participants must accept that anyone can participate in these discursive practices (democratic deliberation should be inclusive), and that anyone can introduce and challenge claims that are made in the public sphere (democratic deliberation should be free). They must also see one another as having equal status, at least for the purposes of deliberation (democratic deliberation should be equal). In turn, critics of Habermas’s account view it as unrealistic, as it presupposes an ideal situation where all citizens are treated equally and engage in public debates in good faith (Mouffe 1999; Geuss 2019).

More generally, it seems that it is only under quite specific conditions that argumentation reliably leads to consensus (as also suggested by formal modeling of argumentative situations (Betz 2013; Olsson 2013; Mäs & Flache 2013)). Consensus-oriented argumentation seems to work well in cooperative contexts, but not so much in situations of conflict (Dutilh Novaes forthcoming). In particular, the discussing parties must already have a significant amount of background agreement—especially agreement on what counts as a legitimate argument or compelling evidence—for argumentation and deliberation to lead to consensus. Especially in situations of deep disagreement (Fogelin 1985), it seems that the potential of argumentation to lead to consensus is quite limited. Instead, in many real-life situations, argumentation often leads to the opposite result; people disagree with each other even more after engaging in argumentation (Sunstein 2002). This is the well-documented phenomenon of group polarization , which occurs when an initial position or tendency of individual members of a group becomes more extreme after group discussion (Isenberg 1986).

In fact, it may be argued that argumentation will often create or exacerbate conflict and adversariality, rather than leading to the resolution of differences of opinions. Furthermore, a focus on consensus may end up reinforcing and perpetuating existing unequal power relations in a society.

In an unjust society, what purports to be a cooperative exchange of reasons really perpetuates patterns of oppression. (Goodwin 2007: 77)

This general point has been made by a number of political thinkers (e.g., Young 2000), who have highlighted the exclusionary implications of consensus-oriented political deliberation. The upshot is that consensus may not only be an unrealistic goal for argumentation; it may not even be a desirable goal for argumentation in a number of situations (e.g., when there is great power imbalance). Despite these concerns, the view that the primary goal of argumentation is to aim for consensus remains influential in the literature.

Finally, a number of authors have attributed to argumentation the potential to manage (pre-existing) conflict. In a sense, the consensus-oriented view of argumentation just discussed is a special case of conflict management argumentation, based on the assumption that the best way to manage conflict and disagreement is to aim for consensus and thus eliminate conflict. But conflict can be managed in different ways, not all of them leading to consensus; indeed, some authors maintain that argumentation may help mitigate conflict even when the explicit aim is not that of reaching consensus. Importantly, authors who identify conflict management (or variations thereof) as a function for argumentation differ in their overall appreciation of the value of argumentation: some take it to be at best futile and at worst destructive, [ 5 ] while others attribute a more positive role to argumentation in conflict management.

To this category also belong the conceptualizations of argumentation-as-war discussed (and criticized) by a number of authors (Cohen 1995; Bailin & Battersby 2016); in such cases, conflict is not so much managed but rather enacted (and possibly exacerbated) by means of argumentation. Thus seen, the function of argumentation would not be fundamentally different from the function of organized competitive activities such as sports or even war (with suitable rules of engagement; Aikin 2011).

When conflict emerges, people have various options: they may choose not to engage and instead prefer to flee; they may go into full-blown fighting mode, which may include physical aggression; or they may opt for approaches somewhere in between the fight-or-flee extremes of the spectrum. Argumentation can be plausibly classified as an intermediary response:

[A]rgument literally is a form of pacifism—we are using words instead of swords to settle our disputes. With argument, we settle our disputes in ways that are most respectful of those who disagree—we do not buy them off, we do not threaten them, and we do not beat them into submission. Instead, we give them reasons that bear on the truth or falsity of their beliefs. However adversarial argument may be, it isn’t bombing. […] argument is a pacifistic replacement for truly violent solutions to disagreements…. (Aikin 2011: 256)

This is not to say that argumentation will always or even typically be the best approach to handle conflict and disagreement; the point is rather that argumentation at least has the potential to do so, provided that the background conditions are suitable and that provisions to mitigate escalation are in place (Aikin 2011). Versions of this view can be found in the work of proponents of agonistic conceptions of democracy and political deliberation (Wenman 2013; see entry on feminist political philosophy ). For agonist thinkers, conflict and strife are inevitable features of human lives, and so cannot be eliminated; but they can be managed. One of them is Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 2000), for whom democratic practices, including argumentation/deliberation, can serve to contain hostility and transform it into more constructive forms of contest. However, it is far from obvious that argumentation by itself will suffice to manage conflict; typically, other kinds of intervention must be involved (Young 2000), as the risk of argumentation being used to exercise power rather than as a tool to manage conflict always looms large (van Laar & Krabbe 2019).

From these observations on different types of argumentation, a pluralistic picture emerges: argumentation, understood as the exchange of reasons to justify claims, seems to have different applications in different situations. However, it is not clear that some of the goals often attributed to argumentation such as epistemic improvement and reaching consensus can in fact be reliably achieved in many real life situations. Does this mean that argumentation is useless and futile? Not necessarily, but it may mean that engaging in argumentation will not always be the optimal response in a number of contexts.

4. Argumentation Across Fields of Inquiry and Social Practices

Argumentation is practiced and studied in many fields of inquiry; philosophers interested in argumentation have much to benefit from engaging with these bodies of research as well.

To understand the emergence of argumentation theory as a specific field of research in the twentieth century, a brief discussion of preceding events is necessary. In the nineteenth century, a number of textbooks aiming to improve everyday reasoning via public education emphasized logical and rhetorical concerns, such as those by Richard Whately (see entry on fallacies ). As noted in section 3.2 , John Stuart Mill also had a keen interest in argumentation and its role in public discourse (Mill 1859), as well as an interest in logic and reasoning (see entries on Mill and on fallacies ). But with the advent of mathematical logic in the final decades of the nineteenth century, logic and the study of ordinary, everyday argumentation came apart, as logicians such as Frege, Hilbert, Russell etc. were primarily interested in mathematical reasoning and argumentation. As a result, their logical systems are not particularly suitable to study everyday argumentation, as this is simply not what they were designed to do. [ 6 ]

Nevertheless, in the twentieth century a number of authors took inspiration from developments in formal logic and expanded the use of logical tools to the analysis of ordinary argumentation. A pioneer in this tradition is Susan Stebbing, who wrote what can be seen as the first textbook in analytic philosophy, and then went on to write a number of books aimed at a general audience addressing everyday and public discourse from a philosophical/logical perspective (see entry on Susan Stebbing ). Her 1939 book Thinking to Some Purpose , which can be considered as one of the first textbooks in critical thinking, was widely read at the time, but did not become particularly influential for the development of argumentation theory in the decades to follow.

By contrast, Stephen Toulmin’s 1958 book The Uses of Argument has been tremendously influential in a wide range of fields, including critical thinking education, rhetoric, speech communication, and computer science (perhaps even more so than in Toulmin’s own original field, philosophy). Toulmin’s aim was to criticize the assumption (widely held by Anglo-American philosophers at the time) that any significant argument can be formulated in purely formal, deductive terms, using the formal logical systems that had emerged in the preceding decades (see (Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 4). While this critique was met with much hostility among fellow philosophers, it eventually gave rise to an alternative way of approaching argumentation, which is often described as “informal logic” (see entry on informal logic ). This approach seeks to engage and analyze instances of argumentation in everyday life; it recognizes that, while useful, the tools of deductive logic alone do not suffice to investigate argumentation in all its complexity and pragmatic import. In a similar vein, Charles Hamblin’s 1970 book Fallacies reinvigorated the study of fallacies in the context of argumentation by re-emphasizing (following Aristotle) the importance of a dialectical-dialogical background when reflecting on fallacies in argumentation (see entry on fallacies ).

Around the same time as Toulmin, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca were developing an approach to argumentation that emphasized its persuasive component. To this end, they turned to classical theories of rhetoric, and adapted them to give rise to what they described as the “New Rhetoric”. Their book Traité de l’argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique was published in 1958 in French, and translated into English in 1969. Its key idea:

since argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 [1969: 19])

They introduced the influential distinction between universal and particular audiences: while every argument is directed at a specific individual or group, the concept of a universal audience serves as a normative ideal encapsulating shared standards of agreement on what counts as legitimate argumentation (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 5).

The work of these pioneers provided the foundations for subsequent research in argumentation theory. One approach that became influential in the following decades is the pragma-dialectics tradition developed by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 2004). They also founded the journal Argumentation , one of the flagship journals in argumentation theory. Pragma-dialectics was developed to study argumentation as a discourse activity, a complex speech act that occurs as part of interactional linguistic activities with specific communicative goals (“pragma” refers to the functional perspective of goals, and “dialectic” to the interactive component). For these authors, argumentative discourse is primarily directed at the reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion. Pragma-dialectics has a descriptive as well as a normative component, thus offering tools both for the analysis of concrete instances of argumentation and for the evaluation of argumentation correctness and success (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 10).

Another leading author in argumentation theory is Douglas Walton, who pioneered the argument schemes approach to argumentation that borrows tools from formal logic but expands them so as to treat a wider range of arguments than those covered by traditional logical systems (Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008). Walton also formulated an influential account of argumentation in dialogue in collaboration with Erik Krabbe (Walton & Krabbe 1995). Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair further helped to consolidate the field of argumentation theory and informal logic by founding the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric in Windsor (Ontario, Canada), and by initiating the journal Informal Logic . Their textbook Logical Self-Defense (Johnson & Blair 1977) has also been particularly influential.

The study of argumentation within computer science and artificial intelligence is a thriving field of research, with dedicated journals such as Argument and Computation and regular conference series such as COMMA (International Conference on Computational Models of Argument; see Rahwan & Simari 2009 and Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 11 for overviews).

The historical roots of argumentation research in artificial intelligence can be traced back to work on non-monotonic logics (see entry on non-monotonic logics ) and defeasible reasoning (see entry on defeasible reasoning ). Since then, three main different perspectives have emerged (Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 11): the theoretical systems perspective, where the focus is on theoretical and formal models of argumentation (following the tradition of philosophical and formal logic); the artificial systems perspective, where the aim is to build computer programs that model or support argumentative tasks, for instance, in online dialogue games or in expert systems; the natural systems perspective, which investigates argumentation in its natural form with the help of computational tools (e.g., argumentation mining [Peldszus & Stede 2013; Habernal & Gurevych 2017], where computational methods are used to identify argumentative structures in large corpora of texts).

An influential approach in this research tradition is that of abstract argumentation frameworks , initiated by the pioneering work of Dung (1995). Before that, argumentation in AI was studied mostly under the inspiration of concepts coming from informal logic such as argumentation schemes, context, stages of dialogues and argument moves. By contrast, the key notion in the framework proposed by Dung is that of argument attack , understood as an abstract formal relation roughly intended to capture the idea that it is possible to challenge an argument by means of another argument (assertions are understood as a special case of arguments with zero premises). Arguments can then be represented in networks of attacks and defenses: an argument A can attack an argument B , and B in turn may attack further arguments C and D (the connection with the notion of defeaters is a natural one, which Dung also addresses).

Besides abstract argumentation, three other important lines of research in AI are: the (internal) structure of arguments; argumentation in multi-agent systems; applications to specific tasks and domains (Rahwan & Siwari 2009). The structural approach investigates formally features such as argument strength/force (e.g., a conclusive argument is stronger than a defeasible argument), argument schemes (Bex, Prakken, Reed, & Walton 2003) etc. Argumentation in multi-agent systems is a thriving subfield with its own dedicated conference series (ArgMAS), based on the recognition that argumentation is a particularly suitable vehicle to facilitate interaction in the artificial environments studied by AI researchers working on multi-agent systems (see a special issue of the journal Argument & Computation [Atkinson, Cerutti, et al. 2016]). Finally, computational approaches in argumentation have also thrived with respect to specific domains and applications, such as legal argumentation (Prakken & Sartor 2015). Recently, as a reaction to the machine-learning paradigm, the idea of explainable AI has gotten traction, and the concept of argumentation is thought to play a fundamental role for explainable AI (Sklar & Azhar 2018).

Argumentation is also an important topic of investigation within cognitive science and psychology. Researchers in these fields are predominantly interested in the descriptive question of how people in fact engage in argumentation, rather than in the normative question of how they ought to do it (although some of them have also drawn normative conclusions, e.g., Hahn & Oaksford 2006; Hahn & Hornikx, 2016). Controlled experiments are one of the ways in which the descriptive question can be investigated.

Systematic research specifically on argumentation within cognitive science and psychology has significantly increased over the last 10 years. Before that, there had been extensive research on reasoning conceived as an individual, internal process, much of which had been conducted using task materials such as syllogistic arguments (Dutilh Novaes 2020b). But due to what may be described as an individualist bias in cognitive science and psychology (Mercier 2018), these researchers did not draw explicit connections between their findings and the public acts of “giving and asking for reasons”. It is only somewhat recently that argumentation began to receive sustained attention from these researchers. The investigations of Hugo Mercier and colleagues (Mercier & Sperber 2017; Mercier 2018) and of Ulrike Hahn and colleagues (Hahn & Oaksford 2007; Hornikx & Hahn 2012; Collins & Hahn 2018) have been particularly influential. (See also Paglieri, Bonelli, & Felletti 2016, an edited volume containing a representative overview of research on the psychology of argumentation.) Another interesting line of research has been the study of the development of reasoning and argumentative skills in young children (Köymen, Mammen, & Tomasello 2016; Köymen & Tomasello 2020).

Mercier and Sperber defend an interactionist account of reasoning, according to which the primary function of reasoning is for social interactions, where reasons are exchanged and receivers of reasons decide whether they find them convincing—in other words, for argumentation (Mercier & Sperber 2017). They review a wealth of evidence suggesting that reasoning is rather flawed when it comes to drawing conclusions from premises in order to expand one’s knowledge. From this they conclude, on the basis of evolutionary arguments, that the function of reasoning must be a different one, indeed one that responds to features of human sociality and the need to exercise epistemic vigilance when receiving information from others. This account has inaugurated a rich research program which they have been pursuing with colleagues for over a decade now, and which has delivered some interesting results—for example, that we seem to be better at evaluating the quality of arguments proposed by others than at formulating high-quality arguments ourselves (Mercier 2018).

In the context of the Bayesian (see entry on Bayes’ theorem ) approach to reasoning that was first developed by Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater in the 1980s (Oaksford & Chater 2018), Hahn and colleagues have extended the Bayesian framework to the investigation of argumentation. They claim that Bayesian probabilities offer an accurate descriptive model of how people evaluate the strength of arguments (Hahn & Oaksford 2007) as well as a solid perspective to address normative questions pertaining to argument strength (Hahn & Oaksford 2006; Hahn & Hornikx 2016). The Bayesian approach allows for the formulation of probabilistic measures of argument strength, showing that many so-called “fallacies” may nevertheless be good arguments in the sense that they considerably raise the probability of the conclusion. For example, deductively invalid argument schemes (such as affirming the consequent (AC) and denying the antecedent (DA)) can also provide considerable support for a conclusion, depending on the contents in question. The extent to which this is the case depends primarily on the specific informational context, captured by the prior probability distribution, not on the structure of the argument. This means that some instances of, say, AC, may offer support to a conclusion while others may fail to do so (Eva & Hartmann 2018). Thus seen, Bayesian argumentation represents a significantly different approach to argumentation from those inspired by logic (e.g., argument schemes), but they are not necessarily incompatible; they may well be complementary perspectives (see also [Zenker 2013]).

Argumentation is primarily (though not exclusively) a linguistic phenomenon. Accordingly, argumentation is extensively studied in fields dedicated to the study of language, such as rhetoric, linguistics, discourse analysis, communication, and pragmatics, among others (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: chs 8 and 9). Researchers in these areas develop general theoretical models of argumentation and investigate concrete instances of argumentation in specific domains on the basis of linguistic corpora, discourse analysis, and other methods used in the language sciences (see the edited volume Oswald, Herman, & Jacquin [2018] for a sample of the different lines of research). Overall, research on argumentation within the language sciences tends to focus primarily on concrete occurrences of arguments in a variety of domains, adopting a largely descriptive rather than normative perspective (though some of these researchers also tackle normative considerations).

Some of these analyses approach arguments and argumentation primarily as text or self-contained speeches, while others emphasize the interpersonal, communicative nature of “face-to-face” argumentation (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: section 8.9). One prominent approach in this tradition is due to communication scholars Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs. They have drawn on speech act theory and conversation analysis to investigate argumentation as a disagreement-relevant expansion of speech acts that, through mutually recognized reasons, allows us to manage disagreements despite the challenges they pose for communication and coordination of activities (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jackson 2019). Moreover, they perceive institutionalized practices of argumentation and concrete “argumentation designs”—such as for example randomized controlled trials in medicine—as interventions aimed at improving methods of disagreement management through argumentation.

Another communication scholar, Dale Hample, has further argued for the importance of approaching argumentation as an essentially interpersonal communicative activity (Hample 2006, 2018). This perspective allows for the consideration of a broader range of factors, not only the arguments themselves but also (and primarily) the people involved in those processes: their motivations, psychological processes, and emotions. It also allows for the formulation of questions pertaining to individual as well as cultural differences in argumentative styles (see section 5.3 below).

Another illuminating perspective views argumentative practices as inherently tied to broader socio-cultural contexts (Amossy 2009). The Journal of Argumentation in Context was founded in 2012 precisely to promote a contextual approach to argumentation. Once argumentation is no longer only considered in abstraction from concrete instances taking place in real-life situations, it becomes imperative to recognize that argumentation does not take place in a vacuum; typically, argumentative practices are embedded in other kinds of practices and institutions, against the background of specific socio-cultural, political structures. The method of discourse analysis is particularly suitable for a broader perspective on argumentation, as shown by the work of Ruth Amossy (2002) and Marianne Doury (2009), among others.

Argumentation is crucial in a number of specific organized social practices, in particular in politics, science, law, and education. The relevant argumentative practices are studied in each of the corresponding knowledge domains; indeed, while some general principles may govern argumentative practices across the board, some may be specific to particular applications and domains.

As already mentioned, argumentation is typically viewed as an essential component of political democratic practices, and as such it is of great interest to political scientists and political theorists (Habermas 1992 [1996]; Young 2000; Landemore 2013; Fishkin 2016; see entry on democracy ). (The term typically used in this context is “deliberation” instead of “argumentation”, but these can be viewed as roughly synonymous for our purposes.) General theories of argumentation such as pragma-dialectic and the Toulmin model can be applied to political argumentation with illuminating results (Wodak 2016; Mohammed 2016). More generally, political discourse seems to have a strong argumentative component, in particular if argumentation is understood more broadly as not only pertaining to rational discourse ( logos ) but as also including what rhetoricians refer to as pathos and ethos (Zarefsky 2014; Amossy 2018). But critics of argumentation and deliberation in political contexts also point out the limitations of the classical deliberative model (Sanders 1997; Talisse 2019).

Moreover, scientific communities seem to offer good examples of (largely) well-functioning argumentative practices. These are disciplined systems of collective epistemic activity, with tacit but widely endorsed norms for argumentative engagement for each domain (which does not mean that there are not disagreements on these very norms). The case of mathematics has already been mentioned above: practices of mathematical proof are quite naturally understood as argumentative practices (Dutilh Novaes 2020a). Furthermore, when a scientist presents a new scientific claim, it must be backed by arguments and evidence that her peers are likely to find convincing, as they follow from the application of widely agreed-upon scientific methods (Longino 1990; Weinstein 1990; Rehg 2008; see entry on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge ). Other scientists will in turn critically examine the evidence and arguments provided, and will voice objections or concerns if they find aspects of the theory to be insufficiently convincing. Thus seen, science may be viewed as a “game of giving and asking for reasons” (Zamora Bonilla 2006). Certain features of scientific argumentation seem to ensure its success: scientists see other scientists as prima facie peers, and so (typically at least) place a fair amount of trust in other scientists by default; science is based on the principle of “organized skepticism” (a term introduced by the pioneer sociologist of science Robert Merton [Merton, 1942]), which means that asking for further reasons should not be perceived as a personal attack. These are arguably aspects that distinguish argumentation in science from argumentation in other domains in virtue of these institutional factors (Mercier & Heintz 2014). But ultimately, scientists are part of society as a whole, and thus the question of how scientific and political argumentation intersect becomes particularly relevant (Kitcher 2001).

Another area where argumentation is essential is the law, which also corresponds to disciplined systems of collective activity with rules and principles for what counts as acceptable arguments and evidence. legal reasoning ).--> In litigation (in particular in adversarial justice systems), there are typically two sides disagreeing on what is lawful or just, and the basic idea is that each side will present its strongest arguments; it is the comparison between the two sets of arguments that should lead to the best judgment (Walton 2002). Legal reasoning and argumentation have been extensively studied within jurisprudence for decades, in particular since Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) and Neil MacCormick’s (1978) responses to HLA Hart’s highly influential The Concept of Law (1961). A number of other views and approaches have been developed, in particular from the perspectives of natural law theory, legal positivism, common law, and rhetoric (see Feteris 2017 for an overview). Overall, legal argumentation is characterized by extensive uses of analogies (Lamond 2014), abduction (Askeland 2020), and defeasible/non-monotonic reasoning (Bex & Verheij 2013). An interesting question is whether argumentation in law is fundamentally different from argumentation in other domains, or whether it follows the same overall canons and norms but applied to legal topics (Raz 2001).

Finally, the development of argumentative skills is arguably a fundamental aspect of (formal) education (Muller Mirza & Perret-Clermont 2009). Ideally, when presented with arguments, a learner should not simply accept what is being said at face value, but should instead reflect on the reasons offered and come to her own conclusions. Argumentation thus fosters independent, critical thinking, which is viewed as an important goal for education (Siegel 1995; see entry on critical thinking ). A number of education theorists and developmental psychologists have empirically investigated the effects of emphasizing argumentative skills in educational settings, with encouraging results (Kuhn & Crowell 2011). There has been in particular much emphasis on argumentation specifically in science education, based on the assumption that argumentation is a key component of scientific practice (as noted above); the thought is that this feature of scientific practice should be reflected in science education (Driver, Newton, & Osborne 2000; Erduran & Jiménez-Aleixandre 2007).

5. Further Topics

Argumentation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and the literature on arguments and argumentation is massive and varied. This entry can only scratch the surface of the richness of this material, and many interesting, relevant topics must be left out for reasons of space. In this final section, a selection of topics that are likely to attract considerable interest in future research are discussed.

In recent years, the concept of epistemic injustice has received much attention among philosophers (Fricker 2007; McKinnon 2016). Epistemic injustice occurs when a person is unfairly treated qua knower on the basis of prejudices pertaining to social categories such as gender, race, class, ability etc. (see entry on feminist epistemology and philosophy of science ). One of the main categories of epistemic injustice discussed in the literature pertains to testimony and is known as testimonial injustice : this occurs when a testifier is not given a degree of credibility commensurate to their actual expertise on the relevant topic, as a result of prejudice. (Whether credibility excess is also a form of testimonial injustice is a moot point in the literature [Medina 2011].)

Since argumentation can be viewed as an important mechanism for sharing knowledge and information, i.e., as having significant epistemic import (Goldman 2004), the question arises whether there might be instances of epistemic injustice pertaining specifically to argumentation, which may be described as argumentative injustice , and which would be notably different from other recognized forms of epistemic injustice such as testimonial injustice. Bondy (Bondy 2010) presented a first articulation of the notion of argumentative injustice, modeled after Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice and relying on a broadly epistemological conception of argumentation. However, Bondy’s analysis does not take into account some of the structural elements that have become central to the analysis of epistemic injustice since Fricker’s influential work, so it seems further discussion of epistemic injustice in argumentation is still needed. For example, in situations of disagreement, epistemic injustice can give rise to further obstacles to rational argumentation, leading to deep disagreement (Lagewaard 2021).

Moreover, as often noted by critics of adversarial approaches, argumentation can also be used as an instrument of domination and oppression used to overpower and denigrate an interlocutor (Nozick 1981), especially an interlocutor of “lower” status in the context in question (Moulton 1983; see entry on feminist approaches to argumentation ). From this perspective, it is clear that argumentation may also be used to reinforce and exacerbate injustice, inequalities and power differentials (Goodwin 2007). Given this possibility, and in response to the perennial risk of excessive aggressiveness in argumentative situations, a normative account of how argumentation ought to be conducted so as to avoid these problematic outcomes seem to be required.

One such approach is virtue argumentation theory . Drawing on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology (see entries on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology ), virtue argumentation theory seeks to theorize how to argue well in terms of the dispositions and character of arguers rather than, for example, in terms of properties of arguments considered in abstraction from arguers (Aberdein & Cohen 2016). Some of the argumentative virtues identified in the literature are: willingness to listen to others (Cohen 2019), willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously (Kwong 2016), humility (Kidd 2016), and open-mindedness (Tanesini 2020).

By the same token, defective argumentation is conceptualized not (only) in terms of structural properties of arguments (e.g., fallacious argument patterns), but in terms of the vices displayed by arguers such as arrogance and narrow-mindedness, among others (Aberdein 2016). Virtue argumentation theory now constitutes a vibrant research program, as attested by a special issue of Topoi dedicated to the topic (see [Aberdein & Cohen 2016] for its Introduction). It allows for a reconceptualization of classical themes within argumentation theory while also promising to provide concrete recommendations on how to argue better. Whether it can fully counter the risk of epistemic injustice and oppressive uses of argumentation is however debatable, at least as long as broader structural factors related to power dynamics are not sufficiently taken into account (Kukla 2014).

On some idealized construals, argumentation is conceived as a purely rational, emotionless endeavor. But the strong connection between argumentative activities and emotional responses has also long been recognized (in particular in rhetorical analyses of argumentation), and more recently has become the object of extensive research (Walton 1992; Gilbert 2004; Hample 2006: ch. 5). Importantly, the recognition of a role for emotions in argumentation does not entail a complete rejection of the “rationality” of argumentation; rather, it is based on the rejection of a strict dichotomy between reason and emotion (see entry on emotion ), and on a more encompassing conception of argumentation as a multi-layered human activity.

Rather than dispassionate exchanges of reasons, instances of argumentation typically start against the background of existing emotional relations, and give rise to further affective responses—often, though not necessarily, negative responses of aggression and hostility. Indeed, it has been noted that, by itself, argumentation can give rise to conflict and friction where there was none to be found prior to the argumentative engagement (Aikin 2011). This occurs in particular because critical engagement and requests for reasons are at odds with default norms of credulity in most mundane dialogical interactions, thus creating a perception of antagonism. But argumentation may also give rise to positive affective responses if the focus is on coalescence and cooperation rather than on hostility (Gilbert 1997).

The descriptive claim that instances of argumentation are typically emotionally charged is not particularly controversial, though it deserves to be further investigated; the details of affective responses during instances of argumentation and how to deal with them are non-trivial (Krabbe & van Laar 2015). What is potentially more controversial is the normative claim that instances of argumentation may or should be emotionally charged, i.e., that emotions may or ought to be involved in argumentative processes, even if it may be necessary to regulate them in such situations rather than giving them free rein (González, Gómez, & Lemos 2019). The significance of emotions for persuasion has been recognized for millennia (see entry on Aristotle’s rhetoric ), but more recently it has become clear that emotions also have a fundamental role to play for choices of what to focus on and what to care about (Sinhababu 2017). This general point seems to apply to instances of argumentation as well. For example, Howes and Hundleby (Howes & Hundleby 2018) argue that, contrary to what is often thought, anger can in fact make a positive contribution to argumentative encounters. Indeed, anger may have an important epistemological role in such encounters by drawing attention to relevant premises and information that may otherwise go unnoticed. (They recognize that anger may also derail argumentation when the encounter becomes a full-on confrontation.)

In sum, the study of the role of emotions for argumentation, both descriptively and normatively speaking, has attracted the interest of a number of scholars, traditionally in connection with rhetoric and more recently also from the perspective of argumentation as interpersonal communication (Hample 2006). And yet, much work remains to be done on the significance of emotions for argumentation, in particular given that the view that argumentation should be a purely rational, dispassionate endeavor remains widely (even if tacitly) endorsed.

Once we adopt the perspective of argumentation as a communicative practice, the question of the influence of cultural factors on argumentative practices naturally arises. Is there significant variability in how people engage in argumentation depending on their sociocultural backgrounds? Or is argumentation largely the same phenomenon across different cultures? Actually, we may even ask ourselves whether argumentation in fact occurs in all human cultures, or whether it is the product of specific, contingent background conditions, thus not being a human universal. For comparison: it had long been assumed that practices of counting were present in all human cultures, even if with different degrees of complexity. But in recent decades it has been shown that some cultures do not engage systematically in practices of counting and basic arithmetic at all, such as the Pirahã in the Amazon (Gordon 2004; see entry on culture and cognitive science ). By analogy, it seems that the purported universality of argumentative practices should not be taken for granted, but rather be treated as a legitimate empirical question. (Incidentally, there is some anecdotal evidence that the Pirahã themselves engage in argumentative exchanges [Everett 2008], but to date their argumentative skills have not been investigated systematically, as is the case with their numerical skills.)

Of course, how widespread argumentative practices will be also depends on how the concept of “argumentative practices” is defined and operationalized in the first place. If it is narrowly defined as corresponding to regimented practices of reason-giving requiring clear markers and explicit criteria for what counts as premises, conclusions and relations of support between them, then argumentation may well be restricted to cultures and subcultures where such practices have been explicitly codified. By contrast, if argumentation is defined more loosely, then a wider range of communicative practices will be considered as instances of argumentation, and thus presumably more cultures will be found to engage in (what is thus viewed as) argumentation. This means that the spread of argumentative practices across cultures is not only an empirical question; it also requires significant conceptual input to be addressed.

But if (as appears to be the case) argumentation is not a strictly WEIRD phenomenon, restricted to Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan 2010), then the issue of cross-cultural variability in argumentative practices gives rise to a host of research questions, again both at the descriptive and at the normative level. Indeed, even if at the descriptive level considerable variability in argumentative practices is identified, the normative question of whether there should be universally valid canons for argumentation, or instead specific norms for specific contexts, remains pressing. At the descriptive level, a number of researchers have investigated argumentative practices in different WEIRD as well as non-WEIRD cultures, also addressing questions of cultural variability (Hornikx & Hoeken 2007; Hornikx & de Best 2011).

A foundational work in this context is Edwin Hutchins’ 1980 book Culture and Inference , a study of the Trobriand Islanders’ system of land tenure in Papua New Guinea (Hutchins 1980). While presented as a study of inference and reasoning among the Trobriand Islanders, what Hutchins in fact investigated were instances of legal argumentation in land courts by means of ethnographic observation and interviews with litigants. This led to the formulation of a set of twelve basic propositions codifying knowledge about land tenure, as well as transfer formulas governing how this knowledge can be applied to new disputes. Hutchins’ analysis showed that the Trobriand Islanders had a sophisticated argumentation system to resolve issues pertaining to land tenure, in many senses resembling argumentation and reasoning in so-called WEIRD societies in that it seemed to recognize as valid simple logical structures such as modus ponens and modus tollens .

More recently, Hugo Mercier and colleagues have been conducting studies in countries such as Japan (Mercier, Deguchi, Van der Henst, & Yama 2016) and Guatemala (Castelain, Girotto, Jamet, & Mercier 2016). While recognizing the significance and interest of cultural differences (Mercier 2013), Mercier maintains that argumentation is a human universal, as argumentative capacities and tendencies are a result of natural selection, genetically encoded in human cognition (Mercier 2011; Mercier & Sperber 2017). He takes the results of the cross-cultural studies conducted so far as confirming the universality of argumentation, even considering cultural differences (Mercier 2018).

Another scholar who has been carrying out an extensive research program on cultural differences in argumentation is communication theorist Dale Hample. With different sets of colleagues, he has conducted studies by means of surveys where participants (typically, university undergraduates) self-report on their argumentative practices in countries such as China, Japan, Turkey, Chile, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United States (among others; Hample 2018: ch. 7). His results overall show a number of similarities, which may be partially explained by the specific demographic (university students) from which participants are usually recruited. But interesting differences have also been identified, for example different levels of willingness to engage in argumentative encounters.

In a recent book (Tindale 2021), philosopher Chris Tindale adopts an anthropological perspective to investigate how argumentative practices emerge from the experiences of peoples with diverse backgrounds. He emphasizes the argumentative roles of place, orality, myth, narrative, and audience, also assessing the impacts of colonialism on the study of argumentation. Tindale reviews a wealth of anthropological and ethnographic studies on argumentative practices in different cultures, thus providing what is to date perhaps the most comprehensive study on argumentation from an anthropological perspective.

On the whole, the study of differences and commonalities in argumentative practices across cultures is an established line of research on argumentation, but arguably much work remains to be done to investigate these complex phenomena more thoroughly.

So far we have not yet considered the question of the different media through which argumentation can take place. Naturally, argumentation can unfold orally in face-to-face encounters—discussions in parliament, political debates, in a court of law—as well as in writing—in scientific articles, on the Internet, in newspaper editorials. Moreover, it can happen synchronically, with real-time exchanges of reasons, or asynchronically. While it is reasonable to expect that there will be some commonalities across these different media and environments, it is also plausible that specific features of different environments may significantly influence how argumentation is conducted: different environments present different kinds of affordances for arguers (Halpern & Gibbs 2013; Weger & Aakhus 2003; see entry on embodied cognition for the concept of affordance). Indeed, if the Internet represents a fundamentally novel cognitive ecology (Smart, Heersmink, & Clowes 2017), then it will likely give rise to different forms of argumentative engagement (Lewiński 2010). Whether these new forms will represent progress (according to some suitable metric) is however a moot point.

In the early days of the Internet in the 1990s, there was much hope that online spaces would finally realize the Habermasian ideal of a public sphere for political deliberation (Hindman 2009). The Internet was supposed to act as the great equalizer in the worldwide marketplace of ideas, finally attaining the Millian ideal of free exchange of ideas (Mill 1859). Online, everyone’s voice would have an equal chance of being heard, everyone could contribute to the conversation, and everyone could simultaneously be a journalist, news consumer, engaged citizen, advocate, and activist.

A few decades later, these hopes have not really materialized. It is probably true that most people now argue more —in social media, blogs, chat rooms, discussion boards etc.—but it is much less obvious that they argue better . Indeed, rather than enhancing democratic ideals, some have gone as far as claiming that instead, the Internet is “killing democracy” (Bartlett 2018). There is very little oversight when it comes to the spreading of propaganda and disinformation online (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts 2018), which means that citizens are often being fed faulty information and arguments. Moreover, it seems that online environments may lead to increased polarization when polemic topics are being discussed (Yardi & Boyd 2010), and to “intellectual arrogance” (Lynch 2019). Some have argued that online discussions lead to more overly emotional engagement when compared to other forms of debate (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock 2014). But not everyone is convinced that the Internet has only made things worse when it comes to argumentation, or in any case that it cannot be suitably redesigned so as to foster rather than destroy democratic ideals and deliberation (Sunstein 2017).

Be that as it may, the Internet is here to stay, and online argumentation is a pervasive phenomenon that argumentation theorists have been studying and will continue to study for years to come. In fact, if anything, online argumentation is now more often investigated empirically than other forms of argumentation, among other reasons thanks to the development of argument mining techniques (see section 4.2 above) which greatly facilitate the study of large corpora of textual material such as those produced by online discussions. Beyond the very numerous specific case studies available in the literature, there have been also attempts to reflect on the phenomenon of online argumentation in general, for example in journal special issues dedicated to argumentation in digital media such as in Argumentation and Advocacy (Volume 47(2), 2010) and Philosophy & Technology (Volume 30(2), 2017). However, a systematic analysis of online argumentation and how it differs from other forms of argumentation remains to be produced.

Argument and argumentation are multifaceted phenomena that have attracted the interest of philosophers as well as scholars in other fields for millennia, and continue to be studied extensively in various domains. This entry presents an overview of the main strands in these discussions, while acknowledging the impossibility of fully doing justice to the enormous literature on the topic. But the literature references below should at least provide a useful starting point for the interested reader.

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Merel Talbi, Elias Anttila, César dos Santos, Hein Duijf, Silvia Ivani, Caglar Dede, Colin Rittberg, Marcin Lewiński, Andrew Aberdein, Malcolm Keating, Maksymillian Del Mar, and an anonymous referee for suggestions and/or comments on earlier drafts. This research was supported by H2020 European Research Council [771074-SEA].

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5.3 Arguments

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Define key components of an argument.
• Categorize components of sample arguments.
• Explain the difference between assessing logic and assessing truth.

As explained at the beginning of the chapter, an argument in philosophy is simply a set of reasons offered in support of some conclusion. So an “arguer” is a person who offers reasons for a specific conclusion. Notice that the definition does not state that the reasons do support a conclusion (and rather states reasons are offered or meant to support a conclusion) because there are bad arguments in which reasons do not support a conclusion.

Arguments have two components: the conclusion and the reasons offered to support it. The conclusion is what an arguer wants people to believe. The reasons offered are called premises . Often philosophers will craft a numbered argument to make clear each individual claim (premise) given in support of the conclusion. Here is an example of a numbered argument:

• If someone lives in San Francisco, then they live in California.
• If someone lives in California, then they live in the United States.
• Hassan lives in San Francisco.
• Therefore, Hassan lives in the United States.

Getting to the Premises

The first step in understanding an argument is to identify the conclusion. Ask yourself what you think the main point or main idea is. Can you identify a thesis? Sometimes identifying the conclusion may involve a little bit of “mind reading.” You may have to ask yourself “What is this person trying to make me accept?” The arguer may use words that indicate a conclusion—for example, “therefore” or “hence” (see Table 5.1 ). After you have identified the conclusion, try to summarize it as well as you can. Then, identify the premises or evidence the arguer offers in support of that conclusion. Once again, identifying reasons can be tricky and might involve more mind reading because arguers don’t always explicitly state all of their reasons. Attempt to identify what you think the arguer wants you to accept as evidence. Sometimes arguers also use words that indicate that reasons or premises are being offered. In presenting evidence, people might use terms such as “ because of” or “since” (see Table 5.1 ). Lastly, if it is difficult to first identify the conclusion of an argument, you may have to begin by parsing the evidence to then figure out the conclusion.

Understanding evidence types can help you identify the premises being advanced for a conclusion. As discussed earlier in the chapter, philosophers will often offer definitions or conceptual claims in their arguments. For example, a premise may contain the conceptual claim that “The idea of God includes perfection.” Arguments can also contain as premises empirical evidence or information about the world gleaned through the senses. Principles are also used as premises in arguments. A principle is a general rule or law. Principles are as varied as fields of study and can exist in any domain. For example, “Do not use people merely as a means to an end” is an ethical principle.

Connections

See the introduction to philosopher chapter to learn more about conceptual analysis.

The Difference between Truth and Logic

Analysis of arguments ought to take place on the levels of both truth and logic. Truth analysis is the determination of whether statements are correct or accurate. On the other hand, logical analysis ascertains whether the premises of an argument support the conclusion.

Often, people focus solely on the truth of an argument, but in philosophy logical analysis is often treated as primary. One reason for this focus is that philosophy deals with subjects in which it is difficult to determine the truth: the nature of reality, the existence of God, or the demands of morality. Philosophers use logic and inference to get closer to the truth on these subjects, and they assume that an inconsistency in a position is evidence against its truth.

Logical Analysis

Because logic is the study of reasoning, logical analysis involves assessing reasoning. Sometimes an argument with a false conclusion uses good reasoning. Similarly, arguments with true conclusions can use terrible reasoning. Consider the following absurd argument:

• The battle of Hastings occurred in 1066.
• Tamaracks are deciduous conifer trees.
• Therefore, Paris is the capital of France.

The premises of the above argument are true, as is the conclusion. However, the argument is illogical because the premises do not support the conclusion. Indeed, the premises are unrelated to each other and to the conclusion. More specifically, the argument does not contain a clear inference or evidence of reasoning. An inference is a reasoning process that leads from one idea to another, through which we formulate conclusions. So in an argument, an inference is the movement from the premises to the conclusion, where the former provide support for the latter. The above argument does not contain a clear inference because it is uncertain how we are supposed to cognitively move from the premises to the conclusion. Neither the truth nor the falsity of the premises helps us reason toward the truth of the conclusion. Here is another absurd argument:

• If the moon is made of cheese, then mice vacation there.
• The moon is made of cheese.
• Therefore, mice vacation on the moon.

The premises of the above argument are false, as is the conclusion. However, the argument has strong reasoning because it contains a good inference. If the premises are true, then the conclusion does follow. Indeed, the argument uses a particular kind of inference—deductive inference—and good a deductive inference guarantees the truth of its conclusion as long as its premises are true.

The important thing to remember is that a good inference involves clear steps by which we can move from premise to premise to reach a conclusion. The basic method for testing the two common types of inferences—deductive and inductive—is to provisionally assume that their premises are true. Assuming a neutral stance in considering an inference is crucial to doing philosophy. You begin by assuming that the premises are true and then ask whether the conclusion logically follows, given the truth of those premises.

Truth Analysis

If the logic in an argument seems good, you next turn to assessing the truth of the premises. If you disagree with the conclusion or think it untrue, you must look for weaknesses (untruths) in the premises. If the evidence is empirical, check the facts. If the evidence is a principle, ask whether there are exceptions to the principle. If the evidence is a conceptual claim, think critically about whether the conceptual claim can be true, which often involves thinking critically about possible counterexamples to the claim.

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Kirsten DeVries

At school, at work, and in everyday life, argument is one of main ways we exchange ideas with one another.  Academics, business people, scientists, and other professionals all make arguments to determine what to do or think, or to solve a problem by enlisting others to do or believe something they otherwise would not.  Not surprisingly, then, argument dominates writing, and training in argument writing is essential for all college students.

This chapter will explore how to define argument and how to talk about arguments.

1.       What Is Argument?

2.       What Are the Components and Vocabulary of Argument?

1.   What Is Argument?

All people, including you, make arguments on a regular basis.  When you make a claim and then support the claim with reasons, you are making an argument. Consider the following:

• If, as a teenager, you ever made a case for borrowing your parents’ car using reasonable support—a track record of responsibility in other areas of your life, a good rating from your driving instructor, and promises to follow rules of driving conduct laid out by your parents—you have made an argument.
• If, as an employee, you ever persuaded your boss to give you a raise using concrete evidence—records of sales increases in your sector, a work calendar with no missed days, and personal testimonials from satisfied customers—you have made an argument.
• If, as a gardener, you ever shared your crops at a farmer’s market, declaring that your produce is better than others using relevant support—because you used the most appropriate soil, water level, and growing time for each crop—you’ve made an argument.
• If, as a literature student, you ever wrote an essay on your interpretation of a poem—defending your ideas with examples from the text and logical explanations for how those examples demonstrate your interpretation—you have made an argument.

The two main models of argument desired in college courses as part of the training for academic or professional life are rhetorical argument and academic argument .  If rhetoric is the study of the craft of writing and speaking, particularly writing or speaking designed to convince and persuade, the student studying rhetorical argument focuses on how to create an argument that convinces and persuades effectively.  To that end, the student must understand how to think broadly about argument, the particular vocabulary of argument, and the logic of argument.  The close sibling of rhetorical argument is academic argument, argument used to discuss and evaluate ideas, usually within a professional field of study, and to convince others of those ideas. In academic argument , interpretation and research play the central roles.

However, it would be incorrect to say that academic argument and rhetorical argument do not overlap.  Indeed, they do, and often.  A psychologist not only wishes to prove an important idea with research, but she will also wish to do so in the most effective way possible.  A politician will want to make the most persuasive case for his side, but he should also be mindful of data that may support his points.   Thus, throughout this chapter, when you see the term argument , it refers to a broad category including both rhetorical and academic argument .

Before moving to the specific parts and vocabulary of argument, it will be helpful to consider some further ideas about what argument is and what it is not.

Argument vs. Controversy or Fight

Consumers of written texts are often tempted to divide writing into two categories: argumentative and non-argumentative. According to this view, to be argumentative, writing must have the following qualities: It has to defend a position in a debate between two or more opposing sides, it must be on a controversial topic, and the goal of such writing must be to prove the correctness of one point of view over another.

A related definition of argument implies a confrontation, a clash of opinions and personalities, or just a plain verbal fight. It implies a winner and a loser, a right side and a wrong one. Because of this understanding of the word “argument,” many students think the only type of argument writing is the debate-like position paper, in which the author defends his or her point of view against other, usually opposing, points of view.

These two characteristics of argument—as controversial and as a fight—limit the definition because arguments come in different disguises, from hidden to subtle to commanding. It is useful to look at the term “argument” in a new way. What if we think of argument as an opportunity for conversation, for sharing with others our point of view on an issue, for showing others our perspective of the world? What if we think of argument as an opportunity to connect with the points of view of others rather than defeating those points of view?

One community that values argument as a type of communication and exchange is the community of scholars.  They advance their arguments to share research and new ways of thinking about topics.  Biologists, for example, do not gather data and write up analyses of the results because they wish to fight with other biologists, even if they disagree with the ideas of other biologists.  They wish to share their discoveries and get feedback on their ideas.  When historians put forth an argument, they do so often while building on the arguments of other historians who came before them.  Literature scholars publish their interpretations of different works of literature to enhance understanding and share new views, not necessarily to have one interpretation replace all others.  There may be debates within any field of study, but those debates can be healthy and constructive if they mean even more scholars come together to explore the ideas involved in those debates.  Thus, be prepared for your college professors to have a much broader view of argument than a mere fight over a controversial topic or two.

Argument vs. Opinion

Argument is often confused with opinion.  Indeed, arguments and opinions sound alike.  Someone with an opinion asserts a claim that he thinks is true.  Someone with an argument asserts a claim that she thinks is true.  Although arguments and opinions do sound the same, there are two important differences:

• Arguments have rules; opinions do not .  In other words, to form an argument, you must consider whether the argument is reasonable.  Is it worth making?  Is it valid?  Is it sound?  Do all of its parts fit together logically?  Opinions, on the other hand, have no rules, and anyone asserting an opinion need not think it through for it to count as one; however, it will not count as an argument.
• Arguments have support; opinions do not .  If you make a claim and then stop, as if the claim itself were enough to demonstrate its truthfulness, you have asserted an opinion only.  An argument must be supported, and the support of an argument has its own rules.  The support must also be reasonable, relevant, and sufficient.

Figure 3.1 “Opinion vs Argument”

Argument vs. Thesis

Another point of confusion is the difference between an argument and an essay’s thesis .  For college essays, there is no essential difference between an argument and a thesis; most professors use these terms interchangeably.  An argument is a claim that you must then support.  The main claim of an essay is the point of the essay and provides the purpose for the essay.  Thus, the main claim of an essay is also the thesis. For more on the thesis, see Chapter 4, “ The Writing Process.”

Consider this as well: Most formal essays center upon one main claim (the thesis) but then support that main claim with supporting evidence and arguments.  The topic sentence of a body paragraph can be another type of argument, though a supporting one, and, hence, a narrower one.  Try not to be confused when professors call both the thesis and topic sentences arguments.  They are not wrong because arguments come in different forms; some claims are broad enough to be broken down into a number of supporting arguments.  Many longer essays are structured by the smaller arguments that are a part of and support the main argument.  Sometimes professors, when they say supporting points or supporting arguments, mean the reasons ( premises ) for the main claim ( conclusion ) you make in an essay.  If a claim has a number of reasons, those reasons will form the support structure for the essay, and each reason will be the basis for the topic sentence of its body paragraph.

Argument vs. Fact

Arguments are also commonly mistaken for statements of fact.  This comes about because often people privilege facts over opinions, even as they defend the right to have opinions.  In other words, facts are “good,” and opinions are “bad,” or if not exactly bad, then fuzzy and thus easy to reject.  However, remember the important distinction between an argument and an opinion stated above: While argument may sound like an opinion, the two are not the same.  An opinion is an assertion, but it is left to stand alone with little to no reasoning or support. An argument is much stronger because it includes and demonstrates reasons and support for its claim.

As for mistaking a fact for an argument, keep this important distinction in mind: An argument must be arguable .  In everyday life, arguable is often a synonym for doubtful.  For an argument, though, arguable means that it is worth arguing, that it has a range of possible answers, angles, or perspectives: It is an answer, angle, or perspective with which a reasonable person might disagree.  Facts, by virtue of being facts, are not arguable.   Facts are statements that can be definitely proven using objective data. The statement that is a fact is absolutely valid. In other words, the statement can be pronounced as definitively true or definitively false. For example, 2 + 2 = 4. This expression identifies a verifiably true statement, or a fact, because it can be proved with objective data.  When a fact is established, there is no other side, and there should be no disagreement.

The misunderstanding about facts (being inherently good) and argument (being inherently problematic because it is not a fact) leads to the mistaken belief that facts have no place in an argument.  This could not be farther from the truth.  First of all, most arguments are formed by analyzing facts.  Second, facts provide one type of support for an argument.  Thus, do not think of facts and arguments as enemies; rather, they work closely together.

Explicit vs. Implicit Arguments

Arguments can be both explicit and implicit. Explicit arguments contain prominent and definable thesis statements and multiple specific proofs to support them. This is common in academic writing from scholars of all fields.   Implicit arguments , on the other hand, work by weaving together facts and narratives, logic and emotion, personal experiences and statistics. Unlike explicit arguments, implicit ones do not have a one-sentence thesis statement. Implicit arguments involve evidence of many different kinds to build and convey their point of view to their audience. Both types use rhetoric, logic, and support to create effective arguments.

Argument and Rhetoric

An argument in written form involves making choices, and knowing the principles of rhetoric allows a writer to make informed choices about various aspects of the writing process. Every act of writing takes place in a specific rhetorical situation. The most basic and important components of a rhetorical situation are

• Author of the text.
• Purpose of the text.
• Intended audience (i.e., those the author imagines will be reading the text).
• Form or type of text.

These components give readers a way to analyze a text on first encounter.  These factors also help writers select their topics, arrange their material, and make other important decisions about the argument they will make and the support they will need.  For more on rhetoric, see Chapter 2, “Rhetorical Analysis.”

Key Takeaways: What is an Argument?

With this brief introduction, you can see what rhetorical or academic argument is not :

• An argument need not be controversial or about a controversy.
• An argument is not a mere fight.
• An argument does not have a single winner or loser.
• An argument is not a mere opinion.
• An argument is not a statement of fact.

Furthermore, you can see what rhetorical argument is :

• An argument is a claim asserted as true.
• An argument is arguable.
• An argument must be reasonable.
• An argument must be supported.
• An argument in a formal essay is called a thesis.  Supporting arguments can be called topic sentences.
• An argument can be explicit or implicit.
• An argument must be adapted to its rhetorical situation.

2. What Are the Components and Vocabulary of Argument?

Questions are at the core of arguments. What matters is not just that you believe that what you have to say is true, but that you give others viable reasons to believe it as well—and also show them that you have considered the issue from multiple angles. To do that, build your argument out of the answers to the five questions a rational reader will expect answers to.  In academic and professional writing, we tend to build arguments from the answers to these main questions:

• What do you want me to do or think?
• Why should I do or think that?
• How do I know that what you say is true?
• Why should I accept the reasons that support your claim?
• What about this other idea, fact, or consideration?
• How should you present your argument?

When you ask people to do or think something they otherwise would not, they quite naturally want to know why they should do so. In fact, people tend to ask the same questions. As you make a reasonable argument, you anticipate and respond to readers’ questions with a particular part of argument:

1. The answer to What do you want me to do or think? is your conclusion : “I conclude that you should do or think X.”

2. The answer to Why should I do or think that? states your premise : “You should do or think X because . . .”

3. The answer to How do I know that what you say is true? presents your support : “You can believe my reasons because they are supported by these facts . . .”

4. The answer to Why should I accept that your reasons support your claim? states your general principle of reasoning, called a warrant : “My specific reason supports my specific claim because whenever this general condition is true, we can generally draw a conclusion like mine.”

5. The answer to What about this other idea, fact, or conclusion? acknowledges that your readers might see things differently and then responds to their counterarguments .

6. The answer to How should you present your argument? leads to the point of view , organization , and tone that you should use when making your arguments.

As you have noticed, the answers to these questions involve knowing the particular vocabulary about argument because these terms refer to specific parts of an argument.  The remainder of this section will cover the terms referred to in the questions listed above as well as others that will help you better understand the building blocks of argument.

What Is a Conclusion, and What Is a Premise?

The root notion of an argument is that it convinces us that something is true. What we are being convinced of is the conclusion . An example would be this claim:

Littering is harmful.

A reason for this conclusion is called the premise . Typically, a conclusion will be supported by two or more premises . Both premises and conclusions are statements .  Some premises for our littering conclusion might be these:

       Littering is dangerous to animals.

       Littering is dangerous to humans.

Thus, to be clear, understand that an argument asserts that the writer’s claim is true in two main parts: the premises of the argument exist to show that the conclusion is true.

Be aware of the other words to indicate a conclusion– claim , assertion , point –and other ways to talk about the premise– reason , factor , the why .  Also, do not confuse this use of the word conclusion with a conclusion paragraph for an essay.

What Is a Statement?

A statement is a type of sentence that can be true or false and corresponds to the grammatical category of a declarative sentence . For example, the sentence,

The Nile is a river in northeastern Africa,

is a statement because it makes sense to inquire whether it is true or false. (In this case, it happens to be true.) However, a sentence is still a statement, even if it is false. For example, the sentence,

The Yangtze is a river in Japan,

is still a statement; it is just a false statement (the Yangtze River is in China). In contrast, none of the following sentences are statements:

Please help yourself to more casserole.

Don’t tell your mother about the surprise.

Do you like Vietnamese pho?

None of these sentences are statements because it does not make sense to ask whether those sentences are true or false; rather, they are a request, a command, and a question, respectively.  Make sure to remember the difference between sentences that are declarative statements and sentences that are not because arguments depend on declarative statements .

A question cannot be an argument, yet students will often pose a question at the end of an introduction to an essay, thinking they have declared their thesis.  They have not.  If, however, they answer that question ( conclusion ) and give some reasons for that answer ( premises ), they then have the components necessary for both an argument and a declarative statement of that argument ( thesis ).

To reiterate: All arguments are composed of premises and conclusions, both of which are types of statements. The premises of the argument provide reasons for thinking that the conclusion is true. Arguments typically involve more than one premise.

What Is Standard Argument Form?

A standard way of capturing the structure of an argument, or diagramming it, is by numbering the premises and conclusion.  For example, the following represents another way to arrange the littering argument:

• Littering is harmful
• Litter is dangerous to animals
• Litter is dangerous to humans

This numbered list represents an argument that has been put into standard argument form .  A more precise definition of an argument now emerges, employing the vocabulary that is specific to academic and rhetorical arguments. An argument is a set of statements , some of which (the premises : statements 2 and 3 above) attempt to provide a reason for thinking that some other statement (the conclusion : statement 1) is true.

Diagramming an argument can be helpful when trying to figure out your essay’s thesis.  Because a thesis is an argument, putting the parts of an argument into standard form can help sort ideas.  You can transform the numbered ideas into a cohesive sentence or two for your thesis once you are more certain what your argument parts are.

Figure 3.2 “Argument Diagram”

Recognizing arguments is essential to analysis and critical thinking; if you cannot distinguish between the details (the support) of a piece of writing and what those details are there to support (the argument), you will likely misunderstand what you are reading.  Additionally, studying how others make arguments can help you learn how to effectively create your own.

What Are Argument Indicators?

While mapping an argument in standard argument form can be a good way to figure out and formulate a thesis, identifying arguments by other writers is also important.  The best way to identify an argument is to ask whether a claim exists (in statement form) that a writer justifies by reasons (also in statement form). Other identifying markers of arguments are key words or phrases that are premise indicators or conclusion indicators. For example, recall the littering argument, reworded here into a single sentence (much like a thesis statement):

Littering is harmful because it is dangerous to both animals and humans.

The word “because” here is a premise indicator . That is, “because” indicates that what follows is a reason for thinking that littering is bad. Here is another example:

The student plagiarized since I found the exact same sentences on a website, and the website was published more than a year before the student wrote the paper.

In this example, the word “since” is a premise indicator because what follows is a statement that is clearly intended to be a reason for thinking that the student plagiarized (i.e., a premise). Notice that in these two cases, the premise indicators “because” and “since” are interchangeable: “because” could be used in place of “since” or “since” in the place of “because,” and the meaning of the sentences would have been the same.

Figure 3.3 “Common Premise Indicators”

In addition to premise indicators, there are also conclusion indicators . Conclusion indicators mark that what follows is the conclusion of an argument. For example,

Bob-the-arsonist has been dead for a year, so Bob-the-arsonist didn’t set the fire at the East Lansing Starbucks last week.

In this example, the word “so” is a conclusion indicator because what follows it is a statement that someone is trying to establish as true (i.e., a conclusion). Here is another example of a conclusion indicator:

A poll administered by Gallup (a respected polling company) showed candidate X to be substantially behind candidate Y with only a week left before the vote; therefore , candidate Y will probably not win the election.

In this example, the word “therefore” is a conclusion indicator because what follows it is a statement that someone is trying to establish as true (i.e., a conclusion). As before, in both of these cases, the conclusion indicators “so” and “therefore” are interchangeable: “So” could be used in place of “therefore” or “therefore” in the place of “so,” and the meaning of the sentences would have been the same.

Figure 3.4 “Common Conclusion Indicators”

Which of the following are arguments?  If it is an argument, identify the conclusion (claim) of the argument. If it is not an argument, explain why not.  Remember to look for the qualifying features of an argument: (1) It is a statement or series of statements, (2) it states a claim (a conclusion), and (3) it has at least one premise (reason for the claim).

• The woman with the hat is not a witch since witches have long noses, and she doesn’t have a long nose.
• I have been wrangling cattle since before you were old enough to tie your own shoes.
• Albert is angry with me, so he probably won’t be willing to help me wash the dishes.
• First, I washed the dishes, and then I dried them.
• If the road weren’t icy, the car wouldn’t have slid off the turn.
• Marvin isn’t a fireman and isn’t a fisherman, either.
• Are you seeing the rhinoceros over there? It’s huge!
• Obesity has become a problem in the US because obesity rates have risen over the past four decades.
• Bob showed me a graph with rising obesity rates, and I was very surprised to see how much they had risen.
• Marvin isn’t a fireman because Marvin is a Greyhound, which is a type of dog, and dogs can’t be firemen.
• What Susie told you is not the actual reason she missed her flight to Denver.
• Carol likely forgot to lock her door this morning because she was distracted by a clown riding a unicycle while singing Lynyrd Skynyrd’s “Simple Man.”
• No one who has ever gotten frostbite while climbing K2 has survived to tell about it; therefore, no one ever will.

What Constitutes Support?

To ensure that your argument is sound—that the premises for your conclusion are true—you must establish support .  The burden of proof, to borrow language from law, is on the one making an argument, not on the recipient of an argument.  If you wish to assert a claim, you must then also support it, and this support must be relevant, logical, and sufficient.

It is important to use the right kind of evidence, to use it effectively, and to have an appropriate amount of it.

• If, for example, your philosophy professor did not like that you used a survey of public opinion as your primary evidence in an ethics paper, you most likely used material that was not relevant to your topic.  Rather, you should find out what philosophers count as good evidence. Different fields of study involve types of evidence based on relevance to those fields.
• If your professor has put question marks by your thesis or has written, “It does not follow,” you likely have problems with logic .  Make sure it is clear how the parts of your argument logically fit together.
• If your instructor has told you that you need more analysis, suggested that you are “just listing” points or giving a “laundry list,” you likely have not included enough explanation for how a point connects to and supports your argument, which is another problem with logic , this time related to the warrants of your argument. You need to fully incorporate evidence into your argument. (See more on warrants immediately below.)
• If you see comments like “for example?,” “proof?,” “go deeper,” or “expand,” you may need more evidence.  In other words, the evidence you have is not yet sufficient .  One or two pieces of evidence will not be enough to prove your argument.  Similarly, multiple pieces of evidence that aren’t developed thoroughly would also be flawed, also insufficient. Would a lawyer go to trial with only one piece of evidence?  No, the lawyer would want to have as much evidence as possible from a variety of sources to make a viable case.  Similarly, a lawyer would fully develop evidence for a claim using explanation, facts, statistics, stories, experiences, research, details, and the like.

You will find more information about the different types of evidence, how to find them, and what makes them credible in Chapter 6, “Research.”   Logic will be covered later on in this chapter.

What Is the Warrant?

Above all, connect the evidence to the argument.  This connection is the warrant .  Evidence is not self-evident.  In other words, after introducing evidence into your writing, you must demonstrate why and how this evidence supports your argument. You must explain the significance of the evidence and its function in your paper. What turns a fact or piece of information into evidence is the connection it has with a larger claim or argument: Evidence is always evidence for or against something, and you have to make that link clear.

Student writers sometimes assume that readers already know the information being written about; students may be wary of elaborating too much because they think their points are obvious. But remember, readers are not mind readers: Although they may be familiar with many of the ideas discussed, they don’t know what writers want to do with those ideas unless they indicate that through explanations, organization, and transitions. Thus, when you write, be sure to explain the connections you made in your mind when you chose your evidence, decided where to place it in your paper, and drew conclusions based on it.

What Is a Counterargument?

Remember that arguments are multi-sided. As you brainstorm and prepare to present your idea and your support for it, consider other sides of the issue. These other sides are counterarguments . Make a list of counterarguments as you work through the writing process, and use them to build your case – to widen your idea to include a valid counterargument, to explain how a counterargument might be defeated, to illustrate how a counterargument may not withstand the scrutiny your research has uncovered, and/or to show that you are aware of and have taken into account other possibilities.

For example, you might choose the issue of declawing cats and set up your search with the question should I have my indoor cat declawed? Your research, interviews, surveys, personal experiences might yield several angles on this question: Yes, it will save your furniture and your arms and ankles. No, it causes psychological issues for the cat. No, if the cat should get outside, he will be without defense. As a writer, be prepared to address alternate arguments and to include them to the extent that it will illustrate your reasoning.

Almost anything claimed in a paper can be refuted or challenged. Opposing points of view and arguments exist in every debate. It is smart to anticipate possible objections to your arguments – and to do so will make your arguments stronger. Another term for a counterargument is antithesis (i.e., the opposition to a thesis). To find possible counterarguments (and keep in mind there can be many counterpoints to one claim), ask the following questions:

• Could someone draw a different conclusion from the facts or examples you present?
• Could a reader question any of your assumptions or claims?
• Could a reader offer a different explanation of an issue?
• Is there any evidence out there that could weaken your position?

If the answer to any of these questions is yes, the next set of questions can help you respond to these potential objections:

Is it possible to concede the point of the opposition, but then challenge that point’s importance/usefulness?

• Can you offer an explanation of why a reader should question a piece of evidence or consider a different point of view?
• Can you explain how your position responds to any contradicting evidence?
• Can you put forward a different interpretation of evidence?

It may not seem likely at first, but clearly recognizing and addressing different sides of the argument, the ones that are not your own, can make your argument and paper stronger. By addressing the antithesis of your argument essay, you are showing your readers that you have carefully considered the issue and accept that there are often other ways to view the same thing.

You can use signal phrases in your paper to alert readers that you are about to present an objection. Consider using one of these phrases–or ones like them–at the beginning of a paragraph:

• Researchers have challenged these claims with…
• Critics argue that this view…
• Some readers may point to…

What Are More Complex Argument Structures?

So far you have seen that an argument consists of a conclusion and a premise (typically more than one). However, often arguments and explanations have a more complex structure than just a few premises that directly support the conclusion. For example, consider the following argument:

No one living in Pompeii could have survived the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius. The reason is simple: The lava was flowing too fast, and there was nowhere to go to escape it in time. Therefore, this account of the eruption, which claims to have been written by an eyewitness living in Pompeii, was not actually written by an eyewitness.

The main conclusion of this argument—the statement that depends on other statements as evidence but doesn’t itself provide any evidence for other statements—is

A. This account of the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius was not actually written by an eyewitness.

However, the argument’s structure is more complex than simply having a couple of premises that provide evidence directly for the conclusion. Rather, some statements provide evidence directly for the main conclusion, but some premise statements support other premise statements which then support the conclusion.

To determine the structure of an argument, you must determine which statements support which, using premise and conclusion indicators to help. For example, the passage above contains the phrase, “the reason is…” which is a premise indicator, and it also contains the conclusion indicator, “therefore.” That conclusion indicator helps identify the main conclusion, but the more important element to see is that statement A does not itself provide evidence or support for any of the other statements in the argument, which is the clearest reason statement A is the main conclusion of the argument. The next questions to answer are these: Which statement most directly supports A? What most directly supports A is

B. No one living in Pompeii could have survived the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius.

However, there is also a reason offered in support of B. That reason is the following:

C. The lava from Mt. Vesuvius was flowing too fast, and there was nowhere for someone living in Pompeii to go to escape it in time.

So the main conclusion (A) is directly supported by B, and B is supported by C.  Since B acts as a premise for the main conclusion but is also itself the conclusion of further premises, B is classified as an intermediate conclusion . What you should recognize here is that one and the same statement can act as both a premise and a conclusion . Statement B is a premise that supports the main conclusion (A), but it is also itself a conclusion that follows from C. Here is how to put this complex argument into standard form (using numbers this time, as is typical for diagramming arguments):

• The lava from Mt. Vesuvius was flowing too fast, and there was nowhere for someone living in Pompeii to go to escape it in time.
• Therefore, no one living in Pompeii could have survived the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius. (from 1)
• Therefore, this account of the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius was not actually written by an eyewitness. (from 2)

Notice that at the end of statement 2 is a written indicator in parentheses (from 1), and, likewise, at the end of statement 3 is another indicator (from 2). From 1 is a shorthand way of saying, “this statement follows logically from statement 1.” Use this convention as a way to keep track of an argument’s structure. It may also help to think about the structure of an argument spatially, as the figure below shows:

The main argument here (from 2 to 3) contains a subargument , in this case, the argument from 1 (a premise) to 2 (the intermediate conclusion). A subargument, as the term suggests, is a part of an argument that provides indirect support for the main argument. The main argument is simply the argument whose conclusion is the main conclusion.

Another type of structure that arguments can have is when two or more premises provide direct but independent support for the conclusion. Here is an example of an argument with that structure:

Wanda rode her bike to work today because when she arrived at work she had her right pant leg rolled up, which cyclists do to keep their pants legs from getting caught in the chain. Moreover, our co-worker, Bob, who works in accounting, saw her riding towards work at 7:45 a.m.

The conclusion of this argument is “Wanda rode her bike to work today”; two premises provide independent support for it: the fact that Wanda had her pant leg cuffed and the fact that Bob saw her riding her bike. Here is the argument in standard form:

• Wanda arrived at work with her right pant leg rolled up.
• Cyclists often roll up their right pant leg.
• Bob saw Wanda riding her bike towards work at 7:45.
• Therefore, Wanda rode her bike to work today. (from 1-2, 3 independently)

Again, notice that next to statement 4 of the argument is an indicator of how each part of the argument relates to the main conclusion. In this case, to avoid any ambiguity, you can see that the support for the conclusion comes independently from statements 1 and 2, on the one hand, and from statement 3, on the other hand. It is important to point out that an argument or subargumen t can be supported by one or more premises, the case in this argument because the main conclusion (4) is supported jointly by 1 and 2, and singly by 3. As before, we can represent the structure of this argument spatially, as the figure below shows:

There are endless argument structures that can be generated from a few simple patterns. At this point, it is important to understand that arguments can have different structures and that some arguments will be more complex than others. Determining the structure of complex arguments is a skill that takes some time to master, rather like simplifying equations in math. Even so, it may help to remember that any argument structure ultimately traces back to some combination of premises, intermediate arguments, and a main conclusion.

Write the following arguments in standard form.  If any arguments are complex, show how each complex argument is structured using a diagram like those shown just above.

1. There is nothing wrong with prostitution because there is nothing wrong with consensual sexual and economic interactions between adults. Moreover, there is no difference between a man who goes on a blind date with a woman, buys her dinner and then has sex with her and a man who simply pays a woman for sex, which is another reason there is nothing wrong with prostitution.

2. Prostitution is wrong because it involves women who have typically been sexually abused as children. Proof that these women have been abused comes from multiple surveys done with female prostitutes that show a high percentage of self-reported sexual abuse as children.

3. Someone was in this cabin recently because warm water was in the tea kettle and wood was still smoldering in the fireplace. However, the person couldn’t have been Tim because Tim has been with me the whole time. Therefore, someone else must be in these woods.

4. Someone can be blind and yet run in the Olympic Games since Marla Runyan did it at the 2000 Sydney Olympics.

5. The train was late because it had to take a longer, alternate route seeing as the bridge was out.

6. Israel is not safe if Iran gets nuclear missiles because Iran has threatened multiple times to destroy Israel, and if Iran had nuclear missiles, it would be able to carry out this threat. Furthermore, since Iran has been developing enriched uranium, it has the key component needed for nuclear weapons; every other part of the process of building a nuclear weapon is simple compared to that. Therefore, Israel is not safe.

7. Since all professional hockey players are missing front teeth, and Martin is a professional hockey player, it follows that Martin is missing front teeth. Because almost all professional athletes who are missing their front teeth have false teeth, it follows that Martin probably has false teeth.

8. Anyone who eats the crab rangoon at China Food restaurant will probably have stomach troubles afterward. It has happened to me every time; thus, it will probably happen to other people as well. Since Bob ate the crab rangoon at China Food restaurant, he will probably have stomach troubles afterward.

9. Lucky and Caroline like to go for runs in the afternoon in Hyde Park.  Because Lucky never runs alone, any time Albert is running, Caroline must also be running. Albert looks like he has just run (since he is panting hard), so it follows that Caroline must have run, too.

10. Just because Linda’s prints were on the gun that killed Terry and the gun was registered to Linda, it doesn’t mean that Linda killed Terry since Linda’s prints would certainly be on her own gun, and someone else could have stolen her gun and used it to kill Terry.

Key Takeaways: Components of Vocabulary and Argument

• Conclusion —a claim that is asserted as true.  One part of an argument.
• Premise —a reason behind a conclusion.  The other part of an argument.  Most conclusions have more than one premise.
• Statement —a declarative sentence that can be evaluated as true or false.  The parts of an argument, premises and the conclusion, should be statements.
• Standard Argument Form —a numbered breakdown of the parts of an argument (conclusion and all premises).
• Premise Indicators —terms that signal that a premise, or reason, is coming.
• Conclusion Indicator —terms that signal that a conclusion, or claim, is coming.
• Support —anything used as proof or reasoning for an argument.  This includes evidence, experience, and logic.
• Warrant —the connection made between the support and the reasons of an argument.
• Counterargument —an opposing argument to the one you make.  An argument can have multiple counterarguments.
• Complex Arguments –these are formed by more than individual premises that point to a conclusion.  Complex arguments may have layers to them, including an intermediate argument that may act as both a conclusion (with its own premises) and a premise (for the main conclusion).

CC Licensed Content, Shared Previously

About Writing: A Guide,  Robin Jeffrey, CC-BY.

A Concise Introduction to Logic, Craig DeLancey, CC-BY-NC-SA.

English 112: College Composition II ,  Lumen Learning, CC-BY-SA.

English Composition 1 ,  Lumen Learning,  CC-BY-SA.

Frameworks for Academic Writing ,   Stephen Poulter, CC-BY-NC-SA.

Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking,   Matthew J. Van Cleave, CC-BY.

Methods of Discovery,  Pavel Zemilanski,  CC-BY-NC-SA.

Writing for Success ,  CC-BY-NC-SA.

Writing in College: From Competence to Excellence ,  Amy Guptill, CC-BY-NC-SA.

Image Credits

Figure 3.1 “Opinion vs Argument,” by Kalyca Schultz, Virginia Western Community College,  derivative image from original by ijmaki, pixabay, CC-0.

Figure 3.2 “Argument Diagram,” Virginia Western Community College, derivative image using “ Thin Brace Down ,” by pathoschild, Wikimedia, CC-BY-SA 3.0.

Figure 3.3 “Common Premise Indicators,” by Kalyca Schultz, Virginia Western Community College, CC-0.

Figure 3.4 “Common Conclusion Indicators,” by Kalyca Schultz, Virginia Western Community College, CC-0.

Figure 3.5 Untitled, by Matthew Van Cleave, from Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking , CC-BY.

Figure 3.6 Untitled, by Matthew Van Cleave, from Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking ,   CC-BY.

Argument Copyright © 2021 by Kirsten DeVries is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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1.1: What is an Argument?

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• Matthew Van Cleave
• Lansing Community College

This is an introductory textbook in logic and critical thinking. Both logic and critical thinking centrally involve the analysis and assessment of arguments. “Argument” is a word that has multiple distinct meanings, so it is important to be clear from the start about the sense of the word that is relevant to the study of logic. In one sense of the word, an argument is a heated exchange of differing views as in the following:

Sally: Abortion is morally wrong and those who think otherwise are seeking to justify murder!

Bob: Abortion is not morally wrong and those who think so are right-wing bigots who are seeking to impose their narrow-minded views on all the rest of us!

Sally and Bob are having an argument in this exchange. That is, they are each expressing conflicting views in a heated manner. However, that is not the sense of “argument” with which logic is concerned. Logic concerns a different sense of the word “argument.” An argument, in this sense, is a reason for thinking that a statement, claim or idea is true. For example:

Sally: Abortion is morally wrong because it is wrong to take the life of an innocent human being, and a fetus is an innocent human being.

In this example Sally has given an argument against the moral permissibility of abortion. That is, she has given us a reason for thinking that abortion is morally wrong. The conclusion of the argument is the first four words, “abortion is morally wrong.” But whereas in the first example Sally was simply asserting that abortion is wrong (and then trying to put down those who support it), in this example she is offering a reason for why abortion is wrong.

We can (and should) be more precise about our definition of an argument. But before we can do that, we need to introduce some further terminology that we will use in our definition. As I’ve already noted, the conclusion of Sally’s argument is that abortion is morally wrong. But the reason for thinking the conclusion is true is what we call the premise . So we have two parts of an argument: the premise and the conclusion. Typically, a conclusion will be supported by two or more premises. Both premises and conclusions are statements. A statement is a type of sentence that can be true or false and corresponds to the grammatical category of a “declarative sentence.” For example, the sentence,

The Nile is a river in northeastern Africa

is a statement. Why? Because it makes sense to inquire whether it is true or false. (In this case, it happens to be true.) But a sentence is still a statement even if it is false. For example, the sentence,

The Yangtze is a river in Japan

is still a statement; it is just a false statement (the Yangtze River is in China). In contrast, none of the following sentences are statements:

Please help yourself to more casserole

Don’t tell your mother about the surprise

Do you like Vietnamese pho?

The reason that none of these sentences are statements is that it doesn’t make sense to ask whether those sentences are true or false (rather, they are requests or commands, and questions, respectively).

So, to reiterate: all arguments are composed of premises and conclusions, which are both types of statements. The premises of the argument provide a reason for thinking that the conclusion is true. And arguments typically involve more than one premise. A standard way of capturing the structure of an argument is by numbering the premises and conclusion. For example, recall Sally’s argument against abortion:

Abortion is morally wrong because it is wrong to take the life of an innocent human being, and a fetus is an innocent human being.

We could capture the structure of that argument like this:

1. It is morally wrong to take the life of an innocent human being 2. A fetus is an innocent human being 3. Therefore, abortion is morally wrong

By convention, the last numbered statement (also denoted by the “therefore”) is the conclusion and the earlier numbered statements are the premises. This is what we call putting an argument into standard argument form . We can now give a more precise definition of an argument. An argument is a set of statements, some of which (the premises) attempt to provide a reason for thinking that some other statement (the conclusion) is true. Although arguments are typically given in order to convince or persuade someone of the conclusion, the argument itself is independent of one’s attempt to use it to convince or persuade. For example, I have just given you this argument not in an attempt to convince you that abortion is morally wrong, but as an illustration of what an argument is. Later on in this chapter and in this book we will learn some techniques of evaluating arguments, but for now the goal is to learn to identify an argument, including its premises and conclusion(s). It is important to be able to identify arguments and understand their structure, whether or not you agree with conclusion of the argument. In the next section I will provide some techniques for being able to identify arguments.

Which of the following sentences are statements and which are not?

1. No one understands me but you. 2. Alligators are on average larger than crocodiles. 3. Is an alligator a reptile or a mammal? 4. An alligator is either a reptile or a mammal. 5. Don’t let any reptiles into the house. 6. You may kill any reptile you see in the house. 7. East Africans are not the best distance runners. 8. Obama is not a Democrat. 9. Some humans have wings. 10. Some things with wings cannot fly. 11. Was Obama born in Kenya or Hawaii? 12. Oh no! A grizzly bear! 13. Meet me in St. Louis. 14. We met in St. Louis yesterday. 15. I do not want to meet a grizzly bear in the wild.

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Course: LSAT   >   Unit 1

• Getting started with Logical Reasoning

Introduction to arguments

• Catalog of question types
• Types of conclusions
• Types of evidence
• Types of flaws
• Identify the conclusion | Quick guide
• Identify the conclusion | Learn more
• Identify the conclusion | Examples
• Identify an entailment | Quick guide
• Identify an entailment | Learn more
• Strongly supported inferences | Quick guide
• Strongly supported inferences | Learn more
• Disputes | Quick guide
• Disputes | Learn more
• Identify the technique | Quick guide
• Identify the technique | Learn more
• Identify the role | Quick guide
• Identify the role | learn more
• Identify the principle | Quick guide
• Identify the principle | Learn more
• Match structure | Quick guide
• Match structure | Learn more
• Match principles | Quick guide
• Match principles | Learn more
• Identify a flaw | Quick guide
• Identify a flaw | Learn more
• Match a flaw | Quick guide
• Match a flaw | Learn more
• Necessary assumptions | Quick guide
• Necessary assumptions | Learn more
• Sufficient assumptions | Quick guide
• Sufficient assumptions | Learn more
• Strengthen and weaken | Quick guide
• Strengthen and weaken | Learn more
• Helpful to know | Quick guide
• Helpful to know | learn more
• Explain or resolve | Quick guide
• Explain or resolve | Learn more

Logical Reasoning Arguments

What is an argument.

• A main conclusion: This statement is a claim that expresses what the arguer is trying to persuade us to accept, whether or not it actually is true.
• Evidence: Also known as premises or support, the arguer provides these statements in order to show us that the conclusion is true. Essentially, the evidence answers the question, “Why do you believe [the conclusion] to be true?” The simplest arguments on the LSAT have just one piece of evidence; more complex arguments will have several.

Conclusion + evidence

• Sarah will probably receive a job offer, because she has ten years of experience.
• Sarah will probably receive a job offer
• She has ten years of experience.
• What the arguer believes is that Sarah will probably receive a job offer, and the reason for believing that is her ten years of experience.
• Since the answer to the question, “Why do you believe Sarah will probably receive a job offer?” is logically, “I believe that because she has ten years of experience”, then we can feel confident that we designated the correct conclusion and evidence.
• If , however, we switched designations, we would be left with the question, “Why do believe that Sarah has ten years of experience?” and the answer, “Because she’s probably going to receive a job offer”—and that makes no sense!

Conclusion + evidence + intermediate conclusion

• Sarah will probably receive a job offer, because she has ten years of experience. That means that she’ll soon pay me back for the money I lent her.
• Sarah has ten years of experience. Therefore
• She’ll probably receive a job offer. And therefore ,
• She’ll soon pay me back for the money I lent her.

Conclusion + evidence + background information

• One of this neighborhood’s residents has been complaining about his sister Sarah having been unemployed for so long. She’s applying for programming jobs at many companies, but she only received her first interview invite last week. She’ll probably receive a job offer because she has ten years of experience. In a job market like the current one, anything over eight years of experience gives a candidate a great advantage.

How do we identify the main conclusion?

Signal words for conclusions.

• It follows that
• As a result
• Nevertheless
• Nonetheless
• The cat will run away if you open the door . That's because the cat doesn't like being inside.
• 90% of adults in the area returned a survey and indicated that they think crime is on the rise. We need to act quickly to combat this increase in crime .

How do we identify the relevant evidence?

• [Insert conclusion here]
• [Insert the “why” reasoning here].
• [Insert premises here]. Therefore ,
• [Insert conclusion here].

Signal words for evidence

• On the grounds that
• As shown by

Looking ahead

• Assumption (sufficient and necessary)
• Match the flaw
• Match the structure
• Identify the role
• Identify the technique
• Identify the conclusion

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What this handout is about

This handout will define what an argument is and explain why you need one in most of your academic essays.

Arguments are everywhere

You may be surprised to hear that the word “argument” does not have to be written anywhere in your assignment for it to be an important part of your task. In fact, making an argument—expressing a point of view on a subject and supporting it with evidence—is often the aim of academic writing. Your instructors may assume that you know this and thus may not explain the importance of arguments in class.

Most material you learn in college is or has been debated by someone, somewhere, at some time. Even when the material you read or hear is presented as a simple fact, it may actually be one person’s interpretation of a set of information. Instructors may call on you to examine that interpretation and defend it, refute it, or offer some new view of your own. In writing assignments, you will almost always need to do more than just summarize information that you have gathered or regurgitate facts that have been discussed in class. You will need to develop a point of view on or interpretation of that material and provide evidence for your position.

Consider an example. For nearly 2000 years, educated people in many Western cultures believed that bloodletting—deliberately causing a sick person to lose blood—was the most effective treatment for a variety of illnesses. The claim that bloodletting is beneficial to human health was not widely questioned until the 1800s, and some physicians continued to recommend bloodletting as late as the 1920s. Medical practices have now changed because some people began to doubt the effectiveness of bloodletting; these people argued against it and provided convincing evidence. Human knowledge grows out of such differences of opinion, and scholars like your instructors spend their lives engaged in debate over what claims may be counted as accurate in their fields. In their courses, they want you to engage in similar kinds of critical thinking and debate.

Argumentation is not just what your instructors do. We all use argumentation on a daily basis, and you probably already have some skill at crafting an argument. The more you improve your skills in this area, the better you will be at thinking critically, reasoning, making choices, and weighing evidence.

Making a claim

What is an argument? In academic writing, an argument is usually a main idea, often called a “claim” or “thesis statement,” backed up with evidence that supports the idea. In the majority of college papers, you will need to make some sort of claim and use evidence to support it, and your ability to do this well will separate your papers from those of students who see assignments as mere accumulations of fact and detail. In other words, gone are the happy days of being given a “topic” about which you can write anything. It is time to stake out a position and prove why it is a good position for a thinking person to hold. See our handout on thesis statements .

Claims can be as simple as “Protons are positively charged and electrons are negatively charged,” with evidence such as, “In this experiment, protons and electrons acted in such and such a way.” Claims can also be as complex as “Genre is the most important element to the contract of expectations between filmmaker and audience,” using reasoning and evidence such as, “defying genre expectations can create a complete apocalypse of story form and content, leaving us stranded in a sort of genre-less abyss.” In either case, the rest of your paper will detail the reasoning and evidence that have led you to believe that your position is best.

When beginning to write a paper, ask yourself, “What is my point?” For example, the point of this handout is to help you become a better writer, and we are arguing that an important step in the process of writing effective arguments is understanding the concept of argumentation. If your papers do not have a main point, they cannot be arguing for anything. Asking yourself what your point is can help you avoid a mere “information dump.” Consider this: your instructors probably know a lot more than you do about your subject matter. Why, then, would you want to provide them with material they already know? Instructors are usually looking for two things:

• Proof that you understand the material
• A demonstration of your ability to use or apply the material in ways that go beyond what you have read or heard.

This second part can be done in many ways: you can critique the material, apply it to something else, or even just explain it in a different way. In order to succeed at this second step, though, you must have a particular point to argue.

Arguments in academic writing are usually complex and take time to develop. Your argument will need to be more than a simple or obvious statement such as “Frank Lloyd Wright was a great architect.” Such a statement might capture your initial impressions of Wright as you have studied him in class; however, you need to look deeper and express specifically what caused that “greatness.” Your instructor will probably expect something more complicated, such as “Frank Lloyd Wright’s architecture combines elements of European modernism, Asian aesthetic form, and locally found materials to create a unique new style,” or “There are many strong similarities between Wright’s building designs and those of his mother, which suggests that he may have borrowed some of her ideas.” To develop your argument, you would then define your terms and prove your claim with evidence from Wright’s drawings and buildings and those of the other architects you mentioned.

Do not stop with having a point. You have to back up your point with evidence. The strength of your evidence, and your use of it, can make or break your argument. See our handout on evidence . You already have the natural inclination for this type of thinking, if not in an academic setting. Think about how you talked your parents into letting you borrow the family car. Did you present them with lots of instances of your past trustworthiness? Did you make them feel guilty because your friends’ parents all let them drive? Did you whine until they just wanted you to shut up? Did you look up statistics on teen driving and use them to show how you didn’t fit the dangerous-driver profile? These are all types of argumentation, and they exist in academia in similar forms.

Every field has slightly different requirements for acceptable evidence, so familiarize yourself with some arguments from within that field instead of just applying whatever evidence you like best. Pay attention to your textbooks and your instructor’s lectures. What types of argument and evidence are they using? The type of evidence that sways an English instructor may not work to convince a sociology instructor. Find out what counts as proof that something is true in that field. Is it statistics, a logical development of points, something from the object being discussed (art work, text, culture, or atom), the way something works, or some combination of more than one of these things?

Be consistent with your evidence. Unlike negotiating for the use of your parents’ car, a college paper is not the place for an all-out blitz of every type of argument. You can often use more than one type of evidence within a paper, but make sure that within each section you are providing the reader with evidence appropriate to each claim. So, if you start a paragraph or section with a statement like “Putting the student seating area closer to the basketball court will raise player performance,” do not follow with your evidence on how much more money the university could raise by letting more students go to games for free. Information about how fan support raises player morale, which then results in better play, would be a better follow-up. Your next section could offer clear reasons why undergraduates have as much or more right to attend an undergraduate event as wealthy alumni—but this information would not go in the same section as the fan support stuff. You cannot convince a confused person, so keep things tidy and ordered.

Counterargument

One way to strengthen your argument and show that you have a deep understanding of the issue you are discussing is to anticipate and address counterarguments or objections. By considering what someone who disagrees with your position might have to say about your argument, you show that you have thought things through, and you dispose of some of the reasons your audience might have for not accepting your argument. Recall our discussion of student seating in the Dean Dome. To make the most effective argument possible, you should consider not only what students would say about seating but also what alumni who have paid a lot to get good seats might say.

You can generate counterarguments by asking yourself how someone who disagrees with you might respond to each of the points you’ve made or your position as a whole. If you can’t immediately imagine another position, here are some strategies to try:

• Do some research. It may seem to you that no one could possibly disagree with the position you are arguing, but someone probably has. For example, some people argue that a hotdog is a sandwich. If you are making an argument concerning, for example, the characteristics of an exceptional sandwich, you might want to see what some of these people have to say.
• Talk with a friend or with your teacher. Another person may be able to imagine counterarguments that haven’t occurred to you.
• Consider your conclusion or claim and the premises of your argument and imagine someone who denies each of them. For example, if you argued, “Cats make the best pets. This is because they are clean and independent,” you might imagine someone saying, “Cats do not make the best pets. They are dirty and needy.”

Once you have thought up some counterarguments, consider how you will respond to them—will you concede that your opponent has a point but explain why your audience should nonetheless accept your argument? Will you reject the counterargument and explain why it is mistaken? Either way, you will want to leave your reader with a sense that your argument is stronger than opposing arguments.

When you are summarizing opposing arguments, be charitable. Present each argument fairly and objectively, rather than trying to make it look foolish. You want to show that you have considered the many sides of the issue. If you simply attack or caricature your opponent (also referred to as presenting a “straw man”), you suggest that your argument is only capable of defeating an extremely weak adversary, which may undermine your argument rather than enhance it.

It is usually better to consider one or two serious counterarguments in some depth, rather than to give a long but superficial list of many different counterarguments and replies.

Be sure that your reply is consistent with your original argument. If considering a counterargument changes your position, you will need to go back and revise your original argument accordingly.

Audience is a very important consideration in argument. Take a look at our handout on audience . A lifetime of dealing with your family members has helped you figure out which arguments work best to persuade each of them. Maybe whining works with one parent, but the other will only accept cold, hard statistics. Your kid brother may listen only to the sound of money in his palm. It’s usually wise to think of your audience in an academic setting as someone who is perfectly smart but who doesn’t necessarily agree with you. You are not just expressing your opinion in an argument (“It’s true because I said so”), and in most cases your audience will know something about the subject at hand—so you will need sturdy proof. At the same time, do not think of your audience as capable of reading your mind. You have to come out and state both your claim and your evidence clearly. Do not assume that because the instructor knows the material, he or she understands what part of it you are using, what you think about it, and why you have taken the position you’ve chosen.

Critical reading

Critical reading is a big part of understanding argument. Although some of the material you read will be very persuasive, do not fall under the spell of the printed word as authority. Very few of your instructors think of the texts they assign as the last word on the subject. Remember that the author of every text has an agenda, something that he or she wants you to believe. This is OK—everything is written from someone’s perspective—but it’s a good thing to be aware of. For more information on objectivity and bias and on reading sources carefully, read our handouts on evaluating print sources and reading to write .

Take notes either in the margins of your source (if you are using a photocopy or your own book) or on a separate sheet as you read. Put away that highlighter! Simply highlighting a text is good for memorizing the main ideas in that text—it does not encourage critical reading. Part of your goal as a reader should be to put the author’s ideas in your own words. Then you can stop thinking of these ideas as facts and start thinking of them as arguments.

When you read, ask yourself questions like “What is the author trying to prove?” and “What is the author assuming I will agree with?” Do you agree with the author? Does the author adequately defend her argument? What kind of proof does she use? Is there something she leaves out that you would put in? Does putting it in hurt her argument? As you get used to reading critically, you will start to see the sometimes hidden agendas of other writers, and you can use this skill to improve your own ability to craft effective arguments.

Works consulted

We consulted these works while writing this handout. This is not a comprehensive list of resources on the handout’s topic, and we encourage you to do your own research to find additional publications. Please do not use this list as a model for the format of your own reference list, as it may not match the citation style you are using. For guidance on formatting citations, please see the UNC Libraries citation tutorial . We revise these tips periodically and welcome feedback.

Anson, Chris M., and Robert A. Schwegler. 2010. The Longman Handbook for Writers and Readers , 6th ed. New York: Longman.

Booth, Wayne C., Gregory G. Colomb, Joseph M. Williams, Joseph Bizup, and William T. FitzGerald. 2016. The Craft of Research , 4th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ede, Lisa. 2004. Work in Progress: A Guide to Academic Writing and Revising , 6th ed. Boston: Bedford/St Martin’s.

Gage, John T. 2005. The Shape of Reason: Argumentative Writing in College , 4th ed. New York: Longman.

Lunsford, Andrea A., and John J. Ruszkiewicz. 2016. Everything’s an Argument , 7th ed. Boston: Bedford/St Martin’s.

Rosen, Leonard J., and Laurence Behrens. 2003. The Allyn & Bacon Handbook , 5th ed. New York: Longman.

You may reproduce it for non-commercial use if you use the entire handout and attribute the source: The Writing Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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• Knowledge Base
• How to write an argumentative essay | Examples & tips

How to Write an Argumentative Essay | Examples & Tips

Published on July 24, 2020 by Jack Caulfield . Revised on July 23, 2023.

An argumentative essay expresses an extended argument for a particular thesis statement . The author takes a clearly defined stance on their subject and builds up an evidence-based case for it.

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Table of contents

When do you write an argumentative essay, approaches to argumentative essays, introducing your argument, the body: developing your argument, concluding your argument, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about argumentative essays.

You might be assigned an argumentative essay as a writing exercise in high school or in a composition class. The prompt will often ask you to argue for one of two positions, and may include terms like “argue” or “argument.” It will frequently take the form of a question.

The prompt may also be more open-ended in terms of the possible arguments you could make.

Argumentative writing at college level

At university, the vast majority of essays or papers you write will involve some form of argumentation. For example, both rhetorical analysis and literary analysis essays involve making arguments about texts.

In this context, you won’t necessarily be told to write an argumentative essay—but making an evidence-based argument is an essential goal of most academic writing, and this should be your default approach unless you’re told otherwise.

Examples of argumentative essay prompts

At a university level, all the prompts below imply an argumentative essay as the appropriate response.

Your research should lead you to develop a specific position on the topic. The essay then argues for that position and aims to convince the reader by presenting your evidence, evaluation and analysis.

• Don’t just list all the effects you can think of.
• Do develop a focused argument about the overall effect and why it matters, backed up by evidence from sources.
• Don’t just provide a selection of data on the measures’ effectiveness.
• Do build up your own argument about which kinds of measures have been most or least effective, and why.
• Don’t just analyze a random selection of doppelgänger characters.
• Do form an argument about specific texts, comparing and contrasting how they express their thematic concerns through doppelgänger characters.

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An argumentative essay should be objective in its approach; your arguments should rely on logic and evidence, not on exaggeration or appeals to emotion.

There are many possible approaches to argumentative essays, but there are two common models that can help you start outlining your arguments: The Toulmin model and the Rogerian model.

Toulmin arguments

The Toulmin model consists of four steps, which may be repeated as many times as necessary for the argument:

• Make a claim
• Provide the grounds (evidence) for the claim
• Explain the warrant (how the grounds support the claim)
• Discuss possible rebuttals to the claim, identifying the limits of the argument and showing that you have considered alternative perspectives

The Toulmin model is a common approach in academic essays. You don’t have to use these specific terms (grounds, warrants, rebuttals), but establishing a clear connection between your claims and the evidence supporting them is crucial in an argumentative essay.

Say you’re making an argument about the effectiveness of workplace anti-discrimination measures. You might:

• Claim that unconscious bias training does not have the desired results, and resources would be better spent on other approaches
• Cite data to support your claim
• Explain how the data indicates that the method is ineffective
• Anticipate objections to your claim based on other data, indicating whether these objections are valid, and if not, why not.

Rogerian arguments

The Rogerian model also consists of four steps you might repeat throughout your essay:

• Discuss what the opposing position gets right and why people might hold this position
• Highlight the problems with this position
• Present your own position , showing how it addresses these problems
• Suggest a possible compromise —what elements of your position would proponents of the opposing position benefit from adopting?

This model builds up a clear picture of both sides of an argument and seeks a compromise. It is particularly useful when people tend to disagree strongly on the issue discussed, allowing you to approach opposing arguments in good faith.

Say you want to argue that the internet has had a positive impact on education. You might:

• Acknowledge that students rely too much on websites like Wikipedia
• Argue that teachers view Wikipedia as more unreliable than it really is
• Suggest that Wikipedia’s system of citations can actually teach students about referencing
• Suggest critical engagement with Wikipedia as a possible assignment for teachers who are skeptical of its usefulness.

You don’t necessarily have to pick one of these models—you may even use elements of both in different parts of your essay—but it’s worth considering them if you struggle to structure your arguments.

Regardless of which approach you take, your essay should always be structured using an introduction , a body , and a conclusion .

Like other academic essays, an argumentative essay begins with an introduction . The introduction serves to capture the reader’s interest, provide background information, present your thesis statement , and (in longer essays) to summarize the structure of the body.

Hover over different parts of the example below to see how a typical introduction works.

The spread of the internet has had a world-changing effect, not least on the world of education. The use of the internet in academic contexts is on the rise, and its role in learning is hotly debated. For many teachers who did not grow up with this technology, its effects seem alarming and potentially harmful. This concern, while understandable, is misguided. The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its critical benefits for students and educators—as a uniquely comprehensive and accessible information source; a means of exposure to and engagement with different perspectives; and a highly flexible learning environment.

The body of an argumentative essay is where you develop your arguments in detail. Here you’ll present evidence, analysis, and reasoning to convince the reader that your thesis statement is true.

In the standard five-paragraph format for short essays, the body takes up three of your five paragraphs. In longer essays, it will be more paragraphs, and might be divided into sections with headings.

Each paragraph covers its own topic, introduced with a topic sentence . Each of these topics must contribute to your overall argument; don’t include irrelevant information.

This example paragraph takes a Rogerian approach: It first acknowledges the merits of the opposing position and then highlights problems with that position.

Hover over different parts of the example to see how a body paragraph is constructed.

A common frustration for teachers is students’ use of Wikipedia as a source in their writing. Its prevalence among students is not exaggerated; a survey found that the vast majority of the students surveyed used Wikipedia (Head & Eisenberg, 2010). An article in The Guardian stresses a common objection to its use: “a reliance on Wikipedia can discourage students from engaging with genuine academic writing” (Coomer, 2013). Teachers are clearly not mistaken in viewing Wikipedia usage as ubiquitous among their students; but the claim that it discourages engagement with academic sources requires further investigation. This point is treated as self-evident by many teachers, but Wikipedia itself explicitly encourages students to look into other sources. Its articles often provide references to academic publications and include warning notes where citations are missing; the site’s own guidelines for research make clear that it should be used as a starting point, emphasizing that users should always “read the references and check whether they really do support what the article says” (“Wikipedia:Researching with Wikipedia,” 2020). Indeed, for many students, Wikipedia is their first encounter with the concepts of citation and referencing. The use of Wikipedia therefore has a positive side that merits deeper consideration than it often receives.

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An argumentative essay ends with a conclusion that summarizes and reflects on the arguments made in the body.

No new arguments or evidence appear here, but in longer essays you may discuss the strengths and weaknesses of your argument and suggest topics for future research. In all conclusions, you should stress the relevance and importance of your argument.

Hover over the following example to see the typical elements of a conclusion.

The internet has had a major positive impact on the world of education; occasional pitfalls aside, its value is evident in numerous applications. The future of teaching lies in the possibilities the internet opens up for communication, research, and interactivity. As the popularity of distance learning shows, students value the flexibility and accessibility offered by digital education, and educators should fully embrace these advantages. The internet’s dangers, real and imaginary, have been documented exhaustively by skeptics, but the internet is here to stay; it is time to focus seriously on its potential for good.

If you want to know more about AI tools , college essays , or fallacies make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples or go directly to our tools!

• Ad hominem fallacy
• Post hoc fallacy
• Appeal to authority fallacy
• False cause fallacy
• Sunk cost fallacy

College essays

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• Write a College Essay
• Write a Diversity Essay
• College Essay Format & Structure
• Comparing and Contrasting in an Essay

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An argumentative essay tends to be a longer essay involving independent research, and aims to make an original argument about a topic. Its thesis statement makes a contentious claim that must be supported in an objective, evidence-based way.

An expository essay also aims to be objective, but it doesn’t have to make an original argument. Rather, it aims to explain something (e.g., a process or idea) in a clear, concise way. Expository essays are often shorter assignments and rely less on research.

At college level, you must properly cite your sources in all essays , research papers , and other academic texts (except exams and in-class exercises).

Add a citation whenever you quote , paraphrase , or summarize information or ideas from a source. You should also give full source details in a bibliography or reference list at the end of your text.

The exact format of your citations depends on which citation style you are instructed to use. The most common styles are APA , MLA , and Chicago .

The majority of the essays written at university are some sort of argumentative essay . Unless otherwise specified, you can assume that the goal of any essay you’re asked to write is argumentative: To convince the reader of your position using evidence and reasoning.

In composition classes you might be given assignments that specifically test your ability to write an argumentative essay. Look out for prompts including instructions like “argue,” “assess,” or “discuss” to see if this is the goal.

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What Is an Argument?

Understanding Premises, Inferences, and Conclusions

• Philosophical Theories & Ideas
• Major Philosophers
• M.A., Princeton University
• B.A., University of Pennsylvania

When people create and critique arguments, it's helpful to understand what an argument is and is not. Sometimes an argument is seen as a verbal fight, but that is not what is meant in these discussions. Sometimes a person thinks they are offering an argument when they are only providing assertions.

Perhaps the simplest explanation of what an argument is comes from Monty Python’s "Argument Clinic" sketch:

• An argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a definite proposition. ...an argument is an intellectual process... contradiction is just the automatic gainsaying of anything the other person says.

This may have been a comedy sketch, but it highlights a common misunderstanding: to offer an argument, you cannot simply make a claim or gainsay what others claim.

An argument is a deliberate attempt to move beyond just making an assertion. When offering an argument, you are offering a series of related statements which represent an attempt to support that assertion — to give others good reasons to believe that what you are asserting is true rather than false.

Here are examples of assertions:

1. Shakespeare wrote the play Hamlet . 2. The Civil War was caused by disagreements over slavery. 3. God exists. 4. Prostitution is immoral.

Sometimes you hear such statements referred to as propositions . Technically speaking, a proposition is the informational content of any statement or assertion. To qualify as a proposition, a statement must be capable of being either true or false.

What Makes a Successful Argument?

The above represent positions people hold, but which others may disagree with. Merely making the above statements do not constitute an argument, no matter how often one repeats the assertions. To create an argument, the person making the claims must offer further statements which, at least in theory, support the claims. If the claim is supported, the argument is successful; if the claim is not supported, the argument fails.

This is the purpose of an argument: to offer reasons and evidence for the purpose of establishing the truth value of a proposition, which can mean either establishing that the proposition is true or establishing that the proposition is false. If a series of statements does not do this, it isn’t an argument.

Three Parts of an Argument

Another aspect of understanding arguments is to examine the parts. An argument can be broken down into three major components: premises , inferences , and a conclusion .

Premises are statements of (assumed) fact which are supposed to set forth the reasons and/or evidence for believing a claim. The claim, in turn, is the conclusion: what you finish with at the end of an argument. When an argument is simple, you may just have a couple of premises and a conclusion:

1. Doctors earn a lot of money. (premise) 2. I want to earn a lot of money. (premise) 3. I should become a doctor. (conclusion)

Inferences are the reasoning parts of an argument. Conclusions are a type of inference, but always the final inference. Usually, an argument will be complicated enough to require inferences linking the premises with the final conclusion:

1. Doctors earn a lot of money. (premise) 2. With a lot of money, a person can travel a lot. (premise) 3. Doctors can travel a lot. (inference, from 1 and 2) 4. I want to travel a lot. (premise) 5. I should become a doctor. (from 3 and 4)

Here we see two different types of claims which can occur in an argument. The first is a factual claim, and this purports to offer evidence. The first two premises above are factual claims and usually, not much time is spent on them — either they are true or they are not.

The second type is an inferential claim — it expresses the idea that some matter of fact is related to the sought-after conclusion. This is the attempt to link the factual claim to the conclusion in such a way as to support the conclusion. The third statement above is an inferential claim because it infers from the previous two statements that doctors can travel a lot.

Without an inferential claim, there would be no clear connection between the premises and the conclusion. It is rare to have an argument where inferential claims play no role. Sometimes you will come across an argument where inferential claims are needed, but missing — you won’t be able to see the connection from factual claims to a conclusion and will have to ask for them.

Assuming such inferential claims really are there, you will be spending most of your time on them when evaluating and critiquing an argument. If the factual claims are true, it is with the inferences that an argument will stand or fall, and it is here where you will find fallacies committed.

Unfortunately, most arguments aren’t presented in such a logical and clear manner as the above examples, making them difficult to decipher sometimes. But every argument which really is an argument should be capable of being reformulated in such a manner. If you cannot do that, then it is reasonable to suspect that something is wrong.

• How Logical Fallacy Invalidates Any Argument
• Appeal to Force/Fear or Argumentum ad Baculum
• Quoting Out of Context Fallacy
• Oversimplification and Exaggeration Fallacies
• Fallacies of Relevance: Appeal to Authority
• What Is the Fallacy of Division?
• The Slave Boy Experiment in Plato's 'Meno'
• Logical Fallacies: Begging the Question
• False Dilemma Fallacy
• Hard Determinism Explained
• What Is Ethical Egoism?
• What Is the Fallacy of Composition?
• How to Prove an Argument Invalid by a Counterexample
• Summary and Analysis of Meno by Plato
• Suppressed Evidence Fallacy
• 5 Good Reasons to Study Logic

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

Part One: Reasoning and Arguments

Chapter Two: What Makes an Argument?

“An argument isn’t just contradiction.” “Can be.” “No it can’t. An argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition.” “No it isn’t.” “Yes it is.” —Monty Python, The Argument Clinic

• Statements: The Building Blocks of Arguments
• Statements That Offer a Reason for Belief
• Statements That Do Not Offer a Reason for Belief
• Implicit Statements
• Complex Arguments

The goal of this chapter is to look closely at arguments so that you will be able to identify them and to pick out their premises and conclusions. As we saw in Chapter 1, arguments are models of reasoning that allow reasoning to be examined and evaluated. They are important because good reasoning is the way to get good answers to the questions you care about.

According to the definition provided in Chapter 1, an argument is a series of statements in which at least one of the statements is offered as reason for belief in another. This definition applies to a simple argument ; later in this chapter we will cover complex arguments, which link simple arguments together into chains.

Any statement, whether explicit or implicit, that is offered as a reason is a premise (sometimes spelled premiss by the British). As we saw in Chapter 1, we can also refer to premises as evidence, warrant, justification, basis, grounds, or rationale. The statement for which the reason is offered is the conclusion . There must be at least one premise (but there is no upper limit) and, in a simple argument, there is exactly one conclusion. [1]

Let’s look more carefully at two pieces of the definition: what statements are, and what it is to offer a reason for belief.

2.1 STATEMENTS: THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF ARGUMENTS

Statements are sentences that can be true or false. [2] Most of the sentences in this book and most of the sentences you speak are statements. Here are two concrete examples:

Eleanor Roosevelt was one of the most prominent first ladies in history. A water molecule is made up of two hydrogen and two oxygen atoms.

Both of these statements can be true or false. The first is true, while the second is false.

The following four sentences do not count as statements for our purposes:

Oh, to be at the beach this afternoon! Speak into the microphone. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist party? I promise to return the money on Tuesday.

Read each of these and ask yourself if it is true or false. You will see that they aren’t quite like the sentences about water molecules and Eleanor Roosevelt. The first of the four can be sincere or insincere; the second can be obeyed or disobeyed; the third can be answered yes or no; and the fourth can be kept or broken. But none of them can be true or false.

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (a)

For each of these four nonstatements, create a new sentence at least loosely about the same topic that is a statement. (There could be many correct answers for each sentence.)

Sample exercise. Oh, to be at the beach this afternoon!

Sample answer. The beach will be crowded this afternoon.

Oh, to be at the beach this afternoon!

Speak into the microphone.

Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist party?

• I promise to return the money on Tuesday.

2.1.1 The Form and the Function of Statements and Other Sentences

Statements typically exhibit a certain form. The usual form of a statement includes a subject—such as water molecule —and a property, or a trait, attributed to that subject—such as being made up of two hydrogen and two oxygen atoms. (More rarely, statements assert an identity instead of attributing a property; that is, they assert that two different names pick out the same thing, as in the sentence Santa Claus is St. Nick. )

Statements, in addition, fulfill a certain function, namely the declarative function of conveying information. The statement Eleanor Roosevelt was one of the most prominent first ladies in history conveys information about a historical figure; as noted above, we can usually evaluate this information, depending on our store of knowledge or our commitment to researching it, as either true or false.

Sentences that are not statements serve a wide variety of other nondeclarative functions. Some sentences are exclamatory —that is, they function to express strong and sudden emotion, as in the sentence:

Some sentences are imperative —that is, they direct others to action. The following sentence is imperative:

Others are interrogative —that is, they serve to ask a question. Consider, for example, the following:

Still other sentences serve a performative function; by asserting certain things under the right circumstances, they enable you thereby to do, or perform, those things. Examples include:

I promise to return the money on Tuesday. I resign from this committee. I apologize for what I said. I categorically deny all allegations.

A single sentence can serve more than one function. This means that a sentence not in the form of a statement might nevertheless function as a statement. Note the following question:

Don’t you know that I love you?

It is not in the form of a statement, but of a question—its form, then is interrogative, not declarative. But in the right circumstances it can function both to ask and to tell. So it not only serves its explicit interrogative function, but it also serves a declarative function—that is, it also functions as a statement.

Here is a sentence that might be thought to serve all five functions:

For the last time I ask you to tell me your name!

On a fairly generous interpretation, you might find these functions:

Declarative, since it conveys the information that this is the last time. Exclamatory, since it expresses strong emotion—exasperation, to be specific. Imperative, since it directs another person to action. Interrogative, since it asks for your name. Performative, since by virtue of asserting “I ask,” I do ask.

Often you need to know more about the context to determine whether a sentence is serving as a statement. It is often necessary to see a larger section of the passage in which it is written, or to hear a larger part of the conversation in which it is spoken, or to know more in general about the circumstances surrounding the expression of the sentence. Suppose, for example, you are asked, Is the beach pleasant this afternoon? Some possible answers might be:

Oh, to be at the beach this afternoon! Is the beach pleasant this afternoon? Whatever you do, go to the beach this afternoon. Yes.

None of these sentences is cast in the form of a statement. And in other contexts each might function quite differently. In this context, however, each sentence is clearly intended to serve the same declarative function as the statement,

The beach is pleasant this afternoon.

For identifying arguments, what matters most is the function served by the sentences; so, in defining an argument as a series of statements, the term statement is meant to include sentences that function declaratively, whether they take that form or not.

Five Functions Served by Sentences

• Declarative —conveys information.
• Exclamatory —expresses emotion.
• Imperative —directs others to action.
• Interrogative —asks a question.
• Performative —does things by virtue of saying them.

Only those sentences serving a declarative function count as statements.

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (b)

Identify the form and function of each of the sentences below. Where you can see more than one function, briefly explain each. Assume there is nothing unusual about the context.

Sample exercise. Please remember that this is a sonata for piano, not pianist.

—Mieczyslaw Horszowksi, rebuking one of his students.

Sample answer. Form is imperative. Function is imperative (telling to remember) and declarative (giving information about playing it).

• Didn’t you hear that class was canceled?
• I now pronounce you man and wife.
• How could he say that and expect us to believe him?
• Hooray for the Tigers!
• We ask that you keep your personal items below your seats during take-off.
• “Why don’t you just stop annoying people,” —George Bailey in It’s a Wonderful Life
• “This is the best story ever written.” —W.H.D. Rouse, in his preface to Homer’s Odyssey
• “All the news that’s fit to print.” —slogan of the New York Times
•  “Don’t live life without it.” —slogan of American Express
• “To succeed in this world, you have to change all the time.” —Sam Walton, Sam Walton: Made in America

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (c)

( i ) Make up a sentence in each of these forms, then ( ii ) explain how it might be used to serve the declarative function.

Sample exercise. Performative.

Sample answer. ( i ) I promise to be home on time. ( ii ) Suppose you ask me, “Will you or will you not be home on time tonight?” I might reply “I promise to be home on time” in part to communicate the declarative I will be home on time.

• Interrogative
• Exclamatory
• Performative

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (d)

Consider the declarative sentence The price is too high. Provide four other sentences that are not in declarative form that serve the same declarative function. Use at least two different nondeclarative forms.

2.2 STATEMENTS THAT OFFER A REASON FOR BELIEF

2.2.1 the reason need not be good.

What matters in identifying an argument is not whether the premise succeeds in supporting the conclusion, but whether it is intended to support it—whether, as our definition puts it, a statement is offered as a reason to believe another statement. When the premise succeeds in supporting the conclusion, that can make it easier to see that it is an argument. But success is not what makes it an argument.

The story is told of a professor, walking across campus, who stops a student to ask, “Excuse me, in what direction am I headed?” When the bemused student replies, “North,” the professor smiles and says, “Ah, then I’ve had my lunch.” It is hard to see how the premise I am headed north supports the conclusion I have had my lunch, but he considers it a reason, and that makes the series of statements an argument.

Or consider the account of Denis Diderot, 18th century French intellectual and atheist, who in 1773 was staying at the Russian court in St. Petersburg, where he entertained and educated the nobility. Fearing that Diderot was undermining their religious faith, Catherine the Great commissioned Leonhard Euler, the most distinguished mathematician of the time, to debate him publicly. Euler, so the story goes, began with this argument.

A squared minus B squared equals A minus B times A plus B; therefore, God exists. Reply!

Diderot, we are told, left the court abruptly amid the laughter of the audience, confined himself to chambers, demanded safe conduct, and promptly returned to France. It is hard to see how Euler’s premise about A and B has any connection to the conclusion that God exists, but it is offered as a reason, and so we take the series of statements as an argument.

It may be that in the professor’s or Euler’s case there really is a worthwhile argument waiting to be appreciated once we figure out what the implicit premises are. Perhaps the professor’s routine is so invariable, and his autopilot so effective, that he feels confident in deducing his past action from his present direction. Perhaps Euler believes that mathematical truths cannot be true unless there is a God to make them true. But in other cases the argument is clearly beyond redemption. Members of the Israel Antiquities Authority were incensed when the Huntington Library in southern California decided to release to the public its photographs of the Dead Sea Scrolls, breaking the authority’s 40-year monopoly over the scrolls. The Los Angeles Times reports:

Bruce Zuckerman, the acting director of the Ancient Biblical Manuscript Center, said he was concerned that someone might depict the Dead Sea Scrolls on T-shirts. Because of such a disrespectful possibility, Zuckerman would preserve the secrecy imposed by the team of editors that has controlled access for the last 40 years.

Not only is the danger of disrespectful T-shirts a terrible reason for preserving secrecy (should we suppress photographs of Gandhi and Mother Theresa as well?), but also it is doubtful that it is Zuckerman’s real reason. Nevertheless, he offers it as a reason for believing his conclusion, and that is enough to count the series of statements as an argument.

2.2.2 Inference Indicators

Given the frequent absence of good reasons for belief, what tells us that an argument is even being offered? Perhaps the best sign of an argument is the presence of an inference indicator , a term that frequently signifies the presence of an inference —that is, of movement from premises to conclusion. (An old-fashioned word for inference indicator, illative, comes from a form of the Latin word for infer. )

Note this hasty bit of reasoning by Christopher Hitchens in Harper’s:

Since it is obviously inconceivable that all religions can be right, the most reasonable conclusion is that they are all wrong.

The highlighted terms suggest that a reason for belief is being offered, and they help us to figure out where the premise is (after the word since ) and where the conclusion is (after the words the . . . conclusion is ).

Some other inference indicators that introduce a premise are highlighted in the sentences below:

Since you said it, it must be true. Because he is being so sweet, you know he’s about to ask for money. Spring is coming early, for the crocuses are already in bloom. I can tell that she will accept the job offer; my reason is that I heard her talking to a moving company yesterday. I think that the butler did it, on account of his fingerprints on the weapon.

A common pitfall in identifying indicators is to suppose that if is an inference indicator that introduces a premise. Suppose, for example, I say,

If the Dow Jones Industrial Average doubles this week, then you will be rich.

This looks a bit like an argument in which the premise is The Dow Jones Industrial Average doubles this week and the conclusion is You will be rich. But this argument— You will be rich, because the Dow Jones Industrial Average will double this week —expresses much more confidence about your imminent wealth than the sentence If the Dow Jones Industrial Average doubles this week, then you will be rich. Premises are held to be true by the arguer. But an arguer who uses if is not asserting that what comes between if and then is true but is only asking us to suppose for the moment that it is true. I am not offering you a reason to believe you will be rich (unless in a separate sentence, I do, without the if, state that the Dow will double this week). It is true that if – then statements do occur often in arguments (Chapter 11 is devoted to such arguments), but these statements can be either premises or conclusions. So, if is not useful as an inference indicator that introduces a premise.

The following are examples of inference indicators that introduce the conclusion:

You said it, therefore it must be true. He is being sweet; thus, you know he’s about to ask for money. The crocuses are already in bloom; consequently, spring is coming early. I heard her talking to a moving company yesterday; it follows that she will accept the job offer. These are the butler’s fingerprints; hence the butler did it.

In addition, two old-fashioned inference indicators are left over from the days when Latin was the dominant European academic language. Ergo is the Latin term for therefore, as in the sentence You said it, ergo it must be true.  And Q.E.D. is the acronym for the Latin phrase quod erat demonstrandum (or, which was to be demonstrated ); it is placed after the conclusion, as in, You said it. It is true. Q.E.D.

The list of inference indicators is seemingly endless; we have covered only a few of the most common ones. Note a less conventional one in this statement:

Rastafarians smoke the herb “ganga” or marijuana as part of their religious rites, citing Psalms 104:14: “He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man.”

Citing is the inference indicator here. What we cite is typically support, so the term indicates that the premise is coming up—the premise (true or false) that the Bible approves of the use of marijuana.

Some Inference Indicators

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (e)

Construct a simple argument using each of the following inference indicators. State in each case whether it introduces a premise or a conclusion.

Sample exercise. is confirmed by.

Sample answer. That he is impractical is confirmed by the fact that he never bought car insurance. (It introduces a premise.)

• it follows that
• the justification is
• on account of

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (f)

Identify the inference indicator in each of the following short passages and state whether it introduces the premise or the conclusion. Two of the passages do not have an inference indicator (these two are not arguments). Identify them as well.

Sample exercise. “I do not want war, but if it is forced upon me I will win because I have always won.” —Napoleon to the Russian ambassador

Sample answer. Because; introduces the premise.

• The gauge is low, so we’re low on gas.
• My sense that he doesn’t like me was confirmed by his refusal to talk to me at the party.
• The way he is dragging his feet shows that he isn’t in very good shape.
• The recent crime statistics in the newspaper are my reason for believing that my neighborhood is safe.
• Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me so.
• The church-burnings are intended to cripple the spiritual lives of thousands of blacks. But amid the destruction they persist, showing that a church exists in its people, not in a wooden frame or pulpit.
• “The saddening syllogism of Marshall Herff Applewhite and his followers seems to have gone like this: we think that an alien spaceship is trailing the comet; observation through a capable telescope shows no such spaceship; therefore, let’s get rid of the telescope.” — New Yorker
• “Because normal two- to four-celled embryos have no differentiated organs or nervous systems, they cannot be harmed by cloning or other research manipulations.” —John Robertson, Chronicle of Higher Education
• “Still obsessed by thoughts of death, I brood constantly. I keep wondering if there is an afterlife, and if there is will they be able to break a twenty.” —Woody Allen, Without Feathers
• “If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe.” —Lord Salisbury, at the end of the 19th century
• “Fiercer far than the light which beats upon a throne is the light which beats on a presidential candidate, searching out all the recesses of his past life. Hence, when the choice is between a brilliant man and a safe man, the safe man is preferred.” —James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 1888
• When asked how he could justify getting confessed murderers off, Texas criminal lawyer Percy Foreman said, in his rolling tones, “Mah fees are their punishment.” —Henry Rothblatt, That Damned Lawyer

2.2.3 When There Are No Inference Indicators

Arguers don’t always supply inference indicators to help you find your way around. This leaves you in the dark if the logic of the argument is bad—that is, if there is no plausible connection between premises and conclusion. But otherwise, you should still be able to make your way.

Bernie Smith, a train buff who manages a model railroad store in Kansas City, was asked about the possibility that cabooses might be eliminated from trains for economic reasons. He offered this argument:

I think they should keep the cabooses. What’s a train without a caboose? People are used to seeing a red caboose tagged on the end and someone waving at them.

Without inference indicators in Bernie Smith’s argument, how are you to find the premises and conclusion?

Here is a helpful, but not foolproof, suggestion. In the absence of inference indicators look for the most controversial statement in the argument; it is usually the conclusion. Then test it out either mentally or on a piece of paper by placing the word therefore in front of the statement. If it sounds right in this form, you’ve found the conclusion. This often works because arguments typically use the familiar as grounds for accepting the new. Premises are usually easier to accept than the conclusion, since the premises are not supposed to be what is in question; the conclusion is. The conclusion, presumably, becomes plausible because it follows from the already plausible premises.

This technique is easy to apply to Bernie Smith’s argument. There’s nothing surprising about this statement:

People are used to seeing a caboose at the end of the train.

But this one is less obviously true:

They should keep the cabooses.

And it sounds right if we insert therefore in front of it; it, then, is the conclusion.

Here’s another argument with no inference indicator, provided by an aide to the astronaut and American hero John Glenn when Glenn was running for president. The aide, speaking anonymously to reporter Morton Kondracke about whether Glenn would make a good president, said this:

It’s great to have Glenn with you. He’s indefatigable when he homes in on one issue. But he doesn’t see the forest or even the trees, only branches and twigs. He’s a responder and not a leader. He has no coherent vision. He would be a symbol, not a man of substance. He would not be a good president.

Our technique of looking for the most controversial statement is not as useful here. Because we have no knowledge of Glenn’s political capability, it is hard to tell whether any of the statements is substantially more controversial than the others. But arguments, as already noted, often occur in the context of answering questions. This suggests another technique: look in the wider context for the question being asked; the argument’s conclusion is usually a proposed answer to that question. In this case, the wider context is a media interview in which the aide was asked whether he believed that Glenn would be a good president. Glenn’s aide is giving reasons for his answer:

John Glenn would not be a good president.

And, again, inserting therefore in front of it does sound right. That statement is the conclusion.

Notice that the conclusion is the first sentence in the caboose example; in the John Glenn example, it is the last. First and last are the two places where a conclusion is most likely to be found, though it could, in principle, be found anywhere.

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (g)

For each argument below, identify the conclusion. If there are inference indicators, identify them, and state whether they introduce premises or conclusions.

Sample exercise. Definitions cannot, by their very nature, be either true or false, only more useful or less so. For this reason it makes relatively little sense to argue over definitions. —Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy

Sample answer. Conclusion: It makes relatively little sense to argue over definitions. Inference indicator: for this reason (referring to the reason that has just been given), introduces the conclusion.

• You aren’t my real mother. Documents in the Hall of Records show that I was adopted.
• Everybody expects the band to come back on stage for an encore, since in their other concerts they have always saved their old hits for the finale.
• I’m sick of hearing my friends telling me to get a life and to spend my time somewhere besides escape rooms. Hey, I have a life. As long as I’m living, I have a life.
• What’s that shimmering on the highway? Well, there is no water in this desert. It’s got to be a mirage.
• Dade County, which includes Miami, is the best place in America to be a criminal. It has the nation’s worst crime rate and does the laziest job of putting criminals behind bars. — Miami Herald
• “We’re waste managers,” said the CEO of Chem Waste. “So, if the business moves to more services and processing, we’ll move with it.” — Forbes
• Those who oppose euthanasia buttress their case by pointing to the rare patients that have been given up for dead but inexplicably survived. — U.S. News and World Report (Note that this passage contains an argument, but does not advocate it—it merely reports on it.)
• “We are describing the first one of a new phylum,” Higgins says. “If Loricifera is not a new phylum, then it must be assigned elsewhere, and there is no satisfactory elsewhere for it.” — Science News
• “I believe in turning our attention to things of importance—to questions that may by some possibility be solved. It is of no importance to me whether God exists or not. I exist, and it is important to me to be happy while I exist. Therefore, I had better turn my attention to finding out the secret of happiness, instead of trying to ascertain the secret of the universe.” —Robert Ingersoll, Ingersoll: Immortal Infidel
• “I believe there will be a new crusade with Jesus Christ as the commander-in-chief who will bring our nation back to greatness,” he continued. Wickstrom, head of the fundamentalist and paramilitary group Posse Comitatus, went on to say that the targets of the crusade would be Jews, “so they better get the hell down to Brazil or anywhere else that will have them.” — Los Angeles Times

2.3 STATEMENTS THAT DO NOT OFFER A REASON FOR BELIEF

Now that we have determined what it is that makes an argument, let’s look at a few things that do not. We will here rule out three of the many kinds of statements that sometimes look as though they may be arguments, but are not: mere assertions, mere illustrations, and mere explanations.

2.3.1 Mere Assertions

Arguments are probably far more common than you have previously thought, but you should not expect now to find arguments in everything you hear or read. Most forms of communication are in part an attempt to influence beliefs, but they do not always use arguments to do so, nor should they. A journalist, for example, is not typically expected to argue that unemployment is down; a teacher does not normally argue that agricola is the Latin word for farmer; and I need not argue that I was born in California and did most of my growing up in Georgia. Merely asserting such things—just saying them—is usually good enough to get others to believe them.

In other cases, however, ideas are asserted without reasons—sometimes with great fervor—and it isn’t good enough. Note this passage from a speech by Robert Ingersoll, 19th century American orator and lawyer:

I do believe in the nobility of human nature. I believe in love and home, kindness and humanity. I believe in good fellowship and cheerfulness, in making wife and children happy. I believe in good nature, in giving to others all of the rights that you claim for yourself. I believe in free thought, in reason, observation, and experience. I believe in self-reliance and in expressing your honest thought. . . . Above all, I believe in liberty.

There is no argument here, no reason offered in support of the beliefs Ingersoll expresses. This does not mean that his beliefs are immune from evaluation; as we will see in Chapter 9, there is much to be said about how to evaluate statements that are not themselves argued for. But they are not to be evaluated as arguments.

2.3.2 Mere Illustrations

Passages intended merely to illustrate a point might also look a bit like arguments. But they would normally be bad arguments; and, as we will see in the discussion of the principle of charity in Chapter 3, it is usually preferable to take them as good illustrations rather than as bad arguments. There are usually clues to mere illustrations, such as for example, for instance, and is illustrated by. I am providing a verbal picture, not making an argument, if I say, “Charlie Parker is a good example of the fine line between artistic genius and insanity.” Similarly, Mark Twain provides us with this in Pudd’nhead Wilson:

There is no character, howsoever good and fine, but it can be destroyed by ridicule, howsoever poor and witless. Observe the ass, for instance: his character is about perfect, he is the choicest spirit among all the humbler animals, yet see what ridicule has brought him to. Instead of feeling complimented when we are called an ass, we are left in doubt.

The ass is not trotted out as reason to believe the first sentence, but as a way of making its point more vivid. It is better to take the passage merely as an illustration, not as an argument. As the old Yiddish saying puts it, “ For example is no proof.”

The distinction between mere illustration and argument is not always clear-cut. Suppose you overhear this remark:

White Southerners are racists. Take David Duke.

Is this an argument, generalizing from a premise about a single case, David Duke, to a conclusion about an entire population, white Southerners (an important sort of argument called inductive generalization that will be covered later in the book)? Or is it merely an illustration? There is no clear way in this case to tell. You could probably tell if you heard more of the conversation. If the listener, for example, had just said, “I don’t understand exactly what you mean. What sort of racism do you have in mind?” then it is clearly an illustration. But if the listener had just said, “Why should I accept such a sweeping indictment of a huge part of our population?” then it is clearly an argument. For this would make it clear that the speaker is offering a reason for belief.

2.3.3 Mere Explanations

Often reasons are given to provide a causal explanation of some state of affairs, not to offer reason for belief in some statement. If I point to my watch and angrily say, “Because you couldn’t read the darn map, we’re going to be late ,” my statement is not providing a reason to believe we are late; we both already know that. I’m merely identifying the cause of our being late. Consider this explanation:

In the 19th century, British jurists sought to modify the laws permitting a husband to “chastise his wife with any reasonable instrument” by dictating that the instrument be “a rod not thicker than his thumb.” Hence the rule of thumb.

This passage points to the cause behind the existence of the phrase rule of thumb. It does not offer a reason to believe that such a phrase exists; it is a commonly used phrase and no fluent English speaker doubts its existence. The first sentence of the passage is not a premise; it refers to a cause. And the second sentence is not the conclusion; it refers to the effect. The passage is not an argument; it is a mere causal explanation.

Terms that serve as inference indicators can also occur in mere explanations (where they are no longer inference indicators). So and hence, for instance, are used in the two preceding examples not to indicate movement from premise to conclusion, but movement from cause to effect. The same goes for inference indicators that typically introduce premises. A psychologist, for example, asks this on a talk show:

Did you ever wonder why people are more likely to laugh out loud when they are with others than when they are alone? Because, among other things, laughing announces “I got it,” and in an empty room, they’d be announcing to nobody.

The psychologist is not providing us with a reason to believe that we more readily laugh out loud when we are with others; he assumes that we already know it or that we’ll recognize it by reflecting briefly on our own experience. When we do realize it, it strikes us as curious. Why would it make any difference whether the room is empty or not? This leads to the explanation offered in the passage, with because used to introduce a cause—the fact that laughter functions as a signal to others that a joke has been understood—not a premise.

There is one way in which premises in arguments are sometimes the opposite of the causes in mere causal explanations. In arguments, recall, the movement from premises to conclusion is typically from the familiar to the new. But in mere explanations, the movement from cause to effect is often from the new to the familiar— from, for example, the surprising and unfamiliar origin of a phrase in British law (the cause) to the well-known everyday phrase rule of thumb (the effect).

Some Attempts to Influence Beliefs That Are Not Arguments

• Mere assertions
• Mere illustrations
• Mere explanations

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (h)

None of the passages below is an argument. Study each one, satisfy yourself that it is not an argument, and state which of the three it is: mere assertion, mere illustration, or mere explanation.

Sample exercise. “A recent report in Advertising Age tells how English-speaking visitors to Tokyo are amused by Pocket Wetty premoistened towelettes, Green Piles lawn fertilizer, Cow Brand shampoo, Shot Vision television sets, Kitchy soup mix, More Ran tea cakes, Trim Pecker trousers, and Creap, an artificial coffee creamer. Calpis is not bovine urine, but a soft drink. Nail Remover is actually a fingernail cleaner. The reason for the odd names is usually a lack of marketing research.” — Psychology Today

Sample answer. Mere explanation.

• The car wouldn’t start because it was out of gas.
• The first company to market a new product isn’t always the company that makes all the money. Kodak, for example, was first with digital photography.
• Year in and year out, the people who succeed are those who work the hardest, regardless of their talent. I urge this view upon you with all of my heart.
• “When a given name is in the long form, it is often set aside in social use for a less proper version, but it is rare that someone legally named Frank will go around calling himself Francis. This illustrates that formal names are often the starting point for shorter forms, but the reverse is not true.” —Daniel Dorff, Verbatim
• “Question to the UCLA Chancellor: The conference Board of Associated Research Councils has recently released its survey results which ranked UCLA in the top five universities in the country. What factors do you think contribute to this kind of academic success? Answer: The basic reason is the quality of the faculty. It is also a tribute to the support that the University has been given by the state of California, the people of California, and the Los Angeles community. This support has provided increased research teaching opportunities and facilities.” — UCLA Monthly
• “I don’t like depressing pictures. I don’t like pestholes. I don’t like pictures that are dirty. I don’t ever go out and pay money for studies in abnormality. I don’t have depressed moods and I don’t want to have any. I’m just happy, very happy.” —Walt Disney
• “As a general rule, when the truth of a theory is judged not with reference to the facts but according to the state of mind of some unique figure of authority, then what you have is not a discipline but a cult. This kind of authority-based theorizing is what typically turns academic fields into swamps of self-referential babble that have no meaning for those on the outside.” —Matthew Stewart, The Management Myth
• “Our capacity for identification and sympathy goes out most readily to non-human characters. Think of Bambi or the Little Engine That Could. Melville intended Moby-Dick to be the symbol of universal evil, and instead we find ourselves rooting for him against one-legged Captain Ahab.” — New Yorker
• “I don’t know where the thought came from or how it struck me, yet all at once I said to myself, ‘But God doesn’t exist!’ It’s quite certain that before this I must have had new ideas about God and that I had begun solving the problem for myself. But still, as I remember very well, it was on that day and in the form of a momentary intuition, that I said to myself ‘God doesn’t exist.’ It’s striking to reflect that I thought this at the age of eleven and that I never asked myself the question again until today, that is to say for sixty years.” —Simone de Beauvoir quoting Jean Paul Sartre, Harpers
• “My pedagogy is hard. What is weak must be hammered away. In my fortresses of the Teutonic Order, a young generation will grow up before which the world will tremble. I want the young to be violent, domineering, undismayed, cruel. There must be nothing weak or gentle about them. The free, splendid beast of prey must once again flash from their eyes. I want my young people strong and beautiful.” —Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (i)

Take the topic of taxes and construct statements of the following sort.

Sample exercise. Mere explanation.

Sample answer. Because the politicians cannot control their spending, taxes have to go higher and higher.

• Mere assertion
• Mere illustration
• Mere explanation
• Simple argument

2.3.4 Arguments and Explanations Sometimes Overlap

As we have seen, any series of statements could potentially be used as an argument if at least one of the statements were offered as reason to believe another. So even a series of statements offered as a causal explanation could at the same time be used as an argument—and thus would no longer be a mere causal explanation. The cause could be the premise, or the cause could be the conclusion. There is nothing tricky to worry about. The standard rule continues to apply: a statement is the conclusion if a reason is being offered to believe it. And the tips for identifying it are no different: it is probably the conclusion if it answers the question being asked in the broader passage; if it is the least familiar, most controversial, of the statements; or if clear inference indicators point to it.

Here is an example of a cause as a conclusion from Alan Abelson, a financial reporter for Barron’s, written on one of his more lighthearted days:

Very often a company comes to market with an initial public offering, boasting a classy record of earnings growth. Then, the very next year, profits take a strange tumble. Obviously, logic impels us to the conclusion that the reason profits took a tumble was because the company went public.

There is clearly a causal explanation here; the tumble in profits (the effect) results from the company’s going public (the cause). But there is also an argument; note the clear inference indicator logic impels us to the conclusion that. The conclusion— Profits often fall because companies go public —includes the cause. And the premises include the effects— Profits often fall the year after companies go public. The effects, Abelson suggests, give us evidence of a particular cause. Arguments of this sort— explanatory arguments —are quite common and will be covered in depth in Chapter 16.

On the other hand, here is an example of a cause as a premise, found in Manage, a magazine geared toward business executives:

Today’s doctors tell us that a hearty laugh is great exercise. When you emit an explosive guffaw, they say, your diaphragm descends deep into your body and your lungs expand, greatly increasing the amount of oxygen being taken into them. At the same time, as it expands sideways, the diaphragm gives your heart a gentle, rhythmic massage. That noble organ responds by beating faster and harder. Circulation speeds up. Liver, stomach, pancreas, spleen and gall bladder are all stimulated—your entire system gets an invigorating lift. All of which confirms what that sage old Greek, Aristotle, said about laughter more than 2,000 years ago: “It is a bodily exercise precious to health.”

This argument offers a reason to believe the conclusion,

Laughing is good exercise.

Note the inference indicator confirms, which precedes the conclusion. But at the same time the premises offer a causal explanation—of what causes laughter to be good exercise. (Even, apparently, in an empty room.) So this passage serves both as argument and explanation, with premises doubling as causes and conclusion as effect.

Use of cause as premise is most obvious when the effect being explained is itself a belief. Suppose I say the following:

I believed it was murder because the coroner’s report said so.

In a case like this, there seems to be hardly any difference between saying that the coroner’s report caused me to believe it was murder and saying that the statement The coroner’s report said so serves as a premise for the statement It was murder. It is both an argument and a causal explanation. It would be quite a different matter had I said:

I believed that it was murder because my enemies put me under a magic spell.

This explains what caused the belief, but makes no mention of any reason I had for believing it (presumably I had no reason). So it is merely a causal explanation, not an argument.

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (j)

Determine whether each of the following includes an argument or is a mere explanation. Defend your answers.

Sample exercise. I saw him treat person after person with respect. That forced me to change my mind, and to believe that he was a decent person after all.

Sample answer. Includes an argument, since his treatment of others is cited as a reason to believe he is a decent person.

• Pushing this button causes that red light to flash.
• You can tell that pushing this button causes that red light to flash, since—look—it flashes every time I push the button, but otherwise it is unlit.
• What caused all the dominoes to fall down? Well, the first domino hit the second one, the second hit the third, and so on—thus, all the dominoes fell down.
• Why should I believe that all of the dominoes will fall down? Well, the first one will hit the second one, the second will hit the third, and so on—thus, all the dominoes will fall down.

2.4 Implicit Statements

This chapter expands on the definition of a simple argument as a series of statements in which one of the statements is offered as reason for belief in another. We have seen how sentences not cast in the declarative form can still function as statements, hence as building blocks of arguments. Sometimes, too, arguments rely on implicit statements , statements that are not spoken or written in any form but are implied or assumed. Note the following argument reported in the obituary of Roy Sullivan, who had killed himself with a shotgun:

Roy Sullivan, a retired forest ranger, was hit by lightning seven times and survived. He was baffled by his misfortune and speculated that the chemical makeup of his body in some way attracted lightning. “I don’t believe God is after me,” he told an interviewer. “If he was, the first bolt would have been enough.”

At the end of the passage, Sullivan offers an argument to rule out the explanation that God was after him. (Assume that he means what most people mean by God —that he is an all-powerful being.) His conclusion is this:

God is not after me.

And his stated reason—his premise—is this:

If God were after me, the first bolt of lightning would have killed me.

But there is another reason that must be combined with this one to get to the conclusion—an unexpressed and thus implicit premise—that Sullivan obviously assumes:

The first bolt of lightning did not kill me.

It would have been silly for him to state it—after all, Sullivan was alive when he offered the argument.

An arguer can have many reasons for leaving a premise or conclusion implicit. Sullivan’s is the most common one—he considers the premise so obvious that there is no need to express it, since it would be pedantic or insulting to do so. But this is not the only possible reason. The arguer may not have thought through the argument carefully enough to be aware of the assumption. Or the arguer, fully aware of the assumption, may be suppressing it to deceive you.

Burger King’s very first TV advertising campaign featured a jingle with these words:

The bigger the burger, the better the burger; the burgers are bigger at Burger King.

In this case it is the conclusion that is implicit:

The burgers are better at Burger King.

This is advertising, so a good guess is that a marketing motive lies behind it. Perhaps they think that if you help yourself to the conclusion, you’re more likely to help yourself to a Whopper.

An argument with an implicit premise or conclusion is called an enthymeme . (This word comes from the Greek roots en for in and thymos for internal urge ; an enthymeme, then, is an argument that leaves a premise or conclusion behind as the arguer’s mere unstated urge .) For the purpose of clarifying and evaluating, implicit statements should be considered just as much a part of an argument as explicit ones.

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (k)

Identify the implicit premise or conclusion in each of these arguments.

Sample exercise. “Every man who attacks my belief . . . makes me uneasy; and I am angry with him who makes me uneasy.” —spoken by Johnson in Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson

  Premise: Every man who attacks my belief . . . makes me uneasy.

  Premise: I am angry with him who makes me uneasy.

  Conclusion: ?

Sample answer. I am angry with anyone who attacks my belief.

Premise: The nicer the father the more generous the father should be with allowances.

Premise: You’re the nicest father I know.

Conclusion: ?

Premise: We’ve been waiting for a windy day to fly the kite.

Conclusion: We should go fly the kite right now.

Premise: Burlingham tore up the proof and threw it away.

Conclusion: Burlingham prevented the first story from being published.

Premise: The only reason Ford would invite Conable was if Ford was the new vice president.

Premise: Ford invited Conable.

Premise: Notated music can always be performed.

Conclusion: In a couple of hundred years, the music of Charles Ives and Aaron Copland—but probably not of the Ramones—will still be performed.

Premise: If George Allen were in his right mind, then he would retire.

Premise: George Allen did not retire.

Premise: : It would be wrong for Nixon to pay off the Watergate burglars.

Conclusion: Nixon did not pay off the Watergate burglars.

Premise: We cannot have an idea of anything we do not experience.

Premise: We do not have any experience of God.

2.5 Complex Arguments

So far our concern has been solely with simple arguments. Complex arguments link together simple arguments, so that the conclusion of one serves as a premise for the next. Judge, this man is a well-established member of the community, so he will not flee the country. Thus, you should release him on his own recognizance. Usually, the conclusion of the final simple argument—such as He should be released on his own recognizance —is the main conclusion . Properly speaking, the main conclusion is the most important one, the one that answers the question being asked in the broader passage. Conclusions that provide a link between the simple arguments—such as He will not flee the country —are termed subconclusions . Complex arguments can be made up of any number of simple arguments and thus may have any number of subconclusions.

In Of Property John Locke argues:

The materials of nature (air, earth, water) that remain untouched by human effort belong to no one and are not property. It follows that a thing can become someone’s private property only if he works and labors on it to change its natural state. From this I conclude that whatever a man improves by the labor of his hand and brain belongs to him, and to him only.

Pay special attention to the second sentence, which is italicized. It is a subconclusion, since it is offered both as a conclusion ( it follows that indicates that the second sentence is supported by the first) and as a premise ( from this I conclude comes immediately after it). The statement for which it is offered as a premise is the main conclusion of the complex argument. [3]

Complex arguments occur often, and we will look at examples from time to time, but simple arguments will be our major concern. If you know how to evaluate simple arguments, you know how to evaluate a series of simple arguments.

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (l)

In the following complex arguments, identify the subconclusions and the main conclusion.

Sample exercise. Three brothers were arrested for disorderly conduct on Christmas Eve after they scuffled with the man posing as St. Nicholas at a children’s Mass. The brothers describe themselves as fundamentalist Roman Catholics. They said they objected to St. Nick’s presence because, “Santa is not real, therefore he is a lie. Therefore he does not belong in church.” —Associated Press

Sample answer. Subconclusion: Santa is a lie. Conclusion: Santa does not belong in church.

• Don’t be silly—you can never become president of the United States. Your official papers show that you were born in Russia. It follows from that, of course, that you were not born in the United States. But only those born in the United States can become president.
• Police officer to suspect: “Eyewitnesses place you at the scene of the crime. Therefore, you lied about your whereabouts at the time. I’m afraid that means that we must consider you a suspect.”
• Teacher to student: “Your work this term was very impressive. It convinces me that you are a prime candidate for our graduate program. And, since all of our graduate students are on full fellowships, you should expect to have funding for your schooling next year.”
• “I have been admitted to the bar in London. That makes me a lawyer. I am—in your terms—colored. So, there is at least one colored lawyer in South Africa.” —Mahatma Gandhi in the film Gandhi (replying to the challenge “There are no colored lawyers in South Africa.”)
• “Twain makes an odious parallel between Huck’s being ‘enslaved’ by a drunken father who keeps him locked in a cabin and Jim’s legal enslavement . . . [so] Twain does not take slavery, and, therefore, black people seriously.” —Julius Lester, Mark Twain Journal
• “Woman is incapable of forming clear judgments, so the distinction between true and false means nothing to her. Thus women are naturally, inescapably, untruthful. . . . On this account . . . they do not enter the moral realm at all. Woman simply has no standard of right or wrong. And, as she knows no moral or logical imperative, she cannot be said to have a soul, and this means she lacks free will. From this it follows that women have no ego, no individuality, and no character. Ethically, women are a lost cause.” —account of Otto Weininger’s views from Ray Monk, Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. (There are five or six subconclusions in this passage, depending on how you count them.)
• “But the power of Marxism cannot be explained solely by his theories; for these were at least partially limited by his 19th-century experience, and they have been superseded by the considerable development of the social science. The power of Marxism must therefore be located to a considerable degree in its religious impulse and its moral protest.” —Paul Kurtz, Free Inquiry
• “God, who prescribes forbearance and forgiveness of every fault, exercises none himself, but does exactly the opposite; for a punishment which comes at the end of all things, when the world is over and done with, cannot have for its object either to improve or to deter, and is therefore pure vengeance.” —Arthur, Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (m)

Each of the next two passages has two conclusions, but in each case they are conclusions to two different simple arguments (with shared premises), not a single complex argument. Identify the two conclusions.

• “There is a famous scene in the Confessions (Book IV) where Augustine saw Ambrose reading without speaking, without even moving his lips. Augustine was amazed! Two conclusions can be reached: by the fifth century a.d. literacy had worked its way into culture and this literacy was rare.” —D. M. Dombrowski, Teaching Philosophy
• “I got hooked on opera when I was 14. It is an addiction that I’ve never for a moment regretted. But, wholly unguided as I was, I developed some curious misapprehensions for which I’ve paid ever since. One of them was the notion that it takes superhuman brains and talent to write an opera. Ergo, operettas are composed by people with only average brain and talent who are unable to aspire to opera, and ‘musicals’ are written by brainless, talentless opportunists who cater to the most vulgar tastes.” —David Greene, Musical Heritage Review

EXERCISES Chapter 2, set (n)

Some of the following passages contain arguments; others do not. If a passage does not contain an argument, identify it either as a mere assertion, a mere illustration, or a mere explanation. If it does contain an argument, identify the conclusion.

• “Every pitcher should know, from the first day of spring, that after covering first base to take a throw, the next move is always to turn to the left quickly and face the infield. Why? So that if there’s a fast runner on second base he can’t score on a routine ground out.” —Thomas Boswell, How Life Imitates the World Series
• “One of the fundamental axioms of physics, embodied in what is known as Fourier’s law of heat conduction, is that heat flows from the warmer parts of a body to the cooler ones. It can therefore be inferred that since the temperature increases with depth in the earth’s crust, there is a flow of heat outward from the earth’s interior.” —Henry Pollack and David Chapman, Scientific American
• “Actually, I like convention food. I like it for the same reason I like airplane food; it’s made of real food, but it’s softer, shinier, and sweeter. Also, everybody gets the same thing and you never know what you’re having until it’s served, if then: the thrill of the unknown.” —David Owen, Harper’s
• Since Defense Secretary McNamara (who had become president of Ford just when the disastrous Edsel was being brought out) promoted inefficient ideas like the TFX airplane, slowed progress by halting LeMay’s B-70 bomber, analyzed everything for cost instead of charging ahead, and favored unilateral disarmament, he must have been responsible for the Edsel. Longtime political opponent Barry Goldwater glued the Edsel charge to McNamara’s back for life. — Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara
• “Early dinosaur reconstructions were not terribly accurate. A horn put on the snout of Iguanodon in its earliest reconstructions, for example, was later shown to be a spike-like thumb bone.” [4] — Science News
• “Of course, there are reasons why academics write in this barbarous way. If they were to use the language that is natural to them, and to express the thoughts and feelings that are really theirs, the result would be so stunningly banal that no one would dream of employing them in a university. It has become necessary to write gibberish to gain promotion.” —Roger Scruton
• “That beavers react aggressively to the presence of a trespasser’s scent mound was demonstrated in another experiment. D. Muller-Schwarze and fellow researchers introduced alien mounds into the territories of two beaver colonies. . . . As soon as the resident animals got a whiff of the foreign odors, they began hissing. . . . One of them summoned up courage to mount the bank and cancel out the unwanted scents with a blast of his or her own excretions.” —Hope Rydeh, Lily Pond: Four Years with a Family of Beavers
• “I am of the opinion that the Bible is the most remarkable book I have read in the English language. I am of the opinion that the authors and the editors of the Bible were the first nonreligionists: that the Bible has nothing to do with religion; that the religionists have purloined the camouflage used by the authors and have made of the camouflage the substance of their power over people.” —letter to the editor, Free Inquiry
• “I think robots appeal to us because we want slaves, and since people always want to be set free, we’ll settle for one that is made of polyurethane and whose brain is a silicon chip. That way we don’t get any complaints.” —Jack Smith, Los Angeles Times
• “If external circumstances determine behavior, then punishment is still needed to curb crime. A home-grown example of this principle is the small California ghetto community of East Palo Alto, which was once the ‘murder capital’ of the country in terms of its murder rate per capita. A year later, the murder rate was down drastically, as were other violent crimes. It put more cops on the streets and more criminals behind bars.” —Thomas Sowell, Forbes
• “The Western concepts embraced by the traditional liberal arts education made a tremendous contribution to intellectual history. Yet certainly their universality is compromised by ethnocentrism. It is only natural, for instance, that Western ideals should lead one to assume the cultural primacy of Europe over Asia, and such an assumption clearly lacks universal validity.” —Yasusuke Murakami, Japan Echo

2.6 Summary of Chapter Two

Sentences vary according to their forms and their functions. Statements—which are sentences that can be true or false—function to convey information. And their form is typically that of a subject and a trait attributed to that subject; an example is the statement The beach is pleasant today. Other types of sentences differ in their forms and functions in ways that mark them as imperative, interrogative, exclamatory, and performative. Sentences that are not in statement form might nevertheless function as statements—that is, they might communicate information; an example is the sentence Oh, to be at the beach this afternoon!

A simple argument is a series of statements in which at least one of the statements is offered as reason for belief in another. The statements offered as reasons are the premises. The statement for which the reasons are offered is the conclusion. Inference indicators are helpful in identifying the premises (e.g., because . . . ) and the conclusion (e.g., therefore . . . ). In the absence of inference indicators, the conclusion can usually be identified either by looking for the most controversial claim in the passage or by looking for the answer to the question being asked.

A series of statements can count as an argument even if some of the statements are implicit and even if the reasons are bad. On the other hand, statements merely asserted with conviction do not count as arguments, because they supply no reason to believe them. Nor do mere illustrations (which might make an idea easier to understand, but do not straightforwardly aim to convince us that we should believe it). Nor do mere causal explanations. In a mere explanation, a cause is often offered to explain an effect that is typically already believed to exist; this differs from an argument, in which a premise is offered to justify belief in a conclusion that may not already be believed to be true. Sometimes, however, explanations and arguments do overlap.

A complex argument is a series of connected simple arguments in which the conclusion of one simple argument serves as the premise of another and is thus a subconclusion.

2.7 Guidelines for Chapter Two

• For the purpose of identifying arguments, consider a sentence a statement if it serves a declarative function.
• Count it as an argument even if the reasons offered seem clearly to be bad ones.
• When possible, identify premises and conclusions by the location of inference indicators.
• When there are no inference indicators, look for the most controversial statement in the argument; if one can be readily identified, it is usually the conclusion.
• When there are no inference indicators, look in the wider context for the question being asked; the proposed answer to it is usually the conclusion.
• If a series of statements is merely an attempt to influence belief without offering reasons, do not count it as an argument.
• Do not count a series of statements as an argument if it merely offers an attempt to make a statement easier to understand—that is, if it is a mere illustration. Terms like for example, for instance, and is illustrated by typically introduce mere illustrations.
• Do not count a series of statements as an argument if it offers merely a causal explanation of a state of affairs. If the statements show the familiar following from the new, and if the new is not offered as a reason to believe the familiar, it is probably a mere explanation.
• Count causal explanations as arguments when they also offer a reason for belief—whether the effect is offered as reason to believe the cause, or the cause is offered as reason to believe the effect. In such cases they are not mere explanations.
• Consider any premise or conclusion that is assumed by the arguer, but not expressed, as part of the argument.
• Count a series of statements as a complex argument when the conclusion for one simple argument serves as the premise for another simple argument.

2.8 Glossary for Chapter Two

Complex argument —a series of two or more simple arguments, in which the conclusion of one argument serves as a premise for the next. Complex arguments can be made up of any number of simple arguments, and thus may have any number of subconclusions.

Conclusion —the statement for which the reason is offered. Each simple argument has exactly one conclusion.

Declarative function —the function of conveying information. An example of a sentence with this function is Eleanor Roosevelt was one of the most influential first ladies in history.

Enthymeme —an argument with an implicit premise or conclusion. This word comes from the Greek roots en for in and and thymos for internal urge ; an enthymeme, then, is an argument that leaves a premise or conclusion behind as the arguer’s mere unstated urge .    For the purposes of clarifying and evaluating, the implicit statements should be considered just as much a part of an enthymematic argument as the explicit ones.

Exclamatory function —the function of expressing emotion. An example of a sentence with this function is Oh, to be at the beach this afternoon !

Imperative function —the function of directing others to action. An example of a sentence with this function is Speak into the microphone .

Implicit statements —statements that are not spoken or written in any form, but are relied on by the arguer as a part of the argument.

Inference —movement from premises to conclusion. Also, sometimes simply a synonym for simple argument.

Inference indicator —a term that indicates movement from premise to conclusion. Also called an illative. Examples are because, which introduces premises, and therefore, which introduces conclusions.

Interrogative function —the function of asking a question. An example of a sentence with this function is Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist party ?

Main conclusion —the most important conclusion of a complex argument , the one that answers the question being asked in the broader conversation.

Performative function —the function of doing, or performing, something by the very act of asserting it under the right circumstances. An example of a sentence with this function is I promise to return the money on Tuesday.

Premise —any statement that is offered as a reason for belief in another statement. (Sometimes spelled premiss by the British.) We alternatively refer to premises as the evidence, warrant, justification, basis, grounds, or rationale. There must be at least one premise in an argument, but there is no upper limit.

Simple argument —a series of statements in which at least one of the statements is offered as reason for belief in another.

Statement —a sentence that can be true or false. It functions to convey information. Its form, typically, includes a subject and a trait that is attributed to the subject.

Subconclusion —in a complex argument, the conclusion of one simple argument that also serves as premise for the next simple argument.

• In formal logic, logicians include as a degenerate case one-line arguments, with no premise at all. For our concerns, which are practical, it is inappropriate to call them arguments. ↵
• Philosophers debate what a statement, used in this sense, really is—that is, what it is that is true or false. Some say that it is a concrete object, namely, a sentence. Some say that it is an abstract object—the meaning of the sentence; this stays the same regardless of which actual sentence is used to concretely express it. And some say that it is an event—an utterance —the actual speaking or writing, the stating, of the statement. For practical purposes we are operating with the first definition. ↵
• Some authors consider a cluster of independent arguments offered for the same conclusion to be complex arguments of another sort. If arguments are independent, however, they should be evaluated independently as simple arguments; these so-called convergent arguments, then, will not be a feature of this text. Likewise, some authors consider arguments with more than one conclusion to be complex arguments. But if the conclusions are indeed independent of one another, then the passage really contains two arguments—to different conclusions—that share the same premises. These, too, should be evaluated independently as simple arguments. ↵
• This prompted paleontologist George Gaylord Simpson to write that “. . . the animal thus thumbed its nose at its first reconstructor.” ↵

A series of statements in which at least one of the statements is offered as reason for belief in another.

Any statement that is offered as a reason for belief in another statement. (Sometimes spelled premiss by the British.) We alternatively refer to premises as the evidence, warrant, justification, basis, grounds, or rationale. There must be at least one premise in an argument, but there is no upper limit.

The statement for which the reason is offered. Each simple argument has exactly one conclusion.

A sentence that can be true or false. It functions to convey information. Its form, typically, includes a subject and a trait that is attributed to the subject.

The function of conveying information. An example of a sentence with this function is Eleanor Roosevelt was one of the most influential first ladies in history.

The function of expressing emotion. An example of a sentence with this function is Oh, to be at the beach this afternoon!

The function of directing others to action. An example of a sentence with this function is Speak into the microphone.

The function of asking a question. An example of a sentence with this function is Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist party?

the function of doing, or performing, something by the very act of asserting it under the right circumstances. An example of a sentence with this function is I promise to return the money on Tuesday.

A term that indicates movement from premise to conclusion. Also called an illative. Examples are because, which introduces premises, and therefore, which introduces conclusions.

Movement from premises to conclusion. Also, sometimes simply a synonym for simple argument.

Statements that are not spoken or written in any form, but are relied on by the arguer as a part of the argument.

An argument with an implicit premise or conclusion. This word comes from the Greek roots en for in and thumos for mind; an enthymeme is an argument that leaves a premise or conclusion behind, in the mind. For the purposes of clarifying and evaluating, the implicit statements should be considered just as much a part of an enthymematic argument as the explicit ones.

A series of two or more simple arguments, in which the conclusion of one argument serves as a premise for the next. Complex arguments can be made up of any number of simple arguments, and thus may have any number of subconclusions.

The most important conclusion of a complex argument, the one that answers the question being asked in the broader conversation.

In a complex argument, the conclusion of one simple argument that also serves as premise for the next simple argument.

A Guide to Good Reasoning: Cultivating Intellectual Virtues Copyright © 2020 by David Carl Wilson is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Definition of argument

• altercation
• argle-bargle [ chiefly British ]
• argy-bargy [ chiefly British ]
• battle royal
• contretemps
• controversy
• disagreement
• falling-out
• misunderstanding

Examples of argument in a Sentence

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'argument.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

Middle English, from Anglo-French, from Latin argumentum , from arguere — see argue

14th century, in the meaning defined at sense 6

Phrases Containing argument

• counter - argument
• ontological argument

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“Argument.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/argument. Accessed 2 Apr. 2024.

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9 What is an Argument?

What is an argument.

This is an introductory textbook in logic and critical thinking. Both logic and critical thinking centrally involve the analysis and assessment of arguments. “Argument” is a word that has multiple distinct meanings, so it is important to be clear from the start about the sense of the word that is relevant to the study of logic. In one sense of the word, an argument is a heated exchange of differing views as in the following:

Sally: Abortion is morally wrong and those who think otherwise are seeking to justify murder!

Bob: Abortion is not morally wrong and those who think so are right-wing bigots who are seeking to impose their narrow-minded views on all the rest of us!

Sally and Bob are having an argument in this exchange. That is, they are each expressing conflicting views in a heated manner. However, that is not the sense of “argument” with which logic is concerned. Logic concerns a different sense of the word “argument.” An argument, in this sense, is a reason for thinking that a statement, claim or idea is true . For example:

Sally: Abortion is morally wrong because it is wrong to take the life of an innocent human being, and a fetus is an innocent human being.

In this example Sally has given an argument against the moral permissibility of abortion. That is, she has given us a reason for thinking that abortion is morally wrong. The conclusion of the argument is the first four words, “abortion is morally wrong.” But whereas in the first example Sally was simply asserting that abortion is wrong (and then trying to put down those who support it), in this example she is offering a reason for why abortion is wrong.

We can (and should) be more precise about our definition of an argument. But before we can do that, we need to introduce some further terminology that we will use in our definition. As I’ve already noted, the conclusion of Sally’s argument is that abortion is morally wrong. But the reason for thinking the conclusion is true is what we call the premise . So we have two parts of an argument: the premise and the conclusion. Typically, a conclusion will be supported by two or more premises. Both premises and conclusions are statements. A statement is a type of sentence that can be true or false and corresponds to the grammatical category of a “declarative sentence.” For example, the sentence,

The Nile is a river in northeastern Africa

is a statement. Why? Because it makes sense to inquire whether it is true or false. (In this case, it happens to be true.) But a sentence is still a statement even if it is false. For example, the sentence,

The Yangtze is a river in Japan

is still a statement; it is just a false statement (the Yangtze River is in China). In contrast, none of the following sentences are statements:

Please help yourself to more casserole

Don’t tell your mother about the surprise

Do you like Vietnamese pho?

The reason that none of these sentences are statements is that it doesn’t make sense to ask whether those sentences are true or false (rather, they are requests or commands, and questions, respectively).

So, to reiterate: all arguments are composed of premises and conclusions, which are both types of statements. The premises of the argument provide a reason for thinking that the conclusion is true. And arguments typically involve more than one premise.

A Brief Introduction to Philosophy Copyright © 2021 by Southern Alberta Institution of Technology (SAIT) is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Relationships Articles & More

Is there a better way to have an argument, here are five principles for more constructive and respectful disagreements..

We’re living in an era of deep divisions. Cable television, social media feeds, and fraying personal relationships all reflect the same troubling pattern: Differences of opinion quickly escalate into attacks, mistrust, and civic stalemates.

In this contentious climate, many Americans have retreated from civic life, or have responded to social conflict with calls for civility. But abstaining from civic life only cedes our public dialogue to the most contentious and polarizing voices. And too often “civility” means the mere absence of argument, or politely ignoring our differences.

We believe that American civic life doesn’t need fewer arguments. Instead, it needs better arguments. We believe that argument has the potential to help bridge ideological divides—not by papering over those divides but by teaching Americans how to engage more productively across difference, whether in town meetings or across the dinner table . Indeed, argument has always been a critical aspect of American democracy: Fundamental and perpetual tensions between core values such as liberty and equality, for example, have existed throughout our country’s history. The point of American civic life is not to resolve these tensions. Rather, we need to understand their origins and grow smarter about engaging them. Through the clash of different ideas and points of view, we often emerge with deeper insights and stronger solutions to the problems that affect us all.

However, the arguments in American politics today are inadequate. We believe the more we can equip communities to argue thoughtfully and constructively, the healthier our country will be. We created the Better Arguments Project to make this possible and, by doing so, to help renew civic life.

The Better Arguments Project is a collaboration by the Aspen Institute Citizenship and American Identity Program, Facing History and Ourselves, and the Allstate Corporation. Our efforts began with a deep exploration of the question: What is a better argument? Over the course of a year, our team met with more than 75 advisers from all around the United States. Drawn from more than 25 communities, our advisers were high school students; experts in law, history, politics, communications, and psychology; educators; and former elected and White House officials.

Bridging Differences Course

Free online, starting October 5, 2021: Learn research-based strategies for connecting across divides. Join us to bridge differences in your work, community, and life.

Our advisers helped us to distill five major principles of better arguments. Our team then partnered with communities around the United States to explore what these principles could look like in practice. From rural Arkansas to urban Queens, from Anchorage to Detroit, in large public gatherings and intimate conversations, we tested how to nurture better arguments in the context of real communities divided by real and pressing issues.

Here are our five principles that make arguments better—and what they look like in practice.

1. Pay attention to context

We may be suffering from a general sense of division in the United States, but a Better Argument event must begin in the needs, culture, and context of a specific community.

In our process, local, on-the-ground partners identify issues most relevant to their own community. In Denver, Colorado, we recently explored tensions about housing, jobs, and political power emerging from the region’s major tech boom, in partnership with Anythink Libraries. In Anchorage, Alaska, we considered the human impacts of a changing climate with the Alaska Humanities Forum. All of these arguments expressed the deep American theme of individual rights vs. collective responsibility in a distinct way. 

Attending to context also means intentionally structuring the conversation to create shared knowledge and reflect local culture. In Detroit, Michigan, where a large community event focused on tensions between natives and newcomers in a changing city, a shared sense of the city’s history was an essential precursor to argument. Our local partners at the Urban Consulate invited a prominent local poet to give a dramatic reading that painted a vivid picture of Detroit’s past for all attendees. In Anchorage, where Native Alaskan culture prizes group relationships and cohesion, we invested more time in longer introductions by participants, and facilitators considered a Native “talking circle” as a model for the conversation.

Everywhere we’ve worked, intentional grounding in the local context has been key to a successful encounter.

2. Take winning off the table

Many public arguments surface in contexts where a lot is at stake: persuading the city council to approve or reject a new housing development, or debating a new school districting plan. A Better Argument, however, is not about winning or losing, defeating or converting the “other side.” It’s about presence, and the robust exchange of ideas. Whatever the issue, setting those boundaries fosters a more open and honest discussion.

In Queens, New York, our team worked with a local museum, Socrates Sculpture Park, that wanted to engage the citywide debate about controversial public monuments and memorials. The city government had instituted its own process, with a panel of experts and formally structured public hearings to decide the fate of monuments to Christopher Columbus, Theodore Roosevelt, and others.

Our partners aspired to something different. We suggested inviting a broader public into a shared inquiry framed by open-ended questions that would surface divergent views, like “How should public art reflect the identity, history, and aspirations of our community?”

When we take winning off the table, we preserve a space to both speak and listen, creating relationships that can build connections, support better decision making, and inspire civic involvement.

3. Prioritize relationships and listen passionately

An argument becomes “better” when we start the conversation with human connection and prepare to listen, not just advance our own points of view. The Better Arguments we’ve hosted are crafted to bring together people of diverse viewpoints who may not have engaged with each other before. No matter the setting or the topic for argument, we always ask participants to “be human first.” This means inviting people to share their identities and their stories, not just their opinions.

We set the stage for a “better” argument with conversations that surface personal identity and shared experiences. We began our discussion of the Denver tech boom by asking, “What makes you proud to be a member of your community?” In Detroit, longtimers and newcomers each responded to the question, “Where do you feel at home in this city?”

Any difficult conversation, whether facilitated or informal, can begin with open-ended questions like those to humanize participants as individuals with complex identities, not just representatives of opposing viewpoints.

Active Listening

Connect with a partner through empathy and understanding

We also promote listening with intentional reflection questions. As the conversation evolves into argument, pairs and tables are asked to step back and consider questions like “What is something someone else said that you appreciate? How has others’ thinking connected to, extended, or challenged your own?” Active listening and perspective taking dramatically can enhance arguments, at least as much as evidence and logic do.

4. Embrace vulnerability

Better Arguments are hard work, and there is inherent risk in showing up. A successful Better Argument depends on participants’ willingness to be open, honest, and vulnerable, as both speakers and listeners. We’ve had success with brief “contracting” exercises to establish trust and set norms at the beginning of each event.

In Detroit, the conversation about natives and newcomers was threaded with difficult issues of race, privilege, and painful history. We asked each participant to silently finish the sentence, “When I think about how Detroit is changing, I feel _________ because ________.”  The facilitator asked participants to call out the feeling they wrote down: “Angry.” “Excited.” “Conflicted.” “Invisible.”

“Given this wide range of powerful emotions,” the facilitator asked, “what do we need to feel secure and take risks in today’s conversation?”

Some participants asked for patience; others requested confidentiality. As important as the actual norms is having the opportunity to construct them together. 

5. Be open to transformation

Without a goal of winning or even reaching resolution, the experience of a Better Argument can instead change how we engage with a difficult issue and with one another. Our events end with an invitation to reflect on the shared experience with a simple but powerful prompt: “I came in thinking ________; I’m leaving thinking _______.” In Anchorage, a policymaker said, “I came in thinking I wasn’t sure I wanted to be here, and I’m leaving thinking that this was a different conversation than I’ve ever had about this topic and I want more.”

We also connect reflection to action by asking participants to complete a final statement, “So now I will….” Their responses reveal how engaging consciously in a Better Argument can spark small but powerful changes in individuals and communities. In Detroit, participants said, “I will stay in touch with the five new people I met today”; “I will introduce myself to my neighbors”; “I will plan a tour to introduce my part of town to newcomers”; and even “I will not be so afraid to talk about difficult topics going forward.” Some event organizers have used the “I will…” cards to identify promising ideas and then offered support to those projects. Others have created opportunities for participants to continue to come together to explore the Better Arguments topic.

Every Better Argument we’ve hosted has been distinct, but these five principles were core to each and will be the foundation of our work going forward. As we continue to travel the country and learn from communities, we’re working forward a vision of inspiring and supporting all Americans to have better arguments in the coming years.

Fundamentally, engaging in Better Arguments means showing up for one another as citizens. Painful at times and celebratory at others, Better Arguments are an opportunity to evolve and expand our sense of community. In this sense, arguments don’t have to drive us apart. Better Arguments can bring us together.

About the Authors

Caroline Hopper

Caroline Hopper is the associate director for the Aspen Institute’s Citizenship and American Identity Program, managing initiatives focused on the challenge of sustaining strong citizenship in America and coherent national identity in an age of demographic flux and severe inequality. Caroline joined the Aspen Institute in 2014, and brings experience and passion for advancing human rights and social justice in the United States and around the world.

Laura Tavares

Laura Tavares, M.A. , is program director for organizational learning and thought leadership at Facing History and Ourselves, an education nonprofit whose mission is to engage students of diverse backgrounds in examining racism, prejudice, and anti-semitism in order to promote the development of a more humane and informed citizenry.

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I’d Like to Have an Argument, Please

To celebrate Stand to Reason’s 30th anniversary, we’re republishing classic issues of Solid Ground that represent some of the foundational ideas characterizing our work over the decades—ideas that continue to be vital to apologetics and evangelism today.  

I want to teach you how to assess a basic argument. How can you know if a line of thinking is a good one or not?

There’s no magic to this. The tools of thinking are simple ones. Anyone can employ them skillfully with a little practice. If you have the right equipment, you can make a lot of progress, even if you don’t consider yourself an intellectual whiz-kid.

Think of an argument like a simple house, a roof supported by walls. The roof is the conclusion and the walls are the supporting ideas. In the lingo of logic, the walls are called premises and the whole structure of the building is called a syllogism.

When all the details of a syllogism are in proper working order, the conclusion can be trusted. The walls are strong enough to support the roof, so the whole structure is reliable. It rests securely on its supporting foundation.

Here are two well-worn syllogisms you may have heard before:

• All men are mortal.
• Socrates is a man.
• Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
• If it’s raining outside, then the streets are wet.
• The streets are not wet.
• Therefore, it’s not raining outside.

Here are some popular ways those two different forms of argument have been employed in defending theism. The first is called the Cosmological Argument, and the second is an example of the Moral Argument:

• Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
• The universe began to exist.
• Therefore, the universe had a cause.
• If God does not exist, then objective morals do not exist.
• Objective morals do exist.
• Therefore, God exists.

The goal of critical thinking is to look at any line of reasoning and test it. Are the walls solid, or can they be knocked down? If the walls go down, the roof goes flat, and the argument is defeated.

A House with No Walls

First, an observation. Some arguments are not really arguments at all. In terms of our house illustration, people sometimes try to build their roof right on the ground. Instead of erecting solid walls—the supporting ideas that hold up the conclusion—they simply assert their conclusion and pound the podium.

An argument, though, is different from an assertion. An assertion simply states a point. An argument gives reasons showing why the point should be taken seriously. These reasons become the topic of mutual discussion or analysis. If there are no reasons, there’s little to assess. Opinions are opinions, not proof. A mere point of view cannot be taken seriously as worthy of belief. That requires reasons.

A roof is useless when it’s on the ground. In the same way, an assertion without evidence is not reliable. The untutored may be persuaded, but those thinking more carefully will not be swayed.

I frequently get calls on the radio from people who think they’re giving me an argument, when all they’re doing is forcefully stating a point of view. They sound compelling, but a closer look reveals an emperor with lots of attitude but no clothes. My first task is to recognize that the roof is lying flat on the ground and simply point it out. The caller wants a free ride, but I won’t give it to him. He must ante up, and good reasons are the price of admission for thoughtful discussion.

If you find yourself stymied in a conversation, you may be looking for an argument that’s not there. Ask yourself, “Did they give me an argument or just make an assertion?” If the latter is true, then say, “That’s an interesting opinion. Now I have a question: How did you come to that conclusion? Why should I believe what you just told me? Can you give me any good reasons for your view? What, specifically, is your argument?”

Don’t let challengers flatten you by dropping a roof on your head. Make them build walls underneath their roof. Ask for reasons or facts that support their point of view.

Three Ways an Argument Can Go Bad

Any real argument—as opposed to a mere contention—has three elements. First, it has a particular form . Second, it makes particular claims . Third, it uses particular words or terms to make its point. When an argument goes bad, the problem is with the form, or the claims, or the terms.

First, an argument’s form can be bad. Take this syllogism: “All men are cheerful. John is a man. Therefore, John is cheerful.” This is a simple argument containing two statements (premises) and a conclusion. The conclusion is dependent on the strength of the first two statements. The first is the major premise—all men are cheerful. The second is the minor premise—John is a man. The final statement is the conclusion—John is cheerful.

Notice the form of this argument. Given that all men are cheerful and that John is a man, the conclusion is inevitable. It follows from the premises because the form is correct in this case. When an argument is structured properly like this, we say the argument is valid .

What about this one: “All men are cheerful. Jane is not a man. Therefore, Jane is not cheerful.” A moment’s reflection shows this doesn’t work. Even if it were true that all men are cheerful and Jane is not a man, it still wouldn’t follow that Jane is not cheerful. Women can be cheerful, too. This form is not valid.

We use the term “fallacy” to describe an argument that has a faulty construction. There are different types of fallacies listed in logic books, and I won’t detail them here. Many of them, though, are obvious upon careful reflection.

When the form is bad—when the conclusion does not follow from the premises—it’s called a non sequitur , Latin for “it does not follow.” Non sequiturs cannot be trusted. It may turn out that Jane is not cheerful, but you can’t draw that conclusion from the argument as it stands.

Even when the form is right, there still may be problems. Claims can also make an argument go bad. Accurate form (a valid argument) does not guarantee that the statements themselves are true. Following our house illustration, the architectural structure may be solid, but the wood itself could be rotten. What if it’s not true that all men are cheerful? Maybe some are gloomy. What if John is not a man, but your neighbor’s pet schnauzer?

Take this argument: “All unicorns live in Ireland. Pegasus is a unicorn. Therefore, Pegasus lives in Ireland.” Acknowledging that the form is valid (it is) doesn’t at the same time commit you to the existence of unicorns or tell you anything about where they live. The factual questions about unicorns is a separate issue.

If the claims in the statements are false, then the argument still fails even though the form is right. Clear thinking requires we look closely at the claims as well as the form. The statements themselves must be true.

The following argument is an example of this mistake: “When an alleged historical account is similar to a myth that came before it, then the later account is also a myth. Ancient myths of dying and rising redeemers are remarkably similar to the Jesus story. Therefore, the Jesus story is also a myth.”

Though the argument is valid (the form is correct), it fails because neither of the premises is true. Myths of alleged dying and rising redeemers that predate the time of Christ bear little resemblance to the accounts of Jesus we find in the Gospels. Further, even if they did, this wouldn’t prove the details of the life of Jesus were fictions. That must be determined independently on historical grounds. [1]

The third way an argument can go wrong is in its terms. The same words may mean different things in different parts of the syllogism. This is called an “equivocation.” Equivocation means a vagueness, ambiguity, or uncertainty. If somebody states her opinion very clearly and then, under challenge, becomes less sure of her position, we say she’s equivocating. She waffles; she’s uncertain.

Sometimes words themselves are equivocal. They have multiple meanings that become confused with each other in the discussion. This creates problems for an argument.

Look at this example: “All men are cheerful. John is a man. Therefore, John is cheerful.” The form is in order and, for argument’s sake, let's stipulate that the claims are true. Is our conclusion reliable? That depends.

What if it turns out that the word “man” in the first premise refers to grown males, while the same word in the second premise refers to an adolescent male? Once the terms are clarified, the argument looks like this: “All adult males are cheerful. John is an adolescent male. Therefore, John is cheerful.” See the problem? This argument falters through equivocation.

Here’s a theological example: “Jesus is God. Mary is the mother of Jesus. Therefore, Mary is the mother of God.”

The form here seems correct—the conclusion follows from the premises. It also seems that the individual statements are true. But something’s wrong here. God is not the kind of being that has a mother. Where did we go wrong?

The problem becomes more obvious when we take it a step further: “Mary is the mother of God. God is a Trinity. Therefore, Mary is the mother of the Trinity.” This, of course, is patently false. But why is there a problem if the form is sound and the claims are in order?

The trouble lies with the terms. There’s an equivocation here on the clause “Jesus is God” in the first syllogism. Jesus is a very unusual individual. Yes, he is God, but he’s also fully human. Jesus is one person with two natures, the nature of God and the nature of man.

When we say Jesus is God, we are not saying his humanity is divine. That would be a contradiction. We are saying he is God in that he has a divine nature. Mary is the mother of Jesus in the sense that she’s the mother of his humanity. She is the mother of his human nature, not his divine nature.

Equivocation—lack of clarity—on these terms makes a false conclusion seem sound. The claims are right. The form is right. But the conclusion is false because the meanings of the terms are equivocal.

Once, I took a call on our radio show from a Jehovah’s Witness who argued, “Jesus is God. God is a Trinity. Therefore, Jesus is a Trinity.” The argument was valid in form, but since the conclusion was clearly false, he argued, the problem must be in the premises.

My caller thought he had logically disproved the Trinity. Either Jesus is not God, or God is not a Trinity. His attempt failed through equivocation, though, but the problem is difficult for most to see at first. It has to do with the troublesome word “is.”

There are at least five meanings for the word “is.” Resolving the equivocation in this argument requires distinguishing between the “is” of essential predication (“Aristotle is human”) and the “is” of identity (“Aristotle is the author of the Nichomachean Ethics” ). There are also the parts/whole “is” (“Aristotle is skin and bones”), the “is” of accidental predication (“Aristotle is white”), and the “is” of existence (“Aristotle is”).

When Christianity teaches that Jesus is God, it doesn’t mean that Jesus and God are exactly identical . Jesus is different from the Father. He shares the Father’s essential nature , but he is not everything that God is. God subsists in three persons; Jesus is only one of those persons. [2]

The missing element here was an explanation of terms. Once the meanings were clarified—and the equivocation removed—this attack on the Trinity was defeated.

Part of the assessment of an argument is based on the clarity of the concepts involved. This is why precision with words is so important for clear thinking.

Invisible Walls

Sometimes it’s difficult to assess an argument because the full form of the argument is not stated. The elements are not listed one, two, three as they are in the examples above. Some of the parts are taken for granted—“understood” by the participants—in the process of conversation. This streamlines conversation, but it can also allow faulty claims to go undetected. Let me illustrate.

Once, a homosexual said to me, “Jesus never condemned homosexuality.” Though this is only a single sentence, it’s actually a full argument in shorthand, streamlined for brevity. The conclusion didn’t need to be stated. I got the point. I was wrong for attacking homosexuality on moral grounds. Because Jesus never condemned homosexuality, it is therefore morally acceptable behavior.

Notice, though, that the conclusion is not the only thing taken for granted here. The minor premise is stated, and the conclusion is assumed, but what of the major premise, our first step in the argument? The unspoken major premise—the invisible wall holding up this argument—contained a serious flaw that went undetected.

We can determine if this is a problem by asking what kind of major premise is needed to make this argument work. The full argument would have to look something like this: “Whatever Jesus did not explicitly condemn is morally acceptable. Jesus never explicitly condemned homosexuality. Therefore, homosexuality is morally acceptable.”

The form of this argument is good; nothing amiss here. But look closer at the major premise. It seems this statement is clearly false. It’s not true that whatever Jesus didn’t directly condemn is morally acceptable. Jesus never explicitly condemned slavery, child abuse, wife-beating, or even gay-bashing, for that matter, but this proves nothing about his moral opinion on those issues.

Many Christians are caught flat-footed here, sensing something is wrong but not knowing what it is. Sometimes we have to look more closely to identify the unspoken premise before we can see the problem clearly. In this case, that can be done by making the invisible wall visible.

Ask a simple question: “Are you saying that if Jesus doesn’t specifically condemn something, then he condones it?” When they back off (and they must, because such a view is untenable), you might ask, “Then what’s your point?” Don’t get into a fuss. Just ask the question calmly and directly. The silence that follows proves the game is up.

A Jehovah’s Witness once called me and said, “The Trinity isn’t mentioned in the Bible.” The unspoken conclusion was obvious: The Trinity is not biblical. But that conclusion depended on the strength of an invisible wall, which I asked about next.

“Are you saying that anything not specifically mentioned in the Bible cannot be truly biblical?” He was in trouble here because lots of things aren’t mentioned specifically in the Bible that still find support in Scripture. The word “monotheism” isn’t in the Bible, for example, but clearly the idea is taught there.

“No,” he answered.

“Then what’s your point?” I responded, and the argument was over.

Often the flaw in an argument—the “fact” that’s wrong—is hidden in an unspoken assumption your challenger takes for granted. Kick the invisible premise into the open. Often it’s all that’s needed for the whole structure to come tumbling down.

The Obligation of Reason

To assess a genuine argument and not a mere assertion, examine the structure. Observe the form of the argument. Examine the claims. Look for hidden statements that may not have been expressed. Finally, examine the terms to see if there’s any equivocation, any ambiguity or lack of clarity that might influence the outcome.

If the argument is sound—if the form is valid, the claims accurate, and the terms clear and precise—then the conclusion is going to be true. Period. In fact, the conclusion is irrefutable; it’s not even possible to be mistaken.

This demonstrates the compelling nature of rationality. There is a bomb-proof quality about deductive logic. If one is faced with a logically valid argument with clear terms and accurate claims, he has a rational obligation to believe the conclusion, even if he doesn't like what he finds. This is called intellectual honesty.

Rationality has nothing to do with what we like; it has to do with what is true. That’s why careful thinking is an indispensable tool for all who are interested in knowing the way the world really is, for those who really do love truth.

[1] For more details, see Gregory Koukl, “ Jesus, Recycled Redeemer? ” Solid Ground , September/October 2009, https://www.str.org/w/jesus-recycled-redeemer-. 

[2] In this case, it can be truly said that the outcome of the argument depended on what “is” is.

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A new podcast examines the perils of intense meditation

Andrea Muraskin

Imagine it's a crisp clear winter day, and you're skiing down a mountain, feeling exhilarated. All of a sudden, you lose control of your skis. You're hurtling down towards the base of the slope, and all you can feel is abject terror.

That's how one young man explained his emotional state during an intensive meditation retreat. It was one of several troubling accounts reporter Madison Marriage heard while reporting Untold: The Retreat , a new investigative podcast series from the Financial Times and Goat Rodeo.

The four-episode series focuses on retreats held by the Goenka network, teaching a popular meditation technique called Vipassana. Participants follow a strict schedule, waking before dawn and meditating silently for 10 days, 10 hours per day. They eat just two vegan meals each day.

In Oregon, psilocybin treatment is an experiment in real time

Meditation and mindfulness have many known health benefits, including helping to process trauma and manage anxiety , improve eating habits, and ease chronic pain. While many participants say Goenka retreats changed their lives for the better, The Retreat tells the stories of individuals whose mental health deteriorated during a 10 day retreat – or for some, after several 10-day retreats.

Some spent time in psychiatric units, and two participants whose families spoke to Marriage, took their own lives.

If you or someone you know may be considering suicide or is in crisis, call or text 988 to reach the Suicide & Crisis Lifeline .

Marriage interviewed nearly two dozen people who had attended Goenka retreats in different countries, including the U.K., the United States, France, India, and Australia. According to these former participants, retreat staff all over the world had a similar reaction when they were approached with mental health problems. "They're going to be telling you the same thing, which is keep meditating even if you're in severe emotional distress," she told NPR.

A global organization, the structure of the Goenka network is decentralized. The Financial Times reached out for comment to lead teachers at several Goenka centers, including the centers in Delaware and British Columbia where participants had died by suicide after exhibiting signs of psychological distress. But they declined to do an interview or answer specific questions on the record.

Author Interviews

In 'hidden valley road,' a family's journey helps shift the science of mental illness.

Bob Jeffs, director of one Goenka center near Merritt, British Columbia, told the producers of The Retreat in a written statement that his staff assess applicants before retreats and tries to dissuade people who are not ready: "Although the experience of hundreds of thousands of people who have successfully completed retreats since the early 1970's is overwhelmingly positive, these courses are not for everyone. We take the safety and well-being of every student in our care extremely seriously."

Untold: The Retreat is a podcast from The Financial Times and Goat Rodeo. The Financial Times hide caption

NPR contributor Andrea Muraskin spoke with Marriage about what her investigation uncovered about the mental health risks of meditation retreats.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Andrea Muraskin: What is Vipassana meditation and how is it taught at Goenka retreats?

Madison Marriage: Vipassana meditation is a type of meditation, which is ancient, its roots go back thousands of years... These retreats teach Vipassana meditation through the teachings of S. N. Goenka. And he's a kind of guru at the heart of this network, who founded the first meditation retreats back in the 1970s, and they've really proliferated.

Goenka's technique is that you spend a few days focusing on just one area of your body, and then it expands. And you have to shift your focus to different parts of your body. You wake up at 4 a.m., you start meditating at 4:30 a.m. You have a break at specific times, your day ends at 8, 9 p.m. And then in theory, you go to bed.

Muraskin: What did you discover about the Goenka retreats and mental health?

Mariage: I don't think many people associate the word meditation with anything negative. It sounds relaxing and something that you might do to help soothe yourself. And that's exactly the reason why a lot of people go off and do these retreats. They're looking for something that's going to help them to feel a bit more relaxed, a bit more calm, having a better headspace, that kind of thing.

I've now interviewed dozens of people who've done these retreats and have had the complete adverse reaction. It's almost like kind of jumping off a cliff in terms of their mental health. Some of these people have done two retreats or three retreats or ten retreats and really loved them. But there is a specific retreat where something in their mind clicks or breaks or snaps. Those are the kind of words that they've used.

Psychosis is really common. So [are] hallucinations, physical pain, like electrical zaps going up and down their bodies. In the first episode, [one young woman] describes it as being like stuck in a torture chamber for her mind.

The big one is terror, abject terror. I had one person email me this week saying, 'Thank you for making this podcast because I thought I was alone.' And he said that he would rather saw his own arm off than go back to that mental headspace.

One man in Britain ...was escorted out of a Goenka center in handcuffs by the police because he had to be sectioned at the local hospital and he wouldn't go voluntarily. There are people leaving these centers and heading to psychiatric units.

Muraskin: What did you learn about what's happening in the brains of people who have these adverse experiences with meditation?

Mariage: So we've interviewed several experts about what meditation does to the brain and one of the foremost experts we spoke to said it's a bit like a stimulant. So having lots of coffee or too much of any stimulants can end up having the opposite effect where instead of doing something good for you, it starts doing something bad, and it can begin to feel a little bit addictive. But there are limits to what the scientific community knows about the human brain and how and why it works in certain ways.

Muraskin: One of your interviewees told you she felt as if she had become addicted to meditation. There's no official diagnosis for meditation addiction in psychology. But did you speak to others who had experiences similar to addiction?

Mariage: Yes. Lots of people said that their first retreat or first several retreats really helped them and really brought them to quite an exciting spiritual plane. It almost sounds kind of mystical and godlike – you're on cloud nine mentally, and they come out and they feel calmer. They know how to process their thoughts better. Their life feels easier as a result. So they go to another. And they have kind of similar feelings, maybe not quite as intense.

And then the feeling starts to fade. So they do another retreat. And then a lot of people said that they ended up struggling to sleep. So they would meditate more because they had initially felt that meditation would help them to sleep because it had made them feel calmer at first. But effectively, they end up meditating through the night, all day, every day for weeks or months on end.

And then, I think maybe this comes back to your earlier question about impact on the brain – I would argue it's perhaps not meditation per se that is harming people's brains. A lot of the people I spoke to ended up having severe sleep deprivation. And it is clinically proven to be extremely bad for your brain not to sleep.

Muraskin: We've heard from several of our readers over time that they benefit from mindfulness and meditation. If somebody reading this interview becomes concerned, and thinks, I like my meditation practice, but should I be worried now, what would you say to someone like that?

Mariage: So the consensus from the psychologists and psychiatrists and academics I spoke to is that amounts of meditation up to half an hour a day on the whole is usually completely fine.

[The problem is] the extremity of this particular practice. Ten hours a day of meditating without any physical movement. You're sitting on the floor cross-legged with your eyes closed, meditating for 10 hours a day. You're put on a vegan diet. So for a lot of people that's far fewer calories, often at half of what they're usually used to. And there's no dinner. There's an element of sleep deprivation. And your sensory world is being massively diminished. And it's that which I think is driving people to quite extreme outcomes.

Muraskin: Do you think the psychological problems that came up during retreats could be explained by underlying mental health issues that the meditators had before they began meditating?

Mariage: I think that's a really difficult question because how can anyone know whether they have a mental health problem? You're meant to fill out a form before you go to one of these retreats and state whether or not you've ever had any kind of mental health issue or history of drug abuse. And if you've never had a mental health problem, you will of course say no and no, and in you go.

And I've spoken to people who say that they were completely stable prior to doing one of these retreats, had never had a mental or physical problem in their lives, and had never tried drugs, and they have gone in and they have emerged completely broken.

I actually think it's irrelevant whether or not somebody had a mental health issue beforehand, because the evidence that I've seen is that the particular format of these retreats can push people past their limits.

Muraskin: Based on your interviews with participants, is it difficult to leave a Goenka retreat early?

Mariage: Yes, it is difficult to leave a retreat early. [If you express the desire to], you're effectively gaslighted into staying.

You're told, oh, you might just be on the cusp of a breakthrough. The founder of this network died a decade ago, but it's still his voice and his teachings that are imparted at all of the retreat centers ...warning people that doing [this] practice is like undergoing surgery of the mind, and to leave halfway through is like walking out of an operation before you've been stitched up by the surgeon.

There was one man who said that every time he closed his eyes he could see streams of bubbles everywhere. And he didn't want to leave because he kind of wanted to fix that. and he thought, I might be stuck seeing streams of bubbles forevermore if I leave before the end of this.

At a lot of these centers you also hand in your keys and phone at the beginning, and that's quite an overt cue that you're here for the full period. You can of course go and ask someone and insist that you want them back, but several sources told me that when they expressed a desire to leave, they were pressured not to.

Muraskin: What did your sources –the meditators that experienced harm or their families – think needs to change to make these retreats safer?

Mariage: So first and foremost, warn people before they go in that mental health problems or kind of psychological distress is possible. It's a bit like putting warnings on bottles of medication that, you know, a tiny percentage of people with this prescription might have an adverse effect.

Secondly, they would like to see mental health practitioners on site. So rather than telling everybody to keep meditating, they need to be able to figure out better when somebody needs a bit more support and what that support should be.

Thirdly, they need proper emergency protocols. So for the two women who lost their lives after attending retreats, the horse had already bolted by the time their parents were contacted. I think it needs to be a lot more proactive in terms of reaching out to emergency contacts.

Muraskin: I can imagine you've received some pushback on the podcast from people who've really benefited from Vipassana retreats. What's your response to people who say you've painted the Goenka network too negatively?

Mariage: We've had a couple of emails from people who say this is really one-sided, you're not looking at the positive experiences at all, this has changed my life for the better.

But the podcast isn't about the people for whom this works.... The purpose is to scrutinize harm that is being done to people and to question why isn't the organization itself doing more to prevent that harm.

Andrea Muraskin is a contributor to NPR's Shots blog and writes the weekly NPR Health newsletter. She lives in Boston.

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5 key moments from Supreme Court arguments on the abortion pill case

Reproductive rights returned to the Supreme Court on Tuesday for the first time in nearly two years, as the justices heard oral arguments for in the high-stakes case FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine .

The high court is considering whether to roll back access to mifepristone, a key abortion medication that is part of a two-drug regimen and used in more than 60 percent of U.S. abortions.

The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, a coalition of anti abortion doctors and others, is arguing that the Food and Drug Administration didn’t sufficiently consider safety concerns when it approved the drug in 2000 or when it removed some restrictions in 2016 and in 2021. The Justice Department, on behalf of the Biden administration, argues that the mifepristone opponents don’t have standing in the case because they have never prescribed the drug. Danco Laboratories, the drug’s manufacturer, also contends that a ruling in favor of those challenging the drug would have a chilling effect on the pharmaceutical industry.

Here are five key exchanges from Tuesday’s oral arguments:

1. The government is arguing that the doctors who brought the case don’t have standing

JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS: General, if we agree with you on standing, could you give us an example of who would have standing to challenge … these FDA actions? U.S. SOLICITOR GENERAL ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR: They are required to treat women who take mifepristone. FDA is not directing the women who take the drug to go seek out care from these specific doctors.

Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas asked the first question cutting to the heart of the government’s case: Who has standing to challenge the FDA’s drug approval process for mifepristone?

Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar didn’t directly answer Thomas’s question, instead saying that the coalition of antiabortion doctors who brought the case don’t have standing. “They don’t prescribe mifepristone,” she said. “They don’t take mifepristone.” As such, Prelogar argued, these doctors “stand at a far distance from the upstream regulatory action they’re challenging.”

2. Who has standing to sue the FDA?

JUSTICE SAMUEL A. ALITO JR.: Is there anybody who can sue and get a judicial ruling on whether what FDA did was lawful, and maybe what they did was perfectly lawful, but shouldn’t somebody be able to challenge that in court? PRELOGAR: I think that with respect to these regulatory changes, it’s hard to identify anyone who would have standing to sue.

One recurring line of question for the government was who exactly could sue the FDA. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. asked Prelogar to provide a more “specific” answer to Thomas’s question about who had standing to challenge the FDA. He asked whether the states that intervened in the case have standing. Prelogar said no.

Alito then followed up with a series of hypothetical scenarios, all related to the question of who has standing to challenge the FDA. Prelogar called one of Alito’s questions speculative and ultimately answered, “I think that with respect to these regulatory changes, it’s hard to identify anyone who would have standing to sue.” Alito seemed unpersuaded by the argument, telling Prelogar: “It’s just too bad, nobody can sue in court. There’d be no remedy. The American people have no remedy for that.”

3. Can a 151-year-old law that prohibits the mailing of ‘obscene materials’ include materials used for abortions?

ALITO: Shouldn’t the FDA have at least considered the application of 18 U.S.C. 1461? PRELOGAR: So I think that the Comstock provisions don’t fall within FDA’s lane.

The conservative justices repeatedly referenced the Comstock Act during the oral arguments, referring to a law that bans the mailing of “obscene” or “indecent” materials and includes provisions limiting access to abortion medication and contraceptives by mail.

Conservatives have looked to the Comstock Act — named after Anthony Comstock — as an opportunity to block mail-order abortion medications such as mifepristone. The first mention of the 1873 law occurred during an exchange between Alito and Prelogar.

“Shouldn’t the FDA have at least considered” the applicability of the Comstock Act, Alito asked.

The “FDA was not affirmatively approving mailing in violation of Comstock, even if you interpreted it that way,” Prelogar responded. “And we don’t think it means what respondents suggest it means.”

The Comstock Act hasn’t been applied in nearly a century and is generally believed to be obsolete.

4. Who is responsible for determining whether the abortion pill is safe?

JUSTICE SONIA SOTOMAYOR: But the reality is, even if there is some increase in emergency room visits, the question of when that rises to a sufficient safety risk is up to the FDA, correct? PRELOGAR: That’s right.

Another recurring line of questioning for the government and drug manufacturer was whether the FDA’s loosening of regulations on the drug has resulted in more frequent trips to emergency rooms.

In a previous exchange with Alito, Prelogar acknowledged that some studies have noted more visits, but “that didn’t equate to additional serious adverse events and, in fact, [in] one of the studies, half of the women who went to the emergency room didn’t get any treatment at all.”

In her question, Sotomayor focused on whose responsibility it was to determine the safety of the drug. Prelogar argued that falls under the purview of the FDA, which she said Congress has entrusted the FDA to do.

5. Are the mifepristone opponents asking for too much?

JUSTICE NEIL M. GORSUCH: This case seems like a prime example of turning what could be a small lawsuit into a nationwide legislative assembly on an FDA rule or any other federal government action. Thoughts? ERIN HAWLEY, PLAINTIFF LAWYER FOR ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE: I think it’s impracticable to raise a conscious objection, but even spotting that the district court remedy was perfectly appropriate.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson repeatedly asked whether the anti-abortion doctors are “entitled” to the remedy they are seeking, which is to prevent “anyone from having access to these drugs at all.”

She told Prelogar she worries that “there is a significant mismatch” in the case between the claimed injury and the remedy the doctors seek. “The obvious common-sense remedy would be to provide them with an exemption that they don’t have to participate in this procedure,” Jackson told Prelogar.

If the doctors can lodge their objections, “isn’t that enough to remedy their issue?” she asked Erin Hawley, who is arguing on behalf of those challenging the medication.

“Do we have to also entertain your argument that no one else in the world can have this drug or no one else in America should have this drug in order to protect your clients?” Jackson asked.

Gorsuch interrupted the exchange between Jackson and Hawley to add that the Supreme Court asks parties “over and over again [to] provide a remedy sufficient to address the plaintiff’s asserted injuries and go no further.”

“This case seems a prime example of turning what could be a small lawsuit into a nationwide legislative assembly on an FDA rule,” he said.

U.S. abortion access, reproductive rights

Tracking abortion access in the United States: Since the Supreme Court struck down Roe v. Wade , the legality of abortion has been left to individual states. The Washington Post is tracking states where abortion is legal, banned or under threat.

Abortion pills: The Supreme Court seemed unlikely to limit access to the abortion pill mifepristone . Here’s what’s at stake in the case and some key moments from oral arguments . For now, full access to mifepristone will remain in place . Here’s how mifepristone is used and where you can legally access the abortion pill .

New study: The number of women using abortion pills to end their pregnancies on their own without the direct involvement of a U.S.-based medical provider rose sharply in the months after the Supreme Court eliminated a constitutional right to abortion , according to new research.

Abortion and the 2024 election: Voters in a dozen states in 2024 could decide the fate of abortion rights with constitutional amendments on the ballot in a pivotal election year. The Biden administration announced new steps intended to ensure access to contraception, abortion medication and emergency abortions at hospitals. Here’s what the moves on reproductive health mean for consumers. See where the 2024 presidential candidates stand on abortion bans .

• The biggest 2024 Supreme Court rulings so far, and what’s still to come March 27, 2024 The biggest 2024 Supreme Court rulings so far, and what’s still to come March 27, 2024
• 5 key moments from Supreme Court arguments on the abortion pill case March 26, 2024 5 key moments from Supreme Court arguments on the abortion pill case March 26, 2024
• What’s at stake in the Supreme Court abortion pill case March 24, 2024 What’s at stake in the Supreme Court abortion pill case March 24, 2024

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Ireland to Intervene in South Africa’s Genocide Case Against Israel at the World Court

Ireland did not outline the argument it planned to advance at the court, but the country’s lawmakers have made repeated calls to prioritize the protection of civilians in Gaza.

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By Megan Specia

• March 28, 2024

Ireland plans to file an argument in South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice, according to the Irish government, making the move as the country has strongly condemned Israel’s actions against civilians in Gaza.

South Africa has brought a case against Israel in the I.C.J., the United Nations’ highest court, arguing that Israel is committing genocide, a claim Israel has denied. Ireland did not outline the argument it planned to advance, but the country’s lawmakers have made repeated calls to prioritize the protection of civilians in Gaza.

The United Nations allows countries to “intervene” in proceedings if they are parties to the United Nations’ 1948 Genocide Convention. Micheál Martin, the Republic of Ireland’s foreign minister and deputy leader, said that officials were working on a “declaration of intervention” in the case that, if approved by the Irish government, would be filed with the court, in The Hague.

“It is for the court to determine whether genocide is being committed,” Mr. Martin said on Wednesday. “But I want to be clear in reiterating what I have said many times in the last few months: What we saw on 7 October in Israel, and what we are seeing in Gaza now, represents the blatant violation of international humanitarian law on a mass scale.”

He urged Israel to call a cease-fire, and then listed a number of pressing issues, including “the purposeful withholding of humanitarian assistance to civilians,” “the targeting of civilians and of civilian infrastructure” and “the collective punishment of an entire population.”

“The list goes on,” he said. “It has to stop. The view of the international community is clear. Enough is enough.”

Irish lawmakers were among the first in Europe to call for the protection of people in Gaza last year, a reflection of Ireland’s longstanding support for Palestinian civilians , rooted in part in a shared history of British colonialism. Ireland’s own experience with a seemingly intractable and traumatic sectarian conflict — The Troubles, which came to a close with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement — has also driven that affinity.

The decision to file a declaration of intervention was made in consultation with several partners, including South Africa, Mr. Martin said. The Irish government does not plan to take a side in the dispute, the government told several Irish news outlets.

Germany in January became the first country to announce that it would intervene in the case, saying that there was “no basis whatsoever” to South Africa’s claim that Israel was committing genocide in the war. The United States has called the case meritless, and several European countries have rejected it, too.

Irish politicians have made repeated calls for Israel to prioritize the protection of civilians in Gaza over their military aims. Mr. Martin said that the intention is that its declaration would be filed once South Africa has filed its written arguments, a process that is likely to take months.

The allegation that Israel has carried out genocide in Gaza — one of the most serious crimes a country can be accused of — is particularly significant in Israel, which was founded after millions of Jewish people were murdered during the Holocaust.

The U.N. genocide convention , to which Israel is a signatory, defines the crime as one with a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.

The South African government maintains that it is pursuing its case to stop a genocide, but analysts say it is also motivated by longstanding domestic support for the Palestinian cause. Israeli leaders have said that South Africa’s allegations pervert the meaning of genocide and the purpose of the 1948 genocide convention.

Megan Specia reports on Britain, Ireland and the Ukraine war for The Times. She is based in London. More about Megan Specia

Our Coverage of the Israel-Hamas War

News and Analysis

Thousands of Israelis have taken to the streets to call for early elections to oust Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu . Many of them believe he has put his political survival  ahead of the broader interests of the Israeli people.

Israeli soldiers withdrew from Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City  after a two-week raid in which they killed around 200 Palestinians and arrested hundreds of others, the Israeli military said.

Netanyahu’s cabinet is divided about whether ultra-Orthodox Jews should retain their longstanding exemption from military service .

Internal Roil at TikTok: TikTok has been dogged for months by accusations that its app has shown a disproportionate amount of pro-Palestinian and antisemitic content to users. Some of the same tensions  have also played out inside the company.

Palestinian Detainees: Israel has imprisoned more than 9,000 Palestinians suspected of militant activity . Rights groups say that some have been abused or held without charges.

A Hostage’s Account: Amit Soussana, an Israeli lawyer, is the first former hostage to speak publicly about being sexually assaulted  during captivity in Gaza.

A Power Vacuum: Since the start of the war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has done little to address the power vacuum that would appear after Israeli forces leave Gaza. The risks of inaction are already apparent in Gaza City .

Supreme Court hears mifepristone arguments as protests gather outside: Highlights

What to know about today's hearing.

• The Supreme Court heard a challenge to the Food and Drug Administration's decisions over the past several years to increase women's access to mifepristone, a drug used in medication abortions, including making it available by mail. Many of the justices appeared to be questioning whether abortion opponents would have standing to sue over the decisions.
• A Texas-based U.S. district judge invalidated the FDA's approval of the pill last year, but an appeals court narrowed the decision to include only actions the agency has taken since 2016. Because the Supreme Court is not reviewing the FDA's initial approval of the drug, the medication will remain available in some form.
• Fourteen states completely ban abortion , including medication abortion, according to the Guttmacher Institute, a research group that supports abortion rights, while several others prohibit delivering the abortion pill by mail and require patients to see a doctor in person before they can get a prescription for it.
• About two-thirds of abortions in the United States were carried out by use of the pill in 2023, the research group says.

Abortion providers react to Supreme Court hearing

Aria Bendix

Abortion providers responded to today's oral arguments by emphasizing the safety and effectiveness of mifepristone, stressing that reduced access to the drug could threaten public health.

“The very existence of this case puts every other FDA-approved medication at risk of being taken off the market or restricted for political reasons,” Alexis McGill Johnson, CEO of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, said in a statement. 

Amy Hagstrom Miller, CEO of Whole Woman’s Health, an abortion provider with in-person clinics in four states, said her virtual clinic will continue to offer abortion pills by mail while the court considers the case.

“This cruel and baseless lawsuit is designed to intimidate and confuse Americans," Miller said in a statement. "This case is not about health and safety; it’s about power and control. Here is the truth: medication abortions are safe and effective.”

Evan Masingill, CEO of GenBioPro, the generic manufacturer of mifepristone, said Tuesday that the company “will continue to use every legal and regulatory avenue to protect access” to the drug.

New York attorney general speaks at rally for abortion pill access outside Supreme Court

New York Attorney General Letitia James joined abortion rights supporters during a protest outside the Supreme Court today.

Erin Hawley spotted outside of the Supreme Court near protesters

Diana Paulsen

Summer Concepcion

After delivering oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Erin Hawley was seen outside of the court near protesters, flanked by two bodyguards.

Anti-abortion protesters gather outside Supreme Court

Several protesters outside the Supreme Court during arguments today were calling for an end to abortion altogether.

"I hope one day we can live in a United States that is abortion-free in all 50 states," said Melanie Salazar, an anti-abortion activist who traveled from San Francisco.

Constance Becker, from Ohio, echoed that she “would love to see pills go” away.

"There are all types of people who are against abortion," Becker said. "I’m progressive. I’m a Democrat. I’m not a Republican, and I am against abortion."

Felipe Avila, communications director for the National Association of Pro-Life Nurses, said he'd like to see a requirement for in-person doctors visits for medication abortions.

"If chemical abortions are available for women, they should be safe," he said. "So we want those safeguards in place."

Supreme Court skeptical of effort to make abortion pill harder to obtain

Lawrence Hurley Supreme Court reporter

WASHINGTON — The  Supreme Court  on Tuesday appeared likely to reject a challenge to the abortion pill mifepristone, with a number of justices indicating the lawsuit should be dismissed.

The court, which has a 6-3 conservative majority, heard oral arguments on the Biden administration’s appeal of lower court rulings that restricted women’s access to the pill, including its availability by mail.

But during the arguments, there was little discussion of whether the Food and Drug Administration’s decisions to lift restrictions on the drug were unlawful.

Instead, the justices focused on whether the group of anti-abortion doctors who brought the lawsuit even had legal standing to bring the claim. The plaintiffs, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, a conservative Christian legal group, argue that the FDA failed to adequately evaluate the drug’s safety risks.

But justices probed whether the doctors could show that they were directly injured merely because they object to abortion and could be required to give emergency room treatment to a woman suffering from serious side effects.

Several justices also noted that doctors who oppose abortion can already object based on their personal beliefs to assisting patients suffering from abortion-related side effects.

“Under federal law, no doctors can be forced against their consciences to perform or assist in an abortion, correct?” conservative Justice Brett Kavanaugh asked at one point.

Read the full story here.

Sen. Josh Hawley was in court for his wife's arguments

Sen. Josh Hawley was in attendance during his wife’s arguments on behalf of the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, which is suing the FDA.

The Republican senator from Missouri and his wife, both of whom graduated from Yale Law School, met while they clerked for Chief Justice John Roberts.

Jackson repeatedly asked about the deference courts should pay the FDA

In her questioning today, Jackson repeatedly asked iterations of whether courts owe any deference to the opinion of the expert agency concerning the safety and efficacy of drugs. In her response, Hawley said the defendants are not asking the court to second-guess FDA determinations at all, but rather to look at what the FDA has said.

After Jackson said she doesn’t understand how that scope of review is not, in fact, second-guessing the FDA, Hawley pushed back, saying she didn't think that’s an accurate portrayal and that the FDA’s statements in 2016 and 2021 were “arbitrary.”

Danco lawyer pushes back against justices citing debunked scientific studies

After being questioned by Justice Alito about the potential adverse consequences of mifepristone, Ellsworth said she had “significant concerns” about justices parsing medical and scientific studies.

Ellsworth said the Texas district court’s ruling relied on an analysis of anonymous blog posts and another set of studies that have since been retracted. 

“Those sorts of errors can infect judicial analyses precisely because judges are not — they are not experts in statistics, they are not experts in the methodology used for scientific studies for clinical trials,” Ellsworth said.

The district court’s ruling cited statistics from an analysis of anonymous posts about negative abortion experiences on the website Abortion Changes You. The study’s co-author is a senior research associate at the Charlotte Lozier Institute, an anti-abortion group.

The ruling also cited two studies supported by the Charlotte Lozier Institute that claimed to find harms associated with abortion. The publisher, Sage Perspectives, retracted both studies after an independent review found the conclusions weren’t valid.

Oral arguments conclude

Today's oral arguments before the Supreme Court have ended.

Prelogar offers a rebuttal to Hawley

Rebecca Shabad is in Washington, D.C.

The solicitor general is offering a rebuttal to Hawley's argument, arguing that the doctors she represents don't have any clear harms and so the standing argument is speculative.

She also said the doctors group that Hawley represents doesn't have organizational standing and the remedy is overly broad.

Thomas, Alito bring back focus on Comstock Act

Thomas and Alito are questioning Hawley about the relevance of the Comstock Act.

Gorsuch questions a nationwide injunction

Gorsuch raised the possibility of this case turning what could be a small lawsuit into a nationwide injunction on an FDA rule or any other federal government action.

Hawley said she thinks it’s impractical to raise a conscientious objection, but that the district court remedy was appropriate under Section 705, which grants the authority for courts to issue necessary and appropriate relief.

Asked why the court can’t specify that this relief runs to the parties before the court as opposed to looking to the FDA in general, Hawley said the only availability for relief from nonregulated parties is if the court does something to the FDA order or regulation at issue.

Most of the justices, including Gorsuch and Chief Justice John Roberts, seem skeptical of her argument.

Kagan grills Hawley on conscience objections by anti-abortion doctors

Justice Elena Kagan drilled down again on the conscience objections of anti-abortion doctors Hawley represents.

Hawley said one of the doctors, for example, had to perform a surgical abortion (a D&C) because of a "life-threatening emergency."

"And did she have an opportunity to object?" Kagan asked.

"No, your honor," Hawley said. "Again, these are life-threatening situations in which the choice for a doctor is either to scrub out and try to find someone else or treat the woman."

Kagan says that most hospitals have mechanisms or routines in place "to ensure" doctors can make objections to performing certain procedures in advance.

"There's just nothing that you have there," Kagan says about Hawley's supporting arguments.

Jackson pushes Hawley on why doctors can't just refuse to treat patients

Jackson pushed Hawley on whether doctors couldn't just object to doing these procedures. Hawley argued that the emergency nature of these cases makes it impossible for doctors to lodge objections.

Jackson questioned whether the court has to "entertain your argument that no one in the world can have this drug ... in order to protect your clients."

Gorsuch followed up on Jackson's questioning, asking why this lawsuit was "turning what could be a small lawsuit into a nationwide legislative assembly on an FDA rule."

Danco lawyer presents argument

Attorney Jessica Ellsworth, who represents Danco, the manufacturer of mifepristone, argued that anti-abortion groups' view is "so inflexible it would upend not just Mifeprix, but virtually every drug approval" the FDA has made for decades.

The changes that the FDA made to the drug’s approved use in 2016 and 2021 — which made it easier to access — can't be linked to a possible harmful event in the future, Ellsworth argued.

Danco lawyer expresses concerns about judges making decisions on pharmaceuticals

Asked by Jackson whether she thinks courts have specialized scientific knowledge with respect to pharmaceuticals and if she has concerns about judges making decisions on them, Ellsworth said Danco has “significant concerns” on the matter, noting that those concerns are shared among pharmaceutical companies that depend on the FDA to approve their drugs.

As an example, Ellsworth mentioned that a district court relied on a study that was based on an analysis of anonymous blog posts and other studies that contain misleading presentations of data.

“Those sorts of errors can infect judicial analyses precisely because judges are not experts in statistics. They are not experts in the methodology used for scientific studies for clinical trials,” Ellsworth said. “That is why the FDA has many hundreds of pages of analysis in the record of what the scientific data showed, and courts are just not in a position to parse through and second-guess that.”

Hawley has begun her arguments

Erin Hawley has begun speaking. She is arguing on behalf of the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, a doctors group suing the FDA.

Thomas questions Danco lawyer about whether Comstock Act applies to company

Justice Thomas questioned Danco's lawyer, Jessica Ellsworth, about whether the Comstock Act applies to the company, as opposed to the federal government.

"How do you respond to an argument that mailing your product and advertising it would violate the Comstock Act?" Thomas asked.

Ellsworth said that FDA's charge under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is limited to looking at safety and efficacy considerations.

"FDA routinely approves drugs whose manufacture and distribution is restricted by other laws, like the Controlled Substances Act, environmental laws, customs laws and so on," she said.

Thomas said that the statute doesn't cover drugs like Mifeprex.

"We disagree that that's the correct interpretation of the statute, but we think that in order to address the correct interpretation, there would need to be a situation in which that issue was actually teed up," Ellsworth said. "This statute has not been enforced for nearly 100 years."

Sotomayor asks about the difficulty of determining risk versus need for access

Asked by Alito about some studies that suggested more frequent emergency room visits related to the use of mifepristone, Prelogar said the FDA acknowledged that as a fact but found that the visits didn’t equate to additional adverse events. She noted that many women might go to the ER because they’re experiencing heavy bleeding, which mimics a miscarriage, and want to know whether they’re having complications.

Sotomayor then asked Prelogar about the FDA’s determinations concerning safety and efficacy of mifepristone.

“Whatever the statistical increase was, FDA determined under the rim standard, that it wasn’t sufficient to create a risk that counterbalances the need for access, correct?” Sotomayor asked.

Prelogar replied that’s correct because the FDA is instructed to take into account burdens on the health care delivery system and that it reviews a variety of sources of data to make conclusions, with the burdens that were suggested were not necessary to keep restrictions in place.

Jackson focuses again on issue of standing

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson again raised the issue of standing and Prelogar repeated her argument about raising conscience objections as the remedy.

Health complications from medication abortions are rare

The standard two-pill regimen for a medication abortion — mifepristone followed by misoprostol — has a 0.4% risk of major complications . 

In very rare cases, abortion pills may cause blood clots in the uterus, heavy bleeding or infection — but, according to Planned Parenthood , the overall risks are lower than with other medications like penicillin, Tylenol or Viagra.

Misoprostol is also safe to take on its own , but it's slightly less effective than the two-drug combo and could cause more uncomfortable side effects, such as intense nausea, diarrhea, chills, vomiting or cramping.

Barrett questions possible increase in complications due to telemedicine

Justice Amy Coney Barrett questioned Prelogar on whether a lack of ultrasound before prescribing mifepristone could increase complications. Prelogar responded that even before telemedicine consultations were allowed for prescribing mifepristone, most women received the pill without one and that there was not an associated rise in complications.

Kagan asks if this is the only time a court has overridden FDA judgment

Justice Elena Kagan asked if the Texas decision was the first time a court has overridden a judgment by the FDA.

Prelogar says she thinks so and argues courts have no business making those judgments.

What is the Comstock Act?

Justice Samuel Alito just questioned Prelogar about the Comstock Act, a 151-year-old law that prevents using the mail to send "obscene" materials.

This law has been used as part of the challenge to newer FDA regulations that allow mifepristone to be mailed to patients. Parts of the bill have been repealed, but the prohibition on abortion materials being mailed still stands.

Alito asks about three changes involving mifepristone making it more dangerous when taken together

Alito asked Prelogar if three changes the government made to the access of mifepristone make the drug's risks higher when taken together. Under the new guidance, patients only need one doctor visit versus three to obtain the drug. The guidance also allows patients up to 10 weeks gestation to take the drug and they're able to access the drug by mail.

"You say that the 5th Circuit didn't give any reason to think that the three changes made in 2016 would be more dangerous in combination than they were individually. But isn't that obvious?" Alito asked. "That three things that may be innocuous or not excessively dangerous, if engaged in by themselves may become very dangerous, when they're all done together?"

Prelogar said the only way that would be true "would be if the three changes are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, guarding against the same kind of safety risk."

"So I agree that if there were a reason to think that the reason why mifepristone is safe up to 10 weeks gestation is because it's being prescribed by doctors instead of nurse practitioners, for example, then those changes would be interconnected," she said.

She added, "But there was nothing like that in this record. The studies that FDA examined instead demonstrated that these changes — and it was an exhaustive examination — were safe, not because there were other different safeguards in place to guard against risks, but rather because if you go up to 10 weeks of gestation, there is no observable increase in serious adverse events, no matter who's prescribing."

Medication abortions spiked last year

Medication abortions accounted for nearly two-thirds of all abortions in the formal U.S. health care system in 2023, according to a recent report from the Guttmacher Institute, which advocates for abortion access. That's a 30% increase since 2020, when abortion pills made up 53% of the overall total.

The provision of medications for self-managed abortions outside the formal health care system also increased in the six months after the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, according to a study published Monday. From July to December 2022, there were an additional 27,800 instances of medication being provided for self-managed abortions compared to what was expected before Roe was reversed, the researchers estimated.

Solicitor general argues conscience protections would continue to apply for individual doctors who don’t want to provide care

Prelogar said the petitioners don’t think the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) would override conscientious protections for an individual doctor. She also noted that hospitals have a series of contingency plans in place such as staffing plans.

Prelogar acknowledged that as a matter of best practices, doctors are often asked to articulate their conscientious objections in advance so that it can be taken into account.

A smaller group of anti-abortion protesters gather outside the court

The protesters outside the court are mainly supportive of abortion access, but there are smaller groups of anti-abortion protesters.

The issue of standing is first up in questioning

Questioning has begun and Justice Clarence Thomas has begun with questions about standing. Standing refers to whether or not the group challenging the law actually faces harm from it and thus can sue.

The government is arguing that the physician group suing the FDA does not have standing, saying that "their theories rely on a long chain of remote contingencies." The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine has argued that physicians could potentially be harmed if they had to treat a patient who had adverse health effects from mifepristone.

Questions from the judges then focused on who would be able to sue if these groups could not. The government had a hard time coming up with a party that would have standing in this case.

Solicitor general warns of consequences of restricting mifepristone access

Prelogar argued in her opening remarks that if the Supreme Court rules in favor of plaintiffs and, as a result, restricts access to mifepristone, it would have profoundly negative effects on people.

She said it would "severely disrupt the federal system for developing and approving drugs," adding that it would harm the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry.

"It would also inflict grave harm on women across the nation," she said. "Rolling back FDA changes would unnecessarily restrict access to mifepristone with no safety justification. Some women could be forced to undergo more invasive surgical abortions. Others might not be able to access the drug at all."

She said the court "should reject that profoundly inequitable result."

Where is medication abortion legal right now?

Danica Jefferies

Access to the two drugs involved in a medication abortion is legal in some form in 36 states and Washington, D.C., according to data from the Guttmacher Institute, a research organization that advocates for abortion access.

But 15 states limit who can prescribe medication abortions, and two states — Arizona and North Carolina — ban the mailing of abortion pills. Arizona, Nebraska, North Carolina, South Carolina and Wisconsin also require an in-person visit with a physician before the pills can be prescribed.

Oral arguments have begun, with solicitor general going first on behalf of Biden administration

Oral arguments have begun. Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar is kicking them off, arguing on behalf of the Biden administration, and is allotted 20 minutes.

Jessica L. Ellsworth, a lawyer for Danco, which manufactures the brand name version of mifepristone, Mifeprex, will go next and is allotted 10 minutes for arguments.

Erin Hawley, wife of Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., will represent the Christian legal group challenging access to mifepristone, and will have 30 minutes to deliver arguments for the respondents.

Rare all-women lineup will deliver arguments before the Supreme Court today

Notably, all lawyers arguing today in support of and against the FDA's actions to increase access to mifepristone are women — an uncommon scenario in oral arguments before the Supreme Court.

Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar will represent the FDA in support of its moves to make mifepristone more accessible. Lawyer Jessica Ellsworth will also represent drug manufacturer Danco Laboratories.

Arguing against the petitioners is Erin Hawley, the wife of Missouri Republican Sen. Josh Hawley, who is representing a group of doctors and other medical professionals opposed to the actions of the FDA on mifepristone access.

Crowds of protesters gather outside court, mainly in support of abortion rights

Laura Jarrett

Different pockets of rallies formed outside the Supreme Court building. Most appeared to be in favor of abortion rights, chanting over megaphones, but there are smaller groups of people with signs protesting against “chemical abortions” as well. The energy outside of the courthouse is vibrant. There has been a huge turnout with some people even sleeping on the sidewalks in line as early as yesterday morning.

Biden campaign blames Trump for potential abortion medication restrictions

Nnamdi Egwuonwu

Megan Lebowitz

In advance of today's Supreme Court arguments, the Biden campaign pointed the finger at former President Donald Trump for the potential restrictions.

"This case could strip away access to medication abortion everywhere in this country," said Biden campaign manager Julie Chavez Rodriguez during a press call yesterday. "It would be the biggest step towards Donald Trump’s ultimate goal of a nationwide abortion ban since Roe was overturned."

Sen. Elizabeth Warren, who's also a member of the Biden campaign national advisory board, said the case before the Supreme Court is about Trump and the GOP pushing closer to a national abortion ban, rather than about the safety or efficacy of medication abortion.

"Donald Trump and MAGA Republicans are prepared to use every tool in their toolbox to control women’s bodies, banning abortion nationwide, ending access to IVF and even attacking contraception access," Warren, D-Mass., said on the call.

Lawyer for doctors' group played key role in Dobbs decision

Erin Hawley, who is representing the group suing the FDA, is senior counsel at the Alliance Defending Freedom, a conservative legal group that represents petitioners in many case against abortion. Hawley wrote briefs for the state of Mississippi in the Dobbs case, which overturned Roe v. Wade.

Hawley met her husband, Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., while they were both clerks for Chief Justice John Roberts, who concurred with the majority opinion of Dobbs but stopped short of also reaching the decision to overturn Roe.

Abortion pill case could spark challenges to IVF, birth control

Vaccines, birth control pills, hormone therapies and fertility drugs would be subject to new litigation if the Supreme Court endorses a challenge to the abortion pill mifepristone, pharmaceutical industry experts warn.

When the court today weighs whether to roll back FDA findings that made mifepristone more readily available, it is not just access to that particular drug, used for the majority of abortions nationwide, that is on the line.

The pharmaceutical industry has raised the alarm, telling both the justices in court filings and anyone else who will listen that giving individual federal judges the power to cast aside the agency’s scientific health and safety findings would cause chaos within the sector. It would likely lead to litigation over other drugs, both current and those yet to be approved, on which people have strong feelings.

Will justices seize on the Comstock Act?

In response to the 2021 decision to allow mifepristone to be sent by mail, anti-abortion advocates have seized on a hitherto obscure 19th-century law called the Comstock Act, which prohibits the mailing of any drug or medicine that can be used for abortion. They argue that the Comstock Act should be taken into account in assessing the FDA’s decision to dispense with in-person visits.

When the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the issue, one of the judges wrote that the FDA decision violated the Comstock Act, but the decision by the three-judge panel did not rely on that finding.

The FDA in court papers described it as a “doubly flawed” argument, arguing that the law was only intended to prohibit drugs that would lead to an “unlawful abortion,” not abortions that are lawful. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion in December 2022 that supports the Biden administration’s position.

Justices could decide the case without addressing FDA authority

The Supreme Court could rule for the government, leaving in place the current approvals for mifepristone, without deciding the knotty legal issues about the FDA approval process.

The government has argued strenuously that the doctors and others who filed the lawsuit do not have legal standing because they cannot show any injury that can be traced to the FDA’s decisions.

If the court were to adopt that argument, it could simply rule that the lawsuit should be dismissed.

The doctors themselves do not prescribe mifepristone, but they argue they are injured because they could be required to treat patients who have taken the pill and have serious side effects. As they oppose abortion, any actions they are forced to take to help a woman complete the process would make them complicit, the plaintiffs argued in court papers .

The FDA’s lawyers wrote in the government’s brief that the plaintiffs can at best point at a “hypothetical scenario,” which is not enough to establish standing.

The challengers, the brief stated, “cannot identify even a single case where any of their members has been forced to provide such care.”

Challengers say FDA decisions were 'arbitrary and capricious'

The challengers — doctors and other medical professionals who oppose abortion — argue that the FDA failed to sufficiently take into account safety concerns when the restrictions on mifepristone, including the requirement that the patient have an in-person visit with a doctor, were lifted.

Among other things, they note that the FDA conceded there would be an increase in emergency room visits by women suffering side effects as a result of the pill being made available by mail. As a result, the government acted in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner in violation of a law called the Administrative Procedure Act, the plaintiffs argue.

The FDA said in court papers that its actions were “supported by an exhausting review of a record including dozens of scientific studies and decades of safe use of mifepristone by millions of women.”

Doctors and patient advocates fear restricted access to abortion pill

Berkeley Lovelace Jr.

About two years after the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, the court today will revisit the issue of reproductive rights, this time contemplating whether to limit access to mifepristone, the first of two pills used in medication abortion.

Ahead of oral arguments and eventual ruling, doctors and patient advocates are expressing alarm about what might happen if the high court decides to tighten access to the drug.

Protests and rallies are being held for and against access to mifepristone

Ahead of the oral arguments, the pro-abortion group Women's March and the Center for Popular Democracy are protesting against the challenge to access with a march to the Supreme Court at 8 a.m.

Students for Life of America, an anti-abortion youth group, will also hold a rally at 8 a.m. in front of the Supreme Court.

At 9 a.m., more than two dozen reproductive and civil rights groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union, will bus in abortion advocates and providers to hold a protest on the steps of the Supreme Court.

Elsewhere, Students for Life of America will join the Pro-Life Action League in a rally at Walgreens headquarters outside Chicago at 12:30 p.m. to protest against the drugstore chain's decision to sell the pill.

What is at stake in abortion pill case?

The Supreme Court is weighing decisions made by the FDA from 2016 onward that lifted restrictions on mifepristone, including one that made it available by mail.

The court is not reviewing the original 2000 decision to approve the drug, which the plaintiffs had challenged in lower courts. Whatever the justices rule, the drug will remain available in some form.

In addition to the decision to make mifepristone available by mail, the court will also consider decisions in 2016 to extend the window in which mifepristone could be used to terminate pregnancies from seven weeks’ gestation to 10 weeks and reduce the number of in-person visits for patients from three to one. In another 2016 move, the FDA altered the dosing regimen, finding that a lower dose of mifepristone was sufficient.

• International

Supreme Court hears oral arguments on major abortion pill case

By Devan Cole , Tierney Sneed and Jen Christensen , CNN

Takeaways from the oral arguments

From CNN's Devan Cole, Jen Christensen, Tierney Sneed and Dan Berman

Justices overall appeared skeptical of the challengers of the FDA's approval of and regulations governing mifepristone, a drug used for medication abortions.

With the caveat that anything can happen, here are the key takeaways from oral arguments:

• Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Neil Gorsuch tore into the challengers’ attorney over the  impact  caused by the lawsuit, suggesting a nationwide injunction was unnecessary.
• Conservative Justice Brett Kavanaugh asked whether federal law provides some protections for doctors who object to providing an abortion on moral and religious grounds – a sign that he may not be convinced that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate any injury to them stemming from the agency’s regulations.
• Justice Samuel Alito, who wrote the opinion reversing Roe v. Wade, and fellow ardent abortion opponent Justice Clarence Thomas, pushed the question of whether anyone can actually challenge the FDA on drug approvals. The FDA wants to be “infallible,” Alito said at one point.
• Alito said that a long-unenforced law, the Comstock Act, banning the mailing of drugs used for abortions was not “obscure” but rather a “prominent” law. Some anti-abortion activists  see the law as an avenue to end medication abortion,  and perhaps all kinds of abortions.
• That the challenge to mifepristone reached the Supreme Court in such a short amount of time was no accident – a result of the “judge-shopping” phenomenon seen recently on major political issues including health care, firearms and abortion.

Read more on the takeaways here .

"Silence" is expected: What it was like inside the courtroom

From CNN's Jalen Beckford

CNN News Associate Jalen Beckford attended oral arguments at the Supreme Court for the first time. Here are his observations:

Upon arrival at the Supreme Court, members of the press and onlookers were greeted by abortion rights groups marching outside the high court.

“My body, my choice!” they shouted as oral arguments in the case over access to the abortion pill mifepristone were soon underway. 

The courtroom was a stark contrast to the commotion of the protests outside. 

Inside the court, "silence" is expected. In the section designated for press, no phones or laptops are allowed, and most reporters resorted to the more traditional pen and pad for their notes. 

I watched as seasoned reporters took notes while holding on to every word uttered by the justices, hoping to get an early prediction of what the court would ultimately decide. Nearly two years after the landmark Dobbs decision that overturned Roe v. Wade, I could feel the weight that this case would have in the national debate over abortion rights. 

Sitting next to me, I saw as a courtroom artist caught every detail of the justices and the historical room, making sure to include the red curtains draped behind them and the large columns surrounding the room.

Although reporters are allowed to leave during the hearing, most stayed put as Elizabeth Prelogar argued on behalf of the FDA, Jessica Ellsworth for Danco Laboratories, and Erin Hawley for the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. We all watched intently as they fielded questions from the justices regarding their arguments, often interrupted if they didn’t truly answer the question. 

Once we were dismissed, I noticed the crowd seemed to have grown outside the court. I saw signs that read “Bans Off Our Bodies,” and New York Attorney General Letitia James among the onlookers and in support of the protests. 

As organizers stood on the steps of the court, reiterating how consequential a decision would be, their words rang as far as the Capitol.

Justices asked an unusual amount of detailed medical questions

From CNN's Jen Christensen

Several justices asked questions beyond the law during oral arguments, seeking detailed answers about medical procedures and practices related to reproductive care and mifepristone, one of two drugs used in medication abortion.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson sought more information on how often doctors might need to perform emergency procedures for a patient who had taken drugs for a medication abortion, even if the physicians object to abortion.

“It’s my understanding that sometimes, the completion, it doesn’t involve surgical intervention. Do you have a sense of how often?” the liberal justice asked.

Jackson also asked Erin Hawley, an attorney representing the abortion pill’s challengers, how close a doctor might need to be to a procedure they object to in order to be “complicit.”

“Like I — I work in the emergency room and this is going on? I’m handing them a water bottle? I’m — like, what do you mean complicit in the process?” Jackson asked.

At another point, conservative Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked about a dilation and curettage, or D&C, the procedure to remove tissue from the uterus, and noted it did not necessarily mean that a doctor was removing a living embryo, since a D&C can happen after a miscarriage. She also asked specific medical questions about the need for tissue to be removed if an abortion wasn’t complete after a medication.

Barrett also pressed whether the elimination of in-person visits to provide mifepristone — a step the FDA ended in 2023 — would “lead to mistakes in gestational aging, which could increase the need for a D&C or the amount of bleeding.”

Medication abortion is available only through the first 10 weeks of pregnancy. Under current regulations, while a person does not need to see a provider in person to receive drugs for a medication abortion, providers still must be available to assess gestational age and whether someone may have an ectopic pregnancy. Most medication abortions occur without an ultrasound.

Analysis: Why Gorsuch is bringing up the increase of nationwide injunctions

From CNN Supreme Court analyst Steve Vladeck

Steve Vladeck, CNN Supreme Court analyst and professor at the University of Texas School of Law, has this to say about the injunction discussion:

"One of the issues lurking in this case, and several other before the Court this term, is the uptick in what Justice Neil Gorsuch calls 'universal' injunctions—court orders that block state or federal policies as applied to anyone based solely on a claimed injury to a small handful of individuals.

We've seen these kinds of injunctions become much more prevalent over the past decade—against both Republican and Democratic policies. And although the Court has yet to rein them in directly, Justice Gorsuch has, as he did in today's arguments, repeatedly suggested that the justices ought to do so.

At the very least, the question of when policies should be blocked on a statewide or nationwide basis because a handful of citizens object to them is an issue that should get more discussion—not just from the courts, but from Congress, which has, to this point, been unwilling to provide more guidance for when these kinds of orders should and should not be allowed."​​

Oral arguments in abortion pill case conclude

From CNN's Devan Cole

Oral arguments have concluded in a major Supreme Court case over access to the commonly used abortion drug mifepristone.

The nine justices heard arguments from three separate attorneys for more than an hour Tuesday morning. A decision in the case is expected by the end of June or early July.

Roberts and Gorsuch ask why a nationwide ban is needed

Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Neil Gorsuch have peppered the attorney for the abortion pill challengers why her clients were seeking a nationwide relief in the case as opposed to a narrower remedy that would apply only to the plaintiff doctors.

“Why can't the court specify that this relief runs to precisely the parties before the court as opposed to looking to the agency in general and saying agency you can't do this anywhere?” Roberts asked the attorney, Erin Hawley.

For his part, Gorsuch told Hawley that he went back “and looked and there are exactly zero universal injunctions that were issued during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 12 years in office.”

“And over the last four years or so, the number is something like 60 and maybe more than that,” he continued.

After Alito suggests FDA wants to be "infallible," Jackson wonders: can courts really be the experts then?

From CNN's Tierney Sneed

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson flipped a question from Justice Samuel Alito on its head to give the US Food and Drug Administration's defenders an opportunity to argue that the agency is better suited to make calls on medical science than the courts.

Alito had suggested that, according to the arguments of the administration and mifepristone manufacturer, the FDA would be “infallible” to any skepticism of its approach.

Jackson returned to the question while Danco’s attorney, Jessica Ellsworth, was arguing, and asked Ellsworth her concerns about judges “parsing” medical and scientific studies.

Ellsworth pointed to some of the questionable types of “misleading” assertions the lower courts used to justify their second guessing of the agency, including a blog post analyzing anonymous anecdotes and studies that have since been retractions.

How FDA’s regulations around mifepristone have changed

From CNN's Jamie Gumbrecht

Congress gave the US Food and Drug Administration the authority to regulate drugs more than 60 years ago, and in 1962 it was also given the authority to require that drug companies prove that the drugs are effective. Mifepristone, one of the drugs used in medication abortion in the US, was initially approved in 2000, but regulations around its use have shifted since then.

For a medicine to be approved by the the FDA, drugmakers needs to meet rigorous standards that show that the drug is safe and effective. They do this through data from lab, pre-clinical and clinical studies.

Here's a timeline of FDA's regulations around mifepristone:

2000:  Initially, mifepristone was approved for medical termination of pregnancy with several restrictions. It could only be prescribed through seven weeks of gestation and only doctors could prescribe it in-person.

2016:  The FDA expanded the use of mifepristone after Danco Laboratories, the drug’s sponsor, submitted additional materials to change the way the drug could be used. The FDA took a closer look at 16 years of data on mifepristone use and took into account the way it was prescribed in other countries, as well as professional organization guidelines. Using data from 20 additional studies that looked at the safety and effectiveness of the drug, the FDA allowed clinicians to prescribe the medicine up to 10 weeks of pregnancy.

2021:  Due to the Covid-19 pandemic along with studies looking at the effectiveness and safety of telehealth, the FDA eliminated the in-person dispensing requirement. After additional review of the available safety and effectiveness data, and based on the experience of millions of people who used the drug, the FDA made that change permanent in 2023 and eliminated the in-person dispensing requirement.

Attorney for abortion foes urges justices to restore restrictions around mifepristone

Erin Hawley, an attorney representing the abortion pill’s challengers, told the justices that they should undo the the US Food and Drug Administration's moves in recent years to ease restrictions around the drug, arguing those decisions ran afoul of federal law.

“FDA’s outsourcing of abortion drug harm to respondent doctors forces them to choose between helping a woman with a life-threatening condition and violating their conscience,” she added later.

Hawley is a senior counsel at Alliance Defending Freedom, a conservative advocacy group. She was a law clerk to Chief Justice John Roberts during the same term as her now-husband, Republican Sen. Josh Hawley from Missouri. An experienced advocate who has specialized in anti-abortion litigation, the mifepristone case will mark Hawley’s first appearance at the Supreme Court lectern.

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